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PHILOSOPHY.

THE SELF-EVIDENT. DAVID NEWPORT.

THE UNIFICATION OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY. M. C. O'BYRNE.

THE ASSAY OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. EDITOR.

FRIEND David Newport contributes to No. 73 of THE OPEN COURT a forcible article discussing "The Self-Evident." Mr. Newport's treatment is marked by a theological tendency, and the points wherein the philosophy of THE OPEN COURT differs from the theology of the author are touched upon in the editorial note, "The Assay of Abstract Ideas." Mr. O'Byrne's article, in the same number, is a scholarly sketch of principles whereon to base the unification of the truths of religion and philosophy.

SENSATION AND MEMORY. EDITOR.....No. 74.

COGNITION, KNOWLEDGE, AND TRUTH. EDITOR..No. 76.

IN these two discussions, the conditions and processes by which we start from the bare excitations of the sensory world and attain to knowledge, are unfolded. Sensation is the primal condition of all knowledge; the products of sensation are preserved and transmitted as psychological forms; the physchological law of this retentive power is memory, from which source are evolved the different branches and varied forms of human thought.

AXIOMS THE BASIS OF MATHEMATICS. DR. EDWARD BROOKS.....No. 76.

THE OLD AND THE NEW MATHEMATICS. EDITOR. No. 77.

A FLAW IN THE FOUNDATION OF GEOMETRY. HERMANN GRASSMANN.....No. 77.

IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal; the relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW.....No. 73.

SYMPTOMS OF SOCIAL DEGENERACY. MONCURE D. CONWAY.....No. 74.

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A GENERATION WITHOUT PROSPECTS. MORRISON I. SWIFT.....No 72.

WHEELBARROW opposes Mr. Henry George and the doctrine of Land Taxation with proper regard for the truth contained in the distinguished economist's theories. Objection is mainly taken to the universal curative power which the advocates of Land Taxation claim for their remedy. In man's obedience to moral laws Wheelbarrow finds the only magic wherewith to change the face of society.

"Symptoms of Social Degeneracy," Mr. Moncure D. Conway, finds to be not unfrequent even in American civilization. We are prone to emphasize the survivals of barbaric institutions in effete Europe, while overlooking the excresences of our own body politic. Lynch-Law, literary piracy, corruption in administrative circles, are signs of the decay of an ethical system and the theology that protects it. Worst of all, these evils are not unaccompanied with attempts at palliation.

ESSAYS AND CRITICISM.

THE ETHICS OF ROBERT BURNS. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....No. 75.

TRUTH AND FICTION. M. WILHELM MEYER...No. 76.

"IN ease, fire, and passion," says Allan Cunningham, "Burns was second to none but Shakespeare." "He might have added," says Gen. Trumbull, "that as a lyric poet, as a national song writer, he was not excelled nor equalled by Shakespeare, nor by any other poet that was ever born. Burns had the divine gift of music in such excellence that he could put in tune all the different instruments of the great orchestra of man and force them all to vibrate in harmony."

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THE STUDY OF SANSKRIT.*

BY H. OLDENBERG.

The study of Sanskrit, the science of the antiquities of India, is about a century old. It was in the year 1784 that a number of men acting in Calcutta as judges or administrative officers of the East India Company, formed themselves into a scientific society, the Asiatic Society. We may say that the founding of the Asiatic Society was contemporaneous with the rise of a new branch of historical inquiry, the possibility of which preceding generations had barely or never thought of.

Englishmen began the work; soon it was taken up by other nations; and in the course of time, in a much greater degree than is the case with the study of hieroglyphic and cuneiform inscriptions, it has become ever more distinctly a branch of inquiry peculiarly German.

The little band of workers who are busy in the workshops of this department of science, have not been accustomed to have the eyes of other men turned upon their doings—their successes and failures. But, in spite, nay, rather in consequence of this, it is right that an attempt should be made to invite even the most disinterested to an inspection of these places of industry, and to point out and show to them, piece by piece, the work, or at least part of the work, that has been done in them.

There still lies formless in the workshops of this department of inquiry many a block of unhewn stone, which perhaps will forever resist the shaping hand. But still, under the active chisel, many a form has become visible, from whose features distant times and the past life of a strange people look down upon us—a people who are related to us, yet whose ways are so far removed in every respect from our ways.

We shall first cast a glance at the beginning of Indian research toward the close of the last century. We shall trace the way in which the new science, after the first hasty survey of its territory, at once concentrated its efforts to a more profound investigation of its subject and advanced to an incomparably broader plane of study. We shall, above all, follow the difficult course pursued in the study of the Veda, the most important of the literary remains of ancient India, a production with which even the works of the oldest Buddhism are not to be compared in point of historical importance. Of the problems that this science encountered, of its aspirations, and of the successes that attended its efforts in solving difficult questions, we may venture to give a description, or at least an outline.

* * *

The first effective impulse to the study of Sanskrit and Sanskrit literature was given by Sir. William Jones, who, in 1783, embarked for India to assume the post of Judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William. The honor of having inaugurated a new era of philological inquiry, was heightened by the lustre and charm of personal character which this gifted and versatile man exerted upon his contemporaries. In prose and in verse Jones is extolled by his friends of both sexes as the phœnix of his time, "the most enlightened of the sons of men"—encomiums many of which a calmer and more distant observer would be inclined to modify. The correspondence and other memoranda of Jones, which exist in great abundance,* furnish the reader of to-day rather the picture of an indefatigable and euphuistic *dilettante* than that of an earnest investigator,—apart from the fact that he was alike sadly deficient in discernment and zeal.

As a young man we find Jones engaged in reading and reproducing in English verse, the works of Persian and Arabian poets; occasionally also with glimpses into Chinese literature. Then, again, a project of his own, an heroic epic—a sort of new Æneid, for which, and certainly with ingenuity enough, the Phœnician mythological deities were impressed into service—was to celebrate the perfections of the English constitution. On the journey to India this man of thirty-seven sketched a catalogue of the works, which, God granting him life, he hoped to write after celebrated models. These models were carefully designated opposite the separate projects of the outline. By the side of this heroic epic (after the pattern of Homer), we find a history of the war with America (after the patterns of Thucydides and Polybius), a philosophical and historical dialogue (after the pattern of Plato), and other plans of similar works.

* Translated from the *Deutsche Rundschau.*

* Edited by his biographer, Lord Teignmouth, and often given with more completeness than appears advisable considering the panegyrical character of the biography.

With this feeling of omnipotent self-assurance, wholly untroubled with doubts, Jones was placed in India before the task of opening a way into the gigantic masses of an unknown literature, of a strange and beautiful poetry. He was as well qualified for the purpose (perhaps in a higher degree so) as many a more earnest and gifted scholar might have been.

The situation of affairs which he found in India forced it upon the European rulers of the land as a duty, to acquaint themselves with the Sanskrit language and its literature. The rapid extension and at the same time the redoubled activity of the English rule made it inconceivable that the existence of the old, indigenous civilization, and literature of the nation could long remain ignored or merely superficially recognized.

Preëminently did this necessity assert itself in the administration of justice, where the policy of the East India Company imperatively demanded that the natives should be suffered to retain as many of their laws and customs as it were possible to concede them. Already, in an act of parliament passed in 1772 in regard to the affairs of the company, a measure had been incorporated, at the suggestion of Warren Hastings, providing that Mohammedan and Indian lawyers should take part in court proceedings, in order to give effect to native laws and assist in the formulation of judgments. The dependence that thus resulted, of European judges upon the reliability or unreliability of Indian pandits, must have been trying indeed, to the conscientious jurist; for the assertions of Indian councillors as to the principles of the Law of inheritance, contract, etc., contained in the native books, were subject to no control.

Warren Hastings, in order to obviate the difficulty, had a digest made by several Brahmanical jurisconsults from the old Sanskrit law books, and this was translated into English. The undertaking had but little success, principally because no European was to be found who could translate directly from the Sanskrit. A translation had first to be made from Sanskrit into Persian and from Persian again into English.* The necessity therefore of gaining direct access to the Sanskrit language was unquestionable. The undertaking was not an easy one, though it was still quite different from such apparently impossible feats of philological ingenuity as the deciphering of hieroglyphic and cuneiform inscriptions.

The knowledge and likewise the use of Sanskrit in India had lived on in unbroken tradition.† There were countless pandits who knew Sanskrit as well as the scholars of the Middle Ages knew Latin, and who were eminently competent to teach the language. It was easy to overcome the opposing Brahmanical prejudices. To become master, however, of the obstacles which emanated from the indescribably intricate and perverted grammatical system* of the Hindus, offered greater difficulties, which could be only overcome by patience and enthusiasm.

Just at the first moments of this trouble came the arrival of Sir William Jones in India. Immediately he was the central figure. From him came the founding of the Asiatic Society; from him, the impulse to a new revision of the Hindu law of contract and inheritance, this time undertaken on a surer basis. He assembled about him competent Brahmans versed in Sanskrit. In the year 1790 he wrote: "Every day I talk Sanskrit with the pandits; I hope before I leave India to understand it as I understand Latin."

It was not now a question of research, but of acquisition, of study; that clear and satisfactory results might rapidly be acquired, and that a proper selection of noteworthy productions of the Hindu mind might be made and presented before the eyes of all. Jones translated the most delightful of all Hindu dramas, the story of the touching fate of the penitent maiden, Sakuntala, who, in the sylvan quiet of her retreat was seen and loved by the kingly hunter, Dushjanta. This work, full of the most delicate sentiment, exhaling fragrance like the summer splendor of Indian Nature, was sung in his delicate rhythms by Kalidasa, of inspired eloquence.†

Still more important than the version of Sakuntala was the publication of a second great work, which Jones translated, the *Laws of Manu.* It seemed as though a Lycurgus of a primitive oriental era had come to light; for this wonderful picture of a strange people's life was ascribed to the remotest antiquity—a description of Brahmanical rule by the grace of Brahma, magnified and distorted by priestly pride, in which the people are nothing, the prince is little, the priest is everything. In the face of such an abruptly accumulated mass of unexpected revelations, respecting an ancient civilization hitherto removed from all knowledge, how could one resist an attempt to give to that civilization and its language a place among known civilizations and languages? Wherever the eye turned weighty and pregnant suggestions offered themselves,

*Published in 1776, under the title, "A Code of Gentoo Law."

†This is the case at the present time. Compare, upon this point, Max Müller's "India what can it teach us" p. 78 et seq.

*The original complaint of Paulinus a S. Bartholomaeo, a missionary in India about the time of Jones, is well known.—"The devil, with a phenomenal display of ingenuity and craft, had incited the Brahmanical sages to invent a language so rich and so complex, that its mysteries might be concealed not only from the people at large, but even from the very scholars who were conversant with it."

†It was formerly thought, for reasons that have not withstood the assault of criticism, that Kalidasa flourished in the first century before Christ; it was the custom to compare him to the Roman poets of the Augustan era, whose contemporaries he in that event would about have been. In point of fact he must be assigned to an era several centuries later,—about the sixth century after Christ.

and with them the temptation to let fancy stray in aimless sallies. What is more, Jones was in no wise the man to resist such a temptation. The vocabulary and the grammatical structure of Sanskrit convinced him that the ancient language of the Hindus was related to those of the Greeks, Romans, and Germans, that it must have been derived with them from a common mother tongue.* But side by side with the conception of this incomparably suggestive idea, innumerable fanciful theories abound in the works of Jones, concerning the relationship of the primitive peoples, where everything was found to be in some way related to everything else. Now the Hindu tongue was identified with that of the Old Testament; now Hindu civilization was brought into connection with South American civilization. Buddha was said to be Woden; and the pyramids and sphinxes of Egypt were claimed to show the style of the same workmen who built the Hindu cave-temples and chiseled the ancient images of Buddha.

Fortunately for the new study of Sanskrit, the continuation of the work begun by Jones fell to one of the most cautious and comprehensive observer of facts that have ever devoted their attention and talent to the study of oriental literatures. This was Henry Thomas Colebrooke (born 1765; went to India 1782), the most active in the active band of Indian administrative officers. He officiated first as an officer of the government, and afterwards as judge, then as diplomatist—a man well versed in Indian agriculture and Indian trade. One can scarcely regard without astonishment the multitude of disclosures which, during the long period he devoted to Sanskrit, he was able to make from his incomparable collection of manuscripts. These to-day are among the principle treasures of the India Office Library. From the province of Indian poetry, Colebrooke, who well knew the limits of his own power, kept aloof. But in the literature of law, grammar, philosophy, and astronomy, he had a wide reading, which in scope may never again be reached. He it was who made the first comprehensive disclosure in regard to the literature of the Veda.

Colebrooke's investigations are poor in hypotheses; we may say he withheld too much from seeking to comprehend the historical genesis of the subjects with which he dealt. But he established the actual foundation of broad provinces of Hindu research. He himself was filled with wonder at the ever impenetrable vistas of that literature which were revealed, and our own wonder is increased by the sure and patient toil with which he sought to penetrate into those distant parts.

While Colebrooke was at the height of his activity, interest in Hindu inquiry began to be awakened in a country which has done more than any other land to make of Hindu research a firm and well-established science—in Germany.

For the discoveries of Jones and Colebrooke there could have been no more receptive soil than the Germany of that time, full of spirited interest in the old national poetry of all nations and occupied with the stirring movements rife in its own philosophy and literature. Apparently, indeed, the latter were closely allied to the spirit of the distant Hindu literature; for here too oriental romanticism and poetical thought sought no less boldly than the absolute philosophy of Germany, to penetrate to the primal and formless source of all forms. From the beginning, poets stood in the foremost ranks among the Sanskritists of Germany; for instance, the two Schlegels and Friederich Rückert, and beside these, careful and unassuming, the great founder of grammatical science, Franz Bopp.

In the year 1808 appeared Friedrich Schlegel's work, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder* (The Language and Learning of the Hindus). From what was known to him of Hindu poetry and speculation, and according to his own ideas of the laws and aims of human inquiry, Schlegel, with a warm and fanciful eloquence, drew a picture of India as a land of exalted primitive wisdom. Hindu religion and Hindu poetry he described as replete with exuberant power and light, in comparison with which even the noblest philosophy and poetry of Greece was but a feeble spark. The time from which the masterpieces of the Hindus dated, appeared to him a distant, gigantic, primeval age of spiritual culture. There was the home of those earnest teachings, full of gloomy tragedy, of the soul's migration, and of the dark fate which ordains for all beings their ways and their end:

> "Obedient to this purpose set, they wander; from God to plants;
> Here, in the abhorred world of existence, that ever moves to destruction."

While Schlegel gave to the world this fanciful picture of Hindu wisdom, highly effective from its prophetic perspectives, but still wanting in sober truth, Bopp applied himself, more unassumingly, but with an incomparably deeper grasp and patient sagacity, to investigating the grammatical structure of Sanskrit; and, on the recognized fact of the relationship of this language with the Persian and the principal European tongues, to establishing the science of comparative grammar. In the year 1816 appeared his *Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen, und germanischen Sprache* (Conjugational System of the Sanskrit Language in Comparison with that

*The identity of Hindu words with those of Latin, Greek, and other languages had been noticed by several before Jones, and likewise the correct explanation of this phenomenon, namely the kinship of the Hindu nation with the Latins and Greeks, had been declared by Father Pons as early af 1740. For fuller account, see Benfey, "History of the Science of Language," (*Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*) pp. 222, 333-341.

of the Greek, Latin, Persian, and Teutonic Languages).

This was no longer merely an attempt to find individual similarities in the sounds of words of the related languages, but an attempt to trace back not only uniformities but also differences to their fixed laws; and thus in the life and growth of these languages, as they sprang from a common root and evolved themselves into a rich complexity, to discover more and more the traces of a necessity dominated by definite principles.

We can here only briefly touch upon the investigations made during the last seventy years, for which Bopp laid the foundation by the publication of his work. Rarely have such astonishing results been achieved by science as here. Elucidative of the early history of the languages of Homer and the old Italian monuments before they acquired the form in which we now find them written, the most unexpected witnesses were brought to give testimony; namely, the languages of the Hindus, the Germans, the Slavs, and the Celts. Of these related tongues, the one sheds light upon the obscure features of the others, just as natural history explains the stunted organs of some animals by pointing out the same organs in their original, perfect form, in other animals.

The picture of the mother tongue, whose filial descendants are the languages of our linguistic family, was no longer seen in merely vague or doubtful features. The laws under whose dominion the system of sounds and forms in the separate, derived languages have been developed from the mother tongue, are being ascertained ever more fully and formulated ever more sharply.

From the very beginning the essential instrument, yes, the very foundation of this investigation, was the Sanskrit language. In the beginning, faith in the primitiveness of Sanskrit in comparison with the related languages was too strong. During the last few years, however, this erroneous conception has been fully rectified; and this in itself is a decided step in advance. We know now that the apparently simpler and clearer state of Sanskrit in sounds and forms is in many respects less primitive than the complicated relations of other languages, *e. g.*, the Greek; and that we must often set out from these languages rather than from the Sanskrit, in order to make possible the explanation of Sanskrit forms. Thus Sanskrit now receives back the light which it has furnished for the historical understanding of the European languages.*

I must not attempt to follow in detail the course which the science of comparative grammar, apart from its connection with Hindu research, has taken. While the two branches of the study were rapidly advanced by Germans particularly, and likewise in France by the sagacious Bernouf, new material kept pouring in from India no less rapidly. In two countries on the outskirts of Indian civilization, in the Himalayan valleys of Nepal, and in Ceylon, the sacred literature of the Buddhists, which had disappeared in India proper, was brought to light in two collections, one in Sanskrit and one in the popular dialect Pali. The ingenuity of Prinseps succeeded in deciphering the oldest Indian written characters on inscriptions and coins. In Calcutta was undertaken and completed in thirty years the publication of the *Mahabharata*, a gigantic heroic poem of almost a hundred thousand couplets, in whose vast cantos with their labyrinth of episodes and sub-episodes many generations of poets have brought together legends of the heroes and days of the olden time, of their struggles and tribulations.

The sum and substance of all this newly-acquired knowledge has been incorporated in the great work of a Norwegian, who became, in Germany, a German—in the *Indische Alterthumskunde* (Hindu Antiquities) of Christian Lassen.

Lassen did not belong to the great pioneers of science, like Bopp. It must also be said that often that sagacity of philological thought is wanting in him, which sheds light on questions even where it affords no definite solution of them. And, indeed, was it not a herculean undertaking, a work like that of the Danaides, to explore the older periods of the Hindu past when, as the chief sources of information, one was solely limited to the great epic, and the law book of Manu? Even a surer critical power than Lassen possessed could not have discovered much of history in the nebulous confusion of legends, in the invented se-

* It may be permissible here to illustrate this reversion of methods in a single point that has become of especially great importance to grammar. The Greek has five short vowels, *a*, *e*, *o*, *i*, *u*. The Sanskrit has *i* and *u* corresponding to *i* and *u*; but to the three sounds, *a*, *e*, *o* corresponds in Sanskrit only a single vowel *a*. Thus, for example, the Greek *apo* (English, *from*) reads in Sanskrit *apa;* the *a* of the first syllable, and the *o* of the second syllable of the Greek word is thus represented in Sanskrit by *a*. Or, to use another example, the Greek *menos* (English, *courage*) is in Sanskrit *manas;* Greek *epheron* (I carried)—*abharam*. What now is the original, *i. e.*, what existed in the Indo-Germanic mother tongue for the three sounds of the Greek *a*, *e*, *o*, or the single sound of the Sanskrit *a?* When scholars began to study comparative philology and to dissect Sanskrit forms they thought the *a*—and this was a conclusion apparently supported by the simplicity of the language—to be alone the original sound; and were led to believe that this vowel was later divided on European soil into three sounds, *a*, *e*, *o*. Investigations of the most recent time—and for these we are to thank Amelung, Burgman, John Schmidt, and others—have shown that the development of the vowel system took the opposite course. The vowels *a*, *e*, *o* were already in the Indo-Germanic mother tongue; and in Sanskrit, or more accurately, before the time of Sanskrit, in the language which the ancestors of the Indians and Persians spoke when both formed *one* people, these vowels were merged into a single vowel Thus the *e* of *esti* and the *o* of *apo* are more original than the *a* of *asti*, *apa*.

Now, we find in Sanskrit that where the Greek *e* corresponds to the Sanskrit *a*, certain consonants preceding this vowel, as, *e.g.*, *k*, are affected in a different way by the latter, than in instances where for the *a* of Sanskrit the Greek *a* or *o* is used. From the linguistic form of Sanskrit alone, which in the one case as in the other has *a*, it would not be intelligible why the *k* should each time meet a different fate. The Greek, in that it has preserved the original differences of the vowels, gives the key to an understanding of the peculiar transformations which have taken place in the *k*-sound in large and important groups of Sanskrit words.

ries of kings in *Mahabharata*, and in that colorless uniformity which the style of the Hindu Virgils spreads unchangeably over the enormous periods of time of which they assume to inform us. In spite of this, Lassen's *Antiquities*—the work of tireless diligence and rare learning—stands as a landmark in the history of Hindu investigations, uniting all the results of past time, and pointing out anew, by the very things in which it is lacking, still untried undertakings.

Just at this time, however, when the first volume of Lassen's work, treating of the earliest periods, appeared, came the beginning of a movement which has severed the development of Hindu studies into two parts. New personalities appeared upon the scene and pushed to the front a new series of problems, for the solution of which an apparently inexhaustible, and to this day, in a certain sense, a still inexhaustible supply of freshly acquired material was offered. This was the most important acquisition that has ever been added to our knowledge of the world's literature through any one branch of oriental inquiry—the acquisition of the *Veda* for science. *(To be continued.)*

ASPECTS, CHRISTIAN AND HUMAN.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

I.

ACCUSTOMED as we are to dub ourselves Christians, we are apt to take it for granted that those changes which have been wrought in modern society—for its improvement, as we hope—have proceeded from influences essentially Christian; but the facts of history do not warrant this assumption. When civilization awoke in Italy during the 14th and 15th centuries, it was no Christian messenger, but a Classic, who roused the sleeper from the long night of monkish lethargy and the bloody nightmares of feudalism. The Reformation in Northern Europe was truly a Christian revival; but it could not have succeeded save for the preparation of the pagan renaissance which freed the intellect and stimulated criticism. When our American Republic was established, with a Constitution which, some complain, ignores God, its founders turned to antiquity, and especially to the records of the Greek commonwealths, for counsel and precedents: and the founders themselves—Jefferson, Franklin, perhaps even Washington—should be classed among liberal thinkers, rather than among Christians. No disciple of Christ, but Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and D'Alembert—avowed sceptics—launched the regenerative ideas in France, and Mirabeau, the skilfullest pilot of the French Revolution, stricken down as the ship entered the rapids, was an unbeliever: and in the excesses of that Revolution, the French attempted, almost childishly, to resuscitate the social and political systems of republican Rome. Frederick the Great, who drilled Prussia in her *rôle* of unifier of Germany, scoffed at religion. Goethe, who raised the German into the company of the world-literatures, early cast aside the Christianity of his time, and was most powerfully quickened by Hellenic thought.

Coming to our own century, how many of the leaders of broadest influence, how many of the personages of typical significance, have worked consciously on Christian principles, or have professed themselves Christians? Byron, a most important symptom, "though he taught us little"; Shelley, the enthusiastic lover of humanity, who saw the contagion, but died before he had discovered the antidote; Keats, the great soul, fired with Olympian draughts,—these were not Christians. Nor can we class as such those who have labored in other fields: Carlyle, Mill, Harriet Martineau, George Eliot, Darwin, Spencer. What Christian sect would welcome to its communion those of widest repute in France,—Hugo, George Sand, Balzac, Comte, Renan, Taine? In Russia, Pushkin and Turgeneff had no religion, and Tolstoy, who has lately earned from Christians the reputation of madman because he has renounced wealth and aristocratic position to live in humility and poverty according to the letter of Christ's command, reveres only the human Christ. This is not the only instance when self-styled Christians have been startled to the verge of contempt by a Christ-like purpose. When Gladstone summarily ended an unjust war begun by his predecessor, he met with strange criticism from the Christian world: part of which sneered at his weakness and sentimentality, and part insinuated that this sanctimoniousness marked a shrewd political ruse. Yet Gladstone is almost the only Christian statesman of the age; Disraeli, who divided with him the admiration of Britons, was no Christian. Bismarck, the maker of United Germany and arbiter of Europe, not only does not himself practice, but mocks as visionaries those who propose to practice the simplest of Christ's admonitions: "Do harm unto others before they can do harm unto you," is the Bismarckian version of the Golden Rule. Gambetta, who for ten years embodied the political whims of the majority of Frenchmen, was an infidel. And if we search the religion of those diplomatists who have turned Europe into a vast camp, we shall not find Christianity to be their inspiration. Look impartially at the methods of trade and statecraft; how largely are they shaped by current creeds! There is more truth than he intended in the remark of that New York broker who said: "God can run things up-town on Sunday; but on week-days, in Wall Street, I take care of myself."

So much must be said, not for the purpose of cheapening the preciousness of Christ's example, but for the purpose of seeing facts as they really are in Christianity as an actual institution. As we are all care-

lessly called Christians; we seldom inquire how many deserve the title, and we accept whatever makes for progress as the fruit of Christian endeavor. But even this cursory review shows that many men and women whose work benefited mankind, openly disavowed allegiance to Christianity, and that their efforts were often hindered, often bitterly persecuted, by professional Christians, who now accept the beneficent achievements, and forget the antagonism in belief. So Romanists have ever been eager to claim the most vehement infidels—the Voltaires and Leopardis—as death-bed converts to Romanism. A futile deception! We rate an institution by the character and conduct of those who zealously work out its principles; not by the imposing list of illustrious men who figure as honorary members. Until those who are both *lip* and *heart*-Christians bravely face the fact that a large number of the most intelligent and virtuous men and women live and labor outside of the pale of Christianity, and until they seek resolutely and honestly for its causes, denunciations of infidelity from the pulpit and exhortations to faith, will be as barren as they have been hitherto, and actual Christianity will deserve but a fraction of praise for making men purer, better, happier.

One of these causes is that the clergy of whatsoever denomination are generally behind, rarely abreast, and never ahead of, the needs of the age. Depending chiefly on tradition, they are natural conservatives. They utter, not what has come as a direct inspiration to them, nor even what was revealed, vital and urgent, to Christ; but what Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Luther, Laud, Wesley, and others, thought about Christ's inspiration. They are echoes of echoes. The carcass of such opinions remains, a mummy embalmed in dogmas: the spirit exhaled with the decease of that society to which those opinions were particularly addressed. We are never careful enough in making allowance for the intangible potency of the *Zeitgeist* which diffuses a similarity of perceptions through all the people of certain epochs or communities. The same hot sun which pleaches the woods with leaves and the meadows with verdure in May, withers the foliage and seres the grass in August. Your ablest Grecian can never know what subtle meaning may have been associated in the mind of a Periclean Greek with a verse of Pindar or Aeschylus; the words stand, but the allusion has vanished, like the fragrance of a pressed flower. So, too, the texts of creeds survive, but who shall conjure back those mental conditions to which those creeds came as the breath of life? We read the war-cries which roused English armies to indomitable enthusiasm at Crecy and Agincourt; we repeat the songs which, less than a generation ago, reverberated through the camps and battle-fields of the Potomac and Mississippi,—but we are only mildly thrilled. The Greek pæan which terrified the barbarians, has no terror for us. How many clergymen still mumble battle-calls which lost all vitality to rally friends or frighten enemies, centuries and centuries ago?

Regret it as we may, blind ourselves to it if we will, the primal, inexorable law of life is motion, is change. To march perpetually—that is the condition of our existence. Our bivouacs are but for a night; our halts but for a noon: then up, and onward. During untold ages the army of mankind has pursued its way: led now by a Moses, it flounders through sandy deserts; led now by a Napoleon, it winds serpentine over Alpine passes; led now by a Darwin, it peers into geological quarries and explores prehistoric caves. Sometimes, in crossing a pleasant country, it dreams of a prosperous repose; anon, it pushes forward, perhaps to lose itself in a new wilderness, and the cry of the preacher floats mournfully upon the wind: "What profit hath a man of all his labor which he taketh under the sun?" Sometimes, it doubles on its tracks, and reads in a heap of blanched and crumbling bones the record of a battle fought long ago. That ancient myth of him who set forth in quest of the Lost Beautiful is no myth, but very reality, the prophetic chronicle of mankind's career. The weary, the straggler, the disheartened, drop away, and are heard of no more. The indolent retreat to some Capua, where they too perish. Only the robust survive. Rest, the fair capital of the Promised Land towards which we strain, flies ever before us: scarcely at long intervals visible in alluring mirage above the horizon. "Thou shalt not pause," is the command issued to us all; and Time, the indefatigable, runs beside us and sets the pace.

Change, therefore, O clergy, is a law, you also cannot evade. Human nature, we affirm with reason, is always the same; but each individual is a new combination of its elements. Change crept in at his making, and must be respected. Likewise, the law of gravity is assumed to be fixed, but each manifestation of it differs from every other. The physicist subdues friction to serve one purpose; attraction, centrifugality, tension, cohesion, to serve others: so should the moralist perceive that different virtues, and their complimentary vices, belong to different epochs and temperaments. And if he be wise, he will not equip himself from the armory of superstition and miracles, in order to enter the lists against enemies in an age of criticism.

During social and political upheavels, poets have been more alert than preachers to foresee the impending change. In the generation before our Civil War, while as yet but faint support came to Abolitionists from northern pulpits, Lowell and Whittier were vent-

ing in poems those torrents of indignation which, broadening and deepening, swelled into a flood before which the dam of slavery was swept into the abyss. The poet is free. No social tie binds him; no selfish interests intimidate him. What the voice in his inmost soul whispers, that he must utter, be the consequences what they may. Since the world expects nothing from him, he does not—even insensibly—tune his words to the world's expectation. Like a heaven-deputed inspector, he passes through society, and reports upon it. Men involuntarily reveal their secrets to him; he observes their passions, he listens to their opinions: and when he publishes his report, they are surprised, and cry out incensed against this betrayal of confidences; or they deny that the case is as bad as he has stated. Free and fearless, then, must the poet be; himself often but half-aware of the mission on which he is bent.

But the clergyman enjoys no such freedom. His training, his associations, the invisible tethers of tradition, determine and limit his activity. He relies upon established methods. His congregation, bred in a particular doctrine, chose him to preach to them because he too was bred in that doctrine. Which of us is free from that intellectual vanity which is flattered by repeated and varied assurance that what we deem to be the truth, is the truth? Which of us is not tickled when our prejudices are justified to us every Sunday in the sermon, and every week-day in our favorite newspaper? Be he never so honest, the professional preacher, no less than the professional politician, will strike the chord which long experience has shown his hearers prefer. Every assembly re-acts upon a speaker by a process so subtle that no analysis has yet traced it. Actors assure us that when they enter the stage, they feel immediately whether the audience is with them or not. But besides this inevitable hindrance to perfect freedom in clerical utterance, there are others quite as coercive. To all persons who thrive by existing institutions—in church, in government, in education, in commerce—the New is suspect. "We have tried the Old, and it has served thus far," say they; "novelties will certainly bring discomforts, perhaps danger, or disaster." Then, too, where heavy emoluments are attached to religious places, there will be a lively, unedifying scramble. Piety is not always the incentive which spurs men to take orders. How many aspirants in England are confirmed in their vocation by remembering that the Archbishop of Canterbury enjoys a stipend of twenty thousand pounds sterling, *plus* innumerable fat perquisites, and a social rank next to the royal family? Do all Romish priests forget that Cardinal Antonelli found religion so profitable, that he left a fortune of eighty million francs to be fought over by his illegitimate children after his death? My imagination refuses to picture John the Baptist, or Christ, or the sturdy fisherman Peter, as master of Lambeth Palace, or sovereign of the Vatican: yet those who presume to call themselves the successors of Jesus, still trick out their presumption in these temporal, unreligious splendors. To the election of a pope there goes as much bickering, and jealousy, intrigue and wire-pulling, and often bribery, as to the nomination of an alderman at a ward-caucus; not fitness and holiness, but influence, but expediency, but compromise, determine who shall wear that tiara, which, more wonderful than the wishing-cap of Fortunatus, suddenly endows its wearer with every virtue and with omniscience! And the incongruities of Anglicanism or of Romanism have their counterparts in the methods of the other Christian sects; and the existence of such methods shows that to the vast majority of Christendom an immediate spiritual relation with the Supreme Spirit is still impossible, and will be impossible as long as men must be dazzled by the gilded mummeries and melodramatic pageants of feudal courts and modern theatres. As soon seek for justice from a Bourbon, or for mercy from a Romanoff, as for authentic, vital, religious inspiration from the prelates of Established Churches. Spiritual reforms begin outside of the congregation, as political reforms begin outside of Parliament and Congress. Not the preacher, but the poet; not the politician, but the untrammelled agitator,—men whose tongues were free, and whose hearts were fearless, have been the heralds and champions of better things.

MARCH 4.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

Our fathers, when the land was young,
  Were like their children, good and bad;
The names that live on every tongue,
  Were but the best they had.

They knew and called the knave a knave;
  They knew and called the fool a fool;
And none so stupid but he gave
  His voice that wisdom rule.

So master-builders raised the state
  On sure foundation, stone by stone;
The worst ambition of the great
  Was such as men might own.

But with the change of passing years
  From honest difference came the strife
That filled the land with blood and tears,
  And sapped the nation's life.

From out the vilest passions, freed
  By civil war and uncontrolled,
We took to govern us the greed
  And worship of the greed of gold.

Thrust from the temple of her choice,
  Fair freedom veils her face, and leaves
The money-changers to rejoice—
  Who make her house a den of thieves.

O, Spirit of the time gone by,
  When virtue was a jewel worn
In public place—before the sky
  Had blushed for honor laughed to scorn;

Hope of the valiant few that stand
  Against the rising tide for thee,
Come forth with power in thy hand
  And turn despair to victory!

Unfurl the banner in whose folds
  Are duty shining like a star,
And courage of the heart that holds
  Nor needs the wasting goad of war.

O, come with Wisdom by thy side;
  We grope for knowledge in the dark;
We seek the way without a guide,
  And rush confused at every spark.

Come with the sacred torch alight,
  Whose rays divide the false and true,
That those who love may know the right,
  And those who will may do.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MENDACITY OF OLD SOLDIERS.

A RETORT TO THE COMMUNICATION OF DR. HORACE POTTER.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

SINCE old Burton's quaint and wise "Anatomy of Melancholy" was given to the world, we have had nothing quite so curious as Dr. Porter's pathology of martial mendacity. As an old soldier I shall stand by my order, and maintain that when "one of the great daily newspapers" charged the soldiers of the late war with chronic mendacity, the newspaper itself was mendacious. I confess that I have known a few old soldiers, who, as Falstaff says, were "given to lying," but they belonged to the war of 1812. Dr. Porter's diagnosis is worthless, because based on an imaginary disease. It is a calumny on the veterans to say that they have an impediment in their veracity.

I do not deny that some of us are afflicted with a "retrograde metamorphosis of our hemispherical ganglia," which I suppose is Greek for corns and bunions, but they are simply the result of hard marching in "contract" shoes. They provoke profanity occasionally when somebody treads on them, but not mendacity.

I suppose the charge of mendacity grows out of the war history published in the *Century Magazine*. Those pictoral fables were written by generals and admirals when debilitated by "neurokinesis." The whole army ought not to be held responsible for their vivid imaginations.

To excuse the old soldiers for ficticious faults because they suffer from "degeneration of nerve-structure" is like pitying an army mule for his bashful voice. The "nerve-structure" of the old veterans is of the firmest texture and best material. Every nerve is catgut. If we don't get what belongs to us it is not because we lack the "nerve" to ask for it. It has been falsely charged upon us that we "want the earth." We do not; all we want is the American part of it, and we shall always have nerve enough to demand that. If there is one special quality that we excel in it is "nerve." If we have any spots about us particularly healthy they are our "nerve-centers." Dr. Porter need not worry himself about them. If he will diagnose us again he will find that our "cerebral neurine" is in fine condition.

Mendacity is not a nervous disease. It is a vice predominant in children who are brought up in fear of punishment; in slaves, for the same reason. In fact, the reason why a gentleman resented the lie by a blow, or a challenge to mortal combat, was not that it reflected upon his moral character, but upon his birth, and his rank in society. Lying was the refuge of menials and serfs. To give a man the lie was to give him the ignoble status of a slave. Mendacity also springs from cupidity, as in merchants and traders; from revenge, as in malicious persons; from political necessity or to excite curiosity, as in newspapers; and from hundreds of other causes, not at all related to nervous disease; nervousness may be the effect of lying, but it is not the cause of it.

Lying is a moral weakness epidemic in civilized or commercial man. It is not an affection of the physical nerves. Traders are not especially nervous people, and yet no man but a fool pretends to rely on their mercantile word. Every buyer relies upon his own judgment as to the cost, quality, quantity, and purity of what he buys. Nearly every descriptive label in a store is a liar. Where is the garrulous old soldier who can compare in eloquent mendacity with a clerk in a dry-goods establishment or with a salesman in a clothing store?

Farmers are not nervous people as a rule, and yet one of the chief luxuries of my early life was to sit on a rail fence and admire the mendacious genius of a couple of them when circumventing each other in a horse-trade. It was a treat that ranked next after Robinson Crusoe, and above Gulliver, Munchausen, or the Arabian Nights. For inventive reach, fertility of resource, nimble shifting, and efflorescent description sanctified by solemn oaths and strengthened by deceptive warranty, there is nothing in the story-books so ingenious in falsehood as a sweetly pastoral horse-trade. Overpowered by its rural simplicity the old soldiers tell truth in despair, because they know they cannot compete in mendacity with bucolic ability and skill.

That one of the great daily newspapers of the country should reproach the old soldiers for their tendency to mendacity is a "raise" of such colossal daring and amount, that every old veteran lays down his hand and immediately quits the game. There is not an army corps that can compete in mendacity with any one of the great daily newspapers of the country. I know of nothing in moral existences that so much resembles Niagara Falls as the flood of mendacity which continually pours over the hard, rocky forehead of the daily press. I shudder when I think on the purgatory of editors. Every improvement of the printing-machine multiplies their punishment as it multiplies their mendacity. The plea of "neurokinesis" will not shorten their term by a single day.

When an old veteran tells a lie, the recording angel debits it against him as one sin, but when an editor prints a lie, the falsehood is multiplied by the "sworn circulation" of his paper, and debited against him in gross. For instance, if the circulation is 20,000 copies, then every lie printed in any edition is properly charged as 20,000 lies.

I am well acquainted with the editor of one of the "great daily newspapers" whose printed falsehoods I will estimate at only ten per day, although the actual figures are very much higher than that. The daily circulation of his paper is about 20,000 copies, excepting Sundays, when it reaches 50,000. In the eternal domesday book, or book of doom, he is charged with 200,000 acts of mendacity per day and half a million for every Sunday, He has been an editor for thirty years, so that it becomes a feat of logarithms to calculate the sum total of his delinquency.

Now, if there is not in the moral universe any forgiveness of sins until expiation done, and if there is a purgatory to execute the law, wherein every soul must endure a certain term of imprisonment for every sin done in the body, I tremble for my old friend, the editor. He and I often spend a pleasant hour together smoking our cigars and settling the affairs of the nation, but I never shake hands with him at parting without a presentiment that when all the other editors of his generation have expiated their mendacity and have been received into paradise, he will still be "doing

time," because the circulation of his paper is so much larger than theirs, and because he has been so much longer in the business.

Besides, what harm is there in the romances old soldiers tell concerning "the battles, sieges, fortunes," which they have passed, unless indeed, like Othello, they enchant young ladies by the spell of them! A hundred of their ficticious tales of bravery and death are not so sinful all together as one calumny that wounds an innocent man or gives pain to his wife and children. Think of the load a man must carry to judgment who bears false witness against his neighbor two hundred thousand times a day, and a half a million times on Sundays; and yet there are editors who break the ninth commandment more times a day than that, and then have leisure to write editorial articles deploring the mendacity of old soldiers.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

LAND AND LAND VALUES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WHEELBARROW says that Henry George "forgets that land has no value aside from labor."

The writer mistakes, unintentionally, George's position. George says that almost all the value of land comes from the growth and labor of the *community* and not from the *individual* who legally owns the land.

For example, in a community of 10,000 people the value of a man's bare land, exclusive of the improvements, etc. on it, comes from the *labor* and *presence* of the 10,000 people. The so-called owner creates, under favorable circumstances, only the one-ten-thousandth part of the increase, and, if he is an absentee landlord, he makes not even that fraction of the value.

Now if you tax the value of land you are taxing the labor of the *whole community*, *slightly*, and the natural opportunity and growth of the community; but as the taxes are expended on the community—for the growth of the community—nobody is injured and the *growth* pays *for the growth*.

LYNCHBURG, VA. THOMAS WILLIAMSON.

THE MASSES DISINHERITED.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

* * * MR. GEORGE nowhere speaks of taxing land, what he would tax is land values, or the rental value of land. It may be asked what is meant by the rental value of land, and it is proper that it should be explained right here. Rent is the price paid for the privilege of access to the raw material of production, for the mere privilege of getting hold of something not created by man, out of which labor and capital can create wealth. Now the first thing necessary to an understanding of what Mr. George advocates is to bear in mind that he never hinted at the abolition of rent, or to vary any of its economic effects whether good or bad. He simply proposes to divert the flow of rent from private into public channels. Wheelbarrow's assertion, therefore, that "if only land should be taxed apart from improvements, many lots on the lake side of Chicago should be free of taxation, for they consist only of improvements" falls to the ground, because improvements upon land are now and would be then permitted only upon condition that their owner will pay the ground rent, that is the annual value of the use of that particular land, for the most valuable purpose to which any one cares to apply it. At present this rent is usually capitalized and is then called its price. But this is not always done. Some of the most desirable land in New York and Chicago, Philadelphia, London, and other great cities, is built upon by the lease-holders. The owner of the improvements pays the annual value of the land to the free-holder. Under Mr. George's system he would pay it to the municipality. In either case he must pay it or lose his improvements.

Wheelbarrow further says: "Moreover, are not those who have invested their capital, *i. e.*, their stored up labor, in land, entitled to be protected in their possession acquired under our present system?" Well, who talks or thinks of disturbing them in their possession? Certainly not Mr. George. He demands that the landlord be left in undisturbed possession with every motive to collect his rent in full, but that the State shall then concentrate all its taxes upon the landlord, and compel him to pay over to the State all which he collects under the name of rent, except a commission sufficiently large to induce him to remain in the business of a landlord or rent collector.

Again Wheelbarrow does not seem to see how any relief would be afforded the poor by this change in the method of taxation, and asserts that the consequences which Mr. George claims would result from a single tax on land values are "fantastical." Let us see if they are "fantastical."

Whereas, under the present system, all tenants, that is to say the overwhelming majority of the people of any country, have to pay first, rent, and then an amount of taxes nearly equal to the rent in addition, the proposed change would leave them nothing to pay but their rent, while the men to whom they pay the rent would have to pay all taxes which the tenants now pay. In other words tenants, that is, the millions, God help them! whose toil is so illy requited, pay two taxes of nearly equal amount, one called rent and the other taxes. Under the system propounded by Mr. George they would pay only *one* tax instead of *two*, and thus half of their present burden would be lifted from their shoulders.

But that would not be all. By abolishing taxes upon industry and the products of industry, and by concentrating them upon land values to their full amount, it will render it impossible for any man to exact from others a price for the privilege of using those bounties of nature in which all living men have an equal right of use, it will compel every individual controlling natural opportunities to either utilize them or abandon them to others, thus providing opportunities of work for all men and secure to each the full reward of his labor. As a result of this is it too much to claim as Mr. George does, that involuntary poverty will be abolished and the greed, intemperance, and vice that spring from poverty and the dread of poverty, be swept away? I think not.

Finally Wheelbarrow says:—"Land taxation, even if it had in its consequences all the impossible blessings it is supposed to have according to Mr. George, would be of no avail to him who believes that he is the mere product of circumstances, and who does not know that a man's character is the most important factor among the conditions that shape his fate. If a man is aware of that, he will dare to become the master of the circumstances that surround him. I know of one panacea only, it is man's obedience to the moral law." Indeed? Well, is not Mr. George's arguments from beginning to end a plea for the application of the "Moral Law?" All around us is distress and misery, want, poverty, and crime. In the very centres of our civilization to-day, "women faint and little children moan." What is responsible for this? Surely the law. Either human law or Divine law that is certain. To say that it is in obedience to Divine law is in my opinion simple blasphemy. No! the cause of that poverty, the cause of that starvation, distress, and monstrous want in the very centres of wealth, of ignorance in the midst of enlightenment, of the direct abasement and degradation in the midst of the highest civilization, comes from the single fundamental fact that the masses of the people have been disinherited. Charity may exert itself and contribute its thousands, philanthropists may hold conventions. Schools and institutes for the education of the masses may be established. Knights of labor may agitate, petition, and strike. Ministers of the gospel may wax eloquent on the sermon on the mount and the fadeless glory, and immortal beauty of Christ's message to men, but all in vain. It is like trying to sweep back the surges of the ocean with a broom, until you go to the root of the evil. So long as a man is a land animal, so long as he can only live on land

and work on land; so long as all wealth is simply the raw material of the land worked up by human labor, then it is inevitable that if the land of any country be treated as the absolute property of one class of that country no matter how they advance, no matter what inventions may be made, what improvements may be carried out, there must be at the bottom of the Social Scale ignorance, degradation, vice, want, and starvation.

This is as clear as the sun at noon-day. I suggest that Wheelbarrow read Progress and Poverty once more.

MILWAUKEE, Feb. 6, 1889. PETER MCGILL.

A SINGLE TAX MAN IN DISGUISE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

DEAR SIR:—In your issue of January 17, I notice an article on Henry George and the single tax by "Wheelbarrow" which, whatever may have been the motive of the writer, and I suspect that after all he may be a single tax man in disguise, scarcely does justice to either Mr. George or the reform which he represents.

In all that Wheelbarrow says about Mr. George's arguments which are based upon scriptural authority or theistic ideas, I can thoroughly agree with him. To those who dispute his premises such arguments are of course of little value, and if Mr. George rested his case here, his reasoning would be poor indeed. It must needs be a poor cause which cannot find its justification in scripture. But one of the strongest points about the single tax from the standpoint of those who reject faith and rely upon reason, is that a large proportion of the single tax men are those who reject either wholly or in part orthodox ideas on religion.

But to return to our Wheelbarrow. Will he please point out the exact place in Progress and Poverty where the millenium is promised "by the simple means of a single tax on land?"

Will Wheelbarrow point out where Mr. George "denounces every progress, under present circumstances, as driving a parting wedge between the rich and the poor." If this is meant to imply that Mr. George opposes all reforms except putting taxation on land values, it simply is not true. Take free trade, for instance, he recognizes the fact that free trade in this country will go to the landlords the same as free trade has increased rent in England. But does he for that reason oppose free trade? Not at all; there is no man in America to-day that has done as much for free trade as Henry George. On reading the first part of Wheelbarrow's article I thought that perhaps he had read Progress and Poverty, that is in much the same manner as the average reader who thinks it can be grasped in a few hours like a novel, but when he gravely tells us that Mr. George "loses sight of the fact that land in itself and apart from labor has no value whatever," it is almost too much. If Wheelbarrow would only take the trouble to read Henry George again he would find that his strongest claim is that the value of land is entirely due to the labor of the whole community, and therefore it is fit and proper that the community and not the alleged owner should get the benefit of it.

A. H. STEPHENSON.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXI.—Continued.

Mr. Hummel retraced his steps to the sitting-room; there also he walked up and down, and told his wife of Mr. Hahn's misfortune in short sentences. He observed, out of the corners of his eyes, that Mrs. Philippine hastened, nervously, to the sofa, and frequently clasped her hands; and that Laura rushed into the next room, and could not refrain from bursting into tears; and he repeated, with dreadful satisfaction, the terrible words: "He has gone out like a candle."

He behaved in the same way at the factory; he paced slowly up and down the warehouse, looked majestically on a heap of hareskins, took one of the finest hats out of a bandbox, held it towards the window, gave it a stroke with the brush, and muttered again: "It's all up with him." To-day his book-keeper, for the first time in his life, was late at his desk: he had heard of the misfortune on his way; he related it in an excited manner to his principal, and finally maliciously repeated the unfortunate words: "It's all up with him." Hummel gave him a piercing look, and snorted so that the timid heart of the clerk sank within him.

"Do you wish also to become manager of my business like that runaway? I thank you for this proof of your confidence. I have no use for such bandit-like proceedings; I am my own manager, sir, and I object to every kind of secret dealing behind my back."

"But, Mr. Hummel, I have carried on no secret dealings."

"The devil thank you for that," roared out Hummel, in his fiercest bass. "There is no more confidence on earth: nothing is firm; the holiest relations are unscrupulously violated; one can no longer trust one's friends; now even one's enemies make off. At night you lie down to sleep quietly as a German, and in the morning you wake up as a Frenchman; and if you sigh for your German coffee, your hostess brings a dish of Parisian spinach to your bed. I should be glad to learn of you on what spot of this earth we are now settled."

"In Valley Row, Mr. Hummel."

"There the last remains of our good genius spoke out. Look through the window. What stands there?" pointing to the neighboring house.

"Park Street, Mr. Hummel."

"Indeed?" asked Hummel, ironically. "Since primeval times, since your ancestors sat on the trees here nibbling beechmast, this place has been called Valley Row. In this valley I laid the foundations of my house, and enclosed in the wall an inscription for later excavators: 'Henry Hummel, No. 1.' Now the machinations of yonder extinguished straw-man have upset this truth. In spite of my protest in court, we have become transformed into park denizens by a police ordinance. Scarcely has this happened, when that man's book-keeper transforms himself into an American. Do you believe that Knips, junior, this salamander, would have ventured on this misdeed if his own principal had not set him the example? There you have the consequences of everlasting changes and improvements. For twenty years we have gone on together, but I believe now you are cap-

* Translation copyrighted.

able of throwing up your place and entering into another business. Bah, sir! you ought to be ashamed of your century."

* * *

It was a sorrowful day for the Hahn family. The master of the house had gone to his office in the city at the usual hour in the morning, and had awaited his book-keeper in vain. When at last he sent to the young man's dwelling, the porter brought back word that the former had departed, and left a letter on his table for Mr. Hahn. Hahn read the letter, and sank down upon his desk with sudden terror. He had always carried on his business like an honest tradesman. He had begun with small means, and had become a well to do man by his own energy; but he had confided his money matters more to his clever clerk than was prudent. The young man had grown up under his eyes, and had gradually, by his pliant, zealous service, won full confidence, and had shortly before been granted the right of signing the name of the firm to financial obligations. The new manager had succumbed to the temptations of these turbulent times and had, unknown to his principal, ventured on rash speculations. In the letter he made open confession. He had stolen a small sum for his flight: but Mr. Hahn would on the following day have to meet his losses to the amount of about twenty thousand thalers. The thunder-bolt fell from a clear heaven into the peaceful life of the merchant. Mr. Hahn sent for his son. The doctor hastened to the police-office, to his solicitor, and to his business friends, and returned again to the office to comfort his father, who sat as if paralyzed before his desk, hopelessly looking into the future.

Dinner-time came, when Mr. Hahn must impart his misfortune to his wife, and there was lamentation within the house. Mrs. Hahn went distractedly through the rooms, and Dorothy wrung her hands and cried. In the afternoon the Doctor again hastened to his acquaintances and to money-lenders; but during this week there was a panic, every one mistrusted the other. Money was scarce, and the Doctor found nothing but sympathy, and complaints of the fearful times. The flight of the book-keeper made even confidential friends suspicious as to the extent of the obligations of the firm. Even by a mortgage on the house, with the greatest sacrifice, no sufficient sum could be obtained. The danger was more threatening every hour, the anguish greater. Towards evening the Doctor returned home to his parents after his last fruitless expedition. To his father he had shown a cheerful countenance, and comforted him bravely; but the thought was incessantly present to his mind, that this misfortune would divide him utterly from his loved one. Now he sat weary and alone in the dark sitting-room, and looked towards the lighted windows of the neighboring houses.

He well knew that one friend would not fail his father in distress. But the Professor was at a distance, and any help he could give would be insufficient; at the best it would come too late. There were only a few hours before the decisive moment. The intervening time, one of rest for all others, was one of endless torture to his father, in which he contemplated, with staring eyes and feverish pulse, a hundred-fold the bitterness of the ensuing day, and the son was terrified at the effect which the dreadful strain would have on the sensitive nature of his father.

There was a slight rustle in the dark room—a light figure stood beside the Doctor. Laura seized his hand and held it fast within hers. She bent down to him, and looked in his sorrowful countenance. "I have felt the anxiety of these hours. I can no longer bear solitude," she said, gently. "Is there no help?"

"I fear, none."

She stroked his curly hair with her hand.

"You have chosen it as your lot to despise what others so anxiously desire. The light of the sun, which illumines your brow, should never be darkened by earthly cares. Be proud, Fritz; you have never had cause to be more so than at this hour, for such a misfortune cannot rob you of anything that is worth a pang."

"My poor father!" cried Fritz.

"Yet your father is happy," continued Laura, "for he has brought up a son to whom it is scarcely a sacrifice to be deprived of what appears to other men the highest happiness. For whom had your dear parents amassed money but for you? Now you may show them how free and great you rise above these anxieties for perishable metal."

"If I feel the misfortune of this day to my own life," said the Doctor, "it is only for the sake of another."

"If it could comfort you, my friend," exclaimed Laura, with an outburst of feeling, "I will tell you today that I hold true to you, whatever may happen."

"Dear Laura!" cried the Doctor.

Her voice sang softly in his ear like a bird:

"I am glad, Fritz, that you care for me."

Fritz laid his cheek tenderly on her hand.

"I will endeavor not to be unworthy of you," continued Laura. "I have long tried in secret all that I, a poor maiden, can do, to free myself from the trivial follies that trouble our life. I have considered fully how one can keep house with very little, and I no longer spend money on useless dress and such rubbish. I am anxious also to earn something. I give lessons, Fritz, and people are satisfied with me. One

requires little to live upon, I have found that out. I have no greater pleasure in my room than the thought of making myself independent. That is what I have wished to express briefly to you to-day. One thing more, Fritz; if I do not see you, I always think of and care about you."

Fritz stretched out his arms towards her, but she withdrew herself from him, nodded to him once more at the door, then flew swiftly across the street back to her attic room.

There she stood in the dark with beating heart; a pale ray of light gleamed through the window and lighted up the shepherd pair on the inkstand, so that they seemed to hover illuminated in the air. This day Laura did not think of her secret diary, she looked towards the window where her loved one sat, and again tears gushed from her eyes; but she composed herself with quick decision, fetched a light and a jug of water from the kitchen, collected her lace collars and cuffs and soaked them in a basin—she could do all this herself too. It was another little saving, it might sometime be of use to Fritz.

Mr. Hummel closed his office and continued to rove about. The door of Laura's room opened, the daughter shrank within herself when she saw her father cross the threshold solemnly, like a messenger of Fate. Hummel moved towards his daughter and looked sharply at her weeping eyes.

"On account of him over the way, I suppose." Laura hid her face in her hands, again her sorrow overpowered her.

"There you have your little bells," he grumbled in a low tone. "There you have your pocket-handkerchiefs and your Indians. It is all over with the people there." He slapped her on the shoulder with his large hand. "Be quiet. We are not responsible for his ruin; your pocket-handkerchiefs prove nothing."

It became dark; Hummel walked up and down the street between the two houses, looking at the hostile dwelling from the park side, where it was less accessible to him, and his broad face assumed a triumphant smile. At last he discovered an acquaintance who was hastening out of it, and followed him.

"What is the state of the case?" he asked, seizing the arm of the other. "Can he save himself?"

His business friend shrugged his shoulders.

"It cannot remain a secret," he said, and explained the situation and danger of the adversary.

"Will he be able to procure money to meet it?"

The other again shrugged his shoulders.

"Hardly to-morrow. Money is not to be had at any price. The man is of course worth more; the business is good, and the house unencumbered."

"The house is not worth twenty thousand," interposed Hummel.

"No matter; in a sound state of the money market he would bear the blow without danger, now I fear the worst."

"I have said it, he has gone out like a candle," muttered Hummel, and abruptly turned his steps towards his house.

In the Doctor's room father and son were sitting over letters and accounts, the light of the lamp shone on the gilded titles of the books against the wall, and the portfolios containing the treasures industriously collected by the Doctor from all corners of the world, and bound up and placed here in grand array—now they were again to be dispersed. The son was endeavoring to inspire his despairing father with courage.

"If the misfortune cannot be prevented which has come upon us like a hurricane, we must bear it like men: you can save your honor. The greatest sorrow that I feel is that I can now be of so little use to you, and that the advice of every man of business is of more value than the help of your own son."

The father laid his head on the table, powerless and stupefied.

The door opened, and from the dark hall a strange form entered the room with heavy steps. The Doctor sprang up and stared at the hard features of a well-known face. Mr. Hahn uttered a shriek and rose hastily from the sofa to leave the room.

"Mr. Hummel!" exclaimed the Doctor, alarmed.

"Of course," replied Hummel; "it is I, who else should it be?" He laid a packet on the table. "Here are twenty thousand thalers in certified City Bonds, and here is a receipt for you both to sign. To-morrow you shall give a mortgage for it upon your house: the papers must be repaid in kind, for I do not mean to lose by it, exchange is too bad now. The mortgage shall run for ten years, in order that you may not think I wish to take your house; you can pay me back when you please, the whole at once, or by degrees. I know your business, no money can now be obtained upon your straw; but in ten years the loss may be recovered. I make only one condition, that no human being shall know of this loan, least of all your wife, and my wife and daughter. For this I have good reasons. Do not look at me as the cat looks at the king," he continued, turning to the Doctor. "Set to work, count the bonds and note their numbers. Make no speeches, I am not a man of sentiment, and figures of rhetoric are no use to me. I think of my security also. The house is scarcely worth twenty thousand thalers, but it satisfies me. If you should wish to carry it off I should see it. You have taken care that it should be near enough to my eyes. Now count, please, and sign the receipt, Doctor," he said, authoritatively, pushing him down on his chair.

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

SCIENTIFIC RELIGION, OR HIGHER POSSIBILITIES OF LIFE AND PRACTICE THROUGH THE OPERATION OF NATURAL FORCES. By *Laurence Oliphant*. Buffalo: 1889. Charles A. Wenborne.

"WE realize that our union, instead of separating my husband from the sainted wife whose influence overshadowed him as he wrote the pages of this book, has, in truth, bound him only the more closely, for she has become so *atomically* wedded with me, that we, the wife in the unseen and the wife in the seen, have become as one; her life is poured through me as an instrument doubling my own affectional consciousness," says Mrs. Rosamond Oliphant in the preface to the work of her husband. In the word *atomically* we have the key-note of his "Scientific Religion." The "atom" is the point where the science of modern physicists stops, and where the spiritualism of "Scientific Religion" begins.

"The great problems of life," says the author truly, "are assuming a new form, as the theological landmarks are gradually fading away beneath the flood of light which has been let into them by theological research, antiquarian discovery, scientific investigation, and psychical phenomena; and men in their trouble are peering earnestly into the new region which is being thus illuminated, for a new order which they may substitute for the old—some vital truth-principle which shall conduce to a purer and nobler social life." Ecclesiasticism fails to supply this principle of truth; it is not found in the maxims of conduct that those who follow worldly ways have adopted; we must seek for it in the "process of divine quickening," in the "magnetic attraction which is inherent in the vivifying principle," which draws the incipients of this new life, at first weak and bewildered, "athwart obstacles that would seem insurmountable. * * * The atmosphere feels charged (to them) with mephitic vapor, which sometimes seems even to interfere with the ordinary respiration." The author admits it is "hopeless to attempt to give any complete description of the mode of operation of this new life-principle, for in no two cases are the phenomena which attend its descent into the human organism similar in their manifestations." Granting that this atomicism be universal then, and supposing it, as Mr. Oliphant does suppose it, to have a basis, how are we to account for the erratic character of the courses it takes? At best it must be an uncertain and unreliable sort of spirituality. In his attempt at explanation, the author proceeds from the principle of atomicity recognized by modern science. Yet he abandons the methods by which that hypothesis was attained. "This and other points" (the immanence or dualism of force), we read, "can never be settled until we realize that our external senses are not tests upon which we can rely for anything." Good and true. But what of our spiritual senses! What is to tell us whether we can rely on *them*. Modern science has not made the acquisitions from which Mr. Oliphant proceeds, by any acceptance of spiritual revelation. But at this point the aims of physics and "Scientific Religion" separate "Science to be true must be divine." So reads the Gospel, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness and all things shall be added to you." How many have sought it! And among the multitude of things added to them, how many of the true acquisitions of scientific progress do we find to be parcel of the grant!

"Though from what has been said," continues Mr. Oliphant, "we may vaguely perceive where these treasures of divine knowledge lie hid, no man can furnish another with a sure key to them. That is to be found by each who would learn the secrets of wisdom, only in his own heart; and it is by an effort of his affections, and not by one of his brain, that he can fit this key to the lock of knowledge. Let him then beware of intellectual effort in this direction, unprepared by the necessary preliminary moral training and discipline to make it."

Moral training and spiritual discipline we need. But in the investigation of things that *are*, "interior illumination" bardly suffices. "The whole system of civilized life," says Clerk Maxwell, "is fitly symbolized by a foot-rule, a set of weights, and a clock." They symbolize, too, the foundation upon which even the theory of atomicism rests. Let us cling, therefore, to the foot-rule, the set of weights, and the clock.

Apart from the scientific untenability of a theory that fashions the atomic constitution of nature to suit every emergency, the work of Mr. Oliphant has many noble features. It is pervaded by a gentleness of sentiment and sincerity of purpose that evokes respect, even where reason commands dissent. We may not agree with "the interlocking of invisible atoms," nor give assent to the hypothesis of "pneumatic and psychic dielectrics," but we recognize the power of self-discipline in its noblest form, and the divinity of the Masculine and Feminine in man, whether they appear as personifications or merely as the expression of mysterious atomic agencies. *μκρκ.*

NOTES.

The frontispiece of the *Century* for March is a portrait of the Grand Lama of the Trans-Baikal, from a photograph given to George Kennan in exchange for his own. Mr. Kennan's article describes an interesting and amusing episode of his Siberian tour.

Col. T. W. Higginson's poems are about to be published by Longmans Green & Co. of New York and London. The volume is called *The Afternoon Landscape*. The poems include the sonnet to "Duty," and lighter stanzas on "A Jar of Rose-Leaves." Among the translations are Sappho's "Ode to Aphrodite," and a dozen sonnets from Petrarch and Carmœns.

Ex-Postmaster-General Thomas L. James, in his article on "*The Railway Mail Service*, in the March *Scribners*, says: "It is due to President Cleveland to state that toward the close of his administration he recognized the importance of permanency in the railway mail service and that he made a long step in advance by approving a series of rules submitted by the civil service commission having for its object the removal of the service from the influences of politicians. It needs more than this, however; it needs the sanctity of the statute law declaring that the clerks should not only keep their offices during good behavior, but that after twenty years of faithful and efficient service, or before that time, if injured in the discharge of their duty, they should retire on half pay. In case of death, from accident while on duty, proper provision should be made for the family of the official. Whenever justice is done by Congress in these particulars the United States will have the best and most efficient railway mail-service in the world."

The latest contribution to the discussion in the *Forum* of the Negro Question is by a Negro writer, Prof. W. S. Scarborough, of Wilberforce University, Ohio. In the March number he reviews with a deal of severity the treatment of the Negro question by the representatives both of the South and of the North. But of the future of his race he takes a very hopeful view. He writes: "That which the South declares it will not have—Negro supremacy—has no part in the Negro's plans for his future, nor is it desired by him. * * * The Negro has made a remarkable advance in intelligence and education. The admitted progress of the race has given birth to leaders, younger and better educated, to replace the ignorant and irresponsible ones. * * * As a member of that race, I believe the Negro is looking over the whole situation as a patriot should view it—with an eye not only to his own prosperous growth, but to that of the American people, of whom he considers himself an inseparable part. With such a view he can but take that step which will lead from present troubles to a fruition of his hopes—to be a man among men and not simply a Negro."

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SENSATION AND MEMORY. EDITOR..... No. 74.
COGNITION, KNOWLEDGE, AND TRUTH. EDITOR.....No. 76.
MONISM AS THE FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF COGNITION..No. 78.

IN the two first discussions, the conditions and processes by which we start from the bare excitations of the sensory world and attain to knowledge, are unfolded. Sensation is the primal condition of all knowledge; the products of sensation are preserved and transmitted as psychological forms; the psychological law of this retentive power is memory, from which source are evolved the different branches and varied forms of human thought.

The last essay of this series shows that the constitution of the human mind naturally predisposes man for Monism. The unitary conception which the intellect seeks to formulate respecting all things brought within its range, is the inward proof offered to us of the correctness of the monistic philosophy. Monism is thus a subjective principle, informing us how to unify knowledge and make it potent.

AXIOMS THE BASIS OF MATHEMATICS. DR. EDWARD BROOKS.....No. 76.
THE OLD AND THE NEW MATHEMATICS. EDITOR. No. 77.
A FLAW IN THE FOUNDATION OF GEOMETRY. HERMANN GRASSMANN.....No. 77.

IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called, *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal. The relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW.....No. 73.
SYMPTOMS OF SOCIAL DEGENERACY. MONCURE D. CONWAY.....No. 74.
MAKING BREAD DEAR. WHEELBARROW.....No. 78.

WHEELBARROW opposes Mr. Henry George and the doctrine of Land Taxation with proper regard for the truth contained in the distinguished economist's theories. Objection is mainly taken to the universal curative power that the advocates of Land Taxation claim for their remedy. In man's obedience to moral laws Wheelbarrow finds the only magic wherewith to change the face of society.

Much criticism has been elicited by the bare mention of Mr. George's economical doctrines—indubitable testimony of their popularity and strength. Letters have appeared in No. 79 and others will follow.

"Symptoms of Social Degeneracy," Mr. Moncure D. Conway finds to be not unfrequent even in American civilization. We are prone to emphasize the survivals of barbaric institutions in effete Europe, while overlooking the excresences of our own body politic. Lynch-Law, literary piracy, corruption in administrative circles, are signs of the decay of an ethical system and the theology that protects it. Worst of all, these evils are not unaccompanied with attempts at palliation.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE STUDY OF SANSKRIT. H. OLDENBERG.....No. 79.
ASPECTS, CHRISTIAN AND HUMAN. WILLIAM R. THAYER.....No. 79.

THE study of Sanskrit, upon which a series of articles commences with No 79, is a department of historical research comparatively new. Prof. Oldenberg, one of the most eminent Sanskrit scholars of the present day, tells us in popular language the story of the origin, growth, and present state of Sanskrit research. This department of philological and historical inquiry has done more than any other towards the true interpretation of the early history, civilization, and religion of the Aryan peoples. Within less than a century results have been attained, of which former generations would not have presumed to think. The articles have been translated from the German.

Under the title of "Aspects, Christian and Human," Mr. W. R. Thayer maintains in lucid and apposite language that the influences and forces to which the great changes wrought in modern society must be attributed, have not proceeded from sources essentially Christian. These advances are distinctly secular and human in character. "Not the preacher, but the poet: not the politician, but the untrammelled agitator, men whose tongues were free, and whose hearts were fearless, have been the heralds and champions of better things."

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NEWS ABOUT THE PLANETS AND THE MOON.

A SURVEY OF THE LATEST ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS.

Prof. J. V. Schiaparelli, in an essay recently published in *Himmel und Erde*, presents a detailed account of his recent astronomical discoveries, which corroborate facts hitherto known and testify to the wonderful accuracy of the observations of former astronomers. They show that the surface of Mars is not dead, like that of the moon; Mars lives; and the development of its life manifests itself in a complicated system of curious phenomena, which only in part can be compared to those happening upon our earth. Mars possesses an atmosphere like the earth; its poles are covered with white patches which alternately increase and decrease; it exhibits meteorological changes.

The surface of the planet is divisible into two classes of regions; the divisions of the first class are bright in color, the shades varying from orange to deep red; the divisions of the other class are dark, and appear in all tints of gray and black. In calling the former regions continents or islands, and the latter oceans, it is a matter of mere convenience that we adopt the geographical expressions applicable to the earth, for we know nothing of their nature, except what we see.

Besides the slow changes that have been observed in the distribution of these colors, white specks have been seen at the periods of opposition; thus, one to which Schiaparelli has given the name of *Nix Atlantica* and which he says equaled the southern Pole in whiteness.

The most wonderful phenomena, however, are the canals. Their name, like all the other topographical designations, was adopted merely for the sake of convenience and not at all because Schiaparelli supposed them to be similar to terrestrial canals. Indeed their size would be too large to admit of such a comparison. They form nets of straight lines with an apparent diameter of from 15 to 20 seconds and even more. Their breadth is not constant. Where two or more canals meet, as a rule, lakes are formed.

The most puzzling phenomenon of these canals is their duplication into parallel bands. The process of duplication does not require more than one or a few days, and it seems that the change takes place simultaneously along the whole length of the canal. If a double canal is cut by a single one, its parallel sections are respectively equal in breadth and brightness, as shown in the diagram subjoined. The stages of transformation have not yet been sufficiently observed since a fog always overspreads the canal before the duplication takes place. Schiaparelli considers this appearance that envelops the canal as the characteristic feature of the transformation. It does not, he says, appear to hide the phenomenon, but to evolve it. He compares it to a number of soldiers who disperse without order to arrange themselves again in two columns.



The arrangement of the lakes where two canals cross, and the size of the canals, follow certain laws. The duplications are always equal in breadth and the lakes (as can be seen in the instances of the crossing of Euphrates and Protonilus, observed at different times) also appear double, following the direction of the duplicated canal.



Mars being the best known of the planets, has quite monopolized our interest. But the other members of the solar system are not quite forgotten.

The familiar red spot on the surface of Jupiter has been employed by Herr Lohse, of Potsdam, to calculate once more the rotation of the planet. Mr. Jenning, of Bristol, has recently established analogous results from numerous observations of the spot, and it appears, in consequence, that the rotation time of the planet, as thus obtained, has been different in different years. In 1885–86, from calculations of 659 rotations,

it was found to be 9 hours, 59 minutes, 41.1 seconds; which was an increase of 7 seconds since 1879. At the present time it is, apparently, decreasing again. Are we to infer from this, that Jupiter really rotates on its axis with an inconstant velocity? That would be indeed astounding, since heretofore astronomers have regarded the rotation times of the planets—and especially that of the earth, which is equal to a sidereal day—as the most constant quantities presented to observation. The evident inference is, rather, that the red spot, considered with reference to its vicinage, does not remain at rest, but is slowly displaced, in the course of time,—not always, however, in the same direction, but now in one, and now the other. Future observation, perhaps, will furnish more definite information regarding these movements, and make disclosures as to the real nature of this interesting appearance.

Remarkable light-phenomena, not noticed hitherto, are reported in the vicinity of the second largest planet, the ring-encircled Saturn, by Dom Lamey. As early as 1868 this astronomer, with a four-inch refracting telescope, at Strassburg, noticed beyond this immediate region, somewhere between the paths of the fifth and sixth satellites, Minas and Titan, certain appearances of light, formed like rings; and since 1884, from observations made on the top of Grignon, favored by an unusually clear atmosphere and with a more powerful telescope, Dom Lamey is convinced of having frequently recognized their exact forms. These rings of light are, according to his account, four in number; but are only seldom visible in their full extent. As their brilliancy is strongest at the very point where the satellites are in proximity to each other, the phenomenon is not explainable as the effect of contrast,—it being the case, moreover, that they surpass in brilliance the nearest satellite. This interesting observation, it is true, has as yet not been confirmed from other quarters. Perhaps, after this suggestion, the possessors of larger telescopes will direct their attention more closely to these doubtful objects.

The moon, according to Langley's measurements, does not seem to be so dreadfully cold, as was formerly the opinion of scientists. By reason of its lacking an envelopment answering to our atmosphere, however, it must still be extremely uninhabitable—quite the opposite of our dear neighbor Mars. But why has the moon no atmosphere even approaching ours in density? Grenstedt explains this from the light density of the lunar substance. Both the earth and the moon are like meteoric masses which, when exposed to the air, oxydize; but by reason of the lesser density of the moon oxidation in its interior spread more freely than in the earth, and even before its original fire became extinct, the air and the water of its surface were chemically imprisoned in its rocks.

ASPECTS, CHRISTIAN AND HUMAN.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

II.

I WONDER not that Christianity, as expounded by the dominant creeds, is losing its hold on the hearts of men. I wonder, rather, that any religion which asserts that all mankind were damned by the sin of a single ancestor, Adam, and that all may be redeemed by the single sacrifice of Jesus, should have survived through eighteen centuries. No doctrines more preposterously at variance with experience than these have ever been solemnly promulgated and stubbornly believed by civilized beings. If I told you that one of your forebears in the tenth century was a cut-throat, and that therefore you and all your posterity must be hopelessly sinful, you would laugh at me; just as you would laugh if I should tell you that all the descendants of a saintly person are assured of everlasting bliss. To him who searches his moral nature no conviction is clearer than that his soul's welfare or disease depends upon himself. The example of good or evil men may affect him, but the decision to follow either of them comes from within. Your identity, differing from all that have ever been or ever will be, is inviolable: no man can wrest it from you, nor have you the power to alienate it from yourself. In each of us is set up this holy of holies, whose threshold no stranger may cross: conscience sits in judgment there. You cannot persuade her that your neighbor's sinfulness justifies you in sinning; nor that his virtue atones for your iniquity. By yourself alone can you be degraded or uplifted. Ponder it well—would you wish it otherwise? Would you have your soul in your brother's keeping? Would you be no better than a chameleon, which borrows the hue of the last bush it glides beneath? No stronger than the subject whom the mesmerist compels to absurd antics and involuntary crime? No—a thousand times no! Let us give thanks that the soul is verily self-centred—that each of us can resolve, "Whatever any one does or says, I must be good."

But the burden of the interpreters of Scripture has been from the first, that we are saved or damned by the acts of others. These twisters of texts deprive man of his dignity, and make of him a passive slave, who was sold into perdition by Adam, unless he be ransomed by Christ. Worst of all, the bargain was struck and sealed ages before we, the poor chattels, were born! No grocer, no cobbler, would do business after such a method: yet in this spiritual barter the everlasting weal of human souls is at stake.

Protestantism and Romanism have vied with each other in branding these twin falsehoods into the faith of Christians. I am not discussing whether Christ himself taught this monstrous doctrine or not, but I am examining some of the phases of actual Chris-

tianity; so I do not cite passages from the New Testament, or from the early Fathers, but I limit myself to a few characteristic quotations from modern representatives of Christian sects. Hear, first, what Latimer, one of the venerable shapers of the Anglican Church, bids every believer to reply to the question, "Who art thou?" "I am of myself, and by myself, coming from my natural father and mother, the *child of the ire and indignation of God, the true inheritor of hell, a lump of sin, and working nothing of myself but all towards hell, except I have better help of another than I have of myself.*"* So Luther asserts that "there's no doubt that all created things have degenerated by reason of original sin." This is the theme of *Paradise Lost*, this the moral of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, the poetical and the prose epic of evangelical Protestantism. Bunyan's hero, whose career is intrinsically as selfish as that of any hermit in the Thebaïd, shrinks not from classing "wives, husbands, and children" with "*harlots, lusts, pleasures, honors, precious stones*, and what not," among the wares vended by Beëlzebub in Vanity Fair: but Christ, he says, "had no mind to the merchandize, and, therefore, left the town without laying out so much as one farthing upon these vanities." Cardinal Newman, who should understand the more enlightened orthodox Romanism of our own time, utters a similar opinion: "*If* there is a God, *since* there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God."†

Verily, logic has invented no other syllogism so diabolical as this: The human race is wicked; God, who created the human race, is good; therefore, the human race is wicked. Can we not hear such a Creator exclaim to his creatures: "I love perfection, and have made thee imperfect. I am all-skillful, all-powerful, and have made thee out of joint. Yet shalt thou worship my perfection, and my justice, and my love, and thou shalt thank me for having made thee liable to eternal damnation, or thou wilt surely be damned." Such is the threat of this bungling mechanician to his important machine. This is the hideous fetish still worshipped as God in many Christian churches: unless it be that the worshippers do not believe in their hearts the creed their lips profess. God a tyrant, religion a terror—that is the meaning of those dogmas which Latimer, and Luther, and Newman, and Andover sectaries disseminate. But, as has been truly said, "I cannot think that there was ever any scared into heaven: they go the fairest way to heaven that would serve God without a hell."

When you come out, on a Sunday evening, from a church where these atrocious doctrines have been reiterated and upheld, what sense of relief, of peace, of expansion is this, which fills you as you breathe the untainted air, and look up at the mysterious stars? They too are comprehended in the destiny which embraces you; and those fire-flies twinkling in yonder meadows, and the crickets chirping in the grass. Do you see here, or anywhere, a sign that the Omnipotence which kindled a light in those stars and on the wings of those tiny insects, which gave a tune to those crickets and night-birds, is bent on persecuting *you?* What spite has the Everlasting against you? The ears have heard the sermon, but the soul revolts against it. Concience publishes anew the sanctity of the individual soul, and the gospel of self-reliance and responsibility. Reason refuses to impute to God wrathfulness and malice which the worst men would not practice.

But if you do believe that a ferocious Elohim misgoverns the universe; that he has created every human being with a predisposition for hell, degrading man in this below the beasts, which dread nothing and hope nothing; if you believe that only a few of those who have heard the name of Christ shall be saved, and that millions of millions, born before Christ's time or in heathen countries, are to be damned without a hearing: do not so stultify your conscience and corrupt all terms as to call this monster *good*, God. If Elohim were omnipotent, the true God, and source of all thoughts and creatures,—instead of being the conception of half-barbarous Hebrews three thousand years ago—whence could you have derived these purer ideals of virtue and mercy? Whence could your reverence of justice and love have emanated? Certainly, not from him; but from some spiritual potentate antagonistic to him, as Prometheus was to Zeus; the source from which every unselfish act and wish has flowed. Ah, sad is it that the dove who should carry Christ's olive-branch of peace and love and hope, has been accompanied and overshadowed throughout the ages by the vultures of Elohim and Ahriman, birds of prey and darkness before whose terrifying screams and cruel talons men have cowered and quailed, unheeding the sweet tidings of the messenger of Love!

Ah me! Ah me! how have we recklessly bandied from mouth to mouth the names of the deepest mysteries; gossiping, as of familiar household affairs, of infinity, eternity, immortality, and of the everlasting, incomprehensible God! And now the question, *What do we know?* brings us to bay, and strikes us dumb. We, who have never yet established our earthly reg-

* *Sermons on the Card*, 1529.
† *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, p. 268

imen so that it has endured unchanged for a single year; we, who cannot stretch forth our hand and pluck a single blossom from to-morrow, nay, from an hour beyond the present: we yet presume to fix the state of human souls through all eternity, to allot the sessions and occupations of heaven and the penalties and anguish of hell! We, who cannot soothe the heart of a bereaved sister, or mitigate the despair of a brother —who behold struggling and falling around us multitudes whom we cannot or do not succor—we prattle complacently about those who are to be saved or damned! Let us put away presumption! Let our insignificance teach us humility! Let our bond of human kinship unite us in charity! The mystery of Evil has never been unravelled by the fingers of logic or theology; the Burden of Sin has never been exorcised by Orphic psalm-singing and sermons. He who has looked, in some awful moment, upon the abysses which mortal sight can never fathom, and has realized, however dimly, that they are unfathomable; who has seen, as in a vision, the universal toss and surge, and the boundless possibilities of life; he will not presume, in lower moods, to babble thereof. "If your strength allow, behold," says the Keeper of Mysteries; "but you may reveal no secrets." Awed and humbled, the gazer turns for relief to the world lighted by the sun. The sufferings, the needs, of his fellow-men,—these he can understand. These are actual, insistent, and within reach. Let him consecrate himself to them, and his energy will expand; let him merge his desires in their welfare, and his perplexities will slumber. The spectator of a battle is appalled by a sense of the peril and horror which beset the combatants: but the soldier thinks only of the justice of his cause, of the duty of courage, of the glory of victory.

THE VICARIOUS ATONEMENT.

Mr. William R. Thayer, while justly criticizing the absurd views of the radical perversity of man and the dogma of vicarious atonement, overlooks, it seems to us, the truth which lies hidden in these doctrines. We really and literally inherit the sins as well as the blessings of our ancestors—of our bodily ancestors as well as of our spiritual ones.

Our bodily ancestors are those whose blood runs in our veins, most of whom (the American nation being chiefly Teutonic) lived, in Tacitus's time, on the banks of the Rhine and Weser. Our spiritual ancestors are those men whose ideas we have accepted, those who contributed to the growth of our present civilization, the Greeks and Romans, the Hebrew* and other nations of antiquity. Now, we are indeed punished for the sins of our predecessors, just as much as we are saved through their ransoming deeds and thoughts.

Individualism looks upon each individual as a separate being who, whatever he be, is supposed to be independent, and to exist of himself, and who, for good or evil, is responsible to no one but to himself. This view is wrong: The individual is what he is through others and mainly through his ancestors; he has to suffer with them, and inherits their blessings. But Mr. Thayer is right in blaming those who literally believe in hell and think that a man can be damned or saved for all eternity without his having consciously or unconsciously accepted the merits or demerits of his ancestors. It takes exertion on our part to acquire the treasures of our spiritual existence:

> "Whate'er thy fathers have bequeathed thee;
> Earn it anew, to really possess it."

Mankind cannot be considered an agregate of single individuals; it forms a living whole, and humanity, the intellectual life of mankind, is one unitary growth in which the men of history are only parts, and transient phases, whose efforts and lives cannot be understood unless the development of the entire race be taken into consideration. P. C.

* Mr. Thayer speaks of the half-barbarous Hebrews. We might just as well speak of the semi-civilized Greek. Our Hebrew literature, we must not forget, contains the germs of our ethical ideals of to-day; and the decalogue of Moses is in its way at least as classical as Homer, Plato, and Aristotle together.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD AND EVIL IN FICTION.

BY CORA H. PALMER.

"In the science of sound," says Mr. J. H Shorthouse,* "there are partial tones which are unheard but which blend with the tones that are heard and make all the difference between the paltry note of the poorest instrument and the supreme note of a violin. So, in the science of life, in the crowded street or market-place, or theatre, or wherever life is, there are partial tones, there are unseen presences. Side by side with the human crowd is a crowd of unseen forms—Principalities and Powers and Possibilities."

So, too, in literature there are unspoken messages, there are hidden meanings which compliment the written word and flood with the light of every-day experience the by-paths of fanciful thought.

In "The Countess Eve" Mr. J. H. Shorthouse has, with a wealth of imagery and exquisite description, interwoven the problem of Eden and the problem of Faust—the search after happiness and the search after higher life.

To be of value, an allegory must embody fundamental truth. However individual opinions as to the origin and credibility of the Mosaic history may vary, the principles underlying the story of Paradise Lost are co-existent with human life and human fallibility. Temptation and its consequences are not the less cogent because faith and scepticism, science and scholasticism, consider them from widely different standpoints. Whether body and soul be dual or indivisible there are impulses inherent which work for evil as there are tendencies intrinsic which strive for good. Relatively we may consider causes, practically we must deal with results; for although thoroughly to reform a man it may be necessary to begin with his grandfather, to help a man it is only possible to begin with himself. The vital question, therefore, is not so much how or why evil is here, as in what way evil may be overcome, and the author who affords honest help to his fellows, though it be in one sentence or one precept only, has done more for hu-

* The Countess Eve. By J. D. Shorthouse. MacMillan & Co. London and New York. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

manity than he who fills volumes with abstruse theory and speculation.

The inculcation of personal responsibility, not alone for the deeds done in the body, but for the thoughts engendered in the mind is the only training that will keep the whole life in equipoise; the only training that makes of man an independent, thinking, willing personage, and not a mere puppet dancing on wires of heredity to the measures of circumstance. For surely the doctrine that man "is no more responsible for his character than for the shape of his nose," will never serve to "help the weak-hearted or to raise up those who fall."

Every soul has its *Arbor Vitæ* in that which stands as the exponent of the greatest excellence to which existence is attainable, and whatever would belittle or degrade this individual ideal must encounter the flaming sword that intervenes to guard the tree of life. Moral, like physical electricity, has a duplex and diametric action. No one ever retrograded by following *consistently* the highest instincts of his nature, yet mistaken opinion may lead to much that in itself is the reverse of excellent; education, therefore, is of doubtful value unless it teach the mind to discern what really are the higher impulses and the true uses of our nature. Perverted good is often more baneful than absolute evil, for not only does it destroy where it ought to quicken, but it reacts against the existence of that *right* reason in which and by which all good is nourished. Every new-made home is a possible Eden, every new-made soul a possible Faust.

Mr. Shorthouse confronts the problems from the orthodox point of view, at the same time recognizing and utilizing all the subtile influences of night, and storm, and darkness; all the charm of music in the spiritual and in the sensual worlds; all the witchery of spring in the air and in the heart; all the grace of forgiveness to beat down the barriers of memory and remorse; all the joy of virtue triumphant over sin. The author pays tribute to the innate strength of purity in woman in his conception of the Countess Eve. It is the genuine womanliness of the heroine, the longing for a wider experience, the eager curiosity to see life; the fresh enjoyment of congenial companionship, and the unconscious innocence that thinketh no evil, which constitutes at once her greatest danger, her greatest safe-guard, and her greatest charm. Steeped in the oblivion of a blind remorse for the transgressions of his youth, her husband's abstraction builds a barrier against which the soul-wings of the wife beat helplessly, until all the human longings of her nature turn from him seeking elsewhere the companionship denied her in her rightful home. The lamp of experience burns in rain if it light not the pit-falls in the path of the present. "There is no entrance into Paradise without love." There is no continuance in paradise without virtue.

A wife's paradise is her husband's heart and love is the tree of life in the midst of her garden, the door of which swings outward—not always, and not often does it swing inward as well. Only to the pure in spirit is the way back into paradise unbarred.

The author draws a sharp line between sins of circumstance and sins of will, but it is in the consequences entailed and in the effect on character that his distinction is made, rather than in the sins themselves.

In the musician de Brie, Mr. Shorthouse has embodied the ideal of a pure soul above and beyond any thought of evil, elevating by his presence everything with which he is brought in contact, while in the actor la Valliere are concentered material graces of person, mind, and manner, in the 'matchless fascination of an attractive nature'—"plastic as clay in the potter's hand, and yet attractive as though it had absorbed the grace of all natures into its own. * * * He is nothing in himself, he is nothing but a lovely masque."

Here is manifestly the type of man's natural organism, physical and mental perfection independent of moral restraint. "He is good but the slave of his feelings, a born actor to whom all parts are alike." His theory of life is the materialists' creed.

It is the creed of indulgence that knows nothing of the higher law of self-restraint—carried to its logical consequence, it is the creed that degrades. In the development of the narrative the author shows the deterioration of man as the influence of the spiritual or moral nature is gradually withdrawn, until in carrying out his theory of enjoyment he sinks to the level of the sensualist, and loses at the last even the approbation of the world which lightly applauds and lightly condones so many offenses.

The motif of the story is plainly the attack by certain phases of so-called advanced thought on the institution of marriage through the attack on the sanctity of the marriage bond,—but perhaps the most valuable doctrine inculcated by the allegory is that, independent of heredity and circumstances, the choice of conduct and the development of character lies with the individual, and that temptation if not the result, is, in any case, largely under the control of the individual will.

Mr. Shorthouse skillfully utilizes the effect of music on opposite natures when he makes the strains of the violin, through which de Brie expresses the 'holy joy of a pure love,' bring to the actor temptation, vague and uncertain, but temptation in visible form; nevertheless a persistent effort of will is required to enable la Valliere to see the tempter a second time.

A character like de Brie, to whom 'training had given the grace of an ideal life,' comes like a breath of fresh air into the vitiated atmosphere of our modern fiction heated with passion and befogged by the vapors of unhealthy imagination. The notion common among novelists of a pseudo-educational school, that man must stray through quagmires of dissipation and starve in deserts of cynicism ere he can reach the serene heights where virtue dwells, is as pernicious in theory as it is unavailing in reform. Satiety is not virtue! These same teachers would hardly give a child arsenic to teach it the effect of poisonous drugs, or the rum bottle to educate it against intemperance. Let authors furnish more stepping stones of noble lives and their readers will be in less danger of tumbling into the morass against which they fain would point a warning finger-post.

Few writers of English fiction have depicted more beautiful characters than Mr. Shorthouse, and fewer yet possess that power of description which, with wonderful alchemy, transmutes into exquisite poetry his prose.

FORCE.

BY JOHN B. WOOD.

THE constitution of the material universe as revealed by science, briefly stated is this. Matter lies in two great divisions. One of these embraces ordinary gravitating matter, having three forms or modes of manifestation, as a solid, a liquid, or a gas. The other is the ethereal medium traversed by the waves of light and heat; itself invisible, unweighable, intangible.

All the changes and appearances of the material universe are cases of motion actual or potential obtaining among atoms, particles, masses; or through the medium before mentioned.

Given the matter with motions (conditioned in certain cases upon the kind of atoms or particles concerned) and the complexity of existence and change is logically inevitable. Mere continuity of existence, mere persistence, is rest obtaining in masses, particles, atoms, or in the medium; the latter, if absolute darkness and cold really are anywhere.

Rest itself is stated in terms of motion. It is dependent on conditions such that any one taken singly would determine motion of a definite rate and direction. While all together are equal in value and effect to two conditions of motion of equal rates in the same straight line; but pointing, as it does, towards the opposite portions of limitless space.

When, therefore, any inquiry is started as to the cause of any material fact or change, we are in reality busying ourselves about the cause of some motion or motions.

Now from experiments and observations interpreted by mathematical analysis, any case of motion is found to be conditioned by circumstances belonging to one or both of two possible classes. Those which relate to the state of motion or of rest of the body at the instant logically precedent to the time with which the inquiry has to do, are of one class. The term generally used as descriptive is inertia. The term, though belonging to the older metaphysics which grudged life and action to "dead brute matter," will do. There is no word associated with the phenomenon indicated which is better. Those circumstances which relate to the placing of other bodies, effective at the time upon the body in question, belong to the second class. The word environment, though having a specialized meaning in relation to the Darwinian theory of organic progress, will not be inapt in regard to this class of causes.

Upon inertia and environment then, results depend. The motion of this earth of ours, at any point of its travel at the rate of some eighteen miles a second to complete its journey around the solar orb, depends in the first place upon its rate and direction of flight just before. And, in the second, upon the placing of all the gravitating bodies of the universe; not to speak of such dust, pebbles, and meteorites as strike it and become incorporated with it.

The path of a rifle projectile at any instant depends upon its line and rate of motion logically antecedent, and upon the earth and its atmosphere and whether there is a wind or not. The heat generated when a cannon ball strikes a steel plate is due to the rate, weight, direction, of motion, of the ball, and to the steel plate.

Now, inertia itself was a result. In inquiring then for the ultimate cause of motion, as long as inertia of motion is found it is plain we must push our inquiries backwards in time. That is we are logically referred to the infinite. Broadly speaking the earth moves at this moment because it moved some hundreds of thousands or millions of years ago. And if, as supposed, the solar system is because of the condensation and gravitation towards a focus of the parts of a nebulous fog, for as long as motion of those parts is assumed, must the ultimate cause of this earth's motion on that side of the investigation elude mental analysis. Back of the nebula in motion—what?—more motion of times older still.

And so of rest. This pebble in a sand bank is there surrounded by its neighbor pebbles, boulders, and sand grains—motionless; and has been so for years on years. Gravitation pulls from moment to moment towards the earth-centre four thousand odd miles away. Every bit of matter in fact, in the universe tugs at it and has tugged at it for long sweeps of time. But the resistance to compression of the particles of the underlying beds of sand and rock, the ball of the vast earth; in fact refuses now as in former times to move into any smaller space and so the pebble is there in what we call its place, still, motionless. Now why is it there? We are. as before, referred from instant to instant backward. Tendencies to motion exactly counterbalanced are found from instant to instant backwards in time until in some day of old we come to that time when the waters deposited it and covered it over. Back of that (perchance) floating cakes of ice, or a slow moving glacier had moved the piece of which our pebble is a worn down remnant. In a still earlier day, grain by grain of it had been slowly dropped, to be built in solidly together, under the waters of the sea. And so on and on the mind flies. And back of all are the same fire mists and moving portions of the condensing gravitating nebula of the solar system.

On this side then cause escapes us. Now the environment. Not as to existence but as to influence. Can we do any better?

Why is it that attraction and repulsion take place between bodies, particles, or atoms? Why does the earth instead of flying on through space in a straight line bend away to arch its line of travel around the sun? Why does a rubber ball flung against the ground recover its shape and by an outward thrust of its elastic particles leap backwards in the air? Why does one cubic inch of water transformed to steam, need seventeen hundred inches of elbow-room; and why will the particles fly asunder to push a piston or sound a whistle in the hurry of their enlargement and escape? Why such motions or tendencies to motion?

The answer usually given is this. This or that force is the cause. The force of gravitation sways the earth inwards towards the solar ball. The force of elasticity allows the particles of rubber to push violently outwards. The force of heat sets the water particles in rapid motion (relative to the mean places which they occupy in the mass) so that the effect is that of a highly elastic body.

In all cases it is assumed that force is a something which really exists; and that the existence of the force is necessary to explain and does in fact explain the phenomena.

Now that uneasy skepticism which will not admit propositions as truths without evidence asks, if you please, a little disturbing question—"What fact testifies in favor of force as an existence?"

We see the facts of the placings of bodies, particles, or atoms. We see the facts of the motions or tendencies to motion towards or away from each other. And that is all that experience makes of it. In its most general expression, experience says "it moves." To say additionally "the force caused the motion" is only a repetition in other language of the bare statement "it moves." For if any thing more is in the second proposition than that the facts were so, what can the anything more really be? What is the force and where? Take gravitation. Is the force in the moving body, in the other bodies or in both; is it in space between bodies? Does it extend in a line, as for example, now at this moment, from the solar centre to the place unknown, where some unseen unknown comet flies; destined to appear to astonished millions on the earth in some tens or hundreds of thousands of years from now? Does it pervade space without filling it? an ocean of influence through which any cometic haze may make its way at the rate of some miles a second without breach of continuity either of force or comet, an example of joint tenancy (as lawyers would say) of space. And how is its pull conceivable? Grant its existence and can the force of gravitation pull matter, or some other force push it, any better than matter can pull or push other matter across an interspace? Do we not want a cause for the cause, a why for the why, a stone under the tortoise which carries the elephant which carries the world? Is our force, in other words, any more than so much more matter wearing a disguise and imposing himself on credulous people as being an aristocrat of mysterious origin and superior nature to the commonplace individual which fills space and moves in it, known to us all and seen every day, a plain, vulgar matter of fact sort of a being?

It is perhaps here said by somebody that there are many things which we do not understand, which, nevertheless, not only may but must be believed and accepted. Most true. But this appeal to ignorance should have come in at an earlier stage of the inquiry. A fact must be believed in whether we can place it logically or not, whether we can know what its relations to other things are, whether we can understand its whys and wherefores or not. Force is brought in because we cannot understand why matter acts on matter through an interspace; why not stop just there, why not believe in the fact of action across space. Why go into architectural construction on a basis of a hypothetical force which needs the faith denied to the certain fact?

Force, then, does not exist in fact. Its only existence is ideal, symbolic. The word has a real meaning. One of the highest importance and value. Force exists as a thought not as a thing.

Let us explain. Instead of stating all the conditions of any actual fact in concrete terms, we say that it was due to a certain

force or forces. Take the case of a stone falling to the earth from rest. Instead of particulars about the amount of matter in the stone and the earth, the distance of each from the common center of gravity, the times and rates of motion towards that center under the circumstances, instead of that sort of statement we use the general expression "force of gravitation" to describe the happening. By this we really imply not only that the particular fact depended upon natural laws and relationship, that it was a part of the order of nature; but that it was one case of a class. That it was one of a possible infinity of facts all subjected to natural law and conditioned by existence and events. We in effect say that the mathematical expression of the values of space, time, matter, and motion, involved in the particular case, in its most general form is good for the infinity of space, time, matter, and motion. So far, that is, as we are entitled to make any assertions concerning the infinite.

Force is thus the name of the generalized cause of any event, just as motion is the name of any event. A little analysis will disclose why it has been supposed to be the name of some thing, existent. In all cases of motion there must be a condition of motion. But no one concrete condition is such in any other case of motion than its own. Motion in the abstract seems to require a condition, a unity of cause, in the abstract. Give a general name and, though only ideal, it seems to denote an existence really correspondent in fact. It is forgotten that there is no such entity as motion in the abstract. Motion must always be the motion of some thing, in some definite direction, of a definite rate, of a definite kind. The question is not then about motion at large, but motions. The inquiry as to the cause of motion is in reality a search for the peculiarity in respect of which all conditions of motions resemble each other.

The mistake made is as if an algebraist having shown that $(a+b)(a-b) = a^2 - b^2$, should go on after this fashion. "Now this is true of any two numbers whatever. But as 6 and 4 cannot represent any numbers but 6 and 4 (and so of any pair of numbers), there must be some real entities immanent in numbers, but not being numbers, of which it is true that the product of their sum and difference is equal to the difference of their squares." Or as if one were to say: "This, that, and the other bodies all agree in this one quality or condition, to wit: the filling of space; but, as no one body occupies the very space occupied by another body, therefore there must be an abstract existence or reality, Body; which entity is that by virtue of which each individual concrete body fills its own individual space."

Besides the confusion of thought created by a general name there is another potent factor. Force is especially translatable into an outside existence, because man projects outside of himself his own feelings and pictures external nature as to some extent resembling himself In this way the feeling of effort, antecedent to observed motion derived from the agency of man and animals gave rise to the notion of a power possessed by conscious natural agents, antecedent to motion, when animal conscious effort was out of the question. And when the ideas of conscious natural agents exerting power faded away, the names given to them kept alive the belief in a resident something distinct from nature which determined all material activities.

Force is no more a cause in the mental than in the material world. Whether we deal with sensation and perception as the later terms of a series which begins with material existences and activities and proceeds from the objective and outward to the subjective and inward; or travel from the formed purpose to the muscular antecedents to material motion, from mind to matter; or deal with the correlations of mental facts—in any and all cases we cannot put our finger on force as a thing, a cause. We are only ascertaining similarities of the conditions of phenomena and giving names to those similarities.

Metaphysicians who spell all the high abstractions with capital letters and treat them more or less as real beings, will not have it said that we are conscious of matter exerting a force upon mind. But the turn of expression is fully as justifiable as the converse assertion that mind is conscious of force exerted upon matter. And so of volition, such metaphysicians hold it to be unforced. To save free-will the "I, the self, or soul, willed without cause." It is forgotten that the "I" is itself an effect; itself a phenomenon acting and being manifested according to certain conditions, laws, formulas, descriptive of the modes of activity. If the logic which makes of Force or Cause a reality is good for anything, there must be an abstract soul-force separate and outstanding from the concrete individuality; which high abstraction is the true force necessitating all mental states and absolutely dominating the much-to-be-saved Free-Will, which soul-force is itself forced or caused.

FORCE AND CAUSATION.

EDITORIAL COMMENT UPON MR. JOHN B. WOOD'S ESSAY.

Mr. John B. Wood's essay on Force, treats a subject which is intimately connected with the problem of causation as it has been explained in the editorials of THE OPEN COURT, Nos 55, 58, 59, and 60. The whole trend of Mr. Wood's argumentation is the same as that presented by THE OPEN COURT. The term "Cause" must be restricted to "motions which produce changes." Causes are always single facts, real events, that happen in a certain place and at a certain time. From the term "cause" the "reasons why" causes take effect, why certain motions produce certain changes must be carefully excluded. The reasons, or grounds, or *raisons d'être*, are not single facts or events but abstract conceptions. Many phenomena of the same kind are generalized and formulated as a natural law. All natural laws are abstractions. Gravitation is a natural law in which all cases of gravity are formulated. Gravity (the force which is treated in gravitation) is an abstract also; it does not exist as a thing of itself behind the phenomena of gravitation. It has been abstracted by a mental process from all phenomena of gravitation, and the idea of gravity serves the very useful purpose of facilitating our comprehension *

It is an enormous economy of thought that we are enabled to think all gravitating phenomena by one concept; and to view all phenomena of one kind from one point is the nature of the process of comprehension.

There are philosophers who imagine that the *raisons d'être* (which they call and confound with causes) are realities, and these realities are supposed to be the real agents behind phenomena. Such philosophers speak of "the cause of gravity," meaning thereby the *raison d'être*, the more general law which will comprise the generalization "gravity" as one special kind and thus will explain it. This *raison d'être* of gravity, just as much as gravitation and gravity, is an abstract and does not exist of itself except in our mind where it is employed in economizing thought.

All forces have been abstracted from natural phenomena for the purpose of explaining natural phenomena, for the purpose of classing all phenomena of one kind together and determining their relations, their similarities to, and differences from other groups of phenomena. Now such philosophers as are not able to discriminate between causes and *raisons d'être* imagine that the forces are the real things to be explained. If we could but explain these forces, they imagine we would be in possession of the key to all problems of nature. Forces, however, being mere abstracts must appear to them like phantoms that elude all our means of grasping them and escape us like the shadows of ghosts. Hence the dogma of the ultimate Unknowability of natural phenomena which is believed in so confidently by all who do not clearly see that forces are

* The phenomena of nature affecting one or several of our senses, are mirrored in our brain as images.

mere abstracts, that natural laws are mere formulas comprising many cases of the same kind and abstracted from these single causes—and that neither forces nor natural laws are causes.

Mr. Wood's term "inertia" corresponds in one phase to "cause," and his expression "environment" to "circumstances" in the editorial of THE OPEN COURT, No. 55. Both causes as well as circumstances have to be taken into consideration in comprehending the process of causation.

We agree with Mr. Wood that a "soul-force," no more than any other force, can be conceived as a reality of itself. But we do not believe that this idea has been invented merely to save the theory of free-will. Free-will is often wrongly conceived as an unaccountable fact in the world of natural phenomena as by its very nature it is supposed *not* to be subject to law. The 'necessary determination of a free will' is confounded with 'the forced result of a will that acts under compulsion.' Both (though so different), being identified, free will is either rejected as a nonsense and impossibility, or it is claimed to be an exception in the general order of nature. Free will and the responsibility of man for his actions in case he is not under any compulsion do not at all stand in contradiction to the conception of Determinism which holds that all natural phenomena (and man's volition not excepted) are subject to and can be explained by law. P. C.

WASTED LOVE.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

How many hearts, since first with upturned eyes
Our fathers sought the silent waste and kneeled,
Have burnt their offering in flames revealed
To no man's sight, beneath unconscious skies!

Lost in the void, innumerable, they rise
And err amid the dark of space, congealed
With fumes from altar, stake, and battle-field
That reeked with blood of human sacrifice.

O heart, our earth is cold for waste of love.
Without thy warmth there is no fire can heat
The poor man's hearth—what need the gods above?—

Without thy warmth no raging blast is meet
To fine our gold and cure the curse thereof;
Without thy flame no torch for wandering feet.

DAISIES.

BY ELISSA M. MOORE.

"Wee, modest, crimson-tipped flower
Thou's met me in an evil hour."—*Burns.*

DEAR little flower with golden heart
The poet still must take your part;
For you the "Inspired Ploughman" sang,
And through the world your praises rang.

"Wee, modest, crimson-tipped flower,"
It surely was no evil hour
In which his plough-share did you wrong
And brought a burst of wondrous song.

A peasant-poet—mother earth
Held you both fast from hour of birth—
He could not see you die unmoved,
You formed a part of all he loved.

The fair, wee, flower, the fair, wee wife;
The simple loves of simple life
That live through time, and will not pass
While red-tipped daisies deck the grass.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THREE STATEMENTS!

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

In Jan. 31st issue, pages 1442–44 inclusive is an article that ought to be read by every intelligent husband and wife—man and woman—on the face of this globe. It so accurately and vividly describes results that are awful to contemplate, that an intelligent contemplation, and synthetical and analytical comparison of elements should move multitudes to an honest and earnest search for the real causes which create such inevitable—with the view to a radical, absolute, certain remedy.

I here aver that there are but three (3) potential causes, aside from the innate, God-made, organizations of man—*viz.*:

1. A wicked financial system.
2. An inequitable taxation system.
5. Unwise, unpatriotic, vicious tariff system.

I also allege, that if the intelligence, integrity, and inherent patriotism of man for the truth, justice, and equity, should solve these three (3) propositions in the true interest of man in majorities, within the domain of our United States government, by constitutional methods; you, and all others would be relieved from talking, writing, and publishing any future polemic in the field of possible ethics, save as to the actual transgression by the first pair; the true and only purpose of Christ's advent; and the grand possibilities in reach for man, here—in Paradise—in all eternity.

I am prepared to prove beyond the possibility of successful argument, controversy, and doubt, that my hereinbefore statements are absolutely correct, as also there are but three (3) conditions standing in the way of a very near realization of the blessed possibilities coiled up in said propositions for man's good—*viz.*:

1. Ignorance.—2. Prejudice.—3. Interests.

"The way is so plain——."

INDEPENDENCE, IA. L. H. WELLER.

WHEELBARROW AND LAND VALUES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

* * * WHEELBARROW seems to be unable to distinguish between land and land-values, but there is no difficulty in it if he will do a little solid thinking. Let him first find out what value is, and then not confound it with anything else. May be we can help him a little. Suppose we say that value is what people will give for a thing. Now land may be very useful and yet worth nothing. No matter *how* useful it may be no one will give anything for it if they can get just as good without buying it. If watches like Wheelbarrow's were free, then watches of that grade would be worth nothing, although they might be very useful timekeepers. When particular land, for any reason, is wanted by more than one person, then a value attaches, and that value is just what any one of them will give for its exclusive use. It is the competition which makes the value at all, and the greater the competition the greater the value, and it is this value which is proposed to be taken under the single tax. Recognizing the equal right of every man, not only to land at all, but to any particular land, then if two or more want the same land the only way to satisify the rights of all of them and determine which shall have it, is to turn it over to the one who will pay the most into a common fund for them all, and in which they all share alike. If it was proposed to tax land, as such, then all land would be taxed; but it is only valuable land which we seek to tax, and just in proportion to its value. Now can Wheelbarrow understand how that land is something "that attaches to land by the growth of the community?" Growth of the community, increase in population, and increase in competition are synonomous terms, and are only different ways of stating the cause of land values. * * *

RAVENSWOOD, ILL. W. H. VAN ORNUM.

THE SINGLE-TAX.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

It is questionable whether any class of reformers is subjected to so much ill-digested criticism as the advanced political economist. * * * Magazine and newspaper readers are being daily entertained by critics who each in his own way "exposes the fallacies" of Henry George. Not the least amusing phase of the onslaught is that these fault-finders seem perfectly oblivious of the fact that in their zeal to forever squelch Henry George, they run counter to established laws, established because in conformity to and based upon, natural laws. * * *

In THE OPEN COURT of January 17th is an article by "Wheelbarrow," who makes bold to say at the outset that he has not only read but *devoured* "Progress and Poverty." Granted that "Wheelbarrow" has inherited the average intellect and really believes that he understands the subject, there is no escaping the inference that the proclaiming of the truth is a hopeless task indeed. He has certainly set up and has probably demolished his man of straw, but he has not seen the central truth of the book he discusses. For instance he makes the statement that while the justice and practicability of Mr. George's land-tax plan is evident, he parts company from him almost from the beginning because of fundamental errors. That is to say: Mr. George's doctrine is fundamentally wrong, but the land-tax scheme is all right. How any plan can be just and still be fundamentally wrong, must be left to others to determine at their leisure. The main purpose of this letter shall be to state succinctly what "Progress and Poverty" does teach.

The basic truth upon which the philosophy of Henry George rests is that the natural resources—the raw material storehouse—belong to the whole people, not to a few. If this truth can be confuted, then, not only the "single-tax" plan must fall unsupported, but the Declaration of Independence must take its place among meaningless homilies. It were mockery to declare to men the "right to life" unless it include the right to the *means* of life. And there cannot be an equal right to the means of life, where land, the source of all wealth, is made the absolute property of individuals. The "single-tax" technicality is but a part of the means by which this right can be asserted. The "single-tax," ideally will, it is believed, secure that right as completely as human enactment can. * * * The value of natural opportunities being denoted by the law of rent, the justice of taking this fund for public purposes cannot be questioned. Society by such an act takes but its own. It does more (so far as conforming to natural law and enforcing justice is concerned), for while taking its own and that alone, it will leave to every individual the full and well earned result of his toil, whether by brain or hand. There is still another result from this simple act of justice, besides a more equitable distribution. It is that the aggregate of *production would be immeasurably increased.* In fact it would only be limited by human desire or the exhaustibility of nature, each of which it is held, is infinite. The ability of man aided by machinery to extract from nature as much or more than he can desire, is not in dispute. It is only because our taxing laws have artificially checked production, the same iniquitous condition diverting the bulk of the product into the coffers of the few instead of the many, that involuntary poverty exists in our advanced civilization.

The "single-tax" men believe that the Declaration of Independence if taken from the archives of forgotton lore, honestly interpreted and lived up to by the people of these United States or any other country, is an all-sufficient remedy for current industrial and social ills. There is a power in that old document, which if let loose would surprise and satisfy the most radical of those who long for better days.

JAMES MALCOLM.

HENRY GEORGE'S MISSION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WHEELBARROW's position concerning land-taxation, I believe to be sober and just. He agrees with Henry George on the main point, *viz.*, the justice and practicability of land-taxation. The *a priori* argument that land is God's gift, given to all men alike, is futile. I do not see why on this basis the Americans should not send rent, or taxes, or whatever you call it, to the Greenlanders because the American soil is richer than that of Greenland. The only argument in favor of land-taxation can be found in experience "by a fair trial."

It is perhaps natural that a man like Henry George, convinced of the importance of land-taxation, exaggerates the effects of his proposed remedy. He is an enthusiast, and he makes a religion of his cause, but his cause is a good one; and when the exaggerations are so recognized as to be no longer misleading, some good will come from it.

One of the main causes of poverty, it seems to me, is the difficulty for men of a special talent to find their proper places. This difficulty will increase the more our industry becomes specialized and it would remain at least the same under the conditions proposed by Henry George. Would the inventors, the authors, the artists, the musicians be really helped if a last resource were open to them all in farming, of which they most likely understand but little? I know of an author of some prominence who emigrated from the British Islands to our country. Twice a farm was procured for him with the pecuniary assistance of friends, and he failed twice most decidedly.

The weakest part of Henry George's land scheme, it seems, is that he so little appreciates the rights of the present land-owners. Think of a farmer-tenant who buys his farm, paying for it with the sweat of his brow, would he not be entitled to a compensation if the George scheme were realized? There have been changes in the social constitution of mankind by which whole classes of society, or single individuals had to suffer, and whenever it was possible the state arranged to pay them off or to sell them out. Why should it not be done in this case. There is nothing which so much prevents the acceptance of Henry George's view as does his unfair method of indiscriminately classing land owners among pirates, robbers, and parasites. In this he is out-Georged by his followers, especially by the Rev. Doctor McGlynn. Historical rights need not be maintained, they can be changed by legislation, but they have to be considered, and every abolition of antiquated rights is to be done with fairness.

Moreover Wheelbarrow is right that sudden changes are dangerous. If our custom-houses were torn down to-day, if free trade were suddenly established and a single tax levied on land, this would bring about a general bankruptcy and an unprecedented panic. Think only of the failures of those saving banks which possess large stocks in mortgages on land! And that would be a mere trifle in a universal deluge. The sharks would have an excellent time!

I had once the pleasure of meeting Mr. George personally and pointed out to him these difficulties to his land scheme. He kindly admitted all—perhaps from mere politeness—"It is all true," he said; "but," he added, "any one who takes the lead in a movement must push it to its extreme and demand not the half but the whole; he must leave compromises to others."

Very well! The leader of a party, the general of an army must act in this way. Mr. George is not a scientist, not an unbiassed economist, although he has proved that he has the capacity of being one—he is the creator and head of a party, as such he must be judged and as such he has a great mission.

OBSERVER.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXI.—Continued.

"Mr. Hummel," began Hahn, somewhat indistinctly, for it was difficult for him to speak in his emotion, "I shall never forget this hour to the end of my life." He wished to go up to him and give him his hand, but the tears streamed from his eyes and he was obliged to cover his face with his pocket-handkerchief.

"Be seated," said Hummel, pushing him down on the sofa; "steadiness and stoicism are always the main thing; they are better than Chinese toys. I shall say nothing further to-day, and you must say nothing to me of this occurrence. To morrow everything will be made smooth before the notary and the registrar, and interest must be punctually paid, quarterly; for the rest, our relation to each other remains the same. For, you see, we are not merely men, we are also business people. As a man, I well know what are your good points, even when you complain of me. But our houses and our business do not agree. We have been opponents twenty years, felt against straw, with our hobbies and our trellis-work fences. That may remain so; what is not harmonious need not harmonize. When you call me bristles and felt, I will be coarse to you, and I will consider you as a straw blockhead as often as I am angry with you. But with all that, we may have, as now, private business together; and if ever, which I hope will never happen, robbers should plunder me, you will do for me as much as you can. This I know and have always known, and therefore I am come to you to-day."

Hahn gave him a look of warm gratitude, and again raised his pocket-handkerchief.

Hummel laid his hand heavily upon his head, as with a little child and said, gently, "You are a visionary, Hahn. The doctor is ready now; sign, and do not either of you take this misfortune too much to heart. There," he continued, strewing sand over the paper carefully, "to-morrow, about nine o'clock, I will send my solicitor to your office. Stay where you are; the staircase is badly lighted, but I shall find my way. Good night."

He entered the street, and looked contemptuously at the hostile walls. "No mortgage?" he muttered. "H. Hummel, first and last, twenty thousand." At home he vouchsafed some comforting words to his ladies. "I have heard that the people there will be able to pull through, so I forbid further lamenting. If ever, in conformity with miserable fashion, you should need a straw hat, you may take your money rather to the Hahns than to others; I give my permission."

Some days after Fritz Hahn entered the small office of Mr. Hummel. The latter motioned to his bookkeeper to withdraw, and began, coolly, from his arm chair, "What do you bring me, Doctor?"

"My father feels it a duty to meet the great confidence that you have shown him, by giving you an insight into the state of his business, and begs you to assist him in his arrangements. He is of opinion, that until this disastrous affair has passed over, he should do nothing important without your assent."

Hummel laughed. "What! I am to give advice, and that too, in the management of your business? You would put me in a position that is preposterous, and one against which I protest."

The Doctor silently placed before him a statement of assets and liabilities.

"You are a sharp customer," cried Hummel, "but for an old fox this trap is not cunningly enough laid." With that he looked at the credit and debit, and took a pencil in his hand. "Here I find among the assets five hundred thalers for books that are to be sold. I did not know that your father had this hobby also."

"They are my books, Mr. Hummel. I have of late years spent more money upon these than was absolutely necessary for my work. I am determined to sell what I can do without; a book-dealer has already offered to pay this sum in two instalments."

"The sheriff is never allowed to levy on instruments of trade," said Hummel, making a stroke through that entry in the ledger. "I believe, indeed, that they are unreadable stuff, but the world has many dark corners; and as you have a fancy to be an anomalous dick among your fellows, you shall remain in your hole." He regarded the Doctor with an ironical twinkle in his eye. "Have you nothing further to say? I do not mean with reference to your father's business, I have nothing further to do with that, but upon another subject, which you yourself seem to carry on; from your movements of late you evidently wish to associate yourself with my daughter Laura?"

The Doctor colored. "I should have chosen another day for the declaration which you now demand of me. But it is my anxious wish to come to an understanding with you concerning it. I have long entertained a secret hope that time would lessen your aversion to me."

"Time?" interrupted Hummel; "that's absurd."

"Now by the noble assistance which you have extended to my father, I am placed in a position towards you which is so painful to me that I must beg of you not to refuse me your sympathy. With strenuous exertion and fortunate circumstances it would now be years before I could acquire a position to maintain a wife."

* Translation copyrighted.

"Starving trade," interposed Mr. Hummel, in a grumbling tone.

"I love your daughter and I cannot sacrifice this feeling. But I have lost the prospect of offering her a future which could in some measure answer to what she is entitled to expect; and the helping hand which you have extended to my father makes me so dependent on you that I must avoid what would excite your displeasure. Therefore I see a desolate future before me."

"Exactly as I prophesied," replied Mr. Hummel, "wretched and weak."

The Doctor drew back, but at the same time he laid his hand on his neighbor's arm. "This manner of language will serve you no longer, Mr. Hummel," said he smiling.

"Noble, but abject," repeated Hummel with satisfaction. "You should be ashamed, sir; do you pretend to be a lover? You wish to know how to please my daughter Laura, such an evasive, forlorn specimen as you? Will you regulate your feelings according to my mortgage? If you are in love, I expect that you should conduct yourself like a rampant lion, jealous and fierce. Bah, sir! you are a beautiful Adonis to me, or whatever else that fellow Nicodemus was called."

"Mr. Hummel, I ask for your daughter's hand," cried the Doctor.

"I refuse it you," cried Hummel. "You mistake my words. I do not think of throwing my daughter into this bargain also. But you must not misunderstand my refusal to give you my daughter; your duty is to pursue her more fiercely than ever. You must attack me, and force yourself into my house; in return for which I reserve to myself the right to show you the way out. But I have always said it, you are wanting in courage."

"Mr. Hummel," replied the Doctor, with dignity, "allow me to remark that you should no longer be on the offensive with me."

"Why not?" asked Hummel.

The Doctor pointed to the papers.

"What has happened in this matter makes it difficult for me to use strong language to you. It can be no pleasure to you to attack one who cannot defend himself."

"These pretentions are really ridiculous," replied Hummel. "Because I have given you my money must I cease to treat you as you deserve? Because you, perhaps, are not disinclined to marry my daughter, am I to stroke you with a velvet brush? Did one ever hear such nonsense?"

"You mistake," continued the Doctor, civilly, "if you think that I am not in a position to answer what you say. I therefore do myself the honor of remarking to you that your mockery is so wounding that even the kindness you have shown loses its value."

"Have done with your kindness—it was only kindness from revenge."

"Then I will as honestly tell you," continued the Doctor, "that it was a very bitter hour to me when you entered our house. I knew how oppressive the obligation which you then conferred upon us would be for the rest of my life. But I looked at my poor father, and the thought of his misery closed my mouth. For my own part, I would rather have begged my bread than taken your money."

"Go on," cried Hummel.

"What you have done for my father does not give you a right to ill-treat me. This conversation strengthens me in the conviction that I have had from the outset, that we must exert ourselves to the utmost to repay you the money we have received, as soon as possible. You have crossed out the item in which I credited my books, but I shall sell them."

"Nonsense!" exclaimed Hummel.

"I shall do it, however insignificant the sum may be in comparison with our debt, because the tyranny which you wish to exercise over me threatens to become insupportable. I at least will not be indebted to you in this way."

"Yet you wish it in another way that suits you better."

"Yes," replied the Doctor. "As you have so contemptuously rejected the greatest sacrifice I could make, I shall continue to woo your daughter, even against your will. I shall endeavor to speak to her whenever I can, and to make myself as acceptable to her as is possible in my position. You yourself have shown me this way. You will therefore be satisfied if I enter upon it, and if you are not, I shall pay no regard to your displeasure."

"At last," cried Hummel, "it all comes to light. I see now that you have some fire in you; therefore we will talk quietly over this business. You are not the husband whom I could have wished for my daughter. I have kept you away from my house, but it has been of no use, for a cursed sentiment has arisen between you; I therefore intend now to carry on the affair differently. I shall not object to you coming to my house sometimes. I depend upon your doing it with discretion. I will ignore your presence, and my daughter shall have an opportunity of seeing how you compare with the four walls. We will both await the result."

"I do not agree to this proposal," replied the Doctor. "I do not expect that you should give me your daughter's hand now, and I only accept the entrance into your family on condition that you yourself will treat me as becomes a guest in your house, and that you will perform the duties of a friendly host, I can-

not suffer that you should speak to me in the way you have done in our conversation to-day. Any insult, either by words or by neglect, I will not bear from you. I am not only desirous to please your daughter, but also to be agreeable to yourself. For that I demand opportunity. If you do not agree to this condition, I prefer not to come at all."

"Humboldt, do not undertake too much at once," replied Mr. Hummel, shaking his head, "for you see I esteem you, but I really do not like you. Therefore I will consider how far I can make myself pleasant to you; I assure you it will be hard work. Meanwhile, take these papers with you. Your father has bought the lesson, that he should himself look after of his own money affairs. For the rest, matters are not in a bad state, and he will be able to help himself out of it; you do not need either me or another. Good morning, Doctor."

The doctor took the papers under his arm.

"I beg you to shake hands, Mr. Hummel."

"Not so hastily," replied Hummel.

"I am sorry for it," said the Doctor, smiling, "but I cannot be denied to-day."

"Only from innate politeness," rejoined Hummel, "not from good will."

He held out his large hand to him.

"Keep your books," he cried out, to the departing visitor. "I can see through that scheme, you will buy them again, and then I shall have to pay for them anyhow."

CHAPTER XXXII.

A CHAPTER FROM TACITUS.

Tobias Bachhuber! when your sponsors concluded that you should be called Tobias they did bad service to you and your descendants. For he who bears that name is by fate subjected to experiences that do not fall to the lot of more favorably named men. Who ever passed so miserable a honey-moon as Tobias the younger, the poor son of the blind man? For was he not obliged to fast, and to struggle with a murderous spirit just at a time when a spiritual struggle would be highly disagreeable to any mortal? Even you, blessed Bachhuber, have bitterly experienced the misfortune of your name. Whether the fatal war with Sweden may have arisen because the Swedes hankered after your manuscript, will not be discussed here; it is to be hoped that new historical investigations may yet bring this secret motive of action to light. But it cannot be denied that you yourself suffered lamentably in the war, and the curse of your name still clings to the treasure which you concealed. All who have anything to do with it have their eyes blinded, and an evil spirit destroys their hopes.

The Professor also was tormented with this blindness, and troubled by the demon. He had found nothing. Many would have been weary and given it up, but his eagerness only increased, for he did not, by any means, search heedlessly; he knew very well that the discovery depended on a long chain of accidents which were beyond all calculation. But he wished to do all in his power; his task was to give assurance to the learned of the world that the archives, collections, and inventories of the Sovereign had been thoroughly examined. This certainty at least he could obtain better than any one else, and he would thus do his duty both to the Sovereign and to Learning. But his impatience became more eager, and the cheerful excitement he felt at first increased to uncomfortable agitation; constant disappointment disturbed his daily frame of mind. He often sat lost in thought, nay, he was always speaking of the treasure, and Ilse could not please him; her objections and even her consolation wounded him, for he was very much vexed that she did not partake of his zeal. He knew accurately what would be the appearance of the manuscript—a large, thick quarto, very old characters, perhaps of the sixth century, much faded, and many leaves half destroyed, for he could not conceal from himself that the mischievous spirit of the times, water and the rats, might have made havoc with it.

One day the Professor entered the Princess's study with heightened color.

"At last I can bring you a good report. In a small bundle of deeds in the Marshal's office, which had hitherto unaccountably escaped me, I have found a lost entry on a single sheet. The chests which the official at Bielstein sent in the beginning of the last century to the vanished castle are briefly designated as numbers one and two, with a remark that they contained besides old cross-bows, arrows, &c., manuscripts of the monastery of Rossau. Thus, there were two chests with manuscripts of the monastery in them."

The Princess looked with curiosity at the sheet which he laid before her.

"It was high time that this account should come to light," continued the Professor, gaily; "for I confess to your Highness that the phantom pursued me day and night. This is a valuable confirmation that I am on the right path."

"Yes," cried the Princess, "I am convinced we shall find the treasure. If I could but help you a little. If it could be obtained by magic, I would gladly put on my magic girdle and call upon Lady Hecate. Unfortunately this mode of calling spirits to one's aid is out of date, and it is difficult to learn the secret art by which learned gentlemen unearth their treasures."

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

ESSAI SUR LA METHODE EN METAPHYSIQUE. *P. Dubuc*, Docteur ès-lettres, Professor de Philosophie, au Lycée Danson de Sailly, 1 Vol. Paris: 1887. Felix Alcan.

M. Dubuc, in his treatise, emphasizes the necessity incumbent upon metaphysicians to direct their efforts to the preliminary question of method. Modern philosophers have, indeed, attempted to organize metaphysics by the importation of scientific processes into their investigations of first principles and first causes. The Cartesian School had endeavored to construct the science of being by means of the mathematical method; the school of Locke and Condillac affected to attain the same result by the experimental method, and the Scottish School, by the psychological method. Finally Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason", opened a new pathway for philosophical studies. M. Dubuc is of opinion that this new method has not so much the power to build as the power to destroy. "It is the glory of those who devise new methods," he says, "that their theories—to the triumph of truth—are afterwards overturned through the power of new processes that their own ideas have introduced into science."

Consequently, he believes it possible, to abandon, in the work of Kant, the method of the system, and proceeding from the premises of the critique, to attain to a doctrine different from transcendental idealism and to effect a restoration of theistic and spiritualistic dogmatism.

THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. Abridged from the History by Prof. Mommsen. By *C. Bryans* and *F. J. R. Hendy*. New York: 1889. Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg.

"Our abridgment of the history of Prof. Mommsen," are the words of the preface to this work, "must of necessity give but a feeble and inadequate idea of the original; but something will have been accomplished if we have given some conception, however faint, of that original, and have induced fresh inquirers to read for themselves those pages so bright with wisdom and imagination." The text and spirit of Prof. Mommsen's researches have been studiously followed. No attempt has been made to compromise the differences that have arisen in the province of Roman historical criticism. In the treatment of all disputed points the authority of Mommsen, as conforming with the expressed purpose of the work, has been accepted and presented. The work of abridgment has been accomplished by Mr. Bryans and Mr. Hendy with commendable tact and felicity. Far from ever having descended into dullness, which they profess has been their purpose as far as possible to avoid, and which if present must be attributed to their unskillfulness, the authors have unquestionably heightened the character of their production by the infusion of personal sympathy and zeal for their task. The style is terse and graphic. So far as we have compared the abridgment with the original, the salient features of the great historian's work have been preserved. To each chapter is appended a list of authorities, and an epitome of the original sources of Roman history precedes the opening chapter. It has been thought wise not to insert maps. True, most of us have an atlas of Ancient Geography at hand, but those who have not will regret the omission. *μκρκ.*

Mr. Singleton W. Davis, of 916 Third Street, San Diego, Cal., has published a little work, *Sketches Of The Scientific Dispensation of a New Religion*, composed by the printer-author as he stood "before his congregation of sleeping type." Price 20 cents.

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D. C. Heath & Company, of Boston, have just published *Lamartine's Jeanne d'Arc*. The work is edited with notes and vocabulary by Prof. Albert Barrère, of Woolwich, England. It is intended to form an easy introduction into French prose for students of schools and colleges. The divisions seem well adapted to classroom purposes; the style is simple and suitable to young pupils.

Among the many interesting articles in this month's *Magazine of American History* is an entertaining sketch of German social and family life, by Gen. Alfred E. Lee. The picture Gen. Lee presents us, is written with enthusiasm and undoubted admiration of the amenities of life in Germany. The series "Historic Homes and Landmarks" is continued by Mrs. Martha J. Lamb; the interesting portraitures of early American life are drawn in attractive and sober characters.

We have received from Prof. G. T. W Patrick, of the State University of Iowa, a copy of his work upon Heraclitus of Ephesus. The essay, which consists of a translation of the Greek text of Bywater, with an historical and critical introduction, was accepted in 1888 as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins university. The fragments that the ingenuity and patience of scholars have collected and emended into an interpretable form, number one hundred and thirty. The scope of Heraclitean research, therefore, is limited. Moreover, this scanty collection of remnants has been made from the citations of other writers, from Plutarch and Philo, from Clement and Origen. The layman, thus, will hardly understand the critical and scholastic labor expended in this branch of philosophical inquiry. "But the interest of the philosopher of Ephesus," says Professor Patrick, "is historical;" the way to study philosophy we have discovered to be investigation of its history; we are to seek in these and like fragments the sources of errors as well as the genesis of doctrines. Notwithstanding the academical character of its title, the style and spirit of the monograph is within the reach of even tyros in the history of philosophy. *The Fragments of the Work of Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature.* N. Murray, Baltimore.

NOTES.

The essays of Th. Ribot upon the "Psychology of Attention" have just been published in book form by Félix Alcan, of Paris. We shall have occasion to note M Ribot's work more particularly in a later issue.

The second edition, revised and enlarged, of Lucien Arréat's *La Morale dans le Drame, l'Epopée et le Roman*, (Félix Alcan, Paris), has appeared. The work will be reviewed in a future number of THE OPEN COURT.

We have received an attractive little pamphlet from E. Petavel-Olliff, of Lausanne, entitled, *Coup D'Oeil sur l'Immortalite Facultative*, treating of the historical and theological genesis of the idea of immortality. An appendix is added with a list of Bible references from which the biblical theory of immortality may be derived.

A life-sized statue of Giordano Bruno is to be erected, in May next, upon the Campo de Fioro, at Rome. The consent of the municipality has been obtained, and history will now do justice to the proto-martyr of liberal thought on the very spot where three hundred and eighty-nine years ago he was burnt alive. A committee for the United States has been appointed to assist in raising funds. Their names are, Robert Ingersoll, T. B. Wakeman, Daniel G. Thompson, and Thomas Davidson Subscriptions from $1.00 upwards to be sent to the treasurer, T. B. Wakeman, 93 Nassau St., N. Y. City. We hope that America will contribute generously to this noble project

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

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THE OLD AND THE NEW MATHEMATICS. EDITOR.No. 77.
A FLAW IN THE FOUNDATION OF GEOMETRY. HERMANN GRASSMANN.....No. 77.

IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called, *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal. The relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

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Much criticism has been elicited by the bare mention of Mr. George's economical doctrines—indubitable testimony of their popularity and strength. Letters have appeared in No. 79 and others will follow.

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Under the title of "Aspects, Christian and Human," Mr. W. R. Thayer maintains in lucid and earnest language that the influences and forces to which the great changes wrought in modern society must be attributed, have not proceeded from sources essentially Christian. These advances are distinctly secular and human in character. "Not the preacher, but the poet: not the politician, but the untrammelled agitator, men whose tongues were free, and whose hearts were fearless, have been the heralds and champions of better things."

The Open Court.

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THE DILEMMA OF A DOUBLE ALLEGIANCE.

THE SAMOA QUESTION FROM AN ETHICAL STANDPOINT.

BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

Eight years ago, when Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, Col. Ingersoll in an effervescence of loyalty to the "plumed knight," said, "Now we shall have more of the Eagle in our foreign politics, and less of the Owl." The contrast was impressive, and the extremes thus figuratively shown described the situation.

Again is Mr. Blaine the minister for Foreign affairs, and the old comparison is revived. The Owl retires, and the Eagle towers in his former pride of place. It may not be certain which is the more valuable bird in the qualities of intellect and wisdom, but there can be no doubt that the Eagle is most popular. For all that, should Nature form a ministry in a republic of birds, the Eagle might be Secretary of War, but the Owl would be Secretary of State.

The American air throbs with electric passion, as when the "long roll" is beaten on drums. Our politics is highly seasoned with saltpetre. The old war-spirit that must have battle-food once in a generation, is hungry again. The most popular man is the aggressive man; the loud and arrogant preacher of the inverted and perverted gospel, "strife on earth, ill-will to men."

The Indian savage who votes for peace stands dishonored in his tribe; he is called a squaw. Our Christian men, although absolutely secure from hostile tribes of other Christian men, shiver at the nickname like the savage. A statesman in the American Congress, recently said that a foreign war was desirable in order to unite the "two sections" of our own people in the bonds of peace. His colleague echoed the sentiment, and there were no statesmen in the capitol brave enough to rebuke it. They feared the nickname. All joined in the Satanic benediction, "Blessed is the warmaker, for he shall inherit contracts and gold. He shall set brother against brother, and lay taxes upon generations yet unborn;

> 'His pride and hate shall make this green earth red,
> And wives and children speak his name with dread.' "

It is charged by doleful soothsayers that the American Republic is falling apart, because of its inherent moral weakness; and members of the American Congress plead guilty to the charge. Shall this plea recorded inside the capitol be confessed by the people outside? Shall it go forth to the envious world that this enlightened government must perish by reason of its righteousness, and that the "two sections" of it cannot live in domestic peace unless engaged in foreign war? If that is true, we ought to celebrate the centennial of the constitution not in gladness but in sorrow.

A nation with an appetite for war can easily find reasons for a fight. At this moment we are lucky as the ass between two bundles of hay, and like him we know not which to enjoy. We are blessed with two quarrels, one with England about Canada, and another with Germany about Samoa. Either can be inflated into a big enough pretext for war. Shall we fight England or Germany?

The inaugural message talks at Germany. It says nothing about the codfish dispute with England, but significantly hints that our "coaling stations" must be preserved. The importance of our "coaling station" at Samoa, was pointed out by the consul in his information that we have no coal at Samoa, never had any coal there, and need none there. "No matter," said the Department, "send some coal there. Let it not be said that the absence of a few bushels of coal at Samoa furnished a pretext for peace."

The coal is on the way to Samoa.

The very hint of war with Germany or England brings a novel question into American debate. It presents to the Germans and the English who are citizens of the United States the dilemma of double allegiance. What is the ethics of patriotism that must guide them in case of actual war? How shall they apportion their allegiance between the land of their fathers and the land of their children? This is a question almost appalling in its pressure upon the conscience of any foreign born American citizen who is truly loyal and patriotic, and who desires to do his duty, whatever it may be.

When the challenge of Bismarck first appeared, if it was a challenge, as some eagle-minded people claim it was, a reporter in Chicago interviewed several Germans of that city, to ascertain what attitude the Germans in America would assume in case of war. The information he said he got was that they would rush eagerly to the army and navy to fight against the

fatherland. Those reported answers must be looked at with suspicion. No man is anxious to fight against his fatherland, and least of all a German or an Englishman. Nor would the Americans require such a sacrifice, except in an extremity that can never come.

A German may renounce his political allegiance to Germany, but his natural allegiance of love and veneration for the fatherland he will never cast away. He could not do so if he would, and retain the respect of the American people; for magnanimity and love of country are conspicuous traits in the American character. What then is his duty in the contingency supposed?

His oath of allegiance to the United States is decisive as to the political status of every naturalized foreigner here. His political duty is to the land of his adoption, but he is not therefore compelled to renounce his natural reverence for the land where he was born. The Americans would never ask a German to fight against Germany, unless a German army were actually landed on our soil, an impossible contingency, for no foreign army could land in any part of the United States and advance ten miles without being captured or destroyed. To require a man to fight against his father and his mother would make still more hideous the monstrous anomaly that war presents in Christendom to-day.

Next to the Americans the Germans are the largest constituent element of the American Republic. The Britons and Canadians come next in contribution of numbers to the nation. Neither of these classes can think of the possibility of war between their birth-land and their adopted land without feelings of grief and pain. To them such a war could have no victories and no joy. Whichever side might win a battle they must mourn, either for the defeat of their fellow citizens, or their fellow countrymen. In any event their tears must flow.

The issues involved in the dispute with England about Canada, and with Germany about Samoa, cannot be whipped into an inflammation that will justify an act of war on either side. They are scarcely above the jurisdiction of a police court. The decision of an ordinary justice of the peace upon their merits would be happier in the end than any decision of guns can possibly be. Let arbitration settle them.

In a contest for material prosperity between his native land and his adopted land, the patriotic sympathies of a foreign born citizen will incline to the land of his adoption, but his merely sentimental or emotional patriotism will incline to the land of his birth. We cannot change this until we can alter the spiritual nature of men. There are ten thousand strings that unite a man to all his ancestors; there are none that unite him to his posterity. For these reasons his prejudices make it very difficult for him to believe that in any international dispute his native land can possibly be in the wrong.

It may be useless to moralize in the face of experience. Whether just or unjust, wise or unwise, an aggressive policy will be popular. It is in harmony with the traditions, the practice, and the ambition of the Anglo-Saxon race. That it tends to war does not weaken it, for the Americans have a dangerous talent there. The owl policy may be dull and lack the stimulant of blood, but after all, the true mission of this country is to promote friendship and good will among nations, the advancement of art, science, industry, and good morals. Her lasting glory will consist in the victories of peace.

Although we hope for peace we are compelled to recognize the passions of men, the qualities of races, and the political forces that control the world. We see in what are called the Anglo-Saxon races a conquering element pressing steadily forward to universal empire. Their march appears to be resistless. Starting from the low lands of Germany, a little more than a thousand years ago, they have already conquered Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and the islands of the sea. It may be that their fighting habit has become an instinct that must be gratified.

Although Europe is an armed camp, the martial feeling there is not so strong as here. Most of the soldiers there are unwilling conscripts, drafted men; here all of them are volunteers chafing in war harness without war. The military passion rages here like a moral scarlet fever. The political surgeons invoke the warrior's lancet, they say, "we must let blood." Meanwhile, war memories are kept alive by a thousand agencies, and chivalrous battle deeds are set before our youths for emulation. The inflammation is continually fed. Unless it can be allayed a fiery eruption must make an outlet for the pent up valor and the patriotic phrensy of our sons.

In the statesmanship of party a low standard of political ethics may co-exist with a high standard of political sagacity. Party leaders, when in office, never oppose a war sentiment predominant in the people. They hive it, for the honey in it, with much clangor of tin pans, as the farmer hives bees.

There is great swarming of military bees just now, and their hum has a trumpet sound, like the cavalry-call to charge. There are regimental, brigade, and division re-unions; gatherings of Grand Armies of the Republic, sham battles, and much flattery of warriors from pulpit, press, and stump. Then we have military schools, where children are dressed in soldier clothes, armed with baby swords and ranked and filed as Captains, Corporals, and Privates. Above them

again we have militia and independent companies armed and uniformed. These "hold their manhood cheap" when they march in Fourth of July processions with veterans who have actually fought in war. Must they fret away their bravery at county fairs, in harmless dress parades? They are as ready as their fathers were to "prove their mettle true."

The duty of men embarrassed by the ties of a double allegiance is to stand bravely by the republic whatever comes, but they ought to unite their moral and political influence to promote the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful arbitration.

Human progress has been sometimes aided by the sword. There are times when public virtue must defend itself and extend itself by arms. Therefore it is not always true that peace is cheap at any price; but as a general rule the man who maintains that war is dear at any price stands on solid moral ground. Patriotic virtue may be latent in physical and intellectual strength; it may be the very inspiration of armies, but when national greatness prompts men to fight for trivial causes it makes them irrational agents of destruction like the mad winds that sometimes wreck ships and villages.

"'Tis well to have a giant's strength,
But tyrannous to use it like a giant."

As I raise my eyes from this paper, I see in the corner of my room a sword; off duty let us hope for evermore. The sight of it overwhelms me with mournful memories. I would gladly give all that I have ever had, and all that I have ever been if Tubal Cain would come again, and beat that sword into a pruning hook; if he would order his apprentices throughout the world to do the same by every other sword. If that would cause an "overproduction" of pruning hooks, let them beat them into fence wire, stoves, pots and kettles, or any other gentle, virtuous, and useful things.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M.D.

THE overmastering sway of special passions can often be traced to the influence of abnormal social conditions, tending to suppress the manifestations of various natural instincts, and thus favoring the development of others to a degree of undue prominence. The vehemence of the genetic passion, for instance, with its life-blighting excesses and the reckless despair of its reaction against stubborn obstacles, has unquestionably been increased by the suppression of instincts which found a free scope of development in the social tendencies of Antiquity. During the seven last centuries of Grecian and Roman civilization, patriotism and the enthusiasm of gymnastic emulation counterbalanced the influence of a passion which during the era of mediæval anti-naturalism acquired a wholly abnormal preponderance, and which still disturbs the moral equilibrium of millions.

Freedom, science, and the love of Nature were for ages persecuted in the name of an earth-renouncing dogma; patriotism, even, was blighted by the delusion which trained all true believers to yearn for the grave as the gate to the proper home of their souls, but the sexual instinct defied control, and consequently became the channel for the united currents of all emotional propensities,—with results which still incline us to greatly overrate the *natural* persistence of a passion, which, under less abnormal conditions, was able to acquire only a decidedly intermittent prominence. Disappointed love, as a cause of suicide, now takes precedence of all other motives of self-destruction, while no other fact in the history of morals is more clearly established than the truth of Peter Bayle's remark, that at a time when suicide was considered justifiable, or even honorable, a free man's desire to leave the world on account of disappointment in courtship, would generally have been attributed to insanity. The women of antiquity had but scant resources outside of marriage, and the example of Dido and Sappho consequently found frequent imitators, while rejected male lovers, with the rarest exceptions, would have laughed down their disappointment after the manner of the poet Ovid—one of the few classic writers who seems to have considered the subject worth any special notice whatever. Love-stories which now almost monopolize the interest of nine out of ten readers (nineteen out of twenty *book*-readers, to judge from the records of our public libraries) were almost unknown to the literary age of Greece and Rome, or were relegated to the sphere of the lowest comedy—even in the era of social license that followed the introduction of Asiatic luxuries. Books of travel and adventure, prize-fight bulletins, ghost stories and ribald satires had long eclipsed the popularity of Homerian heroics, when a writer of love tales would still have been referred to a female clan of readers, or rather of hearers, since persons, even of moderate literary attainments, would not have thought it worth their while to waste an hour with the perusal of other people's courtship twaddle. Werther's wailings would have failed to excite anything but the surprise of a Roman reader, and the end of the romance would have been considered an offense against the laws of probability—not to mention common sense, or the ethics of stoicism. As a motive of self-destruction a temporary tooth-ache would hardly have been thought a more preposterous pretext. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that in that age of earth-worship the moral obligation of enduring the troubles of an unpropitious life for its own sake was generally overrated. The expediency of ter-

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXII.

minating an existence of hopeless affliction was one of the few points in which the disciples of Epicurus agreed with the stoics, and the example of Cicero and Lucretius made them the patron saints of their respective sects. Hegesias, who combined that doctrine with a pessimistic view of life in general, made so many converts that the city of Alexandria, during his presence, experienced a veritable epidemic of suicide, which at last obliged King Ptolemy to banish the philosopher from Egypt. Cassius, Atticus, Cato, and Diodorus held similar views, and Pliny goes so far as to vaunt the lot of man, as "superior to that of the Gods in this respect, that man has the power of seeking refuge in the peace of the tomb." "To death alone we owe it," says Seneca, "that life is not a prison, that erect beneath the frowns of fate a man can preserve his mind unshaken and master of itself. Slavery loses its bitterness, when by a step, a captive can pass to liberty. Against all the injuries of life, we have the refuge of death. You see that yawning precipice? It is the gate of freedom. You see that river, that ocean? Liberty awaits you at the bottom. As we choose the ship in which we will sail, so we ought to choose the death by which we will leave life. In no matter more than in death should we act according to our desire. Man may seek the approbation of others in his life; his death concerns himself alone. That is the best which pleases him most. Fate, indeed, has granted us no better boon than this, that life should have but one entrance and many gates of exit. Why should we endure the agonies of disease and the indignities of despotism, when we can free ourselves from all troubles and shake off every bond? For this reason, and for this alone, life is not an evil—that no one is obliged to live. The lot of man is happy because no one continues miserable but by his own fault. If life pleases you, stay. If not—*jacet janua, exi*,—the door is open. You have a right at any time to return to whence you came."

Nor were such views confined to the disciples of philosophy. Longinus, a commander of the Dacian legions, killed himself in the camp of his captors to save his inferior officers the trouble of treating for his ransom. Tullius Marcellinus, a young patrician of ample fortune, anticipated the development of a troublesome disease by assembling his friends and calmly announcing his intention to starve himself to death. His last days were passed in cheerful conversation; and his faithful attendants, an hour before his death, were dismissed with presents, as from a banquet. A freedman of Otho killed himself at his grave; nay, the younger Plinius mentions a devotee of the circus-sports who flung himself into the blazing funeral pile of a popular charioteer. "From grief without hope," says Musonius, "we may seek refuge in death, even without the fear of direct pain,—in the absence of anything essential to make life pleasant. Why should we tarry? Let us depart cheerfully, as from a festival.

Neither Buddha nor Schopenhauer could have ventured to speak out more plainly; yet in an age when life, upon slight provocation, was so often flung away like an ill-fitting garment, the mischievous pranks of Amor were almost universally dismissed with a jest, even by votaries of his shrine, while grave statesmen and philosophers would have deemed it beneath their dignity to mention them at all.

Turning to the impulsive natives of the South Sea Islands, as representative children of Nature, we find, in that respect abundant evidence of a similar stoicism. With all their emotional passions, the natives of Tahiti treated the disappointments of courtship as a matter of burlesque and good-natured banter, rather than as a subject of tragic heroics, while the manful New Zealander, with all their love of poetry, would have failed to comprehend the meaning of Petrarca's Jeremiads. "Among the Maoris," says Prof. Hochstetter, "married women are treated with comparative indulgence, and the son of a chief does his own wooing as modestly as the poor fisherman's son, but the intrigues of courtship are hardly thought worth a freeman's trouble, and the self-abasement, and self-immolations of our inamoratos would pass the comprehension of a Maori lover."

Those facts throw a suggestive light upon the significance of one of the strangest phenomena in moral physiology, and at the same time illustrate a curious analogy in the pathological principles of physical and emotional life. The fact that a tortoise can survive decapitation, does not indicate the higher value of her existence, as compared with that of a man's, but merely proves the anatomical circumstance that a man's brain is a more important center of vitality than the brain of a tortoise. Nor should we overrate the Pagan standard, of estimating the value of life, because the men of antiquity contrived to endure the torments of a passion that drives millions of our contemparies to the refuge of suicide. The contrasting fate of ancient and modern lovers does not even indicate the decline of stoicism, but merely proves the fact that the sexual passion has become a more important center of emotional life. True to her principle of eudemonism, Nature reverses the doom of life whenever the scale of weal and woe threatens to preponderate on the side of wretchedness, and the same reason that determines the organism to surrender its life to a cureless injury of the brain, impels the soul to renounce an existence embittered by a deep wound of the predominant affections. During the age of Pagan civilization the aspirations of emotional life were centered upon patriotism, ambition, the love of gain, the love of strength and health. During the mediæval millenium of madness

they were engrossed by religious monomanias counterbalanced by the predominance of the sexual instinct. Since the advent of our latter-day civilization they have been divided mainly between sexual love and the thirst of gain—"amativeness" and "acquisitiveness," as the phrenologists would express it,—slightly modified, perhaps, by the influence of inquisitiveness and the lingering after-effects of supernaturalism. In millions of souls the life-despising mania of antinaturalism has extinguished the love of health and the enthusiasm of athletic emulation, (once the master-passion of manhood,) as well as ambition and patriotism, in the ancient significance of those words. Love, however, has remained, like Hope in Pandora's box, and by monopolizing the energies of other passions now burns like a fire intensified by the fuel of many extinguished altars. A modern Petrarch too often stands really at the grave of his only earthly hope in watching the fatal pallor of a beloved face and closing the eyes

> "Which now so faint and dim,
> Held all the light that shone on earth for him;"

and in the words of Musonius, the gate of suicide becomes a welcome refuge from the consciousness "of a loss involving all that could have made life pleasant." Hence, also, the suggestive fact that the frequency of love-suicides increases with the prevalence of conditions tending to limit the energies of passion to the sway of the genetic instinct.

Werther tragedies, in fact, are far more frequent in the crowded cities of our Atlantic seaboard than on the hunting grounds of Texas and California, but after all, less frequent in the largest cities than in the Sabbatarian atmosphere of small country-towns, deprived of amusements, deprived of outdoor-sports, reduced to the alternative of prayerbooks and novels. In commercial communities dollar-worship offers a welcome trilemma, and may monopolize the emotional energies to a degree developing an ultra-Pagan indifference to the caprices of Love, but, on the other hand, involving the risk of a complete moral collapse upon the sudden loss of a prop supporting the hopes of the ruling passion. Suicide as a consequence of financial disaster, is, indeed, becoming an international phenomenon, not always confined to the confessed centres of Mammon-worship, the most characteristic instance being, perhaps, the case of a Swiss soldier who picked up a heavy pocketbook in the grass of a lakeside promenade and sat down to examine its contents. In addition to a number of illegible letters those contents included a large roll of paper-money—white Bank of England notes, quite unlike the French equivalents which the finder had now and then seen in the restaurants of his native town, and after scrutinizing the shape of a Brahma key, hardly apt to fit any local lock, the young native concluded that the miscellany of outlandish objects was of no value to any one but the rightful owner and determined to report his discovery at the police-station and register his name as an applicant for any possible reward. The sensation caused by his announcement was equalled only by his surprise, when he learned that the owner had offered a reward of five thousand francs, and a dismal misgiving was more than verified when further inquries elicited the fact that the pocketbook contained a sum of eighty-five thousand francs in notes that could have been changed at any city-bank. The officials shook the hand of the honest finder; newsmongers crowded in and congratulations were followed by a round of applause, but the soldier staggered out in the street like a man reeling under the effect of a deadly blow, and a few hours after his corpse and a horse-pistol were discovered in an orchard-grove of Hottingen, a short distance from the promenade where he had found and wasted the chance of realizing the day dream of his life.

ASPECTS, CHRISTIAN AND HUMAN.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

III.

He must have a hard heart who has never been touched by that episode in early English history when, after the Romans had withdrawn their last legions from Britain, the Britons, who had learnt from their conquerors the softness but not the strength of civilization, were desperately harassed by the hordes of Picts and Scots from the north, and by the invasions of barbarians from beyond the sea. Messengers hurried to Rome, to bear the "Last Groans of the Britons." "The barbarians on the one hand chase us into the sea; the sea, on the other, throws us back upon the barbarians; and we have only the hard choice left us, of perishing by the sword, or by the waves. Send back thy protecting legions, O Rome, or we die!" So implored the Britons in their distress; but Rome could not succor them. Foes, who should have been her friends, and barbarians who had always been her foes, now encompassed her unto death. Aëtius, her last champion, was vainly struggling to defend her against Attila; and thenceforward no Roman phalanx went to save the Britons from destruction.

Methinks that throughout Christendom there has long resounded, and still resounds, a cry, as frantic and pathetic as theirs, of men in spiritual distress. "Come back! come back!" they call out to those dogmas which, like the Roman mercenaries, so long upheld them. "Come back in your old-time might, ere the wolves of infidelity devour us, or the waters of despair wash over our heads!" But the departed come not back.

Who shall describe the panic, the anguish of men who feel the immemorial bonds of religious tradition bursting asunder? Voyagers tell us that in the Polar Sea, after many tranquil days of mild Spring weather,

the ice-floe suddenly cracks and breaks up, with a tremendous roar; and what was but just now a solid plain whereon a whole nation might safely encamp, splits into a thousand fragments—some huge as mountains, some mere spars and splinters of ice, which jostle and grind and shatter and overturn each other, as all begin to drift slowly at the mercy of wind and tide.

So might one picture to himself that spiritual cataclysm known as the Decay of Faith: except that the rending is less sudden, and is perceptible to the mind's eye alone. At first, it is whispered as a rumor, then it is confidently proclaimed as a fact, that God has withdrawn himself from interposing in earthly affairs. He has withdrawn, leaving his viceroys—natural laws—to work out his purposes. But ere long, fearless sceptics affirm that there never was, and is not now, a God: that the universe is but a monstrous clock, whose wheels were wound up spontaneously and revolve inexorably—a machine which had no maker and has no director. Fix your eyes on the tiniest froth-bubble which twinkles a moment ere it is whirled over the brink of Niagara: so insignificant is this Earth compared with the multitude of the stars, innumerable and immense. "What!" exclaims the pious, "was not Earth, despite her insignificance, chosen by the Almighty to be the especial home of man? Was not the sun created to warm him? And are not all beasts and fowls and fishes to serve him?"—"Nay," replies the man of science, "this tiny sphere you tread was cast off from the sun, like a spark from the wheel of a lapidary. The Animal Kingdom was not made for you, but you are descended from it: yourself and your horse had the same ancestor; the haughtiest prince is but cousin to the clam."—"But what of man's destiny? of the miraculous revelation of religion? Of the war between good and evil? Of man's hope of immortality?"—"Experience and the records of science prove that immutable laws have always prevailed. Of man's destiny, we can know nothing: what has been we state, what may be we cannot guess. Nature begets millions of creatures, among which the weak perish and the strong survive, till these in turn are superseded by stronger species. When the body dies, it is dissolved into its elements, and disappears."—"O my brother, what help? What consolation?"

In an epoch when this cry of anguish is sent up, and the deaf heavens hear it not, the native qualities of men show themselves most plainly in their conduct. Those to whom religion was a check, toss the reins to their appetites, as thieves exult when the police are summoned away to a fire. Some men turn satirists and cynics, and make sport of the arrogant pretensions—suddenly collapsed—of their religious fellows. The ravens of pessimism croak from many a tree. The indifferent are languidly complacent, because indifference now seems the highest wisdom. The stubborn-pious cling desperately to the chance that a flaw in the evidence will be discovered. Some are defiant: they will continue to live as if the assumptions of their creed had not been undermined. The timid caress and cherish the familiar symbols of worship, as a bereaved mother fondles the toys and garments of her dead child,—and try to believe that the lost will return. Some there are who ransack the past, lest the vital truth buried in an earlier religion may have been overlooked: perchance Confucius, or Zoroaster, or Buddha had the secret. Some plunge into the vapors of spiritualism, and snatch at reports of haunted houses and 'materializations' to justify their folly. Many are the look-outs on towers and high places, who strain their eyes eastward for the first streaks of dawn, while in their heart gnaws the doubt that night may have closed in forevermore. Some fortify themselves with the precepts of the wise men, and the examples of the noble. The brave resolve that death alone shall rob them of their courage: like that regiment of English soldiers who, when their transport-ship was foundering in the Bay of Biscay, marshaled themselves in battle-order on the deck, and went down singing their songs of victory.

These are some of the signs by which the Decay of Faith is made manifest: unspeakably tragic to any mind capable of scanning it, and not be understood by the strongest minds. Here is a mystery seen in the guise of agony: no fabled head of Medusa, but a real horror, which paralyzes most of its beholders. Think of it—the relations of men's souls to their spiritual source appear to be hopelessly destroyed! Many earnestly asking, "Have I a soul?" Many seriously answering, "No." Very noteworthy, moreover, is the course of this infection. It steals on so gradually that its victims are not soon aware of it. Not in a day, nor in a year, does it eat its way to the vitals of society. Outwardly, you hardly observe a change. Men eat and work and sleep, as of yore. Business and trade, theatres and entertainments, still occupy or amuse them. In the churches there are still preachers, and congregations to listen to them. There is the perennial wrangle over politics; the daily snarls and squabbles of the critics. Proclamations of thanksgiving to the Almighty are issued; Fourth-of-July orations are spouted; startling inventions and scientific discoveries are announced. We are delirious in our adoration of Progress: only yesterday a new churn was patented; a new asteroid catalogued! But while the malady—*world-ache*, the German experts call it—is invisible on the surface, it spreads pitilessly through every vein and artery; and even when it can be concealed no longer, men's casual behavior alters little. They feign hopefulness or nonchalance: but by the lack of cheer

in the voice and of lustre in the eye, we know that the change has come.

The Religion which dreads to wake up in the morning, lest Science in her midnight vigil shall have made a discovery which threatens to banish God from the universe, can be housed in no solid home of Truth. What? shall the telescope or the alembic be taken as an irrefragable witness, if it testify that the soul of man —whence sprang the ingenuity which fashioned those very instruments—is but a fantastic unreality? Considerations of natural bulk and area seem to me irrelevant in spiritual concerns. My belief in immortality would never be shaken by knowing that the earth is but a speck among the constellations, and that I myself am but an atom compared to the earth. To the ant I am a colossus, as the ant is to the microbe: which proves relativity in size, but nothing absolute. Material standards of more-and-less apply not to the intellect and the soul. No one has observed that men six feet tall are more learned or more benevolent, than men of five feet six; or that dwarfs add to their wisdom by mounting on stilts. Do you measure love by the yard, aspirations by the peck? Those intuitions which urge us towards perfection, would not be more valid were our globe as vast as Sirius: the Texan's chance of immortality is not several hundred times greater than the Rhode Islander's.

Biologists have, indeed, hit upon a formula which helps them in their experiments. They now "envisage the animal mainly as a machine in which potential energy is being transformed back again into kinetic."* A short and easy saw for scientific purposes, but of slight perceptible value for understanding human animals in their complex social relations. I suspect that the sun's disc will have shrunk many leagues, causing a glacial atmosphere to wrap the earth, ere men estimate their passions by so many foot-pounds of potential or kinetic energy.

I had rather, on the contrary, seek in our material insignificance, and in our inablity to express ourselves by algebraic or chemical notation, prognostics to justify our loftiest visions of destiny. Regarding this wee creature, Man, as a body, a combination of physical forces, how contemptible he seems! An ounce of lead, a breath of air, a mislodged grape-seed, any one of a thousand accidents, may bring him to the dust. Yet is this pigmy a partaker of Time and Space. Eternal Force does not slight him, but must work for and in him. There is no property of matter which may treat him as a thing of no consequence. And who shall state the wonder and variety to which his soul is heir? In that invisible mind of his he carries the conception of a universe, of eternity, though he cannot understand them. He beholds himself a sharer in the infinite. Through his fingers slip the chords which unite the farthest past to the farthest future. Every discovery of science which reveals new splendors in our habitation, adds to the majesty of us who dwell therein. And in our hearts these unutterable thoughts, these visions aimed beyond space and time, these unquenchable longings, this love which flows out from us to our fellows, and from our fellows to us—whence are they? Not in the material universe can you discover their origin: not in the world of matter can you discover fulfilments which will satisfy them.

Grant Allen: *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1887.

HEDONISM AND ASCETICISM.

A SYSTEMATIC conception of the universe is the theoretical, and ethics the practical aspect of philosophy. It is obvious that both are closely associated; the one is the basis of the other, and we cannot properly judge of the problems of the latter unless we have grasped the main truths of the former.

By "morals" we understand the proper conduct of life, and by "ethics" the science of morals. Now, it is true that a man can instinctively lead a moral life without having any knowledge of the theoretical basis and the practical application of ethics. Morals are, as a rule, very stable, and a moral man who in later years happens to believe in a wrong system of ethics is not liable to change much of his good habits of life. It is also true that a man who has inborn, perhaps hereditarily ingrained, immoral tendencies will by theoretical instruction in ethics most likely not be greatly improved. Nevertheless, as a rule, philosophy and ethics go together, and a wrong philosophy will produce a wrong ethics, and a wrong ethics will, if not in the present, certainly in the next generation, corrupt the morals also.

The details of a philosophy, or a religion (which latter, after all, is but a popular philosophy, a philosophy of the heart) may be, and, indeed, are, quite indifferent as to the ethical inferences that can be drawn from it. But the main truths are not. The main truths of a religion or philosophy lend the color to the ethics that grows therefrom. And we find in the history of philosophy that materialism, with a great regularity, produces hedonism or utilitarianism; for it places the ultimate object of life in material existence and its well being, *viz.* in happiness. Spiritualism, on the other hand, as a rule, leads to asceticism; it renounces the pleasures of the world, for it seeks the object of life in the deliverance of the soul from the fetters of the body. Monism rejects both views; it finds the purpose of existence in the constant aspiration of realizing a higher and better, a nobler, and more beautiful state of existence. Life is a boon so far only as it offers an occasion to improve that which lies in our power to change—the forms of things and the modes of life. It is not

pleasure or happiness that gives value to our days, but the work done for the progress of our race. Moses expresses this truth most powerfully in a passage of his grand psalm, which we quote according to the forcible translation of Luther: "Man's life will last three score years and ten, or, at the best, four score; but if it was precious, it was of labor and sorrow."

Mere happiness will leave the heart empty, and the aspiration for happiness will make of man a shallow trifler. Asceticism, on the other hand, will prove destructive and suicidal. But if we consider the punctual performance of our daily duty, every one in his province, as the object of our lives, which must be done to enhance our ideals and help mankind (be it ever so little) to progress, we shall find occasion to unite the truths hidden in both,—the materialistic and spiritualistic ethics. We shall find sufficient occasion to practice abstinence, to exercise self-control, and to set aside the fleeting pleasures of the moment. At the same time, while the pleasure-seeker will be wrecked in his vain endeavors, we shall experience that a noble satisfaction, which is the highest kind of happiness imaginable, follows those who are least concerned about enjoyment, and steadily attend to their duty.

P. C.

THE STONES OF MANHATTAN.

BY WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON.

I TREAD the stones of Manhattan; I, who have journeyed far
From the meadow-sward and the moss-bank, and the streamlet's pebbly bar;
I, who have wandered hither, allured by the tales they told
Of how the stones of Manhattan were reeking with ruddy gold.

In the dear old mountain woodland, where maple and birch and pine
Were linked with the swaying reaches of purple-clustered vine,
Where violets blue and yellow, and crimson lilies grew,
And the hawthorn's bloom in spring-time was studded with starry dew,
Over the shelving ledges, over the granite floor,
Over the boulders and pebbles, chanting its dryad lore,
Over its stony pathway, sang a brook with silver tones,—
God! what a stranger stream is roaring over Manhattan's stones!

Dazzled by phantom fortune, I followed that brook adown,
Where its turbid waters tarried a space by the teeming town,
And on through the dreary lowlands, which deeper and darker flow,
Till its dusky waves were lighted with the city's lurid glow,
Till the crystal stream was swallowed in a sluggish, polluted tide,
Till the echoing forest voices in the babel-clamor died,
Till swept like a leaf on the torrent I was whelmed where the breakers beat,
Where the seething, surging human tide flows over Manhattan's street.

I tread the stones of Manhattan, the stones that are hard to my feet,—
As hard as the hearts around me, as hard as the faces I meet.
Hot is their breath in summer, with fever of selfish greed,
Cold is their touch in winter, as hearts to the hand of need.
My heel strikes fire from the flint, but the spark is dead ere it burns,
Strikes fire in my angry striding, but is bruised by the stone it spurns;
And echo scorns with a stony voice the cry of a soul's despair
Breathed out on the thunderous throbbings of the city's desert air.

Oh! faithless stones of Manhattan, that tempted my boyish feet
Away from the clover-meadow, from the wind-woven waves of wheat,
I thought ye a golden highway; I find ye the path of shame.
Where souls are sold for silver, and gold is the price of fame!
But my weary feet must tread yet, as slaves on the quarry floor,
And my aching brain must suffer your pitiless uproar,
Till the raving tide shall sweep above, and careless feet shall tread
On the fatal stones of Manhattan, over my dreamless bed!

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

"Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream:"
SHAKSPEARE, Sonnet 129.

OH! the strong, strange emotion, bitter-sweet,
That fills my weary bosom as I ride
Along these lanes, and note on every side
The woods and fields that knew my childish feet.

Men stare at me, but all the ripening wheat
Bows and is glad; the brook by which I sighed
Told an old tale and laughed; and, dignified,
My friends the trees stretch out their arms to greet.

Ah, yes, 'twas there while resting from my play
I dreamt of future years, that used to seem
So full of promise and so far away.

Poor child! they come and go, but none redeem
The worthless pledge; they pass, and each new day
But dims the memory of that fond dream.

WALLINGFORD, DELAWARE CO., PA., July, 1875.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WHAT WAS MATRIARCHY?

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

MRS. M. J. GAGE presents an idea of the matriarchate widely different from that which I had gained from such reading and thinking as I have devoted to the subject, and it is important to determine which view is the correct one. I have remarked that it "was, so far as can be determined, simply a prostitution in which the temper of the people did not require the mother to conceal the evidence of her position. * * * Female infanticide was practiced, and so was established a system which has its legitimate successor in the prostitution of modern ages."* On this Mrs. Gage observes † "All this is a mistake. Matriarchy was the first step outside of promiscuity; it was the very foundation of the family. Wilkin shows that upon the relation between the mother and child the remotest conception of the family was based." She then cited examples of the exclusion of the father from the family relation in various primitive and some recent races; and the Celtic cult of god and goddess, which were not husband and wife, but mother and son. She also says that under primitive matriarchy "the father was a wanderer and held in no esteem." Finally she believes female infanticide, both for economic and religious reasons, prostitution, compulsory marriages, and the sacrifice of animals, etc., to have been all due to the ascendancy of man in the family or the

* THE OPEN COURT, 1888, p. 1388.
† L. c., 1889, p. 1481.

patriarchate, acquired later in history, and continued to the present day. These statements of Mrs. Gage constitute a terrible arraignment of the male sex, and could they be supported, would go far to justify the *Matriolatry* of which her paragraphs are redolent. If she is right, we men must acknowledge our base origin, and join her in her worship.

There are two ways of approaching the subject; one through the materials of history; the other by the exercise of our rational powers. History of those remote ages is not very clear, and the exact nature of the morality of those times is not easily discoverable. I shall however return to this source of information, but first let us exercise a little common sense.

It is generally supposed that the reason why descent was originally traced through the mother, was because the personality of the father could not be definitely ascertained. This would follow from the ignorance of the mother herself, or the uncertainty attaching to her statements on the subject. There is no other conceivable reason for such a state of affairs, and it is the more probable, if "the father was a wanderer and held in no esteem." Under such circumstances variable paternity would be inevitable; and to this day it is the wandering lives of many men which constitute the insoluble backbone of prostitution. One cannot say correctly that such mothers as these with their children constituted a "family" in the technical sense. Such women with children would necessarily have a a residence more fixed than the unencumbered man, so that women became mistresses of such homes as they were, and this is perhaps what the matriarchate amounted to.

Let us however turn to McLennan's "Primitive Marriage," a standard work, to which I was referred by Dr. E. B. Tylor for information on this subject. Dr. McLennan says, p. 124: "The blood ties through females being obvious and indisputable, the idea of blood-relationship as soon as it was formed, must have begun to develop, however slowly, into a system embracing them. What further development this idea might have,—whether it would simultaneously have a development in the direction of kinship through males,—must have depended on the circumstances connected with paternity. If the paternity of a child were usually as indisputable as the maternity, we might expect to find kinship through males acknowledged soon after kinship through females. * * * And fathers must usually be known before men will think of relationship through fathers, indeed before the idea of a father can be formed. The requisite degree of certainty can be had only when the mother is appropriated to a particular man as his wife, and when women thus appropriated are usually found faithful to their lords." P. 131: "Before the invention of the arts, and the formation of provident habits the struggle for existence must often have become very serious. The instincts of self-preservation therefore must have frequently predominated and shaped the features of society freely as if the unselfish affections had no place in human nature. * * * Foremost among the results of this early struggle for food and security must have been an effect upon the balance of the sexes. As braves and hunters were required and valued, it would be the interest of every horde to rear, when possible, its healthy male children. It would be less its interest to rear females, as they would be less capable of self-support, and of contributing by their exertions to the common good. In this lies the only explanation which can be accepted of the origin of those systems of female infanticide still existing, the discovery of which from time to time, in out-of-the-way places, so shocks our humanity. It is of no consequence by what theories the races who practice infanticide now defend the practice. There can be no doubt that its origin is everywhere referable to that early time of struggle and necessity which we have been contemplating." Mr. McLennan then goes on to show how that the deficiency of women would involve, first, promiscuity, and later, polyandry, in which the determination of male parentage was mostly impossible. Thus the matriarchy represents a primitive stage of society, and one which did not differ essentially from the modern system of prostitution. It gave way to monogamy and polygamy as men began to value women, and desired to protect and support their children.

E. D. Cope.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXII.—Continued.

"I too am little better than an exorcist," resumed the Professor, in answer to the remark of the Princess. "It would be a bad recommendation for me if your Highness were to judge of my work by what I have achieved here in stirring up the old dust. One is delighted and disappointed, like a child. It is fortunate that fate does not often tease us book-writers with such tricks; what we do for the benefit of others does not depend upon accidental discoveries."

"I can form an idea of the seriousness of the work which I do not see," exclaimed the Princess. "Your kindness has opened at least an aperture through which I can look into the workshop of creative minds. I can understand that the labor of learned men must have an irresistible attraction for those who belong to that silent community. I envy the women whose happiness it is to live their whole lives within the sphere of such occupations."

"We are bold conquerors at the writing-table," answered the Professor; "but the incongruity between our inward freedom and outward helplessness is often felt by the conqueror and those about him. They who really pass their lives with us may easily fathom us, and can with difficulty bear our one-sidednees. For, your Highness, learned men themselves are like the books they write. In general we are badly prepared for the whirl of business, and sometimes helpless in the manifold activity of our time. We are true friends to men in those hours in which they seek new strength for the struggle of life, but in the struggle itself we are generally unskilful assistants."

"Are you thinking of yourself in speaking thus?" asked the Princess, quickly.

"I had in my mind a picture of the combined traits of many of my fellow-workers, but if your Highness inquires about myself, I also am in this respect a regular man of learning. For I have often had opportunity of remarking how imperfect is my judgment on all questions in which my learning or my moral feeling do not give me assurance."

"I do not like that, Mr. Werner," cried the Princess, leaning gravely back in her arm-chair. "My fancy took its highest flight; I sat as sovereign of the world, prepared to make my people happy, and I made you my minister of state."

"Your confidence gives me pleasure," replie the

* Translation copyrighted.

Professor; "but if your Highness should ever be in the position to seek for an assistant in government, I could not accept this dignity with a good conscience unless your Highness's subjects had all been passed through the bookbinder's press, and wore little coats of pasteboard, and had on their backs labels that told the contents of each."

The Princess laughed, but her eyes rested with deep feeling on the honest countenance of the man. She rose and approached him.

"You are always true, open, and high-minded."

"Thanks for your judgment," replied the Professor, much pleased. "Even your Highness treats me like a spirit that dwells in a book; you praise me as openly as if I did not understand the words that you speak. I beg permission to convey to your Highness my feelings also in a review."

"What I am like, I do not wish to hear from you," exclaimed the Princess; "for you would, in spite of the harmlessness which you boast of, end by reading me as plainly as if I had a morocco-covered back and gilt edges. But I am serious when I praise you. Yes, Mr. Werner, since you have been with us I have attained to a better understanding of the value of life. You do not know what an advantage it is for me to have intercourse with a mind which, undisturbed by the little trifles around it, only serves its high goddess of Truth. The turmoil of daily life bears hard upon us, and perplexes us; those by whom I am surrounded, even the best of them, all think and care about themselves, and make convenient compacts between their feeling of duty and their egotism. But in you I perceive unselfishness and the incessant devotion of yourself to the highest labor of man. There is something great and lofty in this that overpowers me with admiration. I feel the worth of such an existence, like a new light that penetrates my soul. Never have I known any one about me so inspired with heaven in his breast. That is my review of you, Professor Werner; it is, perhaps, not well written, but it comes from my heart."

The eyes of the learned man shone as he looked at the enthusiastic countenance of the princely child, but he was silent. There was a long pause. The Princess turned away, and bent over her books. At last she began, with gentle voice:

"You are going to your daily work, I will do so also. Before you leave me, I beg of you to be my instructor: I have marked a place in the work on art that you had the kindness to bring from the library, which I could not quite understand."

The Professor took the open book from her hand, and laughed.

"This is the theory of quite a different art; it is not the right book."

The Princess read, "How to make blanc-mange." She opened the title page: "Common-sense cook-book of an old Nuremberg cook." She turned the book round with astonishment; it was the same simple binding.

"How does this come here?" she exclaimed, with vexation, and rang for her maid.

"No one has been here," said the latter, "except the Princes, a short time ago."

"Ah!" exclaimed the Princess, depressed. "Then there is no hope. We are now under the dominion of a mischievous spirit, and must wait till our book returns. Farewell, Mr. Werner; if the mischievous spirit restores me the book I shall call you back."

When the Professor had taken leave, the maid came back alarmed and brought the lost Archæology in a sad condition. The book was in the cage of the monkey. Giocco had studied it industriously, and was furious when the volume was taken away from him.

At the same hour the Chamberlain was standing before the Sovereign.

"Your friends from the University have domesticated themselves with us; I take for granted that you have done your best to make our city agreeable to them."

"Professor Werner appears well contented," replied the Chamberlain, with reserve.

"Has your sister Malwine made the acquaintance of the Professor's wife?"

"Unfortunately my sister has been obliged to nurse a sick aunt in the country."

"That is a pity," replied the Sovereign; "she may have reason to regret this accident. Some time ago you expressed your opinion that some practical occupation would be beneficial to the Hereditary Prince; I have considered the matter. It will be necessary to find the means of a temporary residence in the district of Rossau. The old forester's lodge will not be ill adapted to it. I have determined by additional building to change the house into a habitable residence. The Hereditary Prince must be on the spot to plan the building according to his wishes, and you will accompany him. The architect has orders to draw the plans according to the Prince's directions. I only wish to speak to him about the proposed estimate. Meanwhile the Hereditary Prince will occupy the rooms that are reserved for me in the forester's lodge. But as the building will not take up his whole time, he may employ his leisure in obtaining an insight into our agricultural methods, at the farm of the adjoining proprietor. He should learn about field-work and book-keeping. The year is already far advanced, which makes a speedy departure advisable. I hope

this arrangement will meet a wish that you have long entertained. The beautiful country and the quiet wood will be a refreshment to you after your winter-work."

The Chamberlain bowed dismayed before his master, who so graciously pronounced his banishment from Court. He hastened to the Hereditary Prince and related the bad tidings.

"It is exile!" he exclaimed, beside himself.

"Make your preparations speedily," replied the Hereditary Prince quietly. "I am prepared to go at once."

The Hereditary Prince went to his father.

"I will do what you command, and make every effort to please you. If you, as a father, consider this residence in a distant place useful, I feel that you understand better than I what will be beneficial for my future. But," he continued, with hesitation, "I cannot go from here without making a request which I have much at heart."

"Speak, Benno," said the Sovereign, graciously.

"I beg of you to permit the Professor and his wife to depart as quickly as possible from the neighborhood of the Court."

"Why so?" asked the Sovereign sharply.

"Their residence here is hurtful to Mrs. Werner. Her reputation is endangered by the unusual position in which she is placed. I owe him and her great gratitude; their happiness is a matter of concern to me, and I am tormented by the thought that their stay in our parts threatens to disturb the peace of their life."

"And why does your gratitude fear a disturbance of the happiness that is so dear to you?" asked the Sovereign.

"It is said that the Pavillion is a fateful residence for an honorable woman," replied the Hereditary Prince, decidédly.

"If what you call honor is endangered by her dwelling there, then that virtue is easily lost," said the Sovereign, bitterly.

"It is not the dwelling alone," continued the Hereditary Prince; "the ladies of the Court have been quite reserved in their conduct toward her; she is ill spoken of: gossip and calumny are busy in fabricating a false representation of her innocent life."

"I hear with astonishment," said the Sovereign, "the lively interest you take in the stranger; yet, if I am rightly informed, you yourself during this time have shown her little chivalrous attention."

"I have not done so," exclaimed the Hereditary Prince, "because I have felt myself bound to avoid, at least so far as I was concerned, any conduct that might injure her. I saw the jeering looks of our gentlemen when she arrived; I heard their derogatory words about the new beauty who was shut up in that house, and my heart beat with shame and anger. Therefore I have painfully controlled myself; I have feigned indifference before those about me, and I have been cold in my demeanor towards her; but, my father, it has been a hard task to me, and I have felt deep and bitter anxiety in the past few weeks; for the happiest hours of my life at college were passed in her society."

The Sovereign had turned away; he now showed his son a smiling countenance.

"So that was the reason of your reserve. I had forgotten that you had reached the age of tender susceptibility and were inclined to expend more emotion and sentiment on your relations to women than is good for you. Yet I could envy you this. Unfortunately, life does not long retain its sensitive feelings." He approached the Prince, and continued, good-humoredly: "I do not deny, Benno, that in your interest I regarded the arrival of our visitors differently. For a prince of your nature there is perhaps nothing so fraught with culture as the tender feeling for a woman who makes no demands on the external life of her friend, and yet gives him all the charm of an intimate union of soul. Love affairs with ladies of the Court or with assuming intrigants would be dangerous for you; you must be on your guard that the woman to whom you devote yourself will not trifle with you and selfishly make use of you for her own ends. From all that I knew, your connection with the lady in the Pavilion was just what would be advantageous for your future life. From reasons of which I have full appreciation, you have avoided accepting this idyllic relation. You yourself have not chosen what I, with the best intentions, prepared for you; it seems to me, therefore, that you have lost the right in this affair to express any wishes whatever."

"Father," explained the Hereditary Prince, horrified, and wringing his hands, "your saying this to me is indeed unkind. I had a dark foreboding that the invitation to them had some secret object in view. I have struggled with this suspicion, and blamed myself for it; now I am dismayed with the thought that I myself am the innocent cause of this misfortune to these good people. Your words give me the right to repeat my request: let them go as soon as possible, or you will make your son miserable."

"I perceive an entirely new phase of your character," replied the Sovereign; "and I am thankful to you for the insight that you have at last accorded me into your silent nature. You are either a fantastical dreamer, or you have a talent for diplomacy that I have never attributed to you."

"I have never been other then candid to you," exclaimed the Hereditary Prince.

"Shall the lady return to her home at Bielstein to be saved?" asked the Sovereign mockingly.

"No," replied the Hereditary Prince, in a low tone.

"Your demand scarcely deserves an answer," continued the father. "The strangers have been called here for a certain time. The husband is not in my service. I am neither in a position to send them away, as they have given me no reason for dissatisfaction, nor to keep them here against their will."

"Forgive me, my father," exclaimed the Hereditary Prince. "You have yourself, by the gracious attention which you daily show to the wife, by your civil gifts and frequent visits, occasioned the Court to think that you take a special personal interest in her."

"Is the Court so busy in reporting to you what I, through the unbecoming conduct of others, have thought fit to do?" asked the Sovereign.

"Little is reported to me of what those about us say, and be assured that I do not lend a ready ear to their conjectures; but it is inevitable that I sometimes must hear what occupies them all and makes them all indignant. They venture to maintain even, that every one who does not show her attention is in disgrace with you; and they think that they show special firmness of character and respectability in refusing to be civil to her. You, as well as she, are threatened with calumny. Forgive me, my father, for being this frank. You yourself have by your favor brought the lady into this dangerous position, and therefore it lies with you to deliver her from it."

"The Court always becomes virtuous when its master selects for distinction a lady who does not belong to their circle; and you will soon learn the value of such strict morals," replied the Sovereign. "It must be a strong sentiment, Benno, which drives your timid nature to the utmost limits of the freedom of speech that is allowable from a son to a father."

The pale face of the Hereditary Prince colored.

"Yes, my father," he cried, "hear what to every other ear will remain a secret; I love that lady with ferment and devoted heart. I would with pleasure make the greatest sacrifice in my power for her. I have felt the power that the beauty and innocence of a woman can exercise on a man. More than once have I strengthened myself by contact with her pure spirit. I was happy when near her, and unhappy when I could not look into her eyes. For a whole year I have thought in secret of her, and in this sorrowful feeling I have grown to be a man. That I have now courage to speak thus to you, I owe to the influence which she has exercised upon me. I know, my father, how unhappy such a passion makes one; I know the misery of being for ever deprived of the woman one loves. The thought of the peace of her pure soul alone has sustained me in hours of bitterness. Now you know all. I have confided my secret to you and I beg of you, my Sovereign and father, to receive this confidence with indulgence. If you have hitherto cared for my welfare, now is the time when you can show me the highest proof of our sincerity. Honor the woman who is loved by your unhappy son."

The countenance of the Sovereign had changed while his son was speaking, and the latter was terrified at its menacing expression.

"Seek, for your tale, the ear of some knight-errant who eagerly drinks the water into which a tear of his lady-love has dropped."

"Yes, I seek your knightly help, my liege and Sovereign," cried the Hereditary Prince, beside himself. "I conjure you, do not let me implore you in vain. I call upon you, as the head of our illustrious house, and as a member of the order whose device we both wear, to do a service to me and for her. Do not refuse her your support in her danger."

"We are not attending a mediæval ceremony," replied the Sovereign, coldly, "and your speech does not accord with the tone of practical life. I have not desired your confidence—you have thrust it upon me in too bold a manner. Do not wonder that your father is angry with your presumtuous speech, and that your Sovereign dismisses you with displeasure."

The Hereditary Prince turned pale and stepped back.

"The anger of my father and the displeasure of my Sovereign are misfortunes which I feel deeply; but still more fearful to me is the thought, that here at Court an injury is done to an innocent person—an injury in which I must have a share. However heavily your anger may fall upon me, yet I must tell you that you have exposed the lady to misrepresentation, and as long as I stand before you I will repeat it, and not desist from my request to remove her from here, for the sake of her honor and ours."

"As your words flutter ceaselessly about the same empty phantom," replied the Sovereign, "it is time to put an end to this conversation. You will depart at once, and leave it to time to enable me to forget, if I ever can do so, what I have heard from you to-day. Till then you may reflect in solitude on your folly, in wishing to play the part of guardian to strangers who are quite in a position to take care of themselves."

The Hereditary Prince bowed.

"Has my most Sovereign liege any commands for me?" he asked, with trembling lips.

The Sovereign replied sullenly:

"It only remains to you now to excite the ill-will of the strangers against your father."

"Your Highness knows that such conduct would not become me."

The Sovereign waved his hand, and his son departed with a silent bow.

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

La Morale Dans Le Drame, L'Epopee, et Le Roman. *Lucien Arréat.* Paris: Felix Alcan.

"The object of this work," says M. Arréat, "is to seek, in all literatures, the evidences of moral evolution. It enters thus, concurrently, upon the province of history and psychology: it is a critical dissertation, historical or literary, as you may please to call it." The author neither accepts the doctrines of the intuitionist school, that moral ideas are *a priori* cognitions, nor does he proceed from utilitarian principles, which construct ethics upon the criteria of pleasure or pain. Modern moralists, differing from Kant on the one hand and from the hedonists on the other, do not separate conscience from its proper accompanying phenomena, duty from its object; the purely subjective world of duty is not opposed to the sense-world of desires. They think, that a person, is "obliged" by that which he desires, conceives as an end, and that the bond of obligation is wrought in the mind by the combined action of sensibility and reason, whatever may be the content of happiness or of duty.

This constant connection of duty and obligation is indicated by M. Arréat, in his analysis and exposition of the various states of morality traceable in history and literature. Our author begins with an examination of the sources of moral activity, and of the emotional nature of man. The genesis of positive duties in the epic and drama of early times is depicted. The moral obligation, the moral conflict in the literature of every epoch; punishment and remorse, in tragedy and tradition; the principle of retribution, in the drama:—all are illustrated in the order of their development. The chapters on "The Mechanism of the Will" ond on "Pathological Heroes" are to be especially recommended. The latter is a subject quite new in literary criticism, and the value of M. Arréat's discussion will be enhanced by its conformity with the recent investigations of French experimental psychology. Literary criticism seldom seeks the assistance of science, and we may mark this departure as laudable in the author and indicative of more liberal tendency in a popular department of human opinion. *μκρκ.*

Windfalls.—Sober Thoughts on Staple Themes. *Richard Randolph.* Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth, 740 Sansom Street. Revised editions.

In "A Salutation" to the former of these two volumes Friend Richard Randolph writes:

> "And if we be connected
> On the internal ground,
> With joy are we affected
> When Outward links are found."

In the inward aspiration after universal truth, and in the effort to realize that unity in actual life and philosophical thought which the formal constitution of the mind teaches us exists, the reader will find the kernel of this little series of disquisitions. "The doctrine of a pervading unity in nature, like every other principle in truth," says the author, "may be said to be an intuitive perception of the healthy human soul." Proceeding from this statement, Mr. Randolph selects mathematics as typical of universal science; here are presented principles of universal applicability and certainty, and if there be a universal thought, the object of individual thinking, then by virtue of the applicability of these same laws of perception and thought to the development of other branches of knowledge, the objective reality of all must be equally established. "The whole creation will thus be intelligibly presented to our imagination as a continuous temple of truth and beauty, albeit more or less vaguely, while the lingering veil of moral evil shall at all obscure the perfect designs of the divine Creator, and retard the full appreciation of the willing worshiper," The essays following, of which we may enumerate "The House of Bondage," "The Land of Promise," "The Place of Fiction," "Hidden Life," "Conversation and Education," are full of spiritual vigor and earnest thought.

In the collection "Sober Thoughts on Staple Themes," the same truth-aspiring spirit plays, the same effort to realize the ideals of Brotherly Love is present. "Truth is the law as well as the lawful object of life, and doctrine is valuable only as a reflection of truth." *μκρκ.*

The Jacqueminot Roses, which come to us in the March number of the *Art Amateur* are glowing in color and blooming enough to give promise of a beautiful summer, instead of a chill and tardy spring.

"My Note Book" is full of accounts of auction sales, picture exhibitions, and curious anecdotes about connoisseurs. A large portion of the number is devoted to the accounts of exhibitions including those of water colors, of the Pennsylvania Academy, Brooklyn Art Club, and many others.

The most important article is a biographical and critical sketch of Alexander Cabanel, the late French artist. He was widely known as the decorator of the Tuileries, and also by his portraits. Many Americans were among his letters. The critic sums up his life thus:

"In Cabanel's artistic life there were three well marked periods: those of the student, of the artist, of the teacher and mechanical painter; and the second was the shortest and the least productive." Some reproductions of his crayon studies well illustrate the latter part of his career.

China painters may be interested in the account of "A New Portable Gas Kiln," invented by a woman, to be heated by common illuminating gas, which will "make it possible for china painters to fire their work at home."

A well illustrated article describes the methods of pen-drawing for the photo-engraving process.

Useful hints are given to Amateur photographers.

The most novel thing in the number, however, is "The Bedroom at Bedtime" which describes an old French bedroom with "warming pan" and "post warmer." On the whole, this is an unusually interesting number of this popular periodical. E. D. C.

NOTES.

On December 8, 1888, Col. Garrick Mallery held an address, as retiring president of the Philosophical Society of Washington, upon "Philosophy and Specialties," now published in the Bulletin series of that society. We like the spirit and method of Col. Mallery's address. The extent and significance of organized scientific work in the United States, is reviewed with critical strokes. Our author finds an injurious predominance given to specialistic disquisitions in the proceedings of most of our scientific associations. Their true office should be to harmonize, to correlate, and to put in an intelligible, philosophic form the acquisitions their several departments have made.

We have received the following letters, which for lack of space have been crowded from the columns of the present number: from Mr. Redway and Dr. Gould upon "Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness"; from A. M. G. in criticism of Mr. Francis Russell's communication, "Postulates and Axioms;" and from Wheelbarrow, in answer to the strictures of various correspondents.

A contribution from the pen of M. Alfred Binet will appear in our next issue. The subject, one of transcendent interest to all thinking persons, is "Sensation and the Outer World." Many novel points are touched, and the subject treated in M. Binet's usual clear and facile manner.

Walter Pater, author of "Marius the Epicurean," will contribute the End Paper to *Scribner's* for April, analyzing a group of "Shakspere's English Kings" from a novel point of view.

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

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AXIOMS THE BASIS OF MATHEMATICS. DR. EDWARD BROOKS.....No. 76.

THE OLD AND THE NEW MATHEMATICS. EDITOR.No. 77.

A FLAW IN THE FOUNDATION OF GEOMETRY. HERMANN GRASSMANN.....No. 77.

IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called, *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal. The relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

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Much criticism has been elicited by the bare mention of Mr. George's economical doctrines—indubitable testimony of their popularity and strength. Letters have appeared in No. 79 and others will follow.

"Symptoms of Social Degeneracy," Mr. Moncure D. Conway finds to be not unfrequent even in American civilization. We are prone to emphasize the survivals of barbaric institutions in effete Europe, while overlooking the excresences of our own body politic. Lynch-Law, literary piracy, corruption in administrative circles, are signs of the decay of an ethical system and the theology that protects it. Worst of all, these evils are not unaccompanied with attempts at palliation.

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ETHICAL EVOLUTION.

BY E. D. COPE, PH.D.

The original propounders of the utilitarian theory of morals, did not probably anticipate the substantiation of their position which has resulted from the thought of the present century. The discovery of the law of the evolution of man physically and mentally, and of the consequent evolution of society, has placed the utilitarian doctrine on a foundation which will remain. It is, however, a question of importance whether this theory embraces the *whole* truth or whether it describes a part only of the law of human ethical progress. To examine this question is an object of the present enquiry.

It is impossible to doubt that man in society acquired the habit and learned the principles of just treatment of his fellows, by the mutual pressure which every man has brought to bear on every other man, in asserting and enforcing his own rights. He did not learn it immediately, nor have all men learned it yet, but the educating forces have been and still are at work towards this end. That ethical conduct is an outgrowth of natural mental constitution can be doubted by no one who has observed men. It differs in children as compared with adults, in women as compared with men, and among men as compared with each other. And ethical qualities are so distributed in the different types of mankind as to display clearly the causes of those differences. The ethical merits and defects of children are due to immaturity and ignorance; those of women to the greater strength of their emotional nature; and in men to their superior physical and rational force. Physical necessities and the characteristics of the environment have impressed themselves on races, families, and individuals, so that, given certain conditions, one knows what to expect of men in an ethical direction. It is the innumerable facts of this kind that have led to an examination into the history of the development of the moral nature in man, and have led to its association with the theory of the physical evolution of man, now so clearly taught by the sciences of biology.

The moral sense is well known to psychologists to be a complex faculty. It involves first the knowledge of ethical truth, and second the "sense of right," or the sentiment or affection of the love of ethical right. The knowledge of right is an intellectual faculty and is an expression of the strength of the rational powers. Thus is explained the superiority of the more rational nations and individuals in this direction. But without the disposition to live up to this knowledge it avails little. Rationality is not always able to decide whether the law of right is most profitable or not. There are persons who assert that honesty is *not* the best policy. To judge by men's acts it may be supposed that such persons are not rare. Indeed, in a large portion of the human race the rational faculty itself is yet imperfectly developed. It is not uncommon to see persons who in one or more respects do not even know what is right. A large and full rationality, however, furnishes not only a knowledge of right but furnishes the affectional nature with reasons why it is best to practice right, even from an egotistic point of view. It is said that the utilitarian doctrine makes might and right identical. And so they are in the long run. A strong man may defy a weaker, or even two such, but the limit of his strength is soon reached, and numbers will overcome him. It is the ultimate fate of the malefactor to be overcome by numbers; and for this reason prudence teaches that honesty is the best policy after all. But there is another important egoistic reason for ethical conduct. The ethical life expresses the highest development of humanity; involving clearness of intellect, and benevolence of heart, with a self-control which is the expression of will. This combination of qualities represents the highest stage of human evolution, and is that which has the best chance of continuing. It is also the one which is the best worth preserving in another life, if a survival of the fittest control the admission, where fitness may be supposed to be a capacity for harmonious coëxistence with other minds.

From the altruistic side the motives for ethical life are direct. This part of human character is traceable to the sexual and maternal instincts and the affections which have grown out of them through long exercise. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that natural benevolence and generosity of character, and sympathy for other persons, have been derived from this source. This affectional quality of the mind has ever interacted with the rational in the production of motives of action in men. Each one has served as a

guide and stimulus to the other. With the increase of knowledge men's sympathies have grown broader; with increased strength of benevolence they have grown more regardless of egoistic motives of the material type. It cannot be truly said that altruistic motives are not at the same time egoistic, since there is a gratification experienced in the exercise of them. Whether all altruism is of egoistic origin remains to be seen. And on the other hand, altruism not regulated by judgment, may be immoral, as in some forms of charity, and some forms of sex relations.

A good many phrases have been borrowed from the vocabulary of physical evolution and applied in the field of human action without proper discrimination and with mischievous effect. Thus it was not seen at first that "the struggle for existence" among men is not merely a system of grab, and that the observance of human rights is not one of the conditions of success in it. It has been in some cases forgotten that the "survival of the fittest" is not the survival of the hardest hitter, or of the most successful embezzler. It has been still more frequently forgotten that "the line of least resistance" is very far from being the line of progress, in human affairs, and that in fact no great advance in some directions is possible among men, without considerable work in lines of strong resistance. It is in fact easier for men of limited moral capacities to go down, than up, a fact which might seem inconsistent with a theory of natural ethical evolution. Why it is not inconsistent I will proceed to show.

The effects of ethical degeneracy in a community are self-evident. With frequent dishonesty in business transactions, their freedom would be proportionally diminished, through the failure of credit and the burden of necessary safeguards. Without credit many enterprises that employ labor would come to a standstill, and many persons would be impoverished. Poverty would bring an increase of crimes against person and property, especially against those who profited by corrupt methods. Corruption in the administration of justice would be followed by the taking of private revenge for injuries. Social immorality would be followed by the same results by a shorter route. It is not difficult to perceive how a community might fall into chaos through moral degeneracy; indeed, history has witnessed such a process in various degrees of development, at different times, and in different countries. The last days of ancient Rome, and the French Revolution, may be cited in illustration of the effects on society of the persistent evil-doing of a larger or smaller part of its members.

The consequence of social chaos is misery, and the suffering, if not pushed to the destruction of the sufferer, has its usual good effect. The process of ethical development must be begun over again, and the building of character go on as before, and for the same reasons. Men will only tolerate a certain amount of pain, and when that limit is reached they take rational and serious methods to avoid it in future. This is the sure basis of natural ethical evolution. It is the general sentiment of the orthodox Christian world, that if the moral law of the old and new testaments should not be maintained to be of directly divine origin, the sanctions of morality would be lost, and that society would drift without sail or rudder. But apart from any question of the origin of ethical opinions, and of the text of the bible, it is certain that there is in the nature of things, a provision for the development of the moral part of man's mind, as of any other part of it. But we have seen what this natural system is. Like the struggle for existence in other respects, it is a system of mechanical severity. It is, indeed, that "mill of the Gods, which grinds exceeding fine." It is a Sheol of conflict and strife, and from which men of all nations and conditions may well desire to escape. This fact has been seen and foreseen by the wise of all ages, hence the earnestness of their ethical teachings, and the care with which their ethical laws and rules have been made and preserved.

The rational faculty finds its principal expression in the power of generalization; and the wider the grasp of facts in induction, or the more far-reaching the application of laws in deduction, the higher is the grade of the faculty. Wise men seeing and foreseeing the causes and effects of social conditions, have constructed systems of ethical conduct, and have pointed out the means of obeying them. This action of the wise towards their fellow men constitutes an element in human ethical evolution, in strong contrast to the *laisser faire* method of unassisted nature. It is a method of invitation as compared with one of compulsion. Coöperation with it on the part of men is infinitely economical of suffering. And the education to be derived from such sources is a protection against the evils of immorality to all who are influenced by it. Hence the incalculable value to mankind of such teachers as Buddha and Jesus Christ. The reasons which lie at the basis of their injunctions need not to have been perceived by their hearers; these have taken them largely on trust, and have clung to the promises of happiness which have followed them. The personal interest for the taught, expressed by the teacher, has won the hearts of the people, and the neglect of his lesser personal interests in the presence of the greater interests of all men, have convinced mankind of his sincerity. It is difficult to use the word selfishness in characterizing the lives of these great teachers of ethics. Although it was utility that was taught and sought, it was for the happiness of others. We have here an exhibition of the fruits of a development of

the affectional nature. But is this sufficient to account for the devotion of life-times and lives to such service?

The "strongest inducement" to altruistic conduct is love. The only perfect altruistic conduct is obtainable through love. The rational faculty fails to complete the work, and for this reason. Selfishness is essential to self-preservation in the world, and will be always. Egoism has constant exercise in its lower aspects, in the necessities of support and protection of our physical organism. As long as activity of the self-preservative faculties is stimulated, so long must temptations to dishonesty and egoism in various ways assail us. The rational faculty alone will not raise a sufficiently strong resistance to immorality in most people, if they think no practical harm will follow to themselves. A love will on the other hand act as a more powerful restraint. It is true that unaided by reason, love "loves its friends and hates its enemies," but rational love has a wider scope than one's friends only. But could the altruistic be evolved by natural causes to the degree that is expressed in the love of Jesus Christ to men?

The question of the existence or non-existence of a personal God cannot be gone into very fully here. Both materialists and idealists deny such existence; the former absolutely, the latter with or without qualification. The idealist, regarding thought as the most real thing, frequently sees in the last generalization of mind, a representative of the God of the ordinary man. But mind which consists of ratiocination only, is imperfect. Ratiocination in a being of great power does not imply goodness, for much evil might be inflicted by such a being were he not good, without harm to himself. Anthropomorphism is our natural guide to a personal God, and we cannot believe in universal mind, with essential parts of the human mind omitted. Paternal and maternal love are too strongly implanted in man, to permit him to believe in a deity without these qualities, if he believes in any. And I may say for myself that the nature of mind in all its relations to matter is such as to impress on me a belief in a wider distribution of mind than that which is limited by one little planet, a mere speck in the universe. So such mind must possess love, which with wide knowledge, and therefore power, is equivalent to goodness.

But the history of the world's life is a history of disasters mingled with pleasures, and of misery side by side with happiness. Wickedness prosperous for long periods, and goodness unrewarded, are common experiences. For such reasons as these, the existence of a personal deity has been denied. To the mind of the writer the facts indicate, not his non-existence, but his observance of a policy of non-interference. Such a policy might be construed as the indication of an evil rather than a good supreme being. But it is evident on the other hand that such a policy is required, if terrestrial life is an education; and that such is the case is clearly taught by the doctrine of evolution. Without non-interference character cannot be developed, and evolution fails of its end. Idealism cannot explain this phenomenon. The problem of evil is absolutely inexplicable on a theory which excludes the existence of matter. The fact is that evolution is the conquest of matter by mind; it is the long process of learning how to bring matter into subserviency to the uses of mind. And as mind itself is a property of matter, evolution means an acquisition of the power of self-control, from the material as well as from the mental standpoint.

In this struggle of mind with matter, a supreme mind could not be an uninterested spectator. His own control of matter is more or less concerned in it, since we may regard every conquest of matter by mind as an addition to all mind. And as the lesser mind may be not unphilosophically supposed to have originated from a more primitive mind, the relation is much that of parent to child. Here is a basis for an affection such as the parent knows better than the child; and which often goes quite unknown and unrequited by the children of men, till in later years their own time has come to know what it is to be a parent. With the advent of the knowledge that we are coöperating with a general creation of mind and of happiness, and that our services are needed, we may begin to appreciate the interest which our lives must excite in that of the master workman, and with what pleasure our successes are perceived, and with what regrets our reverses. We may remember that the laws of matter, like those of logic, are immutable, and that no creator can violate them. A being of great experience may learn them, and control by obeying them, so that our own efforts in this direction are but the parallel in a small way, of those that have been undergone by the greater and wiser Mind. Material difficulties probably prevent us from knowing of more than a small part of the laws of psycho-physics, since telepathy and like phenomena are of such exceptional occurrence.

A view of the paternal relation of God kindles in the mind a sentiment of love, which forms an abiding element of character, and motive of action. The motive, so far as it is not due to expected rewards, is as nearly unselfish as any that is known to us. Its tendency is to induce in us altruistic sentiments, which have their result in corresponding actions. Such a motive is stronger than any judgment of the rational faculty by itself. It is, however, difficult to separate the two things in action, since much that we learn of the situation is due to the understanding. Is the love derived from natural sources? Metaphysics cannot yet answer this question.

PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.

The Hindoo Sages compared the world, as it appears to our senses, to a veil—the veil of Maya—which lies upon our eyes and thus shrouds the true aspect of things. And the same view, with comparatively slight modifications, is repeated in the philosophy of Plato. In a poetical passage in the "Republic," the Grecian philosopher compares human knowledge to the condition of men who sit in a cavern facing the wall opposite the entrance; being bound to the spot since birth by chains about their feet and neck. They cannot look around, they cannot see the persons and things passing by behind them, but they see their shadows on the wall opposite and imagine that these appearances are the real things.

The view that natural processes are not actual realities, but mere shadows of invisible existences behind them, has been revived often since, and must be considered even to-day as the philosophy of our time; and only gradually a new conception of the world is rising that looks upon natural processes, the phenomena so-called, as the positive facts of knowledge. The expression 'phenomenon' means 'appearance;' the word has been introduced and is now generally employed as a synonym of 'natural process' because the Hindoo conception of the sham-existence of reality was, some time ago, all but universal.

Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, often speaks of "the thing of itself," and he says that we cannot have any positive knowledge of it. This was very discouraging, but it afforded those who paraded a Faust-like thirst for knowledge yet did not have the strength to devote a life of patient labor to earnest thought and research, an easy means of satisfying their yearning. Our knowledge is but relative, they said to themselves, and it is impossible to conceive the Absolute; the Absolute is the Unconditioned, and to our limited cognition it must be unknowable. If we could comprehend it, we would be omniscient like God, but as matters are, we are limited to the phenomenal world and must confess with Faust:

> "That which one does not know, one needs to use;
> And what one knows, one uses never."

If the absolute is incomprehensible, all our knowledge is vain, and worst of all, we can never hope to know anything about God and about our soul. Is not our soul our absolute self, the thing of itself which manifests itself in our existence? And is not God, the absolute of the universe, manifested in all the innumerable phenomena of nature? God and soul viewed from this standpoint, are unknowabilities.

Kant goes beyond this standpoint. The concepts 'Soul' and 'God,' as absolute existences or things of themselves, are paralogisms of pure reason. We have arrived at these ideas by a fallacy. We experience in our consciousness a consecutive series of sensations or thoughts, but from this fact we cannot infer the existence of a 'consciousness without its contents' as a thing of itself. The world is an orderly arranged whole, but from this fact we cannot infer that a transcendent God is the author of this order. Kant adds in his Critique of Practical Reason, that although the ideas of God and soul are paralogisms, we should regulate our lives as if they existed; we should act as if we had a soul and as if a God existed—a just judge to reward the good and punish the evil.

These ideas of Kant have become popular and the unknowability of the thing of itself contributed greatly to the growth of agnostic thought in England.

The name 'agnostic' was invented by Professor Huxley for the avowed purpose of appeasing obtrusive persons, who bored him with questions as to his belief or disbelief in the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. Prof. Huxley states the facts as follows:

> "Some twenty years ago, or thereabouts,* I invented the word 'Agnostic' to denote people who, like myself, confess themselves to be hopelessly ignorant concerning a variety of matters, about which metaphysicians and theologians, both orthodox and heterodox, dogmatize with the utmost confidence; and it has been a source of some amusement to me to watch the gradual acceptance of the term and its correlate, Agnosticism. * * * Thus it will be seen that I have a sort of patent right in 'Agnostic.' It is my trade-mark and I am entitled to say that I can state authentically what was originally meant by Agnosticism. Agnosticism is the essence of science, whether ancient or modern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe. * * * I have no doubt that scientific criticism will prove destructive to the forms of supernaturalism which enter into the constitution of existing religions. On trial of any so-called miracle, the verdict of science is 'not proven.' But Agnosticism will not forget that existence, motion, and law-abiding operation in nature are more stupendous miracles than any recounted by the mythologies and that there may be things, not only in the heavens and earth, but beyond the intelligible universe, which 'are not dreamt of in our philosophy.' The theological 'gnosis' would have us believe that the world is a conjurer's house; the anti-theological 'gnosis' talks as if it were a 'dirt-pie' made by two blind children, Law and Force. Agnosticism simply says that *we know nothing of what may be beyond phenomena.*"†

In another passage the great English biologist states his views concerning the immortality of the soul:

> "If anybody says that consciousness cannot exist except in relation of cause and effect with certain organic molecules I must ask how he knows that; and, if he says it can, I must put the same question. And I am afraid that, like jesting Pilate, I shall not think it worth while (having but little time before me) to wait for an answer."‡

If, with the Hindoo, we regard natural phenomena as a veil, we may compare the scientist to a man

* These lines were written by Prof. Huxley in 1884.
† The *italics* are ours.
‡ Prof. Huxley in the *Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1886.

who dares to lift that veil, and reveals to us part of the hidden truth. But even so, many Agnostics say, our knowledge must remain incomplete. While we inquire into the manifestations of forces, while we observe how they operate, we shall never be able to know what Matter is and what Force is. Their relations in the phenomenal world may be knowable, but their absolute existence is unknowable.

In answer to this view we must state that there is no absolute force, no force of itself. The so-called 'phenomena' of forces are the realities, and the different forces, such as heat, electricity, etc., are abstract conceptions in which we embrace all the natural processes of one kind. Not 'force' and 'matter' are things to be comprehended; they in their turn have been invented to comprehend phenomena. They do not go beyond phenomena but simply classify and arrange them, in order to comprehend them all together, if possible, in one unitary and consistent system.

Prof. Huxley, while confessing himself to be an Idealist, in an address on Descartes's 'Discourse,' introduces at the same time the mysticism which naturally follows from the principle of Agnosticism that "we know nothing of what may be beyond phenomena." Prof. Huxley says:

"If I say that *impenetrability* is a property of matter, all that I can really mean is that the consciousness I call *extension* and the consciousness I call *resistance*, constantly accompany one another. Why and how they are thus related is a mystery; and if I say that thought is a property of matter, all that I can mean is that, actually or possibly, the consciousness of extension and that of resistance accompany all other sorts of consciousness. But as in the former case, why they are thus associated, is *an insoluble mystery*."*

The concepts 'Impenetrability,' 'Extension,' and 'Resistance,' as they appear in our consciousness, are abstracts which denote certain qualities to be met with in our experience. If the spheres of two abstracts cover, either entirely or in part, the same ground, then as a matter of course the two ideas will always (either entirely or in part) appear to be associated. We form the abstract idea of matter by noting the qualities of all the different kinds of matter, dropping their individual features and retaining those only which they possess in common. Two qualities of matter (the two features which all matters have in common) are generalized under the names of mass and volume. Mass and volume, both being abstracts of the same object, *viz.*, of matter, it is but natural that they will always be associated, the one with the other. According to Prof. Huxley's method we should say: Why the consciousness I call 'mass' and the consciousness I call 'volume' constantly accompany one another is an insoluble mystery.

If we take the agnostic standpoint, the whole world becomes enigmatic and even such a fact as that the consciousness we call 'liquid' constantly accompanies the consciousness we call 'fluid' would appear as a profound mystery.

Professor Bain shows in his "Practical Essays," p. 56, that the word 'mysterious' has sense only if used in opposition to what is plain and intelligible:

"When we are told * * * that *everything is mysterious;* that the simplest phenomenon in nature—the fall of a stone, the swing of a pendulum, the continuance of a ball shot in the air—are wonderful, marvelous, miraculous, our understanding is confounded; there being then nothing plain at all, there is nothing mysterious. * * * If all phenomena are mysterious, nothing is mysterious; if we are to stand aghast in amazement because three times four is twelve, what phenomenon can we take as the type of the plain and the intelligible?"

Prof. Huxley in answer to two onslaughts on his position (one by Dr. Wace from the standpoint of orthodox theology, the other by Mr. Harrison, the defender of the Comtean Positive Philosophy), most ably and, indeed, successfully defends his agnosticism.* It is almost superfluous to state that we concur with him wherever he objects to the antiquated belief of demonology. When he characterizes agnosticism as the principle 'Try all things and hold fast by that which is good' and when he identifies it with "the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him," we heartily and fully agree with his agnosticism; our objection holds *only* in so far as Professor Huxley says "that we know nothing of what may be beyond phenomena."

* * *

KANT'S philosophy and especially his doctrine of the unknowability of 'things of themselves' have given, it is true, a great ascendency to agnosticism and at the same time to the mysticism of antiquated orthodoxy. Nevertheless the spirit of Kantian thought is far from both, and it leads neither to the one nor to the other of these deadly antagonists, but to a unitary conception of the world on the ground of positive facts—a conception which may be called Positivism,† or Monism.

Kant's philosophy, we must bear in mind, is not a system but a method. He tried to avoid the faults of Wolf's Dogmatism on the one side, and of Hume's Skepticism on the other. Thus, he proposed what he called Criticism. He did not offer a plain and outspoken solution of the problems, but he did the work to enable others to solve them: he formulated the problems.

* *Italics* are ours.

* *Nineteenth Century* February, 1889. Prof. Huxley informs us in this article that Sir William Hamilton's essay "On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned" which he read when a boy had stamped upon his mind the strong conviction that the limitation of our faculties in a great number of cases renders real answers to certain questions not merely actually impossible but theoretically inconceivable.

† The introduction of the word "Positivism" into philosophy is the merit of M. Auguste Comte. Although we cannot accept M. Comte's conception of Positivism, we gratefully adopt the name, which, as a synonym of Monism, is a strong and expressive term.

Kant discusses (in Chap. III of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty of Judgment) the "discrimination of all objects as phenomena and noumena." Phenomena are the natural processes which affect our senses (*Sinneswesen*). They are the data of our experience and provide the building materials out of which we create our conceptions of things. Noumena, in contradistinction to phenomena, are pure ideas (*Verstandeswesen*). Kant used the word "noumenon" in its original sense. It is the present passive participle of *νοεῖν* 'to think' and means 'something thought' or 'a creation of our mind.'

Concerning noumena or pure thoughts Kant emphatically declares that they have no significance unless they have reference to the phenomenal, *i. e.*, to the real sensations of our experience.

Kant says: †

"Everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. * * *

"That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its *a priori* principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most important results.

"A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to things *in general* and considered as things *in themselves;* an empirical use, when it is referred merely to *phenomena*, that is, to objects of a possible *experience*. That the latter use of a conception is the only admissible one, is evident from the reasons following.

"For every conception are requisite, firstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought) in general; and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply. Failing this latter, it has no sense, and is utterly void of content, although it may contain the logical function for constructing a conception from certain data.

"Now an object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by intuition, and, even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is *a priori* possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objective validity only from empirical intuition, of which it is itself but a form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their *a priori* possibility, relate to empirical intuitions, that is to data towards a possible experience. Without this they possess no objective validity, but are a mere play of imagination or of understanding with images or notions. ***

"The conceptions of mathematics would have no significance, if we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena (empirical objects). * * *

"The pure categories are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility."

In the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant has inserted a few paragraphs, in which he discusses "the causes why we (not yet satisfied with the substratum of sensation) have added the noumena to the phenomena." "We have learned," he says, "that sensation does not perceive things of themselves, but as they appear to us in accordance with our subjective condition." Now, as they cannot be appearances of themselves, we suppose that something must correspond to it, something which is independent of sensation.

Kant distinguishes two kinds of noumena. Noumena, in the positive sense, he defines to be those that are supposed to have originated in a non-sensuous intuition, and declares that they are inadmissible:

"We in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion."

Noumena, in the negative sense, Kant calls things in so far as we abstract from sensation altogether; they are pure ideas, merely formal thought. They are not only admissible but for certain purposes necessary.

"A noumenon considered as merely problematical, is not only admissible but even indispensable. * * * It is a negative extension of reason. * * * We limit sensation by giving to things of themselves (in so far as they are not considered as phenomena) the name of noumena."

"The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a *mundus sensibilis* and *intelligibilis* is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense (although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division); for the latter class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity.

* * * "After all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena all is for us a mere void. * * * What, therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood by us as such in a *negative* sense."

Thus the question whether our reason, in addition to its admitted empirical use, can be employed in a transcendental way to noumena as objects, is answered by Kant in the negative.

The root of false noumenalism, it seems to us, must be sought in language. It is a misconception of the nature of words which leads us to think that things are absolute existences, being independent of, and distinct from their qualities. If we keep a clear conception, however, of the way words have arisen, and of the purpose they serve, we shall not fall into this dualism that believes in an absolutely unknowable world supposed to be hid behind the knowable world of sense-phenomena.

Words are, so to speak, bundles of percepts. If we pull single percepts out, the bundle is still a bundle; but if we take away all, there is no bundle left, there is nothing remaining that made the bundle a bundle; we have left only an empty nothing. If we take away from a thing all the properties that we are accustomed to comprehend by a word, there is left the meaningless word, a mere sound, the bare string with which the bundle was tied together.

The world is not in a rigid unchangeable state, but in a continuous flux. Yet knowledge becomes possible only when we fix certain percepts and give them relative stability. The faculty of fixing and retaining percepts, namely memory, is therefore the ladder that leads us upwards to a higher spiritual existence;

† Translation by Meiklejohn.

it affords the mechanical means of gaining a firm foothold in the course of eternal changes.

It is as if we sat in an express train and were looking at the landscape flitting by us. The picture, taken as a whole, swims indistinctly before our eyes. If we wish to get a clear idea of the situation, we must allow the eye to rest on some one object, neglecting the others. This we do, in viewing nature, by the concept, *i. e.*, by the word. Words are the instruments by which we fix, in symbols of sound, certain classes of events, perceptions, or experiences; giving them a relative stability despite the universal change of things. In this rests the importance of words, for it is only in this way that we can at all separate a group of occurrences from the course of nature, in order to scrutinize them closely, and to understand them. We must always bear the fact in mind that the element of stability that seems to be present in many words, is a fiction designed to serve a definite purpose. Absolute rest does not exist. Things are in a constant flux, and if we give our words and concepts a relative fixity, we must nevertheless not seek in them eternal existences, or absolute entities, as did Plato, in his 'Ideas.' *

CORRESPONDENCE.

WHO MAKES THE "LAND-VALUE" OF A FARM?

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IN THE OPEN COURT for Feb. 28th, I am honored by criticisms from three advocates of Mr. George's plan of taxation. Those criticisms are evidently written by men competent to defend their own position and attack mine. They have the advantage of me, for I have not their ability to analyze and compare the abstract properties of things. I cannot separate the shadow of a tree from the tree itself, nor the value of land from the land.

My critics complain that I do not correctly state Mr. George's doctrine; and they kindly advise me to read him again. Well, I will if they will. Mr. Williamson says that Mr. George's position is that "*almost* all the value of land comes from the growth and labor of the community, and not from the individual who legally owns the land;" while his brother critic, Mr. Stephenson, says the strongest claim of Mr. George is that "the value of land is *entirely* due to the labor of the whole community." I have placed "almost" and "entirely" in italics for easier comparison. Which is Mr. George's word? Somebody has made a mistake as to his position here. Either Mr. Williamson or Mr. Stephenson ought to read Mr. George's works again.

The variance above noticed is of no importance to the main argument if both statements are erroneous, as I think they are. I do not know how to dissect the doctrine based upon them, but I do know how to analyze a farm, because I have seen farms made, and have helped to make them. Here is the process used in Illinois.

In the first place the virgin soil was communistic property; it belonged to all the people of the United States, and it was expressively described as "Government" land. The experience of my old acquaintance, Thomas Clark, will illustrate the subject like a book. Having selected a quarter-section of land in Boone County for his future home, Tom Clark was immediately confronted by Mr. George's law. The government said to him: "This land is the common property of all the people, and before you can have it, you must pay to the people the land-value of that quarter-section. This is fixed at a dollar and a quarter an acre. Tom paid the money, and took the land. Then he broke forty acres at a cost of three dollars an acre. His quarter-section was now worth $320 in visible value. Next he built a house and barn upon the land, and fenced the forty acres with rails. By this time his plantation in the rough was worth about $500. How much of that value was due to the labor of the "community?" Absolutely none of it; and yet this is the way "land-values" were made in Illinois. The settler who furnished all the labor, and all the capital, and made all the value the land possesses, is coolly described by Mr. Stephenson as the "alleged" owner of the land. He is also the "alleged" owner of the "alleged" fence, and the "alleged" house and barn.

In the wilderness of occult economics I can easily lose my way, but I get along fairly well by the aid of an object lesson so large and palpable as a farm. I ask my critics how they will apply Mr. George's doctrine of taxation to the farm which I have just described. By much wear of muscle and sweat of brow, Tom Clark has brought the whole quarter-section under cultivation, and there is an orchard in one corner of it. Now, which of the ingredients of this farm shall bear the single tax? Is it the breaking of the wild sod? Is it the fence, the barn, or the apple trees? This is a fair question, and it ought to be fairly answered. It is never answered. It is evaded thus: "We do not propose to tax any of these improvements nor the land itself; we only propose to tax the *land-value* of the whole farm."

In that evasion the single tax on values' theory vanishes "like the feverish dream of a summer's night." The land-value of that farm separate from the improvements, is *nothing*. I have Mr. George for that. In "Protection and Free Trade," page 291, he says, "Land in itself has no value. Value arises only from human labor." If so, we tax human labor when we tax land-values. Whose labor made the land-value of that farm? Was it the labor of the man who ploughed the land, split the rails, built the house, and planted the apple trees, or was it the labor of the "Community"? The community did nothing; and besides, it had sold its communal right in the land for a dollar and a quarter an acre?

I repeat that Mr. George loses sight of his own doctrine that land of itself has no value, when he says, page 302: "Now, it is evident that in order to take for the use of the community, the *whole income* arising from land, it is only necessary to abolish one after another, all other taxes now levied, and to increase the tax on land-values until it reaches as near as may be the *full* annual value of the land." Now, if the government takes from Clark the "full annual value" and "the whole income" of his farm, whether by tax, rent, or confiscation, it practically takes the whole farm and all the product of his life-time industry.

It is paltering in a double sense to separate the value of that farm from the farm itself. It is pure mystification to say, "We tax the flavor of the apples, but not the apple trees, nor the land on which they grow; we tax the fragrance of the roses, but not the flowers nor the garden; we tax the sweetness of the grapes, but not the vineyard nor the vines." If the tax upon the sweetness of the grapes is not paid, that sweetness is not levied on, but the vineyard is arrested and sold. In like manner, when the tax on land-values becomes delinquent, the land itself is taken. In the language of my critic, Mr. McGill, "the owner of the improvements pays the annual value of the land to the freeholder. Under Mr. George's system he would pay it to the municipality. In either case he must pay it or *lose his improvements*."

Mr. McGill says that Mr. George's experiments "are a plea for the application of the 'Moral Law.'" I do not doubt that Mr.

* Under the title of "The Oneness of the Phenomenal and Noumenal," in No. 84, a further development of the problem here discussed, will be presented.

George and Mr. McGill conscientiously believe that; but I can hardly imagine anything more immoral and despotic than a law which would attach Mr. George's theory to the farm I have described, and take from the farmers who made the farm "the whole income" of it, and its "full annual value." The farm that I have selected is not an exceptional instance; it is a fair example of the manner in which "land-values" have been made in Illinois and all the Western States. If the answer to this is that the land-value of city lots is not made in that way, I reply: Very well; then let Mr. George apply his doctrine where it fits, and where the application of it can do no wrong, if there is any such place, which I doubt.

Mr. Stephenson requires me to "point out the exact place in Progress and Poverty where the millenium is promised by the simple means of a single tax on land;" and, also, "where Mr. George denounces every progress, under present circumstances, as driving a parting wedge between the rich and poor." I will cheerfully do so. Let Mr. Stephenson read pages 326 and 327, where Mr. George describes the condition of public happiness which would result from levying a simple tax on land. It is too long to quote here, but it describes that social state which is usually called the millennium. "We should reach the ideal of the socialist," says Mr. George, "but not through governmental repression."

For answer to the second question, I refer my critic to page 11, where, after confessing the vast progress made in "comfort, leisure, and refinement," Mr. George says this: "In those gains the lowest class do not share." Then, further on, he says, "The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society."

Personally, I think there is much truth in that statement, but I believe that Mr. George's remedy would make matters worse instead of better. To levy each year a tax upon Clark's farm equal to the "full annual value" of it,—and to deprive him of the "whole income" arising from the land, would be adding another injustice to the wrongs which afflict society now.

Here is a circular explanation of Mr. George's doctrine which mystifies me like a Greek oracle. Mr. Williamson says: "Now, if you tax the value of land you are taxing the labor of the whole *community, slightly*, and the natural opportunity and growth of the community; but as the taxes are expended on the community—for the growth of the community—nobody is injured and the *growth* pays *for the growth*."

Isn't that chopping sand? What is the use of taxing the labor of the whole community, slightly, to expend the taxes on the community, slightly? And how does the growth of the community pay for the growth of the community? I have traveled round and round this proposition looking for a gate-way to its meaning, until I am giddy. To tax the value of land belonging to the whole community is to impose upon ourselves the cannon-ball torture for nothing. One of our punishments in the army was this: A circle was drawn on the ground about 90 feet in diameter. On the outer edge of the circle, holes were dug about a yard apart. In one of the holes was a 32 pound cannon ball. The delinquent had to pick up this cannon-ball and drop it into the next hole, then take it from that and drop it into the next, and so on, round and round, for so many hours a day. This was done as punishment, but Mr. Williamson wants to do it for fun, by the whole community taxing the labor of the whole community, the taxes to be expended on the whole community.

When Tom Clark's quarter-section belonged to the whole community it was never taxed at all, because there is no sense in a community levying taxes upon the values of its own land, and paying the taxes into its own treasury. I once knew a man who fined himself a dollar every time he used profane language, but he merely took it from one pocket and paid it into the other.

If Mr. Williamson means to say that taxing the land-values of Tom Clark's farm taxes the labor of the whole community, I think he makes a mistake. It appears to me that the taxation is levied upon the labor of Clark, and the taxes ought not to be "expended on the community." WHEELBARROW.

DREAMS, SLEEP, AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

AMONG many interesting communications to me regarding my paper in a late number of your journal there is one of peculiar interest from one of your subscribers in England. He states that he has been able to conquer an insomnia of long standing by the device of looking downward when trying to go to sleep. He was prevailed upon to try the device of, in fancy, watching the breath escape from his own nostrils. He found this successful but concluded that the rotation of the eye downward was the essential factor. Thinking of this I have wondered if this were not something more than an individual idiosyncracy, if indeed it were not founded upon a true basis of cerebral habit and necessity. That the eye is the most easily reacting of all sense-mechanisms is a truism, and that of all it is the most intimately connected with all cerebral and psychological processes. Not only this, but the facts of functional amblyopia from prolonged exposure to light, such as moon-blindness, snow-blindness, etc., show how injurious to the eye is such continuous stimulus. Neither for the objects of shutting out the external world of light nor for protection to the eyes, is the darkening of the lids sufficient. Sound sleep and retinal safety demand either a complete external darkness, or a rotation during sleep, as my correspondent says he has found in his own case, of the eye ball upward beneath the arch of the eyebrow. I believe it has been experimentally found that in sleep the globes do rotate upward. It may, however, be true that the necessity was greater and the fact more constant in primitive or savage man than in the civilized man of to-day. The savage slept more frequently in the open air. But if true in either case, the mechanism whereby this act was done, required a constant expenditure of force to effect it, and therefore a watchfulness, an activity of nerve centres somewhere, that rendered the whole cerebral machinery less passive than if it were not compelled to keep up such continuous functional output. Somnolence was therefore less complete, the restorage function more drawn upon, the "sentinal" was more alert. If, therefore, such continuous innervation of the superior recti serve to keep the cerebral organism from sinking so speedily or completely into slumber, then relieving it from such duty of out going stimulation would thus serve to becalm and quiet it. Reversal of the habitual bulbar rotation would thus serve to relieve the centres of the superior recti, and divide the stimulus to the inferior, thus setting up a sort of relief and rest for the too continuously acting centre. It is true that during waking the superior rectus has the least work of all the muscles, and therefore is better able to take up the continuous work of the night; it is also true that excessive innervation of the inferior rectus would be as arousing as that of the superior, and, finally, it may be said that the habit in the civilized man, sleeping as he does in closed rooms, might be dropped; but there remains as answer that continuous contraction of a muscle means waking activity of the centre, and its correlates; that the lower rectus will only be kept functional while the would-be sleeper is consciously making the effort; and lastly that old habits of nature or man are not soon stopped. Would not a better plan than that of my correspondent be that of slowly and rhythmically putting *all* the muscles of the eyes into alternate function, each for a few minutes at a time.

G. M. GOULD.

PROPOSITIONS AND KNOWLEDGE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WITH your indulgence I beg to offer a few observations suggested by the remarks of Francis C. Russell, in number 78 of your valuable journal, under the title "Propositions vs. Axioms." Firstly, as to Propositions, I cannot understand what is meant by their "material content," unless it be that a given proposition referring to the material world, either affirming or denying something of or concerning matter in some of its forms, thence denotes something which in its essential character is material, or composed of matter; for assuredly matter itself cannot be contained within a Proposition as water may be said to be contained within a basin. Since Propositions are merely the creatures of the mind, their "content" can be no more material than the material of the mind,—if such an expression may be allowed. Propositions, as I understand the term, are but words, signs or symbols arranged in certain order to express definite ideas, and it is incorrect to speak of their content in any other terms than those applicable to the ideal. For example, the content of the proposition: All men are mortal, is the idea or notion that all men partake of the attribute mortality, or, that they are subject to the laws of matter. Whether or not all men are mortal is a scientific question, and the evidences tending to prove or disprove the proposition are facts either of a material, ideal, or spiritual nature, the relevancy or importance of which must be determined for us by the methods of logical reasoning.

Although Mr. Russell does not develop any theory of cognition or knowledge, he posits a proposition which would seem to lead us into speculative depths little less than a "bottomless pit." He states that "every cognition is determined by previous cognitions," etc.; that is to say, there can be no knowledge for us except there be an infinite series of preceding cognitions. If to Mr. Russell "cognition" and "knowledge" are synonymous in meaning, according to this theory we can have no knowledge except we have infinite knowledge. It is probably, however, that Mr. Russell attaches different meanings to the two words, whereas to me they are practically synonymous. In fact, we find in the same paragraph above quoted from the statement that knowledge is to be explained as a mere inference from "prior cognitions either alone or combined with * * * sense-presentation." Now, as to the merits of this latter statement it might be said that if, in some instances, knowledge is derived from or determined by prior cognition combined with mental impressions arising as data from the senses, we have a species of knowledge not wholly drawn from or determined by pre-existing cognition, and hence, in so far, a species of original or primary knowledge. Does not Mr. Russell mean to imply that knowledge has two sources of origin, namely, prior cognition, and sense-presentation?

A. M. G.

MR. RUSSELL IN EXPLANATION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I KNOW very well that you cannot allow your columns to be overloaded with the polemics of philosophy. Philosophy, while vastly interesting to a few, is a weariness to the many. Still, I would like to resolve the obscurities that A. M. G. finds in my former letter. The leading motive of that letter was to combat the old and obstructive doctrine that axioms are finalities. In doing this I stated what I understand to be one of the well established doctrines of the modern theory of cognition, viz., that the entire body of our knowledge, axioms as well as the rest, are the result of reasoning. Of course, it would be impossible to "develop" any theory of cognition in a brief letter, nor was it needful. That yawning abyss of speculation discerned by A. M. G. as the leading of the doctrine he challenges, is a mere mirage. While it is quite true that that doctrine implies that knowledge is the result of an infinite series of prior cognitions, it is not true that an infinite series of cognitions implies infinite knowledge. The infinite series one-half, plus one-fourth, plus one-eighth, etc., may be applied to any subject or quantity, however small.

It is also true that cognition and knowledge may be used as synonyms. But I spoke of *cognitions* (plural of a cognition) in the sense of articulated constituents of knowledge, not as intending the entire body of our intellectual possessions, and what I said was that "nowhere in the content of the mind is there to be found any iota of knowledge that cannot be explained as a mere inference," etc. I will be frank to allow that there is an apparent inconsistency between the two statements that all knowledge is the product of mere inference or reasoning, and that knowledge is also consequent on sense-presentation. This inconsistency is, however, merely apparent, not real; but to explicate it would require more space than I can obtain, and I conceive that my original contention against axioms does not require it of me. Should any one desire satisfaction in this matter, let me refer them to three articles by Prof. C. S. Pierce, in vol. 2, *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.

In saying that all genuine propositions must have a material content, no reference was made to mass matter. A proposition is somewhat told about a thing. The thing is called the subject of the proposition, and the somewhat told the predicate, which either is or contains the uniting constituent or copula.

Verbal utterance is nonsense merely, unless it employs the mechanism of the proposition in some of its manifold forms. Every proposition bears some significance. It tells some tale. This may be termed its content. The telling of the proposition may add to or unfold the meaning of the subject, in which case the telling, tale, or content is material in contrast with the case in which the telling is formal merely, and neither adds to nor unfolds the signification of the subject, being a mere empty form or ghost of a telling. For example, take that esteemed "axiom": "Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other." Now, put it that here we have a sheet of tin and an orange and an apple. The sheet of tin shall be equal in weight to the apple, and the orange equal to it in volume. Are the orange and the sheet of tin equal? Clearly our "axiom" must be amended to say, Things that are equal *in the same respect* to the same thing are equal to one another *in that same respect*, which is the very same as to say, Equals are equal or x=x,—all formally valid, but pure emptiness.

When, however, I say that a straight or right line is a line such that between the points that bound any assigned part of it no copy of such part can be drawn, I tell something about the subject of my proposition—viz., a straight or right line—that does not appear in the mere naming of it, and hence, although the proposition states only a formal truth, it yet has in my sense a material content.

FRANCIS C. RUSSELL.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXII.—Continued.

Immediately upon quitting the apartment of the father, the Prince ordered his carriage, and then hastened to his sister. The Princess looked anxiously into his disturbed countenance.

"You are going away?" she exclaimed.

"Farewell!" he said, holding out his hand to her. "I am going into the country to build a new castle for us in case we should wish to change the scene of action."

"When do you return, Benno?"

The Hereditary Prince shrugged his shoulders.

* Translation copyrighted.

"When the Sovereign commands. My task is now to become something of an architect and farmer; this is a useful occupation. Farewell, Sidonie. If chance should bring you together with Mrs. Werner, I would be greatly indebted to you if you would not attend to the gossip of the Court, but remember that she is a worthy lady, and that I owe her a great debt of gratitude."

"Are you dissatisfied with me, my brother?" asked the Princess, anxiously.

"Make reparation for it, Siddy, as best you can. Farewell!"

Prince Victor accompanied him to the carriage. The Hereditary Prince clasped his hand, and looked significantly towards the Pavilion. Victor nodded. "That's my opinion too," he said. "Before I go back to my garrison I will visit you in the land of cat-tails. I expect to find you as a brother hermit, with a long beard and a cap made of tree-bark. Farewell, Knight Toggenburg, and learn there that the best philosophy on earth is to consider every day as lost on which one cannot do some foolish trick. If one does not do this business one's self, others will take the trouble off one's hands. Is is always more pleasant to be the hammer than the anvil."

* * *

The Sovereign was gloomy and silent at dinner; only short remarks fell from his lips, and sometimes a bitter jest, from which one remarked that he was striving for composure; the Court understood that this unpleasant mood was connected with the departure of the Hereditary Prince, and every one took care not to irritate him. The Professor alone was able to draw a smile from him, when he good-humoredly told about the enchanted castle, Solitude. After dinner the Sovereign conversed with one of his aides-de-camp as well as the Professor. The latter turned to the High Steward; and although he usually avoided the reserved politeness of the man, he on this occasion asked him some indifferent questions. The High Steward answered civilly that the Marshal, who was close by, could give him the best information, and he changed his place. Immediately afterwards the Sovereign walked straight through the company to the High Steward, and drew him into the recess of the window, and began:

"You accompanied me on my first journey to Italy, and, if I am not mistaken, partook a little of my fondness for antiquities. Our collection is being newly arranged and a catalogue fully prepared."

The High Steward expressed his acknowledgment of this princely liberality.

"Professor Werner is very active," continued the Sovereign; "it is delightful to see how well he understands to arrange the specimens."

The High Steward remained silent.

"Your Excellency will remember how when in Italy we were much amused at the enthusiasm of collectors who, luring strangers into their cabinets, wildly gesticulated and rhapsodized over some illegible inscription. Like most other men, our guest is also afflicted with a hobby. He suspected that an old manuscript lay concealed in a house in our principality; therefore he married the daughter of the proprietor; and as, in spite of that, he did not find the treasure, he is now secretly seeking this phantasm in the old garrets of the palace. Has he never spoken to you of it?"

"I have as yet had no occasion to seek his confidence," replied the High Steward.

"Then you have missed something," continued the Sovereign; "in his way he speaks well and readily about it; it will amuse you to examine more closely this species of folly. Come presently with him into my study."

The High Steward bowed; and on the breaking up of the party, informed the Professor that the Sovereign wished to speak to him.

The gentlemen entered the Sovereign's apartment, in order to afford him an hour of entertainment.

"I have told his Excellency," the Sovereign began, "that you have a special object of interest which you pursue like a sportsman. How about the manuscript?"

The Professor related his new discovery of the two chests.

"The next hunting-ground which I hope to try will be the garrets and rooms in the summer castle of the Princess; if these yield me no booty, I would hardly know of any place that has not been searched."

"I shall be delighted if you soon attain your object," said the Sovereign, looking at the High Steward. "I assume that the discovery of this manuscript will be of great importance for your own professional career. Of course you will consent to publish the same."

"It would be the noblest task that could fall to my lot," replied the Professor," "always supposing that your Highness would graciously entrust the work to me."

"You shall undertake the work, and no other," replied the Sovereign, laughing, "so far as I have the right to decide it. So the invisible book will be really of great importance to learning?"

"The greatest importance. The contents of it will be of the highest value to every scholar. I think it would also interest your Highness," said the Professor, innocently, "for the Roman Tacitus is in a certain sense a Court historian; the main point of his narrative is the characters of the Emperors who, in the first century of our era, decided the fate of the old world. It is indeed, on the whole, a sorrowful picture."

"Did he belong to the hostile party?" inquired the Sovereign.

"He is the great narrator of the peculiar deformity of character found in the sovereigns of the ancient world; we have to thank him for a series of psychological studies of a malady that then developed itself on the throne."

"That is new to me," replied the Sovereign, fidgeting on his chair.

"Your Highness will, I am convinced, view the various forms of this mental malady with the greatest sympathy, and will find in other periods of the past—nay, even in the earlier civilization of our own people—many remarkable parallel cases."

"Do you speak of a special malady that only befalls rulers?" asked the Sovereign; "physicians will be grateful to you for this discovery."

"In fact," answered the Professor, eagerly, "the fearful importance of this phenomenon is far too little estimated; no other has exercised such an immeasurable influence on the fate of nations. The destruction by pestilence and war is small in comparison with the fatal devastation of nations which has been occasioned by this special misfortune of the rulers. For this malady, which raged long after Tacitus among the Roman emperors, is not an ailing that is confined to ancient Rome—it is undoubtedly as old as the despotisms of the human race; even later it has been the lot of numerous rulers in Christian states; it has produced deformed and grotesque characters in every period; it has been for thousands of years the worm enclosed in the brain, consuming the marrow of the head, destroying the judgment and corroding the moral feelings, until at last nothing remained but the hollow glitter of life. Sometimes it became madness which could be proved by medical men, but in numerous other cases the capacity for practical life did not cease and the secret mischief was carefully concealed. There were periods when only occasional firmly-established minds preserved their full healthy vigor; and again other centuries when the heads that wore a diadem inhaled a fresh atmosphere from the people. I am convinced that he whose vocation it is to investigate accurately the conditions of later times will, in the course of his studies, discover the same malady under a milder form. My life lies far from these observations, but the Roman state undoubtedly shows the strangest forms of the malady; for there were the widest relations, and such a powerful development of human nature both in virtue and vice as has seldom since been found in history."

"It seems to be a particular pleasure to the learned gentlemen to bring to light these sufferings of former rulers," said the Sovereign.

"They are certainly instructive for all times," continued the Professor, confidently, "for by fearful example they impress upon one the truth that the higher a man's position is, the greater is the necessity of barriers to restrain the arbitrariness of his nature. Your Highness's independent judgment and rich experience will enable you to discern, more distinctly than any one in my sphere of life, that the phenomena of this malady always show themselves where the ruling powers have less to fear and to honor than other mortals. What preserves a man in ordinary situations is that he feels himself at every moment of his life under strict and incessant control; his friends, the law, and the interest of others surround him on all sides, they demand imperiously that he should conform his thoughts and will by rules which secure the welfare of others. At all times the power of these fetters is less effective on the ruler; he can easily cast off what confines him, an ungracious movement of the hand frightens the monitor forever from his side. From morning to evening he is surrounded by persons who accommodate themselves to him; no friend reminds him of his duty, no law punishes him. Hundreds of examples teach us that former rulers, even amidst great outward success, suffered from inward ravages, where they were not guarded by a strong public opinion, or incessantly constrained by the powerful participation of the people in the state. We cannot but think of the gigantic power of a general and conqueror whose successes and victories brought devastation and excessive sin into his own life; he became a fearful sham, a liar to himself and a liar to the world before he was overthrown, and long before he died. To investigate similar cases is, as I said, not my vocation."

"No," said the Sovereign, in a faint voice.

"The distant time," began the High Steward, "of which you speak, was a sad epoch for the people as well as the rulers. If I am not mistaken a feeling of decay was general, and the admired writers were of little value; at least it appears to me that Apuleius and Lucan were frivolous and deplorably vulgar men."

The Professor looked surprised at the courtier.

"In my youth such authors were much read," he continued. "I do not blame the better ones of that that period, when they turned away with disgust at such doings, and withdrew into the most retired private life, or into the Theban wilderness. Therefore when you speak of a malady of the Roman emperors, I might retort that it was only the result of the monstrous malady of the people; although I see quite well that during this corruption individuals accomplished a great advance in the human race, the freeing the people from the exclusiveness of nationality to the unity of culture, and the new ideal which was brought upon earth by Christianity."

"Undoubtedly the form of the state, and the style of culture which each individual emperor found, were decisive for his life. Every one is, in this sense, the

child of his own time, and when it is a question of judging the measure of his guilt, it is fitting to weigh cautiously such considerations. But what I had the honor of pointing out to his Highness as the special merit of Tacitus, is only the masterly way with which he describes the peculiar symptoms and course of the Cæsarean insanity."

"They were all mad," interrupted the Sovereign, with a hoarse voice.

"Pardon, gracious Sir," rejoined the Professor, innocently. "Augustus became a better man on the throne, and almost a century after the time of Tacitus there were good and moderate rulers. But something of the curse which unlimited power exercises on the soul may be discovered in most of the Roman emperors. In the better ones it was like a malady which seldom showed itself, but was restrained by good sense or a good disposition. Many of them indeed were utterly corrupted, and in them the malady developed in definite gradation, the law of which one can easily understand."

"Then you also know how these people were at heart!" said the Sovereign, looking shyly at the Professor.

The High Steward retreated towards a window.

"It is not difficult in general to follow the course of the malady," replied the Professor, engrossed with his subject. "The first accession to power has an elevating tendency. The highest earthly vocation raises even narrow-minded men like Claudius; depraved villians like Caligula, Nero, and Domitian, showed a certain nobleness at first. There is an eager desire to please, and strenuous exertion to establish themselves by graciousness; a fear of influential persons or of the opposition of the masses compels a certain moderation. But arbitrary power has made men slaves, and the slavish feeling shows itself in an abject veneration which puts the emperor on a pinnacle above other men; he is treated as if specially favored by the gods, nay, as if his soul was an emanation of godly power. Amid this adoration by all, and the security of power, egotism soon increases. The accidental demands of an unrestrained will become reckless, the soul gradually loses the power of distinguishing between good and evil; his personal wishes appear to the ruler henceforth as the necessity of the state, and every whim of the moment must be satisfied. Distrust of all who are independent leads to senseless suspicion; he who will not be pliant is set aside as an enemy, and he who adapts himself with suppleness is sure to exercise a mastery over his master. Family bonds are severed, the nearest relations are watched as secret enemies, the deceptive show of hearty confidence is maintained, but suddenly some evil deed breaks through the veil that hypocrisy has drawn over a hollow existence."

The Sovereign slowly drew back his chair from the fire into the dark.

"The idea of the Roman state at last entirely vanishes from the soul, only personal dependence is required; true devotion to the state becomes a crime. This helplessness, and the cessation of the power of judging of the worth—nay, even of the attachment of men—betoken an advance of the malady by which all sense of accountability is impaired. Now the elements of which the character is formed become more contracted and onesided, the will more frivolous and paltry. A childish weakness becomes perceptible; pleasure in miserable trifles and empty jokes, together with knavish tricks which destroy without aim; it becomes enjoyment not only to torment and see the torments of others, but also an irresistible pleasure to drag all that is venerated down to a common level. It is very remarkable how, in consequence of this decay of thought, an unquiet and destructive sensuality takes the place of all. Its dark power becomes overmastering, and instead of the honorable old age which gives dignity even to the weak, we are disgusted by the repugnant picture of decrepit debauchees, like Tiberius and Claudius. The last powers of life are destroyed by shameless and refined profligacy."

"That is very remarkable," repeated the Sovereign, mechanically.

The Professor concluded: "Thus are accomplished the four gradations of ruin; first, gigantic egotism; then suspicion and hypocrisy; then childish senselessness; and, lastly, repugnant excesses."

The Sovereign rose slowly from his chair; he tottered, and the High Steward drew near to him terrified, but he supported himself with his hand on the arm of the chair, and, turning languidly to the Professor without looking at him, said, slowly:

"I thank the gentleman for a pleasant hour."

One could perceive the effort which it cost him to bring out the words.

In going out the Professor asked in a low tone of the High Steward:

"I fear I have wearied the Sovereign by this long discussion?"

The High Steward looked with astonishment at the frank countenance of the scholar:

"I do not doubt that the Sovereign will very soon show you that he has listened with attention."

When they were on the stairs they heard a hoarse, discordant sound in the distance; the old gentleman shuddered, and leaned against the wall.

The Professor listened; all was still.

"It was like the cry of a wild beast."

"The sound came from the street," replied the High Steward.

(*To be continued.*)

MOODS.

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

Author of "Woodnotes in the Gloaming," etc.

I.

DARKNESS.

Am I then man, and yet am I not free?
  Am I a slave, with hands and feet in chains?
  Can I but move as far as go the reins?
Some tyrant power alway restraining me?
Or is the slavery within my breast
  Invisible to the great world of men?
  Almost invisible to mortal ken
Yet never leaving me to peace and rest?
My cruel hands I did not fashion—no!
  They were imposed; in truth I had no choice.
Could I but shake them off with a 'let go'!
  And they straightway obey the mandate's voice!
  Alas, if man be born to slavery,
  His will not dowered with supremacy!

II.

With the physical eye I watched the night-sky and the course of the stars; with the mental eye I glanced at the dark background of the past and traced the thought-paths through the ages.

DAWN.

Imperfect human work! Of tumult born;
  Of discord; and with painful struggle too;
  As if with every morning's breath man drew
A subtle poison by which peace is torn.
Imperfect human work! With each advance,
  Achieved at length through many tears of woe
  And joy commingled, man need not forego
The while a glimpse into that great expanse
Wherein the absolute, all-perfect force
  Conducts the systems of the world's unseen,
  (The suns of thought) in their transcendent course.
The mortal eye is dazzled, and must screen
  Itself from light it cannot yet endure—
  A light all-powerful, all-kind, all-pure!

NINE XENIONS.

TRANSLATED FROM GOETHE AND SCHILLER'S MUSENALMANACH.

BY * * *

A MOTTO.

Truth I am preaching. 'Tis truth and nothing but truth—understand me.
  My truth of course! For I know none to exist but my own.

A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION.

One, we can hear, speaks after the other; but no one
  Answers the other. Who calls two monologues a dispute?

A PHILOSOPHER.

Cogito ergo sum: I am thinking and therefore existing.
  If but the former is true, there's of the latter no doubt.

MY ANSWER.

If I am thinking, I am. Very well! But who's constantly thinking?
  Often I was, I confess, when I thought nothing forsooth.

TO CERTAIN PEOPLE.

What a great pity, dear sirs! To select the good you are anxious;
  But mother Nature deprived you of sound judgment and wits.

ANALYSTS.

Do you take truth as an onion whose layers you singly can peel off?
  Never you'll draw out the truth, save 'twas deposited there.

REPETITION.

Let me repeat it again and again that error is error
  Whether pronounced by a fool or by a prominent sage.

THOSE IN AUTHORITY.

Don't be disturbed by the barking; remain in your seats, for the barkers
  Wish but to get in your place, there to be barked at themselves.

SPIRIT AND LETTER.

Truly you can for a time palm off your valueless counters,
  But in the end, my dear sirs, debts must be paid in cold cash.

NOTES.

The essay upon "Sensation and the Outer World," by M. Binet, will appear in our next issue.

Prof. Bunge, of Basel, discusses a very important and much-debated problem in his pamphlet "Vitalism and Mechanism." A physico-chemical explanation of the phenomena of life is not to be thought of, Prof. Bunge says; the whole history of physiology disproves this notion.

Prof. Bunge, in another pamphlet we have received, entitled "The Alcohol Question," unreservedly supports the cause of temperance, advancing arguments to justify total abstinence from the standpoint both of the individual and the State. The teetotalers of America will undoubtedly rejoice at this sign of unselfish liberalism in the scientific circles of a wine-growing country; Prof. Bunge's arguments are irresistible, when rationally regarded. (Leipsic: F. C. W. Vogel, Pub.)

Mr. Joseph Jefferson, the genial and talented actor, has long been at work upon an autobiography which will be published in the *Century* during the coming autumn. Mr. Jefferson's personality is perhaps the most sympathetic of any upon our stage, and we will await with great interest the reminiscences of his life, and the portraits he has drawn of contemporary artists.

Prof. Cope asks at the close of his thoughtful essay on *Ethical Evolution*, "Is the love derived from Natural Sources?" We think *it is*, if by 'nature' is to be understood the living, growing, and creating Universe. The view of "the paternal relation" is, we confess, the most beautiful allegory under which God can be conceived; but we should not forget that after all, it remains an allegory.

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The Humboldt Publishing Co., of 24 East 4th street, N. Y., have published in their Library Series, Grant Allen's "Force and Energy; A Theory of Dynamics," (price 15 cents). In the first part the author advances a theory of transcendental dynamics, which he afterwards applies to the creation of the universe. Force and Energy are defined as the two manifestations of power; the first tending to initiate aggregative motion, finds its expression in gravitation, adhesion, chemical affinity, etc.; the second shows its vitality in the separative powers classified as molar, molecular, chemical, and electrical modes or manifestations of motion. Mr. Allen ingeniously illustrates these operations by explaining the aggregation of the earth into solid bodies, like planets, on the one hand, and by explaining also the movements of the planets in their orbits about the sun.

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

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IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called, *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal. The relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

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Much criticism has been elicited by the bare mention of Mr. George's economical doctrines—indubitable testimony of their popularity and strength. Letters have appeared in No. 79 and others will follow.

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SENSATION AND THE OUTER WORLD.*

BY ALFRED BINET.

ALTHOUGH the subject that I propose to discuss may be regarded as belonging to the province of metaphysics, I do not conceive that this circumstance is a sufficient reason for not entering upon it. I am aware that many eminent psychologists, at the present day, profess a profound aversion for metaphysics. I do not share their aversion. In the first place, I deem it highly improper to limit arbitrarily the field of research, under the pretext of excluding metaphysics. Investigators ought not to erect posts in the domain of science, bearing notices of "no trespassing here." People have never gone so far as to say to physicists, to chemists, or to physiologists: That subject is forbidden you, do not touch upon that problem! Why then do they limit the freedom of the psychologist?

Moreover, it is not enough to set boundaries, it is necessary, at least, that the boundaries be fixed, so as not to give rise to disputes and litigation. Now who, I ask, can say definitely where metaphysics begins and positive science ends? As M. Charcot has recently remarked, with great aptness, we all of us perhaps, both observers and physicians, are metaphysicians without knowing it.

We are pleased to have seen these liberal ideas endorsed by the Paris Society of Physiological Psychology. Some four years ago we attended the organizing session of that society, of which we were a charter-member, and although the proceedings were not public, we believe we commit no indiscretion in telling what took place there. One of our most distinguished members maintained the proposition that we ought to add to the article of our constitution prohibiting in the usual manner discussions upon political and religious topics, a special clause prescribing with equal severity, discussions of metaphysical questions. This motion, it would seem, should have been favorably received by the Society, since at the first session, it was composed of none but physiologists and physicians. It is known that physicians, generally, have no weakness for metaphysics. Nevertheless, the Society protested unanimously, we may say, against the measure of exclusion proposed, and Metaphysics was not proscribed. The adherents of liberalism in philosophy, upon this decision being given, applauded with both hands.

Having prefaced these remarks, I propose, without allowing myself to be diverted from my purpose by any mistrust of metaphysical speculation, to examine an extremely interesting question regarding the relations between sensation and its natural, normal excitant, the external object. This subject, it seems to me, has not been thoroughly elucidated, and though I make no pretension whatever to settle the question in a definitive manner, I believe that a few instructive considerations can be presented upon different points.

I.

FIRST, to attain clearness, let us define several of the terms that we shall have to employ; and to that end we may numerate in brief the various phenemena that we propose to study. Suppose that, my eyes being closed, I lay my hand upon my table, and that I feel a pin rolling about beneath my finger; I experience a sensation of a tactile kind, which excites in me a series of inferences, conscious, sub-conscious, and unconscious, and the whole occurrence is comprised in the following judgment: I touch a pin. In this way, through external perception, we possess knowledge of objects by the sensations they produce in us

Sensation is generally described as if it were produced directly by the contact of the external object with our organ of sense. But, manifestly, this is erroneous. When an object excites in us a sensation, it accomplishes this through the intermediary agency of our nervous system. The pin rolling about beneath our fingers first irritates the corpuscles of touch that lie disposed beneath the skin for the reception of tactile excitations. Thence the excitation travels through the nervous fibers, called the sensitive nerves, that lead to the spinal marrow; having reached the marrow, the excitation ascends by following the posterior ramifications of that organ; it traverses the bulb, follows the cerebral peduncles, penetrates into the *corona radiata* of Reil, and finally gets into the gray cortical matter of the convolutions of the brain, which is probably its final place of reception. At that instant the conscious sensation is produced. In order to be exhibited, it is necessary that the peripheral excitation traverse all

* Part of an unpublished essay upon "External Perception," rewarded by the *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.*

these successive stages, which even now we know so imperfectly. If the path followed by the excitation is interrupted at some point, if the nerve, for example, is severed, if the spinal marrow is interrupted by transverse myelitis; if, in fine, for any cause whatsoever the excitation does not get as far as the brain, there is no sensation, no perception.

It follows from these extremely simple facts (which, notwithstanding their simplicity, I have deemed it profitable to recapitulate), that there occurs between the external object—the pin for instance—and our tactile sensation, an intermediate phenomenon; that phenomenon is the excitation of the nerves. We are in complete ignorance as to what that excitation is, but we are certain of its existence. Accordingly, that which has produced our sensation of a pin, is not *directly* the pin; it is the nervous modification which that object has produced, in acting upon our sense of touch; our sensation succeeds this nervous modification, it expresses to a certain extent its character, and in all instances the perception of an external object is reduced to the perception of the alterations which that object provokes in our nervous fibers and nervous centers.

If things take this course, we see at once what the result is. Nothing resembles less the external object than the excitation it propagates in our nervous substance. What resemblance is there, for example, between the head of a pin that lies beneath my finger, and the physico-chemical phenomenon that traverses the sensitive fibers of my hand and, passing through the spinal marrow, reaches my brain, where it gives rise to the conscious perception of a pin. Plainly, here are phenomena entirely dissimilar. It follows, therefore, that if there is a fact, at the present day, firmly established, it is that the sensations we experience upon contact with external objects are in no particular the copy of those objects. There is nothing outside of my eye that is like color and light, nothing outside of my organ of hearing that is like noise or sound, nothing outside of my sense of touch that is like hardness or softness or resistance, nothing outside of my sense of smell that is like a perfume, nothing apart from my sense of taste that is like a flavor.

Is a direct proof of this asked? A very simple illustration will serve. Take an electrical excitation. Bring it to bear upon any one of the senses. We will see that this excitation, which in itself is always the same, will produce entirely different effects in each separate organ of sense. To the eye it will be a flash of light; to the hearing, a crackling sound; to the touch, a light shock; to the taste, a metallic flavor; etc. These are facts now admitted by all physiologists and philosophers. They may be summarized in the remark of Helmholtz, that sensations bear no resemblance to their objects and are simply signs committed to the interpretation of the mind.

It would be incorrect, however, to imagine that all scientists have renounced the idea of similarity between what the consciousness perceives and what exists outside of our organs of sense—between the sensation and the object. In theory, this erroneous notion is rejected; but in point of fact we encounter it everywhere; only it has become more subtile and more refined than formerly, and I believe that it would be interesting to show how this exploded doctrine, this naïve and crude realism, that no longer ventures to show its face, has crept into many fundamental theories of physics, physiology, and psychology, and wholly invalidated them. But a thorough study of this question would require several articles; we must limit our discussion upon this occasion, and we shall accordingly content ourselves with examining the influence of the fallacious ideas just noticed, upon the physical theory of the external world.

II.

A GREAT many contemporary physicists and philosophers, Wundt, Hæckel, Huxley, Dubois-Reymond, have maintained the theory that the ultimate, absolute, definitive explanation of natural phenomena is a mechanical explanation, and consists in reducing these various phenomena to the fundamental concepts of motion and mass. Such, in the opinion of these authors, would be the ultimate bound of a scientific explanation; the scientist will have accomplished his task when he has succeeded in showing that every physical event is mechanical and consists in a transfer of motion between different masses.

Different authors—few it is true—have arisen against this doctrine, and have combatted it by various arguments. Mr. Spencer, for instance, has endeavored to show that we are implicated in an alternative of absurdities, the moment we suppose that the effect that manifests itself to us as motion, is in itself that which we conceive as motion.*

More recently, Mr. Stallo has observed, that all the properties of matter imply a relation between two things; they exist only in relation with and in dependence upon a second object which receives the action. And so, we cannot speak of the properties of light, for instance, as belonging absolutely to it; apart from like considerations applying to all the other objects supposed to be representable in the sensations of the human eye. Therefore, it follows, the knowledge we possess of nature, resting upon observed relations, cannot pretend to an absolute character.

These several objections appear to us quite correct; but there is one which the authors mentioned

* First Principles, § 17.

have forgotten, and which, in itself, is sufficient to destroy the definitive character that it has been desired to ascribe to the mechanical theory of phenomena. This objection is expressed by saying, that the mechanical theory has failed to recognize the purely subjective nature of our sensations, and has sought to give them an objective stamp, thus committing a lamentable error which, as formerly remarked, may be pronounced a naïve realism. It is indeed with profound astonishment that we find so many physicists still adhering to that crude realism which, since the time of Berkeley, is no longer discussed.

Examine, for instance, the hypothesis of ether vibrations, by which modern physicists explain phenomena of light. Physicists believe that these vibrations actually exist outside of our sensory organs and take place in an elastic medium called the ether, with an amplitude, direction, and velocity determined by computation. They come to explain, in this way, how light added to light, in certain cases, can produce darkness. The phenomenon is to be attributed to an interference, that is to say to a state where the ether molecules, acted upon simultaneously by equal forces and from contrary directions, are held in equilibrium.

The fallacy of this explanation is immediately seen. It consists in transporting into the external world, into what Kant calls the world of noumena, mechanical phenomena that we see realized in our observations and which accordingly consist of phenomena of sensation. What, pray, is a vibration? How do we perceive a vibration? We have, here, a simple sensation, either visual, tactile, or muscular; the sight of a vibration, for example of a pendulum vibration, is just as much subjective as the sight of a color or the taste of a dish; the vibration in the form it appears to us, being a pure sensation, cannot reproduce exactly that which takes place in the external object; it is not the copy of the external object.

Accordingly, the mechanical theory of light, if it be not regarded as purely symbolical, and is taken in its literal significance, attributes as the cause of our sensations of light, phenomena that are known to us only through other sensations of light:—a theory that explains sensations by other sensations.

To avoid this fallacious reasoning in a circle, it suffices to take the mechanical theory of light for just what it is. It is not an explanation of the laws of light; it is not a representation of the external phenomena, necessarily unknown, that produce our sensations; it is a simple translation of a certain number of sensations into other sensations that seem to us more precise. But we shall recur directly to this point. For the present, let us proceed with our work of criticism.

III.

Similar considerations may be presented respecting the physical theory of sound. We see by direct observation in this instance, and not by mere hypotheses, that sound is produced by a vibratory motion of the air, or of any medium through which it is propagated. Scientists, accordingly, have not failed to attempt an explanation of our auditory sensations by air vibrations communicated to our auditory apparatus.

This erroneous explanation has been given by a great many authors. To illustrate, I shall cite the following passage taken from a work of Blaserna upon Sound and Music. "Observe," says that physicist, "that vibrations are something objective; they exist in the sounding body, exterior to man. Sound, on the contrary, is produced in our ear; it is a subjective phenomenon. It is permissible to conclude, accordingly, that the vibrations are the *cause* and the sound the *effect* produced upon our hearing, or, in other words, that sound is the result of certain vibrations of bodies."

The reader will have no difficulty in remarking the error committed in this citation. The vibration of the sounding body, being known to us by sensations, has no more objective value than the auditory sensations. Sound can no more be explained by vibration than vibration by sound. All that can be said is, that what for the eye, the touch, and the muscular sense is a vibratory motion, is for the ear a sound. It may be added that physics simply establishes constant relations between certain qualities of sound: such as pitch, intensity, and timbre, and the amplitude, number, and form of the motions. But to go beyond that, is impossible; while it is chimerical in the extreme to regard the vibration of the sounding body as the cause of the sound. That cause we cannot know, because we cannot pass beyond the boundary of sensation. It is possible, that when we perceive a sound, a peculiar phenomenon occurs externally to us, which, when exciting the retina, produces the appearance of a vibratory movement, and when exciting the organ of hearing, produces the impression of sound; but whatever it be, it must be added that this external and inaccessible phenomenon is in its nature distinct from the two effects it produces in us.

To sum up, and not further to extend the discussion, I believe that physicists are wrong in seeking to explain natural phenomena by phenomena of motion, by a system of forces, or by properties of atoms; for the ideas that we can form of motion, force, and atoms, are constructed by the instrumentality of purely subjective sensations and give us no light whatever as to the nature of the external world.

IV.

Before concluding this study, I must say a few words relative to a highly interesting question that

arises. It is incontestable that observers find an incalculable advantage in substituting, in their investigation of phenomena, the analysis of one of their sensations for the analysis of another. Acoustics, for example, would have yet made little progress, if it had been strictly limited to the investigation of sound sensations. That it has attained its present state of advancement is due to its having systematically studied sound under the aspect of motion, instead of having considered it under its acoustical aspect. The physicist has substituted his eye for his ear; and the study of vibratory motions, which entirely escape the ear and which the eye is able to grasp, has served as the foundation of acoustical science.

Furthermore, this is not the only instance where we remark that great advantage may be derived from substituting one sense for another. Generally, in scientific research, the eye alone officiates, and great numbers of instruments are designed to translate a mechanical, acoustical, or thermal phenomenon, into a phenomenon of sight; such, for example, is the thermometer, which enables the eye to measure temperature with much greater delicacy than could be done by the sense of touch.

There are certain circumstances, even, in which a visual sensation is replaced by a visual sensation of another kind. The graphic method is an instance of this. A muscular contraction may be studied in two different ways. First, by contenting one's self with simply observing the movement of the member, the protuberance of the muscle beneath the skin; and secondly, by employing the graphical method, which inscribes the phenomenon, upon paper, in the shape of a curve. In both cases, the observer is informed of the phenomenon by a visual impression. But if the observer rests satisfied with merely viewing the active member, he sees little; he establishes, in the most favorable cases, simply the protuberance that the contracted muscle produces in the contour of the member. On the other hand, when he has before his eyes the curve of contraction, he has the *measure* of the phenomenon; he sees the height of contraction, its period, the shape of the line of ascent and descent, and a number of other details.

Similarly, in the study of an acoustical phenomenon, if the physicist prefers the visual sense to the auditory sense, it is because the visual senses furnishes him with more precise results than the sense of hearing. Through the eye, a person grasps a motion; having registered that motion, a person sees its form, its extent, its velocity. These are exact data, capable of being measured and susceptible of introduction into computation. The sensation of sound, on the other hand, is a state of consciousness difficult to measure; this is why it is neglected.

The supremacy ordinarily accorded the visual sense over the other senses seems to be due not so much to the peculiar nature of visual sensation as to the presence of an exceedingly important element here involved. That element is extension. The testimony of the sight is employed to measure phenomena made known by other sensations because the intervention of sight reduces the operation to a measurement of an extended object, that is to say, virtually to a question of mathematics.

All human sciences hitherto developed, are visual, tactile, or muscular sciences; wherein all the phenomena of nature are brought within the notion of extension. A purely auricular science, founded wholly upon sensations of sound, has never yet been constructed; although auricular æsthetics is at the present time highly developed and exceedingly rich in point of complexity.

Still, it is not impossible to conceive of a science purely auricular; and in order not to remain in the dark upon the question, I shall confine myself to citing a very simple example, which will show that the ear can do the rule of three. If some one, for instance, were to propose the following problem to me: I have bought three dozen eggs for three dollars and twenty-five cents what is the price of an egg,—I believe that I would be able to solve that little problem without employing figures, pencils, and paper, but simply by recourse to my sense of hearing.

A rule of three can be put in the form of an equation, thus:

$$\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{x}$$

and we know by means of what algebraical operations we can determine the value of x, when the values of a, b, and c are given. This method belongs to what may be designated visual science. But it is possible, we maintain, to proceed differently, by resorting simply to the science of hearing.

Let us take a seat before an open piano. If we strike two notes successively that stand in the relation of a to b with respect to the number of vibrations, and if thereupon we strike a third note that stands to the first in the relation of a to c, our ear will naturally find the fourth note which will be to c as b is to a. Thus, when one has sounded successively the *do* and *mi* and then the *do* of the following octave, the ear will spontaneously indicate the *mi* of the second octave.

Any one who has a tolerably exact ear, can make the experiment and solve the problem. Three notes being given, a person by allowing himself to be guided by the quality of the sound, is able to find a fourth note which stands to the third in the same relation as the second to the first. Persons having a very exact ear and able to distinguish a fifty-fourth of

a semitone, will solve the problem with perfect exactitude. On the other hand, those whose musical sense is not so highly developed, will commit slight errors.

I insist upon the principle of the operation and not upon its applications, which are of slight importance to me. I do not desire to investigate the degree of complexity that it is possible to attain in this direction. I do not know whether it would be possible to convert the piano into a machine for computation. I have simply wished to show that by allowing ourselves to be guided by the quality of sound sensation, we are able to solve numerical problems.

It is, I hold, the mere quality of the sensation that serves us in such experiments; the mind in no wise fixes upon the number of the vibrations, which, furthermore, the ear is incapable of perceiving; it is the pitch of the note that is utilized in solving the rule of three.

These considerations, despite their insufficiency, show us that the sciences actually existing, sciences founded altogether upon extension, cannot furnish us the measure of the possible sciences nor even of the sciences of the future. We do not know what futurity has in store for us. But it is probable that it will transform our sciences and our conception of the world, as it will transform our organs.

PARIS, February, 1889.

FORM AS REALITY.

M. ALFRED BINET presents in his essay "Sensation and the Outer World" the idealistic view of the subject. Mr. E. C. Hegeler in his article, "The Soul," (published in No. 15 of THE OPEN COURT,) places himself on the standpoint of Realism. He explains the problem by a transfer of motion in a special form. We here reproduce the following paragraphs:*

"Feelings are of different intensity, as one pain is stronger than another. Single feelings may be of longer or shorter duration, and between them there may be definite intervals of time. Feelings also differ among themselves as various tastes or odors, or as those accompanying different musical notes.

"I imagine to have two phonographs, and a speech recorded on the tin-foil of the one; in the other the tin-foil is blank. The geometrical line imagined as resulting from a longitudinal section of the scratch in the tin-foil is the analogue to the speech. Both phonographs are turned at the same time. The scratch in the tin-foil of the first speaks; a similar line is made in the tin-foil of the second. Both now have the same geometrical line. What has taken place between them during the operation? Energy, coming formless, or rather uniform, from my arm-muscles in turning the phonograph, passed through the air in vibrations corresponding to the geometrical line in the tin-foil of the first phonograph and was received by the second, producing the same geometrical line in its tin-foil. Is not that what we call form in the undulating geometrical line intimately associated with energy in these vibrations?

"In this way I speak of the feelings I have on hearing a melody, as corresponding to the geometrical form of the line in the tin-foil of a phonograph that records it."

* See THE OPEN COURT, pp. 393, 394.

HONEST AND DISHONEST WAGES.

BY WHEELBARROW.

I SAID a few days ago that although my wages had nominally increased from twenty-five to fifty per cent. in the last thirty years, it had not swollen in proportion to the cost of living, and that I find it harder to live now than in 1859. I acknowledge myself a little confused and doubtful about it, since a great Chicago editor has contradicted me in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. He assures me that I entirely mistake the cause of my poverty; that it is not because I do not get wages enough, but because I don't save what I get, but squander it in luxury, and tobacco, and beer. Well, if I should save all of it, and never spend a cent, it would take me more than a thousand years to become as rich as that editor; therefore, I prefer the evidence of my own home and my own pockets to the opulent moralizing of this economical philosopher. In his tenderness for the workingman, he travels all the way to New York to impress upon the committee the prudent maxim of one Dr. Benjamin Franklin, that "a penny saved is a penny earned."

This editor is one of those philanthropists who pay fifty cents for a dollar's worth of work, and make up the balance in good advice from Poor Richard's almanac. The question is not what we do with our money, but do we get what fairly belongs to us? As for beer, I have never read any more glowing tributes to the virtues of it than I have found in the editorial columns of that very editor's newspaper. No doubt it would be a good thing if all poor men would abandon beer, and it might be a good thing too if all rich men would take the pledge of Sir John Falstaff to "eschew sack and live cleanly," but this is a matter of morals and prudence to be decided by the freewill of each person for himself, rich and poor alike. It is not a question of wages. In the inventory of the great qualities of a certain President of the United States I find recorded his boundless capacity for champagne. I think it would have been better for him if he had never drank champagne; but that is no affair of mine. Mr. Editor will not be allowed to confuse the wages question with the

beer question, for each must be discussed on its own merits, and decided by itself.

Speaking for myself, I have long since abandoned the use of beer, and all other intoxicating drinks; first, because I couldn't afford to buy them, and secondly, because I am stronger and healthier without them. As for tobacco, I am still undecided as to whether its use is hurtful or beneficial. Of course cigars are beyond my reach, but a pipe of tobacco has a soothing influence upon me, and the expense of it is nothing in comparison with the solace it brings. I have a fancy that to a certain extent it has the virtue of appeasing hunger. No doubt a doctor could easily show me that I am wrong in this opinion, but I have always noticed that whenever I have abandoned the use of tobacco I have been hungrier than I was before, so that I really believe the cost of it is more than balanced in the saving of bread. It may be replied to this that smoking must therefore be injurious, as it weakens appetite, but this is no argument in my case, because of all human blessings a good appetite is the smallest benefit to me. I have no use for it. I can stand the expense of tobacco much better than the expense of a good appetite.

But I began to write about wages, and have permitted that editor to switch me off to the side-track of beer. I said that I was getting a dollar and a half a day. That's what they tell me I get, but I have my doubts about it. Do I really get it? Last week I earned nine dollars exactly—nine silver dollars. I spent them for groceries; did I get nine dollars' worth? I suspect that I did not. I believe I was cheated in the weight of the dollars, but I am quite sure that the grocer didn't cheat himself in the weight of the groceries, and I fear that I only got in goods the value of the silver in the dollars that I paid for them. They tell me that the quantity of silver in a dollar is worth eighty cents in gold, and no more; if so, then my wages is only one dollar and twenty cents a day in gold. This is a frightful discount, and it goes far to explain the reason why my dollar and a half a day is not so much to me as a dollar a day was in the olden time, because the extra twenty cents is not half enough to cover the extra cost of life.

I suspect that this twenty per cent. on our wages is a tax upon labor, which goes all into the pockets of capital—a tribute to monopoly—every dollar of which is profit. I believe that this twenty per cent. furnishes the capital stock of all the national banks in the country, and that it largely contributes to the unjust distribution of wealth, which is the reproach of our statesmanship, and a menace to the life of our institutions. It widens the social difference between the rich man and me until we scowl at one another—I at him with envy, and he at me with fear. It is making castes and class distinctions in this country that some day will come together with a crash like thunder, as they did in France in 1789. A dollar and a half a day in silver for me, and ten thousand dollars a day in gold for Mr. Vanderbilt, is illogical in a state of society pretending to recognize the equality of us both; it is the illegitimate offspring of capital and polluted law. I must have more and he must have less, or the strained ligament that holds society together will break. Not by confiscation, nor by physical violence, will the change come—at least in our day—but it will come that way in the next generation, unless the moral forces now at work shall establish capital and labor on a more friendly and equitable basis, unless our social system shall be arranged on juster principles, insuring a fairer division of the profits of labor between the employer and the employed.

I mentioned my suspicions about the silver dollar to a friend who understands monetary science better than I do, and he assured me that my argument was all unsound, because based on the fallacy that dollars of different metals were of unequal value, and the additional fallacy that if I should not be paid in the cheaper metal I should be paid in the dearer one at the same rate of wages. He told me that all dollars are of equal value by decree of Congress. He proved his case by the practical test of a dollar's worth of sugar, which was the same in quantity, whether paid for in paper, or silver, or gold. As he brought the proof of his argument to actual demonstration, I was compelled to yield, but I was not satisfied, although the concrete evidence of a dollar's worth of sugar was palpable as a church or a barn.

I learn by object lessons when I learn anything at all, because my mind soon tires with metaphysics and abstract reasoning. In that way I tried to solve the puzzle by the actual experiment of a silver dollar which I paid out the other day for coffee. It was a bright, good-looking dollar, with stars and other national emblems upon it to give it character, and the positive statement that it might be depended upon as "one dollar." If any suspicion of short weight, or fraud, or adulteration attached to it, such suspicion immediately vanished on the discovery that it was a religious dollar, inscribed with the legend "In God We Trust." Not to trust in a pious dollar such as that would be to lack faith like an infidel; but, after all, I believe that it did not buy me a dollar's worth of coffee. As I walked over to the store I said to myself: "Does it make any difference whether this coin is called a dollar, or a florin, or a doubloon? Will it buy me any more coffee than the worth of the silver in it? The grocer buys his coffee in Brazil, and he pays for it in gold; if this coin is worth eighty cents in gold and no more, I can get eighty cents' worth of coffee

for it, and no more; unless the government steps in and agrees to make up the difference between the value of the cheap dollar and the dear one. If the eighty per cent. dollar and the hundred per cent. dollar have equal purchasing power, it must be because in some way or other the government promises to redeem the cheaper coin. Unless this promise of redemption can be found somewhere in the fiscal machinery of the government, I could not possibly get more than eighty cents worth of coffee for my silver dollar. There is no political economy in the world that will convince me that the grocer could afford to give me any more. I know that Aladdin gave a new lamp for an old one, and got the best of the bargain, but that was an exceptional case, the only one in history. Similar good luck is not likely to happen in our day. The transmutation of metals has not been done yet, and until it is done we need not expect to buy a hundred cents' worth of coffee for eighty cents' worth of silver. I think I am cheated in the dollars I get for my work.

THE ONENESS OF THE PHENOMENAL AND THE NOUMENAL.

What we call things, what we call our personality, our Self, our Ego, are merely abstract concepts that we have formed for the purpose of distinguishing them from other things. Words serve the practical purpose of orientation among the innumerable phenomena of nature. Absolutely considered, and independent of their properties, things neither exist, nor do we ourselves. Properties are parts of a thing, abstracted from it in thought. Some, and in fact very many, of these properties are only separable in thought, and not in reality, from things; while the totality of all properties constitutes the thing entire. Most of the words, by which we designate things, are furthermore shifting concepts. We retain the same word, even when parts or properties of a thing, it may be, have fallen away or when new ones are added. The rose-bush in the garden continues the same rose-bush, even after we have engrafted another species into its stem; it has merely lost certain properties and acquired new ones. A hat without a band and trimming is still a hat, and an old hat with a new band and new trimming continues to be the same hat to us. Only when the change made is very great do we cease to designate the object by the old name.

We ourselves remain ourselves, although continually changing, in body as well as in mind. Of our world of ideas, various parts fade away, or are wholly forgotten, while with new experiences new thoughts continually grow from the old ones.

In order completely to understand a thing, we must know it in its relation to other things. The character of a table is constituted not only by its shape, but also by its purpose to serve people as a table. Without this purpose, properly considered, a table would *not* be a table. A stone, for instance, that has been accidentally shaped into the form of a table by the grinding action of a glacier, is no table. The surroundings in which a table serves the purpose of a table, thus belong to the table as a property which we cannot separate from it. We must learn to understand everything, therefore, not as the expression of something having a separate, absolute existence, that lies concealed behind its realities, but as a part of the All.

Our bodies, of themselves, and apart from all else, would not be able to exist. Without the pressure of the atmosphere, we would burst asunder, while the air surrounding us belongs most intimately to our lungs. A recent scientist has called the kitchen an extension of our chewing and digesting apparatuses. And correctly. But also the fields upon which grow the corn that miller and baker convert into bread for us, belong to our Selves. In reality, the whole world is a part of our being, and the manifestation of our existence is conditioned wholly by the relations in which we stand to the outer world.

This holds good not only of our physical, but still more so of our spiritual existence. Our soul is made up of perceptions and ideas. The objects of our perceptions and our thoughts acquire thereby a relation to our Self; they become parts of the Self, which in the event of a change also transform the corresponding parts of the Self.

The closer the connection is in which a thing stands to us, the more it appears as a part of our being. The skilled violin-player feels his violin, as though it were a part of his body. He controls it, indeed, as an acrobat does his limbs. A benumbed limb which no longer pains, on the contrary, appears as a foreign body that does not belong to us. The captain of a company conducts his troops, as an engineer controls his engine. The engine becomes a part of the engine-driver, the company a part of the captain, and the audience a part of the speaker. Everything it is true, rests upon reciprocity. The speaker in his turn is a part of the audience. Language is the bond of union; in language speaker and audience are one. The speaker must speak the language of his audience, and the audience must understand the language that he speaks. So the engineer is part of the locomotive and he must be familiar with it; in other words, a picture of the locomotive must exist as a living nerve-structure in his brain.

Although we are, in fact, distinct individuals, distinguished from each other by an "I" or a "you," by a "he" or a "she"; yet when closely scrutinized, the "you" of our friends and enemies is a part our own Self. In every way the "I," "you," "he," "she,"

and "we" are parts of a great whole; and human society with its social and political institutions, with its ethical ideas and ideals, is only possible because these "you's" are but little distinct from the "I's." That our life and property in general is safe, that we buy and sell, marry and are given in marriage, that the laws are observed, and that in ordinary circumstances we hold intercourse with one another mutually trusting in our honest intentions; that, too, we struggle and compete with one another and try our best to maintain our places in the universal aspiration onward:—all this is only possible because we are parts of the same humanity and the children of the same epoch, possessing the same ideas of right and wrong, and bearing within ourselves in a certain sense the same souls.

Could some evil spirit, over night, change our souls into those of savages and cannibals, or even into those of the robber-knights of the middle ages, all our sacred laws, all our constables, all the police power of the State would be of no avail: we would inevitably sink back to the state of civilization in which those people existed. But could a God ennoble our souls, so that the sense of right and reason became still more purified in every heart, then better things would result spontaneously and much misery and error would vanish from the earth.

* * *

And the God that can accomplish that, lives indeed —not beyond the clouds, but here on earth, in the heart of every man and woman. An absolute God exists as little as an absolute soul or an absolute thing. We no longer believe in ghosts, and an absolute God, just as an absolute soul is not distinguishable at all from a ghost.

By God we understand the order of the world, that makes harmony, evolution, aspiration, and morality possible. This God is no transcendental thing, existing of itself, enthroned above the clouds; he is immanent, and lives in the hearts of men as their good-will, their honor, their conscience, their ideal, or however else we may please to distinguish it.

The belief in a transcendental God, from lack of clearer ideas, long served our forefathers to symbolize this immanent God. Therefore we will not vilify the old views; they after all contain a great truth. We shall treat them with reverence, notwithstanding we reject them. To us the idea of a God, absolutely existing, has become a superstition; but all the more have we thus come to know the meaning of the God we have abstracted from the reality of the world and from the life of our heart. In this sense, the Faust of Goethe speaks:

> "The God that in my breast is owned
> Can deeply stir the inward sources,
> The God above my powers enthroned
> He cannot change external forces."

The idea of a transmundane God, a God of itself, would be an attempt to create 'a noumenon in the positive sense,' (as Kant calls it) which is inadmissible. There is no reality corresponding to it. However, the idea of a God as the possible presence of a moral law in the world to which we have to conform, is a conception of pure thought which involves no self-contradiction. It would be (to use Kant's expression again) 'a noumenon in the negative sense,' the use of which is admissible and even indispensable for arriving at general conceptions. The idea of God in this sense, it will be found, has some realities corresponding to it, just as much as the quality of heaviness or weight corresponds to our conception of gravity. The God outside of the world is an anthropomorphism, and is as such a remnant of former ages. Monism leads us to the purer and loftier idea of an immanent God.

Goethe says:

> "What were a God who from the outside stirred
> So that the world around his finger whirred?
> He from within the Universe must move,
> Nature in Him and Him in nature prove,
> Thus all that in him lives and moves and is
> Will ne'er his power and his spirit miss."

Agnosticism believes that the substance of these spirits, things absolute, as well as their existence, is an inscrutable mystery of which we can know nothing. Monism goes a step beyond this. According to Monism, the division of the world into knowable things, as appearing in their operations, and into absolutely unknowable things held to exist behind or in phenomena, is an untenable and self-contradictory dualism. Monism rejects altogether the ghost-illusion of existence absolute, and constantly keeps in mind that every thing is a part only of the All, and that every natural process is only an aspect of the entire indivisible existence of the universe. We, too, are a part of the eternal All in which we live, move, and have our being.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

DREAMS, SLEEP, AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

The scholarly article entitled "Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness," which appeared in a late number of your paper, recalls a reminiscence of my own which seems to confirm Dr. Gould's opinion, that sensory communication may be had directly with (the organ of?) consciousness without connection or communication by means of the ordinary senses of preception. Perhaps Dr. Gould's theory of the manner in which this takes place may be modified by subsequent research, but the fact itself can scarcely be questioned.

Some years ago I was living in a California mining-town of several thousand inhabitants. The greater part of the town consisted of frame buildings packed closely together, offering the most favorable conditions for the rapid spread of fire, and the total destruction of the town, should fire once gain a headway. This fact was fully appreciated and several volunteer fire-companies were equipped by the citizens. It is hardly necessary to say that every ear was alert for the clang of the fire-bell, and at its first sound there was an instant gathering of volunteers.

One night in midsummer, after I had been several hours in bed, my usually dreamless sleep was suddenly disturbed by a vivid dream of fire. I saw the flames break out from the roof of the building, and, in my dream, ran to the engine-house and pulled vigorously at the ropes that sounded the alarm-bell. The resulting clangor was so loud that it awakened me, but the sound which I heard in my dreams was not a dream-fancy,—it was the actual ringing of the bell and my first act of consciousness was the perception of this fact.

Now, it is incredible that a chance dream of fire could have occurred at such an opportune moment. Such a coincidence is, of course, possible, but as improbable as the chance coincidence of certain Fraunhofer lines with the spectrum of iron. It is far more reasonable to suppose that the strokes of the bell reached my consciousness first by some other channel than the auditory nerves. The vibratory impact aroused consciousness,—perhaps imperfectly, but still more faithfully than in the case of Dr. Gould and his Thomas cat. In the latter case consciousness was lured into the belief that the discordant caterwauling was the sweetest of music; in the former, there was no deception. The first alarm struck upon my consciousness was the alarm of Fire! In this instance consciousness was in the wrong as to locality and surroundings—for while the dream-fire was consuming the school-house on the hill, the real fire was in an unoccupied building some distance away—but it was not deceived as to the fact.

Dr. Gould mentions also another peculiar feature which perhaps may be reckoned among dream-phenomena—namely, the dream of impending danger which leads to the conscious necessity of awakening. This condition, which is usually brought about by an interruption of the function of some nerve-trunk is one of which most people have an experience at some time or other in life, and all who have passed through it can bear testimony to the energy spent in rousing the body into action. Dr. Gould premises his description of this phenomena with the statement that he lies prone upon his back and then says he can at first move only one or two fingers, or perhaps sway his head. In my own experience, while the general conditions are the same, the manifestations are different. I invariably sleep on my side, and in the process of awakening, begin by moving the foot of the upper limb. I am not able to move head or hands in the least, and the reason is the same as in Dr. Gould's case. The stimulation of the motor nerve-centers, although to consciousness the result of a tremendous expenditure of energy, is but a slight one—hardly more than sufficient, in fact, to perform its work. Directed by consciousness, it must therefore exert its effort in that part of the body, which, because of its position, is most easily moved, or in the least constrainment of position.

In both of the instances noted, the facts show that consciousness may act and react without the intermediation of the lower centers. In the case of the fire-alarm, consciousness was aroused and received a message through the sensory fibers; in the nightmare it was on the *qui vive*, putting forth almost superhuman efforts to stimulate the inert and irresponsive motor centers into action.

J. W. Redway.

SCIENCE AND WORSHIP.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

The whole field of inquiry seems to me capable of being embraced in this sentence, *i. e.*, nature exists; what are its component parts; what is the action of the parts separately and collectively? This, science devotedly investigates; but when some rashly jump to the conclusion that Nature, having parts x; and the parts, action $y\ z$; therefore Nature is not created by God; is there not a manifest non-sequitur? To me it seems so (I am not in any sense one of the scientific circle, but only an amateur student of philosophy). Then the question also arises how did blind Nature change the mode of producing life—there must have been a first life, therefore but one life even on the atheist's hypotheses? How came it, then, that life is now produced by the sexes? Now Jesus Christ does not say "Come all ye men of learning and I will demonstrate the doctrine of the Holy Trinity." So say Aristotle, Plato, and all human philosophers, with regard to their doctrines. But Christ says: I am God the Creator and Sovereign Lord of Heaven and Earth and therefore I require, command under penalty, that you shall believe My Word. The issue is then simple and direct. Christ is God; or He is a fraud.

There is just as much, and more, opportunity of displaying profound learning in praising God through His works as there is in bluntly opposing God. There can be no conflict between reason and the revelation once delivered to the saints.

Yours truly,

Lincoln, Neb. Michael Corcoran.

[Concerning 'the idea of God' and its relation to Nature, we refer the reader to the editorial of this number and to the pamphlet "The Idea of God" (Open Court Publishing Co.).

If Christ had spoken as is quoted above, it is more than doubtful whether he would ever have been worshiped as a savior. Christ said according to Matthew xi. 28: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."—Ed.]

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CÆSARIAN INSANITY IN THE HUMMEL FAMILY.

Mr. Hahn was walking by the side of his garden fence, his soul filled with gratitude; but as this was prevented from escaping through the usual outlet of friendly speech, it compelled him to take refuge in those chambers of his mind in which he kept the plans for the beautifying of his garden. His noble-hearted opponent was about to celebrate his birthday; this Mr. Hahn discovered in a roundabout way. On this day he might perhaps be able to show him some secret token of esteem. The greatest treasures in Mr. Hahn's garden were his standards and bush roses of every size and color,—splendid flowers which bloomed almost the whole year, and were much admired by the passers-by. They were all in pots. These roses he determined to dedicate as a quiet mark of homage to Mr. Hummel.

This thought occasioned Mr. Hahn happy hours. The park-keeper, whose house stood at the limit of the city by the river, had a little boat; this Mr. Hahn borrowed secretly for a few hours in the night. Before the early dawn of morning, on the birthday of his enemy, he slipped out of the house, rowed the pots in the boat to the small steps which led from the water-side into the garden of Mr. Hummel; he glided with his loved roses to the circular bed, arranged them noiselessly according to their numbers, planted each separately, and changed the desert spot into a blooming parterre of roses. When the sparrows in the gutters twittered out their first querulous abuse, he had smoothed down the earth in the bed with a small rake.

* Translation copyrighted.

He cast a look of pleasure on his work, and another on the still dusky outline of the house, within which Mr. Hummel still slept, unprepared for the surprise of the morning, and then glided with his spade and empty pots into his boat, rowed himself up to the house of the park-keeper, and concealed himself and his garden utensils on his own ground before the first rays of the rising sun painted his chimney with roseate colors.

Mr. Hummel entered his sitting-room at the usual hour, received with good-humor the congratulations of his ladies, looked graciously at the birthday cake which wife Philippine had placed with his coffee, and at the travelling-bag which Laura had embroidered for him, took his newspaper in his hand, and prepared himself by participation in the political concerns of men in general, for the business of his own life. When towards the middle of the day he returned from the office, and the Doctor entered his room to offer his congratulations, a dark cloud gathered on the sunny countenance of the master of the house, and lightning flashed from under his ambrosial eyebrows.

"What, Saul among the prophets! Are you come to fetch a lost ass back to your father's house? We cannot accommodate you. Or are you going to deliver a lecture upon the language of the orang-outang in the land of the cocoas?

"My lectures have not caused you any trouble so far," replied the Doctor. "I have not come in order that your hospitable politeness should take the trouble to entertain those present by the outpouring of your good humor. I have already expressed to you my wish never to be the object of it."

"Then defend yourself if you can," cried Hummel.

"I am only prevented," replied the Doctor, "by consideration for those present from giving you in your own house the answer which you seem to wish."

"I should be sorry if you were placed at any disadvantage in my house," replied Hummel. "I propose to you, therefore, to put yourself on an equal footing with me, by remaining in your own house and putting your head out of the window. I will do the same; we can then sing out to one another across the street, like two canary birds."

"But as I am here now," said the Doctor, with a bow, "I claim to be allowed to eat this piece of birthday cake in peace among friendly faces."

"Then I beg of you to resign the sight of my face without overpowering sorrow," replied Hummel.

He opened the door into the garden, and went down the steps discontentedly. While still at a distance he saw the young group of roses smiling innocently in the light of the sun. He walked round the spot, shook his head, and invited his ladies into the garden.

"Which of you got this idea?" he asked.

The ladies showed such lively surprise that he was convinced of their innocence. He called to the old storekeeper and the book-keeper. All showed entire ignorance. The countenance of Mr. Hummel became gloomy.

"What does this mean? Some one has slipped in here while we were asleep. Night garden-work is not to my taste. Who has ventured to enter my property without permission? Who has brought in these products of nature?"

He went restlessly along the side of the water: behind him followed Spitehahn. The dog crept down the steps to the water, smelt at a bit of brown wood which lay on the last step, came up again, turned towards the house of Mr. Hahn, and set up his back like a cat, mockingly, and made a snarling noise. It meant as clearly as if he had spoken the friendly words, "I wish you a pleasant meal."

"Right," cried Hummel; "the intruder has left the handle of the rudder behind. The brown handle belongs to the boat of the park-keeper. Take it over to him, Klaus. I demand an answer; who has ventured to bring his boat alongside here?"

The storekeeper hastened away with the piece of wood, and brought back the answer with an embarrassed air:

"Mr. Hahn had borrowed the boat in the night."

"If there are forebodings," cried Hummel, angrily, "this was one. This nocturnal prowling of your father I forbid under all circumstances," he continued, to the Doctor.

"I know nothing of it," rejoined the Doctor. "If my father has done this, I beg of you, even if you do not value the roses, to be pleased with the good intention."

"I protest against every rose that may be strewed on my path," cried Hummel. "First we had poisoned dumplings, with evil intentions; and now rose leaves, with good ones. Your father should think of something else than such jokes. The ground and soil are mine, and I intend to prevent roosters from scratching here."

He charged wildly into the roses, seized hold of stems and branches, tore them out of the ground, and threw them into a confused heap.

The Doctor turned gloomily away, but Laura hastened to her father and looked angrily into his hard face.

"What you have rooted up," she exclaimed, "I will replace with my own hands."

She ran to a corner of the garden, brought some pots, knelt down on the ground, and pressed the stems with the little balls of earth into them as eagerly as her father had rooted them up.

"I will take care of them," she called out, to the Doctor; "tell your dear father that not all in our house undervalue his friendship."

"Do what you cannot help," replied Mr. Hummel, more quietly. "Klaus, why do you stand there on your hind legs staring like a tortoise? Why do you not help Miss Hummel in her garden-work. Then carry the whole birthday-present back again to the youthful flower-grower. My compliments, and he must in the darkness have mistaken the gardens.

He turned his back upon the company, and went with heavy steps to his office. Laura knelt on the ground and worked at the ill-used roses with heightened color and gloomy determination. The Doctor helped silently. He had seen his father behind the hedge, and knew how deeply the poor man would feel this latest outburst on the part of his adversary. Laura did not desist till she had put all the flowers as well as possible into the pots; then she plunged her hands into the stream, and her tears mixed with the water. She led the Doctor back to the room; there she wrung her hands, quite beside herself.

"Life is horrible; our happiness is destroyed in this miserable quarrel. Only one thing can save you and me. You are a man, and must find out what can deliver us from this misery."

She rushed out of the room; the mother beckoned eagerly to the Doctor to remain behind, when he was on the point of following.

"She is beside herself," cried Fritz. "What do her words mean? What does she desire of me?"

The mother seated herself on the sofa, embarrassed and full of anxiety, cleared her throat, and twisted at her sleeves.

"I must confide something to you, Doctor," she began, hesitatingly, "which will be very painful to us both; but I know not what to do, and all the representations that I make to my unhappy child are in vain. Not to conceal anything from you,—it is a strange freak,—and I should have thought such a thing impossible."

She stopped and concealed her face in her pocket-handkerchief. Fritz looked anxiously at the disturbed face of Mrs. Hummel. A secret of Laura's that he had for weeks foreboded was now to fall destructively on his hopes.

"I will confess all to you, dear Doctor," continued the mother, with many sighs. "Laura esteems you beyond measure, and the thought of becoming your wife —I must say it in confidence—is not strange or disagreeable to her. But she has a fearful idea in her head, and I am ashamed to express it."

"Speak out," said the Doctor, in despair.

"Laura wishes you to elope with her."

Fritz was dazed.

"It is scarcely for a mother to express this wish to you, but I do not know how to do otherwise."

"But where to?" cried the Doctor, quite aghast.

"That is the most painful part of all, as you yourself must acknowledge. What put the idea into her head, whether poetry, or reading about the great world in the newspapers, I know not. But to her frame of mind, which is always excited and tragic, I can oppose no resistance. I am afraid to impart it to my husband. I conjure you to do what you can to calm my child. Her feelings are wounded, and I can no longer resist the inward struggle for this young heart."

"I beg permission," replied the Doctor, "to speak immediately with Laura on the subject."

Without waiting for the mother's answer, he hastened up the stairs to Laura's room. He knocked, but receiving no answer, opened the door. Laura was sitting by her writing-table, sobbing violently.

"Dear, sweet Laura," exclaimed the Doctor, "I have been speaking with your mother; let me know all."

Laura started.

"Every warm feeling is rejected with scorn, every hour that I see you is embittered by the hostility of my father. The heart of the poorest maiden palpitates when she hears the voice of the man she loves: but I must ask, is that the happiness of love? When I do not see you I am in anxiety about you, and when you come to us I feel tormented, and listen with terror to every word of my father. I see you joyless and cast down. Fritz, your love for me, makes you unhappy."

"Patience, Laura," said the Doctor; "let us persevere. My confidence in your father's heart is greater than yours. He will gradually reconcile himself to me."

"Yes, after he has broken both our hearts; even great love is crushed by constant opposition. I cannot, amidst the wrangling of our hostile families, become your wife; the narrow street and the old hatred are destructive to me. I have often sat here lamenting that I was not a man who could boldly battle for his own happiness. Listen to a secret, Fritz," she said, approaching him, again wringing her hands; "here I am becoming haughty, malicious, and wicked."

"I have observed nothing of that kind," replied Fritz, astonished.

"I conceal it from you," exclaimed Laura; "but I struggle daily with bad thoughts, and I am indifferent to the love of my parents. When my father pats my head, the devil cries within me he had better let it alone. When my mother admonishes me to have patience, her talk secretly irritates me, because she uses finer words than are necessary. I hate the dog, so that I often beat him without cause. The conversation at the Sunday dinner, the stories of the old actor, and the eternal little tittle-tattle of the street appear insupportable to me. I feel that I am an odious creature, and I have frequently in this place wept over and

hated myself. These bad fits are ever recurring and become more overpowering. I shall never be better here: where we live under a curse, like two spoiled children. We sink, Fritz, in these surroundings! Even the loving care of parents ceases to make one happy—the anxiety that one should not wet one's feet, that one should wear woolen stockings, and have cakes and sugar plums on a Sunday—is one to go through all this every year of one's life?"

She hastily opened her journal, and held out to him a bundle of poems and letters.

"Here are your letters; through these I have learnt to love you, for here is what I revere in you. Thus would I always have you be. When, therefore, I think of what you have to go through between our houses and to bear from my father, and when I observe that you wear a double shawl under every rough blast, I become anxious and worried about you; and I see you before me as a pampered book-worm, and myself as a little stout woman with a large cap and an insignificant face, sitting before the coffee cups, talking over the daily passers by, and this thought oppresses my heart."

Fritz recognized his letters. He had long felt certain that Laura was his secret confidant, but when he now looked at the loved one who held up to him the secret correspondence, he no longer thought of the caprice which had occasioned him so much grief; he thought only of the true-heartedness and of the poetry of this tender connexion.

"Dear, dear Laura," he exclaimed, embracing her; "it seems as if two souls with which my heart had intercourse had become one, but you now divide me and yourself into human beings of daily life, and into higher natures. What has destroyed your cheerful confidence?"

"Our difficulties, Fritz, and the sorrow of seeing you without pleasure, and hearing your voice without being elevated by it; you are with me, and yet further off from me than in those days when I did not see you at all, or only in the society of friends."

She released herself from his embrace.

"Do you love me? and are you the man who has written these? If so, venture to withdraw me from this captivity. Begin a new life with me. I will work with you and be self-denying; you shall see of what I am capable; I will think day and night of how I can earn our maintenance, that you may be undisturbed by petty cares in your learned work. Be brisk and bold, cast off your eternal caution, venture for once to do what others may look at askance."

"If I were to do it," answered Fritz, seriously, "the risk would be small for me. For you the consequences may be such as you do not think of. How can you imagine that a rash determination can be good for you if it throws fresh discord into your soul, and burdens your whole life with a feeling of guilt towards others?"

"If I take upon myself to do what is wrong," exclaimed Laura, gloomily, "I do it not for myself alone. I feel but too well that it is wrong, but I venture it for our love. Never will my father voluntarily lay my hand in yours. He knows that I am devoted to you, and is not so hard as to wish my unhappiness, but he cannot overcome his disinclination. One day he is compelled to acknowledge that you are the man to whom I ought to belong, the next the bitter feeling of how hateful it is to him again returns, If you venture to defy him you will do what is really agreeable to him; show a strong will, and, though he may be angry, he will easily be appeased by your courage. He loves me," she said in a low tone, "but he is fearfully hard to others,"

"Is he always so?" asked the Doctor. "It is clear the daughter does not know the full worth of her father. I should at this moment be doing both him and you an injustice if I were to conceal from you what he wishes to keep secret. Listen, then: when my poor father was sitting by me in despair, your father entered our house and gave us in the most magnanimous way the means of averting the threatened blow. Do you not know that his sulkiness and quarrelsomeness are frequently only the expression of a rough humor?"

Laura watched his mouth as if she wished to devour every word that fell from his lips.

"Did my father do this?" she exclaimed, startled to the utmost, raising her arms towards heaven, and throwing herself down upon her writing-table.

Fritz wished to raise her.

"Leave me," she entreated, passionately, "it will pass off. I am happy. Leave me alone now, beloved one."

The Doctor closed the door gently, and went down to the mother, who still sat on the sofa overwhelmed with anxiety, revolving in her mind, with motherly alarm, all the exciting scenes of an elopement.

"I beg of you," he said, "not to worry Laura now by remonstrances. She will regain her calmness. Trust to her noble heart."

With these wise words the Doctor endeavored to comfort himself. Meanwhile Laura lay supported against the chair, and thought over her injustice to her father. For years she had borne the sorrow which is bitterest to the heart of a child, and now the pressure was taken from her soul. At last she arose, drew out her diary, tore out one page after another, crumpled up the leaves and threw them into the fire—a small sacrifice. She watched it till the last sparks flickered in the dark ashes, then she closed the stove and hastened out of the room.

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. A Treatise on Metaphysics. *James McCosh*, D. D., LL. D., etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. $2.00.

The venerable and scholarly ex-President of Princeton has set forth, in this neatly printed volume, the metaphysical principles in which his Realistic Philosophy culminates. Our readers are presumably acquainted with the teachings of Dr. McCosh, and have had occasion to admire his clear and lucid style of presentation. Although the positions upheld in the present work are substantially the same as those advanced in the author's former publications, the arrangement of the theses and the development of the same are in this instance altered to conform to the plan of the book. The work, in the words of the author, is to be "regarded as the cope-stone" of what he has been able to do in philosophy. "I define Metaphysics," says Dr. McCosh, "as The Science of First and Fundamental Truths. I cherish the conviction that it may be made as clear and satisfactory as Logic, the science of discursive truth, has been, since the days of Aristotle. It shows us what we are entitled to assume and what we are not entitled to assume without mediate proof. It does so by opening to our view those primitive truths which at once claim our assent and furnish a sure foundation to all our knowledge; which, like the primitive granite rocks, go down the deepest and mount the highest. * * * There are Objects, there are Truths, which are perceived Directly and Immediately; this is not the case with the great body of our knowledge. * * * On the bare contemplation of these two straight lines we perceive that they cannot enclose a space, and on a surface being presented to us, that the shortest distance between these two points in it is a straight line. In order to convince us of these and innumerable such truths, we need no gathered experience, and we make no use of inference. * * * Our intuitions look to 'Things' and the Relations of Things. * * * Our intuitions look to single objects and not to abstract or general notions. * * * We can generalize our Intuitions and thus form Philosophic Principles. * * * Induction, by which is meant a Gathered and Systematic Observation, has a place in Metaphysics. This will seem to many an extraordinary position. It will be regarded by them as stripping philosophy of its crown and sceptre which place it above all the ordinary sciences. It seems to make our deeper thinking to have no other foundation than human observation, which must necessarily be limited. * * * If we would find what intuition is, we must carefully inspect it; not, indeed, by the external senses, which cannot perceive it, but by the internal sense, that is self-consciousness. Not only so, but we must seek a scientific manner to find out the objects which it looks at and makes known to us. In short, we have to construct the science of metaphysics by a process of inductive observation suited to the nature of the mental phenomena which are observed."

Apropos of the discussion in the present number of THE OPEN COURT, we may quote the following from Dr. McCosh, relative to the intuition of body by the senses: "We know the Object as existing or having being. * * * We look on each of the objects thus presented to us, in our organism or beyond it, as having an existence, a being, a reality. Every one understands these phrases; they cannot be made simpler or more intelligible by an explanation. We understand them because they express a mental fact which every one has experienced. We may talk of what we contemplate in sense-perception being nothing but an impression, an appearance, an idea, but we can never be made to give our spontaneous assent to any such statements. However ingenious the arguments which may be adduced in favor of the objects of our sense-perceptions being mere illusions, we find, after listening to them, and allowing to them all the weight that is possible, that we still look upon bodies as realities the next time they present themselves. The reason is, we know them to be realities, by a native cognition which can never be overcome." *μκρκ.*

A FRIENDLY CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. GLADSTONE ABOUT CREEDS. By *Samuel Laing*. London: Watts & Co., 17 Johnson's Court Fleet Street.

This little pamphlet of only nineteen pages is well worth reading. It is a concise expression of the issue between theological orthodoxy and agnostic unbelief. Mr. Gladstone had requested Mr. S. Laing to furnish him with a short summary of the negative creed and Mr. Laing complied with the wish of England's ex-premier. Mr. Gladstone shows again in his attitude that noble sincerity which distinguishes him in everything he does and says and writes. But it is to be regretted that as a theologian he is not sufficiently familiar with the present state of things. He proves this in his article on the Field-Ingersoll controversy, where he defends propositions which have been given up even by orthodox scholars. Mr. Laing's position can be briefly characterized as agnosticism, which says that we cannot know what is behind the veil of phenomena. The result of this negative creed is: "* * * There may be *anything* in the Unknowable, 'behind the veil,' for aught we know to the contrary. * * * Thus, if anyone tells me in general terms that there is a Heaven or Hell behind the veil, I reply, 'It may be so; I do not know.' But, if he attempts to define them, and tells me that by going vertically upwards I shall meet the one, and by going vertically downwards the other, I reply, 'This is merely an erroneous guess; it is simply impossible.'" Our criticism of this position appeared in the editorial of No. 82 of THE OPEN COURT, "Phenomena and Noumena." We need not repeat it here.

NOTES.

The annual series of Mr. Chadwick's Sermons may be had for fifty cents. (George H. Ellis, 141 Franklin Street, Boston.)

Prof. George B. Fisher, of Yale, contributes to the April *Forum*, a reply to Cardinal Manning's attack upon our public school system.

We have received a little pamphlet by Dr. G. M. Gould, "Concerning Reflex Neuroses due to Eye-Strain." (*Medical and Surgical Reporter.*)

In *Scribner's* for April, Charles Francis Adams, President of the Union Pacific, discusses in a very practical way the question of how to prevent railroad strikes.

We have received from Mr. Peter McGill a rejoinder to Wheelbarrow's remarks upon the strictures of his critics, which came too late for publication in the present number.

The problem discussed by M. Binet, in his essay "Sensation and the Outer World," will be treated editorially in the next issue of THE OPEN COURT, under the title "Idealism and Realism."

The "Freethinkers' Magazine" for April contains a full-page steel-plate portrait of Dr. R. R. Westbrook, President of the American Secular Union, and a likeness of J. J. McCabe, with full biographical sketches of each.

Prof. Max Müller's Address before the Society for the Extension of University Teaching, entitled "Some Lessons of Antiquity," has been published. Prof. Müller maintains, apropos of the present tendency to denounce our university curricula as antiquated and useless, that it is the duty of all university teaching never to lose touch with the past. "It seems to me the highest aim of all knowledge to try to understand what is, by learning how it has come to be what it is. That is the true meaning of history, and that seems to me the kind of knowledge which schools and universities are called upon to cultivate and to teach."

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

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IN No. 76, Dr. Edward Brooks of Philadelphia, takes exception to an editorial thesis that "mathematics is unfortunately constructed on axioms." To Dr. Brooks no other way of construction is possible. There exist "*first truths* or *axioms* which the mind has power to cognize," which are incapable of proof, and which every system, even though nominally rejecting them, nevertheless tacitly employs. The editorial answer to Dr. Brooks, in No. 77, is based upon the principles unfolded in the series of disquisitions on "Form and Formal Thought," in Nos. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Axioms so called, *are* the *result* of reasoning, and not the basis of it; the laws of formal thought determine the correctness and necessity of a proposition; conformity, in every instance, with these laws alone makes a truth universal. The relations of actual, material space have thus universally coincided with the laws of a formal system of third degree, and hence the rigidity and finality of those relations. In the same number, a translation from Hermann Grassmann's "Theory of Extension" is presented; it contains the fundamental points of departure of the new geometry from the old. No English version of this epoch-making work exists. The discussion will greatly interest those who have given their attention to the philosophy of mathematics.

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Much criticism has been elicited by the bare mention of Mr. George's economical doctrines—indubitable testimony of their popularity and strength. Letters have appeared in No. 79 and others will follow.

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THE DISCOVERY OF THE VEDA.*

BY H. OLDENBERG.

The acquisition of the Veda, to which we have referred in our last paper, can hardly be accounted a discovery. The existence and position in Hindu literature of this great work, had long been known. At every step the writings that had previously been brought to light, pointed to the Veda as the source from which all proceeded—even more strikingly than in the literature of Greece, we are led back, at every turn, to the poems of Homer. Manuscripts of the Vedic texts, moreover, were to be found, not only in India; they had long been possessed in great numbers by the libraries of Europe. But an attempt had scarcely, if at all, been made to lay hold of these and see if in the unmeasurable chaos of this mass of writings a firm ground for science could not be acquired.

The Sanskrit of the great epic poems, or of Kalidasa, was understood well enough; but of the dialect in which the most important parts of the Veda were written, no more was known than one familiar with the French of to day would know of the language of the Troubadours. Without going deeply into the study it was easy to discern its inherent difficulties from the unwonted singularity of the text and its strange contents, which, in part at least, were extremely complicated, and often involved in a maze of minor details. Would an earnest explorer of this territory, even in case he succeeded, be rewarded for his pains?

It was a band of young German scholars who bent their energies to this work. Most of them are still working in our midst—Max Müller, Roth, and Weber. Two others, whose names should not be omitted here, died a few years ago; these were Adalbert Kuhn and Benfey. There was no need of undertaking great expeditions, such as were those that set out for the investigation of Egyptian and Babylonian antiquity. Those monuments in whose colossal and strange forms, fragments of a primeval age meet the eye, were wanting in India. The knowledge which was to be acquired was not contained in inscriptions, but in manuscripts.* Our scholars repaired to London for a greater or less length of time, and the work was begun among the store of manuscripts possessed by the East India House.

There was no lack of confidence. "It would be a disgrace," wrote Roth, "to the criticism and the ingenuity of our century which has deciphered the stone inscriptions of the Persian kings and the books of Zoroaster, if it did not succeed in reading in this enormous literature the intellectual history of the Hindu nation."

Much that Roth expected has been accomplished or is on the way towards accomplishment. Of much, that was hoped for at that time, we can now say that it was unattainable, and understand why. What has been attained, however, has given to the picture, which science formed of Hindu antiquity, an entirely different aspect. Unbounded in extent, this picture formerly seemed to lose itself in the nebulous depths of an immeasurable past. Now, determinate limits have been found, and the remotest initial point has been discovered for verifiable history. Authentic sources were disclosed, leading to the earliest age of Hindu civilization, from which, and regarding which, historical testimony in the usual sense of the word became accessible; and instead of the twilight, peopled with uncertain, shadowy giants, in which the epic poems made those times appear, the Veda opened to us a reality which we may hope to understand. Or, if in many instances, instead of the hoped for forms, it has afforded the eye but an empty space, even this was a step in advance. For then it was at least shown that the knowledge which was sought was not to be had; and that which had been given as such, had disclosed itself as an imaginative picture born of the caprice of a later legend-maker.

The literature of epic poetry, apparently, could no longer lay claim to an incalculable antiquity; it sank back into a sort of Middle Ages, behind which the newly discovered, real antiquity loomed forth, studding the horizon of historical knowledge with significant forms. We shall now see how the task of understanding the Veda was accomplished, and shall describe at the same time what it was that had thus been acquired. We have here a newly disclosed literature of venerable antiquity, rich in marks of earnest effort, logically developed in sharply, nay rigidly, characterized forms; we

* Translated from the *Deutsche Rundschau.*

† The royal library at Berlin also acquired and owns a rich collection of Sanskrit manuscripts, for which a foundation was laid by the purchase, at the command of Frederick William IV., of the Chambers manuscripts.

have a newly discovered piece of history, forming the historical—or shall we say unhistorical?—foundation of a people related to us by race, who at an early day set out in paths distinctly removed from the ways of all other peoples, and created their own strange forms of existence, bearing in them the germs of the misfortunes they have suffered.

By what means did we succeed in understanding the Veda?

Almost all the more important parts of the Vedic literature—for the Veda, like the Bible, is not a separate text, but a literature with wide ramifications—are preserved in numerous, and, for the most part, relatively modern manuscripts. Only rarely are they older than a few centuries; since in the destructive climate of India it could not be otherwise. The texts, however, which we find in these later manuscripts, decend from the remotest antiquity.

These texts, before they came to us, had to be transmitted through extended periods of time, written out in the present manuscript form, or indeed, in any manuscript form whatever, and have encountered misfortunes of a varied order. It is the task of the philological inquirer to ascertain the character of these events—to determine the genetic history of the texts. It may be said that these manuscripts in the shape they have been transmitted to us, resemble paintings by old masters, which bear unmistakable traces of alternate injuries and attempted restorations by professional and unprofessional hands. What we want to know, so far as it lies in our power, is their form as it originally existed.

The period to which the origin of the old Vedic poems belongs, we cannot assign in years, nor yet in centuries. But we know that these poems existed, when there was not a city in India, but only hamlets and castles; when the names of the powerful tribes which at a later time assumed the first rank among the nations of India were not even mentioned, no more so than in the Germany which Tacitus described were mentioned the names of Franks and Bavarians. It was the period of migrations, of endless, turbulent feuds among small unsettled tribes with their nobles and priests; people fought for pastures, and cows, and arable land. It was the period of conflict between the fair-skinned immigrants, who called themselves Arya, and the natives, the "dark people," the "unbelievers that propitate not the Gods."

As yet the thought and belief of the Hindus did not seek the divine in those formless depths in which later ages conceived the idea of the eternal and hidden Brahma. Wherever in nature the brightest pictures met the eye and the mightiest tones struck the ear, there were their Gods—the luminous arch of heaven, the red hues of dawn, the thundering storm-god and his followers, the winds. The Vedic Aryans had not yet reached their later abode on the two powerful sister streams, the Ganges and the Yumna; the Sindhu (Indus) was still for them the "Mother Stream," of which one of the oldest poets of the Rig Veda says: *

> "From earth along the reach of Heaven riseth the sound;
> Ceaseless the roar of her waters, the bright one.
> As floods of thundering rain, poured from the darkened cloud-bosom,
> So rushes the Sindu, like the steer, the bellowing one."

The poetry of the Rig Veda dates from the time of those wanderings and struggles that took place on the Indus and its tributary streams. Certain families exercised the functions of priestly offices, and possessed the acquisitions of an artificially connected speech together with a simple form of chant using but few tones. These families created Vedic poetry, and transmitted the art to their posterity. The songs of the Rig Veda, which are almost all sacrificial songs, were not really what we call popular poetry. We do not hear in them the language that pours forth from the soul of a nation, as it communes in poetical rhythm with itself. It was a poetry that wanted mainly the proper hearers—the masses of the people who spoke through the mouth of the poet. Their hearers were God Agni, God Indra, or Goddess Dawn; and the poet was not he whom the passionate impulses of his own soul or his own love of song and legend impelled to sing, but he was mainly one who belonged to a poet-family—one of the families of men who in the course of time became united as a caste and erected ever more insuperable barriers between their sacred existence and the profane reality of daily life. For the gods such a poet only "could frame a worthy poem, as an experienced, skillful wheelwright makes a wagon,"—a poem which would be rewarded by the rich, princely lords of the sacrifice, with steeds and kine, with golden ornaments and female slaves from the spoils of war. "Thy blessing," says a Vedic poet to a God,†

> "Rests with the givers,
> With the victors, the many valiant heroes,
> Who make gifts to us of clothing, kine, and horses;
> May they rejoice in the splendor and plenty of divine bounty.
>
> Let all things waste that they have won
> Who, without rewarding, would profit by our hymns to heaven.
> The godless ones, that boast their fortune,
> The transgressors—cast them from the light of day."

It has been fatal for all thought and poetry in India, that a second world, filled with strangely fantastic shapes, was established at an early day beside the real world. This was the place of sacrifice with its three sacred fires and the schools in which the virtuosos of the sacrificial art were educated—a sphere of wonderful activity and the playground of a subtle, empty mummery, whose enervating power over the

* Hundreds of Vedic melodies have been handed down to us in a form the interpretation of which can be subject to no real doubt. As it appears, they are the oldest but unfortunately the poorest memorials of musical antiquity.

† Rig Veda V. 42, 8–9.

spirit of an entire nation we can scarcely comprehend in its full extent. The poetry of the Rig Veda shows us this process of disease at an early stage; but it is there, and much of that which constitutes the essence of the Rig Veda, is rooted in it.

In the foreground stands the sacrifice, and throughout, only the sacrifice. "By sacrifice the Gods made sacrifice; these regulations were the first," it is said in a verse which is thrice repeated in the Rig Veda. The praise of the God for whom the sacrificial offerings were intended, his power, his victories, and the prayers for possessions which were hoped for in return for human offerings—the prosperity of flocks and posterity, long life, destruction of enemies, the hated and the godless—such is the subject-matter of the multitudinous repetitions that recur throughout the hymns of the Rig Veda. Still, among these verse-making sacrificers there was not an utter absence of real poets. And thus among the stereotyped implorations and songs of praise we find here and there a great and beautiful picture—the wonder of the poet's soul at the bright marvels of nature or the deep expression of an earnest inner life. A poet from the priestly family of the Bharadvajas sings of the goddess Ushas, the dawn:*

"We see thee, thou lovely one; far, far, thou shinest.
To heaven's heights thy brilliant light-beams dart.
In beauteous splendor shimmering, unveilest thou thy bosom,
Radiant with heaven's sheen, celestial queen of dawn!

"The red bulls draw their chariot,
Where in thy splendor thou o'erspread'st the heavens;
Thou drivest away night; as a hero, a bow-man,
As a swift charioteer frighteneth his enemies.

"A beautiful path has been made for thee in the mountain,
Thou unconquerable one, thou risest from out the waters.
So bring thou us treasures to revive us on
Our further course, queenly daughter of heaven."†

Another poet sings of Parjanya, the rain God:‡

"Like the driver who forward whips his steeds,
So he urges onward his messengers, the clouds.
From afar the thunder-tone of the lion arises
When the God makes rain pour from the clouds.

"Parjanya's lightnings dart; the winds blow;
The floods pour from heaven; up spring grass and plants.
To all that lives and moves a quickening is imparted,
When the God scatters his seeds on the earth.

"At his command the earth bows deeply down;
At his command hoofed creatures come to life;
At his command bloom forth the bright flowers:
May Parjanya grant us strong defence!

"A flood of rain hast thou sent; now cease;
Thou didst make penetrable the desert wastes.
For us thou hast caused plants to grow for food,
And the prayer of men thou hast fulfilled."

*The Indian word Ushas is related to the Greek Eos, the Latin Aurora.
† Rig Veda VI. 64. The hymn following is V. 83.
‡ This God also reappears among the kindred peoples of Europe, as Fiörgynn in the northern mythology, and among the Lithuanians and Prussians as the God Perkunas, of whom an old chronicle says: "Perkunas was the third dol; and him the people besought for storms, so that during his time they had rain and fair weather and suffered not from the thunder and the lightning."

But we must turn from the description of Vedic poetry to examine the fortune that this production encountered on its way from distant antiquity to the present time, from the sacrificial places on the Indus to the workshops of the English and German philologists. Here a conspicious fact is to be dwelt upon, which belongs to the strangest phenomena of Indian history, so rich in strange events. The hymns of the Rig Veda, as well as the hymns of the other Vedas, have been composed, collected, and transmitted to succeeding ages. There has been incorporated in them a very copious, spiritual prose literature, developed throughout the older and later divisions, and treating of the art and symbolism of sacrifice. There have also arisen heretical sects, like the Buddhists, who denied the authority of the Veda, and instead of its teachings reverenced as a sacred text the code of ordinances proclaimed by Buddha. *And all this has taken place without the art of writing.*

In the Vedic ages writing was not known. At the time when Buddhism arose it was indeed known—the Indians probably learned to write from Semites—but it was used only for indicting short communications in practical life, not for writing books. We have very sure and characteristic information as to the rôle which the art of writing played, or rather did not play, in the church life of the Buddhists at a comparatively late age, say about 400 B. C. The sacred text of this sect affords a picture, executed even in its minutest features, of life in the houses and parks which the brethren inhabited. We can see the Buddhist monks pursue their daily life from morning to night; we can see them in their wanderings and during their rest, in solitude and in intercourse with other monks, or laymen; we know the equipment of the places occupied by them, their furniture, and the contents of their store-rooms. But nowhere do we hear that they read their sacred texts or copied them; nowhere, that in the dwellings of the monks such things as writing utensils or manuscripts were found.

The memory of the spiritual brethren, "rich in hearing,"—what we to-day call a well-read man was then called one rich in hearing,—took the place of a cloister library; and if the knowledge of some indispensable text,—as, *e. g.*, the formula of confession which had to be recited at the full and new moon in the assembly of the brethren,—was in danger of being lost among a body of priests, they acted on the dictum laid down in an old Buddhistic ordinance: "By these monks a monk shall immediately be sent to a neighboring parish. He must be thus instructed: 'Go, Brother, and when thou hast learned by heart the formula of confession, the complete one or the abreviated one, come back to us.'"

It must be admitted that under such circumstances

all the conditions for the existence of books, and the relations between books and reader—if it be allowed me for the sake of brevity to use these expressions—must have been of a very different nature than in an age of writing or one of printing. A book could then exist only on condition that a body of men existed among whom it was taught and learned and transmitted from generation to generation. A book could be known only at the price of learning it by heart, or of having some one at hand who had thus learned it. Texts of a content which only claimed a passing notice, could not as a rule exist. This was fatal for historical writing and generally speaking for all profane literature. Above all, the existing texts were subjected to the disfigurements that errors of memory, carelessness, or attempts at improvement on the part of the transmitters must have imported into them.

Under conditions such as have been described above, the poetry of the Rig Veda has been handed down from generation to generation through many centuries. Separate poems were brought into the collection in the course of oral compilation and transmission. The collection was re-corrected on repeated occasions and was brought to greater completeness; again only by oral compilation and transmission. It is conceivable enough that thus the original structure yes, even the existence itself of special hymns was often injured, effaced, or destroyed. Remodeling destroyed their form. The lines of division between hymns standing side by side would often be forgotten and numbers of them would be merged into an apparent unity. Modern, and easily intelligible terms drove out the obsolete phrases and the ancient word-forms—often the most valuable remains for the investigator, whom they help to explain the history of the language, just as the scientist deduces from fossil remains the history of organic life.

Especially fatal was it for the old and true form of the Vedic hymns that they have been stretched upon the Procrustean bed of grammatical analysis. Earlier and more strongly than in any other nation of antiquity, was interest and pleasure taken in India in scientifically dissecting language. Closely examining the separate sounds of speech and their underlying modifications, they employed exceptional ingenuity and discrimination in constructing a system from which, when it became known in Europe, the science of our century found ample reason to learn much that was marvellous. The ingenuity and penetration of the students of Vedic literature has been burdened like a curse with that genuinely Hindu trait, subtlety; the joy—which at times seems to border on maliciousness—of stretching and forcing things into an artistic garment, of building up labyrinths of fine points, in whose involved courses the skilled and cunning student ostentatiously thought himself able to find his way. Thus, in this grammatical science, understanding and misunderstanding of correct principles are mingled in inexplicable confusion. That under the hands of such linguistic theorists the precious wealth of the old Vedic hymns has not remained inviolate, is easily comprehended. In this fact, a single feature of the remains of these early times was hit upon with rare acuteness and established with wonderful truth; no consideration had prevented the destruction of great masses of old and genuine phenomena to suit half-correct theories. Thus the most patient penetration of our science will be able to restore the lost material only in part.

Finally, however, the caprice under which the hymns of the old singers must have suffered, had its end. The more people accustomed themselves to see in these poems not merely beautiful and efficacious prayers but a sacred revelation of the divine, the higher did their transmitted form—even when this is, or seems to be, of necessity, so irregular—rise in the respect of theologians, and the more careful must they have been to describe and preserve this form with all its dissimilarities.

We possess a remarkable work—it is composed in verse like many Hindu treatises and hand-books—in which a grammarian, Caunaka, who must probably be placed about the time 400 B. C., has given a deep and unusually well-planned survey of the vocal peculiarities of the Rig Veda text. The study of Caunaka's work affords us the proof that *from that time on* the Vedic hymns, protected by the united care of grammatical and religious respect for letters, have suffered no further appreciable corruptions. The most important manuscripts of the Rig Veda which we know, may be two thousand years later than this hand-book of Caunaka's, but they bear all tests in a remarkable way if we compare them with it.

The Rig Veda, indeed, which that Hindu scholar found, was not unlike a ruin. And it was hardly possible by the help of Hindu scholarship to transmit it to posterity in a better condition than it was received. But still the conscientious diligence of the Hindu linguists and divines accomplished something: for the last two thousand years it has preserved these venerable fragments from the dangers of further decay. They lie there, untouched, just as they were in the days of Caunaka. And the investigation of our day, which has already succeeded in bringing forth from many a field of ruins the living features of a by-gone existence, is at work among them, now with the bold grasp of confident divination, now in the quiet uniformity of slowly advancing deliberation, to deduce whatever it may of the real forms of those old priestly poems.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

II.

MANY objections of Pessimism against the Ethical Tendency of the Universe can be explained away in the light of the axiom that Nature never hesitates to sacrifice the welfare of individuals to the welfare of the species. At the entrance of the loam-labyrinths which cover the table lands of central Africa the warriors of the termite ant can often be seen charging a trespasser with a recklessness which frequently results in the slaughter of the bold sentinels, but which, after all, tends to discourage intrusion and thus to secure the welfare of the community. The Leming rat, in its periodic migrations, travels in swarms, preceded by skirmishers who often bridge an ice-cleft with their own bodies, and thus enable the main force of the wandering host to continue their march unhindered.

Many an apparent paradox of the moral world conceals a similar significance. The slaughter of millions, sacrificed to the ambition of a restless conqueror, is only a modified form of the universal struggle for supremacy, which on the whole, results in the survival of the fittest and thus secures the ultimate progress of the species. The passion of inquiry, which has braved the fire of the stake and disturbed the mental peace of countless children of faith, has guided the progress of mankind from error to truth, and like the ardor of patriotism, often compensates, by methods of its own, even the individual sacrifices of its martyrs, whose courage, in exile and chains, has been sustained by the genius of the species, and whose toils have been rewarded by confident previsions of immortal fame. There is, indeed, no doubt, that the interests of the Species are often promoted through the medium of individual motives, as in the instinctive delusions of the sexual passion, or in the impulse of that ambition which unconsciously sacrifices the temporary comfort of its votaries to the permanent benefit of their fellowmen.

It is less directly evident, but not less certain, that under a similar disguise, even the passion of hatred often subserves an unpersonal purpose. An assassin who under the sway of resentment risks his own life to accomplish the ruin of an enemy, might seem to use evil means for a purely evil end; yet it is certain that of all the motives apt to restrain the reckless gratifications of selfishness, the most potent is not the influence of law codes or religious precepts, but the dread of personal revenge. The court of private vendetta has again and again avenged the deeds of evildoers who could defy all other tribunals, and the assassin's dagger has thus more than once discouraged crime by *restraining the passions of unscrupulous egotists through the dread of a more reckless passion.*

That passion, in its fiercest forms, can acquire a force overpowering even the instinct of self-preservation, and history abounds with the records of despots and oppressors slain in the midst of their vassals, and under circumstances making the avenger's deed an almost certain equivalent of suicide.

Nor is the sway of that self-sacrificing fury always confined to a momentary impulse. The assassin of Pedro Arbues, was proved to have prepared for the consequences of his deed a year in advance, and seems to have undertaken a journey of several hundred miles in the full assurance that the murder of the fanatical Grand Inquisitor would cost him his own life. Ravaillac confessed to have haunted the favorite promenades of Henri IV. for three weeks, and Sir Emerson Tennent mentions the case of a Malay servant who had hired himself to a relative of a mortal enemy and watched his chance for two years before he finally found the desired opportunity for gratifying his revenge. Animals, under the spur of rage have been known to follow their offenders for days together. A she-leopard, in the foothills of the Abyssinian Alps, was chased up a tree by a pack of hounds, while the companions of the traveler Rüppel destroyed her young, but effected her escape after being wounded by a shot that tore off one of her ears. Three days after, the tent of the traveler was attacked by a raging beast, which succumbed only to a repeated volley of rifle-balls, and by a half-healed scar was recognized as the victim of that adventure in the foothills, where she must have taken up the trail of her assailants and followed it for a distance of sixty English miles. The naturalist Buckland relates an anecdote of a dog that had to be sold on account of its persistent hostility to a man who had incurred its resentment by an act of cruelty. Six years after that dog met its enemy in the streets of a suburb of Bristol, and at once attacked him with a fury which its new owner could explain only on the theory of hydrophobia, as the terribly mangled stranger seemed to have been the victim of a wholly unprovoked attack. For reasons of his own the wounded man endorsed that hypothesis and insisted on the dog's being slain on the spot, but laughed at the apprehensions of his private friends, and, indeed, was eventually justified in the prediction that his wounds would heal without any perilous after-effects.

Hatred is as persistent a passion as love, and the devotion of dying lovers consecrating their last hours to the task of securing the happiness of a beloved survivor, is offset by the posthumous revenge of implacable haters. De Witt, in the agony of his dying hour, roused himself on the arrival of his sons, to exact an oath of life-long hostility, to the house of Orange. Pozzo

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXII.

di Borgo, the Corsican patriot, inspired all his young relatives with the passion of his hatred to the person of the first Napoleon; and the blood-feuds of Scotch and Italian families have often been perpetuated for a series of generations.

There are race-feuds which at bottom represent the antagonism of irreconcilable tendencies, and the unconscious influence of that antagonism might often explain the enigma of "hatred at first sight," an instinctive and unconquerable antipathy between two persons who perhaps have never exchanged a word and mutually avoided any act of direct discourtesy.

"Do you believe that the 'Daimon-warnings' of Socrates can be explained on the theory of clairvoyance?" I once asked a specialist in psychological studies. "I do not know how spiritualists would account for it," said he, after a pause of introspection, "but I am tempted to ascribe such presentiments to a more permanent instinct. You remember that the promptings of that *daimon* were dissuasive rather than persuasive, and I have had a similar experience at the first sight of total strangers, who somehow or other impressed me with an intuitive certainty of hostile intentions, or of danger to be avoided only by cutting their acquaintance as short as possible. And more than once I have in vain tried to explain such presentiments by any peculiarity in the appearance or the manners of the ominous individuals. Their physiognomical characteristics might be prepossessing rather than otherwise and their manners unexceptionable, nay their impression on others might be decidedly favorable; and yet I seemed to *know*, rather than to suspect, that to me individually any intimate relation with such persons would imply trouble. My first conjecture in such cases was generally the idea that their personal appearance must have clearly recalled that of some half-forgotten rascal who had revealed his character at my expense; but after reviewing the portraits of that rogue's gallery, I came to the conclusion that the origin of the ominous impression must antedate my personal experience. Years ago—perhaps generations ago—the path of one of my ancestors may have been crossed by an ancestor of that obnoxious stranger, or for all I know his smooth manners may conceal tendencies at daggers-drawn with hereditary tendencies of my own, and which some time or other may have exploded in a mortal feud, and would explode again in the first favorable opportunity."

Race-antipathies certainly survive the practical motives of their origin, and often assert themselves in a manner which can be explained only by the influence of hereditary intuition. After centuries of political and religious association the Semitic elements still antagonize the Latin elements in the population of Southern Spain, and even the cosmopolitan tendencies of our own "universal nation" have failed to harmonize the discords of Celtic and Germanic characteristics. "We have a German-Irish family in our neighborhood," wrote a Texas friend of mine at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, "and it was most amusing to see how unconscious instinct prompted the five children of that neighbor to take part for or against King William. The news from Sedan fairly electrified a youngster with the flaxen hair of his Teuton father, though that father was not a Prussian at all, but a Hessian, with a private pique against the annexators of his native land. One of his brothers, with the black eyes of his Limerick mother, persisted in cheering for the defenders of Strassburg and after the surrender of that stronghold of Celtic prestige, avenged himself by kicking his brother's bulldog."

Yet Celts and Teutons have for ages been next-door neighbors; but the inveteracy of such neighborhood-feuds can often be explained by the circumstance that more dissimilar nations often dwell too far apart to develop the antagonism of rivalry. The Portuguese with all their bigotry, grant foreign heretics numerous privileges which they obstinately refuse to their next neighbors, the hated Spaniards. Persians eagerly fraternize with western Giaours to gain allies against their fellow-Moslem, the obnoxious Turks. Exile, however, is apt to correct such prejudices, and in the heart of the black Continent, Caucasians of all subdivisions become impressed with the advantage of a temporary truce — though the Cuban Cazique Hatwai, stoutly protested his resolution to go to Hades rather than run the risk of meeting Spaniards in Heaven. As a rule, exiled individuals will prefer the society of their nearest ethnological relatives. Darwin's experiments induced a menagerie keeper to cage a she-baboon with a couple of Brazilian ringtail-monkeys, whom she consented to adopt, but at once discarded when the keeper introduced an African ape, and it seems a significant circumstance that the Chinese immigrants seem to feel quite at home in Peru, among a race whose ancestors dated their origin from a land on the other side of the Pacific.

Instinct also guides the apparent caprices in the association of certain antipathies. It has been observed, as a moral curiosum that hatred is transferred from parent to children, far more frequently than from children to parents, though the *rationale* of that idiosyncrasy is probably the intuitive perception of the fact that parental love has deeper and more sensitive roots than filial affection, and that the attempt to wound an enemy by a blow at his child is not apt to miss its purpose. In the death of an old man's children an implacable enemy can moreover hope to accomplish the conclusive ruin of a hated lineage, and Oriental despots have often contented themselves with

effecting such purposes by a slaughter of innocents, sparing the patriarchs and female infants of a rival dynasty.

The transfer of vengeance from women to husbands (oftener than *vice versa*) may, on the other hand, be founded on an instinct developed in an age of universal polygamy, supplemented by female slavery and *suttee* rites. From modern data the evolution of that disposition could perhaps be explained only from the fact that a bereaved husband, even after the middle of life, has a chance for repairing his loss by means often denied to an aged widow. The feud of rival queens sealed the doom of the Nibelungen; but even the massacre bulletins of the Pentateuch rarely record the slaughter of female captives.

IDEALISM AND REALISM.*

IDEALISM starts from thought and sensation, from the subjective aspect of phenomena, and in its most consistent form, as spiritualism, denies the existence of matter. Realism starts from real existence, from the objective aspect of phenomena, and in its most consistent form, as materialism, denies the existence of spirit.

Now, as a matter of fact, neither spirit nor matter exist of themselves: they are abstracts. Realism is right in so far as the facts of reality cannot be considered as sham. Idealism, on the other hand, is also right, in as far as the building-stones of all knowledge are our sensations; they are the facts of reality. However, the processes that within our body produce the subjective feeling of sensations, can not be considered as essentially different from the phenomena of the outer world; since science, the classified system of observations, shows that the former not only are most intimately interwoven with and conditioned by the latter, but that they must have grown from them in the process of natural evolution.

Idealism pretends that sensations are radically different from the phenomena perceived. The sensation of light is different from ether-waves, the sensation of sound different from the vibrations of the air. In his excellent essay, "Sensation and the Outer World," in No. 83 of THE OPEN COURT, M. Alfred Binet says:

"Suppose that, my eyes being closed, I lay my hand upon my table, and that I feel a pin rolling about beneath my finger; I experience a sensation of a tactile kind, which excites in me a series of inferences, conscious, sub-conscious, and unconscious, and the whole occurrence is comprised in the following judgment: I touch a pin. In this way, through external perception, we possess knowledge of objects by the sensations they produce in us. * * *

"That which has produced our sensation of a pin, is not *directly* the pin; it is the nervous modification which that object has produced, in acting upon our sense of touch; our sensation follows this nervous modification. * * *

"Nothing resembles less the external object than the excitation it propagates in our nervous substance. What resemblance is there, for example, between the head of a pin that lies beneath my finger, and the physico-chemical phenomenon that passes through the sensitive fibers of my hand and that reaches my brain through the spinal marrow, where it gives rise to the conscious perception of a pin. Plainly, here are phenomena entirely dissimilar. It follows, therefore, that if there is a fact, at the present day, firmly established, it is that the sensations we experience upon contact with external objects are in no particular the copy of those objects. There is nothing outside of my eye that is like color or light, nothing outside of my organ of hearing that is like noise or sound, nothing outside of my sense of touch that is like hardness or softness or resistance, nothing outside of my sense of smell that is like a perfume, nothing apart from my sense of taste that is like a flavor." * * *

Sensation and the phenomena of the outer world are different. Sensations are not the real copies or images proper of things. The nervous system is not actually a mirror to reflect phenomena just as they are. Yet we may justly compare it to a mirror. For, after all, certain features of the phenomena are preserved. They are consequently not so entirely different as is maintained. A certain form of a phenomenon corresponds to a certain form of sensation. The phenomena being different among themselves produce sensations that in their turn also are different among themselves. And the difference suffices to distinguish them.

The electric current in the wire of a telephone is entirely different from the air-waves of sound. Nevertheless the form of air-waves produced by spoken words can be translated, as it were, into the electric current and from the electric current back again into air-waves. Both can adapt themselves to the same form and thus become messengers of information. Must we declare that all communication through the telephone is impossible because electricity and sound-waves, wire and air, are entirely different?

It is true that the pin on the table does not resemble the physico-chemical phenomenon that takes place in our nerves. But it is true nevertheless that this physico-chemical phenomenon of our sensation together with the memories of other sensations, especially those of touch and sight, produces in our mind the conception of a pin. In spite of all difference between the outer world and sensation, the pin as we conceive it to be, is the net result of such sensations. This is possible as in the example of the telephone by a transference of motion from one medium to another through the *preservation of form*. The same is true of the whole world. Our conception of the world, in order to be true, must ultimately be based on the facts of sensation—not on the subjective aspect of sensation only, but also and especially on its objective aspect as motions of a special form. In this way only can we acquire a conception of the objects, as they must be supposed to be independent of the subject.

* Relative to the essay of M. Binet, "Sensation and the Outer World."

The difference between the phenomena of the outer world and sensations, appears more striking than it really is, because, in order to understand a process fully, we must reduce it to some form which can be expressed in mathematical symbols or figures. Formal thought is always the basis of a scientific comprehension, and in order to comprehend a phenomenon, so as to measure and calculate it, we must in many cases translate it, as it were, into the language of that sense which is the organ of measurement and calculation. Therefore audible sound-phenomena are represented as visible air-waves. Hence the growing importance of the sense of sight.

Every manifestation of nature that affects us either directly or indirectly can thus afford us material for our sensation. Inasmuch as all existence must manifest its existence somehow (if it did not, it could not be said to exist), we maintain that all existence can at least indirectly be or become an object of cognition. Cognition never alters the data of sensory experience, although the invention of instruments may enlarge its reach. The Copernican system differs from the naïve view, that the earth is a flat disk, not because it denies or contradicts the facts of sensation, but because it arranges them more systematically with the assistance of mathematics (*i. e.* the method of formal thought).

It is a misconception of knowledge to demand that it should be something different than a methodical arrangement of facts. Our cognition, although it may translate one sensation into another, never indeed goes, nor need it go, beyond sensation. P. C.

A DEFENDER OF AGNOSTICISM.

Col. Ingersoll declares in his article "Professor Huxley and Agnosticism,"* that the Agnostic "has ceased to inquire into the origin of things. He has perceived the limitations of the mind." Thus our fervent iconoclast shuts the door to investigation, and "restricts himself to the examination of phenomena, to their relations, to their effects," because, as he says, "he has no means of a scientific knowledge of the unseen world or of the future."

If by the unseen world we understand the aspirations of man's moral and intellectual nature, the spiritual treasures which neither moth nor rust corrupt and which thieves do not steal, we can indeed have positive knowledge of it, and we are little helped by a simple denial of its knowability.

We side with Col. Ingersoll whenever he opposes the superstitious notions of old theologies; but we urge like many of his opponents, that he should not take "something of value from the life of man," unless he can give something more valuable in its stead. We do not live for the present only, and not merely to make ourselves happy here.

"Life is real, life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal."

Col. Ingersoll says that the Agnostic "endeavors to find in the complexity of things the true conditions of human happiness." It is not clear how complexity can be the condition of happiness. But we recognize that the duties of life must be placed above happiness and even above life itself. We must not confine ourselves to the horizon of our present existence. We live, and think, and work in the present, but let us live so that we continue to live in future generations.

Col. Ingersoll opposes supernaturalism and metaphysicism, and he is right in that. But not perceiving how inconsistent he is, he establishes at the same time another supernaturalism and metaphysicism in the Unknowable that limits our mind. P. C.

N. A. Review, April, 1889.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SPIRIT OF MR. GEORGE'S WORK.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

Wheelbarrow has failed to catch the real spirit of Mr. George's work.

His friend Tom Clark was not confronted with Mr. George's law when he selected a quarter section of land in Boone County. Under Mr. George's plan the government would not say to Tom Clark, "This land is the common property of all the people, and before you can have it you must pay the land-value of that quarter section. This is fixed at $1.25 an acre." But it would say to him: "There are thousands of acres of land around here that no one is using, you just go ahead and take as much of it as you can use and it will cost you nothing, until such time as the country settles up. Then you will have to pay in the shape of taxes, annually, whatever the privilege of the exclusive use of this land may be worth." Tom Clark would then have the $200 which he paid for the mere privilege of access to this wild land left in his pocket, and this would greatly aid him in improving his land. Indeed, with money he could have broken the "forty acres at a cost of $3 an acre," and have $80 left to enable him to purchase a pair of oxen, or something of the like. Bear in mind that Tom Clark, bowing to the Divine Mandate, "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread," simply wanted this land that he might, by applying his labor to it, extract a living for himself and family.

Tom Clark works hard early and late. By the hardest kind of toil and the practice of patience and the exercise of self-denial he has made "his plantation in the rough worth about $500." Wheelbarrow is right in saying that the community did not put this value on the land. Tom Clark, by the sweat of his brow, put it there, and it should be his as against the world. Yet under our present system the tax collector would come around and tax him on the full value of his improvements. He has done a good thing. By improving his farm, building a house, and raising food, he has added to the world's wealth.

Now, there is no doubt that all this time there were thousands of acres of land all around Tom Clarks farm, held by people who had no idea of using it. They bought it for speculative purposes. They do not propose to do anything with it by which labor can be employed. They do not propose to invest a dollar, or do a day's work in the improvement and cultivation of this land. Yet they intend to get rich out of it nevertheless, by holding it until such time as the pressure of population makes the competition for it

sharp, and men will be willing to pay a high price for it, rather than be driven out beyond the confines of civilization. Now the essence of the evil lies in this: Under the present system, Tom Clark must pay the government say 1 per cent. taxes on his land and improvements amounting to $5 per year, and if he does not pay it, his farm, improvements, and all, will be sold for taxes. (Let Wheelbarrow say whether this is "arbitrary" and "despotic" or not, as he charges Mr. George's plan with being.)

The speculator, however, is only taxed on the prairie value of his farm, or say $2 per year. Yet he has the same power over the land he holds that Tom Clark has over his. He has the power of excluding others from it. Then why should he not pay as much for the privilege of holding it idle as Tom Clark does for improving his. Other hard working farmers like Tom Clark settle in the neighborhood, and by their common energy and toil will add yearly to the value of the speculator's land. But will they get any benefits from this increase in the value of his land, which they themselves have caused. Will the speculator give them any of this unearned increment which they themselves have produced? Not at all. But on the contrary, should one of these farmers desire to enlarge the boundaries of his farm, or settle his son on adjoining land, he will have to pay the speculator for the very increase of the value of the land which has resulted from his own labor on his own land, and his own presence in the community. Thus the speculator gets something for nothing, and it is at this Mr. George's plan is aimed

Tax unimproved land as much as you tax improved land, and speculators will be compelled either to put it to some use, or abandon it. Working farmers like Tom Clark would be benefited.

One word more. The passages Wheelbarrow refers to in *Progress and Poverty*, and upon which he bases all his anxiety for his friend Clark, occur in discussions of the abstract question of the right of ownership as now understood; a question that must be settled in Wheelbarrow's mind before the details of the practical application can be fairly discussed. I beg to refer him to the eighth book of *Progress and Poverty* where the application of the proposed remedy is fully gone over.

MILWAUKEE, March 25, 1889. PETER MCGILL.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIII.—Continued.

Mr. Hummel was sitting in his warehouse before a battalion of new hats with broad brims and round crowns, which were placed for review before his field-marshal's eye, and he spoke reprovingly to his book-keeper:

"They are like mere barbers' basins; man is losing his dignity. At all events, we shall make profit by these coverings: no one notices the cats'-hairs of which they are made; but they rob the head of the German citizen of the last breath of fresh air that he has hitherto secretly carried about with him in his high hat. In my youth one recognized a citizen by three points: on his body he wore a coat of blue cloth, on his head a black hat, and in his pocket a great house-key, with the ring of which, in case of assault by night, he could twist the noses of assassins. Now he goes off in a gray jacket to drink his beer, opens the door of the house with a small corkscrew, and the last high hat will probably be bought up as a rarity for art collections. You may immediately put aside part of our manufacture for antiquarians."

This pleasant grumbling was interrupted by Laura, who entered eagerly, seized her father's hand with an imploring look, and drew him from his warehouse into his small office. Mr. Hummel submitted to be thus led, as patiently as Lot when the angel led him from the burning cities of the valley. When she was alone with her father she threw her arms about his neck, kissed and stroked his cheek, and for a long time could bring out nothing but "My good, noble father." Mr. Hummel was well pleased with this stormy fashion of endearment for a time.

"Now I have had enough of this caressing. What do you want? This introduction is too grand for a new parasol or a concert ticket."

"Father," cried Laura, "I know all that you have done for our neighbor. I beg your forgiveness; I, unfortunate one, have misunderstood your heart, and have many times inwardly resented your harshness."

She kissed his hands, tears falling from her eyes.

"Has that dough-face over the way been blabbing?" asked Mr. Hummel.

"He was obliged to tell me, and it was a happy moment for me. Now I will acknowledge all to you with shame and repentance. Forgive me."

She sank down before him.

"Father, I have long been sick at heart. I have thought you pitiless. Your eternal grumbling and enmity to our neighbor have made me very unhappy, and my life here has often been miserable."

Mr. Hummel sat erect and serious, but a little dismayed at the confession of his child, and he had an indistinct impression that he had carried his rough opposition too far.

"That is enough," he said; "this is all excitement and imagination. If I have been vexed through all these years, it has not done me any harm, nor the people over the way either. It is an unreasonable sorrow that now excites your lamentations."

"Have consideration for me," entreated Laura. "An irresistible longing to go forth from this narrow street, has entered my soul. Father, I would like to take a leap into the world."

"Indeed!" said Mr. Hummel. "I also should like to take a leap into it, if I only knew where this jolly world could be found."

"Father, you have often told me how light was your heart when you wandered forth as a boy from your native town, and that from these wanderings you became a man."

"That is true," replied Hummel. "It was a fine morning, and I had eight pence in my pocket. I was as lively as a dog with wings."

* Translation copyrighted.

"Father, I also should like to rove about."

"You?" asked Hummel. "I have laid aside my knapsack; there are only a few hairs remaining on it, but you may tie your boots over it; then one cannot see it."

"Good father, I also want to go out and seek my way among strangers, and look out for what will please me. I will try my powers, and fight my may with my own hands."

"You must put on breeches," said Hummel; "you cannot otherwise go alone in your wanderings."

"I will take some one with me," answered Laura, softly.

"Our maid Susan? She can carry a lantern for you. The paths in this world are sometimes muddy."

"No, father; I mean the Doctor."

She whispered to him:

"I want the Doctor to elope with me."

"Ah, you little spider!" cried Hummel, amazed. "The Doctor elope with you! If you were to elope with him, there would be more sense in it."

"That's just what I want to do," replied Laura.

"Mutually, then!" said Hummel. "Listen: the matter becomes serious. Leave off embracing me, keep your hands away, and make a face beseeming a citizen's daughter and not an actress."

He pushed her down on the window-seat.

"Now speak to the point. So you intend to carry off the Doctor? I ask you, with what means? For your pocket-money will not reach far, and he over the way has not much to spare for such Sunday pleasures? I ask you, will you first marry him? If so, the elopement would be very suspicious, for I have never yet heard of a woman carrying off her husband by force. If you do not marry him, there is something which you must learn from your mother, and which is called modesty. Out with it!"

"I wish to have him for a husband," said Laura, softly.

"Ah, that is it, is it? and was your Doctor ready to take charge of you before marriage, and to run away with you?"

"No; he spoke as you do, and reminded me that I ought not to give you pain."

"He is occasionally humane," replied Hummel; "I am indeed indebted to him for his good intentions. Finally, I ask you, where will you carry him off to?"

"To Bielstein, father. There is the church in which Ilse was married."

"I understand," said Hummel, "ours are too large; and what afterwards? Do you mean to work as a day-laborer on the estate?"

"Father, if we could but travel," said Laura, imploringly.

"Why not," replied Mr. Hummel, ironically; "to America, perhaps, as colleagues of Knips junior? You are as mad as a March hare. The legitimate and only daughter of Mr. Hummel will run away from her father and mother, from a comfortable house and flourishing business, with her neighbor's only son, who is in his way also legitimate, to a fools' paradise. I never could have thought that this hour would arrive."

He paced up and down.

"Now hear your father. If you had been a boy I would have had you well thrashed; but you are a girl, and your mother has formed you according to her principles. Now I perceive with regret that we have allowed you to have your own way too much, and that you may be unhappy for your whole life. You have got the Doctor into your head, and you might as well have fixed upon a tragic hero or a prince, and it shocks me to think of it."

"But I have not thought of such," replied Laura, dejectedly; "for I am my father's daughter."

Hummel laid hold of the plaits of her hair and examined them critically:

"Obstinacy; but the mixture is not throughout the same; there is something of higher womanliness with it; fancifulness, and whimsical ideas. That is the misfortune; here a powerful stroke of the brush is necessary."

These words he repeated several times, and sat down thoughtfully on his chair.

"So you wish for my consent to this little elopement. I give it you upon one condition. The affair shall remain between us two; you shall do nothing without my consent, and even your mother must not know that you have spoken to me of it. You shall take a drive into the world, but in my way. For the rest, I thank you for this present that you have made me on my birthday. You are a pretty violet for me to have brought up! Has one ever heard of such a plant taking itself by the head and tearing itself out of the ground?"

Laura embraced him again, and wept.

"Do not set your pump again in motion," cried Mr. Hummel, untouched, "that cannot help either of us. A happy journey, Miss Hummel."

Laura, however, did not go, but remained clinging to his neck. The father kissed her on the forehead.

"Away with you; I must consider with what brush I shall stroke you smooth."

Laura left the room. Mr. Hummel sat alone for a long time by his desk, holding his head with both hands. At last he began to whistle in a low tone the old Dessauer—a sign to the book-keeper, who was entering, that soft feelings had the upper hand with him.

"Go across to the Doctor, and beg him to take the trouble of coming over to me immediately."

The Doctor entered the office. Mr. Hummel rummaged in his desk and brought out a little paper.

"Here, I return you the present that you once made me."

The Doctor opened it, and two little gloves lay within.

"You may give these gloves to my daughter on the day on which you are married to her, and you can tell her they come from her father, from whom she has run away."

He turned away, approached the window, and thrummed on the pane.

"I have already told you before, Mr. Hummel, that I will not take back these gloves. Least of all will I do it for this purpose. If the happy day is ever to come to me when I can take Laura to my home, it will only be when you put your daughter's hand in mine. I beg you, dear Mr. Hummel, to keep these gloves until that day."

"Much obliged," replied Hummel; "you are a miserable Don Juan. I am in duty bound," he continued, in his usual tone, "to communicate to you what is of fitting importance to you. My daughter Laura wishes to elope with you."

"What now disturbs Laura," answered the Doctor, "and has given her these wild thoughts, is no secret to you. She feels herself oppressed by the unpleasant relations which subsist between us. I hope this excitement will pass away."

"May I be allowed to ask the modest question, whether it is your intention to agree to her plan?"

"I will not do it," rejoined the Doctor.

"Why not?" asked Hummel, coldly. "I for my part, have no objection to it."

"That is one reason the more for me not to act inconsiderately by you, nor to be treated in a like manner."

"I can bequeath my money to the hospital."

"To this remark I have only one answer," replied the Doctor. "You yourself do not believe that this consideration influences my actions."

"Unfortunately not," replied Hummel; "you are both unpractical people. So you hope that I will at last give you my blessing without an elopement?"

"Yes, I do hope it," exclaimed the Doctor. "However you may wish to appear to me, I trust that the goodness of your heart will be greater than your aversion."

"Do not count upon my indulgence, Doctor. I do not believe that I shall ever prepare a marriage-feast for you. My child gives herself with confidence into your hands; take her."

"No, Mr. Hummel," replied the Doctor, "I shall not do it."

"Has my daughter sunk so much in value because she is ready to become your wife?" asked Mr. Hummel, bitterly, and with a rough voice. "The poor girl has acquired some notions among her learned acquaintances, which do not suit the simple life of her father."

"That is unjust towards us all, and also towards our absent friends," said the Doctor, indignantly. "What now distracts Laura is only a petty enthusiasm; there is still in her some of the childish poetry of her early girlhood. He who loves her may have perfect confidence in her pure soul. Only in one respect must he maintain a firm judgment in dealing with her; he must here and there exercise a mild criticism. But I should be unworthy of the love of her pure heart if I should agree to a hasty proceeding, which would at a later period occasion her pain. Laura shall not do what is unbecoming to her."

"So that is Hindoo," replied Mr. Hummel; "there is a spark of sound common sense in your Botocudens and Brahmins. Do your learned books also find an excuse for a daughter not feeling happy in the house of her parents?"

"That is your fault alone, Mr. Hummel," replied the Doctor.

"Oho!" said Mr. Hummel; "so that's it."

"Forgive me my plain speaking," continued the Doctor. "It is the fashion of Laura's father to play the tyrant a little in his family, in spite of all his love for them. Laura has from her childhood been accustomed to view your strange nature with fear; therefore she does not form the impartial conception of your character, nor feel the pleasure in your mischievous humors that those not so intimately acquainted enjoy. If you had seen Laura's transport when I made known to her what you had done for my father, you would never doubt her heart. Now she is overcome with anguish about our future. But you may be assured, if Laura were to give in to her fancy and separate herself from her parents' house, she would soon feel gnawing repentance and longing for her parents. Therefore, the man for whom she would now make this sacrifice acts not only honorably, but also prudently, in resisting it."

Mr. Hummel looked fiercely at the Doctor.

"There is the old bear tied to a stake, the young puppies pull at his fur, and the cocks crow over his head. Take warning by my fate; under all circumstances avoid having female offspring." He put his hand upon the gloves, packed them up again, smoothed the paper, and shut them in his writing-desk. "Thus shall I lock up again my unnatural child; for the rest I remain your devoted servant. So your old Hindoos tell you that I am a droll screech-owl, and a jolly *bon-vivant* to strangers. Is that your opinion of my natural propensities?"

"You are not quite so innocent," replied the Doctor, with a bow. "To me you have been always particularly rude."

"There is no one I would rather wrangle with than with you," acknowledged Mr. Hummel.

The Doctor bowed, and said:

"When you play with other men as with cats, they only bear such treatment because they perceive good intentions under your cross-grained exterior. I can say this to you, because I am one of the few men to whom you have shown real dislike; and, as you are also obstinate, I know very well that I shall still have to have many a tilt with you, and I am not at all sure how it will end between us. That, however, does not prevent my acknowledging the bitter amiability of your nature."

"I object to any further enlightenment as to my real character," exclaimed Mr. Hummel. "You have a disagreeable way of viewing your fellowmen microscopically. I protest against your painting me like a flea in the shadow on the wall. As concerns your proceedings as my daughter's lover, I am content with them. You do not choose to take my child in the way in which she is to be had; I thank you for your scruples. In this matter we are entirely of the same opinion, and you therefore shall not have her at all."

The Doctor wished to interrupt him, but Hummel waved his hand.

"All further talk is useless; you renounce my daughter, but you preserve the esteem of her father, and you have moreover the feeling of acting for the best for Laura. As you feel such great uprightness, you may console yourself with it. You will devote yourself to celibacy, and I should envy you, if it were not for the consideration of Madame Hummel."

"This will not avail, Mr. Hummel," replied the Doctor; "I have not the least intention of renouncing Laura's hand."

"I understand," replied Mr. Hummel; "you wish to besiege my daughter still, from across the street. This quiet pleasure I can, unfortunately no longer allow, for I am certainly of opinion that Laura must at some time leave my house; and as you have chosen the good opinion of the father rather than the daughter, we will confer on this point in mutual understanding. You are mistaken if you think that my daughter Laura will give up her fancies upon wise admonition. Have you not sometimes appealed to my conscience? It was all that could be expected, considering your age; but it has been of no avail with me. It will be the same with this obstinate child. Therefore I am, as a father, of opinion that we must give in to a certain degree to the folly of my child. Consider how far you can go to please us. She wishes to join the Professor's wife. She shall not go to this capital where my lodger has no home, but she has frequently been invited to Bielstein."

The Doctor answered:

"I have urgent reasons for going to my friend during the next few days. I will gladly make a detour by Bielstein, if you will allow me to accompany Laura on this journey, I shall make no secret of its purpose, —and least of all to my parents."

"This elopement is so shabby that, were I a girl, I should be ashamed of taking part in it. But one must not expect too much of you. I will not be at home when this departure takes place: you see, that is natural. I have already made my plans concerning my child's future. I give her over to you for the journey with confidence."

"Mr. Hummel," exclaimed the Doctor, disquieted, "I ask for still greater confidence. How have you decided concerning Laura's future?"

"As you have determined to show me such respect, I beg you will be content with the confidential intimation, that I have no intention of making you any such communication. You preserve my esteem, and I my daughter. My compact is concluded."

"But the compact is not quite satisfactory to me, Mr. Hummel," answered the Doctor.

"Hold your tongue. If in consequence of this agreement your resume your theatrical career, I should advise you never to act the *rôle* of lover. The audiences will run out of all the doors. Do I treat people like cats?—So I treated your father and his flowers this morning. You can give him an intimation of that. My wife has plucked to-day a few roosters for my birthday; if roasting these namesakes of yours does not exite painful feelings in you, it will give me pleasure to see you at dinner. You will not be under the embarrassment of having to talk only to my daughter, for the family clown is invited: he will keep up the conversation—you may be silent. Good morning, Doctor."

The Doctor again stretched out his hand to him. Mr. Hummel shook it, grumbling all the while. When he was again alone in his office the melody of the old Dessauer again sounded in the narrow room, now brisk and hearty. Then, soon after, Mr. Hummel broke forth with the second of the two airs—"the Dear Violet"—to which he had recourse when in an unconstrained humor. At last he mixed up the drumming of the Dessauer with "the Dear Violet" in an artistic medley. The book-keeper, who knew that this *pot pourri* betokened a state of the highest spring warmth, popped his face, smiling respectfully, into the office.

"You may come to dinner to day," said Mr. Hummel, graciously.

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

FRENCH TRAITS: A Study in Comparative Criticism. *W. C. Brownell.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

Mr. Brownell, in this series of collected essays, has attempted a logical analysis of the prominent traits of French character. The inconsistent features of Gallic life—inconsistent at least to the Anglo-Saxon—are brought into harmony by a reference to fundamental principles which have determined the civilization of the French people. The instinct that dominates France is distinctly social, propounds Mr. Brownell, as a thesis; the French have little individual life; manners are more than character, etc. This principle is traced by the author in every phase of the life of the nation. He quotes the words of Gambetta who says, 'There are no questions but social questions.' Their morality, their art, their government, and their women are explainable by that apothegm.

Mr. Brownell's "Study in Comparative Criticism" undoubtedly is entertaining and instructive: the chapters on "Intelligence," "Women," "The Art Instinct" may be cited. We feel at times, however, the presence of an effort to find more in the subject than its nature admits; the method is often one of hyper-analysis; the ideas become blunted by the frequency of their application. The essays were not originally intended for simultaneous publication, which may account for unavoidable repetition. *μκρκ.*

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. By *Francis N. Thorpe*, Ph.D. Philadelphia: Eldredge & Bro.

The work of Prof. Thorpe—of the ordinary school-book size—is adapted peculiarly to class-room purposes. It contains much material, statistical and explanatory. In addition to the "State Papers" usually contained in such works, the author has incorporated "The Mayflower Compact," "The First Declaration of Rights," and "The Emancipation Proclamation." An instructive feature is the map showing the various acquisitions of land made by the United States since 1783, as are also the diagrams illustrative of the divisions of the public domain into townships and sections. We believe the work well fitted, upon the whole, for instruction in schools. There are to be found, however, and particularly in the introductory chapters, many metaphysical generalities respecting the nature of government and rights, that the uncritical minds of young scholars, who rely implicitly on the teachings of such a work, are not competent to analyze and interpret. The impressions thus received often form the foundation of erroneous political opinions which in later life it is hopeless to confute. The definitions of "Communism" and "Socialism," on page 234, might, we think, be made more conformable to the truth contained in the leading principles of these doctrines; some of the most salutary institutions of Europe and America are communistic and socialistic in core, however they may be styled. *μκρκ.*

ESSAYS RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, POLITICAL. *David Atwood Wasson.* Boston: Lee & Shephard. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

About one third of the volume "Essays Religious, Social, etc.," is taken up with a biographical sketch from the pen of the editor, Mr. O. B. Frothingham. David Atwood Wasson was born in 1823, in Maine, and came of a sturdy and respected Scotch-Irish family. His boyhood life is told in an autobiography, abounding in artistically arranged incidents, where the serious verges into the comical. New England religious discipline evidently was not to his taste: "It was Calvinism to which all the heaviest sorrows of my childhood were due. Calvinism that glowers upon all natural joy, that denies to human being any intrinsic worth, to human culture any permanent use, to human perfection any loveliness in heaven's eye;—Calvinism was the curse of my young life." Yet "my case was not so bad," for Mr. Wasson had a father of sterling character and a mother from whom there had always seemed to come down to him "a breath of sweetness, a beam of light too subtle for words." In 1845 he went to Bowdoin College, left in junior year, and in 1849 joined the Theological Seminary at Bangor. Two years later he was ordained pastor of an evangelical church in Groveland, Mass., where the non-conforming and heretical character of his sermons led to a violent severance of his connections with the church. An independent congregation was established in Groveland. It was a critical epoch. Parker and Emerson were shaking the spiritual world of the New England States. "The air was full of new views." Radicalism was settling down in philosophy. The slavery conflict was raging. The position assumed demanded courage, and Mr. Wasson, sensible of the heavy responsibility devolving upon him, was "stimulated to the utmost; he became one of a brilliant company of teachers."

Mr. Wasson's life was preëminently intellectual But the spiritual element predominated. His views were founded upon conviction—upon the kind of conviction that is inwardly imposed and not the conviction that logically results. Logic, with him came afterwards, to justify to others the results he had reached, never to indicate to himself the paths he was to follow. Spiritual assurances he regarded as the highest expression of truth. "The soul of man was in his speculation the centre of all belief." It was infinite in depth, "contained in God, heir to the utmost resource of His being. That is the starting point—pure spiritual unity, pure personality." Mr. Wasson was, in public life, a firm champion of "advanced thought." He sympathized with the Free Religious Association and contributed frequently to *The Radical* and *The Index*. His most finished essays appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The North American Review*, and *The Christian Examiner*. Part of the memoir is devoted to an analysis of Mr. Wasson's intellectual methods, his view of life, and of the world. The essays published are: "Nature the Prophecy of Man," "Unity," "Social Texture," "Conditions of Social Productiveness," "The Puritan Commonwealth," The New Type of Oppression," "Authority," "The Genius of Woman"; of which the last two may be mentioned as characteristic and uniting qualities of a high order of excellence. *μκρκ.*

NOTES.

The *Magazine of American History* for April contains the De Peyster portrait of Washington, never before published.

Wide Awake for April publishes a novel and graceful Easter game for young people, "The Cascaroni Dance," illustrated by Edmund H. Garrett.

St. Nicholas for April is a charming issue. The illustrations are highly creditable to the character of the text. Lieutenant W. R. Hamilton contributes an article, which will be interesting to young readers, on "Ancient and Modern Artillery." The continuation of Mr. Edmund Alton's "Routine of the Republic," forms a proper counterpart to the former.

The Century for the present month, a Centennial number, is devoted mainly to topics suggested by the inauguration of President Washington. The illustrations are rich and numerous; many are copies of unpublished prints and portraits in the possession of private families and private collections. Mr. John Bach McMaster, in "A Century of Constitutional Interpretation," traces, with a masterly hand, the origin of many political problems.

In a pamphlet of ninety-nine pages, entitled "*Pioneer Pith, The Gist of Lectures on Rationalism*," (Truth Seeker Co., New York), Mr. Robert C. Adams discusses the conditions and methods of progress in human thought. "The first essential to efficient action," says the author, "is a right conception of the universe. * * * All religions, therefore, depend upon a Cosmogony, a theory as to the origin and nature of the world."

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P. O. DRAWER F. CHICAGO, ILL.

Review of Recent Work of THE OPEN COURT.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

SENSATION AND THE OUTER WORLD...A. BINET....No. 83.

IDEALISM AND REALISM. EDITOR.....No. 84.

DREAMS, SLEEP AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

M. Binet, after having animadverted upon the impropriety of excluding metaphysical questions from the domain of science, proceeds in the above-mentioned essay to discuss the interesting question of the relation between human sensation and its normal excitant, the external world. No resemblance is predicable, maintains M. Binet, between the perceptions of consciousness and the bodies that exist beyond us. Doctrines enunciating such resemblance, the author declares fallacious, and terms them "crude and naïve realisms." This fallacy, however, is widely prevalent in science. Physicists and philosophers still hold that the definitive explanation of natural phenomena is a mechanical explanation, wherein the concepts of mass and force are the ultimate and fundamental data. They fail to recognize, in this, the purely subjective character of sensations. They translate, merely, sensations of one kind into sensations of another kind, which seem to us more precise; thus, they explain the phenonenon of sound by the phenomenon of a vibration; merely substituting, thereby, a visual sensation for an auditory sensation. This leads the author to discuss the supreme importance of the visual sense in the investigation of phenomena; the possibility of a purely auricular science is held forth; the author shows that the ear, by noting the *qualities* of sound, can solve *numerical* problems. Thus, the progression of human knowledge is accompanied by a progresion of human capabilities. The future will transform our sciences; it may transform our senses.

Sensation and the phenomena of the external world, it is granted, *are* different. But does it follow that knowledge of external objects is therefore impossible? The electrical phenomenon traversing the wire of a telephone bears no resemblance to the spoken words thrown against the mouth-piece in the shape of air-waves; no more so than does sensation the external object. Yet is communication by means of a telephone impossible? *Are* not the spoken words reproduced at the other end of the line in substantially the form in which they were received? *Preservation of form* is all that is necessary; and this is possible even where there is no superficial resemblance. It is a contradiction to demand that knowledge should be other than it is. Cognition does not, and *need* not, go beyond sensation.

In Numbers 82 and 83 two interesting letters appear, discussing questions raised by the articles of Dr. G. M. Gould upon Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness—practical studies upon the psychology of consciousness.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE.

ETHICAL EVOLUTION. PROF. E. D. COPE.....No. 82.

The utilitarian theory of morals, says the distinguished author has found in the law of evolution a permanent substantiation. Yet does that doctrine embrace the *whole* truth, does it embody exclusively the law of human ethical progress? Ethical conduct, it is true, is an outgrowth of natural mental constitution; it differs among individuals, among families, among races; physical necessities, and conditions of environment direct it. But the knowledge of right is an intellectual faculty. Ethical life expresses, further, the highest development of humanity. Accordingly, moral conduct has *various* phrases of evolution: the rational as well as the natural, the individual as well as the social; to which corresponding motives of utility, egoism, and altruism belong. We find these motives interacting, each predominant in their respective spheres. The rational element has found its expression in generalization, in the formation by far seeing men of ethical codes; the affectional element, the element of Love, has found its expression in beneficent altruism, wherein the filial relation to God forms an abiding motive to action. The faculty of reason and the sentiment of love ensure ethical perfection.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS. FELIX L. OSWALD, M.D. Nos. 81, 84.

Interesting essays in moral physiology, abounding in citations from history and science in support of the positions taken.

NEWS ABOUT THE PLANETS AND THE MOON.....No. 80.

This constitutes a survey of the latest astronomical observations. It includes a brief account of the canals on the surface of Mars, with their various attendant phenomena; the rotation of Jupiter; the temperature of the moon; and the strange light-phenomena recently observed in the neighborhood of Saturn.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW .....No. 73

CORBESPONDENCE UPON THE DOCTRINE OF HENRY GEORGE..... Nos. 79, 80, 82, 84.

The criticisms by Wheelbarrow, touching the doctrines of Henry George, have evoked much comment and discussion. The main bulk of the correspondence relative to this question, remains still unpublished; showing the wide-spread interest taken in the subject, and the undoubted popularity of Mr. George's theories. The main endeavor of our correspondents seems directed towards demonstrating Wheelbarrows ignorance and misunderstanding of the great economist's position. This Wheelbarrow seeks to refute in a letter in No. 82.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DILEMMA OF DOUBLE ALLEGIANCE. GEN M. M TRUMBULL.... .....No. 81.

The article by Gen. Trumbull is opportune. Its tone and position is commendable. Amid the chauvinistic fanfaronade of demagogic statesmen and bellicose newspapers, evoked by petty irritations over Samoa coal-stations and bait for cod-fish, the thoughtful citizen of foreign birth must often feel the appalling meaning that the problem of double allegiance embodies. "What is the ethics of patriotism that must guide us in case of actual war?" "The duty of men embarassed by the ties of double allegiance," says Gen. Trumbull, "is to stand bravely by the republic whatever comes, but they ought to unite their moral and political influence to promote the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful arbitration." The question has excited much comment from the press throughout the country.

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MAKING BREAD DEAR.

A CRITICISM OF WHEELBARROW, BY A SYMPATHIZER.

In Number 78 of your paper, I read an article signed "Wheelbarrow." Too easily affected perhaps by the unfortunate condition of my fellow-men, I was greatly moved by the description given by Wheelbarrow of the hard lines in which his life is set. To be forever pushing a wheelbarrow at the meagre remuneration of $1.25 per day, with a hard taskmaster standing near (at much higher wages per diem), forever crying, "Fill up the barrow," is indeed an unhappy lot. But this is only part of the picture he drew. While he secures for his toil only the small wages attaching to this most common kind of human labor, there is, according to him, a wicked design on the part of those superior to him in position, to render his pittance the most inadequate for his numerous wants, by artificially raising the prices of those things which his necessity demands.

My heart burned with indignation as I read his eloquent, if somewhat ambiguous, indictment of society; for he is truly eloquent, and when I read his glowing words, I wondered why he did not turn his attention to the Bar, the Pulpit, or the Press, because in either of these his mental gifts give promise of success; and by his own confession, pushing a wheelbarrow is hard, monotonous, and unprofitable work. But this reflection made the contrast between what he might have been, and what he is, the more painful, and served only to aggravate the wickedness of those who try to oppress him. With these thoughts in mind I read again his pungent article. On the second reading, doubts arose in my mind. I asked myself the question, "Is this the statement of real fact, or is it a sketch in which a fervid imagination has outrun sober fact and reasonable judgment?" This I determined to ascertain if possible. I took the following extracts as fairly representative of his chief grievances, and said: "If I find this true, I will take his statement for the other specifications."

"All through the summer time, Nature, the bounteous mother, covers our share of the earth with a carpet of grain, resplendent in green and gold, while *bands of criminals are permitted by the law to discount it and corner it, to bewitch it, and bedevil it, that it may become costly and scarce to the workingman.* The guilty profit goes to them, and with it they corrupt our laws in the very capitol where they are made.

"While one gang of food gamblers raises the price of bread, *another gang raises the price of meat.* * * * As making bread dear is morally a crime, let us make it a crime by law; let us build new penitentiaries to accommodate those vermin of trade who make dear the food of the poor. They are the lineal descendants of the sordid Egyptian speculators who tried to corner all the corn in Egypt, because there was a famine in the land of Canaan."

Determined to be thorough in my examination of the matter, I called upon a farmer friend, showed him the article, and asked if the farmers were engaged in the wicked combination. He replied: "I know of no combination to make wheat or flour high. I do know that the price is very low—so low as to afford the farmer but little remuneration for his toil. Statistics prove that the average pay to the farmer is about 82 cents per day, or about two-thirds of what Wheelbarrow earns, and the truth is that many from the country are moving into the city to secure, if possible, a more remunerative job, such as Wheelbarrow enjoys." I then called upon a miller who I know is honest. He said: "There is no combination among millers. On the contrary, competition is very fierce. If we get 25 cents per barrel for the use of our mill, and the risk we take, we are satisfied. In fact we do not average so much."

I had anticipated about this form of reply from facts already within my knowledge, and therefore was not much disappointed that in these two places—the farm and the mill—Wheelbarrow's trouble did not originate.

I then went to the Board of Trade. I visited a man, not an operator himself, but well acquainted with all the course of trade and speculation in the form of cereal and other product dealt in in this market.

He read the accusation of Wheelbarrow and said:

"This kind of loose talk is hard to answer. It has no real foundation in fact. The only reply possible, is to set forth the real facts; and that requires a great many more words than it is necessary to use in accusing a man of murder, conspiracy, or other crime. No one wants to make bread dear; no one wants to make it cheap. The speculator operates to make *money*. He

buys hoping for a *rise*, or he sells for future delivery hoping for a *decline*. There can be no buyer without a seller, and no seller without a buyer. If the short seller was too numerous, grain would go down, and bread would be cheap; but the agriculturalist would suffer, and if this influence continued long enough, he would cease to raise wheat, when a reaction would ensue, wheat would be scarce and high, and bread would become dear.

"Against this influence, the speculative buyer offers the only barrier. He is handicapped at the beginning by charges and expenses from which the short seller is free, *i. e.*, if he buys and carries wheat or other property, he is subjected to the cost of storage, interest, insurance, and the risk of deterioration in quality. Both the buyer and the seller are governed by their conclusions, reached from the best examination they can make of the present and prospective quantity of grain, as compared with the present and prospective demand for it, whether for home consumption or foreign exportation.

"One immediate effect of the operations described is to make a continuous cash market for all products so dealt in, and the two forces, it may be safely asserted, operate to bring the average price of wheat to a fair equilibrium under the law of supply and demand. At least it is true that in an open market such as usually exists, the current price is an expression of the agreed opinion of the world as to the fair value of the article. I say world, because the world trades in our market. If the price is for a moment higher than any individual trader's opinion of the real price he will offer for sale, and thus affect the price downward. If he thinks it too low, he will buy in the market, and thus influence the market upward. The opinions thus backed by monied risk, are much superior to the *ex parte* notion of Wheelbarrow, or any other person who merely stands off and looks on.

"I might go on and speak about 'corners' so-called," my informant continued, "but perhaps I have said enough."

No, I replied, it is about corners that I especially want to hear, for I suspect that there, if anywhere, will be found the true occasion for Wheelbarrow's severe strictures.

"Well," he said, "I will tell you all I know about them. I have already spoken about an open market, meaning by that a market which is under no individual's or syndicate's control. Now, it occasionally happens, at infrequent intervals, that some one man, or a small group acting together, will take advantage of a moment when the actual stock of wheat or provisions in store is small, and secretly buy it all. With the actual property thus in possession, they will make contracts of purchase with the unsuspecting seller for future delivery. When the contract is due, the seller must buy in what he had previously sold, but as the stock is already in his adversary's hands, he can buy only of him, and at his price. The short seller is thus occasionally caught and put in chancery by the wily, and perhaps unscrupulous, dealer, who has thus cornered the market.

"But in the nature of things, such a condition must be of short duration. The operator who has cornered the market must buy all that comes. The advancing price, which is its inseparable feature, brings into the market the reserve from all points, and under the rapidly increasing load, the cornerer usually finds himself unable to continue to buy, and is at last obliged to let go of his holdings, suffers enormous losses, and frequently involves himself in ruin.

"Some years ago, Jim Keene, of New York, tried the game. He lost two millions of dollars or more. Afterward McGeoch tried it. His losses amounted to millions, and he retired a ruined man. Ten years ago, a Cincinnati clique tried it. They lost enormously, and some of those interested are now in the penitentiary, where Wheelbarrow says they belong. But those are episodes. They are like raids in the rear of an army, or piratical excursions over ordinary peaceful seas. Their influence is so brief they seldom affect the price of the product to the actual consumer.

"As an illustration; in a celebrated pork corner some three years ago, the price for regular delivery on change rose to $35 per barrel, but the consumer could buy for use or shipment to other parts of the country for $14 per barrel in any quantity he desired. This is a brief, but substantial statement of the fact. They cannot be said to make bread dear as Wheelbarrow alleges, for in a swing of months or years, their influence is next to nil in that direction."

Having thus exhausted the chief specification of Wheelbarrow, I did not pursue the question into other fields. My own mind was greatly relieved, and I have thought others among your sympathizing readers might be similarly affected by this perusal.

Part of Wheelbarrow's unhappiness arises from the alleged fact that since "I first worked with the wheelbarrow * * * wealth has multiplied fourfold or more. Of that multiplied wealth I get no share at all." Now, he might be asked in what way he has contributed to increase wealth fourfold. As a wheeler of earth, has his power increased fourfold, or even doubled, over his predecessor in the same line a thousand years ago? He can walk no faster, he is no stronger, and he works fewer hours than his brother laborer of a century ago. By what right then can he demand that he share in an increase which he did not contribute to produce? As a matter of fact, however, he *has* shared in the larger productivity which society as a whole has

brought about. When he went to railroading, "my wages was a dollar a day; it is now from a dollar and a quarter to a dollar and a half." This itself is a gain of from 25 to 50 per cent., and if he will take note of the table of prices for the things which he consumes, he will find the purchasing power of his dollars has increased.

I dislike to characterize his essay in unfriendly terms, but it is that kind of writing, now so much in vogue from labor agitators and would-be reformers, which hurts the cause it would help, confuses the true issues, obscures sound judgment, and helps to paralyze the efforts of those who would gladly aid the humbler members of society to attain a better hold on life.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE VEDA, AND THE HINDU EPIC.

BY H. OLDENBERG.

We may say, that the greatest undertakings planned and the most important results achieved in the field of Sanskrit research, are linked with the names of German investigators. If we add that this could not easily be otherwise, it is not from national vanity; we should but express the actual facts of the case, based upon the development of the science. It was natural that the first movements toward the founding of Hindu research, the first attempts to grasp the vastly accumulated material and find provisional forms for it, should have been the work of Englishmen, men who spent a good part of their lives in India, and were there brought in constant contact with native Sanskrit scholars. But not less natural was it that the honor of instituting further progress and gaining a deeper insight should be accorded to Germans. The two fields of knowledge by which, especially, life and power were imparted to Hindu investigations were and are essentially German. These are comparative grammar, which we may say was founded by Bopp, and that profound and potent science, or perhaps more correctly expressed art, of philology, which was practiced by Gottfried Hermann, and likewise by Karl Lachmann, the enthusiastic follower of Lessing—an art full of acute and purposeful ability, exact and truthful in small matters as in great. Representatives of this philology, moved to antipathy by many characteristic features of the Hindu spirit, and not the least influenced by the assertion that Latin and Greek grammar has this or that to learn from the Sanskrit, might meet the new science of India with reserve or more than reserve. Still this could in no wise alter the truth that the study of Hindu texts, the investigation of Hindu literary remains, could be learned from no better teachers than from those masters who had succeeded in improving and interpreting the classical texts with unerring certainty and excellence of method.

It was a Leipsic disciple of Hermann and Haupt who, at the instigation of Burnouf, in 1845, in Paris, conceived the plan of publishing the Rig Veda with the commentary of its Hindu expounder, the abbot Sayana, who flourished in the 14th century after Christ. This was the great work of Max Müller, the first of of those fundamental undertakings on which Vedic philology rests. It was necessary above all to know how the Brahmins themselves translated the hymns of their forefathers, which were preserved in the Rig Veda, from the Vedic language into current Sanskrit, and how they solved the problems which the grammar of the Veda presented, by the means their own grammatical system offers. Herein lay the indispensable foundation of all further investigation. It was necessary to weigh the Hindu *traditions* concerning the explanation of the Veda, which erred in underestimation as well as overestimation, and to test the consequences of both errors, in order finally to learn the art of scientifically estimating them. This constitutes the great importance of Max Müller's work extending through a quarter of a century (1849–1874). To complete was easy, but to begin was exceedingly difficult; for most of the grammatical and theological texts which formed the basis for Sayana's deductions, were, when Max Müller began the work, books sealed with seven seals.

A few years after the first volume of Max Müller's Rig Veda appeared, two other scholars united in a work of still greater magnitude. It has long since become to all Sanskritists the most indispensable tool for their labors. I refer to the Sanskrit dictionary, compiled under the commission of the Academy of St. Petersburg, Russia, by Roth and Böhtlingk. It was intended to make a dictionary for a language the greatest and most important part of whose texts were still not in print. The work was similar to that which the Grimm Brothers began at the same time for the German language. Roth undertook the Vedic literature, the foundation of the whole; Böhtlingk the later periods. Friendly investigators, and especially Weber, helped them by bringing into use the known and accessible texts or manuscripts that were serviceable to them. The most important thing was, that the Veda had now for the first time—setting aside a few previous studies—to be gone through with a view to lexicography. The explanations which the Hindus themselves were wont to give of the words of the Vedic language were regarded as a valuable aid for understanding it. But the matter did not rest here. "We do not hold it," said the two compilers in their preface, "to be our task to acquire that understanding of the Veda which was current in India some centuries ago; but we seek the sense which the poets themselves gave to their hymns and maxims." They undertook "to get

at the sense from the texts themselves, by collating all the passages related in word or meaning." In this way they hoped to re-establish the meaning of each word, not as a colorless conception, but in its separateness and therefore in its strength and beauty. The Veda was thus to re acquire its living sense, the full wealth of its expression. The thought of the earliest antiquity was to appear to us in new forms full of life and reality.

The execution of this work, carried on with tenacious industry and brilliant success for four and twenty years (1852–1875), did not fall short of the magnitude of the plan originally conceived. In minor points we find it easy to point out numerous deficiencies and errors. The two compilers well knew that without that spirit of boldness which does not stand in fear of unavoidable errors, it were better never to undertake their task. In face, however, of the great value of that which they have accomplished, all faults sink into insignificance.

What a chasm separates their work from that of their predecessor, Wilson!* In Wilson's work there is little more than a fair enumeration of the meanings which Hindu traditions assigned to the words; for his dictionary the Veda scarcely exists, if it does so at all. Here in the work of Roth and Böhtlingk on the other hand, is brought to light the immense wealth, replete with oriental splendor, of the richest of all languages; the history of each word, and likewise the fortunes that have befallen it in the different periods of the literature and have determined its meaning, are brought before our eyes. The difference between the two great periods in which the development of Hindu research falls, could not be incorporated more clearly than in these two dictionaries. In the one instance are found the beginnings, which English science, resting immediately on the shoulders of the Indian pandits, has made; in the other is the continuation of English work conducted by strict philological methods to a breadth and depth incomparably beyond those beginnings, and at the head of this undertaking stand German scholars.

To Müller's great edition of the Rig Veda and to the St. Petersburg Dictionary further investigations have been added in great abundance, and these have more and more extended the limits of our knowledge of the Veda. Already a new generation of laborers have taken their places beside the original pioneers in these once so impassable regions. As a whole, or in its separate parts, the Rig Veda has been repeatedly translated. Its equipment of words and forms has been studied from ever new points of view and with ever new questions in mind. To many a picturesque word of the strong, harsh Vedic language its full weight has thus been given back.

The principles and practices according to which the old collectors and revisers of the Veda text proceeded, have been examined by us; and consequently we are able to decide what they have received as remains and what they themselves have incorporated into those remains. The readings of the passages quoted from the Rig Veda in the other Vedas have been collected in order to find in them the remains of the genuine and oldest textual form. The religion and mythology of the Veda have been described; the national lives of the Vedic tribes has been portrayed in all its phases. The texts afford the data for such a portraiture of these features that it has justly been said that the description given surpasses in clearness and accuracy Tacitus's account of the national life of the Germans.* Finally an attempt has been made—or rather an attempt will have to be made, for even at this time the work is in its beginnings—to discover amid the masses of Vedic prayers and sacrificial hymns something which must be an especially welcome find to scientific curiosity—the beginning of the Indian Epic.†

In a time so rich in poetry and reverence for poetry as the epoch of the Rig Veda was, the pleasure of romancing must also have produced its blossom of poetic fancy. Undoubtedly this was so. Short narratives, short hymns must then have existed, enclosed, as it were, in narrow frames. Thus, in general, are the beginnings of epic poetry shaped, before poetic ability rises and ventures to narrate in wider scope and with more complicated structure the fate of men and heroes. It seemed as though those beginnings of the Indian epic were lost. And still they were preserved, though to be sure in a peculiarly fragmentary form. In the Rig Veda there is many a medley of apparently disconnected verses in which we have thought to discover the accumulated sweepings of poetic workshops. In fact they are fragmentary remains of epic narratives, verses, which were once couched in prose form—narratives in prose, and speeches and counter-speeches in verse, just as, often, in Grimm's fairy-tales when the poor daughter of the king or the powerful dwarf has to speak an especially weighty or touching word, a rhyme or two appears.

Now, the Vedic tale-tellers impressed in their memory only the verses having a fixed form. Each new narrator would repeat the prose with new words, and finally its subject-matter would pass almost wholly

* Wilson's dictionary appeared in 1819; a second edition in 1832.

* H. Zimmer: *Altindisches Leben; die Cultur der vedischen Arier.* (Ancient Indian Life; the Civilization of the Vedic Aryans.) Berlin: 1879, p. vii.

† The remarks here made on the beginnings of the Indian Epic, rest on conceptions which I have before briefly sought to establish. V. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellsch.*, 1885, p. 52, et seq.

into forgetfulness, so that only the verses would survive, sometimes as a series of dialogues, long and copious enough for us to understand their connection with the whole, and sometimes as unrecognizable fragments, which supply as little respecting their antecedents and connections in which they belong as—to keep the same comparison as above—a couple of rhymes in one of Grimm's fairy-tales would represent of the whole tale.

It may be permitted, for the sake of making clear what has been said, to cite here a passage from one of those old narratives whose connection, at least as a whole, may be conjecturally determined.* The scene is between gods and demons, its subject is the great battle which was fought in heaven, the thunder fight, which for the strife-loving spirit of that age was the pattern of their own victories. Vritra, the envious fiend, kept the waters of the clouds in captivity, that they might not pour down upon the earth; but God Indra smote the demon with his thunderbolt and let the liberated waters flow. Indra—this must have been said in the lost prose introduction to the narrative—felt, as he entered the battle, too weak for his terrible opponent. The gods, faint-hearted, withdrew from his side. Only one offered himself as an ally, Vâyu (the wind),† the swiftest of the gods, but he demanded as a reward for his fidelity, part of the sacrificial draught of Soma, which men offer to Indra. Vâyu speaks:

"Tis I. I come to thee the foremost, as is meet;
Behind me march in full array, the Gods.
Givest thou me, O Indra, but a share of sacrifice,
And thou shalt do, with my alliance, valiant deeds of might."

Indra accepted the alliance:

"Of the honied draught I give thee the first portion;
Thine shall it be; for thee shall be pressed the Soma.
Thou shalt stand as friend at my right hand;
Then shall we slay the serried hosts of our foe."

Then a new person appears, a human singer. We know not whether a definite one among the great saints of that early time, the prophets of the later generation of singers, was thought of or not. He wished to praise Indra; but can Indra now be praised? The hostile demon is not yet conquered; doubts as to Indra and his might come to the singer. He says to his people:

"A song of praise bring ye who long for a blessing,
If truth be truth, sing ye the praise of Indra."

"There is no Indra," then said many a one,
"Who saw him? Who is he whom we shall praise?"

Then Indra himself gives answer to the weak-hearted:

"Here stand I before thee, look hither, O Singer;
In lofty strength I tower above all beings.
The laws of sacred order make me strong;
I, the smiter, smite the worlds."

The confidence of the pious in their God is restored, his hymn of praise is sounded. And now Indra enters the conflict. The falcon has brought him the Soma, and in the intoxication of the ambrosial drink, the victorious one hurls his thunderbolt at the demon. Like a tree smitten by lightning, falls the enemy. Now the waters may flow forth from their prisons:

"Now hasten forth! Scatter thyself freely!
He who detained thee is no more.
Deep into the side of Vitra has been hurled
The dreaded thunderbolt of Indra.

"Swift as thought sped Indra along;
Pierced into the citadel, the brazen.
And up to heaven, to the thunderer,
The soaring falcon bore the Soma.

"In the sea the thunderbolt rests,
Deep engulfed in the watery billows.
The flowing and ever-constant waters
To him bring generous gifts."

I pass over the difficult conclusion of the poem—the creation of language by Indra after the battle with Vitra. One fourth of the languages that exist on earth, Indra formed into clear and intelligible speech; these are the languages of men. The other three fourths, however, have remained indistinct and incomprehensible; these are the languages that quadrupeds and birds and all insects speak.

This is one of the early narratives of the Hindus concerning the deeds of their gods and heroes. We must not endeavor here, to restore the lost portions written in prose which served to connect the strophes. To make the modern reader clear as to the connection of the verses, another method of expression must be chosen than that peculiar to the narrators of the Vedic epoch. As it appears, they were content with recounting the facts they came across, or rather with recalling them to their hearers, in short and scanty sentences. The poems incorporated in the narrative—which has been shown by the poem of Indra's battle—are not wanting in flights of poetic eloquence. Without the finer shades of human life, it is true, yet in earnest, simple power, like mountains or old giant trees, stand the productions of that poetry. What took place in them, is similar, nay more than similar, to the occurrences taking place in nature. For as yet the primitive *natural* significance of those gods has not been veiled by the human vesture which they wore; and in the narratives of their deeds the great pictures of nature's life with its wonders and its terrors are generally projected. The duty of bringing together and interpreting such fragments of this the oldest epic, Vedic research must regard as its most fruitful, though perhaps not its easiest, task.

* Rig Veda 8,100. I omit a few verses of obscure meaning, and say nothing of difficulties, for which this is not the place to give a solution.

† He is also called Vâta. This name has been identified—though the correctness of this is highly questionable—with the German name Woden.

ETHICS AND NATURAL SCIENCE.

THE beginning of ethics is *thought*. The animal who cannot think or reason cannot be called an ethical being. When man begins to think, he commences to

understand his relations to others and thus learns his duties. He formulates his duties in general principles and regulates his actions according to maxims of universal application. In this way only can he place himself and his life in harmony with the order of All-existence.

When we reflect a moment upon what we owe our ancestors, we shall soon find that we owe them all we have and even more: we owe them all we *are*. What are we but the accumulated activity of all our ancestors from the very beginnings of life, the monad and the monad's struggles for existence included? Our nineteenth century civilization is not a revolution which has introduced any new idea that inverts or destroys the thoughts, ideas, or aspirations of former centuries. The most advanced view, however different from the old views, is a further evolution of the past.

The recognition of this truth is the essence of historical research, and those who are most advanced in the culture of true progress, who acknowledge the principle of scientific investigation in ethics and religion, those who are decided to modernize their morals and adapt themselves to the spirit of the dawning future, should be the first to understand this truth. Yet many radical thinkers overlook it. Through their opposition to the errors of the past they become blind to its merits. Only by understanding the connection of the present with the past will they be able to do justice to the cause which they defend, for they can gain justice for themselves only by doing justice to others, and the just claims of the present can only be established by showing that they are the logical outcome of the past.

Ethics is not, as some modern philosophers try to make us believe, an arithmetical example by which to calculate how we can purchase, at least sacrifice, the greatest amount of happiness. This barter morality of hedonism is a pseudo-ethics which indeed would make true ethics impossible.

The pseudo-ethics of hedonism starts from the wrong idea that man lives solely for being or becoming happy. If this were true, the great pessimist Schopenhauer would be right in saying that life is a failure and that existence is not desirable because a life without trouble and pain, a victory without battle, a conquest without wounds and anxiety, are impossible. Ethics is so much at variance with man's craving for happiness that if man lived merely to be happy there would be no ethics whatever. Ethics indeed is taught to counteract the dangerous, although perhaps inborn and natural, craving for happiness.

The beginning of ethics is to reflect upon ourselves, our surroundings, and our actions. Before we act we must stop to think. The brute animal follows his impulses; so does the savage. The thoughtful man takes into consideration all possible results of his action; and however dimly at first, he soon learns that his person is intimately connected with his surroundings, with his fellow-beings, and with nature.

Even a savage knows that he is no absolute entity, no unit by himself. His very existence is the product of his parents, and his life is sustained through certain natural conditions by a constant struggle in which he is aided or hindered by his fellow-men. His relation to his fellow-men, and his dependence upon nature which yields to him substance that maintains his life, teaches man that he has some duties to perform, which if neglected will prove disastrous to himself and his fellow-beings. The *relations* in which man stands to others imply *duties;* and the man who attends to these duties is moral.

When man earnestly attends to what he recognizes as his duties, he will progress and in consequence thereof his comfort and prosperity will increase. His pleasures will be more refined; his happiness, his enjoyments, and recreations will be better and nobler.

The increase, or rather refinement of happiness, however, cannot be considered as the ultimate aim of ethics, for pain and affliction increase at the same rate, because man's irritability, his susceptibility to pain, grows with the growth of his intellectuality.

The pain of a more civilized man will be more intense than that of a savage, and it is an undeniable fact that people of a lower degree of culture are as a rule merrier than the more educated classes. There is sufficient occasion in this country to observe the glad and hearty happiness of the negro, who is so easily satisfied. In comparison with the African the more cultured American of European ancestry must appear morose.

If all the advancement of our civilization had no other object than to produce a greater amount of happiness, the anthropoids would have better remained in their forests and have lived upon the tropical trees, subsisting on their fruit. They would thereby have better attained this end. Therefore we maintain that the elevation of all human emotions, whether they are painful or happy, the elevation of man's whole existence, of his actions and aspirations, is the constant aim of ethics.

* * *

THE hostility which prevails between scientists on the one side and moral teachers on the other is produced through a misunderstanding. The moral teacher, and especially the clergyman, is afraid lest science undermine the principles of ethics. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest appears to contradict the principle of morality. And the scientist in his turn does not find the moral law as it is commonly preached in the pulpit, justified in nature.

Professor Huxley says:

"From the point of view of the moralist the animal world is on about the same level as a gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight—whereby the strongest, the swiftest, and the cunningest live to fight another day. * * *

"In the cycle of phenomena presented by the life of man, no more moral end is discernible than in that presented by the lives of the wolf and of the deer. * * *

"As among these, so among primitive men, the weakest and stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other sense, survived. * * *

"The history of civilization—that is, of society—on the other hand, is the record of the attempts which the human race has made to escape from this position. * * *

"But the effort of ethical man to work toward a moral end by no means abolished, perhaps has hardly modified, the deep-seated impulses which impel the natural man to follow his non-moral course." * * *

Professor Huxley adds with special reference to the civilization of the English nation of to-day:

"We not only are, but, under penalty of starvation, we are bound to be, a nation of shopkeepers. But other nations also lie under the same necessity of keeping shop, and some of them deal in the same goods as ourselves. Our customers naturally seek to get the most and the best in exchange for their produce. If our goods are inferior to those of our competitors, there is no ground compatible with the sanity of the buyers, which can be alleged, why they should not prefer the latter. And, if that result should ever take place on a large and general scale, five or six millions of us would soon have nothing to eat. We know what the cotton famine was; and we can therefore form some notion of what a dearth of customers would be.

"Judged by an ethical standard, nothing can be less satisfactory than the position in which we find ourselves. In a real, though incomplete, degree we have attained the condition of peace which is the main object of social organization (and it may, for argument's sake, be assumed that we desire nothing but that which is in itself innocent and praiseworthy—namely, the enjoyment of the fruits of honest industry). And lo! in spite of ourselves, we are in reality engaged in an internecine struggle for existence with our presumably no less peaceful and well-meaning neighbors. We seek peace and we do not ensue it. The moral nature in us asks for no more than is compatible with the general good; the non-moral nature proclaims and acts upon that fine old Scottish family motto, 'Thou shalt starve ere I want.' Let us be under no illusion, then."

If the unitary conception of the world is true, that all existence is but one great continuous whole; that all difference is but variety in unity; that one truth is in harmony with all other truths as every part of existence is related to the whole existence of the One and All:—if this is true, how can there be a difference between the moralist's and the naturalist's views? Should we not declare *a priori* that there can be no contradictory truths? Either the naturalist or the moralist, perhaps both, are wrong.

With all due respect to the facts presented by Professor Huxley, we must object to the conclusion at which he arrives. Professor Huxley's view of morals is based on the error that the wolf is immoral while the sheep is moral. The strong one is supposed to be an evil-doer, simply on account of his strength, while the weak one is supposed to be *good* simply on account of his weakness. Not the hero is glorified that "fights the good fight of faith," but the martyr that allows himself to be slaughtered without resistance.

This ethics has long been fostered by Christian moralists, because unfortunately Christ was compared to a lamb that is sacrificed, and because, in one of his allegories, Christ compares the good to sheep whom he will place at the right hand. The allegory is misinterpreted. It is not the weakness, not the inactivity, but the purity of the sheep that is approved by Christ. How much is blamed, in another parable, the inactive and cowardly servant who buried the talent that was entrusted to him!

This ovine morality has detracted much of the pith and strength from Christian ethics. It has made it tame and weak and even despicable. Morality is not as many lamb-souled moralists pretend, the negative quality of suffering; morality according to modern ethics is the positive virtue of energetic activity. Ours is, as the scientist correctly states, a struggle for existence; and those who consider it meritorious to succumb to injustice and violence justly go to the wall. Their enemies, unjust though they may be, are comparatively more moral, for they are their superiors in the virtue of courage which gives them strength and power.

Prof. Huxley describes how the moralist, in the effort to restore harmony, tries to account for the iniquities in this world. He says:

"From the theological side, we are told that this is a state of probation, and that the seeming injustices and immoralities of Nature will be compensated by and by. But how this compensation is to be effected, in the case of the great majority of sentient things, is not clear. I apprehend that no one is seriously prepared to maintain that the ghosts of all the myriads of generations of herbivorous animals which lived during the millions of years of the earth's duration before the appearance of man, and which have all that time been tormented and devoured by carnivores, are to be compensated by a perennial existence in clover; while the ghosts of carnivores are to go to some kennel where there is neither a pan of water nor a bone with any meat on it." * * *

This would indeed be a consistent consequence of a soft-brained and weak-hearted system of ethics, which praises the innocence and meritoriousness of mere suffering, and depicts as the ideal of morality a millennium of eternal peace, where the struggle for existence is unknown, where no labor or painstaking is necessary and all time is spent in the glorification of an all-wise Creator.

Such a state of absolute perfection is impossible and we must smile at the ingenuousness of those philosophers who pretend to teach modern ethics and still

adhere to the old millennium idea of a life of perfect adaptation where universal happiness will prevail.

The error in this Utopian idea is easily seen if we understand that the struggle for existence is inherent in nature. The struggle for existence is not only not in contradiction to ethics, it is on the contrary its most important factor, which must be taken into consideration and *is* taken into consideratien by the monistic view of ethics. The old ethical view demands that man shall not resist evil; that he shall leave off fighting and humbly allow himself to be trodden under foot. But the ethics of monism does not make man unfit for life, it renders him fitter in the struggle for existence. It teaches that so long as we are in harmony with the One and All of nature, so long as we remain in accord with natural laws, we shall be best able to resist evil. And this we can only do by constantly exercising our faculties and strengthening brawn and brain for the continued struggle,—which will cause us, it is true, much trouble and uneasiness, but at the same time will raise us to a higher level; it educates us and enhances the work of our existence.

The moral law is a natural law, it may be contrasted to, but does not stand in contradiction with, the other natural laws of a lower order. The deeper we investigate the more we shall be convinced that benefits acquired by injustice will prove to be injurious in the end: very often they are even the beginning of ruin. Truth and justice are the most powerful weapons in the struggle for existence. Truth and justice will always conquer in the end. It often takes more time than the life of a single individual to see the triumph of truth; but we can be sure, even if the defenders of truth and justice die, if they succumb to their immoral enemies, that truth and justice will survive.

It is the belief in truth and justice which lies at the bottom of the old religious and ethical views. This belief was a faith, but took the shape of a creed. The moral quality of a religious virtue soon ossified as a system of dogmas. It was mixed with superstitious notions, with anthropomorphic ideas, and with unwarranted phantastical expectations of a compensation in a supernatural Utopia. It grew powerful because, after all, it was more in harmony with truth than the views of those who saw only the surface of natural facts and could detect no order and no moral law in nature. But it became intolerable through the errors taught and the wrongs committed.

If, now, new ideas triumphantly break their way, let us remember that the new ethics and the religion of the future do not come 'to destroy, but to fulfil.' The present is the product of the past and the future will be the product of the present. A Latin proverb says, *Sic nos non nobis!* It is we who stand here as the representatives of humanity, but it is not for ourselves, nor for the gratification of personal vanity. It is we of the nineteenth century, but not by the wisdom of the nineteenth century, which would not exceed the wisdom of former ages if it were not benefited by their experience. Nor do we work and struggle to benefit ourselves. As our ancestors worked and struggled for us, so we have to struggle and fight for future generations.

Sic vos non vobis! Bear in mind it is you who work for the advancement and elevation of the human mind. But it is not you or you alone that you aspire for; it is humanity which is represented in you.

All life on earth forms one great, unbroken chain, one continuous whole, the unity and law of which we comprise in the formula of evolution. Let us regard ourselves as the representatives of this great whole, let us faithfully act according to this view and we need not trouble for the rest. Our actions will be moral and we shall at the same time be allied to those powers of nature which grant the strength of survival and represent advancement, progress, and the elevation of humanity. This ethics is in harmony, not at variance with natural science, and this is not the destruction but the fulfilment of the old religious faiths and their ethical aspirations. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GROUND-RENT AND LAND-VALUES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WHEELBARROW says in his article in THE OPEN COURT of March 21, on "Who makes the 'Land Values' of a Farm?" in speaking of the farm of his old acquaintance Tom Clark:

"Now, which of the ingredients of this farm shall bear the single tax? Is it the breaking of the wild sod? Is it the fence, the barn, or the apple-trees? This is a fair question, and it ought to be fairly answered. It is never answered. It is evaded thus: 'We do not propose to tax any of these improvements nor the land itself; we only propose to tax the *land-value* of the whole farm.' In that evasion the single tax on values' theory vanishes 'like the feverish dream of a summer's night.'"

The answer to this question is exceedingly simple and is never evaded by any intelligent Single-taxer. Neither "the breaking of the sod," nor "the fence, the barn, nor the apple-trees" will bear any of the single tax.

1. If Tom Clark's farm is worth *nothing*, as Wheelbarrow says, without Tom Clark's improvements it will be taxed *nothing* under the Single-tax regime.

2. If it is worth the dollar and a quarter an acre which Tom Clark paid for it, without his improvements, it will be taxed upon that much value.

What Tom Clark has done to make the farm more *useful* does not enter into the question of what renting *value* the bare, unimproved land has. The farm will be taxed upon its bare rental value without improvements.

If Wheelbarrow cannot separate the idea of "the value of land from the land," as he confesses, he certainly ought to understand that one piece of land has more renting value than another, and he ought to be able to understand so simple a proposition as having *ground-rent* and nothing else paid into the public treasury. That is all there is to the "George theory." It is simply to pay *ground-*

rent and nothing else into the public treasury. Wheelbarrow does not understand that: if he does he would not have written as he did about Tom Clark's farm. But why should Wheelbarrow or any one else find any difficulty in understanding what it means to pay *ground-rent* and nothing else into the public treasury? Why should Wheelbarrow ask whether the single-tax would fall on Tom Clark's fence, or barn, or orchard? Tom Clark would simply have to pay *ground-rent* no matter how *useful* his farm was to him, if it had no selling or renting *value* over and above the value of his improvements Tom Clark would pay *no taxes*. The single-tax means simply *ground-rent*. If a man does not know what *ground-rent* is he cannot understand the single-tax.

Wheelbarrow may have studied "Progress and Poverty" a great deal but he certainly does not understand Mr. George. And yet why should he find the least difficulty in understanding him? Is it so hard to understand what *ground-rent* is?

Respectfully Yours,

NEW YORK. HUGH O. PENTECOST.

A FARMER ON HENRY GEORGE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT.

SIR:—A word about the "George Theory." If the object be to increase the number of land holders it *almost* atones for the utter lack of judgment in the method designed to bring it about. I am not speaking of cities; my objections only apply to farming communities. Land owners are "pirates, robbers, and parasites," are they?" It does look so, perhaps, to Mr. George, but my opinion is that intelligent farmers owning their own land are guardian angels. The rural "greeny" is often made the material of a joke in the "funny papers," but the intelligent farmer often has occasion to smile at the ignorance of the "smart" city people concerning rural economy. James Malcolm (p. 1507 of THE OPEN COURT) hints that the producing capacity of nature—meaning the soil—is infinite. If this is true it is true in the same sense that nature in man is capable of resisting disease. Let man fail to conserve his vitality he soon falls a prey to disease. Just so with land. This may seem to be false as regards the rich prairie soil of the west, but wait. Ohio was said to have inexhaustible soil and where is it now? About here, unless a very slow rotation of crops is employed, pound for pound of potash and phosphoric acid taken from the soil must be restored to the soil to retain its fertility. Even when rotation *is* employed large quantities must be used. And also of our land—not very hilly—five sixths at least cannot be tilled more than one half the time for it would wash away. Instances are all about us of *temporary* farmers—not through ignorance but by *greed*—bringing farmers down to sterility in a very few years. The true farmer "improves" his holidays in quite a different line from that which is generally called "improvements," and the single tax *cannot* be adjusted to meet this contingency. The Desert of Sahara is a notable example of failure to conserve the soil's fertility.

No! If you take away land ownership you pull down the foundation—the fertility of the soil—on which the whole country rests. You will be unjust to farmers but your injustice will not be confined to them. When the foundation falls, not only the sills of the house—the farmers—but the whole house falls. It would be different at the equator where bread and fruit grow without ploughing up the soil, and I advise Mr. George and his followers to go there for I think his theory would suit there to perfection. Again no!! Limit ownership to 100 acres, to 10 acres, even to one acre, if it must be done, but let us *own* that acre and if you tax that, tax our *buildings* too.

Yours Truly,

ONE OF THE LAW'S "INFANTS."

MILL GREEN, Md.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

OLD ACQUAINTANCES.

SINCE the conversation upon the Roman emperors, the Sovereign had withdrawn for a few days from his Court. He was ill. His nervous prostration, as the physicians declared, was the usual consequence of a cold. Only a few privileged persons—among them Master Knips—had access to him during this time, and they had no cause to rejoice in their confidential position, for it was difficult to deal with the princely invalid.

To-day the Sovereign was sitting in his study; before him stood an old official, with a weazen face, reporting the daily occurrences of the capital, opinions which were expressed in public places concerning the Sovereign and his illustrious house, small scandalous family anecdotes, also observations that had been made in the palace to which the Princess had gone within the last few days, and the persons she had seen there. Prince Victor paid daily visits to the Baroness Hallstein, and passed the evening with the officers of his former regiment; he had returned unexpectedly that morning.

"How do things go on in the Pavilion?" asked the Sovereign.

"According to the account of the lackey, there have been no visitors from the city, nor any letters; everything as usual in the afternoon. When the strangers were sitting in front of the door, the lady had spoken of a journey to Switzerland, but her husband replied that there could be no thought of it until he had finished his business. Then there had been an uncomfortable silence. In the evening both attended the theatre."

The Sovereign nodded, and dismissed the official. As he sat alone, he pushed his chair against the wall, and listened to the sound of a small bell which, from the further end of the room, was scarcely audible; he hastily opened the door of a niche in the wall, and took out the letters which a confidential secretary had sent up through a tube from the lower story. There were various handwritings: he passed quickly through the contents. At last he held a bundle of children's letters in his hand. Again he laughed. "So the great ball has burst already." His countenance became serious. "A genuine peasant, he has no sense for the honor of having the top-boots of a prince among his fields." He took another letter. "The Hereditary Prince to his sister. It is the first letter of the pious John Patmos, saying nothing, as if it had been written for me. That may possibly be so. The con-

* Translation copyrighted.

tents are scanty and cold. He expresses the wish that his sister also may pass a pleasant time in the country. We wish the same," he continued, with good humor; "she may pluck flowers and talk with scholars about the virtues of Roman ladies. This wish shall be fulfilled by all parties." He laid the letters back in the niche, and pressed a spring in the floor with his foot; there was a slight rustling in the wall, and the packet glided down.

The Sovereign raised himself from his chair and walked about the room.

"My thoughts hover restlessly about this man. I have received him with complaisance; I have even treated his insane hopes with the greatest consideration, and yet this unpractical dreamer mocks at me. Why did he make this insidious attack on me? He did it with the malicious penetration of a diseased person, who knows better than a sound one what is deficient in another. His prating was half vague reflection and half the silly cunning of a fool who also carries about him a worm in his brain. It does not matter: we know one another, as the Augur knew his colleagues. Between us a family hatred burns, such as can only exist between relations—an enduring, thorough hatred, which conceals itself beneath smiles and polite bows. Trick for trick, my Roman cousin. You seek a manuscript which lies concealed with me, but I something else, which you would withhold from me."

He sank back in his chair, and looked timidly towards the door; then put his hand into a pile of books, and drew out a translation of Tacitus. He tapped the book with his finger.

"He who wrote this was also diseased. He spied incessantly into the souls of his masters; their pictures so filled his fancy, that the Roman people and the millions of other men appeared unimportant to him: he suspected every step of his rulers, yet neither he nor his generation could do without them. He gazed at them as on suns, the eclipse of which he investigated, and which reflected their light on him, the little planet. He began to doubt the wisdom of the order of things; and that to every human mind is the beginning of the end. But he had wit enough to see that his masters became diseased through the miserable meanness of those like himself, and his best policy was that of the old High Steward, to bear all with a silent obeisance."

He opened the leaves.

"Only one, whom he has included in his book," he began again, "was a man, whom it moves one to read about. This was the gloomy majesty of Tiberius: he knew the rabble, and despised them, till the miserable slaves at last placed him among the madmen. Do you know, Professor Tacitus, why the great Emperor became a weak fool? No one knows it—no one on earth but me, and those like me. He went mad because he could not cease to be a man of feeling. He despised many and hated many, and yet he could not do without the childish feeling of loving and trusting. A common youth, who had once shown him personal devotion, caught hold of this fancy of his earthly life, and dragged the powerful mind down with him into the dirt. A miserable weakness of heart converted the stern politician of Imperial Rome into a fool. The weak feelings that rise up in lonely hours are the undoing of us all; indestructible is this longing for a pure heart and a true spirit—undying the seeking after the ideal condition of man, which is described by the poet and believed in by the pedant." He sighed deeply; his head sank on the table between his hands.

There was a slight sound at the door. The Sovereign started The servant announced—"The Grand Marshal von Bergau." The Grand Marshal entered.

"The Princess inquired at what hour your Highness will take leave of her."

"Take leave?" asked the Sovereign, reflecting. "Why?"

"Your Highness has been pleased to order that the Princess shall this morning go to her summer castle for a few days."

"It is true," replied the Sovereign. "I am well today, dear Bergau, and will breakfast with the Princess. Will it be agreeable to you to accompany her?" he asked, kindly.

"I am very grateful to my gracious master for this favor," replied the Grand Marshal, honestly.

"What lady has the Princess chosen as her attendant?"

"As your Highness has given her the choice, she has decided upon Lady Gottlinde."

"I agree to that," said the Sovereign graciously. "The good Lady Gottlinde may be invited to breakfast, and you yourself may come also, that I may see you all once more about me before the journey. I have one more thing to say. Mr Werner will follow you; he wishes to examine the rooms and chests of the castle for his scientific purposes. Render him assistance in every way, and show him the greatest attention. I have also a confidential commission for you."

The Grand Marshal made a piteous face, which plainly indicated a protest.

"I wish to win for us this distinguished man," continued the Sovereign. "Sound him as to what place or distinction would be acceptable to him. I wish you to observe that I am most anxious to keep him."

The Grand Marshal, much discomposed, answered:

"I assure your Highness, with the greatest respect,

that I know how to value your confidence, yet this commission fills me with consternation; for it exposes me to the danger of exciting the displeasure of my gracious master. I have had opportunities of remarking that one cannot count upon gratitude from these people."

"You must not offer him anything; only endeavor to make him express some wish," replied the Sovereign dryly."

"But if this wish should exceed the bounds of moderation?" asked the Marshal hesitatingly.

"Take care not to object to it; leave it to me to decide whether I consider it immoderate. Send me a report immediately."

The Sovereign gave the signal of dismissal; watched sharply his bow and departure, and looked after the departing gentleman and gravely shook his head.

"He is not old, and yet the curse has overtaken him; he becomes grotesque. Here is another riddle of human nature for you learned gentlemen: the person who has every hour to control his countenance and manner, to whom the most rigid tact and correct forms are necessary in his daily intercourse, should, just when he becomes older, lose this best acquisition of his life, and become troublesome by his weak chattering and unrestrained egotism. You know how to answer, Emperor Tiberius, why your service, clever man, gradually made your servants caricatures of your own character? Now they have revenged themselves on you; it is all right. There is a desperate rationality in the links of the world. O misery, misery, that we should both have so little cause to rejoice at it!"

He groaned, and again buried his head in his hands.

* * *

Shortly after Ilse received the latest letters from home.

"How can the four-leaved clover be lost out of a well closed letter?" she asked her husband. "Luise, on her birthday, found some clover leaves and sent them in her former letter, to bring you good luck. The child is just at the age in which such nonsense gives pleasure. The dried clover was not in her letter, and as she is careless, I scolded her for it in my answer. To-day she assures me that she put them into the envelope the last thing."

"It may have fallen out when you opened the letter," said the Professor consolingly.

"My father is not contented with us," continued Ilse, discomposed; "he does not like it that the Prince has come into the vicinity; he fears distraction in the farm and gossip. Yet why should people gossip? Clara is still half a child, and the prince does not live upon our estate. There is a dark cloud over everything," she said; "the light of the dear sun has ceased to shine. Nothing but disturbances, the Sovereign ill, and our Hereditary Prince vanishes as if swept away by a storm. How could he go away without bidding us good-bye? I cannot set my mind to rest as to that; for we have not deserved it of him, nor of his courtly Chamberlain. I fear he does not go into the country willingly; and he is angry with me, Felix, because I said something about it. No good will come of it, and it makes me heavy at heart."

"If this trouble leaves you any thought for the affairs of other people," began the Professor, gaily, "you must allow me a small share. I think I have found the hidden castle which I have so long sought. I see from this chronicle that in the last century the country seat to which the Princess is going was surrounded by a forest. I hear that in this remote place much old household rubbish is preserved. I feel like a child on the eve of its birthday. I have made known my wishes to fate, and when I think of the hour when the present shall come to me, I feel the same heart-beating expectation which scares away sleep from the boy. It is childish, Ilse," he continued, holding out his hand to his wife, "I know it is; but have patience with me; I have long wearied you with my dreams, but now it will come to an end. The hope indeed will not come to an end, but this is the last place I have any reason to search for it."

"But if it should again happen that you do not find the book?" asked Ilse, sorrowfully, holding his hand.

A gloomy expression came over the Professor's face; he turned around abruptly, and said, harshly:

"Then I shall seek further. If Fritz had but come!"

"Was he to come?" asked Ilse, with surprise.

"I have requested him to do so," replied her husband. "He answered that his father's business and his relations with Laura prevented him. To him also it appears that a crisis is impending; he has suspicions with respect to the specification that I found here, which I consider unfounded."

"Oh, that he were with us!" said Ilse; "I long for a friendly face, like one who has for many days been traveling through a desert wilderness."

The Professor pointed towards the window.

"This wilderness looks tolerably humanized, and a visitor, such as you desire, seems already coming up to the house."

Ilse heard the rumble of wheels coming along the gravel of the castle road. A carriage stopped before the Pavilion, and the country coachman cracked his whip. The servants hastened to the door; Gabriel opened the carriage door; a little lady descended, gave a parcel to the lackey and a bandbox to Gabriel, and called out to the coachman to inquire about put-

ting up the horses. She hastily ascended the steps, and, as she did so, gazed on the paintings and carved scrolls.

"This is a great pleasure, Mrs. Rollmaus," exclaimed Ilse, delighted, meeting her at the door.

The Professor hastened to the stranger

"My dear Ilse," cried the little lady; "revered and highly honored Professor, here I am. As Rollmaus has been charged with the superintendence of an estate in the neighborhood, in trust for a nephew, and as he has had to travel into this country to put things in order, and will stop only a short time, I thought I would take the pleasure of paying you a visit. Your father, brothers, and sisters wish to be remembered to you. Clara is growing up the very image of you."

"Come in, come in," said Ilse; you yourself are the best greeting from home."

Mrs. Rollmus stopped at the door.

"Only a moment," she said, pointing to the bandbox.

"You come to old friends."

"You must allow me however, that I may not disgrace this princely house."

Mrs. Rollmaus was taken into an adjoining room, the bandbox opened, and, after the best cap was put on, as well as white collar and cuffs, the learned lady floated into the sitting-room with Ilse.

"Magnificent," she exclaimed, looking with admiration at the ceiling, where the god of love held out to her his bunches of poppies. "One can see at once by the cross-bow that it is a Cupid; one frequently sees them on gingerbread figures, where they stand between two burning hearts. Dear Professor, the pleasure of meeting again, and in such surroundings, is truly very great. I have long looked forward with pleasure to this hour, when I could express to you my thanks for the last book you sent me, in which I have gotten as far as the Reformation. Rollmaus would gladly have come with me, but he has business to attend to in the distillery on account of the old boiler, which must be removed."

During this speech the eye of Mrs. Rollmaus wandered inquisitively into every corner of the room.

"Who would have thought, dear Ilse, that you and the Professor would have come into friendly relations with our princely personages? I must confess to you that I have already looked about me in driving here for the princely court-yard, which, however, probably lies on the other side, as I see only gardens here."

"There are no offices at the castle," explained Ilse, "only the stable and the large kitchen have remained."

"They say there are six cooks," rejoined Mrs. Rollmaus, "who are all great head-cooks; although I do not know for what other part of the human body they could be cooking. But the originalities of a Court are very great,—amongst which are the silver-cleaners, who, I verily believe, do not do their duty; at least, the small coin in our country is very dirty, and a great scouring day would be necessary for them. They say that the young Prince has now gone to the Chief Forester's lodge. Our Chief Forester is fully occupied; he grumbles over this royal quartering, and has ordered himself a new uniform."

She became serious and thoughtful, and there ensued an awkward pause, during which she rubbed her nose, looked at Ilse good-humoredly, and pressed her hand.

"There appears to be a storm coming," she continued, in a low tone, "and the country gentlemen complain that the spring grub has eaten the rapeseed. Here, indeed, it seems like a paradise, although I hope that no wild beasts rove about here, and it is not the season to pluck the apples from the trees with pleasure. Something seems to have turned up in the capital which is very remarkable; for as I came to the estate with Rollmaus, the Inspector told me of a fortune-teller who prophesied wonderful things of the people of this city. Do you know anything certain about her?"

"We have few acquaintances," answered Ilse; "we only get news from the papers."

"I should be glad to hear something about that person, for I have latterly begun the study of phrenology; and I hear, dear Professor, that these investigations are much combated. I do not myself feel sure about them. I have examined the head of Rollmaus, and am surprised to see how much the bump of destruction is developed behind his ear, though he is annoyed at every cup-handle the maid servants break. Nevertheless, dear Professor, I find the powers of thought shown upon your brow. The bumps are very large, by which I do not mean to say that they are unbecoming to you. But to return to the fortune-teller. She told the Inspector that he was married, and had two children, and that his wife was dead, and that he wished to take another, who would add two more. This is all correct, for he is again courting. Now, I ask you, how could this person know it?"

"Perhaps she knows the Inspector?" replied the Professor, rummaging among his papers. "I advise you not to confide in her art, and I do not recommend to you the study of phrenology. But now let us know how long you can remain with us. I am obliged to go to the Museum, and hope to find you on my return."

"I can remain a few hours," said Mrs. Rollmaus. "I have three miles to go, but the roads here are better than with us. Although now our highway is being built, and the road commissioners already go along it to the town of Rossau. Only think, dear Ilse, the stone bridge between your estate and the town is already pulled down, but they have put up a temporary one in its stead. For a few hours, then, I beg of you to be satisfied with my company."

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

TIMES AND DAYS: BEING ESSAYS IN ROMANCE AND HISTORY. London and New York: Longman's, Green, & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

This neat and dainty volume presents us with a collection of studies in life and character. Their form is that of designedly unfinished portraitures; reflections, it appears, mainly suggested by incidents and experiences of the writer's life. Many—though we cannot say it of all—are rich in delicate fancies, witty conceits, and touches of consummate irony and sarcasm. We quote the following, entitled "Rivers," as representative:

"There is a quiet beauty in the upper reaches of the river. Here it is only a small musical stream. There it laughs over a little weir, or puts its white shoulder to the old wheel of a small flour mill. Here it slips through green bowers, peeped at through thick leaves by the high sun. Here it passes by smooth lawns which trail their fringes of willows in the water. Here a great market boat lolls along, lazily propelled by long sweeps, and bearing down garden products to the city.

"But see the stream after it has washed foully through the town. Water? It is ink, and bad at that. It has passed by high towering wharves crowned by warehouses, under stately bridges thunderous with traffic. It has reflected in its greasiness palaces and high-domed churches. And now it has come out of its burrow, the town, into the country again—a flat bare country. But how different it is now. Its banks are slime. It no longer laughs, but from its depths, when it is disturbed, patches rise, like leprous spots on its surface. Its quiet is all gone. Its surface is crowded with journeying craft. Here with a hayboat piled high. There with great silent-going screw-steamers moving grimly out of and in the busy port. Its sky is full of the trailing serpents which these leave. Here, too, trains of towed barges burden the tide. It is a great highway carrying fleets of commerce this way and that. It is no longer the pleasant stream that whispered comfort to the soul; this only suggests comfort to the pocket. And man's life, as has often been said, is not unlike such a stream. Pure in childhood, given to business in the haunts of men—and it issues therefrom smudged and befouled, and withal richly prosperous—but ugly, unwholesome, slimy, until it is lost in the great pure sea of death."

HIS BROKEN SWORD. *Winnie Louise Taylor.* Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

The above is a novel combining a very beautiful and stirring love-story with a description of modern methods of criminal legislation and punishment. It is a book of unusual merit and interest throughout, written with an evident, but very noble purpose, a little "preachy" in its style now and then, but devoid of all cant and sentimentality, and a worthy contribution to modern fiction. Miss Taylor is a resident of Illinois, who for several years has devoted herself to a study of the problem of prison-reform. She locates the story, in which she illustrates her views on this subject in Wisconsin, a state far in advance of our own in its general system of pauper and criminal legislation. Thus she does not prejudice her critics in advance, with a picture of old-time methods and results. On the contrary her spirit seems most fair and just throughout. She brings a clear mind and warm heart, sound judgment and loving sympathy to the solution of her problem, and the result is given in the history of the strange but not impossible fortunes of Robert Allston. His Broken Sword is, like most novels of the day, without a plot; but the interest increases with every page, and this is a high compliment to pay to the writer's fitness for her task, and the worthy purpose which led her to its undertaking The main motive of the work is not fully developed until near the middle of the book, which is thus relieved of a too severe didacticism of tone and intent. It dates back to the early sixties, and the opening of the Civil War, and to the older reader revives many mingled sad and pleasant memories of that time. We purposely refrain from giving the outline of the story in the hope of more successfully arousing interest in a work which cannot but create a new enthusiasm for humanity in every one who reads it.

C. P. W.

The Humboldt Publishing Co., No. 24 East Fourth Street, New York, have issued in pamphlet form, an essay by William Nelson Black, *Ultimate Finance; a True Theory of Wealth.* It is the merit of this series of publications to have brought within the public reach, numerous works of scientific excellence, and the character of Mr. Black's treatise justifies the present selection. The first two chapters treat of the origin of property and the evolution of wealth, the third and fourth discuss the principles and possibilities of banking and insurance, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh are devoted to a correction of the many misconceptions that abound on the nature of accumulation, and the administration of property. The main purpose is an exposition of the theory of bonded insurance. Our readers will find it a clear and concise exposition of the principles of finance.

The Art Amateur for April has many good things, but we are a little staggered by the first sentence that meets our eyes in a notice of the Whistler Exhibition. "Every artist is of necessity an *abstractor of quintessence.*" Surely Concord School never produced anything more delightfully abstract and absurd. The rest of the article is written in simple English but surely the art of writing should be respected by the amateur as well as those of painting and sculpture.

"The Atelier" is filled with good matter and good illustrations. The best method of work in pen and ink sketching is clearly described and very good examples are given from Liphart's works. A "rapid sketch of a passing object" by Vierge shows how such action may be given in the slightest work by one who knows how to seize the characteristic points and lines of his subject.

A very peculiar drawing by Bontet de Monvel has much the effect of a negative photograph or a Chinese embellishment of a fan—there is such a strong and unexpected contrast of large lights and black shadows in it. The Crayon drawings by Clausen, by Jean Aubert, and Leon Perrault, are all spirited and pleasing.

The season for flower painting is just approaching. Those who love the beauty of flowers as well as their scientific meaning—will find it a great pleasure in traveling in summer to be able to paint the rare flowers they find as well as to preserve them for the herbarium. A good representation in water colors may be made very quickly, even while the train is stopping at way stations, by one skilled in the art. *The Amateur* has many good suggestions for such work.

NOTES.

We have received great quantities of letters relative to the Henry George discussion. Our limited time has alone prevented us from considering them. We shall, however, select the best for publication.

In 1749, says *Life Lore*, in a charming little essay, Beguelin bethought himself of the Columbus joke and cut a window in a egg. Prof. Gerlach has now constructed, practically upon this idea, a contrivance styled the embryoscope. The professor's application of glaziery to embryology has not been without success. It is "particularly instructive for those who are interested in the influence of outside upon inside to look through this window, to see how one chemical acts as a brake, and another as a stimulus, to observe how under pressure the chick does not lose heart but forms a double one; to notice how, disgusted with its uncovering, it sometimes neglects altogether to draw over it one of its orthodox birth-robes, which students call the amnion. Like a disturbed infant, it kicks off its clothes."

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

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

SENSATION AND THE OUTER WORLD...A. BINET....No. 83.

IDEALISM AND REALISM. EDITOR.....No. 84.

DREAMS, SLEEP AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

M. Binet, after having animadverted upon the impropriety of excluding metaphysical questions from the domain of science, proceeds in the above-mentioned essay to discuss the interesting question of the relation between human sensation and its normal excitant, the external world. No resemblance is predicable, maintains M. Binet, between the perceptions of consciousness and the bodies that exist beyond us. Doctrines enunciating such resemblance, the author declares fallacious, and terms them "crude and naïve realisms." This fallacy, however, is widely prevalent in science. Physicists and philosophers still hold that the definitive explanation of natural phenomena is a mechanical explanation, wherein the concepts of mass and force are the ultimate and fundamental data. They fail to recognize, in this, the purely subjective character of sensations. They translate, merely, sensations of one kind into sensations of another kind, which seem to us more precise; thus, they explain the phenonenon of sound by the phenomenon of a vibration; merely substituting, thereby, a visual sensation for an auditory sensation. This leads the author to discuss the supreme importance of the visual sense in the investigation of phenomena; the possibility of a purely auricular science is held forth; the author shows that the ear, by noting the *qualities* of sound, can solve *numerical* problems. Thus, the progression of human knowledge is accompanied by a progresion of human capabilities. The future will transform our sciences; it may transform our senses.

Sensation and the phenomena of the external world, it is granted, *are* different. But does it follow that knowledge of external objects is therefore impossible? The electrical phenomenon traversing the wire of a telephone bears no resemblance to the spoken words thrown against the mouth-piece in the shape of air-waves; no more so than does sensation the external object. Yet is communication by means of a telephone impossible? *Are* not the spoken words reproduced at the other end of the line in substantially the form in which they were received? *Preservation of form* is all that is necessary; and this is possible even where there is no superficial resemblance. It is a contradiction to demand that knowledge should be other than it is. Cognition does not, and *need* not, go beyond sensation.

In Numbers 82 and 83 two interesting letters appear, discussing questions raised by the articles of Dr. G. M. Gould upon Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness—practical studies upon the psychology of consciousness.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE.

ETHICAL EVOLUTION. PROF. E. D. COPE.....No. 82.

The utilitarian theory of morals, says the distinguished author has found in the law of evolution a permanent substantiation. Yet does that doctrine embrace the *whole* truth, does it embody exclusively the law of human ethical progress? Ethical conduct, it is true, is an outgrowth of natural mental constitution; it differs among individuals, among families, among races; physical necessities, and conditions of environment direct it. But the knowledge of right is an intellectual faculty. Ethical life expresses, further, the highest development of humanity. Accordingly, moral conduct has *various* phrases of evolution: the rational as well as the natural, the individual as well as the social; to which corresponding motives of utility, egoism, and altruism belong. We find these motives interacting, each predominant in their respective spheres. The rational element has found its expression in generalization, in the formation by far seeing men of ethical codes; the affectional element, the element of Love, has found its expression in beneficent altruism, wherein the filial relation to God forms an abiding motive to action. The faculty of reason and the sentiment of love ensure ethical perfection.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS. FELIX L. OSWALD, M.D. Nos. 81, 84.

Interesting essays in moral physiology, abounding in citations from history and science in support of the positions taken.

NEWS ABOUT THE PLANETS AND THE MOON.....No. 80.

This constitutes a survey of the latest astronomical observations. It includes a brief account of the canals on the surface of Mars, with their various attendant phenomena; the rotation of Jupiter; the temperature of the moon; and the strange light-phenomena recently observed in the neighborhood of Saturn.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW ....No. 73

CORRESPONDENCE UPON THE DOCTRINE OF HENRY GEORGE..... Nos. 79, 80, 82, 84.

The criticisms by Wheelbarrow, touching the doctrines of Henry George, have evoked much comment and discussion. The main bulk of the correspondence relative to this question, remains still unpublished; showing the wide-spread interest taken in the subject, and the undoubted popularity of Mr. George's theories. The main endeavor of our correspondents seems directed towards demonstrating Wheelbarrows ignorance and misunderstanding of the great economist's position. This Wheelbarrow seeks to refute in a letter in No. 82.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DILEMMA OF DOUBLE ALLEGIANCE. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL..... .....No. 81.

The article by Gen. Trumbull is opportune. Its tone and position is commendable. Amid the chauvinistic fanfaronade of demagogic statesmen and bellicose newspapers, evoked by petty irritations over Samoa coal-stations and bait for cod-fish, the thoughtful citizen of foreign birth must often feel the appalling meaning that the problem of double allegiance embodies. "What is the ethics of patriotism that must guide us in case of actual war?" "The duty of men embarassed by the ties of double allegiance," says Gen. Trumbull, "is to stand bravely by the republic whatever comes, but they ought to unite their moral and political influence to promote the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful arbitration." The question has excited much comment from the press throughout the country.

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MAKING BREAD DEAR.

AN ANSWER TO THE CRITICISM OF "A SYMPATHIZER"

BY WHEELBARROW.

In the last number of The Open Court I find a formidable criticism by a "Sympathizer" who reproves me as a "would be reformer," "paralyzing the efforts of those who would gladly aid the humbler members of society to attain a better hold on life."

At first I was disposed to regret my article "Making Bread Dear" if the tendency of it was to such a mischievous result; but on reflection I saw that it had worked the other way; and I felt rather proud that it had not been without a good effect on Sympathizer. It did not paralyze him. It aroused him. It moved him so strongly that he investigated the evils I denounced. He examined my accusations and answered them.

The first witness offered by Sympathizer for the defense is a farmer, who did not know of "any combination to make wheat or flour high." Sympathizer went to the wrong farmer. He should have gone to one of those grateful farmers who sent a memorial to the very forestaller I complained of, thanking him for raising the price of wheat by working a "corner" in which hundreds of men were "squeezed" into poverty, the prime article of life bewitched, and the hunger of the poor increased. I assert that any agency is immoral which obstructs the natural ebb and flow of the tide running up and down between the producer and the consumer, that healthy, navigable stream which is called "supply and demand." It is an immoral agency that by conspiracy or cunning raises the price of bread to the hod-carrier, or lowers the price of wheat to the farmer.

It is a mistake that the farmer's pay is only 82 cents per day. Statistics may say that, but they cannot prove it because it is not true. Sympathizer's friend, I suppose, meant a net income of 82 cents a day over and above all expenses. It must also be a mistake that farmers are moving into the city to compete with shovelers. I have not yet seen any farmers who desire to trade ploughs for wheelbarrows. If the statement were true it would prove that agriculture had become the weak, attenuated base of American existence, and our social fabric would topple over, splitting itself to pieces in the fall like an iceberg in the sea. I admit that the farmer is much poorer than he ought to be; I admit that he is the victim of numerous legalized extortions, but as he seems to enjoy them, and fears that they may be lifted from him, I will try to bear *his* poverty with resignation, although I have no patience with my own.

The next witness is a miller who testified as follows, "There is no combination among millers. On the contrary, if we get twenty-five cents per barrel for the use of our mill and the risk we take we are satisfied." The honesty of millers is proverbial, but I think this testimony will not stand the test of cross-examination. Did the witness mean that he made a barrel of flour for twenty-five cents, paying his workmen out of that, and also his taxes, and insurance?" Or did he mean that his profit was twenty-five cents a barrel? As to the "combination," I fear that Sympathizer's miller has not yet got the key to it. According to the journals published in the milling interest, negotiations have been for several months in progress looking to a combination of the big millers to freeze out the little ones, and abolish that "fierce competition." I have no doubt that the conspiracy will eventually succeed.

The next witness was a man who testified for the Board of Trade. He was not himself a member of the Board but he knew all about its machinery and methods. He was one of those exasperating witnesses who know too much, and hoodoo the side that calls them. It will be necessary now to bring on a real member of the Board to contradict or explain the testimony of Sympathizer's friend. His evidence verified my complaint, and showed that the price of bread *can* be artificially raised by "operations" on the Board of Trade. Nothing can be more cold-hearted and selfish than the following testimony: "The speculator operates to make *money*. He buys hoping for a *rise*, or he sells for future delivery hoping for a *decline*." Let Sympathizer read that sentence carefully and he will see that it springs from the ethics of the "pit" where conscience is drugged and stupefied. Let him bear in mind that the "speculator" spoken of "operates" on the bread of the poor; I say the bread of the poor because bread is literally the staff of life to the working man, while it is a trifling element in the rich man's bill of fare.

What is it that the speculator buys "hoping for a

rise? Wheat! Just think of a man wasting his religion in praying for a *rise* in the price of wheat! This, too, in a prayer sometimes three months long. 'Or to sell for future delivery hoping for a *decline*.'" What a perverted moral instinct it must be that prompts a man to hope that the value of an article will diminish after he has sold it to his neighbor. Is it really true that no man can prosper unless at the expense of others?

The defense is as bad as the offense. Here is the explanation: The speculator sold at a stated price for future delivery that which he did not have, but which he must buy before the day agreed on to deliver it. For instance, on the first day of May, Peter sold Paul one hundred thousand bushels of wheat at one dollar per bushel to be delivered on the 30th day of June. Peter doesn't own a bushel of wheat but has two months in which to buy it. He spends the two months in praying that wheat may fall to seventy-five cents a bushel. His prayers are granted, and he buys the hundred thousand bushels of wheat for seventy-five thousand dollars. He delivers them to Paul and demands and receives from him a hundred thousand dollars for the wheat. He cares nothing for the fact that the wheat is not worth what he takes for it, nor for the further fact that the twenty-five thousand dollars won by Peter may be the measure of Paul's ruin.

Not only do the "operators" pray for those unnatural prices, but they also work for them, and effect them. Here is the confession of sympathizer's witness: "If the price is for the moment higher than any individual trader's opinion of the real price, he will offer for sale, and thus effect the price *downward*. If he thinks it too low, he will buy in the market, and thus influence the market *upward*. The opinions thus backed by monied risk, are much superior to the *ex parte* notion of Wheelbarrow, or any other person who merely stands off and looks on."

I do not see the superiority of those opinions to mine, for they are the very same opinions that I myself expressed. I complained that rich operators *could* affect the market, and effect the rise or fall of wheat by the aid of money. What is gambling but "opinions backed by monied risk?" That expression is a plagiarism from the invitation of the man who runs the wheel of fortune at the races. "Step forward, gentlemen, and back your own opinions."

Manufacturing or Commercial industry "backed by monied risk" is a very different thing to the speculation on the prices of things which the seller does not own and the buyer does not want; things which are not now and never will be in the possession of either party, and which perhaps are not yet in existence. This kind of speculation does not equalize the temperature of prices, and make a fair average one month with another between the producer and the consumer. In a market subject to artificial derangement, the poor man must always pay for a speculative margin which the baker must keep on the price of bread to protect him from a possible rise in flour. Every man who handles the wheat from the time it leaves the farm until it is sold in the form of bread, is compelled to insure himself against a possible speculative inflation of its price, and the consumer pays the insurance.

The witness did not deny that "corners" were operated by rich men on the Board of Trade. He not only admitted it but gave examples of its vicious and gambling character. I submit my case on the testimony of Sympathizer's witness. The details of his testimony reveal commercial business in its most heartless form, where the measure of one man's gain is the measure of another man's loss. In reply to the apology that "their influence is so brief, they seldom affect the price of the product to the actual consumer," I offer the fact that the great "corner" of three months ago did actually raise the price of bread in the city of Chicago. The coal barons of New York who levied a tax on all consumers of coal, are well remembered still. Answer that, explain it, or excuse it if you can.

Sympathiser's witness tells us that "corners" are merely "episodes." He says: "They are like raids in the rear of an army or piratical excursions over ordinary peaceful seas." What further testimony is necessary to their amiable and benevolent character? Fancy Captain Kidd on trial for scuttling ships. Sympathiser's friend is called in as a witness to character. He testifies that he is well acquainted with the defendant, and that he is merely an inoffensive pirate; that he did not scuttle all the ships on the ocean "as he sailed, as he sailed," but only a few of them; and that his "influence was so brief as to not affect the price of the product to the actual consumer."

Suppose a gang of pirates should raid Lake Michigan for a few days, plunder ships, and destroy them, swoop down upon Chicago and carry off rich booty, would Symnathiser comfort the victims of the raid by the assurance that the influence of the pirates "is next to nil"?

Sympathizer says that I have no right to claim an interest in the increase of my country's wealth, nor, I suppose, in the expansion of its glory. He says that as a wheeler of earth I can do no more "in that line" than my predecessor did a thousand years ago. That is true, and I only ask wages in proportion to the rank of my wheelbarrow in the scale of productive activities.

The wealth of a country is the product of all its industrial forces working together. Let us suppose that of this product the wheelbarrow contributes one part, the jackplane two parts, the trowel three, the plough four, the yardstick five, and so on up to the

banker's ready reckoner, which we represent as ten. In twenty years the product of them all has doubled; shall the banker's share be twenty, the merchant's ten, the farmer's eight, the trowel's six, the jackplane's four, and the wheelbarrow's only one. I insist that in proportion to my rank in the scale of production I am entitled to my share of the increase. I am a stockholder in the Bank of Industry, and I am entitled to my dividends in proportion to the stock I hold. If I did not wheel earth somebody else would have to do it, perhaps the bricklayer, or the clerk, or the merchant, or the banker, for wheeling of earth must be done. When in the great lottery of life the duty of doing it, fell to me, I bore upon my shoulders men of greater skill to work at higher trades than mine. Without me to stand on, they must have worked upon a lower plane. I am willing that the man who contributes five talents to the capital stock shall receive another five over and above. I envy not the hundred per cent. reward to him who has contributed four, or three, or two talents, but I insist that my one talent, if I bury it not in the ground, but throw it into the common fund, shall be doubled in honor like the rest.

While other men grow up with the country must I stand still? As I cannot release myself from duty to my country, neither can any other man justly deprive me of my share in its greatness and its growth. You can no more justly deprive me of my share in the increase of national riches than of my share in the increase of national freedom, for which I fought in many battles. Have I no inheritance in the legacy of the past? Did the great inventors and discoverers leave me nothing when they died? As well tell me that Shakespere, Goethe, Plato, Newton, Bacon, left me nothing. I am heir of all the men whose genius has multiplied the moral and material riches of the world. Every other man is co-heir with me in the great inheritance, and every woman too.

Sympathizer kindly advises that if my Wheelbarrow wages is too low, I turn my attention to the Bar, the Pulpit, or the Press. This is like the physician who advertised advice gratis to the poor, and when they came for it, recommended them to try the climate and the waters of Baden-Baden. Does Sympathizer know of any wealthy congregation in want of a preacher of my peculiar faith?

Let it not be thought that my censures were aimed at the Board of Trade as a corporation, or at its members as a class. They were aimed at certain methods practiced by certain men within the privileges and opportunities of the Board, methods which are confessed and condemned by Sympathizer and his witnesses. Many of the most honorable, generous, and useful men in this community are members of the Board of Trade; men whose friendship any man may be proud to enjoy.

When I demand cheap bread, I do not wish to deprive the farmer, the miller, or the Board of Trade man, or anybody who contributes to its production and distribution, of his deserved reward. Everybody who does work for the benefit of society is employed in his own way to make bread cheap. Bread, it is true, under special conditions, with a given amount of labor and its machinery, cannot be cheaper than the legitimate wages of its producers. But its price is often increased by additional taxes levied upon it by industrial "pirates" that intervene between the legitimate distributors. Theirs is that making bread dear of which I spoke.

Let us unite against the common enemies of society. Every honest calling is productive of some good. It makes life easier and better. The honest business of the Board of Trade, as Sympathizer explains, is to equalize the price of wheat and facilitate its journey from the farm to the laborer in the city. That appears to me to be a useful work and I can see how it may tend toward "making bread cheap. From what I had heard of Sympathizer's article, I expected a complete refutation, but I think he strengthens my position. I see clearer than ever that "making bread dear" is a crime.

THE HISTORY OF THE VEDIC EPOCH.

BY PROF. H. OLDENBERG.

CONCERNING the Vedic poems, the question arises, what do we know of the history of India in the age which produced them? Where does the possibility here begin of fixing events chronologically? In that part of the province of history in which this precision is lacking, can any determinate lines of another sort be drawn?

Of a history of ancient India in the sense in which we speak of the history of Rome, or in the manner in which the history of the Israelitic nation is recounted in the Old Testament, the Vedas afford us no testimony. A succession of events clearly united with one another, the presence of energetic personalities, whose aspirations and achievements we can understand, momentous struggles for the institution and security of civil government—these are things of which nothing is told to us. We may add that there are things which seem to have existed in Ancient India less than in any other civilized nation. The more we know of the history of this people the more it appears like an incoherent mass of chance occurrences. These occurrences are wanting in that firm bearing and significant sense which the power of a willing and conscious national purpose imparts to its doings. Only in the history of thought, and especially of religious thought, do we tread, in India, upon solid ground. Of a history in any other sense we can here scarcely speak. And a peo-

ple who has no history, has of course no written historical works.

In those eras in which, among soundly organized nations, interest in the past and its connection with the struggles and sufferings of the present awakes, when the Herodotuses and Fabiuses, the narrators of that which has happened, are wont to arise, the literary activity of India was absorbed in theological and philosophical speculation. In all occurrences was seen but one aspect, namely, that they were transitory; and everything transitory was recognized, we may not say as a simile, yet as something absolutely worthless, an unfortunate nothing, from which the sage was bound to divert his thoughts.

We can thus easily see how fully we must renounce our hopes of an exact result, when the question is raised as to the time to which the little we know of the outer vicissitudes of the ancient Hindu tribes must be assigned, and, especially, as to the time in which the great literary remains of the Veda and the changes which it wrought in the Hindu world of thought belong. The basis that might serve toward definitely answering these questions of chronology—lists of kings with statements of the duration of each reign—is wholly wanting for the Vedic period. Of early times at least no such lists have been handed down to us; there are no traces indeed that such ever existed. The later catalogues, however, which have been fabricated in the shops of the Indian compilers, can today no more be taken into consideration as the basis of earnest research, than the statements of the Roman chroniclers as to how many years King Romulus and King Numa reigned. How unusual it was in the Vedic times for the Hindus to ask the "when" of events, is shown very clearly by the fact, that no expression was in current use by which any year but the present was distinguishable from any other year.

The result of this for us, and likewise, of course, for the science of Ancient India, is that those long centuries were and are practically synonymous with immeasurable time. The standard by which we are accustomed to compute the distance of historical antecedence in our thoughts or imaginations, fail us in this richly developed civilization as completely as in the prehistoric domains of the stone age, or in the first feeble glimmerings of human existence. In fact, as prehistoric research tries to compute the duration of the past ages which have given to the earth's surface its form, so as to determine approximately the age of the human remains embedded in the strata of the earth; so, in a similar way, the investigation of the Hindu poetry, in its attempts to compute the age of the Veda, has sought refuge in the gradual changes that have imperceptibly taken place in the course of centuries, in that great time-measurer, the starry heavens.

There was found in a work, classed as one of the Vedas, an astronomical statement which has served as a basis for such computations. The result attained was that this particular poem dated from the year 1181 B. C. (according to another reckoning 1391 B. C.). Unfortunately, the belief that in this way certain data are to be acquired had to vanish quickly enough. It was soon found out that the Vedic statement is not sufficient to afford any tenable basis for astronomical computations. Thus it remains that for the times of the Vedas there is no fixed chronological date. And to any one who knows of what things the Hindu authors were wont to speak, and of what not, it will be tolerably certain, that even the richest and most unexpected discoveries of new texts, though they may vastly extend our knowledge in other respects, will in this respect make no changes whatever.

There are two great events in the history of India with which this darkness begins to be dispelled—the one approximately, and the other accurately, referable to an ascertainable point of time. These are the advent of Buddha and the contact of the Hindus with the Greeks under Alexander the Great and his successors.

That it was the old Buddhistic communities in India that first began the work of gathering up the connected traditions within historical memory, seems certain. At least this corresponds with the apparent and accepted course of events. To Vedic and Brahmanical philosophy all earthly fortunes were absolutely worthless—a vanity of vanities; and over against them stood the significant stillness of the Eternal, undisturbed by any change. But for the followers of Buddha, there was a point at which this Eternal entered the world of temporal things, and thus there was for them a piece of history which maintained its place beside or rather directly within their religious teachings. This was the history of the advent of Buddha and the life of the communities founded by him.

There is a firm recollection of the assemblies in which the most honored and learned leaders of the communities, and great bands of monks coming together from far and wide, determined weighty points of doctrine and ritual. The kings under whom these councils were held are named, and the predecessors of these kings are mentioned even as far back as the pious King Bimbisara, the contemporary and zealous protector of Buddha. Of the series of kings which in this way have been fixed by the chronicles of the Buddhistic order, two figures are especially prominent—*Tschandragupta* (*i. e.*, the one pro-

tected by the Moon) and his grandson *Asoka* (the Painless). *Tschandragupta* is a personality well known to Greek and Roman historians. They call him *Sandrokyptos*, and relate that after the death of Alexander the Great (in the year 323 B. C.), he successfully opposed the power of the Greeks on their invasion into India, and lifted himself from a humble position to that of ruler of a wide kingdom. *Asoka*, on the other hand, is not mentioned by the Greeks; but in one of his inscriptions—by him were made the oldest inscriptions discovered in India, and these have been found on walls and pillars in the most distant parts of the peninsula—he himself speaks of Antijoka, king of the Iona (Ionians, *i. e.*, Greeks), Antikina, Alikasandara, and other Greek monarchs.*

Here at last a place is reached where the historical investigator of India reaches firm ground. Events whose years and centuries—as though they occurred on another planet—are not commensurable with those of the earth, meet at this point with spheres of events which we know and are able to measure. If we reckon back from the fixed dates of Tschandragupta and Asoka to Buddha—and we have no grounds for regarding the statements of time which we find respecting Buddhistic chronology as not at least approximately correct—we find the year of the great teacher's death to be about 480 B. C. His work therefore falls in the time at which the Greeks fought their battles for freedom from Persian rule, and the fundamental lines of a republican constitution were drawn in Rome.

Buddha's life, however, marks the extreme limit at which we may find even approximate dates. Beyond this, through the long centuries which must have elapsed from the beginning of the Rig Veda epoch to that of Buddha, the question still remains: What was the succession of events—the few events of which we may speak? What the order in which the great strata of literary remains were formed? We observe the relation which one text bears to the others which appear to have previously existed; we follow the gradual changes which the language has suffered, the blotting out of old words and forms and the appearance of new ones; we count the long and short syllables of the verses so as to learn the imperceptible but strictly regular course by which their rhythms have been freed from old laws of construction and subjected to new forms; moving in a parallel direction with these linguistic and metrical changes we note the changes of religious ideas, and of the contents as well as the external forms of intellectual and spiritual life. Thus we learn in the chaos of this literature ever more surely to distinguish the old from the new, and understand the course of development which has run through both.

Many a path, it is true, in which research hoped to press forward, has been shown to be delusive and worthless; problems have had to be given up, changed, and presented in different forms. But in its last results the work has not been in vain. For, in respect to the Veda in particular, and the antiquities of India in general, we have learned to recognize the principal directions in which the tendencies of historical growth are to be traced.

From the second century of Hindu research we can scarcely expect discoveries similar to those which the first has brought: such a sudden uprising of unusual, broad, fruitful fields of historical knowledge. But we may still hope that the future of our science will bring results of another sort no less rich—the explanation of hitherto inexplicable phenomena, the transformation of that which is half known into that which is fully known.

* Antijoka is Antiochas Theos; Antikina, Antigonos Gonatos; Alikasandara, of course, not Alexander the Great, but Alexander of Epirus, son of Pyrrhus, the enemy of the Romans. All these princes reigned about the middle of the third century B. C. Of Alexander the Great in India no traces have been found, with the exception of a coin which bears his picture and his name.

NO CREED BUT FAITH.

By creed we understand a summary of the articles of religious belief, and by faith a trustful confidence in something or some one that we are convinced is good and true. Creed is dogmatic; faith is moral. The creeds of the world are contained in the many Credos, in the doctrines of the different religions; faith is enshrined in human hearts. Creeds are dead letters; faith is the quickening spirit.

The religious problem of to-day will find its simple solution in the sentence: No creed, but faith. Let us have faith in the moral order of the world, the faith of a grain of mustard seed, and without swerving live and grow accordingly. Let us have faith in our ideals of Truth and Beauty and Goodness. If we have no faith, how can our ideals be realized? How can the tree grow if the seed be dead?

Faith in Hebrew is *amunah*, which means firmness. No credulity is wanted, but steadiness of character. Faith in Greek is πίστις, which is etymologically the same word as the Latin *fides* and the English *faith*. The verb πιστεύειν does not signify to believe, but to trust. So long and in so far as Christianity was a living faith, it was truly human and progressive. But as soon as priestcraft prevailed and identified creed with faith, the religious spirit lost its life; it became a reactionary power, for it was fossilized into the letter that killeth; and instead of faith credulity was enthroned as the basic virtue of a religious life. Not truth ascertainable and verifiable by scientific investigation was accepted as the basis of religion, but certain unverified and even absurd doctrines, which were established as self-evident axioms. Science was pooh-poohed like

Cinderella as worldly and ungodly, whereas by rights it should hold the torch to faith lest it walk in the path of superstition or other errors.

Three days after the crusaders had taken Antioch (June 3, 1098), Kerbogha, the Emir of Mosul, arrived with an army which was in almost every respect, and especially in numbers, superior to the Christians. He invested the city and cut off all supplies. Famine and sickness caused great havoc, and many goodly knights, among them even prominent leaders, such as Count Stephen of Blois, deserted in great despair. The whole army seemed to be doomed to die by the sword of the Moslem or to be starved. In this plight Peter Bartholomew, a Provencal of low birth, came to Count Raymond and declared that St. Andrew had shown him the holy lance that had pierced the side of Christ, and that it lay buried in St. Peter's Church of Antioch. The search began at once; twelve men dug a whole day, and in the evening a lance was really found not far from the altar. The lance being found, the crusaders began to have confidence again. Under the command of the circumspect and brave Boemund, they went out to do battle. Although worn out by fatigue and famine, they were confident that the holy lance would lead them to victory, and full of enthusiasm they beat the Emir so that his great army was soon scattered to the winds.

The story of the holy lance, it was soon discovered by the more sober Normans, was an imposture, but among the sanguine-minded Provencals the belief in it had worked wonders of prowess and made the apparently impossible an actual fact.

There may be a living faith concealed in a foolish superstition. It is not the error, not the superstition that works wonders, but the faith that lives in it. No victory, no virtue, no strength, without at least a grain of faith, be it ever so much mixed with false notions. False notions are a disastrous ingredient in faith, and unless in time discarded, they will and must lead into danger. For weak souls, an alloy of truth and error may serve as a substitute for pure truth; but it is truth alone that can make us strong and free.

Creed rarely can stand criticism, but faith can not only endure and survive criticism, it should even invite it. Criticism may destroy all creeds, but it will never destroy faith, and if it could, it would take out of life that which alone gives value to it. It would take away our ideals, our hopes, our aspirations, and the purpose of life. Life would be empty and meaningless.

Christ said:

"Verily I say unto you: If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you."

The instance of the crusaders' victory over Kerbogha is an example of how powerful faith can be, even though closely interwoven with superstition. It was not the superstition, however, that gave strength to the crusaders, but the moral faculty of confidence closely connected in this case with superstition. Great minds can exercise the same self-control and perform the same deeds, even greater deeds, without the assistance of superstition. It can be said of weak minds only, that superstition serves as a support to faith. It is true, that if well directed, it can give to a child the self-confident strength of a man. But woe unto us if we mistake superstition as genuine faith.

Our faith must not be blind, but rational; it must be based on exact knowledge, and it is our duty to purify it by critique and to harmonize it with science.

The reconciliation of moral ideals to knowledge, of religious faith to science is not of to-day nor of yesterday. Ever since humanity has aspired to progress and to increase in wisdom as well as in power, there has been a constant readjustment of the relation of these two factors. The prophet Hosea says:

"Hear the word of the Lord, ye children of Israel: * * * My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge. Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee."

It is lack of knowledge, or as we would now say, of science, that threatens to be destructive. If our clergy do not cease to preach creed, if they oppose science because it is in conflict with their creed, they will no longer remain priests of the Almighty, *i. e.*, of the moral power that leads humanity onward on the path of progress. They will deteriorate into a caste of time-servers and hypocrites, for they are lacking in the faith of the grain of mustard seed, which is the power of growth and progress.

Superstitions have under exceptional conditions, in the days of man's childhood, served as substitutes for faith; but we should learn that they are not the living faith itself nor do they add to the strength of faith. They rather detract from its vigor, its purity, and its nobility. Superstitions and the lack of knowledge will ultimately lead to perdition. On the other hand we should learn that our faith, our confidence in the truth of moral ideals, is by no means subverted if the superstitions incidentally connected therewith are recognized as illusions. Science of late has done away with many errors which had grown dear to us, but it has not and never will do away with our ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. It has rather taught us the laws according to which they can more and more be realized. Ideals evolve and change and, upon the whole, they progress and are improved.

If the grain rots in the earth we no longer fear that it is lost. We now know that the transformation is no sign of decay but of growth and as the husks of our

superstitious notions are breaking, a new faith bursts forth which will be wider and broader, purer and greater than all the old creeds with their narrow sectarian convictions. Dogmas will be forgotten, but Religion will remain. All the creeds will die away, but Faith will live forever. P. C.

THE FRIAR.

BY * * *

A friar, still in youth,
Enters the abbot's cell;
He modestly begins
His misery to tell,
In hope confession may
The pain of heart dispel:
"In spite of all my prayer
With me no peace doth dwell."

The old man kindly looks
In his repentant face,
And says, "Thou must believe
In God and in His grace!"
"O father, that I could
These doubts of mine efface,
And simple as a child
The hope of Christ embrace.

My conscience never can
Find from my sin release.
The more I ponder them,
The more my doubts increase.
Oh, to believe in God!
Oh, that this pain would cease.
I fear, there is no truth,
There is in life no peace!"

Old volumes in that cell
On shelves were placed around.
The authors of them had
In past times tried to sound
The very depth of truth,
And found it too profound.
Now, through the books, methinks,
Compassion did resound.

The abbot wistfully
Gazed at him in his pain.
A silence long and sad
Did all his heart explain;
But in his thoughtful eyes
Was writ this doleful strain:
"Thou look'st for peace and truth
In this, our world, in vain."

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

SAD is the flower, O Sun, that decks the way
Too soon; while yet the wind of winter blows,
And blissful are the blossoms that unclose
Their tender petals to the warmth of May.

Sad is the soul, O Truth, that sees thy ray
Too soon; and blest, ah, doubly blest are those
Who linger dreaming till their sweet repose
Is broken by the warmer beam of day.

Now joyous nature holds the vernal rite
And worships thee beneath the cloudless sky,
O Sun, from whom is life and all delight:

Yet one that loves thy bounty breathes a sigh:—
Ah, wherefore whisper, seeing all so bright,
O Truth, that e'en by this the Sun shall die?

TO JOHN BRIGHT.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

WELL named, for all his valiant life was bright
With noble deeds. He rent the cloud that hung
Heavy on England. Words upon his tongue
Took wings of fire that made the darkness light.

His love was large. In days that worship might
He stood for justice, and with justice wrung
The prey from might itself. He died too young
To lose the faith that leans upon the right.

When England laughed to see the blood we let,
And hoped our nation dead, he held alone
For union. Brothers all, must we forget?

Though waning senates groveled at the throne
Of vile expedience, the world knew yet
One statesman that durst call his soul his own.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THROW OPEN NATURAL OPPORTUNITIES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

No doubt THE OPEN COURT has received a surfeit of letters defending or explaining the "Henry George doctrine," but I desire to notice a phase of the question which has not received the attention it deserves, *viz.*, "That poverty is the result of man's inherent vices."

"In man's obedience to moral laws (?) he finds the *only* magic wherewith to change the face of society."

This Calvinistic doctrine clashes with my sense of justice. As I apprehend Wheelbarrow's "morality," it is a compound of foresight, economy, thrift, and industry.

If prosperity is the result of superior moral qualities, then the morality of Jay Gould must be far greater than that of Wheelbarrow, and before Wheelbarrow presumes to teach morality, he must prove—by showing his vast possessions—that he himself is moral. Jay Gould, not Wheelbarrow, ought to teach morality; for is not his wealth the result of foresight, economy, thrift, and industry? Does this then not prove that he possesses in large degree, morality? To answer in the negative at once overthrows Wheelbarrow's philosophy, for then it is readily perceived that prosperity, and its attendant possibilities, is not necessarily the result of moral virtue.

"Ah, but we should be contented with our conditions, simply striving to do right."

No sir, contentment is ignorance; is conservatism; a progress-blighting philosophy. Who dares preach contentment to the father of a starving child? Tell poverty to be shrewd, to gamble upon what the *morrow* will bring forth? Advise it to be economical when its pressing necessities demand consumption? To be thrifty when it is bending every energy to relieve the hunger of yesterday? To be industrious when work at any price is looked upon as a boon?

We cannot teach morality, and I mean *morality*, to dead men; as a first condition they *must* be alive, and the less energy there is devoted to the struggle for mere existence, the more can be expended in developing moral character.

The spirit of the Henry George doctrine is expressed in the

following excerpt from THE OPEN COURT, page 1479: "So far as our knowledge reaches, thus far do we intellectually own nature, and can hope to rule its course in the interest of humanity by *accommodating ourselves and natural events to nature's unalterable laws.*"

We aim at this, that is all, and as a primary and yet vital step in that direction, we seek to open up natural opportunities, confident that if we start right we are sure to follow up the advantage. Will not Wheelbarrow drop his pre-conceived ideas or theories long enough to study what it is we aim at, and then join us in this great struggle for the rights of man?

Fraternally yours,

NEW YORK CITY. BENJ. DOBLIN.

NATURAL OPPORTUNITIES AND TOM'S BOOT.*

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

"I THINK there be six Richmonds in the field." I have answered five, and now comes Mr. Doblin with new arguments. He charges at an effigy of me made out of his own head, as the schoolboy made the ship. I merely call upon him to direct his lance at me, and not at my "Counterfeit presentment." Mr. Doblin makes phrases, puts them into quotation marks, and then refutes their argument. This in itself is innocent enough, but people who do not understand it may infer from the quotation marks that the phrases and their sentiments are mine.

I never said "morality is a compound of foresight, economy, thrift, and industry." These are useful ingredients of character, but they are chiefly duties to ourselves. They are in the moral code indeed, but its more important parts prescribe the duties which we owe to others, the higher obligations of "morality."

Mr. Doblin cuts, clips, shortens, plaits, and takes in fold after fold of the spiritual garment called "morality" until it is diminished to the stature of a man whom he calls Jay Gould. Then he insinuates that "Wheelbarrow" did the tailoring, and that the diminished robe exactly fits my pattern of morality. I may exclaim with Cassius in the play, "You wrong me every way, you wrong me Brutus;" you charge to me a superstructure which I never built, for contrasts and comparisons I never thought of.

Is it not presumptuous to sit in judgment on our fellow men, and tell the world that we are holier than they? Is it not self-righteous to contrast the vices of his 'Jay Gould' with the shining virtues of ourselves? Our moralizers would become insolvent if that "awful warning" should be called to his reward. He serves the purpose of a dummy block whereon reformers may display their neighbor's fault for public reprobation. When they have it fitted on the image to the worst advantage they advertise it and exclaim, "Here is a choice article of social wickedness; see how it fits this dummy." Not one of them will try it on himself and say, "Behold, how closely it fits me." So handy is that Wall Street curiosity to "point a moral, and adorn a tale," that I sometimes think the odium cast upon him springs from envy at his vices and his luck. I fear to weigh my own righteousness against the sins of any man, lest when I gaze into my looking glass I see reflected there the features of that man.

The ironical sentiment about contentment is put within quotation marks as if it came from me. I am innocent of it; but it furnishes a text for high grade moral reprobation, which I heartily approve. All I ask is that the indignant "No Sir!" be addressed to the guilty person, and not to me. I am on record against contentment, if by that is meant the end of aspiration for myself, or the end of work for others. Neither have I ever told poverty to gamble upon what the *morrow* will bring forth. The odds against poverty are too great.

If I ever advised poverty to be thrifty in order to "relieve the hunger of yesterday," I did a foolish thing. I think I am innocent of that also, although I plead guilty of advising thrift against the hunger of to-morrow. I never grieved over the "hunger of yesterday" but once, and that was when I was a little boy. I was asked If I would have a bit of meat pie; I said "No," when I meant "Yes," and was taken at my word. Next day I was tortured by the vision of that lost meat pie. Towards night it occurred to me that it was useless to weep over the hunger of yesterday and I have never done so since. It is the hunger of to-day that worries me.

I fully agree with Mr. Doblin that we cannot teach morality to dead men. I think with him that as a "first condition" of success in teaching, the pupils "*must* be alive."

As to the "spirit of the Henry George doctrine" I have no quarrel with it; "the letter killeth." It is not Mr. George's motives, but his measures that I question. I am as anxious as he is to "open up the natural opportunities," although I think the phrase is vague, uncertain, and misleading. We differ as to the means by which to "open up." Tom Kennedy and I were shovelers in the same gang. We were working on a bit of railroad not far from Chambly in Canada, and lodged in the house of a little Frenchman there. Tom was an Irishman, who reached conclusions by the most illogical means. One night he woke up complaining of the closeness of the room. "We must have some fresh air," he said, "I'll open up the windy." Instead of doing so in a Christian manner, he picked up one of my boots and flung it through the glass into the street, where I found it in the morning. Tom's conclusions were all right, but his way of reaching them was defective. Fresh air was a "natural opportunity" to which he was entitled, but he had no right to obtain it by throwing another man's boot through a third man's window. Neither has Mr. George nor Mr. Doblin.

If I should ask Mr. Doblin to "drop his pre-conceived ideas" in favor of Mr. George's theory, long enough to study my objections to it, he would rightly consider my demand unreasonable. It is not necessary to the candid study of any subject that a man should drop his pre-conceived ideas concerning it; yet Mr. Doblin, with complacent self esteem, demands that I drop my pre-conceived ideas of his particular faith before I study it. This is a concession which no disputant has a right to ask of his antagonist. A man who denied the efficacy of prayer was requested by the preacher to give the matter "prayerful consideration."

My pre-conceived ideas of taxation leaned very much toward the scheme of Henry George. I am dropping some of them because the study of the question leads me to doubt their wisdom and their justice. For instance in the case of Thomas Clark, the farmer whom I spoke of lately. I think that society has no right to confiscate his farm because some other man holds land for speculative purposes. To tax it away from him by Mr. George's plan is to confiscate it.

"The Rights of Man." What man? What are the rights of Thomas Clark to the farm which he has literally planted in the wilderness? To tax the value of that farm to its full amount, the whole of which value has been made by the hard labor of Clark, would be a wrong for which the only excuse would be a plea of political insanity.

* When I wrote this I had not yet seen the letter of Rev. Hugh O. Pentecost in No. 85 of THE OPEN COURT.

NOTES.

We have received an interesting lecture by W. Lymington Brown, M. D., upon *Benjamin Franklin.* It is an instructive sketch of the life of our great countryman, full of many salutary lessons.

Charles Eliot Norton, of Harvard, will contribute to *Scribner's* for May, a paper upon "The Lack of Old Homes in America," and the associations and sentiments of which we are thereby deprived.

We read with great pleasure and satisfaction the articles by Pericles, in *The Independent Pulpit*.

We have received a number of *Tracts for Christians* from Mr. R. Randolph, of Philadelphia, the author of "Aspects of Humanity." Among them also a little brochure entitled "Stages of Faith, or Traces of Divine Mediation in Human Intelligence."

Miss Mary Morgan (Gowan Lea) will contribute to THE OPEN COURT a series of translations from Goethe, Rinkert, Chamisso, Platen, Eichendorf, Ernst Schultze, Hoffmann von Hattersleben and Paul Fleming, under the title "Gems from the German."

A new magazine for teachers, outside of the usual line of school journals, will be commencod May 1, 1889 It will endeavor to interest teachers and older pupils in the work of the scientific and literary world, and present an "outlook" upon current events, etc. It will be called the *Teacher's Outlook*, and published by the Teachers' Publishing Co., Des Moines, Iowa.

In a pamphlet styled *Unitarians as Congregationalists*, Mr. J. H. Crooker, of Madison, Wis., after sketching the rise and extension of Unitarian doctrines, refers to "the issue in the West." "The only way out of our so-called Western difficulties," says Mr. Crooker, "is in loyalty to Congregational Polity. . . . . Western Unitarianism must be left free to grow and to define itself by the work of its several churches."

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—Continued.

The Professor went away; the ladies talked confidentially over the family at home, during which Mrs. Rollmaus could not entirely give up her scientific investigations; for, in the middle of the conversation, she put her fingers on Ilse's temples, and begged permission to feel the crown of her head; whereupon she said, with much delight, "There is much sincerity there, as I should have supposed." She then looked significantly at Ilse. She was loquacious and flippant, but she showed a degree of restraint which Ilse attributed to the strangeness of the place.

After Mrs. Rollmaus had admired the dwelling, criticized the pictures, and felt the texture of the furniture coverings, Ilse pointed to the sun, which was breaking through the clouds, and proposed that they should walk out into the park. Mrs. Rollmaus assented with pleasure, and Ilse had much to do to answer the questions of the excitable lady. Then they came to a part of the grounds which served as a promenade at this hour for the ladies and people of the city. "What a surprise," exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus, suddenly seizing Ilse's arm, "the princely livery." At a turn in the path, the hat of a lackey became visible; the Princess, accompanied by Lady Gottlinde and Prince Victor, came directly towards them. Amidst the respectful greetings of the promenaders, the princely party approached. Ilse stepped aside, and curtsied. The Princess stopped. "We were on the point of calling on you," she began, kindly; "my brother was obliged to leave suddenly; he will have told your father how sorry he was that he could not take any messages from you to your family." She gave a passing look at Mrs. Rollmaus, who was supporting herself with both her hands on her umbrella, bending her head forward, not to lose a syllable that fell from the lips of the princely lady. Ilse mentioned her name.

"A kind friend from the neighborhood of Rossau, who is spending a few days near here."

Mrs. Rollmaus ducked down very low, and, almost unconscious from terror, said: "It is only three miles from here, in Toadville; although, if I may, by your Highness's permission, be graciously allowed to say so, there are no more toads there than in any other respectable place."

"You are taking a walk," said the Princess, to Ilse, "will you accompany me a little way?" She beckoned Ilse to her side, placing herself between her and the lady in waiting. Prince Victor remained behind with Mrs Rollmaus.

"So toads are not pastured on your estate?" began the Prince.

"No, my gracious ——," replied Mrs. Rollmaus, embarrassed, supporting herself on her umbrella. "I do not really know what is the right title to address you with."

"Prince Victor," replied the young gentleman, carelessly.

"I beg your pardon; but this honorable name does not satisfy me. May I beg to know the other title, similar to what, in the case of pastors, would be expressed by Very Reverend? For to offend princely persons would not be pleasant, and I am not conversant with these forms of address."

"High and honorable lady, you may call me Highness; thus we shall both have our rights."

"It shall be as you command," exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus, delighted.

"You have long known the Professor's wife?"

"From her childhood," explained Mrs. Rollmaus; "I was a friend of her deceased mother, and I can truly say that I have shared both happiness and sorrow with our dear Ilse. Prince Victor, it is impossible for your Highness to know her true heart as well as we do. Latterly, through her learned acquaintances, she has come into another atmosphere; but long before her betrothal it was clear to me that it would be a match."

"Good," said the Prince. "How long do you remain in the neighborhood?"

"Only until the end of the week; for Rollmaus prefers the country to the city, which is not to be wondered at; he has not the inclination for intellectual pursuits by which I am inspired. For this there is

* Translation copyrighted.

more opportunity in the city, although one, even in the country, can make one's observations on heads and other natural objects."

"The weather is changeable; is your carriage closed?" interrupted the Prince.

"It is a britscka, with a leather top to it," replied Mrs. Rollmaus. "I must honestly avow to you that it has been quite an unexpected pleasure to me that this visit has afforded the opportunity of seeing your Highness, for I have heard very much of you."

"I should be very grateful to you," replied the Prince, "if you would kindly tell me what you have heard. I have hitherto believed that my reputation was not by any means so bad as it might be."

"No one, however noble he may be, can escape calumny." exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus, eagerly; "they talk of tricks. I fear your Highness will take it amiss if I mention this gossip."

"Tell me something of it," replied the Prince, "whatever it may be."

"They maintain that your Highness is convivial and lives quite boisterously, and other things which it would be unpleasant for me to repeat."

"Go on," said the Prince, cheerfully.

"That your Highness makes fools of other people."

"That is grievous," replied the Prince. "Is your coachman a courageous man?"

"He is somewhat surly even with Rollmaus, who indulges him much."

"Believe me Mrs. Rollmaus," continued the Prince, "it is a sorrowful business to be a prince. Disquiet from morning to evening. Every one will have something, and no one brings anything except bills. Thus all gaiety is sacrificed, one becomes sad, and slinks about through the bushes. My favorite recreation is a little quiet conversation in the evening with my old nurse and instructress, the widowed Cliquot, and to play a little 'patience.' Then one counts the good works that one has done during the day, sighs that they are so few, and looks for one's boot-jack. We are the victims of our position. If there is anything I envy the Professor's wife, it is her servant Gabriel, a trustworthy man, whom I recommend to your favorable attention."

"I know him," replied Mrs. Rollmaus; "I must acknowledge that the autobiography which you have given me agrees with all that I have discovered from the structure of your Highness's head, so far as your hat does not deprive one of the sight of it, which indeed is very much the case."

"I would be thankful to my cranium," muttered the Prince, "if it would lead everyone to believe my words as easily as you do."

"As long as I live, it will be a pleasure as well as a souvenir to me," continued Mrs. Rollmaus, with an ambulatory curtsy, "to have been brought by accident to this intimate intercourse with your Highness, the remembrance of which I will, if I may be allowed to say so, recall to myself by your Highness's picture, which I hope may be had in the shops. I shall place myself before it when I am in the singular number, as now my son Karl does with his grammar, and think of past hours."

Prince Victor gave Mrs. Rollmaus a look of friendly benevolence.

"I will never allow you to buy my portrait. I beg permission to send you a copy as a remembrance. It is, unfortunately, not so true as I could wish. The painter has made me too large, and I am not quite content with the costume: it looks like a clergyman's gown. Meanwhile I beg you kindly to imagine it without this superfluity. Has the Chief Inspector Rollmaus good horses? Does he raise them himself?

"Always, your Highness, he is famed for it among the neighbors."

The Prince turned with fresh interest towards the little lady.

"Perhaps one could transact some business with him. I am looking out for some strong saddle-horses. What kind of a man is he to deal with?" he asked, frankly.

"He is a very sharp tradesman," replied Mrs. Rollmaus, hesitatingly, and looking at the Prince with secret pity. "He is considered by his acquaintances as an expert in horses, and—and, if I may say so—is rather knowing."

The Prince pursed up his lips, bringing out a sound almost like a suppressed whistle.

"Then he is very unlike the highly honored lady, and I shall hardly be able to do business with him. Would it not give the Professor's wife pleasure to visit you for a few days in the village of toads?"

"It would be the greatest pleasure to us," exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus, "but the house is empty, and is not furnished, and we must manage as best we can, and the victuals, too, as a rule, are cold."

"Only in case of extreme necessity, I mean."

Meanwhile Ilse was walking by the side of the Princess through the groups of citizens making their obeisances, but her heart was not so light as that of Mrs. Rollmaus. The Princess spoke kindly to her, but upon indifferent subjects, and she turned frequently to the other side to her lady. It was clearly not her wish to enter into more conversation with Ilse than was absolutely necessary. Ilse saw clearly that it was a show of favor before the world; she felt the intention of it, and asked herself secretly why it was necessary, and her pride revolted at this graciousness, which did not come from the heart. The Princess kept Ilse for some time in the most crowded part of the promenade.

"I leave the palace to-day," said the Princess, "and go for a few days or weeks into the country. Perhaps I shall have the pleasure of seeing you there."

At parting Prince Victor took off his hat politely, but only said: "The air is becoming sultry."

Ilse brooded over this little incident as she returned with her companion to the Pavillion. She answered the animated questions of Mrs. Rollmaus absent-mindedly, and only gave a half-look at the promenaders, many of whom now took off their hats to her.

Gabriel had prepared some coffee in honor of Mrs. Rollmaus, and had set the table in front of the door. There the ladies sat down. Mrs. Rollmaus looked enchanted at the blooming azaleas, praised the cake of the palace, and still more the princely personages, and chatted away in her best humor, whilst Ilse looked seriously down.

"I have seen some of the princely personages, and I should now like to see the fortune-teller. It is remarkable, dear Ilse, that my valuable connection with the Professor always brings in question the power of soothsaying. It is really not from inconsiderate curiosity that I wish to question this person. It is no object to me to learn about my future. I know sufficiently how this will all be. For to a certain extent we live under natural conditions; first the children come, then they grow up, one becomes older, and if one does not die too young, one lives a little longer. That has never been inscrutable to me, and I do not know what a person could now discover for me. It would, therefore, be some misfortune that would come to pass, and I do not wish to have that prophesied. I wish it only for the sake of instruction, to find out whether such a person knows more than we others. For in our days there are doubts about the powers of soothsaying, and I myself have never had a presentiment, except once, when I had the toothache, and dreamt that I smoked a pipe, which took place and had a nauseous effect; but this cannot be called wonderful."

"Perhaps the fortune-teller knows more than others," replied Ilse, absently, "because she has somehow made herself acquainted with their history."

"I have thought of something," cried Mrs. Rollmaus; "I would ask her about the silver soup-ladle, which, in an inexplicable way, disappeared from our kitchen."

"What will the lady give me if I tell her?" asked a hollow voice.

Mrs. Rollmaus started. At the corner of the house stood a large woman behind the flower-pots; from her shoulders hung a ragged cloak, her head was covered with a dark handkerchief, from under which two flashing eyes were fixed upon the ladies. Mrs. Rollmaus seized Ilse's arm, and cried out, terrified: "There is the fortune-teller herself, dear Ilse. I beg your advice; shall I ask her?"

The woman stepped cautiously from behind the plants, placed herself in front of Ilse, and raised her handkerchief. Ilse rose and looked annoyed on the sharp features of the withered face.

"The gipsy!" she exclaimed, stepping back.

"A tinkering woman!" exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus, displeased; "the secret knowledge of such as she is, is connected with poultry-stealing, and worse things. First they steal and conceal, and then tell where the stolen property is."

The stranger paid no attention to the attack of Mrs. Rollmaus.

"You have hunted my people like the foxes in the wood; the frost has killed them; your watchmen have imprisoned them, and those that still live lie within walls, clinking their chains; I rove alone through the country. Do not think of what was done by the men that night, think only of what I predicted. Has it not come to pass? You look on the stone house opposite, and you see how slowly he comes along the gravel-path, to the room in which the naked boy hangs on the ceiling."

Ilse's countenance changed.

"I do not understand what you mean. Only one thing I see, that you are no stranger here."

"Many years have my feet glided through the snow," continued the gipsy, "since I passed through the doors of these black creatures."

She pointed to the angels holding tulip wreaths.

"Now disease has come upon me."

She stretched out her hand:

"Give to the sick woman of the high road, who once went on the same path that you are now treading."

The color rose in Ilse's cheeks; she gazed fixedly on the beggar woman, and shook her head.

"It is not money that I want from you," continued the gipsy. "Entreat the spirit of this house for me, if he should appear to you. I am weary, and seek rest for my head. Tell him that the strange woman on whom he hung this token," she pointed to her neck, "begs for his help."

Ilse stood motionless; her cheeks glowed and her eyes flashed angrily on the woman.

"What will you give to find your silver again?" asked the beggar, in an altered tone, turning to Mrs. Rollmaus.

"So you are the fortune-teller?" said Mrs. Rollmaus, angrily, "and not a penny will I give you. Any one who examined your head would find a fine organism there. I have often heard such gibberish. Away with you before the police come. One of your

people prophesied to my head-maid that she would marry a landed proprietor, and I was obliged to dismiss her, though she had been very useful. She began to attack even Rollmaus himself, although he only laughed at her. Go, we will have nothing to do with you."

"Think of my request," cried the stranger to Ilse. "I shall return."

The gipsy turned away and disappeared behind the house.

"They are scamps," said Mrs. Rollmaus, deeply irritated. "Believe nothing of what they say to you. This one talks worse nonsense than the others. I really believe, dear Ilse, you take to heart what this beggar woman has said."

"She knows this house, she knew well what she says," said Ilse, faintly.

"Naturally," exclaimed Mrs. Rollmaus; "they rove about and peep through all the crevices, they have a good memory for other people's business, but do not remember their own thievish tricks. I have a great suspicion of her as regards my soup-ladle. If this is the famous fortune-teller I am so disgusted as not to care to make any further inquiries. Ah! and you also, I see."

"I know the woman," replied Ilse; "she belongs to the band who stole our children, and wounded the arm of my Felix. Now her uncanny figure comes before me like a spirit, and her dark words excite horror in me. She threatens to return, and terror seizes me lest this woman should once more come upon me unawares. I must away from here."

Ilse hastened into the house, Mrs. Rollmaus followed her, and said, kindly:

"If she comes again, she shall be sent away. The best way of dealing with these prognosticators is to imprison them with bread and water."

Ilse stood in the sitting-room looking timidly about her.

"He who hung the cross upon her was the master of this castle; and when she spoke those wild words to me at the gate of the farm yard, she did not mean my Felix."

"She meant eight shillings, and nothing more," said Mrs. Rollmaus, consolingly.

"How dare she compare my life with hers? How does she know whether the lord of this house attends to my words?"

Mrs. Rollmaus endeavored in vain to tranquilize her, by sensible observations upon the worthlessness of these female vagabonds. Ilse looked down, with her hands folded, and the consolatory speeches of her worthy friend were spoken in vain.

Strange voices were heard in the house; Gabriel opened the door, and announced the Intendant. The old man entered the room officiously and begged to be excused for the interruption.

"My most gracious master has commanded me to inquire whether a strolling woman has been begging here. She has slipped into the castle, obtained access to the Princess, and frightened her, just when her Highness was departing for the country. His Highness wishes to warn you against the stranger—she is a dangerous person."

"She was here," replied Ilse, "and talked wildly; she showed that she knew the house."

The Intendant looked disturbed, as he continued:

"A long time ago, her Highness, the deceased Princess, took compassion on a gipsy girl whose mother had died on the high road. She had the creature instructed, and, as she was amusing, and seemed to promise well, she was at last taken into the castle and employed in small services; but she has badly repaid this generous treatment. At a time of heavy affliction in the castle, this person fell back into the habits of her childhood; she took to stealing, and disappeared. To-day, one of the servants recognized the maiden in this strange woman. His Highness, the gracious Prince, who is ailing, was informed of this by his valet and was much excited by it. Search is being made through all the streets and roads for the stranger."

The old man took leave. He looked gloomily after him; but she said with more composure to Mrs. Rollmaus:

"This accounts for the language of the stroller, which sounded different to that of begging people in general, and it accounts for her wish to receive the pardon of the Prince."

But now Mrs. Rollmaus in her turn became depressed and sad.

"Ah, dear Ilse! if the witch has really lived here among these distinguished people, she may know many things that have happened in this house; for people do not speak well of it, and they say that in former times princely mistresses lived here. The house is not to blame, nor are we; it is only because the Hereditary Prince has gone to your father, and you knew him at the University, that people shake their heads at it; it is idle gossip."

"What gossip?" exclaimed Ilse, in a hoarse voice, seizing the hand of Mrs. Rollmaus.

"They say that you are the cause of the Hereditary Prince coming into our country. We should all rejoice if you were to visit your father before you journey, as was intended; but I really believe, as long as the Prince is there, it would be better for you to remain here, or anywhere else. It is only for the sake of prudence," she continued, soothingly, "and you must not take it to heart."

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DAVENPORT ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES. Vol. IV, (1882–84), Vol. V, part I (1884–89). Davenport, Iowa. Published by the Academy.

Before coming to Davenport a few weeks ago we were unaware of the value of its Museum. Having been asked by an acquaintance to visit the place we were fortunate enough to find in the venerable curator, Mr. W. H. Pratt, a friendly and enthusiastic guide, who is ever willing to show and explain the collections under his care to interested visitors. In some departments the Davenport Museum of Natural Sciences is undoubtedly the richest west of Chicago; as to the number of mound builder's pipes,—among them the much disputed elephant pipes,—it takes first rank, having not less than sixty, while the next largest collection extant contains but forty. We cannot repeat here the interesting remarks of our Mentor concerning this collection and the noteworthy tablets but would refer students to the extensive and apparently thorough vindication of the same, prepared by the late Mr. C. E. Putnam, in the latter part of Vol. IV, of the proceedings.

The collection of skulls, taken from mounds and from more recent burial places, is a study in itself. The entomological department, the herbarium, and the great mass of archaeological relics would be attractive to any specialist, not to speak of other treasures hoarded together in that snug little building. There is a sort of scientific air about it, which makes itself especially felt in the library room; it is just the place for lectures on scientific subjects to a select circle; and the student who may have leisure to go there in the morning or afternoon, will find the much needed quiet as well as the material for profitable study. The Academy exchanges periodicals with many scientific institutions all over the world, and we find reports and proceedings in fourteen different languages, the contents of which will be easily accessible when the well advanced card-catalogue is finished.

From what we have seen we conclude that geology, archaeology, and ornithology are favorite branches of study among the members of the Davenport Academy; and a glance at the above named volumes of proceedings shows the two most extensive articles to be one on ancient pottery (illustrated) by Wm. H. Holmes in Vol. IV, and one on the birds of Iowa by Chas. R. Keyes and H. S. Williams in Vol. V. It is almost unnecessary to add that it will pay any scientist who happens to come to Davenport, to inspect the "Academy of Sciences" on Brady street.

THE LIMITATIONS OF TOLERATION. A Discussion between Col. Robert G. Ingersoll, Hon Frederic R. Coudert, Ex-Gov. Stewart L. Woodford. New York: The Truth Seeker Co.

This discussion was held before the Nineteenth Century Club of New York, at the Metropolitan Opera House. It is now printed in pamphlet form from a stenographical report, and comprises forty-four pages. The remarks of the late Mr. Courtlandt Palmer, who presided at the meeting, are likewise included. The debate between these three gentlemen, for such it was, is well worth reading, and although from the colloquial form in which it is cast, it has not the literary charm that marks the written compositions of either of the eminent speakers, its dash and general inpromptu character afford a pleasing substitute.

The Root of the Temperance Problem—a lecture by J. H. Crooker, Madison, Wis.—is now circulated in pamphlet form. Mr. Crooker's remarks embrace a brief survey of the temperance problem. The writer advocates that there can be no genuine temperance reform apart from the general advance of society. "Substantial progress must come, can only come, from that regeneration of man's nature which consists in that spiritual emancipation where reason and conscience prevail over appetite and which will be brought about by all those educational influences which add to Inner Life."

Universalism, What it is and What it is good for, is a prize essay by Rev. O. Cone, D. D., president of Buchtel College. It is an exposition of "the Christian doctrine known as universalism," which is now preached in "one thousand parishes," and taught in "four colleges" and "three Theological Seminaries." (Philadelphia: Universalist Convention.)

PUBLICATIONS OF THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT.

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

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

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

SENSATION AND THE OUTER WORLD...A. BINET....No. 83.

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DREAMS, SLEEP AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

M. Binet, after having animadverted upon the impropriety of excluding metaphysical questions from the domain of science, proceeds in the above-mentioned essay to discuss the interesting question of the relation between human sensation and its normal excitant, the external world. No resemblance is predicable, maintains M. Binet, between the perceptions of consciousness and the bodies that exist beyond us. Doctrines enunciating such resemblance, the author declares fallacious, and terms them "crude and naïve realisms." This fallacy, however, is widely prevalent in science. Physicists and philosophers still hold that the definitive explanation of natural phenomena is a mechanical explanation, wherein the concepts of mass and force are the ultimate and fundamental data. They fail to recognize, in this, the purely subjective character of sensations. They translate, merely, sensations of one kind into sensations of another kind, which seem to us more precise; thus, they explain the phenonenon of sound by the phenomenon of a vibration; merely substituting, thereby, a visual sensation for an auditory sensation. This leads the author to discuss the supreme importance of the visual sense in the investigation of phenomena; the possibility of a purely auricular science is held forth; the author shows that the ear, by noting the *qualities* of sound, can solve *numerical* problems. Thus, the progression of human knowledge is accompanied by a progresion of human capabilities. The future will transform our sciences; it may transform our senses.

Sensation and the phenomena of the external world, it is granted, *are* different. But does it follow that knowledge of external objects is therefore impossible? The electrical phenomenon traversing the wire of a telephone bears no resemblance to the spoken words thrown against the mouth-piece in the shape of air-waves; no more so than does sensation the external object. Yet is communication by means of a telephone impossible? *Are* not the spoken words reproduced at the other end of the line in substantially the form in which they were received? *Preservation of form* is all that is necessary; and this is possible even where there is no superficial resemblance. It is a contradiction to demand that knowledge should be other than it is. Cognition does not, and *need* not, go beyond sensation.

In Numbers 82 and 83 two interesting letters appear, discussing questions raised by the articles of Dr. G. M. Gould upon Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness—practical studies upon the psychology of consciousness.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE.

ETHICAL EVOLUTION. PROF. E. D. COPE.....No. 82.

The utilitarian theory of morals, says the distinguished author has found in the law of evolution a permanent substantiation. Yet does that doctrine embrace the *whole* truth, does it embody exclusively the law of human ethical progress? Ethical conduct, it is true, is an outgrowth of natural mental constitution; it differs among individuals, among families, among races; physical necessities, and conditions of environment direct it. But the knowledge of right is an intellectual faculty. Ethical life expresses, further, the highest development of humanity. Accordingly, moral conduct has *various* phrases of evolution: the rational as well as the natural, the individual as well as the social; to which corresponding motives of utility, egoism, and altruism belong. We find these motives interacting, each predominant in their respective spheres. The rational element has found its expression in generalization, in the formation by far seeing men of ethical codes; the affectional element, the element of Love, has found its expression in beneficent altruism, wherein the filial relation to God forms an abiding motive to action. The faculty of reason and the sentiment of love ensure ethical perfection.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS. FELIX L. OSWALD, M.D. Nos. 81, 84.

Interesting essays in moral physiology, abounding in citations from history and science in support of the positions taken.

NEWS ABOUT THE PLANETS AND THE MOON.....No. 80.

This constitutes a survey of the latest astronomical observations. It includes a brief account of the canals on the surface of Mars, with their various attendant phenomena; the rotation of Jupiter; the temperature of the moon; and the strange light-phenomena recently observed in the neighborhood of Saturn.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW .....No. 73

CORBESPONDENCE UPON THE DOCTRINE OF HENRY GEORGE..... Nos. 79, 80, 82, 84.

The criticisms by Wheelbarrow, touching the doctrines of Henry George, have evoked much comment and discussion. The main bulk of the correspondence relative to this question, remains still unpublished; showing the wide-spread interest taken in the subject, and the undoubted popularity of Mr. George's theories. The main endeavor of our correspondents seems directed towards demonstrating Wheelbarrows ignorance and misunderstanding of the great economist's position. This Wheelbarrow seeks to refute in a letter in No. 82.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DILEMMA OF DOUBLE ALLEGIANCE. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL ....No. 81.

The article by Gen. Trumbull is opportune. Its tone and position is commendable. Amid the chauvinistic fanfaronade of demagogic statesmen and bellicose newspapers, evoked by petty irritations over Samoa coal-stations and bait for cod-fish, the thoughtful citizen of foreign birth must often feel the appalling meaning that the problem of double allegiance embodies. "What is the ethics of patriotism that must guide us in case of actual war?" "The duty of men embarassed by the ties of double allegiance," says Gen. Trumbull, "is to stand bravely by the republic whatever comes, but they ought to unite their moral and political influence to promote the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful arbitration." The question has excited much comment from the press throughout the country.

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THE UNIVERSAL FAITH.

A MONISTIC, POSITIVE, HUMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE RELIGION.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

In the remarkable discussion* between Frederick Harrison, the English Headcentre of the Comtists, and Prof. Thomas H. Huxley, the distinguished scientist, and the originator of the happy term "Agnostic," the most noteworthy passage is the following which we may call *Prof. Huxley's Profession of Faith.*

"That a man should determine to devote himself to the service of humanity—including intellectual and moral self-culture under that name; that this should be, in the proper sense of the word, his religion—is not only an intelligible, but, I think, a laudable resolution. And I am greatly disposed to believe that it is the only religion which will prove itself to be unassailably acceptable as long as the human race endures."—Prof. Huxley.

This frank and noble statement by the great Scientific Agnostic is indeed a jewel; a prize, to be carefully treasured up out of a discussion otherwise to be regretted, because tending to dissever and dissipate influences and efforts which might coöperate to realize that self-same religion.

That this statement is true, and that it is the substance of *The Universal Faith* which ought to influence intelligent people, has been for years the solid conviction of a number of those who adhere to the *American Secular Union*, who have been largely influenced by the works of Auguste Comte, and who are known as "Republican or American Positivists," but who have no connection with, and are in no wise recognized (except in their *anathema*) by the Comtist Papacy of which Pierre Lafitte (Peter the First) is grand Pontiff at Paris, and of which Dr. Richard Congreve and Mr. Frederick Harrison are the most distinguished English Hierophants.

One of the best known of this Republican School of Positive Religionists was Mr. Courtlandt Palmer, of New York, whose recent decease has been regarded not only by them, but by the liberal elements of our country generally, as an irreparable loss. The Open Court gave a friendly and appreciative recognition of the religious views of Mr. Palmer on the occasion of publishing (No. 71, Jan. 31, 1889) my address on that subject at the Memorial Meeting held in his honor by the Nineteenth Century Club, of New York, of which he was the founder and president. The Statement of the Universal, Monistic, Republican Religion in that address excited an interest which has called for further exposition, and no text could be more timely than the precious words above quoted from the Father of the Agnostics; a text, which we wish to repeat, and to emphasize by a fair explication of some of its implications.

The religion it describes as "devoted to the service of humanity," and "including" as its means "intellectual and moral self-culture," is the religion upon which, as it seems, all sensible people ought to agree as really true and good. Such general agreement added to its general complete and verifiable nature makes it at once synonymous with the general and universal faith or religion to be taught and practiced by man—in a word with the *Positive* and *Monistic* Religion of Science.

Next, it is evident, and is admitted, that this religion in order to include "intellectual self-culture," must rest upon that which is true, that is, upon *Science*, instead of notions which are unverifiable or unknowable to the intellect. In a word, this religion must, at its first step, satisfy *the head* by its truth.

Again, this religion, in order to "include moral self-culture," must rest upon morals and duty as distinguished from police or forceful laws: that is, moral conduct sanctioned by the intentions, motives, and emotions. This religion must also, therefore, by its culture of the intentions and emotions satisfy, educate, and enoble *the heart.*

Lastly, this religion is to determine its believers to devote themselves "to the service of humanity." We may spell the last word with a little *h*, when we consider the dark side of human nature, as the Professor does in the words about "apes" etc., which follow our text; or we may spell it with a capital *H*, when we consider the good in Humanity as a basis of historical and social evolution, as Comte showed us how to do, as Mr. Harrison has done in his "Meaning of History," and as Herbert Spencer (our philosophic Balaam) has proved it the right thing to do, in his Sociology.

What is the result? Why, we have "a religion" on hand again, with the same problems and very similar

*Reprinted in *The Truth Seeker*, and *The Popular Science Monthly*, New York City.

solutions, that the terrible, "asphyxiating" Comte gave us when we began to study Positivism 30 years ago: The three *H's* and the three *P's* still confront us, *viz.*:

The *Head* must have a true *Philosophy*.

The *Heart* must have a satisfying *Poesy*.

The *Hand* must have a beneficent *Polity*.

All these *H's* are to be reasonably devoted by "self-culture" to the service of humanity as the evolutional, social, and moral source, centre, test, aim, object, and joy of all. The clear head; the loving heart; and the helping hand:—Such seems to be the substance of the new religion by whomsoever stated, and under whatever name. How, for instance, does this programme differ from that of the Agnostic Professor? Why may not all Scientists, Agnostics, Positivists, Secularists, Socialists, and Reformers and well-wishers of their kind agree in his statement of the new religion? To so agree in a frank, practical, and honest, instead of a personal and disputatious spirit would certainly be the first step of a great advance towards its realization.

The next step would be to settle the three *P's*, so far at least, as to have a working base and method; and in so doing, we would have that inquiry under an intellectual and moral guide, (*viz.*, the service, that is, the good and glory of humanity,) the effect of which would almost of itself ensure, as to the result, a mighty power of agreement. For, under this scientific human test, the questions to be asked and answered are only two: 1. *Is it true?* 2. *Is it good?* That is, does our subjective agree with the objective order; our thoughts with things and their facts, laws, and processes. If so, do these, our ideas, notions, and feelings, care for and tend towards the good of the individual and the race?

1. If we apply these tests to the first question: *Which is the true Philosophy?* ought the Scientific, and therefore the intelligent world, to differ much about the substantial answer? The scientific method of verification stands firm. There is the Copernican Astronomy with its improvements from Bruno and Galileo to the Lick telescope: there are the immensities of space and time, and within them the "phenomenal" changes which we sense and call "matter": these changes are found to be correlates of each other, and the law of "the equivalence of forces" results. Each change is the centre of changes correlative in its environment and which extend by similar correlations in ever widening circles as we trace them, until they are lost in the infinite. Thus science leaves us only a *Monistic* world.

These things being so, every other philosophy, except the correlative or scientific, is ousted. There is no crack or cranny left between the correlates (which are the "causes" of each other) in which a god, spook, or entity, or miracle of any kind can be found or inserted. But the world, or universe, is conceivable only as infinite. There is, then, no place or room for causative or creative beings, within, before, or outside of the world. "Miracles do not happen." It follows that all theological and metaphysical philosophies are excluded by the simplest and most general facts and laws of science, and that a scientific classification of scientific knowledge is the only correlative, that is the only scientific, monistic, and positive philosophy possible. To achieve this philosophy, which is the knowable explanation of our world, is the greatest triumph of our race.

It is no answer to this conclusion to say, as Professor Huxley seems to do, that Comte tried to elaborate this philosophy, and that he did not know enough to do it well. To the great scientists who make this reproach the answer falls with crushing force: "It is your duty to supply, as speedily as possible, the defects of his time and his personal limitations, instead of trying to discredit the philosophy itself and the good work he may have done towards it." Even Mr. Spencer thought it well to borrow from Comte the fundamental words "sociology" and "altruism," and it does not appear that "synthetic" or "cosmic," is better than "positive" or "correlative" or "monistic" as a trade mark of the new unitary and scientific philosophy. The trouble with the Spencerian and Fiskian philosophy is that it is essentially dualistic and metaphysical. Comte, insufficient, verbose, and crude as he may be, avoided their capital error: *he no where breaks the back of the world.* His ultimate is *one*, unitary, correlative universe, of which the highest correlate, flower, and outcome, is *human love*, the coöperative unitary power of the human race. Upon this one infinite world, in its two aspects: 1. As *objective* or the "Not I" to man; and 2. As *subjective* or related to the "I," *i. e.*, subservient to man, he founds the future of the human race. All science since his day has confirmed this position. As long as the *extent*, *unity*, and grandeur of the mighty foundation he laid for the future activity of Humanity remains unrecognized, blaming his style and magnifying the defects of his ignorance and of his personality, can justly excite little more than contempt. Just as Kant, and all the thinkers between Hume and Comte, are to be understood, if at all, in relation to that great "sceptic," so Spencer and all of the scientists since Comte must have him and his work as their background to make any solid philosophical and moral sense of their works. For without some unity, some correlative outline, sustaining the true and good, they are only disjointed and incoherent chunks of intellectual and moral anarchy ending in "Administrative Nihilism," as Prof. Huxley has admirably proved in his essay under that title. Since the old divine and spook philosophies went out under the light of correlation, Spencer and the special

scientists have done invaluable work, but its philosophic value seems to be that they have been (often unconsciously) useful commentators upon, and amenders of the unitary positive philosophy which Comte founded, and which still stands as the base of the scientific philosophy upon which any religion satisfactory to the intellectual and moral nature of man must rest. This is so, because it first gave philosophic meaning to the four fundamental corner stones or conceptions of such a philosophy and its consequent religion, *viz.:*

a) *The relativity of human knowledge*, and its consequent limitation to the correlative and phenomenal as the knowable.

b) *The classification of the sciences*, reaching from the distant homogeneous nebulæ through the domains of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, and ethics to individual psychology and morals.

c) *The evolution of human history and civilization*, revealing a progressive order through fetichism, sabeanism (astrolatry), polytheism, monotheism, pantheism, to positive monism, with consequent humanism, social and moral.

d) *The conception of humanity as a great social organic being*, acting in continuity (as above stated, in history) and in solidarity under international law and politics, and so ideally and practically becoming a criterion and test of political and moral action to mankind.

e) The superstructure upon these corner stones can be none other than the new religion, the Monistic Universal Faith; the Religion of Science, and Humanity.

After years of consideration of the attacks of "Spencer and Co." upon these corner stones the verdict must be in the words of Mill and Bain in regard to their attacks upon his Classification of the Sciences, that they "have made out no case." Since Comte's day the great laws of correlation and evolution have made these corner stones immovable. Is it not time for the second thought of this generation to end all envious or idle criticisms, and to begin the practical work of constructing, teaching, and living the new religion?

2. If so, we are called to pass from the Philosophy to the *Poesy* or Art of the new Faith, that is, its satisfaction of the emotional nature of man. Under the test questions, 'What is true, What is good,' in this domain, the answers agree generally, that the objects of art are the culture, enjoyment, and education of our heart or emotional nature. All agree further as to the prime importance of this culture, for "out of the heart are the issues of life": the ideal is the permanent, the temporal and transitory only the symbol, as Goethe tells us in closing *Faust*, and in so many other beautiful ways and places. "The imagination, says he, "is indeed a grand faculty, but I like it not when it plays with facts." That is, the scientific, objective truth must be inviolable. The true in art is the ideally true. The imagination "bodies forth things all compact" and makes by its *poesy* (ποιέω) an ideal world for the culture, enoblement, and pleasure of man. By music he flies to a higher life! Here we have the method by which falsehood, and theosophic and metaphysical fog are ousted out of art, and the whole range of its creative powers is enobled by the resultant good and joy and glory of man.

Thus, for instance, the grand expansion of our cosmic emotions in natural poetry, in landscape-painting and gardening, by which the feelings lead the intellect in annexing the Cosmos to Man, is but the heart's reading and prophesy of the new monistic and natural philosophy on its æsthetic side.

A similar expansion of art in the human and historical world attends the extension of the theory of the evolution of civilization as we have it scientized in Kant, Herder, Condorcet, Comte, Guizot, and Spencer.

This new cosmic and human feeling, which is the predecessor of the new religion, is so manifestly triumphing in architecture, sculpture, poetry, painting and music, that the new life, the free human life it creates, is demanding a newer and a better polity by ever renewing political agitations, if not revolutions.

3. We are thus brought to the third, the practical and social domain which the new religion will gradually transform. What will be the *Polity* of the future? is the question. Unless we are to stumble on blindly, we are to take such answer as historical and social evolution indicates. The Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, American peoples, and their advanced philosophers and leaders, believe that the future indicated is the Federative Commonwealth, resting upon coöperative democracies enjoying "home rule," of which the Swiss and American Republics are, so far, our best prototypes, but far enough from perfect.

Comte, on the contrary, following the traditions of the Latin races and his own catholic and loyal descent, and influenced largely by De Maistre's powerful book on 'The Pope,' took it for granted at the beginning of his elaboration that its outcome must be a grand revival of the Papacy with science as its creed, a Pope of the civilized world at Paris, and a temporal power divided into countries so small that they could never, like the Princes of the Middle Ages, make any practical resistance to the Pontiff, the Lord of the hearts and minds of his race, and therefore of their lot and fate.

We have pointed out that the laws of correlation and evolution have in substance confirmed the philosophy and poesy that Comte founded; would that the truth could be admitted with equal frankness that those laws have vetoed for ever the *form* of the Positive Polity that

Comte proposed. In a word this papal business in all its letter, spirit, and purpose is wholly wrong: that is, it is *wrung* or twisted out of the true course of human evolution. It is an anachronism, a fossil made to order. Very like the attempt of the Mormons to re-establish the patriarchal polity in Utah is this attempt to recall and reform the Hierarchal Papacy of the Middle Ages. This Mormon illustration of Prof. Huxley, original with him, is an old one with us, but none the less true and instructive. We cannot go over the case at length. Had Comte been of German, English, or American parentage and education his papal polity would never have been dreamt of. As Mill has pointed out in his review of Comte, this polity is reached by defying evolution. It ignores the political meaning of Protestantism and the consequent revival of the temporal powers, with attendant mental, emotional, and religious liberty,—clearly indicating, as theology and metaphysics decline more and more, the rise of the "Federation of Mankind and the Parliament of the World." Comte's polity was *prehistorically* defeated by the victory of Hermann over the Romans, of Luther over the Pope, of Elizabeth over the Armada, and of Wolfe over Montcalm, at Quebec. The sceptre has forever passed from the Latin races and their imperial and papal politics, to the peoples themselves, who are organizing as coöperative, social, democratic, representative republics the world over. The best thing the Latin nations of Europe can do is to fall into the republican line, as their Latin descendants in Central and South America have done, and as France is trying to do. That all clearly indicates that the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers of which Comte writes so approvingly will evolve as a fact—a fact not at all possible under any form of Papacy, which is, and must from its nature ever be, an incubus upon all minds and hearts. The law and the aspirations of mankind are towards universal, mental, and emotional liberty. This can only result from the limiting of government to "home rule" in temporal affairs, administered by democracies, and yet federated so as to form an invincible republic.

The early Christians by their "kingdom not of this world," did for a time sever the two powers and free the heart and soul of man from the Roman temporal empire, but soon Constantine gave them over to the papal empire which, still worse, crushed the very brains and hearts of men. The law of evolution points not back to either of these oppressors, but forward to the "Federated Republic" of the civilized peoples, whose glory it will be to secure the greatest possible freedom of mind and heart and body, and at the same time the most extended and useful administration of human affairs.

All this neither Comte nor his disciples have ever been able to see. He awarded to the United States a position in history, merely "colonial," and had no evolutionary conception of what the modern world had been about in politics since the Middle Ages. His influence has, therefore, been *nil* or retrograde. Hope there has been that Frederick Harrison would turn the Comtist faces to the future, and not permit evolution to force them into the ideal heaven unwillingly and with their backs to the light; but the conversion (turnabout) has, it seems, yet to be made. The first duty they owe to their great master is to reverse his great evolutional error. It is that error with its spirit and concomitants, which defeats their good objects, and makes their whole movement disgusting not only to Mr. Spencer and Prof. Huxley but to thousands, who would otherwise gladly aid them the world over. When the Republic takes the place of their Papacy in their programme, they will be the great benefactors of humanity. Until then they can only play, under evolution, the part of Charles Lamb's antiquated friend who never could "keep abreast with his age, but was nevertheless dragged along in the procession."

In the meantime, as James Parton, our biographer of Voltaire, told the Ninteenth Century Club, in his lecture on The Coming Man's Religion, "the proper and practical religion of a citizen of the United States is, in the first instance, The United States of America." For us the new religion takes hold right there. Through their republics the people will regulate, administer, and protect, but without an organization of the new religion, how can they acquire the *motive*, "the intellectual and moral self-culture," to perform those functions wisely?

That question we leave to THE OPEN COURT, as an exponent of the New Faith, to answer, if it can or will.

PERSONALITY—INDIVIDUALITY—CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY TH. RIBOT.

Translated from the French by γυλν.*

IT is above all necessary to explain what in psychological language is understood by the term "person." Person, is the individual clearly conscious of itself, and acting accordingly; it is the highest form of individuality. Metaphysical psychology exclusively reserves this characteristic for man; but while attempting to explain the same, it merely supposes an ego that is a complete unity, simple and identical. This, however, is the mere semblance of a definite solution of the problem. Unless we attribute to this ego a supernatural origin, it will be necessary to explain, how it is born, and from what lower form it proceeds.

Experimental psychology does not propose the problem in the same manner, or treat it according to the same methods. Experimental psychology learns from natural scientists that in many instances it is

* *Les Maladies de la personnalité.* Paris, Félix Alcan.

difficult to determine the characteristics of individuality, even of those creatures that are by far less complex than those of persons. Hence it mistrusts any purely simple solution, and, far from regarding the question as settled, as it were, at the first onset, at the close of its researches, views the very problem itself as rather the result of long and laborious investigations. Therefore, it is but natural that the representatives of the old school, after once having lost their true bearings, should groundlessly accuse the adepts of the new school of actually purloining their ego. But on either side both language and methods have now become so different, that all mutual understanding henceforth will be impossible.

It will be necessary, even at the risk of increasing the already extant confusion, to investigate what teratical, morbid, or simply rare cases can teach us concerning the formation and disorganization of personality, yet without assuming to treat the subject in its totality.

Personality, being the highest form of psychic individuality, there spontaneously arises another preliminary question: what is individual?

In answer to this much debated question it is here sufficient to observe, that careful physiological investigations prove that the psychic individual is the expression of an organism; in conformity with the latter, it is either low, simple, incoherent, or complex and unified. Descending the whole series of animated beings, we see how the psychic individual is always formed through the more or less complete fusion of more simple individuals. "A colonial consciousness" is created through the coöperation of local consciousnesses. The discoveries of modern naturalists, in this respect are of the utmost importance to psychology, because they completely transform the problem of personality. The latter henceforth must be studied from below—from the lowest step of the ladder.

Thus we are prompted to ask, whether the human person itself is not also, *un tout de coalition*—a whole by coalition, the extreme complexity of which veils from us its origin, and whose origin would remain impenetrable, if the existence of elementary forms did not throw a certain light upon the mechanism of this fusion. In fact, the human personality is an aggregated whole, a complex. In order to know it, we must analize it; but the analysis here is fatally artificial, because it disjoins groups of phenomena, which do not merely stand in juxtaposition, but are really coördinate, their relation being not of simple simultaneousness, but of reciprocal dependance. And yet, this work of analysis is altogether indispensable and we must severally undertake to investigate the *organic*, *emotional*, and *intellectual* conditions of personality, at the same time laying due stress on occurring anomalies and disorders.

Before entering upon the exposition and interpretation of facts, we must clearly understand the nature of consciousness. We are here confronted by two hypotheses, to wit: the old hypothesis, which regards consciousness as the basic property of soul, as the essence of spirit; and the modern hypothesis, that regards consciousness as a phenomenon, superadded to the cerebral activity; as an event, having its own conditions of existence, appearing or disappearing, and at the mercy of circumstances. The old hypothesis, at all times, was radically unable to explain the unconscious life of spirit. For a long while it even entirely overlooked the problem, yet later was compelled to admit so-called "unconscious states," although they were but an ambiguous, half-contradictory expedient.

The modern hypothesis is simpler, clearer, more consistent. It expresses the unconscious in physiological terms, as states of the nervous system, and not in psychological terms, as latent ideas, or non-felt sensations. Yet this is only one side of the hypothesis at issue.

Like all general terms, consciousness must be resolved into concrete data. There does not exist will in general, but volitions, and in a like manner there is no consciousness in general, but only states of consciousness. The latter are the reality.

It would be idle to define consciousness as: "the fact of being conscious," for this is merely a datum of observation, a final fact. Physiology teaches that its production is always associated with some activity of the nervous system, particularly of the brain. The reverse, however, does not take place. All psychic activity certainly implies nervous activity, still, all nervous activity does by no means imply psychic activity — nervous activity being far more extended than psychic activity. Consciousness, accordingly, is something superadded.

In other terms, we have to bear in mind, that every state of consciousness is a complex event, conditioned by a particular state of the nervous system. This nervous process is not an accessory but an essential part of the event, and, moreover, is its basis and fundamental condition. As soon as produced, the event exists *in* itself; as soon as consciousness is added to it, the event exists *by* itself. Consciousness completes and perfects the event, but does not constitute the same.

This hypothesis easily explains how all manifestations of psychic life, sensations, desires, feelings, volitions, memories, reasonings, inventions, etc., may alternately be conscious and unconscious. There is nothing mysterious in these alternations, since in all cases the essential conditions, *i. e.*, the physiological conditions, ever remain the same, and consciousness is but a perfectionment.

Yet, why is this perfectionment sometimes superadded, and at other times lacking?

If in the physiological phenomenon itself there was not something more when consciousness is present than when it is absent, we should indirectly adjudge victory to the adverse hypothesis. Could it be proved that every time certain physiological conditions exist, consciousness will appear; that whenever they disappear, the former disappears; and whenever they vary, also consciousness varies—this would no longer be an hypothesis, but actually a scientific truth. We are still very far from this point.

At all events, we may be sure that consciousness itself will not furnish these revelations. As Maudsley justly observes, consciousness at the same moment cannot be effect and cause,—cannot be itself and its molecular antecedents. It lives but for a moment, and cannot through a direct intuition return backward as far as its own immediate physiological antecedents; and moreover, to go back to its material antecedents, would be to lay hold of, not itself, but its own cause.

At the present moment it would be chimerical to attempt even a broad determination of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the apparition of consciousness. We know, indeed, that the cerebral circulation, in the double relation of the quantity and quality of the blood, is a matter of great importance. A striking proof of this is furnished by experiments, performed upon the heads of recently beheaded animals. Psychometric researches demonstrate every day that the state of consciousness the more it is complex, requires proportionately a greater length of time, and on the contrary, that automatic acts—whether primitive or acquired and the rapidity of which is extreme—do not enter into consciousness. We may, moreover, admit that the apparition of consciousness is attached to the period of disassimilation of the nervous tissue, as Herzen distinctly has shown.* All these results, however, are only partial conquests; but, the scientific knowledge of the genesis of a phenomenon supposes the determination of *all* its essential conditions.

The imminent future, perhaps, will furnish these. In the meantime, in order to corroborate our hypothesis, it will be more profitable to prove, that it alone explains, not purely a condition, but the principal character of consciousness,—its *intermission*. In order from the outset to avoid all equivocation, I may observe that here it is not the question of the discontinuity of the states of consciousness among themselves. Each state of consciousness has its limits which, while allowing it to associate with the others, at the same time will protect their respective individualities. Here it is not the question of this, but simply of the well-known fact that consciousness has its interruptions, or as is said in, popular parlance: "Man does not always think." It is true that this assertion has been contradicted by the majority of metaphysicians. As a matter of fact they never have furnished any proof for the support of their thesis, and as all appearances are against it, the *onus probandi* would legitimately seem to be incumbent on the former. Their whole argumentation reduces itself to maintaining that since soul is essentially thinking, it is impossible that consciousness should not exist on any degree whatever, even when there remains no trace of it in the memory. But this is simply begging the question, since the hypothesis maintained by us contests precisely their major premise. Their alleged proof is definitively but a deduction drawn from a contested hypothesis. Leaving aside all *a priori* solutions let us examine the question in itself. Let us leave aside the cases of syncope, provoked anæsthesia, epileptic vertigo, coma, etc., and abide by what is more common, more frequent, to wit: the psychic state during sleep.

One has maintained that there is no sleep without dreams; but this is a purely theoretic assertion, and a consequence of the above-mentioned principle, that the soul always thinks. The sole argument of fact that they can plead, is to the effect, that sometimes the sleeper, addressed or questioned, may answer in a sufficiently pertinent manner, and at his waking will have no recollection of the matter. Still, this fact alone does not justify any general conclusion and to the theory of the metaphysicians physiology opposes another. Physiology lays stress on the fact that the life of every organ comprises two periods: the one of relative rest or assimilation, the other of activity or disassimilation; that the brain makes no exception to this law and that experience shows, how the duration of sleep at different times and in the different circumstances of life stands in direct ratio to the craving of assimilation. The cause is the necessity of repairing the losses sustained; of making nutritive circulation follow upon functional circulation. During the state of being awake the brain consumes more of materials than the blood furnishes, so that oxidation soon diminishes and along with it the excitability of the nervous tissue. The experiments of Preyer prove that sleep then will overtake the subject, when through prolongated activity the substance of the brain, like that of a fatigued muscle, is encumbered with a quantity of acid waste material (*detritus*). Even the presence of these products at a given moment will stop the cerebral activity, and the latter does not reappear before rest has allowed the complete elimination of these waste products. It must be admitted, that complete, absolute sleep, without dreams, is the exception; but

Revue Philosophique, Vol. VII, p. 352, and *La Condizione fisica della Coscienza*. Rome, 1879.

that it actually occurs, and not unfrequently, suffices to establish the intermittent character of consciousness.

The last point to be examined is the theory that regards consciousness as a phenomenon. The theory is the offspring of the following basic principle in physiology: "Reflex-action is a type of nervous and the basis of all psychic activity." Those who regard consciousness as a phenomenon, have sometimes defended their theory in a form that has caused them to be called the theorists of pure automatism. They love to compare their "conscious phenomenon" to the flying sparks from a steam-engine, lighting it up for an instant, but having no effect upon its speed. This may sound well enough purely as a metaphor, but would be an exaggerated and inexact view of the real efficacy of consciousness.

Even from the exclusive point of view of the survival of the fittest, the apparition of consciousness upon earth constitutes a fact of the greatest magnitude. Through consciousness experience which is an adaptation of a higher order, became possible. But we have not now to investigate its origin. Very ingenuous and clever hypotheses have been advanced on this subject, which all belong to the domain of metaphysics, and which experimental psychology refrains from discussing, while simply accepting consciousness as a *datum*.

It is highly probable that consciousness has been produced, like every other vital manifestation, at first only in a rudimentary form and apparently without great efficiency. But as soon as it left behind a vestige, to constitute in the animal a memory for the psychic sense, to store up its past for the profit of its future, from that moment, undoubtedly, a new chance of survival was effected.

To the unconscious adaptation, blind, incidental, dependent on circumstances, there was superadded a conscious adaptation, dependent upon the animal itself, more certain and more rapid than the former; and in reality this conscious adaptation has shortened the work of selection. Such has been the part played by consciousness in the development of the psychic life.

AGNOSTICISM AND AUGUSTE COMTE'S POSITIVISM.

The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte has been most severely attacked in England by those who should have hailed the French thinker as their best ally and co-worker, by Mr. J. S. Mill, Mr. Herbert Spencer and Professor Huxley. And yet all three are inspired, like Mr. Comte, with an arduous and holy zeal to free the human mind from traditional dogmatism; all three have devoted their lives to establish a new philosophy of radical free thought. But what is stranger still, all three, especially Mr. Spencer and Prof. Huxley, are entangled in the very same error as their great French predecessor. They all together believe in the unknowability of absolute existence, of the unconditioned, of that which lies beyond phenomena, and thus failed in their aspirations to present a philosophy of positive science. They did not succeed in liberating us from mysticism. They all are Agnostics.

M. Comte observes* that there are three phases of intellectual evolution, for the individual as well as for the mass: the *Theological* (or *Supernatural*), the *Metaphysical* and the *Positive*.

In the theological phase the mind explains phenomena in a mythological way as the productions of supernatural agents. In the metaphysical phase the supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces and entities. In the positive phase the mind, convinced of the futility of all enquiry into causes and essences, restricts itself to the observation and classification of phenomena, and to the discovery of the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things bear to each other: in a word, to the discovery of the laws of phenomena. "The metaphysician," M. Comte says, "believes he can penetrate into the causes and essences of the phenomena around him, while the positivist recognizes his incompetency and limits his efforts to the ascertainment of the laws which regulate the succession of these phenomena."

Between the second and third phase, according to M. Comte's definition, there is no other essential difference than the "conviction of the futility of all enquiry into causes and essences." And this conviction is the main doctrine of agnosticism. M. Comte accordingly was truly an agnostic before Prof. Huxley invented the term, and before Mr. Spencer wrote his First Principles. All the difference between M. Comte on the one hand and agnostic thinkers on the other are of secondary importance. They are like sectarian divergencies among denominations of the same creed.

We consider as M. August Comte's greatest merit —aside from his ardent enthusiasm for truth in philosophic enquiry, and for reform in our state of society—the invention of the term "positive" which is a very expressive word. But we do not understand by "positive," as does M. Comte, any limitation of the human mind. We understand by "positive" the monistic view of a unitary conception of the world.

Positivism, as we should express ourselves, recognizes that the so-called phenomena are positive facts, that there are neither causes nor essences behind them, that Absolute Existence or the Unconditioned, or the Metaphisical (or by whatever name the Unknowable may be called) are chimerical nonentities, self-contradictory conceptions, and impossibilities.

*Compare "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences," by G. H. Lewes, pp. 10, 11, and 18.

By experience only man becomes familiar with the facts of existence. The facts of existence are no phenomenal sham; they are real, and knowledge means the systematical arrangement of experiences.

M. Comte erroneously considered Kant as the representative metaphysical philosopher. In truth it was Kant who struck the first vigorous blow at the errors of ontology and the belief in absolute existence, while M. Comte was still as deep entangled in metaphysicism as are his English rivals and opponents, the partisans of agnosticism.

We are little helped if we are told that we can never know anything about the causes and essences of things and that the Unconditioned is an inaccessible province which we should not attempt to enter. This view which is so excellently and adequately called agnosticism, appears from our conception of positivism, as a transition from the metaphysical to a truly positive phase. It is the last remnant of dualism. In the philosophical conception of agnosticism, the metaphysical essences have faded into vague unknowabilities and will disappear entirely as soon as the idea of absolute existence is recognized as untenable ground—as soon as philosophy is conceived as a unitary conception of the facts of reality. P. C.

PROF. HUXLEY'S CHURCH.

Mr. Wakeman has referred to Prof. Huxley's Profession of Faith; as to the kind of church appropriate to that faith, the Professor has left us in no doubt, as will be seen from the following passage from his celebrated article on "Administrative Nihilism":

"Again, I suppose, it is universally agreed that it would be useless and absurd for the State to attempt to promote friendship and sympathy between man and man directly. But I see no reason why, if it be otherwise expedient, the State may not do something toward that end indirectly. For example, I can conceive the existence of an established church which should be a blessing to the community—a church in which, week by week, services should be devoted, not to the elevation of abstract propositions in theology, but to the setting before men's minds of an ideal of true, just and pure living; a place in which those who are weary of the burden of daily cares, should find a moment's rest in the contemplation of the higher life which is possible for all, though attained by so few; a place in which the man of strife and of business should have time to think how small, after all, are the rewards he covets compared with peace and charity. Depend upon it, if such a church existed, no one would seek to disestablish it."

CORRESPONDENCE.

EXTRACTS FROM OUR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE SINGLE TAX QUESTION.

J. G. Galloway, Dayton, Ohio.

"It is not proposed nor inferred by Mr. George to take the whole income of a man's farm who works for his own living. But that part of the income which Tom Clark's children may be able to extort from the children of other men, as rent for the privilege of living on the earth."

A. H. Sawyer, Billings, Montana.

"I should like to ask 'Wheelbarrow' one question and one question only with respect to his article in The Open Court of March. 21. Should a cyclone strike Tom Clark's farm and entirely destroy the results of Tom Clark's labor even to the turning of the wild sod back in the furrow, and Tom Clark's farm or rather farm site should still retain a value, who or what has produced that value? that being the value which single tax men call land value.'"

John Mills, New York.

"Tom Clark will be taxed upon the value of outlying contiguous land; and this you say is one dollar and a quarter the acre. This is just what Tom will be required to pay taxes on; no matter how many barns, houses, fences, and the like he may put up. If, however, a saw-mill is started near by, and this is followed by a wood working factory, and soon a branch railroad comes swooping down upon him erecting a depot, followed by schoolhouses and a town hall, additional manufactories and enterprises leading up to an extensive population until outlying contiguous land is worth one thousand dollars per acre or more, then Tom will be required to pay taxes upon this increased valuation. If this be too great a tax for profitable farming Mr. Clark can sell his property for a sum that will abundantly remunerate him for all his outlay of labor and capital. Cleared from superfluous verbosity this is all there is to land value taxation."

John S. Watters, New Orleans, La.

"Land is that great necessity without which men cannot exist. The land trust is the unspoken, unwritten, perhaps unconscious, but nevertheless effective combination among the owners of land, to demand from users the last cent they possess for the privilege of using it. Private, exclusive, individual *possession* of land is essential. So is private possession of a portion of the atmosphere essential. In winter men heat a portion of the atmosphere in their houses. Possession must be guaranteed; but who would think it possible for a man to *own* air?"

W. E. Brokaw, Bristol, Dakota.

"Let me give him a little maxim as a touch-stone, which he can easily verify, but which he cannot refute, *viz.*: Land values rise or fall in proportion to the increase or decrease of population. Where land is monopolized the value rises or falls in proportion to the expectation of increase or decrease of population. This latter is mere speculative value. If 'those who have invested their capital in land,' are 'entitled to be protected in their possession' because of such investment, then the purchaser of a stolen horse is entitled to a similar protection. If not, why not?"

J. G. Malcolm.

"On the George principle of taxation a man like Mr. Clark living on a farm having no value except the improvements upon it would have no taxes to pay. At present such men have to pay local taxes, and tariff taxes, and are burdened with taxes every time they turn around. Under George's plan, if his land had not increased in value, only to the extent of the improvements upon it, he would not be taxed more than on the purchase price, $200. This at five per cent. would only be $10 a year. Mr. Clark probably pays ten times that now every year in tariff taxes alone."

T. W. Wittler, Chicago.

"Now we single taxers desire to encourage such improvements, and therefore when we apply Mr. George's doctrine of taxation to Tom Clark's farm, we exempt those $300 (this being the value of the improvements) from all taxation. Therefore all the taxes Tom Clark would pay if the single tax were in force would be on the $200 which represent the value of the farm before any improvements had been put upon it. His portion of taxes under the single tax system would be (basing my figures on the

present rate of interest) $8 a year. But what would Tom Clark gain by the change? Let us see; remember all taxes outside of the single tax would be abolished."

W. H. Van Ornum.

"The value of the land must still be determined by what it would be worth were it swept clear of all improvements. In other words, the improvements being made by Thomas Clark belong to him and are not considered in determining the value of the land, that equal right of all is satisfied by allowing Thomas Clark to retain his possession and use, on payment into the public treasury of as much as any one of the people would give for such use. But if Thomas Clark cannot afford to pay as much as some one else—cannot put it to as good a use, he simply sells his improvements to the new occupant and goes elsewhere. The rights of Thomas Clark are protected and respected, and the rights of the community are satisfied."

Wm. C. Wood, M. D., Gloversville, N. Y.

"Does not location, *i. e.*, nearness to schoolhouse, factory, mill, railroad station, market, post office, and church make a difference in the value of a farm? Does the erection of buildings and fences, the planting of orchards and the digging of wells as well as other improvements add to the value of that farm? If both questions are answered as they must be in the affirmative I have yet another. Is not the first value described, a value that arises external to and separate from the owner of the farm as an individual, and which he helps create only as a single item of the sum total which makes up the community? Is not the second value, however, an individual creation, the result of the application of his labor, skill, and intelligence to the land? The first value, the single tax would levy upon, the second it would not touch."

Michael Corcoran, Lincoln, Neb.

"'Wheelbarrow' is right. Henry George has clearly promised the millennium to his disciples. It was only the other day that a few young men were discussing the 'Panacea' in a very animated manner. One fine young fellow, a friend of mine, seemed wounded to the heart because I said that Henry George made such ridiculous claims for his pet tax. In point of fact I compared Henry George's claims to a column and a half of all the ills that flesh is heir to, with '——Pills' above and 'Cures 'em all, Sure,' below. A somewhat less sweeping measure, and a somewhat smaller claim for such measure would have more appearance of common sense, than a book full of poetry and intenseness; in fact, a book which is simply one long peroration, with the introduction and the argument promised for some future occasion."

Theodore P. Perkins, Lynn, Mass.

"Land value in city and country alike is made by the landed and the landless alike in proportions impossible to determine. That is why 'land owners,' so-called, have no right to take money for it from other men. That is why all the money, men are willing to pay for the use of land, apart from improvements, should go into the public treasury to pay public expenses. As to the abolition of poverty, that is a side-issue. The land reform rests on simple justice, like the other anti-slavery movement. We claim, however, that the chief cause of poverty is legalized robbery, and that the legalized robbery which results from private ownership of land is the most disastrous. We claim that the free conditions resulting from the abolition of our iniquitous taxes and the collection of land-rent by the community will have a very strong tendency to make poverty needless and disgraceful."

C. J. Buell, Minneapolis, Minn.

"How would it have been with Tom under the single tax? He would have been at liberty to take up any piece of government land he chose, regardless of the amount, without paying anything per acre. He moved on and went to work, no taxes to pay whatever. The first year he broke up *sixty-five* acres, for he had seventy-five dollars more to pay for breaking, as he didn't have to pay that for his land. He raised a bigger crop and made a larger profit. Then he built a better house and barn and put up better fences for he had more means to do it with. The next year he had his entire tract under cultivation, and raised a good crop which found a ready sale at a good price. In exchange he obtained much valuable machinery, furniture, food, clothing, and other things that he and his family needed. He has not yet been visited by the tax assessor and may not be for some years to come. Why not? For the simple reason that he has nothing which the assessor under the single tax has any right to levy a tax upon."

"P." Chicago, Ill.

"In fact, while looking so intently at the little quarter section of land owned by Clark, Wheelbarrow utterly failed to notice the hundreds of unimproved quarter sections owned by speculators and lying, some of them quite near to Clark. Now, I suppose that adjoining Clark's quarter section there was or still is an entire section of land that is held by a resident of some eastern city simply as a speculation. Meanwhile farmers continue to move westward. Why? Is it because there is not enough good land at home? Oh, no! There are in Tom Clark's own county a few thousand untilled acres of as fine soil as ever yielded to the plow. Why is it not cultivated? Because it is controlled by speculators who expect to become wealthy without bestowing honest toil upon it. If Wheelbarrow objects to a tax on farm labor, let him consider the tax that is daily and hourly levied on the farm laborer in the shape of an exorbitant price on farm lands. Wheelbarrow is a good practical joker, but a poor thinker on economic subjects. He should confine himself strictly to handling his one wheeled vehicle."

From a Farmer, (Charles M——) Mill Green, Md.

"Although, as C. A. Green rightly says, land in the east can be bought for about what it cost to clear it, yet I will admit that *all* land is originally worth *something*. But it is true, even if single tax men cannot see it, that there *are* improvements that become so incorporated with the original value of land that it *cannot* be separated. Attention! This is the keystone to my objection. Most other objections are small, being only natural conservatism. I will try to make my meaning plain to my city friends by an illustration. A man buys a sloping and rocky town lot. He removes rocks and transports dirt, making a first-class building-site worth double its original value. Years pass, the single tax becomes a law. This man is taxed full rental value because it is then simply impossible to estimate its original value. All this is simplicity itself compared with what goes on at the farm. *We* have stumps, stones, and, worst of all, rocks in abundance which also cost in 'abundance' to be removed. If your correspondents express the 'George Theory,' it is a great deal worse than I thought. Friends of the single tax had better stop explaining. Mr. McGill puts the matter very smoothly, sympathizing with farmers, and he says, 'Working farmers like Tom Clark would be benefited.' Beg pardon, but I cannot see it. Farmers would have to pay *nearly all* the tax, for it cannot be truly denied that farmers own most all the best land, and considering its original value, one acre of it is worth, on the average, nearly as much as one acre of city land; for man's gregarious habits made the city land worth so much, and Mr. McGill strongly protests against taxing this. Then remove the protective tariff, making more direct taxation. Verily, would not farming be driven to the wall? Statistics say that farmers wages average eighty-two cents a day; do you want to lower them? If you show no mercy, none shall be shown you. This is natural law. Yet, if given time, this state of things would right itself, but single tax men would, if they could, force it on us all at once: for witness read back numbers of the 'Twentieth Century.' In the light of these remarks, is it not significant that nearly all single tax men are from the large cities?"

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—Continued.

Ilse stood silent and motionless; Mrs. Rollmaus continuing her comforting words, but Ilse scarcely seemed conscious of them.

It is not safe, Ilse, to teach young princes to use agricultural machines, and to fight duels; the tuition fee will be paid you doubly, and in new coin, as is the custom of the courts.

There was a long and uneasy silence in the room. Ilse looked wildly about; then she took a cane chair, and placed herself opposite to Mrs. Rollmaus, and her fingers flew over her work. "Do not let us talk any more of such calumnies," she said. "What is your son Karl doing? are you satisfied with his progress? and how does he get on with the pianoforte? It would be a good thing for him to understand something about music."

Mrs. Rollmaus recovered her spirits talking over the dances that her son Karl played; she chattered on, and Ilse listened silently, counting over the stitches in her colored wool-work.

The Professor returned, and shortly after the carriage drove up. Mrs. Rollmaus disappeared into the next room to pack up her cap in the band-box, and then took an eloquent leave of her dear friend, the Professor. Her last words to Ilse were:

"It may be long before we meet again; preserve your friendship for me even though I am far from you."

"What is the meaning of these solemn words of parting our neighbor has spoken?" asked the Professor, astonished.

"They mean that we are in a house, to be within the walls of which fills an honest woman with horror and dread," answered Ilse, with flashing eyes; "and they mean that I wish to go away from here, and that it is time for you to take away your wife from unwholesome surroundings."

She told him breathlessly what Mrs. Rollmaus had related, and what the beggar-woman had suggested.

"I am ensnared, Felix," she exclaimed, "by my own fault, I am sorry to say. God knows that in my conduct towards the young Prince I had no thought of bringing your wife into disrepute, but I have been imprudent, and I am suffering for it horribly, horribly! Now I understand the forebodings which have tormented me for weeks past. If you love me take me away quickly from here, the ground burns beneath my feet."

A sharp pang seized the Professor as he saw his wife struggling with agony, bitter enough to stun the strongest soul of woman, and to crush the noblest powers for years.

"It is as repugnant and humiliating to me as to you to look openly upon wickedness. I am ready to do all that I can to deliver you from this trouble. Let us calmly consider how this can be done. You cannot, in such a state of passionate feeling, decide what would be good for you, for your judgment is not unbiased enough to choose your own course. To what old house that a tenant rents or a landlord opens, do not painful recollections attach? Even he who lives a simple life in a strange neighborhood, cannot escape the attacks of idle gossip. Turn away your thoughts from that common woman. It would not become either you or me to depart like fugatives on her account. What have we done, Ilse, to lose our self-respect? There is only one wise method of dealing with the evil work of foolish and perverse accidents, to go forward firmly and to care little for it. Then the dissonance will pass away and perish of itself in the noise of daily life. Those who allow themselves to be disturbed by it, increase it by their own sorrow. Suppose that we were suddenly to leave this house, you would carry away with you the feeling of having left like one who had been conquered, and you would be incessantly pursued by the consciousness of a discordant murmur behind us which would not be silenced."

"You speak coldly and wisely," exclaimed Ilse, deeply incensed; "in spite of what you say, though, you little feel the injury your wife suffers."

"If you now had the self-possession for which I always admired you, you would not allow such unjust complaints to pass your lips," replied her husband, gloomily. "You must know that if I saw you in danger, I would this very hour take you away. Must I now waste words with you to tell you that. But even against the gossip of the weak, this residence is the best defense, for the Prince is away and you remain behind with your husband."

"I know the cause of this indifference," murmured Ilse.

"You know what binds me here," exclaimed the Professor, "and if you were to me what you ought to be, the sharer of my hopes, and if you had the same feeling for the value of the treasure which I seek, you would, like me, feel that I should not needlessly turn away. Bear with this residence, dear Ilse, however irksome it may appear to you," he continued encouragingly, "the longest period is past. I am invited to pursue my quest in the country-chateau of the Princess; there I anticipate that I shall find what will set us free."

"Do not go," exclaimed Ilse, approaching him; "do not leave me in this dreadful insecurity, in a terror that makes me shudder at myself and every strange sound that I hear in these rooms."

* Translation copyrighted.

"Terror," exclaimed the Professor, displeased, "terror of spirits. Rarely is life among strangers so easy and comfortable as this residence is to us; there may be discord everywhere, and it is our own fault if we allow it to master us."

"Do not go," cried Ilse again. "Yes, there are spirits that pursue me, they hang day and night above my head. Do not go, Felix," she exclaimed, raising her hand; "it is not the manuscript alone that allures you, but the woman who awaits you there. This I have known ever since the first day we came to this town. I see how the magic of her superficial soul ensnares you. I have until to-day struggled against this fear, from the confidence I had in my loved husband. If you go now, Felix, when I would like to cling to you, when I seek every moment for comfort from your voice, I shall begin to doubt you and to have the fearful thought that my trouble is indifferent to you, because you have become cold to me."

"What are you thinking of, Ilse?" cried the scholar, horrified; "is it my wife that speaks thus? when have I ever concealed my feelings from you? and can you not read in my soul as in an open book? Then, was it this that lay so heavy on your mind? Just what I should not have considered possible," he said, frankly and sorrowfully.

"No, no," cried Ilse, beside herself; "I am unjust, I know it; do not attend to my words. I trust you; I cling to you. Oh! Felix, I should be driven to despair if this support breaks under me."

She threw her arms around his neck, and sobbed. Her husband embraced her, and tears came into his eyes at the grief of his wife.

"Remain with me, my Felix," continued Ilse, weeping. "Do not leave me alone just now. I have still a childish, simple heart. Have patience with me. I have been ill at ease here; I do not know why. I cling to you, and I tremble lest you should be alienated from me. I know that you are mine, and I struggle with the fearful foreboding that I shall lose you here. When you go out of the house, it seems to me as if I must take an eternal farewell, and when you return, I look doubtfully at you, as if you had changed towards me in a few hours. I am unhappy, Felix, and unhappiness makes one distrustful. I have become weak and faint-hearted, and I am afraid of telling you, because I fear that you will on that account have less respect for me. Remain here, my beloved; do not go to the Princess—at least, not to-morrow."

"If not to-morrow," he said, cheerfully, "then the next day, or some other day. I cannot forego this short journey. To give it up would be a wrong that we must not take upon ourselves. The longer I delay, Ilse, the longer you will be kept within these walls. Even from your point of view, is it not prudent to do quickly what would make us free?"

Ilse released herself from his embrace.

"You speak sensibly at a moment when I had hoped for a far different tone from your heart," she said quietly. "I know, Felix, that you do not wish to give me pain, and I hope that you are true in what you now say, and conceal nothing from me. But I feel in the depths of my heart a long-accustomed pang that has often come over me in sorrowful days since I have known you. You think differently from what I do, and you feel differently in many things. The individual and his sufferings signify little to you in comparison to the great thoughts that you carry about with you. You stand on a height, in a clear atmosphere, and have no sympathy with the anguish and trouble in the valley at your feet. Clear is the air, but cold, and a chill seizes me, when I see it."

"It is the nature of a man," said the Professor, more deeply moved by the restrained grief of his wife than by her loud complaints.

"No," answered Ilse, gazing fixedly before her, "it is only the nature of a scholar."

In the night, when the scholar had been long sleeping, his wife rose by his side and gazed, in the subdued light, on the countenance of her loved husband. She got up, and held the night-lamp so that the yellow light fell on his peaceful countenance, and large tears dropped from her eyes on his head. Then she placed herself before him, wringing her hands, and striving to restrain the weeping and convulsions which shook her body.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IN THE PRINCESS'S TOWER.

When the Princess, at the urgent desire of her father, had returned to her home, the illustrious family whose name she now bore made it a condition, not only that she should pass some months of the year at the residence of her deceased husband, but that she should have a special establishment arranged for her in her father's capital. A compact to this effect was concluded, the object of which was undoubtedly to secure to the young Princess a certain degree of independence. In order to fulfil the agreement in appearance, a princely castle in the country was assigned to the Princess for a dwelling, as there was no suitable building in the capital. The castle was half a day's journey from the city, at the foot of a woody hill, surrounded by fields and villages—a pleasant summer residence. The Princess had already spent some of the months of her mourning there.

It was a warm day on which the Professor set off to go to the castle. The air had not yet become cool after the storm of the night. There were fleeting

shadows and bright sunshine on the sky and earth; the thick clouds sometimes cast a grey covering over the straight road along which the learned man passed; but then again it lay before him like a golden path, leading to the longed-for goal.

Thus did dazzling light and dark shadows flit through the soul of our scholar. "The manuscript will be found; it is concealed from us," he said to himself, and his brow became clouded. "If it should not be found, many will read with astonishment how deceptive appearances were, how near the possibility. Many will with regret resign the hope which the words of the monk had inspired, yet none will feel this regret so much as I shall. A thought which has for years occupied my fancy, and directed my eyes to one object, has gained the mastery over me. The free mind of man plays with the thousand impressions of ancient and modern times: he restrains their power by the balance of his reason and strength of his will. But with me a small image of the faded characters of an old book has penetrated so deeply into my soul that the hope of obtaining it makes the blood course through my veins, and the fear of losing it paralyzes my energies. I know that my eagerness is too great; it has hardened me against the childish anguish of my wife, and I myself have not become stronger since I have trodden the uncertain path of the poacher. Every one should be on his guard lest his dreams should diminish the sovereignty of his mind. Even the dreams of the best hours, when a soul innocently devotes itself to a great feeling, may turn a man away from the straight path of duty, that lies nearest to him."

A golden light broke over his countenance. "But if it is found! It is only a small portion of our knowledge of ancient times that lies concealed in it. And yet it is just this discovery that would pour a flood of light upon a landscape hovering in twilight, and several decades of ancient life would become visible to our eyes with as distinct an outline as if they lay in a nearer past. The discovery would solve a hundred doubts, and excite a thousand new ones. Every later generation would rejoice in the great gain, and would seek, with revived energy, for new disclosures. Even for her, who at the castle shares so warm-heartedly in my anxieties, I wish the pleasure of this discovery. To her also it would be forever a great remembrance, that she had taken a kindly interest in the first labors of the searcher."

Higher rose the mountains and more brilliant became the coloring of their masses. The line of hills in the foreground stood forth from the misty distance; blue glimpses of the valley were visible through the openings of the dark wood. The carriage rolled through a well-preserved forest; a thick growth of firs and pines shut out the prospect for a time; when the road led again into the open country, through grassy meadows and groups of trees, the castle lay straight before the eyes of the scholar. A massive, old-fashioned tower crowned with pinnacles rose out of a low wood; the afternoon sun shone above, its rays forming long streaks in the vaporous atmosphere. The brown walls stood out in the lonely landscape, like the last pillar of a gigantic ruined castle; only by the fresh-looking stone mullions of the well-fitted windows did one perceive that it was a habitable abode. Adjoining the tower rose the small chateau, with steeply-sloped roof and pointed windows; in its moderate dimensions it formed a strange contrast to its massive companion; but in spite of the disproportion of the parts the whole formed a stately relic of the middle ages. One could well see that its walls had afforded shelter and defense to many generations.

The tendrils of the wild vine twined up to the roof of the house and round the windows of the tower, which rose in seven stories, supported by strong buttresses. Thyme and grass grew above in the crevices of the crumbling stone, but the grass which a few days ago had covered the ground had been pulled up and the court and doors festively adorned for the new occupants. Banks of flowers and plants in pots were placed around in profusion. There was only one corner in which the hasty work had not been finished, and the remains of mossy green on the ground, and a swarm of blackbirds that fluttered round the tower, showed that the building had stood uninhabited in a lonely country.

The Professor sprang from the carriage, the Marshal greeted him from the balustrade, and led him into the unpretentious guest-chamber. Shortly after he conducted him through a vaulted passage of the castle to the tower. The Princess, who had just returned from a wall, was standing, with her summer hat in her hand, at the entrance of the tower

"Welcome to my Solitude," she said; "happy be the hour in which this old mansion opens its doors to you. Here you stand at the entrance of my realm. I have made myself at home in almost every part of the tower; it is our female fortress. When these solid oak doors are closed we ladies can found an Amazonian kingdom, and without danger fire fir-cones upon the whole male world, for this is the fruit that flourishes best here. Come, Mr. Werner, I will take you to the place where your thoughts linger more willingly than with children of the present."

A winding stone staircase connected the stories of the tower, each of which contained rooms and closets; the highest was a loft. The Princess pointed mysteriously to the staircase.

(To be continued.)

A CENTENNIAL PRAYER.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

O THOU, beneath whose valiant hand
The conquest spreads from land to land,
'Till earth's extremest ends record
Thy victory and own thee lord ;
Thou in whose image gods were fair,
To thee, O man, I raise my prayer !

A hundred years of eager toil
Has turned our wheels and tilled our soil
Since, faithful to their proud decree,
Our fathers made us one and free,
And now we bid the world behold
Our wealth increased a hundred fold.

May memory of the sterner days
When virtue took the place and praise,
Make clear the truth that wealth, apart,
But swells the purse to shrink the heart ;
And leave us like our fathers, strong
To love the right and hate the wrong.

While science with her dawning light
Makes dim the guiding star of night,
And baffled by the break of day
Bewildered millions seek the way,
O keep us on the course begun,
And haste the rising of the sun !

Build us an altar, rock on rock,
Whose time-defying strength shall mock
The winds and floods of doubt, 'till all
Have spent their weary force and fall :
An altar where the true may bring
The true heart's wealth in offering.

Beneath a single flag unite
The scattered bands that waste their might
Against the leagued hosts of vice,
In unavailing sacrifice :
"And, cast in some" more human "mould,
Let the new cycle shame the old !"*

THE MOTTO ON OUR COINS.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

To those by whose influence the Motto, "IN GOD WE TRUST," *was put upon the coins of the United States.*

Is there no shame that thus ye dare disgrace
The fleeting winter of a poor old god ?
That thus ye filch his venerable name
To deck your idol and to cover o'er
Your bestial rites with stale hypocrisy ?
Or has the die, less brazen than yourselves,
Altered your motto, and refused to stamp
"*The* God we Trust" upon the yielding gold ?

And yet are days not distant when the thought
Of him ye now blaspheme had made you quake
And half forget your plotting in your fear.
But oh, how dimly burns thy smouldering hell !
Poor shadow of a great divinity.
Where is the terror of the mighty hand
Whose infant strength could strangle Hercules,
And shake the lofty throne of thundering Jove ?
Didst thou not bend before thy holy sign
The rabble hordes and yoke their fiery lust ?
Did not thy vicar reign upon the earth
Above the kings ? and make them fear thy wrath
More than the wrath of all their enemies ?
Were not thy altars laden with the deeds
Of fairest virtue and of foulest crime,
While men in every act, or great, or small,
Besought thy help, thy sanction, or thy grace ?
Yea, and though all thy ancestors were dead,
Did they not give thee immortality ?

Alas ! O god, how time has mocked and marred
And wasted thee ! that what is vile should dare
To prostitute thy name, and what is best
Should blush to see the years upon thy brow,
And like a worn jade turn thee out to die
In the lean pastures of the Incognoscible.

How sad a thing it is that when a god
Grows old, as all have done and ever must,
He cannot leave the government of earth
In younger hands, and quietly retire
To some secluded region, far away
From all the strife and tumult of the world.
Thus would the many weaknesses of age
Go unremarked, and thus his waning days
Be peaceful, and his memory remain
Forever cherished in the hearts of men.
But no ; when once his prime is reached and passed,
And each new year brings new infirmities,
His priests begin to tremble lest the herds
They govern in his name should lift their eyes
And mark the dotage of their deity.
The fear that made them valiant in his youth
To work his will is then gone out of them,
And they who served him, then would make his age
The servant of their dear ascendancy.

At first a little fard is judged enough
To hide time's ravage from the vulgar gaze,
But when the faltering step and sightless eye
Foretell the dissolution that must end
Their bloated reign, oh, then begins a farce
To make the heart of honor bleed with shame.
Haggard and wan, but tricked for public show
In hues fantastic like a mountebank,
The god is tortured, and when all his shape
In palsied antics writhes, the priests cry out
"Behold the wondrous power of the Lord !"
And many who would worship but have eyes.
Seeing these things, forget the glorious past
To scoff, and mock their long credulity.
And so till all have left him but the blind
And those who lead the blind—and then he dies.

VERSAILLES, 1873.

* JOHN G. WHITTIER, "Centennial Hymn."

NOTES.

Sympathizer's rejoinder to Wheelbarrow's answer will appear in No. 88 of THE OPEN COURT.

Mr. Louis Belrose, Jr., of Washington, is a follower of Auguste Comte in his first period. The two poems published in this number may be considered as a poetical expression of his philosophy. We beg to differ from him concerning the idea of God and have attempted to conceive it on the basis of positive facts.

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

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Review of Recent Work of THE OPEN COURT.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

SENSATION AND THE OUTER WORLD...A. BINET....No. 83.

IDEALISM AND REALISM. EDITOR.....No. 84.

DREAMS, SLEEP AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

M. Binet, after having animadverted upon the impropriety of excluding metaphysical questions from the domain of science, proceeds in the above-mentioned essay to discuss the interesting question of the relation between human sensation and its normal excitant, the external world. No resemblance is predicable, maintains M. Binet, between the perceptions of consciousness and the bodies that exist beyond us. Doctrines enunciating such resemblance, the author declares fallacious, and terms them "crude and naïve realisms." This fallacy, however, is widely prevalent in science Physicists and philosophers still hold that the definitive explanation of natural phenomena is a mechanical explanation, wherein the concepts of mass and force are the ultimate and fundamental data. They fail to recognize, in this, the purely subjective character of sensations. They translate, merely, sensations of one kind into sensations of another kind, which seem to us more precise; thus, they explain the phenonenon of sound by the phenomenon of a vibration; merely substituting, thereby, a visual sensation for an auditory sensation. This leads the author to discuss the supreme importance of the visual sense in the investigation of phenomena; the possibility of a purely auricular science is held forth; the author shows that the ear, by noting the *qualities* of sound, can solve *numerical* problems. Thus, the progression of human knowledge is accompanied by a progresion of human capabilities. The future will transform our sciences; it may transform our senses.

Sensation and the phenomena of the external world, it is granted, *are* different. But does it follow that knowledge of external objects is therefore impossible? The electrical phenomenon traversing the wire of a telephone bears no resemblance to the spoken words thrown against the mouth-piece in the shape of air-waves; no more so than does sensation the external object. Yet is communication by means of a telephone impossible? *Are* not the spoken words reproduced at the other end of the line in substantially the form in which they were received? *Preservation of form* is all that is necessary; and this is possible even where there is no superficial resemblance. It is a contradiction to demand that knowledge should be other than it is. Cognition does not, and *need* not, go beyond sensation.

In Numbers 82 and 83 two interesting letters appear, discussing questions raised by the articles of Dr. G. M. Gould upon Dreams, Sleep, and Consciousness—practical studies upon the psychology of consciousness.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE.

ETHICAL EVOLUTION. PROF. E. D. COPE.....No. 82.

The utilitarian theory of morals, says the distinguished author has found in the law of evolution a permanent substantiation. Yet does that doctrine embrace the *whole* truth, does it embody exclusively the law of human ethical progress? Ethical conduct, it is true, is an outgrowth of natural mental constitution; it differs among individuals, among families, among races; physical necessities, and conditions of environment direct it. But the knowledge of right is an intellectual faculty. Ethical life expresses, further, the highest development of humanity. Accordingly, moral conduct has *various* phrases of evolution: the rational as well as the natural, the individual as well as the social; to which corresponding motives of utility, egoism, and altruism belong. We find these motives interacting, each predominant in their respective spheres. The rational element has found its expression in generalization, in the formation by far seeing men of ethical codes; the affectional element, the element of Love, has found its expression in beneficent altruism, wherein the filial relation to God forms an abiding motive to action. The faculty of reason and the sentiment of love ensure ethical perfection.

PASSIONS AND MANIAS. FELIX L. OSWALD, M.D. Nos. 81, 84.

Interesting essays in moral physiology, abounding in citations from history and science in support of the positions taken.

NEWS ABOUT THE PLANETS AND THE MOON.....No. 80.

This constitutes a survey of the latest astronomical observations. It includes a brief account of the canals on the surface of Mars, with their various attendant phenomena; the rotation of Jupiter; the temperature of the moon; and the strange light-phenomena recently observed in the neighborhood of Saturn.

SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

HENRY GEORGE AND LAND TAXATION. WHEELBARROW.....No. 73

CORRESPONDENCE UPON THE DOCTRINE OF HENRY GEORGE.....Nos. 79, 80, 82, 84.

The criticisms by Wheelbarrow, touching the doctrines of Henry George, have evoked much comment and discussion. The main bulk of the correspondence relative to this question, remains still unpublished; showing the wide-spread interest taken in the subject, and the undoubted popularity of Mr. George's theories. The main endeavor of our correspondents seems directed towards demonstrating Wheelbarrows ignorance and misunderstanding of the great economist's position. This Wheelbarrow seeks to refute in a letter in No. 82.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DILEMMA OF DOUBLE ALLEGIANCE. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....No. 81.

The article by Gen. Trumbull is opportune. Its tone and position is commendable. Amid the chauvinistic fanfaronade of demagogic statesmen and bellicose newspapers, evoked by petty irritations over Samoa coal-stations and bait for cod-fish, the thoughtful citizen of foreign birth must often feel the appalling meaning that the problem of double allegiance embodies. "What is the ethics of patriotism that must guide us in case of actual war?" "The duty of men embarassed by the ties of double allegiance," says Gen. Trumbull, "is to stand bravely by the republic whatever comes, but they ought to unite their moral and political influence to promote the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful arbitration." The question has excited much comment from the press throughout the country.

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MAKING BREAD CHEAP.

A REJOINDER TO WHEELBARROW ON MAKING BREAD DEAR.

BY SYMPATHIZER.

Wheelbarrow complains in his last essay about the small inheritance of wealth or reward which he receives from the increased productivity of society as a whole. He demands higher wages.

Space will not permit any thorough consideration of Wheelbarrow's complaint, but, adopting his comparisons and figures, may not the following suggestions go part-way towards explaining the small share which comes to him, as an individual? He has supposed, and seems to approve as reasonable, a certain relative value in industries. Thus wheelbarrows as a class, he says, are entitled to one part in the industrial product, jackplanes two parts, the plough four parts, etc. Now he supposes that in twenty years the product of them all has doubled. Shall the farmer's part now be eight, the jackplane's four, and the wheelbarrow's still only one?

Accepting his formula, may it not be true that wheelbarrows, as a group, taken altogether, *do* get their portion doubled, as jackplanes as a whole receive their double portion? If this be true, then the division of the share coming to these groups would become equitably divided among the units composing them. If, therefore, the units composing the wheelbarrow group increased in a faster ratio than the units composing the jackplane group, the share to the units in the wheelbarrow group would be relatively less than would fall to the units or individuals composing the jackplane group. If all men were wheelers, there would be no productivity. Neither must the wheelbarrow wing of the great industrial army be too large. Society can afford to that group, as a division, only a certain share.

In fact, I believe and statistics seem to prove, that the comparative increase seems to favor the lowest class of workers. The unskilled laborer could in former ages scarcely earn his daily bread and in rare cases only provide himself with a home and have a family. He is comparatively best paid in a highly civilized society. Any increase of industrial productivity will benefit all classes, but the least skilled do comparatively profit most of all.

The individuals composing a group or division, if their share of the allotment be too small, must join some other division, and no motive can be more effective than the desire to gain a larger individual share of the total industrial product. This is, however, only a suggestion. The question is a large one. It deserves serious and continued study.

It is a hopeful sign that modern thought is becoming engaged with it. Let us hope that through the intelligence displayed in Wheelbarrow, and the growing intellectual power evident on every side among workingmen, the great questions of our social economics will find at last a just and final solution.

* * *

But let us confine our attention to the main point of our discussion which is the "crime of making bread dear."

It is somewhat anomalous that one who has never owned a bushel of wheat, nor more than one barrel of flour at any one time, should find himself defending speculation in bread-stuffs. But as the probability is that "Wheelbarrow" is in about the same case, we both have the advantage of looking at the subject from a comparatively disinterested standpoint; and I think we both desire to find the truth.

His review of my criticism is keen and searching; but if I may say so, it appears to be a little disingenuous. For instance, my "witness" said: "The speculator buys *hoping* for a rise, or sells *hoping* for a decline." Wheelbarrow thereupon attacks him, and tries to impeach his character. He says:

> "Nothing can be more cold-hearted and selfish than such testimony; it springs from the ethics of the pit. Just think of a man wasting his religion in praying for a rise in wheat. This, too, in a prayer sometimes three months long."

Well, I think I ought not to have exposed my witness to this stricture; and perhaps I ought to have stated in specific terms that a speculator rarely prays, and if he does, it is as often that he prays for a decline as for a rise. My witness used the word "hope" it is true, when the word "belief" would have expressed the facts more clearly. Let us say, then, that the speculator buys *believing* that wheat will rise in price, or sells *believing* it will fall in price, and thus save Wheelbarrow from further moral pain.

Again, my "witness" did not defend corners. He first explained them, and then candidly admitted that

they bore to the regular operators of the Board of Trade about the relation that a piratical excursion bears to commerce, or that the hurried raid in the rear of an army bears to the regular movement of a campaign. But Wheelbarrow scolds my witness as a defender of these objectionable, though brief, influences, and this is not quite ingenuous.

Where commerce covers the sea with ships ministering to the needs of man, experience shows that the pirate may, now and again, in ships manned by men, make excursions hostile to commerce; but experience shows also, that these are incidents, and that their total effect is next to nil, and it is a comfort to know that it is so. It is satisfactory, also, to know that "corners" are in their nature brief events, incidents to greater movements, and that in the sweep of time their influence is comparatively unimportant.

I am ready to join with Wheelbarrow (abandoning my witness if necessary) in denunciation of the kind of "cornerers" who resemble pirates. But there remain the "cornerers" whose actions my witness likened to that of a hostile raid in the rear of an army. This does not resemble piracy. It is often excusable. It is frequently patriotic and praiseworthy. Wheelbarrow himself says:

"When I demand cheap bread, I do not wish to deprive the farmer, the miller, or the Board of Trade man, or anybody who contributes to its production and distribution, of his deserved reward."

This is just and right, but if Wheelbarrow would study the facts, he would find that there is frequently at work an influence which, if left unchecked, would rob the farmer, if no one else, of his hard earned reward. This influence is the "short seller." Like the poor, he is always with us, though more audacious. An honest *believer* he may be that lower prices will prevail, owing to his belief in increased crops, or a diminishing demand. He will sell for future delivery if anyone will buy. Like an auctioneer, he will offer it down until he finds a buyer.

In former times governments performed the functions of the Board of Trade equalizing the price of grain by establishing storehouses, buying when the price of wheat was low and selling when it was high. They thereby lowered the price of bread in hard and raised it in good times, thus favoring now the farmer and now the consumer. A socialistic government would have to do the same as did the old paternal governments. Whether they would do it as well as the Board of Trade does it now, remains doubtful.

Now, let us suppose a practical case—a case which has more than once had real existence.

A "rich" man on the Board of Trade, performing the function of the benevolent government of former times, discovers that the course of the market has brought the price of wheat to a point which does not yield to the farmer his "deserved reward," nor such a price as to justify him in future effort to raise wheat on his farm, if the current price were to continue. In the *belief* that such a state of things cannot long continue, this "rich" man buys. Possibly he has a warm sympathy with the poor farmer, whose crop is ready to market: at all events, he buys: he buys largely. Does the price advance? No, it declines. To average his purchase, he doubles his first purchase at the now lower price. Does it then advance? No! it declines. He figures up the extent of his holding. He finds that he has purchased for an early delivery nearly as much as the total stock in our warehouses, but the price is still falling.

He goes upon "change." A score of voices are offering to sell, by the thousands, by the hundreds of thousands of bushels, competing with each other at fractions less in price at every breath. Shall he join that shouting throng, surrender his judgment, sell as best he can, bear his losses the best he may. He will not do so if he begins his name with an "H." He discovers that a planned campaign has been inaugurated by the "bears" to break the market to the lowest point, and by heavy calls on him for margins, compel him to let go his holdings, and sell to them at their own price.

To face such a situation requires nerve and courage of the highest order. If this buyer has it, and can control the capital necessary, he will plan a work similar to that of "a raid in the rear of an enemy." He will buy. He will buy all that is offered. He will control or corner the market. Only thus can he protect himself. If he is successful, he teaches reckless men,—men who have no regard for the farmer's "deserved reward," that there is retribution for their reckless disregard of equity. And I do not hesitate to say that, under the condition I have sketched, his action conduces to the welfare of the country, and herein is patriotic and praiseworthy.

Wheelbarrow asks—and his question possesses a pathetic interest: "What is it that the speculator buys?" And he answers with impressive emotion: "Wheat!"

Will Wheelbarrow allow us to remain calm at all his excitement?

What is it that all buyers and sellers buy and sell? If it is not wheat, it is meat, or fruit, or coal, or tools, or books, or other necessities which men want and use. Every article, be it made of iron or wood, may it serve directly for the production of food or indirectly to the prolongation and amelioration or elevation of life is to some extent "our daily bread." Man does not live upon bread alone, and in a certain sense we all are engaged in producing bread—life-stuff for human

beings—in some form, and who will deny that everybody attempts to sell his part of it as dear as possible? and everybody has a right to do so. Wheelbarrow agrees with me, that if anybody's work is more difficult, he may have greater rewards, and the scale of wages can easily be regulated by free competition.

Wheelbarrow becomes sentimental when he observes that some people deal in wheat, and that they hope for a rise of wheat.

When Wheelbarrow delved and carried earth at a railway job, he undoubtedly added his mite to the general capital and was engaged in making bread cheap, for the road will soon carry farmers and their machines West to raise more wheat. But when Wheelbarrow now demands his wages doubled, his own and of course those of all wheelers of earth too, he prays for making bread dear; for higher wages must increase the expenses of building railroads, and if any improportionate increase of wages took place on a larger scale, it might prevent roads to be built and thus would necessarily make it impossible for many farmers to go West, and those who live West could not send their wheat East. It would tend to making bread dear.

While upon the whole, Wheelbarrow, as it appears to me, means what is right and just, he has one fault, and that is his rhetoric. What is the use of sentimentality in economical or in any other questions? Let us come to business in plain and clear terms without any verbosity and ado, and we will the quicker understand one another. Making bread cheap in the sense Wheelbarrow preaches, may be well enough, but let us not forget, that in a certain sense, we are entitled to make it dear, just as much as Wheelbarrow is entitled to demand higher wages, if he can get them, or rather—if he deserves them.

When I undertook to oppose Wheelbarrow I chiefly intended to call attention to the fact that there are two aspects of the question of making bread dear. Labor agitators, as a rule, demand that "the bread we eat must be cheap, but for the bread we make we should demand the highest price," and the short-sighted, credulous listeners are apt to believe him who promises most. They do not see that agitators preach "yes and no" in one breath, that sour and sweet at the same time comes out of their mouth.

There is a modern reformer appealing with his arguments to the broad masses, who promises by the simple means of taxing land to its full rental value to offer bread for nothing. Henry George says in "Progress and Poverty," that if but the landlords were taxed out of existence, we would realize the ideal of the communist. We shall have meals at public tables for the mere asking of it, free libraries, free theatres, free baths, free railroads, free street cars, heat and motor power furnished in our houses at public expense, etc., etc.

What is that else than offering bread gratis? and it is bread for body and soul, bread of any description. But if all that can be had for the mere asking of it, who will then work? "That is just the advantage of it," I am told, "wages will rise, they will rise as high as they never have been, and men will not work at all unless it be for the pleasure of work."

An excellent prospect if it were possible! Pray, gentlemen, how can you, for any length of time, distribute values gratis, unless you can also create them gratis?

Mr. George promises that we shall reap where we did not sow and that we shall have an unlimited credit in the bank of public prosperity without being obliged to make any deposit.

Mr. George has a great followership and whatever be the merit of his idea of land taxation, nobody seems to be aware of the utopian scheme of what constitutes Georgeism proper. He promises that the bread we eat shall be cheap, so cheap that it is given for the mere asking of it, and the bread we make shall be dear, so dear that nobody shall be able to buy it, unless he pays the full price we demand.

Let us cease to be overawed by oratory. There is an untruth in every exaggeration and every untruth contains poison.

Let us work to produce bread, every one in his way; useful work will lead to make bread cheap. But at the same time let us bear in mind that bread means human labor, it means human lives. Any artificial combinations to make bread dear for the benefit of a few conspirators—pirates as I called them—is to be condemned. In that I fully agree with Wheelbarrow. But let us not demand that bread be too cheap, for that would necessarily degrade a certain number of human lives into abject poverty, and deprive them of their due reward for having contributed to make bread.

DREAMS AND VISIONS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

It has often been remarked that an explanation of the soul-phenomena known as dreams, would furnish a key to the enigma of the soul itself, and the problem of slumber-visions has, indeed, been a subject of curious speculation since the earliest dawn of philosophy. Aristotle (*De Somno et vigilia*) makes the physiology of sleeping and waking the topic of a special treatise, and like Dr. Abercrombie, seems to assume a distinct organ, if not a sixth sense, for the perception of facts unknowable to the ordinary (waking) mode of cogni-

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXIV.

zance. Plutarch and Herodotus quote numerous anecdotes of prophetic night-visions. Pliny, too, examines the subject from a physiological point of view, and the *Oneirocriticon* of Artemidoros is a "dream-book," quite in the modern mystic sense of that term, and abounds with fanciful rules for the interpretation of dreams, of which he distinguishes two kinds: the ordinary allegoric and the directly prophetic ("theorematic," as he calls them) which warn the sleeper by an actual prevision of coming events.

The writings of the mediæval schoolmen teem with similar speculations, and Kieser, Brierre, and Abercrombie treat the problem from a highly metaphysical point of view; but the most satisfactory explanations of dream-life have after all been derived from the study of physical analogies. Sleep is a process of restoration and readjustment, and physicians well know that the healing powers of nature assert themselves most effectually during the entire suppression of volitional control characterizing a deep slumber. In dreams, too, the absence of direct sense-impressions and volitional interference seem to favor an automatic function of the brain which, in that respect, might be defined as a method of *mental digestion*. And just as the process of physical digestion and assimilation eliminates the superfluous elements of food, retaining only those needed for the special purposes of the organism, the brain, during sleep, appears to deal specially with topics of direct concern for the personal interests of the sleeper and to assort and adjust the store of empiric impression (the mentel *ingesta*, as it were) after eliminating all unessential and unconsequential elements. Withal, the suspense of conscious cerebration by no means implies an eclipse of the intellectual faculties. Dreams are not limited to plays of fancy; the brain in slumber may deal with philosophical and abstrusely scientific speculations, or resolve moral doubts which perhaps have puzzled the mind for days, and it is a common experience that the distressing problems of practical life adjust themselves, as it were, in sleep, by a more or less conscious process of the cerebral laboratory.

In short, there is no doubt that *the instinct guarding the welfare of the individual presides over dreams as it presides over the automatic functions of the physical organism.* The very suspension of the will power, with its passions and prejudices, seems, indeed, to enable an inner monitor to decide vexing doubts in accordance with the best permanent interests of the sleeper. It has often been observed that the dramaturgy of slumber represents all actors in a rôle revealing their true character with remarkable correctness, and often with a suggestiveness that has tempted mystics to ascribe that sort of clairvoyance to direct inspiration.

Yet here, too, physical analogies might suggest a simpler explanation. The saving crisis of dangerous diseases which often supervenes in deep slumber may be explained by the circumstance that the complete repose of the volitional faculties enable the organism to concentrate all its energies upon a needed work of repair, and for similar reasons the non-interference of waking prejudices may give the instinct of self-preservation a long desired chance for removing a baneful delusion as to our best interest in a proposed mode of action, or as to the true character of designing fellow-men. Something or other in the looks or the actions of a marked rascal may have suggested a suspicion of his secret motives, though at the time collateral circumstances observed that misgiving, leaving only a vague, unexplained uneasiness as the direct result of such experiences. But in sleep that impression reasserts itself with a force freed from the interference of prejudice, and for a moment removes the mask of false appearances; the sleeper receives a "warning." Similar warnings often correct the impressions of false hope. Impending perils may cast a shadow persistently ignored in a waking state, while the mind is by the influence of a self-deluding optimism—the wish that is father to the belief in the insignificance of the threatening danger. But in sleep the voice of the monitor cannot be silenced by such illusions, and warning forebodings often take the form of distinct visions, repeated with a vividness and frequency which at last cannot fail to influence the actions of the individual, in spite of all waking sophisms. I remember the instance of an American family that had settled in the northern uplands of Cameron County, Texas, but before the end of a year removed to the vicinity of a larger settlement, and sold their half completed home for reasons that remained a mystery to their upland neighbors. "We had selected that building-site after a good deal of prospecting," the first proprietor of that house told me a few years later, "and at first it seemed a puzzle to me that nobody had pre-empted it long ago. It was a broad hill with a fine prospect east and south; we had an abundance of timber, fine range, two good springs, and a ledge of soft limestone within a thousand yards of the house, where you could shape out building-stone with a common saw. I never could hope to find better neighbors; they actually got up a picnic to celebrate our arrival, so glad they were to have English-speaking folks within visiting distance. We had every prospect of getting an improved road and a post office, and three months after our first entry I would not have sold that homestead for ten times my direct expenses. But about half a year after, that ranch seemed a haunted place and I didn't feel at rest day or night though people that know me are not likely to call me superstitious. I never was a fraid of

darkness even when I was a boy and a swarm of ghosts would not scare me worth a cent. But one night, about a week after I had got home from a trip to Brownsville Landing, I dreamt our house was tackled by a gang of Greaser bushwhackers (Mexican bandits) and that they shot me down and killed my little boy with a club, and then loaded their horses with everything they could move. Two nights after I had exactly that same dream over again, and I could see every stick and stone in our yard, when I tried to make a break for our next neighbor and was shot down just as I rushed through the gate. I noticed the very horses and saddles of that gang and could have recognized every one of them if I had met them in daylight, and I now do believe that I did see them somehow or other on that trip to the Landing. The idea began to haunt me when that dream had come back for the third time, though I never said a word; but one morning my wife seemed uneasy till all our farm-hands had started to work, and then asked me to come out in the garden for a minute. "Do you think there are any robbers in this neighborhood?" she asked me when we were quite alone. "Why, did you see or hear anything suspicious?" I asked her back. "No, but I had such a strange dream last night," said she, with a sort of a shudder, "I dreamt a gang of Mexicans came to our house and made me run for my life, and just before I got through the door I saw them knock down little Tommy with a club." "Didn't I help you?" I laughed. "I don't know," she said, "I saw you collar one of them, and I kept calling for you in English to save yourself, but just as you dashed through the gate I heard the crack of a shotgun and then I fainted." I made no reply, but that minute I felt that we couldn't stay no longer, and two weeks after I made up my mind to move to Indianola. There were no Mexicans in our immediate neighborhood at that hill-farm, and no serious robbery had happened anywhere nearer than Casa Blanca, but I felt that I had to look for a new home if I expected to get an hour's peace, and it often seemed to me that I was doing a sin if I let my little boy out of sight for ten minutes. So we made up an excuse about schools and post offices and managed to sell our pretty place for a few hundred. The neighbors thought I must be half crazy, but I couldn't help it; and just ten weeks after we were gone we got the news of that Pancho Parras massacre. The whole neighborhood had been sacked and outraged, and as I know my boy, I am now morally certain that he would have stood his ground and got himself killed, if he had seen any brute lay hands on his mother."

The very homeliness of that account impressed me with a conviction of its absolute truth, and on the whole I consider it the most characteristic instance of what Artemidoros would have called "theorematic dreams." Moorish chronicles, though, relate that in 726, or nearly five years before the date of the fatal expedition, the Chalif Abderahman had an interview with a hermit who gave him a detailed description of the battle-field of Tours and all the particulars of the disastrous defeat which had been revealed to him in a prophetic dream. The Earl of Stafford, too, is said to have been warned by the dream of his Scotch gardener, who was subject to that sort of second sight, and once told his master that he had seen him in his sleep, addressing a large assembly from the top of a raised platform. "There were three other chiel's standing up alongside of my lord," said the gardener, "one of them looked like a priest but I could not make out the two others." Hibbert's "sketches of the philosophy of apparitions" give a circumstantial account of a vision in which a lady—at that time in the enjoyment of tolerable health—had the day and the very hour of her death revealed by a dream, which she communicated to a few of her intimate friends; and even Goethe in his autobiography (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Vol. XI) relates a vision which eight years after was verified on that very spot, and under circumstances which at once recalled the details of that second sight apparition.

Such details are no doubt often suggested by sensory impressions received in a waking state, out of which the mind, pre-occupied by other thoughts, had at the time failed to take special cognizance. Miss Cobbe, in a contribution to *MacMillan's Magazine*, relates a very suggestive instance of that kind from the experience of a British officer, engaged in the pursuit of a gang of Hindoostan bandits. His wife, who accompanied him on that expedition, one morning urgently entreated him to leave his camp in a certain jungle, where she had been "haunted by the sight of dead men." The very next day the officer's skirmishers discovered the traces of a new-made grave, and after removing a shallow stratum of leaves and sand, disinterred not less than fourteen corpses. "It is very conceivable," remarks Miss Cobbe, "that the horrible vision was suggested by the foul odor of death. Had the lady been in a state of mesmeric trance, the same occurrence would, no doubt, be quoted as a splendid instance of supernatural revelation."

An even clearer proof of the sensory source of certain dream-visions is related in Dr. Carpenter's anecdote of a traveling magistrate who, "having been retained, before his elevation to the bench, in a case which was to be tried in the North of England, he slept at the house of one of the parties in it, and dreamt through the night that lizards were crawling over him. He could not imagine what had suggested such an idea to his mind, until, on going into the apartment in

which he had passed the evening, he noticed a mantelpiece clock, on the base of which were figures of crawling lizards. This he must have seen without *noticing* it, and the sight must have left a 'trace' in his brain, though it left no record in his conscious memory."

In the *tableaux vivants* of the sleeping brain, such scenes are often interwoven with those "allegoric visions" which form the large plurality of prophetic dreams, and the main topic of modern and mediæval commentaries, though the most curious instance on record is a tradition of classic antiquity. When the island-king Polycrates was invited to visit the Persian satrap of Sardis, his daughter, as a biographer of the accomplished despot informs us, had a dream in which she saw her father annointed by Apollo and washed by the hands of Jupiter. The horrible significance of that dream was revealed at Sardis when the treacherous satrap had the king crucified in an open field, where the burning sun covered him with sweat, and a thunderstorm with rain.

The *daimon* of Socrates predicted only evil but never happy events; yet monitory dreams, prompted by the ever-active instinct of self-preservation, are by no means limited to "warnings." They occasionally assume the form of *attractive* visions, and I remember the comments of a consumptive, who had contracted his fatal disease by an excess of indoor work, and described the tantalizing dreams which for years tormented him with visions of highland scenes and waving forest-trees. "On awakening in the morning," he said, "I often found my pillow drenched with tears, and there were days when I felt that I could have cheerfully renounced my city comforts and started for the Sierras to share the pot-luck of a hunter's cabin, if the dread of my father's temper had not prevented me. After my lungs had been ruined," he added, with a sigh, "those visions never came back. I fear *they had failed to serve their purpose and gave me up for lost.*"

The popular belief that appealing dreams limit their mission to the prediction of perils, may be explained by the circumstance that the significance of inviting visions is less apt to be strikingly revealed by eventual experience. Warning dreams are forcibly recalled by the supervention of the threatening event, whether or no the warning should have prompted the adoption of timely precautions. Attractive intuitions of dream-life, on the other hand, are apt to be mistaken for prefigurative, rather than monitory visions, and even if they should fail to be heeded, their real purpose may never be suspected, or reveal itself only in the vague longings which transiently haunt our waking hours, like the echo of a distant voice.

SPACE AND TIME.

In his Critique of Pure Reason (Part I, Section I), Kant proposes the question: "What then are time and space? Are they real existences?" And he answers in the negative. He says:

"If we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing every thing into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as *sine quibus non* of the possibility of their existence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor any thing really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated,—we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance—an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of."

Space and time, Kant declares, are nothing else than forms, the one of our external the other of our internal sense. They are not real, they are ideal.

We agree with Kant that space and time are ideal, not real in so far as they are no things, no objects, but abstract conceptions. Space of itself apart from extended, extending or moving things, and time of itself apart from changes do as little exist as matter of itself or force of itself. Space does not extend, but things extend and move; and their extension *is* space. Time does not change but things are changing; their change, or rather the measure of their change, *is* time. Without extended things no space, and without motion or change no time. We disagree from Kant in so far as he says that space and time are the forms *of the thinking subject only*. He denies that they are properties inhering in the objects, because, he maintains, they cannot have been abstracted from reality. If they were abstracted from reality, he argues, mathematics would be an experimental, yet no transcendental, *i. e.* formal, science, and we could never attribute to mathematics absolute validity (rigid necessity and universality). Kant explains his position as follows:

"Those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being any thing real) for the purpose of containing in themselves every thing that is real.

"If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in space or succession in time), abstracted from experience, though represented confusedly in this state of separation, they find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical doctrines *a priori* in

reference to real things (for example, in space),—at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such certainty cannot be found in an *a posteriori* proposition; and the conceptions *a priori* of space and time are, according to this opinion, mere creations of the imagination, having their source really in experience."

From this standpoint Kant concludes:

"I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves."

Taking this position that space and time are forms of our cognition merely, not of things, Kant accepts the inevitable consequence that

"The question, 'What are objects considered as things in themselves?,' remains unanswerable even after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world"

If Kant were right in his solution of the problem, the question "How does the constitution of thinking subjects universally, (so far as we can judge), happen to have such forms of space and time as they are," would be unanswerable. Could we not, or at least some of us—of living beings—just as well have a constitution of four-dimensional space? And if so, how would in that case our conception of four dimensional space tally with actual space?

If space inhered, as Kant maintains, in the thinking subject *only*, special relations and laws would appear different to four-dimensional beings. Kepler's third law for instance, that "the squares of the times of revolution of the planets are always proportional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun," would to them most probably appear as "the cubes of their times of revolution being proportional to their mean distances taken to the fourth power." To us a right-angled solid that measures two inches in each of its dimensions, (*viz.*, a cube) contains eight cubic inches. A four-dimensional being would be sure that a right-angled solid that measures in all its dimensions two inches must necessarily contain sixteen four-dimensional inches. Anybody who denies that such radical changes would take place in the objects of the phenomenal world, must inevitably admit that tridimensionality is not merely our "mode of intuition," but an inherent quality of matter.

If the form of matter is tridimensional it is natural that beings whose bodies are built up of tridimensional matter will be able to ascertain the tridimensionality of their world by experiments of mere inner experience. Taking up space themselves. they can by mere reflexion determine how many dimensions actually exist. Kant does not distinguish such internal experimenting from reasoning a priori. Reasoning a priori should be strictly limited to pure formal thought, while experiments are and remain a matter of experience whether they are executed on phenomena of the outer world or whether the subject experiments on or within his own body, which after all, like the rest of things, is an object in the phenomenal world.

If Kant had investigated the problem of the a priori (of formal thought), he would have found that the forms of our cognition naturally grow with experience, and that we acquire them indeed by abstraction. Consequently, absolute apriority which Kant attributes to space can not be granted it. Our mathematical laws possess absolute rigidity and universality for tridimensional space and as a system of third degree they are a priori, *i. e.*, pure formal thought, but the fact that space is tridimentional is exclusively a matter of experience.

How much of experience enters into our conception of space can be seen from the following logical syllogism:

PREMISSA MAJOR:

The formal laws of a system of third degree apply to any system of third degree with rigidity and universality,

as we know a priori (*i. e.*, from pure reason, or formal thought, from inner reflection upon the laws of pure form).

PREMISSA MINOR:

Actual space being tridimensional is a system of third degree,

as we know by experience and can prove by experiment.

ERGO:

The formal laws of third degree apply to space with rigidity and universality.

* * *

KANT, in his argument, identifies 'ideal' and 'subjective.' The conception of space being an abstract idea and its being to some extent formal thought, does not at all compel us to deny that actual space is a real (although by no means a material) property in objects.

Kant says:

"The proposition, "All objects are beside each other in space," is valid only under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of *our sensuous intuition*. But if I join the condition to the conception, and say, 'all things, as external *phenomena*, are beside each other in space,' then the rule is valid universally, and without any limitation.

"Our expositions, consequently, teach the *reality* (*i. e.* the objective validity) of space in regard of all phenomena which can be presented to us externally as objects, and at the same time also the *ideality* of space in regard to objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the *empirical ideality* of space in regard to all possible external experience although we must admit its *transcendental ideality*, in other words, that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends, and look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves."

Whether space and time apply to "things in themselves" must be considered from the standpoint of monism as an idle question, since "things in themselves" do not exist.

In contradistinction to Kant's view we maintain: The nature of our cognition is such that space can not but appear tridimensional to us. Our existence is tridimensional, and for that very reason our cognition is tridimensional also. Our existence, however, is a part of the whole of reality and our life is a phenomenon among many other innumerable processes of nature. Consequently we look upon the forms of our existence as upon a specimen, so to speak, of the forms of existence in general.

It does not lie within the scope of our problem to enter into the details of the growth of space-conception. There is but one way for a living being to acquire the idea of space, and that is by motion—not only through the observation of moving bodies, but also and chiefly through self-motion. If we were immovably fixed to one spot, we would have no conception of space or at least a very dim one. Only while moving ourselves, can we measure distances, and by measuring we form our ideas about space. If this is true, and I think it can be proved experimentally, the definition of space as "the possibility of motion in all directions" will be justified. That the different senses having a different kind of motion, will have different measures for space is obvious. The most primitive method of the different senses in judging of distances is the remembrance of the effort necessary to pass through it from one end to the other. Errors are corrected by a comparison among the results of the different senses and may be altogether avoided by the application of a standard measure in which all distances can be expressed. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SINGLE TAX AND GEORGEISM.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

MR. GEORGE made a blunder by going to England and leaving his doctrine loose in the hands of his disciples. They have given it so many emendations and explanations that he will hardly know it when he gets home. If he could read the thirty or forty defenses of it which have appeared in THE OPEN COURT he would laugh at their paradoxical ingenuity. He would exclaim with that Maryland farmer, "Friends of the single tax had better stop explaining."

The most condensed explanation of the single tax doctrine is given by Mr. Hugh O. Pentecost in THE OPEN COURT, No. 85. I will first notice that. He says:

"If Wheelbarrow cannot separate the idea of 'the value of land from the land,' as he confesses, he certainly ought to understand that one piece of land has more renting value than another, and he ought to understand so simple a proposition as having *ground-rent* and nothing else paid into the public treasury. That is all there is to the 'George Theory.'"

Very good! That simplifies the debate. Mr. Pentecost is of high authority as a commentator on the gospel according to George. If Mr. George left the key to his problem in the hands of any man, he left it in the hands of Mr. Pentecost. I must therefore consider his interpretation orthodox although it is hardly consistent with the original text as written by Mr. George himself. Mr. Pentecost gives us a very narrow definition of Mr. George's claim. Mr. George expands the *ground-rent* project until it includes the confiscation of all the value of all the land. This is practically the confiscation of the land; and the communists of Europe and America understand it so. Mr. George himself understands it so. In proof of this I quote his very words, as I find them on page 302 of "Protection or Free Trade."

"Now it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the community the *whole income* arising from land, *just as effectually as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land*, it is only necessary to abolish, one after another, all other taxes now levied, and to increase the tax on land values till it reaches, as near as may be, the *full annual value* of the *land*."*

Can confiscation be declared in plainer words than those? They are copied from Webster's dictionary, where Confiscation is defined as "Appropriating to the public use." Why quibble over words and phrases such as "single tax," "ground rent," "land values," and similar labels *on* the bottle, when Mr. George declares that the remedy *in* the bottle will "take for the use of the community the whole income arising from land, just as effectually as it could be taken by *formally appropriating* and letting out the land?" "It is only *ground-rent*," says Mr. Pentecost, after the manner of Leroy Carter, a comrade of mine, who was arrested for killing a pig. "Did you kill that pig?" said the colonel; "No, sir," said Carter, "I did not. He came smelling around the tent, so I just run my bayonet through him, and he——died." It is only *ground-rent*, but it appropriates the land. We do not propose to kill Tom Clark, we shall only just playfully run him through with a bayonet.

The popularity of Mr. George's theory lies in the extravagant claim he makes for its beneficence. I have been criticized for saying that the millennium is included in his plan Let us examine his most recent utterance on the subject. A few weeks ago Mr. George wrote a letter to the *Chicago Times*, in which he said:

"The single tax reform is the most pressing. This is the one great reform that by relieving industry of all burdens and preventing the monopolization of the one element necessary to all production and all life will enormously increase production, will secure an equitable distribution of wealth, will solve the labor question, which lies at the root of all our social and religious difficulties, will make Christianity possible, will give the masses of men opportunity for more than a struggle to exist, and will open the way for an advance to a far higher and grander civilization."

If that is not the millennium, what is it? Does Mr. Pentecost believe that such tremendous results are to be obtained by the application to society of the insignificant porous plaster which he calls *ground-rent?* Does he believe that his fly-blister will draw the inflammation from the body-politic, allay the social fever, solve the labor question, and "make Christianity possible?" Is not Christianity possible now? And does it not exist in many different forms? If the full promise of Christianity has not yet been realized, will it come through the diminutive device called *ground-rent?* The towering pretensions of Mr. Henry George are brought by Mr. Pentecost to an anti-climax when he *declares* that *ground-rent* paid into the public treasury "is all there is to the George Theory." All that is needed now to "make Christianity possible" is a little *ground-rent.*

Mr. George ridicules the protectionists for trying to make people rich by taxing them, yet he attempts the same impossible feat in a tenfold more difficult and exaggerated form. He actually says that a single tax on land values amounting to the "*whole income*" of the land and its "full annual value" would benefit the farmer. This contradiction is the illusive creed of multitudes, as appears from the letters in THE OPEN COURT.

* The *italics* are mine.

Let us see how Mr. George's plan would enrich Tom Clark He would be taxed $8 or $10. for his farm according to the Georgeian assessor. But some new comers would be willing to pay more for God's bounty and Mr. Clark would be evicted. Those who can separate the land value from the land will perhaps tell him how he can take his improvements along. You declare that Tom Clark may sell his improvements. You can even force him to sell; but you can force nobody to buy them.

I agree that land values may be taxed; but I maintain that they cannot be seized and sold in satisfaction of the taxes, any more than a crack in the wall of a house can be taken in execution for the rent. All taxes upon land values are ideal in their assessment; they are actual and real in their collection. They attach to the realty, the land, and if not paid, the land itself, and not the land value, is sold by the sheriff. Therefore all taxes upon land values are taxes upon land. To assert that they are friendly to the soil itself, is to repeat in a new form the apology for the cutworm, who merely attacks the wheat, but is careful not to injure the land.

The state of New York *e g.* must bear a very large burden of taxation, and it is not statesmanship but sentiment which proposes to obtain the money by a tax on land values irrespective of the improvements on the land. According to the ratio of population, the state of New York must pay twenty-seven million dollars annually in taxes to the national government alone, although according to the ratio of wealth the share of that state would greatly exceed that sum. How could the money be raised by a tax on land values alone, in addition to the sums necessary to defray the vast expenses of the State, County, and Township governments? Men live in dreamland who think to benefit the New York farmer by levying all taxes upon land values, and exempting from taxation all the personal property of that opulent state, all the money, bonds, banks, railroads, ships, factories, stocks of goods, and all buildings of every description whatsoever. There is not in all dupedom a more deceitful vision than that of a farmer growing rich by the exemption from taxation of all kinds of property except his own.

I should like to continue but I must stop here to day because it will take me a few days of hard study to answer your Dakota correspondent who can see no moral distinction between stealing horses, and investing capital in land; and that Ohio critic who says that Mr. George is not after Tom Clark, but his children; and that Chicago man who desires to encourage Tom Clark in making improvements on his farm by exempting everybody and everything from taxation except land owners and land values; and that Massachusetts economist who tells us that the abolition of poverty is only a "side issue."

Mr. Pentecost sees no difference between the proportion of land taxation and Georgeism. But I see a difference. While I consider the one feasable, I think that the latter is fantastical.

WHEELBARROW.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PASSE ROSE. *Arthur Sterburne Hardy.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Mr. Hardy's first attempt in fiction, "But Yet a Woman," published a few years ago was a delight and surprise to all who read it, and gave rise to agreeable expectation concerning his future work. Passe Rose, in its *locale* and general plot is a complete contrast to his first work and proves him an accomplished writer of pure romance. A fine poetic sensibility marks all of the characterizations, while the descriptions of the semi-sivilized and picturesque life of the age of Robert G, Tans gives an ideal grace and charm to every page. C. P. W.

We have received from the *Société Royale Malacologique* of Belgium the annual reports for 1887, constituting the twenty-second volume of Series IV (Brussels: P. Weissenbuch). The work opens with a continuation of M. Cossmann's illustrated catalogue of the fossil shells of the Eocene epoch in the environs of Paris; the cuts are appended to the volume. M. Cossmann's *memoire* occupies most of the volume. M. Edgar A. Smith has some remarks upon the terrestrial shells of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo; M. E. Perijens, upon the Bryozoa of the Tasmajdan, at Belgrade. The various catalogues, discussions, and remarks upon malacological subjects embodied in the work, will be of undoubted value to specialists at home.

The Liberal Hymn Book, edited by Eliza Boardman Burnz, (24 Clinton Place, New York) is a small paper-bound volume, easily carried in the vest-pocket The songs contained in the little book are adapted to popular tunes; they are designated for use in liberal meetings and liberal homes, being as the editress says, "a very effective means for extending the domain of free-thought." The collection comprises some of our most familiar popular hymns, and many selections from Whittier, Tennyson, Longfellow, and others. Apropos of the occurrence of the word God in different passages, the editress defines Him to be man's highest conception of what is noblest and best in the universe or in humanity—"the totality of all Good." The orthography is a slight modification of the system of the American Spelling Reform Association: *a* being omitted from *ea* in such words as hed, helth; *e* omitted after a short vowel, as in hav, giv; *f* written for ph, as in fonograf; *ed* changed to *t*, when it has the sound of *t*, etc.

The Future of Morality as Affected by the Decay of Prevalent Religious Beliefs, is the title of a concise pamphlet of 16 pages, by Mr. M. S. Gilliland (London: Watts & Co.). The author first examines the nature of morality. He finds it to be "a particular kind of conduct, rendered necessary by the nature of man and the conditions of his existence, and made pleasureable by the persistence of that necessity; both necessity and pleasure being appreciable by human faculty, uninstructed by supernatural revelation." Tracing, then, the connection between morality and religion, the latter is found to be the "reflection of the intellect and character of the believers." Morality, thus, is declared to be entirely "independent of religion in its origin, basis, and sanction." We have no cause for anxiety, says the author, as we face the breaking up of creeds, nor should we fear the results of a dis-sociation of morality from religion. Ours must be an earnest endeavor to apprehend the moral order of the universe; and fearless fidelity to the convictions we thus gain.

NOTES.

St. George Mivart, late professor of biology at University College, Kensington, the author of "Genesis of Species," opposes in the *Forum* for May Darwinism and the ethics derived from Darwinism on moral grounds.

The *Century* Magazine for May will contain richly illustrated essays on "Samoa: The Isles of the Navigators," by H. W. Whitacker; on "Our Relations to Samoa," by George H. Bates; on "The Tuscarora's Mission to Samoa," by James T. McKay. Verestchagin's picture of the wailing place of the Jews is published among the illustrations of the article "Round About Jerusalem," by Edward L. Wilson.

The May number of the *Magazine of American History* brings another entertaining chapter of fresh Centennial information, "Washington's Historic Luncheon in Elizabeth," with very unique pictorial attractions. As usual, it is a specimen of typographical beauty—in the artistic elegance of its printing it holds the highest rank in the magazine field, Price, $5 a year. Published 743 Broadway, New York City.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXV. — Continued.

"Yonder at the top, below the rafters," said the Princess to the Professor, "the whole space is crammed with old household furniture. I could not restrain my curiosity, so yesterday I just peeped into the room; the things lie heaped up in wild confusion; we shall have much work."

The Professor examined with pleasure the well-preserved stone-work of the arched doors and the artistic work of the old-time lock-smith. Little had been done in modern times to make the walls look respectable or to repair damage; but any one who took interest in the chisel and carving tools of the old builders, might perceive everywhere with pleasure that the tower could easily be changed into a masterpiece of ancient style.

The servant opened the door into the Princess's rooms. These also were simply arranged. The broken painted glass of the small window had been repaired with panes coarsely painted; only fragments of the old pictures still adhered to the lead.

"There is still much to be done here," explained the Princess; "and we shall gradually have everything arranged within the next few years."

The clatter of the Castellan's keys were heard in the anteroom, and the Professor turned towards the door.

"One moment's patience," cried the Princess, and she flew into an adjoining room. She returned in a grey cloak with a hood, which enveloped her in its folds, only the delicate face, the large beaming eyes, and smiling mouth being visible.

"It is only in this gnome costume that I venture to approach the dusty spirits of the lumber-room."

They ascended to the highest story. While the Castellan was picking out the key from the bunch, the Professor eagerly examined the door, and remarked, "More beautiful mouldings by your old lock-smith."

"I have hopes," said the Princess.

"Everything looks that way," replied the learned man.

The heavy door creaked on its hinges, and a large room presented itself to the eyes of the searchers. A bright light shone through the narrow openings in the wall upon the mysterious apartment; atoms of dust were seen whirling about in the straight shafts of air, while before and beyond all was confusion wrapt in semi-darkness. Old furniture was piled up in hopeless confusion; gigantic wardrobes with broken doors, heavy tables with balls for feet, chairs with straight backs and leather cushions, from which the horsehair bristled out; together with fragments of old weapons, halberds, corroded greaves, and rusty helmets. Indistinct and vague, the forms appeared among each other: legs of chairs, flat pieces of wood with inlaid work, and heaps of old iron lying all around. It was a chaos of frippery, the artistic products of many centuries. Their hand touched the table at which a contemporary of Luther had sat; their foot pushed against a chest which had been broken open by Croats and Swede; or against the white lacquered chair, with moth-eaten velvet cushions, on which a court lady had once sat, in a hoop dress, with powdered hair. Now all lay together in desolate heaps, the cast-off husks of former generations, half destroyed and quite forgotten; empty chrysales, from which the butterflies had flown. All were covered with a grey shroud of dust—the last ashes of vanished life. What once had form and body, now, crushed into powder, whirled about in the air; clouds of dust opposed the entrance of those who came to disturb its possession; it hung to the hair and clothes of the living intruders, and glided slowly through the open door to the rooms, where varied colors and brilliant ornament surrounded the inmates, in order there to carry on the endless struggle of the past with the present—the quiet struggle that is daily renewed in great and small things which makes new things old, and finally dissolves the old in order that it may help to nourish the germ of youthful life.

The Professor glanced like a hawk amidst the legs of tables and chairs in the dusky background.

"Some things have lately been removed from here," he said; "there has been some sweeping among the furniture in the front."

"I yesterday endeavored to clean a little," said the Castellan, "because your Highness expressed a wish to enter here; but we have not gone far."

"Have you ever formerly examined the furniture in this room?" asked the Professor.

"No," replied the man. "I was only placed here last year by his Highness the Sovereign."

"Is there any catalogue of the things?" said the Professor.

The man said there was not.

"Do you know if there are chests or trunks here?"

"I think I have observed something of the kind," replied the Castellan.

"Fetch the workmen to move the things," ordered the Princess. "To-day every part or this attic shall be examined."

The Castellan hastened down. The Professor endeavored again to peep among the piled-up masses, but the glaring light from above dazzled his eyes. He looked at the princely child; she was standing in a costume of bright color at the door, like the fairy of the castle, who has ascended into the dwelling of the grey-bearded spirits of the house in order to accept their homage.

* Translation copyrighted.

"It will be a long work, and your Highness will not like the dragging about of the dusty furniture."

"I will remain with you," exclaimed the Princess; "however contemptibly small may be my share in the discovery, I will not give it up."

Both were silent. The scholar moved about impatiently among the chairs. Moths fluttered in the clouds of dust, and a brown martin flew out from the nest which it had built in a corner of the window. All was still; there was no sound but a slight regular tapping, like a pendulum striking the hour, in the desolate room.

"That is the death-watch," whispered the Princess.

"The wood-worm is doing its work in the service of nature, it dissolves what is decayed, into its elements."

The sound ceased, but after a time began to tick again, then a second; they tapped and gnawed incessantly, down, down, and further down! Over the heads of the searchers the jackdaws were croaking, and further off the song of the nightingale sounded softly upon the labor of those who were unearthing the past.

The workmen came; they brought one article after another to the front of the room. Thicker rose the discoloring dust; the Princess took refuge in the anteroom, but the Professor did not leave his post. He worked hard himself, raising and arranging things in the front row. He went back for a moment to the door to take breath, the Princess received him laughing.

"You have undergone a complete transformation. You look as if you had been awaiting resurrection in this room, and I do not think I look much better."

"I see a chest," said the Professor, and hastened back. Another confused medley of chairs' legs and backs were lifted away, and the workmen laid hold of a little chest which stood in the dark. "Set it down," ordered the Castellan, who quickly passed a large brush over it. It was carried to the light and appeared to be a trunk of pine wood with an arched top; the oil color of the paint had disappeared in many places. There were iron clamps at the corners, and a rusty key that held fast the staple of the lock, but hung loosely in the wood. On the cover of the chest, which was dusty and worn, a black '2' was visible. The Professor had the chest put at the feet of the Princess. He pointed to the cipher.

"This is probably one of the chests that the official of Rossau sent to the castle Solitude," he said, with assumed composure, but his voice trembled.

The Princess knelt down and endeavored to raise the cover, the lock broke away from the wood, and the chest opened.

Above lay a thick book, bound in parchment. Quickly the Professor pounced upon it, like a lion on his prey, but he laid it down again immediately. It was an old missal, written on parchment, the cover damaged and torn, the layers of parchment hung loosely in the book. He put his hand again in the chest, a torn hunting net filled the remaining space; beside that some damaged cross-bows, a bundle of arrows, and small iron-work. He raised himself, his cheeks were pale, his eyes glowed.

"This is No. 2, where is No. 1," he exclaimed. He hurried back into the room, the Princess followed. "Forward, men," he cried out, "fetch the other trunk."

The men continued their work.

"There is something here," said one of the workmen; the Professor hastened to the spot, raised and drew it out, it was only an empty chest.

The work went on. The Marshal also had been brought here by curiosity; he eagerly viewed the old furniture, and caused those pieces to be placed together, which, according to his idea, might be mended and used in the castle. The staircase was filled with household goods, and one of the servants' rooms was opened that the old things might be deposited in it. An hour had passed, the room became more empty, the sun was sinking, its rays reflected the image of the opening in the wall on the opposite side; the other chest was not to be found.

"Remove everything," said the Professor, "even to the last piece of wood.

A heap of old lances, broken glasses and pottery were fetched out of the corner, also broken legs of tables, split pieces of veneered wood, and in the corner a great pewter tankard:—the space was clear. On the floor lay gnawed pieces on which the death-watch had already done its work.

The Professor entered the door again.

"This room is cleared," he said, with forced composure, to the Castellan. "Open the next room."

"I do not believe that you will find anything in it," replied the weary man. "You will only find old shelves and stoves there that formerly stood in the castle."

"Let us go in," said the Professor.

The Castellan opened the door hesitatingly; a second room, still larger and less inviting, came to view; sooty earthen pans, bricks, and slabs of slate, lay mountain-high at the entrance, and over these were wooden tools that probably had been used in the last repairs of the castle.

"I am glad to see this," said the Marshal; "such a load on the upper story is wrong. This lumber must be taken out of the tower."

The Professor had ascended a hill of slate slabs, and was seeking in the darkness for another trunk, but the chaos was too great.

"I will have it cleared out immediately," said the

Marshal, consolingly, "but it may take a long time; we shall hardly get through to-day."

The Professor looked imploringly at the Princess.

"Get more people," she commanded.

"Even with that it will soon be dark," replied the Marshal, prudently. "We shall see how far we can get. At all events the Professor may betimes to-morrow find the entrance prepared."

"Meanwhile let us shake the dust from our clothes," said the Princess, "and come into my library; it lies just under us, you can there overlook the work of the people who are clearing away. The chest shall be conveyed into my library. I will take it with me, and shall expect you."

Two men carried No. 2 into the library, and the Professor went unwilling to his room to dress.

The Princess walked about the room where the old chest had been placed, awaiting the return of the scholar. With a heavy heart she looked forward to meeting him; she concealed in her soul a wish and a commission. The Sovereign had taken leave of her this time with more kindness than he had done for years; before her departure, he had led her into a side room and spoken to her about Werner.

"You know that one cannot leave too much to honest Bergau; I should be glad if you will also do your best to keep the learned man with us. I have got accustomed to him in this short time and would unwillingly miss his enlivening society. But I do not think of myself alone. I am becoming old, and such a man would be of the greatest value to your brother for his whole life—a man in full vigor, who is always collected and calm in the midst of our distracting doings: I therefore wish this intimacy to be preserved and increased for you both: for you also, Sidonie. I have seen with especial satisfaction how enthusiastically you enter into the studies of our learned men. Your mind will not be sufficiently interested with the twittering of the well-mannered birds who surround us; some assistance from a talented person will open to you a nobler conception of the world. Endeavor to gain this man: every kind of burdensome duty shall be spared to him; what now makes his position uncertain shall be removed as soon as he is installed with us. I do not insist upon your speaking to him, I only wish it; and I wish you to believe that in this also I am thinking of your future."

Without doubt this was the case.

The Princess had listened to the words of her father with the quiet criticism that was customary between such near relations. But the words of the Sovereign on this occasion met with such an echo in her soul, that she expressed her willingness to speak to Mr. Werner.

"If you undertake this," the Sovereign said, in conclusion, "you must not do it by halves. Employ all the mild influence that you can exercise over him, obtain his square word and promise for whatever he is inclined to accede to."

The Princess now thought over these words with disquietude. Ah! she would gladly have conveyed to the heart of this much valued man the wishes of her own, but she felt annoyed and perplexed that her secret feelings should be made subservient to the will of another.

The Professor entered the library of the Princess; he gave a glance at the casts and books which were lying about, just unpacked and unarranged, and began:

"When one's hopes have been so much raised, it is difficult to bear suspense. One cannot help laughing over the mocking accident which brings us in contact with a monk whose work is of no value, and withholds from us that of the other which is of immeasurable importance."

The Princess pointed with her hand to the door: outside were heard the steps of people carrying something.

"Only have a little patience; if there is nothing more to-day there may be to-morrow."

"To-morrow!" exclaimed the Professor; "a whole night lies between. Meanwhile the worm gnaws incessantly, and all the powers of destruction are at work. Numberless are the possibilities that separate us from our hope: that acquisition alone is certain which we have in our hands."

He examined the chest.

"It is much smaller than I imagined. By what accident did the missal lie in it? It is not even certain whence it came, and it is still very doubtful what may lie concealed in the other chest."

The Princess raised the top.

"Let us meanwhile pay attention to the little we have found."

She took up the parchment volume, and put it in the hands of the learned man. Some leaves slipped out; the Professor caught hold of them; his eyes contracted, he jumped up and hastened to the window.

"These leaves do not belong to it," he said, reading them. At last he exclaimed: "A piece of the manuscript is found."

He held out the leaves to the Princess; his hand trembled, and the agitation of his countenance was such that he was obliged to turn away. He hastened to the table and searched the missal, opening it leaf by leaf, from beginning to end. The Princess held the leaves in her hand in eager expectation, and approached him. As he looked up he saw two large eyes fixed on him with tender sympathy.

(To be continued.)

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Review of Recent Work of THE OPEN COURT.

PHILOSOPHY.

HEDONISM AND ASCETICISM. EDITOR.....No. 81

Philosophy has two aspects. Of these, ethics forms the practical aspect, and, a systematic conception of the universe, the theoretical. Philosophy and ethics go together; fallacy in the one leads to corruption in the other. Materialism will logically end in hedonism or utilitarianism, for it places the object of life in material well-being, in happiness; Spiritualism will lead to asceticism, a renunciation of the pleasures of the world. Monism rejects both views; it sees the purpose of existence in progress, in the constant aspiration after something higher and nobler.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE VEDA.—THE INTERPRETATION OF THE HINDU EPIC. H. OLDENEERG..Nos. 84 and 85

Prof. Oldenberg is one of the most eminent Sanskrit scholars of the present day. He tells us in popular language the story of the origin, growth, and present state of Sanskrit research. The discovery of the Veda, which forms the subject of the paper published in No. 84, must be accounted the most important acquisition to science ever made through any one branch of oriental enquiry. The results of investigation in this department have reconstructed the foundations of comparative history, philology, philosophy, and religion. Through the untiring efforts of great scholars, a new world, a new literature, a new and strange people have been revealed to us.

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PRESERVATION OF MORAL PURITY IN CHILDREN.

BY A. H. HEINEMANN.

The aim of ethical education must be to evolve in man the capability, that is, the will and the power, to withstand temptation, to reject whatever is evil, and to desire and do what is pure and good. But it is not knowledge, but habit and use, by which alone the goal of ethical education can be attained. Habit is second nature. Train a man to the habit of thinking nothing but what is pure and good, and he will grow unable to think or to will anything impure. By means of habit, education must make a desire of the pure, and a correlative horror of the impure, a natural impulse equal in power and intensity to an inborn force, though superior to it by being conscious of itself.

Education by habit does by no means belittle the claims of the education of the intellect. Both must proceed side by side, as educational science instructs us. The boy with a well developed ethical power ought also to be possessed of a clear judgment regarding the moral value of any events confronting him. One of these events will, naturally, be an attack of the genetic, or amative passion.

But amativeness, as it affects secret organs, is also fond of secrecy and shy of observation and publicity. It will not submit to being discussed openly, but will prefer pondering over itself in a self-indulgent, dreamy sort of way. In fact, by preventing a boy, or girl, dreaming, you may count almost with certainty upon delivering his or her passion of love of everything morbid there may be in it.

Amativeness is not an active passion, else it would not be dreamy. It was of an active nature at the time of the Troubadours and Minnesingers when it stirred up men to deeds of valor. In those times woman occupied the seat of honor both at tournaments and in men's minds. She does not do so now, or, at least, she does so only in exceptional cases and with exceptional men. With most men, woman is but a necessary means for the pleasurable satisfaction of desires, an expensive luxury which man is not able or willing to deny himself. In fact, most men, and more particularly, young men, look upon the satisfaction of the genetic passion as the greatest pleasure of life, frequently to such an extent as to throw away their lives if their monomania of love happens to meet with a disappointment. If they were able to fight for their ladies as did the knights of the Middle Ages, they would most assuredly not be in danger of committing suicide for them.

Such efforts of strength in the passion of love are very generally excluded in this day of ours. Love has become a passive passion, pent up within the mental recesses of the affected individual. That is the reason why it must now be pronounced the most violent, the most dominant passion of the period. Young men will think of their lady-love from the moment they rise in the morning until they fall asleep again; walking, working, or eating, they will, all the time, have the thought and image of their love in their minds. That constant preoccupation will, in most cases, exercise a repressive influence upon the activities of both mind and body. A laxity of muscle and of thought will frequently set in and go on increasing. At the same time there is generally an ever increasing desire of being alone and an irresistible tendency to dreamy inactivity and fanciful revery.

From such a dreamy condition to an attempt at obtaining satisfaction of the genetic passion, the transition is easy and natural and almost sure to occur. In fact, after a boy or girl, has been allowed to abandon himself or herself, to that indolent condition of dreamy self-indulgence, escape from the defiling result is hardly possible. There is no means to prevent it except a removal of the causes of the evil, and the causes are the want of energy and of the love of exertion universally found in the present generation. Bring up pure minded boys and girls and there will be no danger of the vice of self-indulgence.

A boy with a taste for outdoor sports, for gymnastics, or for any active exertion in general, intellectual work not excluded, will, as a rule, not be inclined to give way to the spell of dreamy self-indulgence of the passion of love. When he is in love, he will pursue the object of his passion with the energy and activity of a knight-errant of the olden times. He will not stoop to the dozy self-indulgence of the love-sick weakling and will not easily become a prey to the demoralizing effects of the passion.

The means by which to prevent the excessive development of the genetic passion, consists, therefore,

in the adequate development of the talents and the strength of the boy, by which a habit of incessant activity is induced, preventing him, under any circumstances, to submit to the spell of the dreamy self-indulgence of passion. That is the main secret of the educational management of the case.

There is every opportunity at present to obtain a knowledge of the method to be followed in this sort of education. You need only go to the Kindergarten and the manual-training schools to see how the system of educating youth by means of work and habit is practically carried out.

From their earliest age, children must be kept active all the time. When still in their cradle, their attention when they are awake should incessantly be kept busy. The first gift of Frœbel, the soft ball, is of an inestimable value at the time. When the child commences to move about, it must always be engaged doing something. If inclined to discover something on its own hook, it must be watched to keep it out of mischief or danger, although it should be allowed to do as it likes as much as possible. But it must never be allowed to lie, or sit, or stand, and do nothing. Neither will there ever be an inclination to be idle. In fact, idleness is an illness, or the result of illness. It does not occur in healthy children unless they are brought up to it by being at first forced to indulge habits of inactivity.

The most dangerous time is the twilight hour of the evening before the gas or lamps are lit. It is frequently passed in a dreamy, lazy way of doing nothing, everyone indulging in apparently harmless thoughtlessness. It should be spent in talking to children, in telling tales and hearing them tell theirs, in explanations and controversy; but it should never be spent in dreams. The habit of dreaming is the source of a great looseness of thought and action inducing a love of ease and habitual slothfulness. I would never allow of such a period of twilight unless the mental activity of the company was unusually lively.

When the boys are old enough to go to school and play about with their companions by themselves, the parents should see that they have either some work to attend to, or that they played about. They must never be allowed to sit still and meditate, or dream.

It is not sufficient, however, to produce constant activity by supervision, that is by outward compulsion only. The love of activity, or exertion, must be planted in the child's mind, must be a natural tendency. Such love of exertion is not possible unless there is a real liking for the work to be done. The work, or activity must be agreeable to the talents and inclinations, to the capacities of the child. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to find out a child's natural talents and, having found them, to develop them, that is, to let him use or manifest them as much as possible. Such activity as will strengthen and improve his innate powers, every child will love to engage in. Under such treatment habits of industry and constant exertion cannot fail to become a natural tendency of the growing man.

Another point as important as that of the love of activity, is that of purity of language and thought. Language is thought. Through impure language youth gets used to impure thought.

"That cannot be so," say people. "A child will repeat what it hears without knowing what is the meaning of the sounds repeated."

That is so, no doubt. But by repeating sounds which have an impure meaning, the ear gets used to hearing, the mouth to speaking, words having impure meaning. These impressions of the senses get fixed in the mind like any other impressions, or sensations; the mind gets used to them and will retain them. When, at a subsequent period, the child begins to understand them, they have already become part and parcel of the stock of knowledge stored in the mind. Thus it was the early and unconscious hearing and repeating done by the innocent baby which has filled the mind with impure sensations which are later transformed into impure conceptions and thoughts. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to protect little children from hearing and repeating impure language.

This remark, timely as it no doubt is in every civilized country, is particularly appropriate here. For in no other country is impure language and, consequently, the influence of the genetic passion perceptible at so early an age as in America. Equivocal expressions suggestive of circumstances neither comprehended nor comprehensible as yet, with kissing, courting and touching, begins with our children commonly before they get into their "teens." And with that early contact between the male and female, the secret working of the genetic passion commences. If you would ward off that impure influence, protect your children from bad language. Accustom their minds so thoroughly to purity of expression and thought that they cannot listen to, much less repeat, vile words without a feeling of disgust. It is that feeling which will cause them to persistently reject equivocation and vulgarity.

I have a little boy of thirteen who supplies me all the time with substantial proofs of the reality of the conditions just described. He will refuse listening to any of the vile talk of his playfellows, and never hesitates to tell his mother, or me, anything which may strike him as strange or suggestive of evil. When he was eleven years old, he happened to fall in with a lot of rough boys using very vile language and telling all sorts of indecent and obscene tales causing my boy

to feel an irrepressible curiosity about the sexes and the generative functions. He wanted an explanation and solution for his doubts, and I was compelled either to give him that explanation or to let him go to other sources of information. Now, I am aware of the nature of such sources as are accessible to children and I was afraid to trust my boy to them.

The other day, I know, a boy at a public school had heard a word new to him and suggestive of some secret and immodest meaning. He went to Webster's dictionary which is the book most generally consulted by both boys and girls upon these matters, and tried to find the word. A teacher (male) happened to see him at the book and asked him what word he was looking for. The boy told the master. "Oh, that is no business of yours," said the teacher. "You told us yourself we must look up any word which we do not understand," replied the boy. "So you must, but not such a kind of word," was the teacher's direction when he sent the boy away. What would the boy do then?—go somewhere else and be more eager than before to find out that thing which his teacher tried so hard to conceal from him as to actually withdraw the rule he had laid down for finding unknown words in general. And in future that boy will do as all his companions do: he will supply himself with another word beginning with the same letters and of an innocent meaning, and when asked what he is looking for, he will pronounce that word held in reserve and will, by so doing, practice himself in the art of dissimulation in addition to the improper curiosity causing him to consult the dictionary.

I had by all means to avoid bringing such consequences upon my boy. When I, therefore, found his curiosity excited to such a pitch as to require satisfaction, I made up my mind to instruct him in the natural process of propagation.

I obtained a number of books with drawings on the physiology of plants, animals and man, and commenced with plants. I showed him a great many drawings of the generative organs of plants calling his attention to the beautiful leaf-like shapes of these organs, and, more particularly, to the difference between these organs in the male and the female flowers, the transmission of the pollen, and the development of the seed in the female flower. I continued that part of the subject until he ceased asking questions upon it and said he understood the matter.

Then I proceeded to the lowest kinds of living creatures and pointed out how similar their generative organs were to those of plants. In this connection the incident of contact between male and female presented itself so naturally that the boy almost found it out by himself. The progress from worms and molluscs to fishes, birds, and mammals was now so natural as to require hardly any further explanation, the drawings of the generative organs being enough to explain everything to the full satisfaction of the boy. Before we had advanced to man, my boy told me, I need not go any further, he had seen enough of it and thought he understood it perfectly. I was very glad to hear him say so, and much more so when he told me that none of the boys who had ever spoken to him about such matters, really did understand anything about it; they all were groping in the dark, and if any of them came again to talk to him, he would tell them that they knew nothing at all about it and that he understood the whole science of it.

Ever since the boy has been fully satisfied upon the subject. He will not listen to anything his friends will tell him upon these secret matters because he esteems their talk, idle prating of ignorance. The serious instruction he received upon the subject caused him to receive it in a sort of scientific mood excluding the possibility of frivolity and prattling levity. No doubt, therefore, this knowledge has eradicated that morbid curiosity with which the suggestions of his companions had filled him, and has thereby preserved him in all his innocence and purity of word and thought.

Another advantage of the scientific knowledge is this that it gives to the boy the courage of his opinion. He need not now be afraid of being called a baby and twitted about ignorance. On the contrary he is able to silence his opponents by the superiority of his knowledge. His strength has been increased by the study; his contempt of the ignorance displaying itself in bad jokes and vile insinuations, has become very pronounced; and his determination to act up to his knowledge and be upright and pure has grown much clearer and firmer.

THE PAPER DOLLAR.

BY WHEELBARROW.

Mr. S., of Lincoln, California, has criticized my complaint against the silver dollar. He says that I offer "only one argument against continuing the coinage and use of the dollar, namely—there is not enough silver in it." This, he says, "is about the only argument founded on fact, advanced by any opponent of the monetization of silver. Very well, the only argument "founded on fact" against the last half ton of coal I bought was that it contained only seven hundred and fifty pounds. What further argument is necessary? The coal merchant gave troy weight in mistake for avoirdupois. The quality of the coal was good enough. I complain not of that. So the nine silver dollars I got for my week's wages were good silver, but they were deficient in weight. That's all I complain of.

The weakness of my argument, says Mr. S., "is apparent upon reflecting that there is not a dollar's worth of paper in a greenback or bank-note; yet the paper dollar will buy as much as the gold dollar." The weakness of this argument consists in the fact that there is no such thing as a paper dollar. As to the pieces of paper that travel about as dollars, I will do them the justice to say that they make no claim to be anything more than promissory notes. I had one of them this morning: it was my only monetary possession in this world, and I squandered it at the meat-market, but before parting with it I read carefully the legend on it—"The United States will pay to bearer one dollar." This promise I traded for beef. I had no money to pay for the beef, but the butcher accepted the printed promise of the United States to pay for it, and I walked off with my Sunday's roast. Mr. S. thinks that the "paper dollar" buys beef because of its own value; and he reveals in that queer delusion the weakness of his own position.

When anybody tells Mr. S. that the reason why the paper promise to pay a dollar will buy beef, is because it is based on gold, and can be exchanged for gold, he replies, "Is it possible that any considerable number of those who make this reply do not know that the silver dollar can also be exchanged for gold, or for silver certificates, that are equal to gold in purchasing power?" With shame I confess that I am so ignorant as not to know that the silver dollars can also be exchanged for gold ones, and I will be thankful if Mr. S. will tell me where this wonderful miracle is done. Do they perform it at the United States Treasury? If not, will they do it at the Mint in California? If Mr. S. knows the magician who performs this valuable alchemy, will he kindly introduce me to him? I should like to win his friendship.

"Or for silver certificates." This unlucky phrase condemns Mr. S.'s argument, because if gold dollars and silver dollars are of equal value, then gold certificates and silver certificates must also be equal for similar amounts, and silver dollars could be exchanged for gold certificates; but the fact is, they can only be exchanged for silver certificates, because of their inferior value. All decrees of legislatures regulating the purchasing power of money, or the selling value of goods, are void by the constitution of nature and society. They are futile as the law which declares how many bushels of wheat shall grow on an acre of land, and how many pounds of wool a sheep shall wear in his overcoat. If silver dollars and gold dollars were equal, surely the Government would not make any distinction between them. Let Mr. S. test the Treasury, and he will see his golden vision vanish. Let him deposit ten thousand silver dollars with the Treasurer of the United States, and ask him for a gold certificate of that amount, and the very messenger boys will laugh at him. Let him ask for a certificate to that amount simply in dollars, without specifying the metal, and the result will be the same. His certificate will be very careful to say that his deposit was in silver dollars, and the Government will pay back nothing else when the certificate is returned.

Mr. S. asks a plain, straightforward question, "Does 'Wheelbarrow' believe it would be good to retire the silver dollar, or would he have more silver put in it?" He shall have a straightforward answer. I believe that if more silver were put in it, it would do "good"—to me, and it was purely from a standpoint of self-interest that my attack upon the silver dollar was made. As a man working for wages, I confess that I am not satisfied with the weight of silver in the dollars I get for my labor, and I would like to see the metal in the silver dollar increased until it reaches the value of a dollar in gold. To tell me that a silver dollar worth eighty cents will purchase as much for me as a gold dollar worth a hundred cents, is to trifle with my common sense; it is like persuading me that fourteen ounces make as valuable a pound of coffee as sixteen ounces, and that it is a superstition to believe that there is any difference between them.

If I accept Mr. S.'s invitation to wander off with him into a discussion of the good or evil policy of "retiring" silver dollars, both of us will soon be floundering out of our depth in the flood of jargon invented by currency tinkers and quack statesmen to bewilder a lot of dupes like Mr. S. and me. What gibberish is this about "retiring" anything that is of actual value to mankind? Nature has planted the ore in the earth; men dig it out and smelt it, and refine it into silver for human benefit, and immediately a lot of financial marplots want to "retire" it into the moonbeams, or into the nebular hypothesis, or "anywhere, anywhere, out of the world." As wisely talk of "retiring" the mountains whence it comes. As well talk of "retiring" corn, or hats, or calico. The coinage of silver should be unlimited, for coining is nothing more than the government certificate stamped upon the piece of metal to the effect that it weighs so many pennyweights or grains; but it should be an honest coinage, not eighty per cent. truth, and twenty per cent. falsehood. The present Silver Coinage Act is a monument of imbecility or dishonesty. If silver coinage is a good thing, why limit it to four million dollars a month? And if it is a bad thing why compel the government to coin at least two millions a month? This kind of obstruction to nature's laws is ironically called statesmanship.

Mr. S. is kind enough to say that I am "too sensible a man to wish to see silver demonetized and left in circulation, as was done in 1873." He is

also positive that I "did not work for wages during those six terrible years from 1873 to 1878, when employers bought silver at from ten to fifteen cents discount, and paid their laborers with it at *full* value." As to that I can only say that I did work for wages during those "terrible six years," but I must confess that my employers did not oppress me to such a heartless extent as to pay me in silver dollars, because they were at a premium. I never received a dollar in silver during the whole time, because greenback dollars were cheaper than silver dollars, and my employers paid me in paper. Employers on the Atlantic coast were not so hard-hearted as they were on the Pacific coast. They didn't impose upon their workmen the cruelty of silver dollars. If they had done so, it would have been better for me. Mr. S.'s illustration curiously proves my position, that workingmen are always paid in the cheapest money current at the time, and if he will keep strict watch he will notice that in proportion to the cheapness of the dollars paid them for their wages, inversely and adversely is the dearness of the necessaries of life which they are compelled to buy.

What will I do "if silver appreciates in value until it is worth more than gold?" Well, I will cross that bridge when I come to it. But I shall never cross it, because when that appreciation comes I shall be treading the golden pavements of that celestial city where silver is cheaper than sand.

So long as the government redeems the silver dollar by accepting it for taxes at its face value, so long it may be kept at mercantile par with a gold dollar; but whenever the government knocks that prop from under it the silver dollar will fall to its bullion value; business will drop to a silver basis with a crash, and the prices of everything will rise except the price of labor. A depreciated currency is a continual menace to the working men. When I hear them clamoring to be paid in cheap money for dear work, their cry sounds like a vehement appeal for lower wages.

M. GUYAU'S FAITH.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTENSE AND EXPANSIVE LIFE CONCEIVED AS THE COMMON PRINCIPLE OF ART, MORALITY, AND RELIGION.

BY ALFRED FOUILLEE.*

Translated from the French by γνῶν.

THE predominant idea, that M. Guyau intended to develop and follow through all its main consequences, was that of "life" as the common principle of art, morality, and religion. The creative conception of all his system is the following: Life, when correctly understood, in its very "intensity" encloses a principle of natural "expansion," generosity, and fecundation. Guyau hence draws the consequence, that life naturally within itself reconciles both the individual and social point of view, the conflicting dualism of which—always more or less apparent—has proved the stumbling-block of our extant utilitarian theories on art, ethics, and religion. According to his theory the highest task of the Nineteenth Century—the one to which he himself wished to contribute his share—was precisely "to impart a paramount prominence to the 'social' side of the human individual, and generally of all created beings"—the very side, which throughout had been too much neglected by the egotistic materialism of the last century.

While pointing out this social aspect of individual life, we should at the same time give a more solid basis to art, ethics, and to a religion, worthy of the name. At the time when Guyau studied the utilitarian philosophy, he had seen the Eighteenth Century close with the egotistic theories of Helvetius Volney and Bentham, akin to the rather too naïve materialism of de La Mettrie and even of Diderot. Our Nineteenth Century has enlarged the boundaries of science. On the one hand, matter has more and more been subtilized under the observant eye of the scientist, and the "clock-work" mechanism of de La Mettrie has become totally inadequate for the solution of the problem of life. "On the other hand, the individual, which had been regarded as isolated, pent up within its lonely mechanism, of late has appeared as essentially accessible to influences from without, in close solidarity with the consciousness of others and determinable by impersonal sentiments" (cf. Guyau *L'art au point de vue sociologique*. Introduction.) The nervous system is no longer conceived as the seat of phenomena, the principle of which surpasses the individual organism. On the contrary, solidarity predominates over individuality. It is really as difficult to bound and circumscribe in any living body an æsthetic, moral, or religious emotion, as within the same to confine heat or electricity; the physical and intellectual phenomena are equally expansive and contagious. The facts relating to sympathy, whether nervous or mental, are becoming better known; those of suggestion and hypnotic influence also begin to be scientifically investigated. From the most easily observed cases of disease we pass by degrees to the phenomena of normal influence among different human brains, and hence also among different stages of human consciousness. The Nineteenth Century will close with discoveries, as yet but vaguely formulated, but perhaps in the moral world as important as those of Newton or Laplace in the sidereal world, to wit: discoveries bearing upon the existing attraction of the human sensibilities and human wills, solidarity of intelligences, and penetrability of human consciousnesses.

* The original is published in *La Morale, l'art et la religion, d'après M. Guyau*. By Alfred Fouilleé. *Felix Alcan*, Paris, 1889.

Guyau, accordingly, attempts to found a scientific psychology and sociology, in the same manner as the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries had founded physical and astronomical science. In his system, social feelings will reveal themselves as complex phenomena, mainly produced through attraction or repulsion of the nervous systems, and comparable to astronomical phenomena. Social science, which to a great extent is made up of ethics, æsthetics, and of religion, in Guyau's system, becomes, as it were, "a more complicated astronomy." Finally, Guyau's scientific psychology and sociology "will even shed a new light" upon metaphysics themselves. Let us take for an instance determinism. In the latter we have a doctrine, which—while denying to individuals the form of personal power, termed free-will—seemed at first to exert only a depressing influence; and yet, at the present time, this very doctrine seems to give birth to certain metaphysical hopes, still very vague, yet of unlimited bearings, making us perceive, "that our individual consciousness might possibly exist in a kind of dumb communion with all other consciousnesses; and that, on the other hand, consciousness thus expanded in the world, must, like light and heat, play a very important part; yet, doubtless, further capable of increase, and of extending through the coming ages."*

Since all life "in becoming conscious of itself" at the same time will perceive that it is indivisibly personal and socially collective, the same must also take place in regard to the "feeling" that we have of life, as soon as within us it becomes more intense and free—the feeling which we term "pleasure."

Like life, pleasure has always a certain social side, and it will more and more develop this aspect by virtue of a transformation, which is not one of the least important that the future has in store for humanity. Even the ethics of Epicurus pointed to this same conclusion. In fact, what would be a purely personal, selfish pleasure? Does there really exist any of the kind? What part can it play in life? Descending the ladder of animated beings, we perceive, that the sphere in which each being moves, becomes more and more contracted, almost clogged. Such are polyps and mollusks attached to certain fixed points. On the contrary, when we ascend to the higher orders of beings, we at once see that their sphere of action opens, widens, is fused into the sphere of action of other beings.

In man, individual feeling at all times reaches far beyond the individual itself. Pure egotism would not only be mutilation of self, but even an impossibility. Neither my griefs nor my pleasures are absolutely my own. The thorny leaves of the Agave before developing and displaying their enormous borders, for a long time remain wrapped within each other, and forming clusters like single hearts. During this period the thorns of each leaf are impressed upon its neighbor leaf. Later, all these leaves grow in size and withdraw to a distance, but their birth-mark remains, and grows along with them, like a seal of pain impressed by life itself. The same takes place in our heart, in which from our very birth are impressed all the joys and griefs of the human race; and with each of us, despite all our efforts, the once impressed seal will remain.

In the same manner as the "I" to contemporary psychology is an illusion,—as there is no separated personality, being really made up of an infinity of beings and of small consciousnesses, or states of consciousness, so also any purely selfish pleasure is but an illusion. My own pleasure does not exist without the pleasure of others, and I feel as if the entire society must coöperate toward this end, more or less so, from the narrow circle that surrounds me and my own family, to the vast society in the midst of which I live. Such were the conceptions and theories that Guyau wished to apply to art, ethics and religion.

In Guyau's conception, the beautiful was the higher life as immediately felt in its expansive intensity and in its double activity both individual and social; ethics was that same higher life, as "willed" and sought after; religion, finally, was the higher life as "imagined"—and, indeed, imagined under the forms of a "universal society of consciousnesses." In other terms, art, ethics, and religion ought to raise individual life to the dignity of a collective life.

When art will have given us in an intense form the immediate feeling of the life that has been realized, morality shall make us "will" the life to be realized; finally metaphysics—the basis of religion—will cause us to *construct* hypothetically a world of a higher life, the supreme end of our loves, and ultimate term of our efforts.

All these considerations, as furnished by psychology, physiology, and sociology, in M. Guyau's mind abutted on a theory of solidarity at the same time organic and social, which according to him was the common principle of true æsthetics, true ethics, and true religion. The universal "determinism" to him was but the logical and mechanical form of this solidarity, which M. Guyau extended not merely to the individual or to human society, but to the entire nature.

In one of his philosophical monologues in verse,—in which the form is familiarly adapted to his unfettered frame of mind—under a sensible image we also detect his conception of universal solidarity. Thus, one day near Biarritz, while ascending a certain steep

* Guyau, *L'art au point de vue sociologique.*

path, with the usual companion of his rambles at his side, he pours forth his feelings in the following lines:

"The leafless oaks, their naked arms reach out,
Like wrestlers stripped, and eager to engage
In fierce contention, while the North-winds shout,
And vainly strive to throw them down in rage.
A dying tempest whistles up on high;
While the mad clouds assume the changing form
Of giant birds borne headlong through the sky,
Their strong wings helpless in the stronger storm."

"Forward we march, our heads toward the ground,
Bending beneath the dolorous weight of thought;
At last our eyes the hazy pathway found,
Not the smooth road our wistful hearts had sought,
But rough as life, and like it without end.
It's tortuous coils twined round the mountain's side;
Eternal spirit, shine while we ascend,
Fling out a light our stumbling feet to guide."

From the broken cloud there suddenly issues a ray of light that irradiates the scenery, and the roads all around; this single beam was sufficient to change everything, not only without, but even within:

"The rifted clouds give way, the light shines through,
To our weak hearts from Nature's ardent soul,
One thrill of the divine, and all is new,
The darkness passes, rolled up like a scroll.
The wrinkled Earth smoothes his benignant brow,
And speaks in songs; our spirit walks abroad,
Communing with the Universe; and now,
All things are good; ourselves are parts of God."

"What is that force omnipotent, I ask
Whose hand exalts us to its own domain?
Whose nerves electric move us to our task,
Of self-devotion, sacrifice and pain?
A sunbeam warm with grace a heart can ease,
And human thought belongs to self no more,
Our spirits bend beneath it, as the trees
Bow to the sea-wind sweeping down the shore."

Cares, griefs, and sufferings seemed all to vanish away through the broken storm-cloud.

"They know not why; but yield, as I must yield.
I am not even master of my fears,
My restless heart holds grief and joy concealed,
From my dull sight, while I am racked with fears.
The tear of sorrow and the smile of joy,
Await alike the hazard made by fate;
They come by its consent, while I employ,
What strength I have, and learn to watch and wait.

"The vast eternal thought itself unrolls,
And fills its home, the Universe, where I
Seek for the mystic power which controls
My fate, and yours, and that of all who die.
I am, myself, of the creative word,
A syllable. What matter, if I find
That melody divine the prophets heard,
That rhythm pure, the concert of the mind."

Guyau is almost indignant at his own littleness, of not being even allowed to remain undisturbed, alone with his thoughts, free like a God:

"Within my heart I feel the budding rose,
And like the butterfly I kiss the flowers.
From you to me all pain and pleasure flows,
From me to you the same, and all the powers
Of life belong to all. No single pain
Exists, no solitary pleasure falls to me.
Whatever comes to one all share the gain,
Each ocean drop belongs to all the sea.

"I pray that I the griefs of all may share
And in your pleasures have a kindred part.
May I be happy with my race, and bear
The hearts of all within my bursting heart.
With our own radiance be each pathway bright,
Removing from the road that selfish "I,"
Let us reflect within ourselves the light
That mounts from earth, or falls from out the sky." *

And finally there follows that half-poetical and half-scientific dream, common to all evolutionists—the dream for a closing period in the world's history, when "altruistic feeling" will supersede and absorb all purely selfish, "egoistic feelings."

There is no denying the intrinsic grandeur of this indivisibly psychological sociologic conception of art, ethics, and religion. M. Guyau has developed it in a series of very different works, the unit of which is the idea of "life," of expansive fecundity inherent to the intensity of life, and finally of vital solidarity, which effects that the consciousness of true individual life is completely involved within the consciousness of our union with universal society.

FORMAL THOUGHT AND ETHICS.

THE most remarkable treatise on ethics as a science is Immanuel Kant's "Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morality." (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.*) He attempts in this little book to show that the rules of moral conduct can be based on an unalterable principle, which by rational beings can and must be recognized as being of universal application. Kant says:

"As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy (the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature. By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human nature, but that they must be existent by themselves a priori,—whence, for human nature, as well as for any rational nature, practical rules can be derived."

We prefer to call Kant's Metaphysics of Morality† "Formal Ethics." Formal ethics is as truly the basis of applied ethics as for instance geometry is the basis of geodesy. Formal ethics is a science as demonstrable and plain as logic or arithmetic, and like the other formal sciences will find its verification and application in experience.

Kant says:

"Will is conceived as a power of determining itself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a power can only be met with in rational beings. Now it is the end that serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination, and *this end, if fixed by reason alone,* must hold equally good for all rational creatures. * * *

"To know what I have to do in order that my volition be good, requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexpe-

* Versification by Gen. M. M. Trumbull.

† We here briefly review Kant's ethics in so far only as we agree, and abstain from a discussion in so far as we do not agree. Some of Kant's ideas, and more so his terminology admit of criticism. For instance, his conception of freedom is vague, and his discrimination between man as *homo noumenon* or a moral being, and man as *homo phænomenon* or a physical being, can not be conceded in the sense he puts it.

rienced in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself: Canst thou will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become a universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, there the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, too, not by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or even others, but because it is not fit to enter as a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws."

Kant formulates his maxim in the following way:

"Act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by thy volition were to become a natural law."

If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with cosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things in the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to a certain ruin.

A will that as a matter of principle determines itself to be guided by reason alone, and thus to remain in unison with the order of the universe, Kant calls a *good will.* The command prescribed by pure reason is the "*categoric imperative.*" He calls it "categoric" because its behests admit of no exception, and are to be applied with rigid universality. Since there is only one kind of reason, there is only one measure or standard of morality, which must be the same for all rational beings. A "*person,*" according to Kant, is an individual who can be held responsible for his acts. A person can by the power of his reason regulate his action according to principles, and the subject-matter to which in special cases the categoric imperative obliges or binds us, is called "*duty.*"

The enormous practical importance of formal thought appears here in its full significance. All formal truths are necessary truths; they possess universality, and therefore they can be employed as norms. In other words, they are ethological; they can be used as rules and constitute a categorical *ought.* Ethics is, as it were, the logic of man's conduct, and vice versa; logic may be considered as the ethics of thinking. Geometry is the ethics of measuring and arithmetic the ethics of calculation. Without formal thought and without the rigidity of the laws of formal thought, we could have no constitutive norms whatever, no basis for scientific investigation, no guidance for invention, and no foundation of ethics.

* * *

Before Kant arrived at his ethics, he had tried to explain morality from man's desire for happiness.* But he abandoned this idea entirely; and certainly, morals can not be identified with our desire for happiness, although it is true that immorality always causes much misfortune, and will, as a rule, lead to unhappiness. In fact, morals are preached in order to counteract the dangers of our desire for happiness. The high-road of virtue does not appear at all pleasurable, nor does it promise ever to become so, while the by-paths of vice are extremely pleasant to look upon, and many of them will continue to be so for a long time, perhaps even to the end; and the end may be a sudden and painless death.

Happiness is like a shadow; if pursued it will flee from us; but if a man does not trouble himself about it, and strictly attends to his duties, pleasures of the best and noblest kind will crop out everywhere in his path. If he does not anxiously pursue it, happiness will follow him.

Happiness in itself, the quickened pulse of joy, the gladness of heart, and the laughter of our lips is a shallow and empty thing; it has no value, and the man who attended to his duty for the mere pleasure of having the consciousness that he has done his duty, would find his reward poor. He must attend to his duty for the sake of his duty, and he will realize that it is not happiness itself that blesses us, but the object which causes our happiness; it is not the joyous thrill as such, but the ideas, the hopes, the aspirations that joyfully thrill through the fibres of our mental existence. Accordingly, we should not so much care for happiness and for a great amount of happiness, but that our desire for happiness be satisfied with, and respond to, such motives only as possess moral value —such as are in harmony with the universal order of things.

* * *

Although we accept Kant's formal ethics as the basis of morality, thus attributing the highest authority in matters of conduct to reason, we do not in the least undervalue the importance of experience as a source of information concerning our moral aspirations. And although we maintain that, as there is but one reason, so there is but one standard of morality, we do not deny that there are many different stages and innumerable aberrations in the moral development of mankind. The abstract conception of a good will is always one and the same, being the unison of will with reason, but the conception of that which is to be looked upon as good, must necessarily vary not only with the kind and amount of reason we possess, but also with the changeable demands of the circumstances in which we live. Different conditions require different duties; and to different duties different moral ideals correspond.

Usually we are inclined to judge the actions of men of past times from the standpoint of the moral ideals of to-day. But that is entirely wrong, and many apparently barbarous deeds are justifiable—even right, with regard to the circumstances and requirements of their era. If some hero of olden times had acted ac-

* *Werke* viii, p. 676, and iii, p. 392.

cording to the higher and better ideal of these latter days, it would have been considered (and sometimes perhaps justly so) as weakness on his part. For though the ethical tendency is the same throughout, yet the evolution of ethical ideals shows different stages.

* * *

The innate qualities and talents with which nature endows certain individuals, and which therefore are justly called gifts, according to the theory of evolution, are faculties inherited from ancestors. The labor of former generations is not lost; its fruit has been preserved and handed down to the generation now living.

This fact has a profound ethical import!

There is nothing without work in this world. That easy and apparently effortless production which we admire in genius, is possible only through the inherited abilities acquired by the labor of ancestors.

The single individual, therefore, ought to be conscious of being the product of the labor of ages. And what he does, be it evil or good, will live after him in so far as his individuality impresses itself and influences his contemporaries. In consideration of this fact, man will think with reverence of the past, with regard for the future, and with earnestness of the present.

* * *

The categorical imperative of Kant appears as a norm or a regulative law which is of universal validity just as much as the norms of arithmetic or logic. All the rules of formal sciences have a normative, *i. e.*, a regulative value.

If they are rigidly applied, they will in all cases be found to be correct and to lead us to true results. The categoric imperative, however, (not unlike the norms of the other formal sciences,) is more than a mere regulative law; it is a natural law which rules the development of the world and is the cause of all progress in the history of evolution. We can verify its presence through an impartial observation of facts by experience.

Human society could not even exist, nor could it ever have risen into existence, if the moral 'ought' did not constantly prompt the majority of human minds to obey the behests of the categoric imperative. No society is possible unless it is founded upon the basis of morality.

Morality, although in a broader sense of the word, extends far beyond the province of rational beings. It does not only regulate the relations among them, it also creates the conditions from which they originate.

Cells possess all properties of organized beings: alimentation, growth, and propagation. A mother-cell, having reproduced itself by repeated divisions, is still connected with its filial cells. All cells in their union are more fit to encounter the struggle for existence. Henceforth the work to be done for their preservation is divided and dispensed in such a way that some cells perform one, other cells an other function for the unity thus created. It is division of work, according to a general plan; and that is what constitutes an organism.

The single organ or limb of a body does no longer exist for itself but serves the idea of a larger unity of which it feels itself to be a part. The purpose, aim, and end of its existence is forthwith not in itself but in something higher than itself. This principle pervades all organized nature. Organisms cannot exist but under this condition. The relations of the different organs of an organism among themselves demand special kinds of work to be done, which, if the organs were conscious, we would not hesitate to call their duties. The organs of an organism, if in a state of health, obey this principle, and this principle is essentially a moral principle.

The same principle which produced organisms and animals, guides them in their further development; and only so far as any creature is animated by this ethical guidance, is it able to develop into some higher being. The moral principle is the star of Bethlehem that guides the foremost men of all human races to the cradle where a new truth and new duties are born and where the germs of new ideas are thriving.

The human body and the organism of society both rest on the same principle. The first higher unity is the family; families grow into tribes, and tribes form nations. The love of parents has broadened into patriotism, and no doubt the next higher ideal will be that of humanity.

The next higher stage to which natural development ever tends is its ideal, and there will be no rest in the minds of the single individuals until this ideal is realized. After that, new ideals arise and lead us onward on the interminable, infinite path of progress, not as Darwin says, merely driven by the famous law of the struggle for life, but prompted by the strife for the ideal.

The ethical principle is no mere constitutional law, proposed by a legislature as fitted to serve the majority. It is, as we have learned, a natural law pervading the universe; and a scientist must be blind to facts if he does not discover it. Even in the inorganic world, I venture to say, this law prevails, though in a broader sense. Gravitation out of a whirlpool of gaseous materials forms well-arranged solar systems. It is the law of order and unity which dispenses to different bodies the different parts to be performed. The law of gravity, as formulated in mathematical terms by Newton, is the ethical rule of primordial matter; and if the single atoms of a nebula which are still rushing in different directions, could tell us their

ideal, it would be that of a harmoniously regulated solar system. The chaos will clear, according to simple mechanical rules; the ideal will be realized, and the general turmoil will give way to order.

* * *

This world is not a world of happiness, but of ethical aspiration. The essence of all existence is evolution or a constant realization of new ideals. True, it is the struggle for life; but if you look at it more closely, is it really life that the progressive part of humanity is striving for? No, they sacrifice even their lives for some higher purpose, for their ideal. If we look upon the martyrs of progress, it would indeed be a strange contradiction to say that people are consciously sacrificing and losing their lives in a struggle for life.

The ideal is erroneously supposed to be an imaginary nonentity; or the illusion of an enthusiastic—perhaps even a morbid-brain. An ideal, however, is a part of our soul, and it is such as prompts us to action, and can regulate all our conduct in life. The power and importance of ideals are greatly increased because they can easily be imparted to others in a few words. A martyr may die, but his heroism can at the same time be impressed on the minds of his very hangmen, so that the best part of his soul is implanted into their souls, and triumphs through the sacrifice of his life.

Ideals are the most intense realities imaginable. Physically considered, they are certain organized structures in a living brain. The mechanical work done by the combustion of the oxygen in a few drops of blood is extremely small, and how great, incalculably great, is the result obtained! Here is the *δός μοι ποῦ στῶ καὶ κινήσω τὴν γῆν** of which Archimedes spoke. The thinking of an ideal may not cost more expenditure of energy than 0.001 foot-pound, and yet it may revolutionize the world.

The ideal is no mere fiction, it is a power of reality, pervading the universe as a law of nature; and with regard to humanity it points out to man the path of progress. Progress, if it is guided by the ideal, will produce new and better eras for humankind. And if a moral tendency were not the fundamental law of nature, there could not be any advancement, development, or evolution. P. C.

AN INSTANCE OF HIGHER HUMANITY.

THE noble nature of a higher humanity came with spontaneous vigor to the front in the moment when in the Samoan waters the men-of-war of three nations struggled against the fury of the elements. The London *Telegraph* is greatly struck by the gallant bearing of the crew of the Trenton when in the midst of the death-dealing hurricane they saluted the more fortunate Calliope as she struggled out to sea.

"Almost sure," says the *Telegraph*, "of instant death themselves they could see the queen's ship at her utmost steam pressure fighting fathom by fathom her way to life and safety and appreciate the gallantry of the effort, cheer the brave, handsome ship defying the hurricane, and, finally, see her glide past, overcoming the roll of the sea and the savage wind with the generous pleasure of true mariners, glad of a smart and daring deed.

"We do not know in all naval records any sound which makes a finer music upon the ear than that cheer of the Trenton's men. It was distressed manhood saluting triumphant manhood, the doomed greeting the saved, it was pluckier and more human than any cry ever raised upon the deck of a victorious line of battle ship; it can never be forgotten by Englishmen speaking of Americans."

* Translated: Give me a place to stand on and I will move the world.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MRS. ELLA E. GIBSON ON DR. BROWN'S BOOK.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT.

I AM so well pleased with Doctor Brown's book, just issued, that I cannot forbear requesting space to say a few words in its favor. It is entitled "Researches in Oriental History," which embraces, 1) Researches in Jewish History; 2) in Zoroastrianism; 3) Derivation of Christianity; 4) Whence came the Aryans?

Its author believes this is the only successful attempt to trace the Messianic idea from its fountain and follow it until developed into Christianity. Let every thinker carefully read this compendious volume, and then judge if the author has not made good his claim.

One thing is certain, a vast amount of Christian authority has been consulted, quoted, and adduced, and if the author has arrived at false conclusions, based on Christian evidence, it is more the fault of the Christian than his own. He proves by their own investigations and admissions, in some cases, that there are no monumental traces of the Jews ever having been in Egypt, that they were not a nation previous to their captivity, only 445 years before the Christian era, and that the Christian religion was derived from myths many thousand years old.

It is hoped that this book will be extensively read, not only by radicals, but by conservatives also. It is filled with valuable historical facts that enquirers cannot afford to lose. The whole book, with table of contents, makes 407 12mo pages. It is printed from new long primer type, on fine, double calendered, white paper, and strongly bound in muslin. Price $1.50, sold by the author, G. W. Brown, M. D., Rockford, Ill. Further, I am not advised at this date. ELLA E. GIBSON.

BARRE, MASS., April 25, 1889.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXV. — Continued.

The Professor seized the two leaves of the manuscript, and said, "What I have here, is both valuable and discouraging; one could almost weep that it is not more; it is a fragment out of the sixth book of the annals of Tacitus, that we already possess in another manuscript. These are two leaves of a parchment

* Translation copyrighted.

volume, but between them many are lost. The writing is well preserved—better than I should have expected. It is written by a German, in the characters of the twelfth century."

"He looked quickly over the contents in the light of the setting sun. The Princess glanced over his shoulder curiously at the thick letters of the monk's hand.

"It is correct," he proceeded, more calmly, "the discovery is of the greatest interest. It will be instructive to compare this manuscript with the only one extant." He looked at it again. "If it is a copy," he murmured, "perhaps both indicate a common source. Thus the manuscript that we are seeking must be torn; these leaves have fallen out, and perhaps during the packing up have been shoved into a wrong book. There is much still that is mysterious; but the main fact appears to me certain, that we have here a remnant of the manuscript of Rossau, and this discovery ought to be a guarantee that the remainder is at hand. But how much of it?" he continued, gloomily, "and in what condition will it be?"

He again listened anxiously to the steps of the men who were clearing away in the loft. He rushed out of the room up the stairs, but returned in a few minutes.

"The work goes on slowly," he said; "as yet there is nothing to be seen."

"I do not know whether to wish that it should go on quickly," exclaimed the Princess, cheerfully; but her eyes gave the lie to her smiling mouth. "You must know that I am very selfish in helping you to find the manuscript. As long as you are searching you belong to us. When you have obtained the treasure, you will withdraw yourself into your invisible world, and the retrospect alone will remain to us. I have a mind to close the remaining rooms of the house, and only to open one to you each year, until you have become quite at home with us."

"That would be cruel not to me alone," replied the Professor.

The Princess stepped up to him. "I do not speak mere empty words," she said, in a changed tone. "My father wishes you to make your home with us. Bergau is commissioned to enter into business arrangements, but they are not of the nature to determine your decision. Yet when I express the same wish, that you should remain with us, I do it from my own heart."

"This demand upon me is very unexpected," answered the learned man, with astonishment. "My custom is to weigh such proposals calmly, and from different points of view. I therefore beg your Highness not to require an answer."

"I cannot let you off," exclaimed the Princess. "I should like to gain you in my own way. You shall choose your office and occupation here as freely as is compatible with our different relations: you shall have every kind of distinction, and every wish that it is in the power of the Sovereign to satisfy shall be fulfilled."

"I am a teacher in the University," replied the Professor. "I teach with pleasure, and not without success. My whole nature and the course of my education fit me for this vocation. The rights and duties which enclose my life have a firm hold on me. I have pupils, and I am engrossed with the work in which I wish them to partake."

"You will never find pupils that will be more truly devoted, or cling more warmly to you, than my brother and myself."

"I am not a tutor who can for any length of time oversee the duties of a prince; I am accustomed to the rigid method of the professor, and to quiet labor among my books."

"This last part of your occupation, at least, will not be lost to the world by your remaining here. This is just the place where you would find leisure, perhaps more than among your students."

"This new life would bring me new duties," replied the Professor, "which I should feel called upon to fulfill. It would occasion me also distractions to which I am not accustomed. You invite a man whom you regard as firm. True, in his own circle of life, that character he possesses; but you have no surety that in another sphere of life he will continue to be so. Do not believe that under changed circumstances I shall retain the repose and calmness of effort that the mind of a worker needs; and my dissatisfaction at inner disturbances would certainly make itself felt upon those about me. But even if I could hope for all regarding my home and my private relations that would make life satisfactory to me, I must still take into consideration where I can personally be most useful; and I am not at present convinced that this would be the case here."

The Princess looked down sadly. The steps of the men who were to free the manuscript from the piles of rubbish still continued to sound above.

"Yet," continued the Professor, "if we were to be fortunate enough to find the manuscript, many days, perhaps many years of my life would be taken up by a new task, which would be so great that I might find my University occupations a burden. Then I should have a right to ask myself, in what surroundings I should best be able to advance this work. In this case, I should also have a right to leave the University for a long time. But if I do not find it, it will be painful to me to part from here, for my soul will long hover restlessly about this place."

"I will not let you off so easily," cried the Princess. "I hear only the words, duty and manuscript. Is the

liking that we show to you, then, of no value to you? Forget, now, that I am a woman, and consider me as a warm-hearted boy, who looks up to you devotedly, and is not quite unworthy of your interest."

The Professor looked at the student who stood before him and did not wish to be considered a woman. The Princess had never looked so attractive. He gazed on the blushing cheeks, on the eyes which were fastened so expressively on his countenance, and on the rosy lips which trembled with inward emotion. "My pupils generally look different from that," he said, softly, "and they are accustomed to criticize their teacher more stringently."

"Be content for once," said the Princess, "with finding pure admiration in a susceptible soul. I have before said how much I value your acquaintance. I am no empress who governs a kingdom, and do not wish to employ your powers in my interest. But I should consider it the highest happiness to be in intimate relations with your mind, to listen to the noble words you utter. I feel a longing to look upon life with the clear eyes of a man. You have easily, as if in play, solved riddles that have tormented me, and answered questions with which I have struggled for years. Mr. Werner, you have taken a kind interest in me; if you go from here, I shall find myself alone in those pursuits with which I should most prefer being occupied. If I were a man I should seek you as my teacher; but I am fettered here, and, I beckon you to me."

The learned man listened, entranced, to the soft voice that spoke so persuasively.

"I do not beg for myself alone," continued the Princess, "my brother also needs a friend. It will be his task to take charge of the welfare of many. What you could do for his mind would be for the benefit of others. When I look away from the present, and dream of the future of our princely house and of this country, I feel proud that we, brother and sister, have a presage of what will be demanded in our time from princes, and I feel an ambition that we should both, before all others, show ourselves worthy of this high calling. I hope to see a new life developed in my home, and my brother and myself surrounded by the best minds of our nation. Thus we should live sensibly and earnestly together, as our times require; it should be no pleasure-loving Court after the old style, but a hearty intercourse between the Sovereign and the mind of the nation. That will make us freer and better in ourselves, and will be an advantage to the whole people; it will also be a bright remembrance for future times. When I think of such a future, then, Mr. Werner, I see you as the dear companion of our life, and the thought makes me proud and happy."

The sun was setting, and its last, rays fell glowing upon the Princess and the head of the scholar. Sweetly sounded the song of the nightingale among the elder-bushes; the Professor stood silent opposite the beautiful woman who painted life to him in such rosy colors; his heart beat and his strength failed him He saw before him two eloquent eyes, and the sound of the entreating words, "Remain with us," rang with entrancing magic once more in his ear.

Something rustled near the Princess; the leaves of the manuscript which she had taken fell to the ground. The Professor bent down to pick them up, and as he raised himself again began, in a feeble tone:

"Your Highness takes a bright look into the future; my eye is accustomed only to read single lines in the history of past ages. Here lies my first task; my dreams hover about these leaves. I am only a man of the study, and I should become less were I to endeavor to become more. I know that I deprive myself of much, and in this hour, when a vision of a brilliant life shines before me so invitingly, I feel this more deeply than ever. But my greatest happiness must be, from within quiet walls, to impress upon the souls of others what will there blossom and bear fruit. My greatest reward must also be that in hours of triumph, when filled with the consciousness of power, some pupil of mine will give a fleeting thought to the far-distant teacher, who has been but one among the thousands that have formed him, but one among the many sowers in the limitless fields of science."

Thus spoke the scholar. But while speaking, with a severe struggle for composure, what was true and honorable, he did not think only of the truth, nor only of the treasure which he was seeking, but of the greater one which he had left in order to pursue his quest with the beautiful fairy of the tower. He heard the beseeching words, "Do not go, Felix," and they were a timely warning. "When I return to her, will she be contented with me?" thought the innocent man. He was spared the necessity of asking the question.

The rolling of a carriage was heard below, and the steps of the servant who was coming to announce an arrival.

"Is your will so inflexible, your intention so firm!" exclaimed the Princess, passionately." But I am also obstinate; I shall continue my entreaties. War between us two, Mr. Werner! Farewell, till evening."

She hastened down the steps. The evening light disappeared behind dark clouds; the mist hovered over the meadows and hung on the tops of the trees; and the daws flew croaking round the walls of the tower. The door of the room above creaked on its hinges, and the Castellan rattled his keys, while the scholar looked lovingly at the leaves which he held in his hand.

(To be continued.)

TO LONGFELLOW, HAWTHORNE, AND THOREAU.

BY ISAAC K. FRIEDMAN.

THREE names that fell at once upon our world,
Three men who wrought with might for one grand aim,
To spread their country's beauty, valor, fame.
Three pens which flashed as one, and wildly whirled

Around in shapes fantastical, and hurled
Their force against all sin, that hides its shame
Behind some gaudy veil or luring name;
Then turned around the vale of love, unfurled

New scenes of beauty, showed new paths which led
About the realms of song, and yet each pen
Revolved about a different sphere, but met

At one grand centre where above was shed
The light of stars, and voices said: "Ye men
Have written what your land will ne'er forget."

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE IMMANENT GOD. *A. W. Jackson.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

We have here a series of eight sermons, manifestly written from the liberal standpoint, dealing with the ever present religious problems of God, Prayer, and Immortality. They are much above the majority of printed pulpit discourses both in literary style and intellectual substance, and will doubtless bring a word of help and strength to many readers. C. P. W.

THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY. *John Fiske.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Prof. Fiske's books are always of the first order, both in the high range of his chosen subjects, the well-stocked and philosophical understanding he brings to their discussion and the readable quality of all his writings. The above work derives a peculiar interest from its appearance during or preceding the Centennial period. The writer explains the derivation of his title, suggested by the remark of Thomas Paine on hearing the news of the Treaty of 1783, "The times that tried men's souls are over;" a prediction which the succeeding five years prior to the adoption of the national constitution and the election of Washington as first president of the United States thoroughly disproved. Prof. Fiske's book shows very clearly that the most critical and trying times in a nation's history are not necessarily connected with the dramatic scenes and incidents of a revolutionary war, but in the after time of external peace, when the work of new upbuilding and political reconstruction begins. Enthusiasm born of a high moral purpose is sufficient to carry a nation through the first; but a firm and steadfast conviction, accompanied by unfaltering resolution, and sublime patience are needed in the second. Prof. Fiske's latest work follows naturally and it is not necessary to say, worthily in the line of succession marked out by his previous historical writings, which should be included some day in a complete history of the American Republic. C. P. W.

LA MORALE, L'ART, ET LA RELIGION, D'APRES M. GUYAU. *Alfred Fouillée.* Paris: 1889. Felix Alcan.

M. Alfred Fouillée in a series of nine essays recapitulates, explains, and comments upon the ideas of his gifted friend, M. Guyau, on the subject of Ethics, Art, and Religion. Jean-Marie Guyau, who died prematurely on the 31st of March, 1888, at the age of 33 years, nevertheless left behind a series of remarkable works, which, in point of style and original thought, are at the present time attracting considerable attention. As legitimately claimed by M. Fouillée, in France M. Guyau ranks as the foremost original thinker and philosopher-poet of the evolutionist school. In his "La Morale anglaise contemporaine" he attempted to correct and complete the evolutionist ethics of Darwin and Spencer; while in "Les Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine," and "Vers d'un philosophe," and still other works he applies his theories to art and religion. At an other place of this number the reader will find an English translation of M. Fouillée's second essay which faithfully explains M. Guyau's lofty ideals as a moralist and poet. He above all interests us in the latter capacity. Guyau, in fact, may be considered as one of the earliest monist poets of France, for, notwithstanding the fanciful garb in which he clothed some of his conceptions, such indeed, the reader will find him, and even more consciously so, than any other contemporary French poet. M. Fouillée, in his concluding essay, with a touching pathos dwells upon his friend's exuberant and unflagging mental activity, despite the depressing influence of long and intense physical sufferings. Guyau's last moments, in more than one sense, worthily portray the noble attitude of a dying "philosopher-poet" of the monistic religion.

PROLEGOMENA TO IN MEMORIAM. With Index to the Poem. *Thomas Davidson.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Prof. Davidson's work inevitably recalls another of somewhat similar nature, and dealing with the same theme, written by John F. Genung and published five years ago by the same firm. The two books are, however, quite different, though each aims to interpret, and supply a running commentary on the great poem with which it deals. Mr. Genung's work is that of the literary critic, and Prof. Davidson's of the philosophical student. Mr. Genung deals with the literary form and structure of the poem, building up a theory of his own on what he calls the three cycles, marked by the returning Christmas-tide, into which he divides it. Prof. Davidson concerns himself but very little with questions of this kind, confining his attention almost entirely to the subject-matter of the poem. He pronounces "In Memoriam" the greatest modern poem, and ranks it, so far as its moral purpose is concerned, with the great world-poems of Faust and the Divine Comedy, "Since a man's moral world is the response to his whole moral nature, including three elements, insight, love and energy, the catastrophe may come through the failure of any one of these, *i. e.*, through doubt, widowed or blasted affection, or unavailing activity. The world of a Faust is shattered by the first, that of a Tennyson by the second, that of a Charles Albert by the third." The writer pronounces the poem a noble and triumphant tribute to faith, and explains at some length in his introduction the nature and office of this particular mental attribute or condition. Prof. Davidson is the disciple and expounder of Rosmini, and takes opportunity to quote from that writer, saying that no other modern theologian has dwelt so explicitly with the subject of faith. He traces the progress of the poet's mind from despair and doubt, engendered by sorrow, to hope and a more assured belief, based on a closer study of nature's laws, and that higher spiritual perception which must outrank even logical understanding in the solution of the deepest problems of fate and being. Prof. Davidson's book will be found a helpful and inspiring guide to the study of a poem dealing with the profoundest questions of religion and philosophy. It is written in the clear forcible style that makes his work equally free from verbiage and that obscurity of thought, which often in interpretative labors of this kind, tries to hide itself in a mass of wordy and meaningless sentences. C. P. W.

Did Man Fall? The Location and Topography of the Garden of Eden a Fact, etc., a publication of The Truth Seeker Company, of New York, forms an interesting study in the topographical science of the Book of Genesis. The author's (Mr. Israel W. Groh's) exegesis of the book of Genesis hardly accords with the orthodox exposition.

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HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE VEDA.—THE INTERPRETATION OF THE HINDU EPIC. H. OLDENBERG..Nos. 84 and 85

Prof. Oldenberg is one of the most eminent Sanskrit scholars of the present day. He tells us in popular language the story of the origin, growth, and present state of Sanskrit research. The discovery of the Veda, which forms the subject of the paper published in No. 84, must be accounted the most important acquisition to science ever made through any one branch of oriental enquiry. The results of investigation in this department have reconstructed the foundations of comparative history, philology, philosophy, and religion. Through the untiring efforts of great scholars, a new world, a new literature, a new and strange people have been revealed to us.

DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

The Open Court.

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RISE OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.

BY PROF. CARL HEINRICH CORNILL.

Translated from the German by γνῶν.

ANYONE wishing to speak upon the history of the people of Israel must regard himself as particularly favored, from the very nature of the subject itself. To all of us, Abraham and Moses, Saul and David, and the others of whatever name, are like dear, old acquaintances. These, in fact, are among the first impressions which the susceptible minds of children receive, and the unique magic of religious poetry that clings to these legends always deeply and ineffaceably impresses itself upon their youthful hearts; and even he who has long since forgotten to look upon the Bible with the eyes of faith, nevertheless will not be able to wipe out altogether those tender youthful memories.

I may, accordingly, anticipate a general interest in and, at least in its broad outlines, suppose a certain general knowledge, of the subject to be treated. Still, on the other hand, this knowledge is not so complete that I might not hope to be able to show those old and well-known forms in a new light, and through the accumulation of various details and the revelation of a grand historical inward connection, to work them into well-colored and realistic historical pictures.

Of truth, what an astonishing wealth and variety of separate material is here ready at hand! The history of the people of Israel, in fact, shares with the common and many-sided life of humanity, the eminent quality of being interesting at whatever point we may touch it. We may turn our attention to characters more particularly belonging to political history and we shall behold a Saul, David, Ahab; or to the heroes of the soul, and we shall encounter Moses, Samuel, Elia. We behold the ruin of the people as a political nation through Babylonian conquest, and the resurrection of the people as a religious sect through Ezra and Nehemiah. The ideal, heroical figures of the early Maccabees justly awaken our admiration, and even their degenerate descendants, during the period of the people's decadence, are themselves not altogether destitute of a certain attraction. The truculent grandeur of a King Herod, and the appalling extermination of the nation by the Roman sword—the most heartrending catastrophe, perhaps, that history ever has witnessed—fitly close this grand historical panorama, in which on every side and at all times we are confronted by entrancing phenomena, arousing all our interest.

From out of this superabundant wealth of accumulated materials I shall select particularly the rise of the people of Israel and of its national organization; and as a legitimate ground for this preference of mine I may remark, that it accords perfectly with the predominant trait of our century and of its science, to investigate precisely the origins of organisms, and to explain all the most hidden processes in the life and action of nature; for the nations of the earth may likewise be regarded as organisms. Still, my principal motive in choosing this part of the subject was the hope of being able to contribute, regarding this very epoch, results which are least known. In fact, since the grand work of Heinrich Ewald, signalizing an epoch in these researches, science has not achieved more for any era of the history of the people of Israel than for the history of its primitive existence. Our present subject, accordingly, expressed in popular language, will embrace the period from Abraham to David, as related in the five books of Moses and in those of Joshua, Judges, and Samuel.

The usual exposition is to the effect that Abraham went forth from the land of Haran into Canaan in order to settle there. In the fourth generation after him his descendants migrated to Egypt. In the latter country they led for a long period a quiet and peaceful life until the unbearable oppression of the Egyptians drove them out of the country. Their leader, Moses, by birth a Hebrew, yet thoroughly imbued with Egyptian culture, led them through the desert and across the peninsula of Sinai, back to the land of their fathers. Moses conquered the land to the east of the Jordan, Joshua the land to the west of that river; the latter exterminated almost entirely the Canaanite population and allotted the land as untenanted possessions to the Israelites. Thereupon twelve judges in succession wield the supreme power of the people, until finally the national kingdom arose in the person of the Benjamite Saul, which, in the person of his successor, David, is transferred to the house of Judah.

It cannot be denied that this was the prevailing idea, as early as the time of the Babylonian exile, when the historical books of the Old Testament were for the first time subjected to a comprehensive revision; and

to-day, in fact, the Books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings lie before us, upon the whole, in this shape.

This version is a relatively recent one, having arisen at a period when living historical tradition no longer afforded information. The oldest written sources, having by a fortunate chance been only slightly digested, and thus preserved in all substantial features, were incorporated in the great historical collection and give a widely different picture of the earliest history of the people of Israel.

At this point, there arises the unavoidable question whether, generally speaking, we are permitted to regard these oldest traditions of the people of Israel as history in the strict sense of the word. Not before the exodus from Egypt can we speak in a strict sense of a history of the people of Israel. All that lies before this point of time may be characterized as prehistoric or primeval. Only in the first Book of Moses, the book of Genesis, is information to be had of this prehistoric or primeval era.

Even regarding Moses as the author of the five books that bear his name, yet concerning this remote epoch, separated from his own by a series of centuries, Moses himself would have had to resort to oral hearsay and tradition. It was impossible for him to report these things as an eye-witness. But it is now generally conceded that Moses cannot possibly be the author of the books named after him. These books have rather originated from the comprehensive digestion of a whole series of independent written sources, of which the oldest cannot be older than King Solomon, nor yet much later, and written consequently between 900 and 850; thus between them and Moses there is an interval of several centuries. Only a few scattered sections in the Books of Judges and Samuel, and a few poetical fragments from the five Books of Moses might be older; any comprehensive and coherent historical work earlier than 900 cannot be proved.

The memory of the past, accordingly, has been handed down substantially through the medium of oral tradition; the Israelitic nation itself is the author of these historical narrations, to which the biblical narrator, in giving them a permanent written form, has only imparted a finer psychological character and the magic of his unsurpassed art of representation. The material contents, the ingredients of these narrations, must be regarded from the point of view of popular tradition, of legend.

What is legend? Its main characteristic, of course, is popularity. Legend is a natural product, unaffected by tendencies, an unconscious poetry; and moreover it is characteristic of legend that it does not invent its material but that it embellishes extant tradition with poetic imagery; legend, like ivy, winds itself about cold matters of fact, often resistlessly overpowering them and flourishing in rank luxuriance, yet not able to thrive without them and unsupported by them.

Legend and history, therefore, are not contradictions, but advance together in brotherly harmony; the legend, from its very nature, presupposes an historical substratum. Only traditions that are attached to some definite locality, some definite monument, or name, are to be regarded as exceptions to the truth of these remarks; traditions of the latter kind adhere exclusively to the locality, monument, or name that they are intended to explain; instead of an historical they here have a material substratum, and even in these instances, they still have a substratum; the legend always stands with firm, marrowy frame upon solid and durable soil, and not with uncertain foothold touching the stars, a play to wind and wave; and on this ground, precisely, we are, in my opinion, altogether wrong in looking upon legend with an exaggerated skepticism.

Legend bears a resemblance to the youthful memories of man. The child will not retain everything, but only distinct events, and not always the most important; but what it does retain it retains firmly. And above all the child will never be mistaken as to the total character of its childhood. A man who has spent a cheerless youth will never imagine that he has been a merry, happy child; a man who has been raised in a village or among the mountains will never believe that he was born in a large city or on the plain. The youthful reminiscences of nations must also be judged according to this same analogy. The ready-made, artistically complete, and finished shape that these reminiscences have assumed on the lips of the people, or of any great poet, is to be called legend and, as such, the result of unintentional poetic creation; but, on the contrary, its historical substratum and the basic character of the whole must be regarded as authentic tradition.

It shall be my endeavor to sketch in brief outline the character of the historical substratum underlying the oldest traditions of the people of Israel, and to show how upon this basis may be erected the true course of the early history of this remarkable people.

FACTS AND TRUTHS.

BY W. M. BOUCHER.

THOUGH, as compared with his theological antagonists, Col. Ingersoll is like a "light shining in darkness," a glowing meteor rising above the horizon of irrationalism, superstition, ignorance; and as day banishes night, so his luminous sentences drive out from the region of the mind mists and mysticism, ghosts and hobgoblins innumerable; yet he shows that he him-

self has not reached to full appreciation of science; has not compassed its real significance, nor understood fully its methods. I am here taking for granted that so great, brilliant, and successful a critic, so "free a lance," as the Colonel is, will not object to be himself criticized.

The Colonel intentionally and professedly ignores and repudiates much of what the scientists — all the scientists — hold to, and much of what is the most essential element or process in science as a method. He almost wholly ignores and repudiates the words "law," "principle," "truth," in a scientific sense (though he is not consistent with himself here), and affirms that the word "fact" covers the ground. He claims that there is no difference between the words "fact" and "truth," that there is no such thing as law, in the sense which scientists use it (no natural laws), and that we should not speak of laws as causes to effects or of causes at all, though he himself is fond of using the phrase "laws are this side the facts," meaning thereby that we do not discover the law until after we have observed and considered the facts. And, admitting thereby, it will be seen (but he does not seem to see), that there is the law nevertheless. Besides, though we do not discover the law until after we have considered the facts, this does not prove that the law is not behind, beneath or in the facts, and much less does it prove that there is no law.

Indeed, the most distinguishing difference between an ignorant and uncultured mind and an intelligent and cultured mind is, that the former sees only the facts or phenomena, while the latter sees not only the facts, with the physical eye, like the other, but penetrates or sees with the mental eye beyond the facts and into their relation, and therefore their meaning and their significance; in other words, discovers their law or laws. For "law is an invariable relation between variable phenomena."

If the Colonel had learned enough of science to have learned this, he would not have undertaken the implied criticism of the scientist for using the word, which he does when he insists (and he does so insist, as I learned in conversation when taking him to task), upon saying "fact of gravitation," instead of law of, or even truth of, gravitation. And see what company he classes himself with in thus insisting upon seeing no further and deeper than this mere surface view of fact.

I am all the more surprised at the Colonel for his not having corrected this error — this stupendous error — after having read (which I know he has read by what, in his discourses and writings, I have noticed) the description of these two classes of minds in relation to these subjects of fact, law, truth, principle, etc., in an article entitled "Public Spirit as a Measure of Manhood."

Now, I submit that there is scarcely a proposition amid all the barren dogmas of theology (which he so brilliantly and successfully attacks) more short-sighted, superficial, irrational, than this one, that facts cover the whole field of our research; that a knowledge of facts is all we know. Irrational I say advisedly. (And how strange it is that so great a rationalist should be so irrational.)

For if we stop with the observation of facts (and by observation is the way we come to a knowledge of facts), we fail to give any scope to our reason, to exercise it at all. And in thus failing we, of course, will not and cannot discover or come to any knowledge of law, and, therefore, of science. We cannot have science without "superadding reason to sense" (observation.) Those who understand science or scientific methods know that we observe facts and infer laws, which inferring means, or is, reasoning. And so the truth is that by far the greater part, and by far the higher, of our knowledge is inferential—that is, rational—which particularly distinguishes man from the brutes and the cultured from the uncultured.

Now, this is the way in which the Colonel has got into such a muddle about laws and science. He has taken the scientists' word law to mean a sort of entity, a thing in itself, such a meaning as was at one time given to the word disease, when it was spoken of as an entity which entered the system and was to be driven out again in order to cure the patient. But, had he seen fit to give as much attention to the constructive as he has to the destructive side of reform, he would have long ago learned that no such meaning is any longer given to the word law, and that this sort of personification of what was but a relation is a remnant or survival of the "spirit of the time" when men were wont to personify all of the forces or laws of nature.

No, my courageous, noble brother, do not worship facts. They are poor, superficial, naked things. Don't let their ostentatious claims and noisy presentation of themselves impose upon you. The babbling, noisy brook is likely to be a shallow one. What's most apparent is generally not the most real. "Appearances are deceitful."

Your worshiping facts is a reaction, and the other extreme from the worshiping of those personifications called gods. Rather worship truth than fact, for it is a much greater and grander thing. One truth may compass a myriad of facts. Facts are fleeting and changeable. Truths or laws or principles are immutable and therefore wholly reliable. In fact, upon the immutability of law depends the possibility of science. And it is the doctrine of rationalism itself that science is the only canon of truth. Science is the means and truth the end. The practice of truth the means and salvation or happiness the end. Facts are on the plane

of our mere animal senses. Truths are on the plane of the most exalted parts of our being.

But I am not, in all this, by any means ignoring facts. They are the necessary foundation of this grand and high-reaching structure called science. But, as facts, they are as inferior to the completed structure of science as the pile of loose bricks is to the perfected building. So we are not like those of whom you so justly complain, the theologians, in that we do not ignore the facts, although (unlike them) we do so exalt reason, and somewhat unlike you, we do say that all our knowledge would not amount to much without reason, inference, law, truth.

Science is, say, "a body of organized phenomena (facts), so arranged as to exhibit the law by which they are governed (or attended) in their relations of interdependence."

But the Colonel objects to the word "cause." But would not he be one of the first to claim that all our knowledge is at best but relative? And could he therefore insist that there is no justification, either for the sake of elucidation or otherwise, for the use of such a juxtaposition of words as "cause and effect," and no real scientific or valuable meaning in them when so placed or joined? If so, then, like the most of people, the Colonel, too, must have a "bias." And it looks to be more than an anti-theological bias.

I would that our brave, sincere and earnest brother would not only be almost, but altogether, persuaded to be a—no, no, not that—a scientist, and so a constructionist, instead of, or as well as being, a destructionist. He has splendid capabilities for such a calling. We are agreed in challenging the soundness of the proposition that "an honest man is the noblest work of God," for the reason of the assumption that is involved therein (not that we don't think an honest man a noble thing.) Let us also agree in believing and maintaining that the "noblest works of man are the discovery and application of truth"—not facts; facts are not "discovered."

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.*

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA," ATTRIBUTED TO VALMIKI.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

INTRODUCTION.

THE *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, as is generally known, are the two great epic poems of the Aryan tribes that settled in India. The Mahabharata describes the prolonged internal struggles of the Aryan tribes, supposed to have taken place about the time when they had reached the banks of the river *Yamuna*, and of the upper *Ganges*. The Mahabharata, accordingly, exhibits the picture of endless battles between the Aryan tribes themselves, and displays all the manly generosity, chivalry, as also the more dangerous passions that characterize the earlier stages of any tribal and national development.

The *Ramayana*, on the contrary, belongs to a much later period, when the religious and social institutions of the Aryas had considerably weakened and modified their self-assertion and energy in their motives, and outward manifestions. The "*Sitaharana*", that is, "the Rape of Sita," is generally admitted to be one of the most touching episodes, contained in the Ramayana. The Ramayana describes the high feats of the Indian prince *Rama;* while the scene of his expoits is laid in Southern India (Southern *Deccan*) and in the Island of *Lanka*, or the modern Island of Ceylon, both of which are supposed have been conquered, and colonized by the Aryas about 500 years before Christ.

The Aryan tribe of the *Koshala* had originally settled on the banks of the river *Sarayu;* and here in the beautiful city of *Ayodhya* (the modern Oude), is said to have resided the old king Dasaratha. This king had three wives, of the names *Kausalya*, *Sumitra*, and *Kaykeyi*. The first wife bore him Rama; the second, Lakshmana; and the third, his youngest son Bharata. The king, when grown old and infirm, wished to crown his oldest son, Rama; but Kaykeyi, the third wife, opposes his will, and demands that her own son Bharata should be crowned, and besides that Rama be exiled for a period of fifteen years. In vain the old king entreats her to desist from her cruel request. She obstinately refuses; and, as the king on a certain occasion, in the fulness of his kind heart, had promised to grant her any first two requests she might demand, he is accordingly compelled to accede to her wishes. Rama, on his part, forthwith obeys, and sets out accompanied by his young wife Sita and by his half-brother Lakshmana, king Dasaratha's second son.

Such was the legendary origin and motive of prince Rama's expedition against the swarthy, aboriginal population of Southern India; and at this conjuncture also the Ramayana displays the leading features, characterizing, and pervading the whole poem. Rama, namely, in a passive manner obeys the unjust sentence, and in the same submissive spirit, valor, self-asserting independence, with every other manly quality, are throughout this poem, in each instance presented as purely secondary to filial attachment, to passive obedience, humility and self-denial. Rama, accordingly, is a kind of observant knight of the Temple, or what the Germans would call, "ein Tugendheld."

*The Hindu proper names are here spelt in ordinary English characters. Their correct transcription, according to the usage adopted by Sanskrit scholars is as follows; Mahabharata—Mahâbhârata; Ramayana—Râmâyana; Sitaharana—Sîtâharana; Sita—Sîtâ; Rama—Râma; Koshala—Koçala (a tribe); Dasaratha—Daçaratha; Sumitra—Sumitrâ; Dandaka—Dandaka; Lankâ.

This moreover shows, that the Ramayana, in its ultimate form, was recast at a period, when the proud Kshatrya, or warrior caste, had at last definitely bent its neck under the controlling yoke of the sacerdotal caste of India.

Rama's pure-minded wife Sita also renounces all earthly comfort, to follow her husband; and the brotherly attachment is illustrated in Lakshmana, who accompanies them. Rama, indeed regrets, that he shall no more go a hunting on the charming banks of the Sarayu; but he forgets his own troubles, when his beloved Sita wants him "to tell her the names of all the strange plants and flowers they meet with."—In this manner the Brahmanic, or sacerdotal influence, has strongly asserted itself in the Ramayana; not merely in the motives, but also in the means, through which the aboriginal population of Southern India was vanquished. All those high feats are performed by a single man, and his arms are divine weapons, created by the supreme god Brahma himself; and, accordingly, mere human valor and virtue are forcibly thrust into the back-ground, or reduced to diminutive proportions.

Rama settles in the wood of Dandaka, which begins on the southern bank of the Ganges, and his hermitage is called Janasthana. Here he is said to have alone killed the prodigious number of fourteen thousand Rakshas that is, fiends, demons, giants, by which names must be understood the aboriginal Dravidian population of Southern India, the swarthy Bhillas, and Gonda-tribes. On this account Rama naturally arouses the bitter resentment of the powerful Rakshas-king Ravana by name, the ruler of Lanka, or Ceylon, "the fairest isle of the ocean." One fine day the wily Ravana devises a plan for carrying off Rama's wife, Sita; and this forms the subject of the Sitaharana, which I have attempted to paraphrase, rather than translate literally into the English language.

Classical Sanskrit, *viz.*, the main bulk of Sanskrit literature has no prose, but in every department, even in science and philosophy, adopted a metrical form. Hence all extant European translations from Sanskrit literature unavoidably display the hybrid character of both translation and paraphrase. Those who are acquainted with Sanskrit syntax well know, that without the latitude allowed by both paraphrase and the genius of the Sanskrit language, Sanskrit literature would be highly unattractive to most European readers. Without violating the original text in any essential particulars, it was necessary for the popular purpose of the paraphrase to depart in several instances from the literal meaning of certain epithets and allegorical similes, contained in the Sanskrit text. My translation, hence, simply aims at being a readable paraphrase of a highly poetical episode, that certainly deserves to be known to all men of average culture.

At the opening of the present episode the dusky king Ravana orders a Raksha of his subjects, Maritcha by name, to execute his design, by transforming himself into a golden stag, for the purpose of enticing away from the hermitage the two brothers, Rama and Lakshmana. The plan is successful, and poor Sita falls an easy prey to Ravana. Her constancy, however, and devoted attachment to her husband are touchingly illustrated in the last chapters of the Sitaharanam. To this very day Sita has remained the most exalted pattern of conjugal fidelity and an interesting type of noble Hindu womanhood. But I must also add, that her faith was ultimately rewarded by a happy and pleasant sequel.

A kind, black devil, Hanuman by name, described as the king of all monkeys, informs Rama of Sita's whereabouts; and with the assistance of the aforesaid king, Rama recovers Sita. They bridge the sea between the continent and the island of Lanka with huge rocks, and attack Ravana in his own stronghold. Rama in battle encounters the chariot of his foe, and they fight long, very long, until, on the seventh day, Rama fells Ravana, "the swarthy, fierce-eyed king of the Rakshas, in blood-red garments, with ear-rings, necklace and bracelets of gold."

Sita, through a trial of fire, proves that all the while she has been faithful to Rama; and, as now the fifteen years of exile in the wilderness have at length expired, they all return to the beautiful city of Ayodhya, where in peace and plenty Rama and Sita reign many happy years.

THE COMING RELIGION.

BY CHARLES K. WHIPPLE.

In ancient times, dissent from the theological ideas then generally accepted received not only the extremity of popular indignation, but condemnation to the severest penalties by the civil ruler. Increasing intelligence and the advance of civilization have materially changed that state of things, and now every article of theology and religion is freely discussed, sometimes even in an irreverent and contemptuous manner. We maintain, however, the right of free inquiry and discussion; considering the occasional abuse of it a less evil than the governmental suppression of it. It may be worth while to consider what features of religious belief are likely to hold their ground against hostile criticism, and to remain permanent features of the religion of the future. Such I consider to be the five following, namely: — God, Immortality, Duty, Responsibility, Retribution.

1. *God.* The devotees of science generally admit a manifest purpose in that which we call collectively Nature. As it is difficult to conceive a purpose without a purposer, we can escape the absurdity of referring ourselves and our habitation to chance only by assum-

ing the existence of God; and as religionists agree with agnostics in admitting this supreme power to be past finding out, we may rationally believe in Him without comprehending Him.

2. *Immortality.* The existence and action of God being assumed, it seems absurd to suppose that He would have given such capacities to human beings without giving opportunity for all to expand and develop as a few have already done. So large and elaborate a foundation implies an intended superstructure. It seems reasonable, as John Fiske has said, to feel entire confidence in the reasonableness of God's work. It must be that He will give opportunity in another state of existence for the development of those wonderful and admirable faculties which, richly manifested in a small minority of human beings, remain latent in the vast majority, as far as this world is concerned. Therefore, we shall continue to live after the death of the body.

3. *Duty.* We cannot comprehend God. But since the works which (to avoid absurdity) we must attribute to his purpose and action, are great beyond our conception, and since that purpose and action are in many things manifestly good, perhaps the aspects of nature and humanity which seem to us not good, seem so in consequence, partly of our limited powers, and partly of the small portion of time allotted to us here and of our ignorance of God's purposes in the future. Perhaps the whole plan is as great and good as parts of it now appear to our imperfect vision. In that case, it is rational for us to ascribe perfect goodness (what the Hebrew prophets called righteousness) to the author of our being, and to assume our moral obligation to coöperate with Him by being good and doing good to the extent of our ability. If God be really such as I have supposed, we must recognize a duty of attempting such coöperation with Him as may assist his purpose of promoting human welfare and happiness.

4. *Responsibility.* If duty really thus binds us to God as a Father and to human beings as brothers and sisters, failure in either department of this duty must, sooner or later, prove injurious to ourselves. He who chains another, necessarily feels one end of the chain weighing upon and encumbering himself. The still, small voice of conscience, reproaching us for wrong-doing, is as manifestly a part of human nature as any other part of it, material or spiritual; and it is reasonable to suppose that the invisible Power whose voice we thus hear has the right so to reproach us, as well as authority to hold us to account. There is every reason to believe that we are responsible to God for the right use of the life He has bestowed, and the opportunities He has given us.

5. *Retribution.* What we call justice, administered by public functionaries, fails of accomplishing its purpose in great numbers of cases for want of wisdom or goodness or power sufficient for the purpose. But if there be a Ruler of mankind perfectly wise and good and just and powerful, whose plan includes the government of men after this world as well as in it, it is a matter of course that He will render to every man according to his works. So much faithful obedience, so much welfare. So much disregard or violation of known right, so much necessity of painfully retracing our course to the point of deviation, and then beginning a return to the right road. So much wilful injury to a fellow creature in this life, so much service applied to his benefit in the next. The perfectly just and good Ruler will necessarily arrange and accomplish this work of rendering to each of his subjects according to his works.

But when the perfect Ruler is also a loving Father to each one of his subjects, a new and most important element comes into the case. The retribution for evil-doing must then contemplate and provide for the ultimate welfare of the evil-doer. The first element of welfare to such a person must be his reformation, and whatever suffering is essential to such reformation must on no account be remitted. So far as the offender is wise, he will see the advantage of not only submitting to this discipline, but of coöperating with it and making every effort to reform himself. If, however, he is stupidly obstinate, and determined to persist in error, the consequence to him must be a continuance of failure, defeat, and suffering. Eternity is before him, with endless opportunity of repeating the experiment, of trying to gain advantage by wrong-doing. How long will he hold out? The Ruler who must render to him according to his works, the Father who is demonstrating to him by experience the certain ill consequences of ill-doing, can wait as long as he can. The contest is unequal. Sooner or later, supreme wisdom and goodness must certainly prevail, and the rebellious subject, the prodigal son, will repent and return. The character of God being such as we ascribe to Him, it is absurd to suppose that his administration will fail of its purpose; absurd to suppose that his justice and love, working in concert, will not ultimately accomplish the welfare of every human being by accomplishing his reformation.

The idea, then, of escaping the consequences of evil-doing by obtaining pardon through an intercessor is an utterly erroneous one. To request that the wrong-doer should not be worse off for his offence, or that another should suffer for the wrong instead of himself, would be to request a reversal of God's method of moral government. The only right course for the offender is reverently to submit himself to the law, to accept its penalty, and to keep himself thenceforth in the line of its requirements.

GOD, FREEDOM, AND IMMORTALITY.

MR. CHARLES K. WHIPPLE in his essay, "The Coming Religion," considers five features of religious belief, which, as he hopes, are likely to hold their ground against hostile criticism. He names the ideas God, Immortality, Duty, Responsibility, and Retribution. Mr. Whipple's arguments are in the main similar to those proposed by Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason.

Kant showed in his Critique of Pure Reason that the ideas Soul, World, and God are 'paralogisms of pure reason.' We can arrive at these concepts by a logical fallacy only. We may nevertheless, he declared in his Critique of Practical Reason, retain these concepts, because they are of greatest importance for our practical and our moral life. If we act as if we had no soul, and as if no God existed, we are more likely to go astray than if we act as if we had an immortal soul and as if a God existed—a God, a just and omnipotent judge, who will reward the good and punish the evil.

Upon the need of morality he builds an ideal world, the foundations of which are the ideas of *Freedom* (including moral responsibility), *Immortality*, and *God*. Being fully conscious of the fact, that these ideas are not provable, Kant called them "the three postulates of practical reason."

The conflict between Pure Reason and Practical Reason proves that in Kant's philosophy traces of Dualism are preserved which lead him to incompatible assertions. He boldly and honestly lays down the inconsistency of his philosophy in his four "antinomies," or contradictory statements. Popularly expressed, they are:

THESIS.	ANTITHESIS.
1. The world is limited.	1. The world is infinite.
2. The soul is a simple substance, and therefore immortal.	2. The soul is a compound, and therefore destructible.
3. There is moral freedom distinct from the law of causality.	3. There is no freedom, but all is subject to causality.
4. There is a God.	4. There is no God.

Kant believes that the arguments to either issue, the positive or the negative, are of equal weight. Thesis as well as Antithesis, he declares, can be defended or attacked with equal force.

Is it not strange that a great man can fall into so great an error—an error that is at the same time so palpable? Of two statements that are contradictory, one only can be true. It is impossible that both are right, or that the arguments of either are correct. Yet it is possible that both are wrong, that the formulation of the dilemma is radically incorrect,—and such is the case with Kant's antinomies.

We resolve the four antinomies into the following statements, which cannot be said to be contradictory.

1. Space (which is no object, no palpable thing, but merely the possibility of motion in every direction) is infinite. Yet the world, although immeasurable to us consists of a definite amount of matter and energy which can neither increase nor decrease.

2. The soul is a compound of highest complexity and is therefore destructible; but being a compound of a special form, it can be broken and built again. When built again, it can be improved. Souls of a special kind can be formed, and ever nobler ideas can be implanted into souls. Thus the soul—a special compound of living thoughts, living in the organized brain-substance of bodily beings as real nerve-structures—can continue to exist even beyond the death of the single individual; it can be propagated, transplanted, and evolved. And to accomplish this is the main object of human institutions. There is no immortality of the ego beyond the clouds, but there is a continuance of soul-life in this world. The continuance and higher development of soul-life is of vital importance, and the duties of our present lives must be performed, not to please or benefit ourselves but in a spirit such as to enhance the life of the race to come. We must live so that our soul shall continue to live and to evolve in future generations.

3. Freedom and necessity are not incompatible;* but freedom and compulsion are contradictions. If a man is compelled by the authorities of the law to observe the law he cannot be said to be free. But if the law—the good will to live according to the law and the honest intention to act with righteousness—is a part of the man and a feature of his character, he is free while observing the law. The actions of a moral man are necessarily moral; they are the necessary outcome of his free will.

4. The anthropomorphic idea of God as a transcendent personality is undoubtedly a paralogism of pure reason; but the conception of an immanent God as the cosmical law to which we have to conform in order to live and to continue to live in future generations is no paralogism, no logical fallacy. Such a conception of God is at variance neither with reason nor experience, and there is no atheist who could not be converted to it by rational argument and by a study of nature. This God is not the personified weakness of a benevolent father—the ideal of the deists who would fain make him as sentimental and feeble as they were themselves. This God is the stern severity of order and law—irrefragable and immutable as are all natural

* See the writer's "Fundamental Problems," pp. 191–196, to be published in about a week, and the Editorial of No. 33.

laws, and yet at the same time as reliable and as grand, as sure and eternal—visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation, and showing mercy unto the thousands of those that keep his commandments.

We thus have the three postulates of Kant again, although in another shape. We have no transcendental God, no illusory ghost-immortality, no freedom that stands in contradiction to the law of causation. But we have the immanent God of a moral law in nature; we have the immanent immortality of a continuance of our soul-life beyond death and the moral freedom of responsibility for our actions. The errors that were attached to these ideas are done away with, but their ethical value remains unimpaired. They have ceased to be postulates and have become truths—for now they are no longer paralogisms, they are free from contradictions; they are real, because they represent certain facts of reality which can be verified by experience.

P. C.

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

While yet a child, before the joys of spring
Had come and gone till all were known to me,
I set an orchard out with many a tree
Of goodly stock for plenteous harvesting.

And though the sweet birds came to light and sing,
It seemed the far-off day would never be;
And, heedless of their note, impatiently
I waited for the time of fruit-bearing.

The time has come: the trees are now full-grown;
And o'er my head the branches interlaced
Bear fruits of varied flavor, all my own.

But, nearly in my reach, I let them waste:
While, listening to the bees' unwearied drone,
I sit and muse, and hardly care to taste.

TO THE SOUL.

AN ODE OF EVOLUTION BY W. D. LIGHTHALL.

O lark aspire!
Aspire forever, in thy morning sky!—
Forever, soul, beat bravely, gladly, higher,
And sing and sing that sadness is a lie.

Forever, soul, achieve!
Droop not an instant into sloth and rest.
Live in a changeless moment of the best
And lower heights to Heaven forgotten leave.

Man still will strive.
Delight of battle leaped within his sires:
They laughed at death; and Life was all alive:
In him not blood it seeks, but vast desires.

He wakens from a dream:
Reviews the forms he fought in ages gone—
He or his ancestors, their shapes are one:—
And also of himself the forms he battled seem.

He sees the truth!
"I wrestled with myself, and rose to strength.
Still be that progress mine!—I see at length
All World, all Soul are one, all ages youth!"

CORRESPONDENCE.

POSITIVISM.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

KINDLY permit me a word of explanation.

It is true, as you say, that I am a follower of August Comte in his first period, but if I were inclined to hold any one responsible for my conception of the universe I should choose his disciple, Emile Littré.

To use Comte's own words, the initial elaboration of his second great work coincided with a decisive invasion of a virtuous passion for Mme. Clotilde de Vaux, and the result was a nervous crisis that put him in real cerebral danger. (Letter to Mill.)

When, under this influence, he adopted the subjective method and, as he says, "began the new philosophic career, in which the heart was to have at least as much place as the mind itself," Littré staid with the facts.

Speaking of some verses in No. 87, of THE OPEN COURT, you say that you "differ with me concerning the idea of God and have attempted to conceive it on the basis of positive facts." Please do not judge me by those lines. Your conception is about the same as mine, although I do not call mine God.

Respectfully yours,
LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

COMTISTS AND AGNOSTICS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT

IN Mr. Wakeman's article, in a former issue, there is a remark that is decidedly puzzling to one acquainted with the writings of Spencer; and I feel the more constrained to call attention to it, since it opens the way to a general criticism on Mr. Wakeman's paper and the attitude of Comtists toward other anti-metaphysical schools of thought.

The remark is to the effect that the attacks of "Spencer and Co." upon the four corner-stones of Positivism have failed. These corner-stones are enumerated thus:

a) The relativity of human knowledge.
b) The classification of the sciences.
c) The evolution of human history and civilization.
d) The conception of humanity as a great social, organic being.

Now how any portion of Spencer's writings can be construed into an attack on numbers (a), (c), and (d), I cannot understand. Surely there has never been a more ardent supporter than Spencer of the relativity of knowledge, the evolution of man and the organic unity of society.

I am persuaded that Mr. Wakeman intended that the "attacks of 'Spencer and Co.' upon these corner-stones" should refer only to (b). This has undoubtedly been assailed by Spencer; with what success need not here be discussed. For this "corner-stone" is plainly not one on which the superstructure of the "Religion of Humanity" rests in the least. What possible difference can it make to that religion whether in our hierarchy of the sciences we introduce the division of "abstract-concrete," or deny the possibility of a linear arrangement?

Mr. Wakeman's placing this as a fundamental doctrine of monistic religion is, however, quite in accord with the custom of Comtists in general; and suggests the general criticism first alluded to. For is it not this insistence by Comtists on unessentials that has kept agnostics away from the Religion of Humanity, rather than a spirit of "envious and idle criticism"? Agnostics, even though agreeing with Spencer in regard to the worship of the Unknowable, believe also in the necessity of an ethical religion, and would gladly join hands with positivists in forwarding it. But they are so persistently met with this demand that they should give

assent to unessential Comtean dogmas, hail Comte as their High Priest, and confess that to him they owe their emancipation from mysticism, that union is rendered impossible.

Surely it is very unfortunate that agnostics and positivists, whose differences are slight compared with their fundamental agreement, should not be able to unite in common work for humanity; but Mr. Wakeman has only strengthed my conviction that agnostics cannot be held accountable for the continued separation. R. F. SMITH.

SARANAC LAKE, N. Y.

PHILOSOPHY AT MONTREAL.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

"DEAR Correspondent," writes one, "tell us a little more of that interesting circle of friends who meet fortnightly to read and discuss together philosophical topics."

In reply, I might say something of what might be called an exceptional evening—one spent in listening to an able essay on the Transcendental Philosophy of New England: the Emerson period. By courteous invitation of the scholarly lecturer, members of the club assembled in his delightful and spacious study on the evening appointed. The first half hour was spent in examining photographs of the literary celebrities of that interesting epoch. The essay occupied an hour or more, the lecturer delivering it in his usual calm, clear style, emphasizing the more important parts, and pausing occasionally to give his audience a chance for a moment's reflection. Toward the end of the lecture, something was said about the disastrous failure of the Brook farm experiment—as seen from a financial point of view. As the lecturer concluded, 'Metaphor' enquired of him with something of an anxious tone.

"And do you think the dream must always be a failure—from what is called the 'practical' point of view?"

"I hope not," answered the lecturer, in grave if not hopeless tone, and Metaphor's optimism was evidently unsatisfied.

Opposite the essayist sat "Greek." 'Greek' took up the argument immediately, and in firm voice, and interestingly broken English, said:

"I am *quite* sure that the dreamer and the worker are two, and must always be two. The thinker has enough to do with his thinking, and the doer has enough to do with his doing, and both fail when they take up what belongs to the department of the other. The dreamer will always get the pail on the wrong side of the cow, and the milk will always be spilled—just as we hear was the case at Brook farm. When I teach my Latin and my Hebrew and my French, I am often that tired and my head aches, and I cannot go and plant and dig."

"Ah, but," said 'Metaphor,' laughing, "if you had taught Hebrew and Latin for perhaps two hours, and then rested your brain by doing an hour's gardening, it appears to me you might have saved time in the end, by escaping a headache. Why should not the worker learn to work thoughtfully, and the thinker learn to think healthfully? At the present day dreamers and workers, both, are drudges, and why? Because there is an unnatural separation between the two sides of life. With a more advanced civilization I anticipate that brain and hand-work will be so judiciously intermingled that both shall be done pleasurably as profitably—that is, *wholesomely*."

"No, no," 'Greek' broke in, "I speak because I have tried; and if I worked at the garden after my Hebrew, my head ached more than ever. I——."

But at this point the clock, inconsiderately, struck ten, and the philosophers dispersed. Perhaps THE OPEN COURT will help them to settle the unsettled question. 'Metaphor' quotes in defense of his solitary position Emerson's words,—*One must believe one's own thought.*

Thomas Aquinas and Scholasticism, was the subject of last meeting. 'A biographical sketch of the 'angelic doctor' arrived just at the right moment from our Scottish correspondent, under the signature "Scotch Mist." The prelude is characteristic of the writer:

"Fain would your Scottish correspondent go to sleep until the next century, if assured that his fellow philosophers would also do so and waken at the same moment. By that time, as he has heard from good authority, that marvelous instrument, the phonograph, will be in perfection, and in daily use. Then will Progress, Mystic, Metaphor, Commentator, and their compeers 'do their thinking aloud' and brighten the dullness of their far distant cousin, *Scotch Mist*. Said *Mist* is noted for absorbing all that comes, only to be lost in colorless, shapeless vacuity. Not altogether, nor hopelessly, however. As a metaphysician he believes there is something hidden beyond the visible; as a philosopher he loves to search out wisdom, to ponder upon the mysteries of consciousness, this inscrutable *ego* which dwells within and mocks all efforts to define it." MARY MORGAN (Gowan Lea).

MONTREAL, April, 1889.

ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

ALLOW me to ask you the explanation of a sentence I read in your paper: "Agnosticism and August Comte's Positivism." You say: "The errors of ontology and the belief in absolute existence." * * * The Monistic Unity of our Monism, (*Monos*,) is it not *the* ENS, "*absolute existence*," the *absolute substance* of which noumena are the different aspects, and of which phenomena or "matter" are only the *sensed* manifestations? In that question is the only cloud that is obscuring to me a point of our beautiful monistic sky. P.

The answer to this question is contained in the editorials of Nos. 82 and 83, "Phenomena and Noumena" and "The Oneness of the Phenomenal and Noumenal."

The word phenomena is derived from *φαίνεσθαι*, *to appear*, (*φαίνω*, to show; *φάω*, to shine) and means "*appearance*." It is now used in two senses: 1) appearance or unreal illusion; and, 2) natural phenomenon. The two meanings exclude one another. The former is mere appearance or unreal semblance, the latter the fact of experience or the reality that is "sensed." Phenomena, in the sense of the latter explanation, are the basis of all knowledge and philosophy. They are the positive existences of nature.

Noumena, (or thought-existences,) are concepts of an abstract nature. The idea of goodness or virtue is a noumenon. Virtue does not exist corporeally as an absolute being, or as a concrete object like a table or a tree. Virtue is nevertheless a reality. It does not exist as a body of itself, but it exists as a real quality in bodies. We, in our mind, abstract the quality of goodness and call it virtue. Noumena, therefore, are not things, and not objects, or bodily entities, but, if they are true, they represent real qualities of bodily entities. If there are no realities that correspond to them, they must be looked upon as mere illusions, but they are of greatest importance in so far as they afford us the possibilities of a higher, a human, and humane life. The noumenal world of thought is the foundation of man's rational existence.

The idea of absolute existence, of *the Ens*, the *monos*, or whatever it may be called, is a noumenon, an abstract conception which embraces all facts of reality under the aspect of their inseparableness. But there is no *monos* of itself; there is no "absolute existence" that exists like a thing. The facts of reality are never absolute, never abstract, they always are definite single objects of experience. P. C.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ILSE'S FLIGHT.

ILSE was awakened by her husband's parting kiss; she sat at her bed-side and listened to the sound of the rolling wheels.

"This has been a fearful night," she said; "after tears and anguish there came bad dreams. I was hanging over a precipice; from the depth below, concealed by fog, arose the noise of a waterfall. Felix standing above, held me by a handkerchief; his strength was giving way; I felt that, but I had no anxiety about it in my dream. I wished that Felix would let me go, and not sink with me. Pass away in peace, my dream, to thy portals of ivory; thou wast a good dream, and I have no cause to be ashamed of thee.

"He is on his journey, and I am alone. No, my Felix, you are with me, even when I do not hear your voice. Yesterday I was angry with you; I am sorry for it. I bear you within me, just as you have taught me, that the soul of man passes into and rests in others. That part of Felix which I preserve within me I will keep honorably, and quietly cherish in this hateful house."

She opened the curtains.

"It will be a gloomy day again; the finches are already sitting at the window, crying for the dilatory woman who has slept beyond the breakfast hour of her little ones. Outside all is in bloom, and the large leaves of the Schubart-plant blow about joyously in the moist air. But this rain will be more than my father likes; the seed will suffer. The good God cannot please us all at the same time; we are indeed covetous.

"At home they gossip about me; my neighbor did not say the worst that she knew. I have not been used to this. When I became the wife of my Felix I thought myself raised above all the meanness of the world, but I now feel its sting in my soul."

She passed her hand over her eyes.

"No tears to-day?" she cried springing up. "When my thoughts course wildly through my brain I will prove to myself that I have something of the scholar's character in me, and will calmly look into my own heart and quiet its beatings by prudent reflection. When he first came to our house, and the noble spirit of his conversation aroused me, his image pursued me into my room. I took a book, but I did not know what I read; I took up my accounts, but I could not put two and two together; I observed that all was confusion within me. Yet it was wrong to think thus about a man who was still a stranger to me. Then in my anguish I went into the nursery, tidied all my brother's and sister's things, and saw whether the boy's clothes needed mending. I was then a regular home body. Ah, I am so still; I hope it will help me now. I will put all my things together for I feel as if should take a journey to-day, and that it will be well to have all prepared."

She opened the closet, drew out her trunk, and packed it.

"But where to?" she asked herself. "Far away? How long it is since I had wings like a swallow, and could gaily fly with my thoughts into foreign parts! And now the wings of the poor little swallow are broken. I sit alone on my branch; I would gladly conceal myself in the leaves, and I dread the fluttering and the chattering of my neighbors."

She supported her weary head with her hands.

"Where should I go to?" she sighed; "not to my father; nor could I now look with pleasure on mountains and old monuments. How can one have a heart for the forms of nature and the achievements of past nations when one's own life is racked and disturbed?

"My Felix said that one should always consider oneself the child of the whole human race, and be elevated by the high thought that millions of the dead and living are united to us in an indissoluble unity. But who of those who were and are about me will relieve my tormented soul of the pangs that constantly trouble me? Who will deliver me from dissatisfaction with myself and from fear about the future? Ah me! It may be a teaching to inspire man in hours of exaltation, when calmly contemplating all about him, but for him who is writhing in torment and affliction, the teaching is too high, too high!"

She took from the shelf her little Bible, which had been given her by the good Pastor on her departure from her father's house, and drew it out of its cover.

"I have long neglected to read you, dear book, for when I open your pages I feel as if I had two lives; the old Ilse revives who once trusted in your words; and then again I see myself, like my husband, criticizing many passages, and asking myself whether what I find in you is according to my reason. I have lost my childish faith, and what I have gained instead gives me no certainty. When I fold my hands in prayer, as I did when I was a child, I know that I dare pray for nothing but strength to overcome, by my own exertion, what now casts down my spirit."

The gardener entered the room, as he did every morning, with a basket of flowers which the lord of the castle sent her. Ilse rose and pointed to the table.

"Set it down," she said, coldly, without touching the basket.

She had, at other times, frequently expressed to the man her pleasure in the beautiful flowers he had cultivated. It had always given him pain that the

* Translation copyrighted.

illustrious personages of the castle never noticed his rare plants, and he had been so pleased with the warm interest taken by the strange lady that he brought the flowers every morning himself, and pointed out to her the new favorites of the conservatory; he had cut for her the best he had.

"The others do not notice them," he would say; "and she remembers the Latin names too."

He now placed the basket of flowers down with a feeling of mortification.

"There are some new specimens of the calceolaria," he began, reproachfully; "they are of my own raising: you will not see others of this kind."

Ilse felt the disappointment of the gardener. She approached the table, and said:

"They are indeed very beautiful; but flowers, dear sir, require a light heart, and that I have not now. I have ill repaid your kindness to-day; but you must not be angry with me."

"If you would only look at the grey-spotted ones, exclaimed the gardener, with the enthusiasm of an artist; "these are my pride, and are not to be had anywhere else in the world."

Ilse admired them.

"I had taken great pains for many years," continued the gardener. "I had done all I could to obtain good seed, but only common ones came; after I had almost lost courage, the new kinds blossomed all in one year. It was not my art," he added, honestly: "it is a secret of nature; she has given me good fortune, and relieved me from my cares all at once."

"But you took pains and did your best," answered Ilse; "when one does thus, one may trust to the good spirit of life."

The gardener went away appeased; Ilse looked at the flowers.

"Even he who sent you has become to me an object of dread. Yet he was the only one here who showed me uniform kindness and treated me with respect. Felix is right: there is no reason for us to be disturbed on his account. Who knows whether he is much to blame for the disagreeable reports about this house. I must not be unjust towards him; but when I look at his flowers, it seems as if an adder lay within them, for I do not know whether his soul is pure or impure. I do not understand his ways, and that makes me uncertain and fearful."

She pushed the basket away, and turned from it.

The maid who waited upon her came into the room, with a troubled countenance, and begged permission to go away for the day, as her mother was very ill in a neighboring village. Ilse asked kindly about the woman, and gave the girl the desired permission, with good wishes and advice. The maid went slowly out of the room; Ilse looked sorrowfully after her.

"Her heart, too, is heavy. It is well that Felix is not at home, for I can now be alone with my sorrow. It will be a quiet day, and this will be welcome after yesterday's storm."

Again there was a knocking at the door; the Castellan brought the letters that the postman had given him for the Pavilion. There were letters from her brothers and sisters who kept up a regular correspondence with their distant Ilse. A ray of joy passed over her serious face.

"This is a pleasant morning greeting," she said. "I will to-day answer my little band in detail. Who knows whether I may have time for it next week."

She hastened to the writing-table, read, laughed, and wrote. Her uneasiness had passed away; she chatted like a lively child in the language and thoughts of the nursery. Hours flew in this occupation. Gabriel brought up and carried away the dinner. When in the afternoon he found her still bending over the letters, he lingered by her and hesitated whether he should speak to her; but as Ilse was so deeply engrossed in her work, he nodded and closed the door.

Finally, Ilse wrote to her father. Again her thoughts became sad, anguish rose from the depth of her heart, and lay like a burning weight on her bosom. She left her writing-table, and paced hastily about the room. When she came to the window, she saw the lord of the castle coming slowly along the gravel path towards the Pavilion.

Ilse stepped back quickly. She was not unaccustomed to the short visits of the Sovereign; but to-day she felt fearful, the blood rushed to her heart, she pressed her hands over her bosom, and struggled for composure.

The door flew open.

"I come to inquire," began his Highness, "how you bear your solitude. My house also has become empty, my children are gone from me, and it is lonely in the great building."

"I have employed my leisure in intercourse with distant friends," answered Ilse.

She would not on this occasion mention the children to the Sovereign.

"Are the little ones who play about in your home amongst these friends?" he asked laughing. "Have the children again expressed their wishes to you?"

He took a chair and invited Ilse to be seated. His demeanor made her more composed; his manner was that of a discreet and well-intentioned person.

"Yes, your Highness," replied Ilse; "but this time my younger sister, Luise, was the most active correspondent."

"Does she promise to become like you?" asked the Sovereign, kindly.

"She is now twelve years old," replied Ilse, with

reserve; she is sentimental upon every subject and every blade of grass excites her fancy. It appears as if she were to be the poetess of the play-room. I do not know how these fantastical ideas have come into our family. In her letter she tells me a long story, as if it had happened to herself, and yet it is only a tale which she has read somewhere. For since I have left my home, more story-books have reached it than were there in my youth."

"Probably it is only childish vanity," said the Sovereign, kindly, "that leads her to substitute an invention for truth."

"That is it exactly," answered Ilse, more cheerfully. "She pretends that she lost her way in the wood, and that when she was sitting sorrowfully among the toad-stools, the little animals whom she was in the habit of feeding in our court-yard,—the white mouse in the cage, the cats, and the shepherd's dog,—placed themselves about her and ran before her till she found her way out of the wood. The cat together with the mouse, your Highness; that was silly! This story she related boldly as if it were the truth, and expected me to think it touching. That was too much—but I have given her my opinion of it."

The Sovereign laughed, laughed from his heart. It was a rare sound that echoed through the walls of the dark room, and the god of love above looked down with surprise on the joyous man.

"May I ask how you criticized this poetic state of mind?" asked the Sovereign. "There is a poetical idea in the tale, that the kindness shown to others will always be repaid when required. But it is unfortunately only an poetic idea; gratitude is seldom met with in real life."

"One ought not, in life, to trust solely to the help of others," replied Ilse, firmly; "and one ought not to show kindness to others in order that it may be repaid. There is indeed a strange pleasure felt when some chord which one has struck brings back its echo to one's heart; but one should not trust to it. A child that has lost its way should make good use of its five senses in order to find its way home by itself. But, certainly, one ought not to put forth poetical ideas as if they were real incidents. I was obliged to scold her; for, your Highness, girls in these days must have right ideas taught them, or they will soon lose themselves in dreams."

The Sovereign laughed again.

Where are the wise and good animals, Lady Ilse, that will give *you* friendly counsel in your time of need?

"You are too strict," continued the Sovereign. "The witch fancy deceives the judgment of even us grown-up people; one is fearful without reason, and one hopes and trusts without justification. The person who could ever command a true, impartial judgment of his own position, would have a freedom that would make life hardly endurable."

"Fancy confuses us," answered Ilse, looking round, "but it warns us also."

"What is warmth of feeling, and devotion to others?" continued the Sovereign, sorrowfully. "Nothing but subtle self-deceit. If I now am flattered by the joyful feeling that I have succeeded in sharing the wealth of your heart, that too is only a deception; but it is a dream which I carefully cherish, for it does me good. With a happiness which I have long been deprived of, I listen to the honest tones of your voice, and the thought is painful to me that I shall ever be without the sweet enjoyment they afford. It is of greater value to me than you imagine."

"Your Highness speaks to me as to a true friend," replied Ilse, drawing herself up; "and when I take to heart the kindly tone in which you now express your sympathy, I have to believe your honesty and sincere intentions. But this same fancy, which you blame and praise, disturbs also the confidence which I would gladly have in your Highness. I will no longer be silent about it, for it pains me after such kind words, to foster any unfounded feeling against you." She rose hastily. "It disturbs my peace of mind to feel that I dwell in a house which the feet of other women avoid."

The Sovereign looked astonished at the woman who, with such firmness, controlled her inward excitement.

"The fortune-teller," he murmured.

"Your Highness knows well what fancy does," continued Ilse, sorrowfully. "It has tormented my soul, and made it difficult for me in this place to believe in the esteem of which your Highness assures me."

"What have they been telling you?" asked the Sovereign, in a sharp tone.

"What your Highness ought not to desire to hear from my lips," replied Ilse, proudly. "It is possible that the master of a Court considers such things with indifference. I say that to myself. But it is a misfortune to me to have been here: it is a stain on a spotless robe, and I fix my eyes wildly upon it; I wash it away with my hand, and yet it always lies before me, for it is a shadow that falls from without."

The Sovereign looked gloomily before him.

(To be continued.)

All things are connected with one another and the bond is holy. There is hardly anything foreign to any other thing. For things have been coördinated and they combine to form one and the same cosmos. For there is one cosmos made up of all things and one God who pervades all things and one substance, one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth.—MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

In the *Art Amateur* for May, by far the most interesting article is one on Pen Drawing for Photo-Engraving. It is the third of the series, and is profusely illustrated with reproductions of pen and ink sketches. These are so carefully described and analyzed, as to direct the attention of the student to the most important points, and lead him to reflect on the principles illustrated in the work. Attention is also drawn to the roulette work, which is a quick method of producing strong effects, although the writer appears to think that equally good results, if not better, are produced by hand work alone. The article is by Ernest Knauff, who has the true German idea that long and careful study is necessary to produce good work.

"Architect's" paper on Home Decoration is illustrated by a very attractive looking, cozy corner with book shelves, and it contains some good hints to make home attractive.

A few words on lambrequins and corner cupboards will be very suggestive to housekeepers who like to contrive conveniences and decorations.

The number contains also the usual variety of designs, the gossip about picture sales, a paper on the influence of artificial light on color, some interesting statements regarding woods, and other instructive and agreeable reading. E. D. C.

In the latest number of *Mind* Dr. Maudsley discusses the Double Brain, which, he states, represents the halves of the body and the unity of the whole whereof itself is a part. The halves of the double brain, like the halves of the body, (one perhaps fuller than the other) have corresponding functions. Mr. Stephen presents the second paper "on some kinds of necessary truths." Mr. Stephen says that geometrical axioms are neither simple empirical truths, nor the result of a form arbitrarily imposed upon the sense-given symbols, but that they emerge under the necessity of correlating our various impressions by the help of certain assumptions (p. 214).

It is with pleasure that we learn of the proposed new edition (the eleventh) of Diesterweg's celebrated work, "Popular Astronomy and Mathematical Geography," (*Populäre Himmelskunde und Mathematische Geographie.*) The revision has been conducted by Dr. M. Wilhelm Meyer, whose name is well known to the readers of THE OPEN COURT, and Dr. B. Schwalbe, a distinguished teacher, of Berlin. The worth of the new edition needs no further warranty than the names of the editors afford. Complete in ten parts, 15 cents each. Emil Goldschmidt, Publisher, Berlin.

The publishing house of Wilhelm Engelmann, Leipsic announce the projected publication of a series of little works, entitled "The Classics of the Exact Sciences." The first will fitly be the famous monograph of Helmholtz on the "Conservation of Energy."

The *Revue de la Science Nouvelle* is a monthly magazine published by the Paris "Scientific Association for the Defense of Christianity." Its table of contents embraces a vast range of subjects of universal interest.

NOTES.

Prof. Edward S. Holden, the director of the Lick Observatory, contributes to *Himmel und Erde* for May, a paper upon the Lick Telescope and its achievements.

The *Revue Belgique* has been publishing, of late, a number of interesting papers upon instruction in Political Economy at the German and Austrian universities.

A series of articles, by prominent American scientists, upon the practical applications of electricity will begin in the June *Scribner*. The series will be a complete representation of the position of electricity in the industrial world.

Murray, of London, has issued a cheap edition of Darwin's "Naturalist's Voyage Round the World," which will ensure a wider reading for this masterpiece of narrative.

The new *Century* Dictionary, which has been in course of preparation during the past seven years, is about completed. We await its appearance with pleasure and expectant curiosity.

The researches in theoretical electricity conducted in recent years by Prof. Hertz, of Karlsruhe, have attracted widespread attention in the world of science. The results obtained point to the conclusion that electricity is an undulatory movement of the same medium which scientists have assumed to be the vehicle of light and heat. THE OPEN COURT will soon publish a paper descriptive and explanatory of Prof. Hertz's experiments.

The "Rise of the People of Israel," an historical sketch begun in this issue of THE OPEN COURT, is from the pen of Dr. Carl Heinrich Cornill, an eminent theologian of the University of Königsberg. An orthodox expounder of Christian doctrine, Prof. Cornill has nevertheless been actuated in his researches by the spirit of modern historical criticism. The essay originally appeared in the series "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge" (Rud. Virchow and Fr. v. Holtzendorff, Editors), from which the translation has been made.

The latest *Independent Pulpit* contains a controversy between Edgeworth and Pericles. Edgeworth (alias Dr. Lazarus) assails, in the name of anarchism, anything and everything that represents order or law. He fiercely attacks THE OPEN COURT in the name of agnosticism and materialism for "its representation of monism" which "is but a metaphysical fantasy" and its shadowy "order of atomic shapes," as if THE OPEN COURT had propounded some new atomic theory. He ridicules "the elegant troll of its wheelbarrow" because it "vilifies" (sic!) "mutual banking, the only possible mode by which labor can exchange with labor in avoiding a ruinous tribute to money monopoly." Edgeworth believes in polarity. Polarity is one of those words, alluded to by Mephistopheles in Gœthe's Faust:

> "Shun too over sharp a tension,
> For just where fails the comprehension
> A word steps promptly in as deputy.
> With words 'tis excellent disputing,
> Systems to words 'tis easy suiting;
> On words 'tis excellent believing,
> No word can ever lose a jot by thieving."

We recommend Edgeworth to read what Professor Huxley has to say on polarity. He says in his article on agnosticism in the *Nineteenth Century* of February, 1889:

"Polarity is a word about which I heard a good deal in my youth when "Natur-Philosophie" was in fashion, and greatly did I suffer from it. For many years past, whenever I have met with 'polarity' anywhere but in a discussion of a purely physical topic, such as magnetism, I have shut the book."

Pericles encounters the gallant knight of anarchism who wants "liberty in love and love in liberty" with great ability and good humor. He says:

"One cannot help remembering the advice given Paddy at the Donnybrook Fair: 'Wherever you see a head, hit it;' and as the legend tells us, Paddy did so without much caring whether it was the pate of friend or foe."

Pericles, it appears in the discussion, is a Frenchman whose lay sermons in the *Independent Pulpit* and other papers are efforts to introduce the Athenian spirit into our nation. "The first thing to be done," he says, "is by an artistic education to raise the minds of the people to a higher and nobler standard, that they be, as said Gambetta, '*un peuple artiste.*' Meliorism and Art are twin brothers. It is this conviction that has led me to take, as *nom de plume* the name of Pericles."

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HEDONISM AND ASCETICISM. EDITOR.....No. 81

Philosophy has two aspects. Of these, ethics forms the practical aspect, and, a systematic conception of the universe, the theoretical. Philosophy and ethics go together; fallacy in the one leads to corruption in the other. Materialism will logically end in hedonism or utilitarianism, for it places the object of life in material well-being, in happiness; Spiritualism will lead to asceticism, a renunciation of the pleasures of the world. Monism rejects both views; it sees the purpose of existence in progress, in the constant aspiration after something higher and nobler.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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A DISCOURSE AT THE DISSOLUTION OF HIS SOCIETY, FEB 3, 1889.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

Nearly forty-eight years have passed since Theodore Parker gave his sermon, now historic, on "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." An occasion has now arrived which renders it fitting and reverent to estimate the transient and the permanent in his own teaching. For the honored Twenty-eighth Congregational Society now rests from its isolated labors, twenty-nine years after its founder rested from his.

The Society, sometimes known as the Fraternity, makes over this Memorial of its founder to another fraternity,—the Benevolent Fraternity of Churches. The two fraternities were born of the same spiritual mother, though they have been late in discovering the fact. In 1838, Emerson gave his great address before the graduates of Divinity College, Cambridge. Theodore Parker, then twenty-eight, wrote in his journal:

"Sunday, July 15, 1838. Proceeded to Cambridge to hear the valedictory sermon by Mr. Emerson. * * * So beautiful, so just, so true, and terribly sublime was his picture of the faults of the church in its present position. My soul is roused, and this week I shall write the long-meditated sermon on the state of the church and the duties of these times."

That was the inception of what was presently called "Parkerism." But about the same time another soul was roused,—that of Channing. The Unitarian apostle wrote: "I would that I could look to Unitarianism with more hope." He complained of a want of vitality and force which gave but little hope of its accomplishing much under its existing auspices and form.

Channing's eloquent emphasis on the moral and humanitarian side of Unitarianism alarmed theologians, but it impressed the congregations. An association of individuals was formed; it coöperated with the ministries-at large of various churches; and all these were incorporated, just fifty years ago, as the Benevolent Fraternity of Churches. Its object, as stated in the Act (Feb. 16, 1839), was "the moral and religious instruction of the poor in the City of Boston."

The religion which had been rationalized for scholars was now to be humanized for the poor. Soon after the voice of Theodore Parker was heard in the land. It was not yet especially humanitarian; it was theological.

Rumors sped abroad of a wolf in sheep's clothing prowling after sheep; and one of the early acts of the Fraternity was to request its ministers not to exchange pulpits with Parker,—a request disregarded by John Sargent and James Freeman Clarke, in the interest of intellectual liberty.

The fears of the Benevolent Fraternity were transient; their moral earnestness was permanent. Regarded only as a gesture, the Benevolent Fraternity was prophetic of a movement now general; and one of its prophets, however unrecognized, was Theodore Parker. In an early sermon he said:

"Jesus goes out to that despised class of men, and says, He came to seek and save them. Was that a small thing? Even today, in democratic Boston, to be a minister to the poor is a reproach. He is esteemed the most fortunate minister who is ministered unto, and not who ministers.

"The man who in Boston gathers crowds of men from the common walks of life — what is he called? 'A preacher to the rabble,'—that is the ecclesiastical title."

The instruction of the incorporated Fraternity was not to be ecclesiastical or doctrinal; but simply "moral and religious." The Act reads as if Parker had written it.

I have heard that two members of a German peasant family, named Klein, emigrated at different times to this country, where they could not find each other. One translated his name, Klein, *Small;* the other translated his Klein, *Little.* Small and Little lived in the same street for fifty years, and only discovered that they were brothers when their old mother in Germany left a little money to be divided between them if they could be found. I shall leave you to apply the story to the two Boston Fraternities now amicably adjusting possessions bequeathed by that maternal liberalism of which they were offspring.

I do not propose to dwell on the history, so familiar, or accessible, of Parker's thorny pilgrimage to the painful prominence he reached as the heretic of heretics.

Unitarianism began as a textual protest. It had discovered that a Trinity was not taught in the Bible. But in the course of a long controversy, and by the larger culture it promoted, Unitarianism hatched a brood which needed a new element.

The orthodox pointed to the heretical tendencies as the fulfilment of their warnings. "We told you so!" When Francis Newman was a young clergyman, and first questioned an article, his brother, now Cardinal Newman, said, "Take care! if you go so far you will go farther." Francis answered, "When I see farther I will go farther." But that kind of courage cannot be expected of a whole church, which must carry along the slow with the swift.

The Unitarians denied with indignation that their new doctrines tended to general rationalism; and when their Divinity School began to send forth restless adventurers into seas guarded by Calvinistic chimæras, such were repudiated.

There was a sort of panic, in which some Unitarians for a time reversed the principles of toleration they had pleaded in the days of their own persecution. It was partly due to the outbreak of so-called atheism.

In 1834, Abner Kneeland wrote: "Universalists believe in a God, which I do not, but believe that their God with all his moral attributes (aside from nature itself) is nothing more than a chimæra of their own imagination."

After four years he was sentenced to two months imprisonment, and served out that last penalty of moribund bigotry, despite the protest of Channing. By his disregarded petition to the Governor for Kneeland's release Channing and his friends had suffered. They had made Kneeland himself the chimæra dire of Unitarianism.

Even Parker was not without his chimæra; and he declined to attend a Thomas Paine banquet, though Paine was only a premature Parkerite,—like himself an earnest believer in God and immortality. In short, as Paine said in the struggle for our national independence, so now, in the struggle for spiritual liberty, these were the times that tried men's souls. The wonder is not that so many were found wanting but that so many proved equal to the occasion.

It was in the thick of this revolution that Parker delivered his discourse on "The Transient and the Permanent in Christianity." The theme of it was that the spirit of truth and righteousness, which Christianity represented, naturally took its garb from the age in which it was born, or the ages through which it passed; that it was invested with the legends, rites, and speculations rife among those who successively had charge of it; that these investitures of it must necessarily be as transient as other speculations of the uncritical times in which they were woven. New sciences, races, aims, must weave new raiment for it. But through all changes, Christianity, summing up as it did the religion of love to God and man, belief in the All-perfect and immortality, would prove the absolute religion which would never pass away.

The power and poetic beauty of the discourse were never surpassed by Parker. But one wonders at the reign of terror. It is all so simple. The new Jerusalem still rests on transparent glass.

Channing was troubled not to find belief in miracles expressed in it, but he wrote:

> "Let the full heart pour itself forth! Give my love to Mr. Parker."

The more logical brain of Gannett saw the inevitable next step before Parker himself saw it; and when the new thinker had presently rejected the miracles also he was ably answered.

Dr. Gannett did not lose his head; it was due to his inflexible justice that Parker was not excommunicated. He declared that Parker was a believer and preacher of Christian truths, but was destroying the historical evidence, the only evidence of those truths. They survived in him from the evidence he once believed, but those who followed him, being without the evidence, would not believe the truths.

This position was not met by the transcendental appeals to an inner oracle. Parker said the truth of the message does not depend on the authority of the messenger; the truth of geometry does not depend on the authority of Euclid. Geometry, however, was a thing that all might verify; divine fatherhood, life after death could not be verified unless by some historical evidence, except for those whose inner oracle responded. They were discredited by Abner Kneeland, for instance, who had been an orthodox, then a universalist preacher, had travelled somewhat the same road as Parker, and seemed to be an "awful example" of the landing-place to which the new views tended.

Of all this Parker was unconscious. He wept over the criticisms, but never admitted their force. This phenomenal fact is explicable only by another which his opponents did not appreciate; namely, that his mind was not skeptical, not negative, but essentially constructive. Only after he was dead, and his biography by John Weiss had appeared, was this realized. Then it was that his great, but always fair, antagonist, Dr. Gannett, wrote on Theodore Parker the true verdict:

> "He was a very learned man, and a tender, true-hearted man, honest and thorough."

The whole source of Parker's heresies is in that sentence. Because Parker was a very learned man, he could not accept statements which criticism and scholarship had to him proved erroneous; because he was tender and true-hearted, he rejected traditional conceptions which to him showed God heartless; because he was honest, he spoke out what he believed.

Beyond his heart-heresy, and his veracity in abandoning proven errors, Parker was a great believer. There is sufficient reason for the favor now shown for

his writings by those who once resisted him. He was building the fortresses of their future. Their old misunderstanding need not be wondered at. Nay, it was not without its honorable side. It is an old story of shepherds watching by night that when the glory of the Lord shone round about them they were 'sore afraid.' No doubt they had their flocks at heart; and no man can now doubt that the watching shepherds of the last generation dreaded some omen in the new star, now welcomed by their successors.

And something analogous may be said of Parker's political radicalism. While Boston "society" disowned him he was yet of all men the most Bostonian. All the history that led to Boston, and built Boston, and made this old city a Sinai whose smoke and flame republished for this land the laws of liberty, were incarnate in Theodore Parker.

When Thackeray came to Boston he went first of all to the Music Hall, to hear Parker, and then to the preacher's library. Towards the close of his visit, being with George Ticknor, Thackeray said: "Ticknor, I have not got into the best Boston circle after all." Ticknor assured him that he had, and counted up the grand people he had met. But Thackeray replied: "Still, I can't have seen the best. No, no! Why, Prescott tells me he does not visit Parker."

If Boston did not love Parker, Parker loved Boston. I remember we had a little fable at the Divinity School that a Millerite met Emerson and cried, "The end of the world is at hand." "All the better," said Emerson, "Man can do well without it." The same fanatic presently meeting Parker announced the end of the world. "My good man," said Parker, "that does not concern me; I live in Boston." The story tells true. Boston is still learning in his library. In those bequeathed books is the life-blood of great men by whom he was fed; but of none nobler than he who so long gave this people to eat of his own broken body, and his blood daily shed for them.

Had Theodore Parker been adapted to our time, he could not have been so adequate to his own.

Near Plymouth, England, I remarked a memorial to an ancient worthy who built a market-house; beneath it was another memorial, to a later worthy, who cleared the market-house away and made a highway for the people. At Plymouth, Massachusetts, we may find a memorial of worthies who built a creed stonier than its famous rock, yet did some service in its time; and beside their names might be written, with equal honor, those of the men who pulverized the dogmas to pave the highroad of progress. High among these would be the name of Theodore Parker; yet none who know his spirit can doubt that could that faithful man reappear, and find that his pavement was worn out, broken, or unequal to new needs, he would lead in the work of its replacement by a better.

The great teachers, including even Parker himself, are yet but heralds of the voice which shall announce the New World religion. It were faithless to their spirit to be satisfied with its perishable embodiment.

THE MIGRATIONS OF THE TRIBES OF ISRAEL.*

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.

BY PROFESSOR CARL HEINRICH CORNILL.

Translated from the German by γνῶν.

According to established tradition the people of Israel were not native in the land that afterwards became their home, but had immigrated from the northeast of Mesopotamia; a tradition which is all the more striking in view of the fact that the language spoken by the people of Israel could only have originated in Canaan itself. This linguistic difficulty was felt even in Biblical times, as the remarkable forty-seventh verse in the thirty-first chapter of the first Book of Moses testifies: in this verse, which is plainly the product of a later learned interpretation, "Laban the Aramæan" calls the stone-wall which Jacob in the Hebrew language had called Galeed, "Jegar-Sahadutha," a correct Aramæan expression.†

According to the familiar tradition of the Hebrew people itself, its primitive home was in the mountainous tract extending between the left bank of the Tigris and Lake Van, which separates Mesopotamia from Armenia and by the Greek geographers is called Arrhapachitis. (Arphaxad, son of Sem, is the ancestor of the Hebrew people—1 Moses x. 22-25; xi. 10). From the above-mentioned highlands there descended an emigration of tribes into the fertile plain of Mesopotamia. (Salah, Arphaxad's son, 1 Moses x. 24; xi. 12, denotes "emigration," "emission.") They crossed (Eber, Salah's son, 1 Moses x. 24; xi. 14, is "crossing," "passage") the Tigris, and then they separated, (Peleg, Eber's son, 1 Moses x. 25; xi. 16, is "separation," "division"); the main body advanced through the heart of the region and finally settled in and around the Haran, the Karrhae of the ancients, in the northwestern part of Mesopotamia; a smaller band, including the ancestors of Israel, struck out in the opposite direction toward the extreme southeast and at Ur, in Southern Babylonia (1 Moses xi. 28, 31), endeavored to obtain possession of permanent settlements; still in the end they preferred to follow the main body of their kinsmen to Haran (1 Moses xi. 31). Here their migratory instincts awoke once more. Following the direction of the common high-road of the ancient world

*The value and interest of Prof. Cornill's articles will be greatly increased if read with Bible in hand.—Ed.

† All Hebrew words and names are given according to the spelling of the King James Bible.

between Egypt and Babylonia they journeyed still further toward the southwest (1 Moses xii. 4, 5). The great leader of this tribal migration was Abraham.

The most careful and impartial weighing of all adverse arguments and difficulties has not as yet been able to shake my faith in the genuine historical authenticity of Abraham; I regard Abraham as an historical personality in the strictest sense of the word, as really so as Alaric, the king of the Visigoths, or Rurik, the prince of the Varangians.

Egypt, perhaps, was the original ultimate goal of this Abrahamic migration, that same Egypt which time out of mind had exerted a kind of magic attraction upon all Semitic tribes, and which probably even during the very centuries of the Abrahamic emigration, on repeated occasions, had received, and (not always willingly) harbored Semitic guests on its fruitful soil. Still, the story purporting to be an account of Abraham's expedition into Egypt (1 Moses xii. 10–20), is altogether a recent one and purely a luxuriant outgrowth from the stem of the original tradition. As a matter of fact the Abrahamic migration remained in Canaan. One division of this migration, the one personified in Lot, moved toward the eastern bank of the Jordan (1 Moses xiii. 7–12), where comparatively early both nationally and politically it became consolidated as Moab and Ammon (1 Moses xix. 37–38). Abraham himself settled in the west Jordan region, the Canaan proper (1 Moses xiii. 12).

Abraham and his tribal kinsmen were nomads, wandering shepherds, roaming peacefully about the country; while the aboriginal inhabitants of the land had long before attained the higher culture of city life. The immigrants borrowed their language from the latter, but at the same time guarded as before the primitive purity of their pastoral life, and their healthy, naïve natural sense revolted above all against the religion of the Canaanites.

The religious character of the Canaanites particularly displayed two characteristic manifestations: *viz.*, religious obscenity, and infant sacrifice; Abraham held aloof from both. In the touching and deeply poetical story of the intended sacrifice of Isaac, for whom ultimately a ram was substituted, tradition (1 Moses xxii.) has recorded Abraham's positive rejection of infant sacrifice.

In describing this predominant feature, and in characterizing Abraham as a religious hero, tradition has, further, correctly interpreted the true state of things. The work of Moses was not an absolutely new one; it is linked to a popular initiative of the past, and there is no reason for entertaining a doubt, when tradition even in this most specific manifestation of the Israelitic popular spirit makes Abraham the patriarch of his race; although very naturally we now are unable to prove and correctly expound in all its details this "faith of Abraham."

The descendants of Abraham in the West Jordan region, true to the usage and customs of their fathers, continued wandering nomads. Being unable to wrest lands from the superior power of the Canaanites, they turned their eyes southward to the highland about Mount Seir, where the primitive tribes of the Horites both in power and culture stood far below the Canaanites. The main body of the descendants of Abraham, accordingly, pushed forward toward the south, conquered the Horites, and settled down permanently on Mount Seir as Edom (1 Moses xxxvi. 1; 5 Moses ii. 12–22), and soon effected their national and political consolidation. Edom thereupon remained in undisputed possession of the aforesaid territory.

The remnants of the descendants of Abraham, who had remained behind in the West Jordan region, would perhaps have been absorbed by the Canaanites, or would have been compelled to seek connection with one of the kindred tribes, if a new and considerable immigration from the common ancestral home of Haran had not brought them aid and reinforcements. This was the Jacobite migration, represented in the person of Jacob.

It is the merit of Ewald with subtle insight to have detected in Jacob the "after-comer," the "loiterer."

Jacob appears as the father of twelve sons; these are the twelve tribes into which in historical times the people of Israel were divided. The twelve tribes again became subdivided into four groups, by legend personified in four mothers, two legitimate wives and two concubines of the patriarch, *viz.:* a Lea-group, a Rachel-group, a Bilha-group, and a Zilpa-group; Lea and Rachel were the more considerable, Bilha and Zilpa the inferior groups. The Lea-group surpassed all the others in number and importance, and the Zilpa division was connected with it; yet the Rachel-group was hardly inferior in power and nobility, and the Bilha-group closely adhered to the latter.

The legend states that Jacob brought along with him his eleven sons out of Haran; only the youngest, Benjamin, was born in Canaan. Might we also from this draw certain historical conclusions? As regards the rise and growth of the tribes, we are confronted with the most obscure problems of the prehistoric period of the people of Israel, which perhaps never will be perfectly cleared up. Tradition is only in so far incontrovertibly right as it relegates the beginnings of tribal growth to pre-Egyptian times, while weighty reasons corroborate the truth of this fact; and we have likewise to regard as correct, that the tribe of Benjamin comparatively rather late branched off from that of Joseph. But nothing more definite than this can be asserted.

Ewald has given expression to a clear hypothesis, which, in fact, possesses a high degree of probability. He believes that in the Lea-group he can discern the remnants of the Abrahamic group that remained in Canaan; in the Rachel-group the auxiliary reinforcement from Haran, that is, the Jacobite migration:—a statement, that asserts much. At all events, the Jacobite migration certainly did join the remnants of the Abrahamic migration that had remained in Canaan, and henceforth becomes the representative of the entire national and historical development. The Jacobite migration, however, entered not only externally but also spiritually upon the inheritance of Abraham; the faith of Abraham passed to Jacob and was perpetuated in him as the father's noblest legacy.

Yet at an early time there must have arisen contentions among the kindred tribes. Joseph, from whom Benjamin perhaps had not as yet branched off, boasting his power and noble pedigree, claimed the supreme hegemony, but was forced to yield to a coalition of the other tribes, and went into Egypt where the rich pasturages of the Asiatic border-land, since remote antiquity had been the playground of Semitic nomads. The Lea-tribes at this conjuncture seem to have attempted to draw the Bilha-tribes, Dan and Naphtali, into the spheres of their power, the latter subtribes having been deprived of their old support; and Reuben, particularly, seems to have intended to do them violence, (1 Moses xxxv. 22); but both those vigorous and valiant tribes were able to maintain their independence, and Reuben himself came out of this contention so severely damaged that henceforth and for all time to come he lost his "primogeniture," his old power and tribal prestige (1 Moses xlix. 4).

Later there occurred events that forced them all to emigrate; but we are, of course, utterly unable to give a precise account of these events. On this occasion Joseph wreaked a noble vengeance, hospitably receiving his brothers in the district in which he had settled, oblivious of the old injury and only mindful of the old relationship. And in this manner the sons of Jacob became inhabitants of the land of Egypt.

At first the Egyptian government seems to have assumed a well-meaning attitude of neutrality toward the strangers; but soon the situation became completely altered. The Pharaoh Ramses II happened, at the time, to be involved in a severe conflict with the populations and kingdoms of western Asia; Palestine, partly at least, being the theatre of the struggle. The contest, as regards Egypt, ended, indeed, not in open defeat nor yet in victory; the ultimate result being a peace which nevertheless failed to warrant complete security to either side. The consequence was that henceforward Ramses naturally began to look with mistrust upon the foreign population of alien blood that had settled on the Asiatic border, while at the same time he happened to be in need of laborers for his numerous public works. He, accordingly, resorted to the expedient of pressing into the service of the State all the Semites who were settled on the eastern border of Egypt on the isthmus of Suez, and under strict military supervision compelled them to perform toilsome villein-service.

Incidentally I may observe, that I am fully aware of the arguments which have recently been advanced against the hypothesis that Ramses II, the Sesostris of the Hellenes, in reality was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and his son Merenpta the Pharaoh of the Exodus. These arguments are well worthy of a most earnest consideration, but the accepted identification of both Pharaohs still appears to me as the most satisfactory.

In this manner, Israel, from free nomads, had been turned into Egyptian socage-serfs. So long as Ramses, one of the most warlike of the Pharaohs, wielded with a strong hand his iron sceptre in Egypt, the oppressed Israelites seem reluctantly to have borne up with their hard fate. But even chains of servitude availed not to break the stubborn, independent heart of those proud Bedouins. When the turbulent Ramses was succeeded by a son very unlike his father, the people of Israel again took heart. There only lacked a resolute leader who should guide the latent ferment to a definite goal; this leader was soon found.

Moses, a Hebrew of the tribe of Levi, had through a fortunate chance been received into the ruling caste of Egypt and thus found an opportunity thoroughly to acquire Egyptian training and culture. But the natural impulse of his heart drew him toward his own people; he preferred to be the brother of these despised serfs rather than live in the enjoyment of Egyptian splendor and magnificence. His keen insight soon discerned that the only way to free his people from the iron encompassment of Egyptian fortresses and military garrisons lay across the sea into the heart of the desert. It was a desperate undertaking. He obtained precise information concerning the topography and the political situation of the neighboring country, allied himself with kindred Bedouin tribes of the Arabian desert, and when dreadful scourges and visitations were terrifying the Egyptians, and had paralyzed their efforts, Moses thought the right moment was at last arrived: his fellow-countrymen with many other kindred national elements in their train (2 Moses xii. 38; 4 Moses xi. 4) assembled, and forthwith marched forth from the land of bondage.

By well-devised marches and maneuvers they were able to deceive the Egyptian guards on the frontier; they soon reached the Isthmus of Suez, but there they were overtaken by a flying corps of Egyptian cavalry.

Before them the raging sea, behind them their pursuers, panting for revenge. It was a moment of supreme anxiety! A violent northeast wind drove the shallow waters from the channel, and they marched through on the dry bottom of the sea into the desert, to freedom. The pursuing Egyptians were overwhelmed by the retreating flood; but Israel was safe.

The entire highway leading to Canaan being in undisputed possession of the Egyptians, and the latter by treaties with the neighboring kingdoms having stipulated the mutual extradition of all fugitives, Moses accordingly led his people into the narrow defiles of Mount Sinai, which were accessible indeed to a band of wandering nomads but could not be approached by a large army. Israel tarried for a long time in the region of Mount Sinai, and in this grandly impressive mountainous scenery tradition has located the scene of Moses's greatest work, his religious reorganization of the people. The entire tradition is agreed to the effect that Moses was the initiator, pioneer, and creator of that unique spirit which belonged peculiarly to the people of Israel, and through which it most radically differed from other tribes related by speech and descent. There, upon Mount Sinai, Moses gave to Israel its national God Jahve* (this is the original and correct pronunciation, instead of Jehova), thereby making Israel a nation as the people of Jahve. The name of Jahve, in fact, cannot be explained from the Hebrew tongue, but seems to have been borrowed from Sinai; and, indeed, according to Israelitic tradition, Moses's adviser and assistant, his father-in-law Jethro, was a priest of Sinai (2 Moses xviii).

Still, it remains utterly impossible to state precisely and positively of what the work of Moses really consisted, since—however unwelcome the truth may be—not even the ten commandments can be regarded as having been actually formulated by Moses; we have here only an inverted conclusion from effect to cause. Israel is the only people known to us that never had a mythology; not even making the easy step, by way of complement, of associating a female divinity with the highest divine being. Jahve's unique nature must accordingly be a Mosaic idea. Jahve alone is the God of Israel and this Jahve is the origin and source of all divine and human law; this must be a thought peculiarly Mosaic. A lofty spiritualization of the divine idea and, as a direct result of this, a lofty spiritualization of the Ethos are to be regarded the prominent features of the Mosaic Jahve faith. We have, moreover, to attribute to Moses the creation of, at least, a very simple worship; since a religion without worship would be, with primitive nations, inconceivable. The institution, also, of a priesthood as the only legitimate mediator between Jahve and Israel must be Mosaic; but the tradition that Moses entrusted his brother Aaron with this high office has not been found as yet among the oldest sources.

Sinai, however, was only a station and not the final goal of the migration. Soon after, the multitudes, strengthened by their rest, moved onward; this time to Kadesh-Barnea in the desert south of Canaan (4 Moses xiii. 27; xx. 1, 14; 5 Moses i. 19, 46; Judges xi. 16, 17). This locality, at least, seemed sufficiently adapted to receive the permanent colonization of frugal shepherds; it lay beyond the reach of the Egyptian arms, and yet on the very threshold of the coveted land itself. Here they might quietly await the development of things. According to all traces the sojourn in Kadesh must have been a rather long one. Moses probably died there. Tradition is constant in regard to the point that he never personally entered the land of promise; in fact, neither he nor any other of the emigrants that left Egypt. And this constant tradition is all the weightier if we recall to mind that here there is the question of a distance that under normal circumstances it would be easy to complete within a fortnight.

An external event finally brought Israel to the goal of its wishes. The Canaanites, here called Amorites, under a king called Sihon, made an advance upon the eastern bank of the Jordan, drove the Moabites and Ammonites out of the most fertile parts of their territory and founded a new Amorite kingdom with the capital of Hesbon (4 Moses xxi. 26). Then they remembered their kinsmen in the desert at Kadesh. Moab and Ammon themselves, perhaps, on this occasion invoked the aid of Israel; at all events they were welcome allies, and the youthful and well-husbanded natural strength of Israel was able to achieve the proposed task: they destroyed the kingdom of Sihon of Hesbon; and Israel remained settled in the fruitful region, and kept for itself the price of war and victory.

Yet soon the fertile valleys and meadows could not contain the ever-increasing number of men and flocks; they were urged resistlessly to cross the Jordan. There seemed to exist every possibility of settling down across the river. According to all accounts the Canaanites were scattered in numerous small isolated territories without internal connections or mutual sympathy; moreover their energy had been relaxed by luxurious habits, and in valor they could not match the impetuous sons of the desert.

Judah was the first to advance (Judges i. 1–20; 1 Moses xxxviii. 1). He crossed the Jordan and turned toward the south where the mountain range that later

*The word *Jahve*, according to the traditional etymology, is derived from the verb *hajah*, "to live, to exist, to be," and signifies "the being, the living, the eternal one." So it is explained in "The Idea of God," page 7 and 8. Professor Cornill in a private letter to the editor of this journal, writes: "My reason for not considering Jahve an original Hebrew word, is founded upon the fact that *hajah*, in the sense of *to be*, is not Hebrew. In a word or ginally Hebrew the change of *v* into *j* would be difficult to account for."—Eo

bore the name of Judah, with its fruitful slopes excited his covetousness. Judah doubtless succeeded in gaining a permanent foothold in this region, but only at the cost of severe losses which were made good by the amalgamation of Canaanite, Edomitic, and Arabic elements; but after a hard and long struggle "the interloper" (Pharez) became the master of "the first begotten" (Zarah) (1 Moses xxxviii. 27–30). In the time of David, when Judah stands in the broad day-light of history, the Israelitic part of the population is undisputed master of the country, and the latter throughout felt as Israelitic.

The tribes of Simeon and Levi made the second attempt, which turned out a complete failure. By means of treason they obtained possession of the Canaanite City of Schechem, commanding the Mountain of Ephraim; but Israel turned shuddering away from the nefarious deed, and Simeon and Levi were vanquished by the revenge of the Canaanites (1 Mos. xxxiv. 25–30; xlix. 5–7). Levi as tribe was entirely exterminated, yet later through a most remarkable metamorphosis awoke to a new life as a sacerdotal caste, and the remnants of Simeon hid with the kindred tribe of Judah (Judges i. 3) by which they were absorbed.

The house of Joseph undertook the third and most successful expedition. Only Reuben and Gad continued to dwell in the East-Jordan district; the other seven tribes under the leadership of the Ephraimite Josuah combined in a common campaign against Middle and Northern Palestine. They gained a firm foothold in Gilgal on the other side of the Jordan (Josh. iv. and v.) and from that position they were able to conquer Jericho (Josh. vi.), Ai (Josh. viii.), and Bethel (Judges i. 22–25). Then at last the Canaanites were aroused into a determined and general resistance, but at Gibeon they were an other time defeated by Josuah (Josh.. x.) and thus Israel became the master of all Middle Palestine. In the north they were again confronted by a coalition of Canaanites under king Jabin of Hazor; but at Lake Merom it was likewise vanquished by Joshua.

The conquest of Palestine and the establishment of the Kingdom of Israel, will be related in a subsequent number.

Our religion is geographical, belongs to our time and sphere; respects and mythologizes some one time, and place, and person, and people.—*Emerson.*

Wise on all other topics, men lose their head the moment they talk of religion. It is the sturdiest prejudice in the public mind that religion is something by itself; a department distinct from all other experiences, and to which the tests and judgments men are ready enough to show on other things, do not apply. —*Emerson.*

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

II.

अथ सीताहरणम् (आर्षे रामायण
आरण्यककाण्डे अष्टचत्वारिंशाग्र्या अष्टौ सर्गाः)

आत्मनो मरणं मत्वा संशयं परमं गतः ।
१ अकामो भयसंविग्नो निःश्वस्य बहुशस्तदा ॥
निश्चितं रावणं दृष्ट्वा मारीचो भयविह्वलः ।
२ गच्छामीत्यब्रवीद्भीतो दीनो नक्तंचरेश्वरम् ॥

Now Maritcha* forecasting his own death grew perplexed at heart, unwilling and trembling with fear; but on seeing Ravana determined, he said at last, with many sighs: I shall go then!

Ravana, the lord of the nightly-roving Rakshas, grew overjoyed at this determination, and in a hearty way embracing him, he replied: This generous resolution is worthy of you, O hero, and now I behold Maritcha in his true character.

You must now mount with me my swift, easy chariot, all studded with precious stones and drawn by wild asses with Pisatcha-faces.† Then mounting they at once drove away from the neighborhood of that hermitage.‡ On the way they enjoyed the sight of pleasant towns and lotus-lakes, mountains, rivers, and various inhabited regions.

Having at last reached the forest of Dandaka they descried in the distance the hermitage of Rama. Then alighting from their swift, easy chariot, bright with many costly ornaments, Ravana seizing Maritcha by the hand spoke as follows:

"That yonder, looming up in the distance, is the hermitage of Rama, surrounded by plantain-trees. Let us now, O dear friend, set about the work which brought us hither."

At these words of Ravana Maritcha with great alacrity at once divested himself of his native form of Rakshas-fiend, and transformed himself into a golden stag.

In his disguise he looked the most charming of created beings, of a shimmering silver hue as if besprinkled with countless glittering drops, playing in the blended colors of lotus, crystal, and emerald, with four antlers that seemed of gold, set with precious stones.

*As told in the introduction, Maritcha is a so-called Raksha-fiend. By the blond Aryan tribes the aboriginal black tribes of India and the Drawidian populations of the Deccan in the South were identified with demons, monkeys, etc.

† The Pisatchas were a class of evil spirits.

‡ Namely, the locality in the forest where they happened to be at the time.

Having assumed this glorious stag-like form, he kept moving slowly in front of Rama's hermitage.

He now well felt that his own life-time was verging on its last hour. Whether right or wrong, he said unto himself, "the thing has certainly to be done, whether for my master's sole profit, or to earn a speedy heavenly reward. And when I recall to mind the indomitable valor of Rama and my own master's peremptory commands, it is only meet that I should prefer the latter to my own earthly existence." In this frame of mind and with the vision of his death before his eyes, Maritcha endeavored to catch at a high resolve, and lingering within the sight of Rama and Sita, he strove to attract their attention. In this manner Maritcha approached the formidable Prince Rama, a hero worthy of his ancestors; the royal hermit who had renounced all earthly pleasures, and true to his vow was treading the path of virtue.

Not far from him Maritcha, the son of Sunda, beheld the blameless Princess Sita, in her dazzling beauty like the purple effulgence of the setting sun.

Yet Sita had been the first to perceive him.

(To be continued.)

LOVE-LONGING.

(See D. G. Rossetti's beautiful sonnet, "Love-Sweetness.")

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

Not that the fragrant shadow of her hair
Is on thy face, nor that her hands are wed
A tender lily wreath about thy head,
I'm envious; nor that her features wear

The love her soft remembering sighs declare:
Not that her bosom's white is turned to red
Beneath thy lips which on her own had fed;—
Not therefore; no, my lady too is fair.

But because thou hast known that sweeter thing
For want of which my soul finds nothing sweet—
A listener to the song that it would sing.

Because thy spirit, when its pinions beat
The lonesome air "in cloud-girt wayfaring,"
Feels "breath of kindred plumes against its feet."

1877.

GEMS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

I.

JOY AND PAIN.

Two chambers hath the heart:
Joy dwells in one;
Pain owns the other part.

Joy rules the present hour;
Pain is asleep,
Unconscious of her power.

Step lightly, Joy! Take care
To whisper low;
If Pain awake — — — beware!

—*Herm. Neumann.*

II.

BY THE SHORE.

What write the waves upon the sand?
A sad complaint thereon they trace:—
We come, we go,—an endless race;
No rest for us upon the land!

I yearn to sail the shining sea;
My deepest joy and secret hope,
I wrote upon the sandy slope:
The waves have stolen it from me!

—*Gottschalk.*

III.

WHOSE LIFE IS SORROW.

Whose life is sorrow, and whose sorrow, life
(Perchance, what I experience, may guess);
Whose every aim at earthly happiness
Has to succumb before this mortal strife;

Whose footsteps sinuous labyrinths ensnare,
And when he would return, their portals hide;
Whom Cupid hath allured unto his side,
In order to provoke a grim despair;

Unto whom lightning's flash new fears disclose;
And, from whom, billows of the angry deep
Receding, wipe away all hope of weal;
Who envieth the dead their dreamless sleep;
Whom Love can no more mock, nor discompose;
He understands me,—he feels what I feel.

—*Von Platen.**

CORRESPONDENCE.

WHEELBARROW'S ERROR.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

Wheelbarrow is such a wriggler that it is rather hard to pin him down, but I think it can be done if The Open Court will keep its columns open for the single-tax discussion a little longer.

Whatever may be the effect of his adroit rhetorical sleight of-hand performances upon many of your readers, everything he writes only serves to make it more apparent to every intelligent single-taxer that he does not understand the single-tax doctrine. He has a convenient number of friends whom he brings into the arena and makes perform illustrative tricks—Tom Clark and the fellow who threw his boot through the window, and the other fellow who stuck the pig—but they all serve to illustrate the one conspicuous fact aforesaid, that with all Wheelbarrow's cleverness he is not clever enough to understand a doctrine that is perfectly clear to many other persons not half as bright as he.

In his communication, of May 2, he becomes very jocose over my calling the single-tax ground-rent, and quotes the following passage from Mr. George to prove that it is something more than ground-rent:

"Now it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the community the *whole income* arising from land, *just as effectually as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land*, it is only necessary to abolish, one after another, all other taxes now levied, and to increase the tax on land-values till it reaches, as near as may be, the *full annual value* of the land."

I have left it just as he italicized it, and I ask any of your readers to read it again and decide whether it means anything but ground-rent. To take the *full annual value* of land is simply ground-rent, whether it is taken by an individual or the commu-

* Platen has been compared to a snow-covered volcano.—Tr.

nity. It is not to appropriate the *land* but it is to appropriate the *value* of the land "just as effectually as it could be taken by appropriating and *letting out* the land." It is ground-rent. And if, instead of ridiculing the idea, Wheelbarrow will but reflect upon it, he will save himself any further exposition of his lamentable ignorance upon the subject.

As for the practicability of doing the thing which Wheelbarrow scouts, I have only to say that it *is* done in your own Chicago in the case of some land right in the heart of your city, that upon which your greatest National Bank stands, I think, just as it is done in New York in the case of the city docks. There is no use to say a thing cannot be done when it *is* done.

Wheelbarrow says that under the George system Tom Clark would be taxed $8 or $10 on his farm. I think friend Tom would be glad if he only had to pay $8 or $10 a year in taxes. But on Wheelbarrow's own statement that Tom's farm was worth nothing above his improvements, I declare that under the George system he would pay no taxes *of any kind*. He says, that Tom would be "evicted" and lose his improvements if some one should over-bid him. I reply that the fear of eviction was not before the eyes of the men who built the massive buildings in Chicago upon the city ground-rent plan.

Wheelbarrow does not know what he is writing about. He does not understand the George system, and I think before he writes any more upon the subject, he should inform himself.

When he says that under the George system "the *land itself* and not the value of the land" would be sold by the sheriff to satisfy the claims of the tax-collector, he talks nonsense. *How can land which is taxed by the government up to its full rental value have any selling value?*

Wheelbarrow says:

"If Mr. George left the key to his problem in the hands of any man, he left it in the hands of Mr. Pentecost."

Your readers here have Wheelbarrow's word for it that if anyone knows what Georgeism is, I do. Very well. There can be no doubt then that I know what I am talking about upon this subject. I ought, therefore, to be a good judge of another's knowledge upon the same subject, and I say to the readers of THE OPEN COURT that Wheelbarrow's arguments concerning the single-tax should have no weight with them because he does not understand the subject.

Allow me to repeat that the single-tax means simply the payment of ground rent and *nothing else* into the public treasury. As to whether this would be a heavier burden to the farmer than he now bears, any farmer can decide for himself by calculating what his land is worth *without improvements*, estimating what a tax of four or five per cent. on that amount would be and comparing the sum with what he now pays in all other taxes, including internal revenues, tariffs, and the interest on the mortgage that is probably on his farm.

If Wheelbarrow were not so given to "high-jinks" in his writings upon this subject, if he were not so happy in the light and airy way in which he dances around it, if he were a dull man, it would not be necessary to "jump on" him. But for his own sake as well as for the sake of many of his readers there is nothing to be done but to advise him plainly to study the subject further before he attempts to instruct others upon it.

I might take up some other points in his paper, but what is the use? In the next article Wheelbarrow would simply prance into the ring and pull yards of pretty paper out of his mouth, followed by colored fire. But on the pretty paper nothing relevant would be written and from the fire would come no light upon the theme.

NEW YORK. HUGH O. PENTECOST.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXV. — Continued.

The Sovereign looked gloomily before him.

"I shall not use the subterfuges that you put into the mouth of a master of a Court, for I feel at this moment, deeply and passionately like you, that an injury has been done your honor. I have only one excuse," he continued, with passion: "you came here as stranger to us, and I little thought what a treasure lay concealed near me. Since that, in our slight intercourse, you have awakened in me a feeling to which I yield irresistibly. It is seldom permitted me by fate to say undisguisedly what I feel. I disdain to use the impassioned language of a youth, for I do not wish to disquiet you. But do not think that I feel less strongly towards you because I know how to conceal my emotion."

Ilse stood in the middle of the room, and a burning color rose to her cheeks.

"I beg your Highness not to say another word, for it is not right that I should listen to you."

The Sovereign laughed bitterly.

"I have already wounded you, and you quickly make it plain that I labored under an illusion when I hoped for your affection. And yet I am so completely your slave, that I beg of you not to refuse your sympathy to a passion which glows so warmly within me, that it has at this moment entirely deprived me of my self-control."

Ilse gasped:

"I must away from here."

"Renounce that idea," cried the Sovereign, beside himself. "I cannot be deprived of your presence or of the sound of your voice. However slightly it may gladden me, it is the happiness of my days—the one great feeling in a life without pleasure or love. The knowledge that you are near me maintains me in my struggle against thoughts that stupefy me in gloomy hours. Like the devout pilgrim who listens to the bell of the hermitage, I listen to the slightest chord that vibrates from your life into mine. Consent to accept the devotion of a lonely man," he continued, more tranquilly. "I vow never more to wound your delicate feelings. I vow to be contented with that share of your life which you will freely give me."

"I repent of every word that I have spoken to your Highness, and I repent of every hour in which I have thought with reverence of you," exlaimed Ilse, with kindling anger. "I was a poor trusting child," she continued, excitedly. "I bowed submissively to my Sovereign before I saw him as he is; now that I know

* Translation copyrighted.

him, he excites abhorrence in me, and I gather up my garment and say, Monster, begone from me!"

The Sovereign fell back in his chair.

"It is an old curse that echoes in my ears from these walls; it is not your own heart that drives me from you. From your lips should only come words of love and compassion. I am not a tempter, I am myself a wanderer in the wilderness, with nothing about me but desert sand and towering rocks. I hear the laughter of children; I see the fair-haired group passing by me; I see two eyes fixed on me with kindly greeting, and a hand, with the filled cup, which beckons to the weary one; and, like a vision of mist, it has all disappeared. I remain alone, and I sink to my destruction."

He closed his hands over his eyes. Ilse did not reply. She stood, turned from him, looking through the window at the clouds which flitted across the heaven.

All was quiet in the room. Nothing moved, and no one spoke. At last the Sovereign rose slowly: he approached Ilse. There was a glassy look in his eye, and he moved with effort.

"If I have wounded you by what I have said in a moment of overwhelming passion, forget it. I have proved to you that I am not yet free from the weakness that hopes to gain a heart which would beat in unison with mine. Remember only that I am an erring one who sought comfort from you. It was an humiliating request: if you cannot respond to it, do not be angry with the wretched one who asks."

He gazed on her with a long, protracted look of burning passion, deadly, wounded pride, and something more, that inspired her with terror, but she looked him firmly and rigidly in the face. He raised a warning finger, and left the room.

She listened to his tread as he went away, marked every step as he descended, and when he closed the house-door, pulled the bell.

Gabriel, who was standing in the anteroom, entered quickly.

"I wish to go away from here," exclaimed Ilse.

"Where to, Mrs. Werner?" asked the frightened servant.

"Where to?" echoed in Ilse's ears.

"To my husband," she said; but, as if listening to her own words, she shuddered. He also was in a house of the Sovereign. He was with the daughter of the wicked man. He himself was not safe there—his wife would not be safe with him. Where to? The question whirled in her head. The son of the cruel man was with her father, so she must not go home; her neighbour had said so. She sank her head as if stunned. A feeling of helplessness lay like a dead weight upon her; but she raised herself again, and approached Gabriel. "I will leave this city to-day—at once."

The servant wrung his hands.

"I knew it would come to this," he exclaimed.

"You knew it," asked Ilse, gloomily; "and neither I nor my husband did? Was it seen to every passer-by, and yet a secret to him and me?"

"I noticed that there was something about this place that seemed uncanny," answered Gabriel, "and that no one trusted the distinguished gentleman who just now left. How could I tell you what seemed only my foolish fancy?"

"It is not well to pay too little attention to people's talk," replied Ilse; "I wish to go to some place where I can find a woman, Gabriel. Get a carriage for me immediately, and accompany me to Mrs. Rollmaus. We will leave everything here, and you must return to the house, that you may be on the spot when my husband comes back."

"Where shall I get a carriage?" asked Gabriel, hesitatingly.

"From the city, and not from the castle stable."

Gabriel stood and reflected. At last he said, abruptly:

"I shall go; be careful to prevent the lackey from learning that you are preparing for a journey."

"No one shall know it," said Ilse.

Gabriel hastened away, and Ilse locked the door and flew into the next room. There she collected all that was indispensable for the journey. She closed all the cupboards and wardrobes, and put the keys in a bunch. "When Felix comes, he shall not say I ran away unthinkingly." She went to his writing-table, and sealed up the letters in a packet. "So that no curious eye can look upon you," she said. When she packed up the letters of the children and her own answers, a shudder came over her, and she concealed the bundle rapidly beneath other papers. She was ready, and Gabriel had not yet returned. He seemed to linger long. With firm steps she went through the rooms. "You have grown more strange to me the longer I have dwelt here. What has become of the brilliant impression of the first evening? It was a cold splendor, hostile to my life. I would gladly root up every recollection of it from my soul." She placed herself on the spot where, in the night, she had looked on her sleeping husband. "That was my last sorrowful look at his dear face; when shall I see it again? I go from you, Felix; who would have thought it when we stood together before the altar? I leave you behind among wicked men; you also in danger, and I go away alone, to seek safety for myself far from you. Who would have said some days ago that I should have marked him a liar to his face? I go, Felix, in order to save myself for you. Think of that, and do

not be angry with me. I would not have gone for less cause." She sank down on a cushion, and wrung her hands with tearless sorrow. She lay for a long time in this condition. At last there was a knocking at the outer door. She jumped up and opened it, but she drew back terrified when she beheld the pale countenance of her faithful servant.

"I have not ordered a carriage," said Gabriel, "for it would be of no use."

"What do you mean?" asked Ilse, angrily.

"Any carriage that went from here would not take Mrs. Werner where she wishes, but only where another wishes."

"Then we will go ourselves, and take a vehicle in the city."

"Wherever we go," replied Gabriel, "we shall be observed, and if I attempt to call a carriage it will be taken from us."

"You are frightened yourself, Gabriel, and see danger where none exists," replied Ilse, annoyed.

"If we could only get an honest man to take you to Mrs. Rollmaus," continued Gabriel; "but it is doubtful whether you could get there. Do you see that man below by the castle? He goes slowly as if he were taking a walk, but he never turns his eyes from this house. That is one of our spies, and he is not the only one."

"Who has told you that?" asked Ilse.

"I have a good friend here who belongs to the castle," replied Gabriel, hesitating. "Do not be angry, Mrs. Werner, that I asked him, for he knows all their tricks. It is possible, he said that we may succeed; for one cannot assume that all the people of the city are robbers or deceivers, but it is uncertain and dangerous."

Ilse seized her hat and cloak.

"I am going, Gabriel," she said, quietly. "Will you accompany me?"

"Dear Mrs. Werner, wherever you wish," answered Gabriel. "But first listen to my proposal. My acquaintance thinks that the safest way would be, if the Crown Inspector should fetch you himself in the evening. The evenings are dark, and you may then perhaps be able to leave the house without the lackey or any one else remarking it."

"A prisoner!" exclaimed Ilse. "Who is your acquaintance?" she asked, looking sharply at Gabriel.

"He is true as gold," Gabriel assured her, "and I will willingly tell you later, but I beg you not to ask me to-day, for he has desired, for his own safety, that no one should be told."

"I trust in your faithfulness," replied Ilse, coldly; "but you yourself may be deceived; I will not follow the advice of a stranger."

"He has offered me a horse," said Gabriel, it is outside the city. If you will give me a line to the Crown Inspector, I will ride there and bring the carriage in good time."

Ilse looked gloomily at the servant.

"Many hours must pass away, and I will not remain here alone. I will go on foot along the high road to my friends."

"Look, Mrs. Werner, at the sky; a storm is coming."

"I do not care for it," exclaimed Ilse; "it is not the first time I shall have gone through the rain. If you do not choose to accompany me, you may wait here for my husband, and tell him that I have gone away to my home, and when I am with good people I will write to him."

Gabriel wrung his hands; Ilse put on her cloak.

Suddenly loud altercation was heard on the floor below. Gabriel hastily opened the door; the bass voice of a stranger was scolding the lackey vehemently:

"But I tell you I am not the man who will allow the door to be shut in his face; she is at home, I say."

Ilse threw off her hat and cloak, sprang down the stairs, and called out.

"Mr. Hummel!"

"Your most obedient servant, Mrs. Werner," cried out Hummel. "I come immediately, only I will first express to this major-domo my high opinion of him. You are a scoundrel, sir, and an object to whom I wish such treatment as he deserves—a well-seasoned switch and a tight halter. I am coming, Mrs. Werner." He ascended the stairs heavily, Ilse flew to meet him, led him into her room, and was so overcome that she laid her head on his shoulder and wept.

Mr. Hummel was silent, and looked sympathizingly at Ilse.

"So these are Court ways?" he asked, softly; "and this is the fashion in which people act here?"

"My husband is away. I wish to leave this place; Mr. Hummel, do help me to escape!"

"That is exactly my situation," said Mr. Hummel: "I am implicated, myself, in an elopement affair. I have come to this city in order to convey to you a request from my daughter Laura, and to bring matters to some settlement with the clergymen here. But where do you wish to go to?"

"To kind friends who will take me to my father's house."

"That will certainly be the right course," replied Mr. Hummel.

"In times of despair, when everything totters in the world, the child should go back to the father. His faithfulness remains; she is twenty years old before that of the husband begins. As your father is not here, allow one who knows what it is to feel anxious about a child to take the place of a father to you."

Ilse clung to him: Mr. Hummel pressed her hand, after his fashion, tenderly; but it was a hard pressure.

"Now for composure and cool blood. It can be no small matter which moves you so strongly. I will not leave you until I see you well protected." He looked at Gabriel, who made him a sign. "Do not trouble yourself further in the matter. Be quietly seated, and allow me to confer with Gabriel. I will take care of everything for you, and I shall answer for everything."

Ilse looked at him thankfully and seated herself obediently. Mr. Hummel beckoned Gabriel into the next room.

"What has happened here?" he asked.

"The master has gone away for a few days; meanwhile Mrs. Werner has been treated in an unseemly way; great wickedness is carried on here, and they will not let her go."

"Not let my lodger go?" cried Mr. Hummel; "ridiculous! I have a passport to Paris in my pocket, we will skip over this country like grasshoppers. I will fetch a conveyance immediately."

Gabriel shook his head. The confidants again conferred together. Mr. Hummel came back and said, with greater seriousness, to Ilse:

"Now I must beg of you to write a few lines to the Crown Inspector—to the husband, not to his wife, otherwise there would be confusion. You must request him, immediately after the receipt of this letter, if he is willing to do a great kindness, to come here in a closed carriage, to stop in the suburb, at the Black Bear; and he must not leave his carriage. Nothing further. This letter Gabriel will convey to him. How he does so is his affair, not ours; if he chooses to fly, like this ambiguous genius on the ceiling, who has forgotten its overcoat, it will be so much the better. Now the letter is written, forgive me if I read it. All right and accurate—away, Gabriel, quickly. When you have passed the castle, then make speed: till then, act like a composed philanthropist. I will allow you to whistle my Dessauer, if you can. If they ask you any questions, say you are attending to some business for me."

Gabriel hastened away. Mr. Hummel placed his chair in front of Ilse, and looked at his watch.

"You will have to wait five hours for the carriage if all goes right. Meanwhile you must bear my company, I will not leave the house without you. Do not be troubled at the delay. I am glad of it; for I wish to speak with you as with an honorable woman, to whom I can take off my hat with true respect, concerning my own affairs, which I have much at heart. We have time enough for it. I have also brought some papers to the Professor; they are of little importance, but I will lay them on the table, and we shall sit oposite each other like people of business. Then I should be glad if you would give that Judas in the servants' chamber a few instructions for me. Have the goodness also to take everything away that might lead him to suppose that you and I were going to elope."

Ilse looked round her, undecided.

"What shall I say to the man, Mr. Hummel?"

"You are so good a housewife," replied Hummel, politely, "that I can leave entirely to you to decide what you will provide for me. I have been travelling the whole day," and he made a significant gesture towards his waistcoat.

"Ilse jumped up; in spite of all her anxieties, she could not help laughing, and said:

"Forgive me, Mr. Hummel."

"That is the right frame of mind," replied Hummel; "there is no better remedy for tragic spirits than a well spread table. I beg, therefore that you will send not only for one plate, but for two. I could not eat if you were looking on. Believe me, Mrs. Werner, the noblest feelings are not to be depended on if an honest piece of bread and butter is not impressed on them as a stamp. It makes people calm and firm—and you will have occasion for these virtues to-day."

Ilse rang the bell.

"If the knave appears," proceeded Mr. Hummel, "mention to him my name and my firm. I do not generally travel incognito, and I wish not to be looked upon as a mystery here."

The lackey appeared. Ilse gave him orders to fetch the necessary refreshment, and asked him how it was he had denied her dear landlord admittance.

The man stammered an excuse, and went away hastily.

"When I came to the house I was aware that all was not right here. I asked after you at the castle and received no satisfactory answer. I asked a man at the back of the castle who was wandering about, which was your house. He looked at me like a cross-bill. You were travelling, he declared, and he tried to discover my secret. Thereupon there was a short conversation, in which cross-bill showed his spite because I in ignorance called him by his proper title of spy. The sentinel came up at this, and I saw that these jovial comrades had a great mind to arrest me. Then a young gentleman appeared, who asked the other the cause of the disturbance, and said he knew that you were at home. He accompanied me up to this house, asked my name politely, told me also his own, Lieutenant Treeclimber, and advised me not to be frightened away, that the servants were insolent, but that you would be rejoiced to see an old friend. He must be known to you."

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

VIRGIL'S AENEID: The First Six Books Translated into English Rhyme. *Henry Hamilton.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

"The differences in the two languages," says Mr. Hamilton, in the preface to his translation, "render it impossible for many of the beauties of the Latin to be reproduced in our own tongue." Mr. Hamilton has therefore chosen to present, so far as possible, the spirit of the original "by resort not to the same, but equivalent expedients." Thus, by the frequent employment of alliteration, Mr. Hamilton seeks to produce the same effect that a different metre and a different artifice, or perhaps the same artifice, produced in the original. We instance the passage where, in Book I, Juno repairs to the retreat of Aeolus and his winds; where the God of blasts binds his turbulent servants with heavy chains; where, unwilling, as Mr. Hamilton translates,

> "With *r*umbling *r*age *r*ound the *r*ough *r*ocks they *r*oar."
> *Illi indignantes magno cum murmure montis.*

The well-known line, *tantæne animis cœlestibus iræ?* Mr. Hamilton renders:

> "Within celestial minds is such *f*ierce *f*ury *f*ound?"

Mr. Hamilton has adopted an expedient, highly calculated to impart variety and charm to his translation, of changing the measure of the verse with each recurring speaker. By this means, the characters of the poem acquire individuality; the metre is adaptable to the caste of mind and the manner of expression peculiar to each. In most instances the choice of measure has been a fortunate one, comporting with the tone of utterance and the circumstances of address. We may quote, as illustrative of Mr. Hamilton's skill and careful versification, the following few lines, introductory to the description of the memorable chase:

> "Meantime Aurora's steeds from ocean rise,
> And breathe the morning beams along the skies;
> Forth from the gates the chosen band appears
> With toils and meshes and broad-pointed spears,
> While hounds keen-scented, and Massylian horse,
> And brawny huntsmen, range in royal force.
> The Punic nobles at the portal wait
> The queen, who at her toilet lingers late;
> In gold and purple trapping stands her steed,
> And champs the foaming bit impatient to be freed.
> At length she comes, by a long train attended,
> Clad in a chlamys of Sidonian kind;
> A golden quiver on her back is bended,
> In golden knots her tresses are confined,
> And her purpureal robes do golden buckles bind.
> Sprightly Iulus and the Trojan bands
> Join the bright conc'ave; while Æneas stands
> Towering in manly beauty half divine,
> Or mingling gaily with the moving line.
> As when Apollo leaves the Lycian lands
> And Xanthic floods bound up in wintry bands,
> To see again his native Delian isle
> And lead anew the choral dance, the while
> Cretan and Dryop chant his shrine around,
> And painted Agathyrsians swell the sound;
> Himself along the lofty Cynthian height
> Majestic moves, his floating tresses bright
> Crowning with leafy wreath, or with fine gold
> Pausing his loosened locks to interfold,
> While his darts rattle on his shoulders: so,
> Not less full pulsing doth Æneas go,
> And such grace mantles o'er his noble mien.
> Soon pathless lairs and mountain heights are seen,
> And lo! from craggy cliffs wild goats down-leap,
> Yet in their flight the rocks and ridges keep;
> While stags o'erscour the plains in headlong course,
> Fleeing the mounts to join their dusty force.
> Ascanius gallops on with rising joy:
> Now these, now those, outrides the daring boy,
> Wishing a foaming boar might cross his way,
> Or tawny lion offer mightier prey."

We have chosen at random. The work has many passages that indicate marked poetical talent and a scholarly adherence to the original. Undoubtedly the translation of Mr. Hamilton will find favor among English readers of the great Roman poet.

Early in June, Longmans, Green, & Co. will issue in New York the first number of *The New Review*, an English monthly started by Mr. Archibald Grove, a young Oxford man. Three Americans, Lady Randolph Churchill, Mr. Henry George, and Mr. Henry James are among the contributors to the first number.

"Protestantism in the Middle Ages," (*Le Protestantisme au Moyen Age*), is the title of a discourse by M. E. Doumergue, held at the Montauban commencement, 1888-89. M. Doumergue is a fervent, faithful theologian. His sketch is spirited, and replete with forcible rhetorical turns.

"The Objects of the Science of Ethnology," (*Die Ziele der Ethnologie*), a lecture held by Dr. Franz Boas, before the German Gesselig-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, of New York City, is a review of the present state and purposes of ethnological research. The study is comparatively recent, yet its acquisitions—the results of the enthusiastic labors of Tyler, Bastian, Morgan, Bachofen, and others—have already exerted a marked effect upon the course of modern thought. Ethnology bids fair to be the foundation of all sociological and comparative science. (H. Bartsch, 87 Frankfort Street, New York.)

NOTES.

Dr. Carus will sail for Europe on May 25, to return in August. During his absence, the editorial management of THE OPEN COURT will be conducted by Mr. Thomas J. McCormack.

We have heard with deep regret of the death of Dr. Samuel Hirsch. His life has been one of active religious effort, and his career one of marked distinction.

The essay of Mr. Moncure D. Conway upon "The Transient and Permanent in Theodore Parker" will be followed by two others upon the same subject.

Ludwig Noiré, the eminent German philologist, whose conspicuous services in the province of philosophy and linguistic science have won him merited scientific renown, died at his home in Mayence, in the latter part of March.

Emerson was eminently monistic. "Once," he says, "men thought spirit divine and matter diabolic: one Ormuzd, the other Ahriman. Now science and philosophy recognize the parallelism, the approximation, the unity of the two: how each reflects the other as face answers to face in a glass: nay, how the laws of both are one, or how one is the realization."

As an appropriate accompaniment to Prof. Gunlogsen's prose adaptation of the Sanskrit poem "The Sitaharanam," the second chapter of which is published in the present issue of THE OPEN COURT, we have reproduced and printed the opening lines of the episode in the original Sanskrit characters. The Devanagari alphabet—that in which Sanskrit is written—is supposed by many Oriental scholars to be of Semitic origin. It was not employed in India until the time of king Acoka—probably about the seventh century before Christ.

Simultaneously with the publication of this week's OPEN COURT, will appear a new work by Dr. Paul Carus, entitled, "Fundamental Problems. The Method of Philosophy as a Systematic Arrangement of Knowledge." The work is, in main, an amplification of the series of philosophical essays which during the past two years appeared in the editorial columns of THE OPEN COURT. The important additions that have been made, the rearrangement of the subject-matter showing the progressive and constructive character of the method, and an exhaustive index, will render the volume a valuable companion-book to readers of THE OPEN COURT.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absolnteness, bnt the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, bnt the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolntely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the colnmns of THE OPEN COURT, bnt all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bnnd des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individnal (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a gniding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's condnct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of nniversal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they wonld hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natnral history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in nnison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitions notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. Bnt all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illnsion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as snch is a sham.

It is ohvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, bnt complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been distnrbed and re-adjnsted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the nnion of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

REVIEW OF RECENT WORK OF "THE OPEN COURT."

The work of THE OPEN COURT, for the past six issnes, covers a wide range of snbjects. In an article in No 87, "The Universal Faith," Mr. T. B. WAKEMANN, of New York, discnsses the foundations of a "monistic, positive, human, constnctive religion." In the nnmber preceding, an editorial essay points out and emphasizes the radical difference between religious Creeds and religious Faith. Then follow in Nos. 87, 88, and 89, respectively, the articles, "Agnosticism and Augnste Comte's Positivism," "Space and Time," "Formal Thought and Ethics"; the first of which derives additional interest from its bearing upon the controversy now raging between the Agnostic and Comtist philosophers of England; the two latter being essays in a constnctive philosophical series. "Personality, Individuality, Conscionsness," is the title of an essay (No. 87) by M. TH. RIBOT, the eminent French psychologist, translated with his consent from *Les Maladies de la Personalité*. It contains the gist, one may say, of the principles from which modern psychology sets out. Dr. FELIX OSWALD contributes, in No. 88, a paper on "Dreams and Visions," an interesting stndy; and in No. 89, Mr. A. H. HEINEMANN writes effectively npon "The Preservation of Moral Purity in Children." Thns mnch for Science and Ethics.

In criticism, appears the striking article from the French of ALFRED FOUILLEE, entitled, M. GUYAU'S Faith; in this essay the doctrines of the poet philosopher are presented as he propounded them in his conceptions of art, morality, and religion. The paper "The Transient and the Permanent in Theodore Parker" (No. 91), is Part I of a disconrse held by Mr. MONCURE D. CONWAY at the dissolution of Mr. Parker's Society; it is a bright and comprehensive sketch of Mr. Parker's work and of the intellectnal activity of his time. Three articles (Nos. 90, 91, 92,) upon "The History of the People of Israel" are worthy of every reader's careful perusal. The author, Prof. CORNILL, is an orthodox theologian of Königsberg; his researches are marked by critical acumen, spirit, and above all, a love of trnth. A unique featnre of the last few nnmbers is "The Sitaharanam," an Episode from a Sanskrit Epic, translated into English prose by Prof. ALBERT GUNLOGSEN.

In Economics, the controversy between "WHEELBARROW" and "SYMPATHIZER," Nos. 78, 85, 86, 88, occupies the first place. The snbject is "Making Bread Dear"; the discussion embraces "Corners," "Board of Trade," and "The Labor Problem." WHEELBARROW is well known to readers of THE OPEN COURT; SYMPATHIZER is a prominent Chicago citizen. The whole is now published in pamphlet form.

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No. 92. (Vol. III.—14.) CHICAGO, MAY 30, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 cts.

THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE AND THE FOUNDING OF THE KINGDOM OF ISRAEL.

BY PROFESSOR CARL HEINRICH CORNILL.

Translated from the German by יעלין.

It would be erroneous to suppose that the whole land of Palestine, directly upon occupation, became the undisputed possession of the Israelites. In the first chapter of the Book of Judges—one of the most important and valuable of extant historical documents—we possess a detailed enumeration of all the Canaanites whom Israel "did not drive out." From this enumeration it appears, that the best and most fertile parts of the country, and above all, the majority of the cities—with their strong fortifications, at all times impregnable to the rude military art of the Israelites—remained in the possession of the Canaanites. Only the forest-covered mountain ranges of Middle and Northern Palestine were occupied by Israel; and a very long and obstinate work had still to be performed before the Canaanite population was finally subjugated; a task partly accomplished by force of arms and the imposition of tributes, and partly by peceable conquest and absorption with the people of Israel.

It must be admitted that to Moses and his work Israel was indebted for the power with which through ages it struggled victoriously in full consciousness of the high aim that was to be attained. Moses had given to the people a nationality and therewith an inalienable palladium, which, purified and strengthened by the power of religion, could not submit to oppression, but marched conquering onward; it was owing to Moses alone that in Canaan Israel did not become Canaanites, but, on the contrary, that the Canaanites were transformed into Israel.

Indeed, the actual outcome of the protracted conflict between these two peoples and different nationalities, had not, to human calculations, by any means been absolutely certain. In Canaan Israel passed from a nomadic to an agricultural life, and might not such a radical change of life and of its conditions easily have brought about a transformation of national character? Irrespective of the superior culture and number of the Canaanites, Israel certainly harbored within itself a very dangerous foe, and a living germ of disorganisation; *viz.*, the stubborn, stiff-necked feeling of independence and the strong family instincts, peculiar to nomads, that still clung to the national character after the people had abandoned nomadic ways of life. Even after the common effort under Joshua had partially laid the foundations of national organization, the people were once again broken up into families and tribes, who without concerted action and without discipline, planlessly and aimlessly sought localities in which to settle down. Tradition, also, has expressly handed down a number of peculiar features of this tribal and family history.

One fraction of the tribe of Manasseh,—the families of Jair and Machir—conquered the region to the east of lake Galilee (4 Mos. xxxii. 39–41; 5 Mos. iii. 14–15; Judg. x. 3–5)—a fact of the greatest importance, because thereby there was reëstablished a connection between the West-Jordan country and Gilead, as the Israelites called the East-Jordan region. The tribe of Dan in its struggle against the powerful and warlike Philistines, had failed to secure a permanent settlement in the fertile plain along the coast of the Mediterranean; but Dan thereupon conquered the city of Laish in the far off north on the slopes of Mount Hermon, and changed its name into that of Dan (Judges xvii. and xviii.; compare also i. 34). Shamir, on Mount Ephraim, was settled by the family of Tola of the tribe Issachar (Judges x. 1–2); Pirathon, in the same locality, by the family of Abdon (Judges xii. 13–15); Aijalon by the Zebulonite family of Elon (Judges xii. 11–12). This dispersion might have proved injurious and even ruinous, if over all of them, each family and each tribe, there had not reigned supreme one common idea; namely, Jahve, the God of Israel.

Jahve was the only national principle, the only bond that bound together all Israelites; in fact, as Jahve's own people they were a nation. Only extreme emergency had been able to effect a national union, and that not a general, but merely a transient one.

After Joshua's victories, the Canaanites, through the concentration and straining of all their resources, seem to have made but one single effort to overcome the invaders. Under the leadership of Sisera there was effected a powerful coalition of Canaanite kings, which undertook a war of extermination against Israel. This war of extermination threatened to be realized to the fullest extent. The Israelites were forced to seek

hiding-places in the woods and in the mountains, where they stayed until Jahve finally brought assistance. At this critical moment a divinely inspired woman, the prophetess Deborah, aroused the discouraged Israelites. Under the leadership of Barak, of the tribe of Issachar, 40,000 Israelites of the tribes of Ephraim, Manasseh, Benjamin, Zebulun, Issachar, and Naphtali assembled together, and now the power of the Canaanites was unable to resist the ardent impetuosity of that great host, fighting for Jahve. At Taanak, on the river Kishon, the Canaanite army was defeated and dispersed, and Sisera himself in his flight murdered by a woman (Judges iv. and v.). After this battle we never again hear of resistance on the part of Canaanites.

Israel at last enjoyed rest from the Canaanites; but now there threatened still another foe. Kindred tribes looked with envy upon the success of Israel, and naturally coveted their own share of the Canaanite prey. Thus Moab even advanced across the Jordan, and at Jericho, its king, Eglon, received the homage and tribute of the tribe of Benjamin, until the Benjamite Ehud stabbed Eglon and freed his people from the foreign yoke (Judges iii. 12–30). Likewise Ammon advanced toward the Jordan, and the hard-pressed tribe of Gad was only saved through Jephthah's valor (Judges xi.). At the very time when in Canaan Israel was becoming an agricultural people, the nation constantly suffered from the hostility and rapine of the sons of the desert; Amalekites, Midianites, Ishmaelites, all of them sought to enrich themselves at the expense of the Israelite husbandman, and to rob him of the fruits of his labor.

The fact that bands of Midianites advanced, killing and plundering, as far as Mount Tabor, far in the north, in the vicinity of Lake Galilee in the West-Jordan region, is in itself a telling proof of how defenceless Israel remained through its unfortunate disunion against these predatory sons of the desert.

This invasion of Midianites, moreover, had certain important consequences. From sheer arrogance and wantonness the Midianites had on Mount Tabor butchered a number of prisoners belonging to the noble Manassite family of Abiezer. Then Gideon or Zerubbaal, the head of the family, took to arms to wreak vengeance of blood on the murderers. He assembled his own household and retainers, to the number of 300, and with these went in pursuit of the departed Midianites. He overtook them far beyond the Jordan; he succeeded in dividing the forces of the enemy, and took prisoners the two Midianite kings, Zebah and Zalmunna, whom he ordered to be executed in expiation of his murdered brothers. He thereupon punished the inhabitants of Succoth and Penuel, who had scornfully refused him their assistance in this expedition of revenge (Judges viii.).

The conclusion of the narrative concerning Gideon has, unfortunately, been mutilated. It must have related, that Gideon actually founded a tribal kingdom, erected in his ancestral city of Ophrah a golden image of Jahve, and held a regular court, with a number of female retainers.

Thus from the house of Joseph proceeded the first attempt at political concentration—the foundation of a dynastical kingdom; and, perhaps, from this dynastical kingdom there might have been developed a folk-kingship—but the time for this had not yet arrived.

Gideon, during his lifetime, remained in the undisputed possession of power over Joseph; but after his death the harem-regiment—that constant curse of all oriental dynasties—likewise effected the ruin of his house. Abimelech, the son of a woman of noble birth from the city of Schechem—at the time a thoroughly Canaanite city—with the aid of his Schechemite retainers, seized the supreme power, attacked Ophrah and slew his brothers—according to tradition, three score and ten in number—upon one stone; only the youngest escaped. This event, naturally, was not of a kind to cause kingship to strike deep roots in the heart of the people of Israel.

Abimelech enjoyed the usurped power for only three years, when he became involved in difficulties with the men of Schechem. He also played the part of an Israelite king to the city of Schechem, which scarcely proved agreeable to the proud Canaanite nobles. They openly revolted against him; in consequence of which event he conquered Schechem and razed it to the ground. But fate overtook him at Thebez, upon which city he had wished to bring the same ruin. In the act of setting fire to a tower, into which the inhabitants of Thebez had fled for shelter, a woman from the roof of the structure hurled a mill-stone upon his head, and he was killed (Judges ix.). Thus the first attempt to found an Israelitic kingdom had ended in murder and conflagration.

Again the old anarchy prevailed, the old lack of cohesion, which the Book of Judges describes in the following words: "In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes" (Judges xvii. 6; xxi. 25).

Incidentally, it may be observed, that it is simply impossible to give even an approximate chronological statement and arrangement of the events between the exodus from Egypt and the reign of Saul. If Merenptah was the Pharaoh of the exodus, we may place them in the interval between about 1300 to about 1030; the year 1017 as the year of Saul's death seems tolerably certain.

The kingship of Gideon, like a will-o'-the-wisp, had

vanished from sight, and been followed by utter darkness over the land of Israel. This darkness is only cleared up by the subsequent events that brought about the solid foundation of the national kingdom. The national kingdom had become an absolute necessity. An orderly government, popular feeling, and nationality could only be preserved through the concentration in some strong hand of all the scattered and, consequently, weakened national energies.

The notion that the creation of a purely human kingship would be a grievous sin, because an apostasy from Jahve, the only legitimate king of Israel, is but a later assumption of Hebrew theological schools, and discoverable for the first time, with certainty, in the prophet Hosea. This idea was entirely unknown to the olden time. The oldest sources relate all these events with a rejoicing and thankful spirit; in the rise of the national kingdom they justly behold a signal proof of the grace of Jahve; a direct, divine interposition of Jahve for the redemption of his people.

On the present occasion, the troubles arose from a different direction, and were by far more serious than any former had been. To the southwest of Mount Ephraim, toward the Mediterranean, there dwelt the warlike and valiant race of the Philistines—the hereditary foe of Israel. The Philistines profiting by the helplessness of Israel, advanced toward the mountain and invaded the fertile plain of Jezreel. The first collision between the belligerents, at Ebenezer, proved calamitous to Israel. Then Israel, in order to secure the assistance of Jahve, fetched out of the temple at Shiloh the Ark of the Covenant, the ancient and sacred war-symbol of the house of Joseph; but the second battle turned out even more disastrous. Thirty thousand Israelites covered the field of battle, the Ark of the Covenant was captured, and the power of Joseph had been utterly broken (1 Samuel iv.). The Philistines dragged the Ark of the Covenant as a trophy of war into their own country, burned and destroyed the temple at Shiloh, and conquered the whole land of Israel to the bank of the Jordan; the people were disarmed and held in awe by Philistine viceroys and Philistine strongholds. Thus Dagon had triumphed over Jahve.

But Jahve had not forsaken his people; through the trying fire of extreme need and suffering he wished to weld it together to a strong and united nation. An aged seer, Samuel by name, had discovered in the Benjamite Saul the man of the period, and had kindled in his heroic soul a spark of patriotic enthusiasm. Just at this time the Ammonites also insolently insulted Israel, and threatened the city of Jabesh, in Gilead. Then Saul slaughtered a yoke of oxen and sent the bleeding pieces throughout Israel with the following message: "Whosoever cometh not forth after Saul, so shall it be done unto his oxen!" A desperate host then assembled around the bold leader; the enemies were taken by surprise and scattered to the winds.

The people, exultant over this first victory after long servitude and shame, bore the fortunate general in triumph to the ancient sacred spot of Gilgal, there to place upon his head the royal diadem (1 Samuel ix.–xi.).

Saul owed his crown to his sword, and his whole reign was one uninterrupted strife; for the main point was, to become master in his own land, and to secure it against determined enemies and overweening neighbors. Saul at once addressed himself to the more difficult and more important task of throwing off the yoke of the Philistines. His son, Jonathan, slew the Philistine governor, who held his court at Gibeah, and at this signal of revolt the Philistine armies again poured into the insurgent land of Israel. Saul could only muster 600 men who had remained with him; but the lofty consciousness of fighting for home and hearth, for freedom and honor, imparted heroic courage to the men of Israel; Jonathan, above all, performed wonders of bravery, and, after a hot contest, victory declared itself for the desperate little band (1 Samuel xiii.–xiv.).

Yet this success was only a transient one. Saul regarded as his main task to keep in constant readiness the fighting strength of his people, and to this end he assembled about his person a small standing army, made up of 3,000 of his boldest subjects. Thus the star of King Saul arose at the beginning, bright and brilliant, but very soon it was overcast by dark clouds.

An "evil spirit from God" suddenly saddened the heart of the king. His attendants called to his side the Judean David, from Bethlehem, a man of tried courage, a skilled performer on the harp, a knight and troubadour in one, who, by his pleasant art, was expected to dispel the melancholy of the king. This new actor on the stage of Israelitic history is, next to Moses, the greatest personage of ancient Israel; for him had been reserved the glory of completing the work of Moses. What Saul began, David executed to its fullest extent; outwardly he made Israel free and independent, and inwardly united; the political and national consolidation of the people of Israel is the work of David.

David was one of those divinely endowed natures that win the hearts of all; a born ruler, to whom all willingly submit, and serve with alacrity. He appears before the king as a highly attractive figure, graced with every ornament of mind and body—radiant with youth, beauty, and strength; by his bewitching amiableness commanding the love of all. At first everything went well. Saul, too, could not resist the

magnetism of his person; he made him his armor-bearer, his squire or "aide," and while David became devotedly attached to Saul's son, the king gave him his daughter in marriage.

This state of harmony, however, was not destined to last long. The Philistines again invaded the land and, during the war that ensued, David distinguished himself to such an eminent degree, that even the glory of the king was overshadowed. At that time of history kings had also to be the bravest of their nation, and we therefore easily understand that gloomy jealousy now began to devour the melancholy heart of the suspicious monarch. In a fit of sullen dejection once, he even hurled a javelin at his son-in-law, and the latter fled his presence. From that instant Saul's good genius forsook him forever, and the close of his reign exhibits a sad picture of civil strife and external troubles.

Despite the critical condition of his kingdom Saul, with an armed retinue, pursues the fleeing David, and, finally, drives him out of the country. The hounded fugitive was at last compelled to seek refuge among the Philistines—the enemies of Israel. Within a year and four months from that time, fate had overtaken the Israelitic king. The Philistine host again combined against Israel. A decisive battle was fought on Mount Gilboa, in which Israel was utterly routed. Saul, beholding the death of his three sons, fell, in a fit of despair, upon his own sword. Such was the untoward end of the first king of Israel.

Saul is a truly tragical figure. Although endowed with a grand and noble disposition, chivalrous and heroical, fired with ardent zeal, yet, after all, he had achieved next to nothing. At his death the condition of things had again become the same as at the time of his accession; Israel lay prostrate, and the power of the Philistines was greater and firmer than ever before. Saul's failures must be attributed mainly to his moral disposition. He was more of a soldier than a ruler. He lacked the commanding personality, the inborn power of leadership, and still more so, the versatile, statesmanlike talent that David possessed. Saul had honestly performed his kingly duties; when attacked, he returned blow for blow with telling vigor; but he was far from being a creative, organizing genius. Above all, he lacked, to a deplorable extent, all sense and appreciation of the essential character and national *raison d'être* of the people of Israel. In this latter respect, tradition has handed down a clearly drawn portrait of Israel's king.

Saul was well on the way toward changing Israel into a secular, military state, and thus turning the nation from its true historical mission. A conquering kingdom of this world, perhaps, might have boasted a brief period of transient splendor and prosperity; but it would have disappeared, without leaving a trace of its existence, like Egypt and Assyria, Babylonia and Persia, Media and Lydia. King Saul, certainly, is entitled to our deepest compassion and heart-felt sympathy, but the fall of his dynasty was fortunate for Israel.

Yet not unavenged was Saul's blood shed on the heights of Gilboa; his avenger and the genuine performer of his life-work arose in the Judean whom he had attacked and persecuted. Cautious conduct was now necessary on David's part. It would have been worse than foolhardy with only 600 Judeans to open war with the Philistines. Above all David wished to save what still might be saved. He therefore caused himself to be anointed hereditary king of Judah, under Philistine suzerainty; while Abner, Saul's general, assembled the scattered remnants of Saul's power in the East-Jordan country, and at Mahanaim made young Ishbosheth king; the latter was Saul's only surviving son, and probably not yet of age.

David resided seven years in Hebron and Ishbosheth likewise seven in Mahanaim. Abner made the attempt to subject David to the sceptre of Ishbosheth, but in this attempt he was completely foiled by the bravery of David's Judeans. Shortly afterwards Abner, the only support of the house of Saul, was murdered and Ishbosheth himself fell a victim to the vengeance of blood; and at this conjuncture the northern tribes agreed to confer upon David the government of the lands of Saul.

Even the first measure enacted by David as over-king of Israel bears witness to his high statesmanly genius. The city of Jebus remained still in the hands of the Canaanites; David conquered this city and made it the political capital of the new kingdom. This city was strongly fortified by its natural surroundings, situated rather toward the middle-region of the kingdom, and while independent of any of the tribes, and raised above and beyond their petty rivalries, it was better adapted for the purpose intended than any other city. As a characteristic contrast to this policy, Saul, even as king, had quietly continued to reside in his native village. The founding of Jerusalem, as David called his new "city of David," was a fact of the greatest historical importance, when we bear in mind what Jerusalem became to the people of Israel and later through Israel to humanity.

Now, at last, the eyes of the Philistines were opened at their former loyal vassal, and they endeavored to choke, at its very birth, the rising power of David—but in vain. The task upon which Saul had been wrecked, was accomplished by David, and indeed definitively. David for all coming ages made the return of the Philistines an impossibility, yet, on the other hand, he did not molest them in their own

country; did not rob them of a single inch of land or take a single stone from their fortresses.

David figures as the greatest warrior of ancient Israel. Victory ever remained faithful to him; he humbled all the neighbor-nation's or conquered them—but we must particularly lay stress upon the fact, that David waged all his brilliant wars only in order to repel unprovoked attacks, and in defense of the most vital interests of his people. It cannot be proved, or even made to seem probable, that any of his wars had been begun by himself personally. David was no greedy robber, no vulgar swash-buckler.

Yet even all these heroical deeds are not the grandest trait of his character; what he achieved in the inner moral sphere is of infinitely greater importance. Above all his heart beat high in unison with the national soul of Israel. As a true Israelite he was a faithful servant and worshiper of Jahve, for whose sole glory and with whose trusting aid he wielded the sword. He wisely understood that a king of Israel must not only be a brave warrior, but that in the Israelitic state there also must be a place for Jahve. In conformity with this view David wished within the political centre of his kingdom to create also an ideal, religious centre. While Saul characteristically had allowed the Ark of the Covenant, the people's old-time halidom, to perish from oblivious neglect, David's earliest concern was to fetch it back from the little village, where it remained forgotten, and bring it into the new political capital, where it would occupy a more worthy station; just as Gideon once had inaugurated his tribal dynasty by the erection of a sanctuary in his native city of Ophra. David himself never undertook any important action without first consulting Jahve through the priest.

The portrait of David is not wanting in human traits of the worser sort, and the books of Samuel with inexorable love of truth have not in the least wished to hide or mince the matter. Still, the fact remains that David stands forth as the most luminous figure and most gifted personality in the whole history of Israel, in greatness surpassed only by the prophet of Sinai, by Moses, "the man of God."

What David achieved for Israel cannot be rated too high. Israel as a people, as a political factor, as a concrete power in the world's history, as a nation in the highest sense, is exclusively the work of David; and, although the kingdom which he built up through the struggles and anxieties of a long and active life, soon collapsed; although Israel itself, even a few generations after his death, was again divided into two halves—still, the ideal unity long survived the division that had really taken place. The past grandeur of the Davidian Epoch still became the haunting dream of the future days of Israel; and it is not through a mere chance that the wistful longing, and even the consolation of Israel, should reappear in the form of a returning ideal, David, who, in his own person, should combine all the virtues and excellencies of the historical David, without any of his foibles.

With David the people of Israel had, once for all time, reached the acme of its national existence; his like never appeared again. After David, the history of the people of Israel changes into a continuous tragedy, pointedly illustrating the words of the Apostle Paul, that the misfortune of Israel enriched the world. The pearl is a disease of the shell, and kills that which creates it. And thus, also, the costly legacy bequeathed by Israel to the world, gushed forth from a well of tears. The worldly grandeur of Israel collapsed stone by stone, inch by inch, into utter decay; but the smaller it might appear outwardly the greater it became inwardly. In the downfall of Israel Jahve triumphed; and on the ruins of Jerusalem, Jeremiah proclaimed the New Covenant.

Israel died as a political nation, but arose again as a religious sect, as a community of the pious, the God-fearing, who, alone, would be privileged, and able, from out of their midst, to send forth another son of David, according to the flesh, and, spiritually, the performer of the work of Moses; greater than David, greater even than Moses.

DREAMS AND VISIONS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

II.

THE converts of Darwinism know that many of their opponents are apt to waive their objections after becoming familiar with certain species of their dumb fellow-creatures, and, as it were, studying the stepping-stones by which evolution has advanced in the progress from reptile to man.

For similar reasons many of our dualistic friends would be likely to modify their theories of hypnotic visions if they could study the numerous transition-forms between ordinary sleep and the alleged preternatural phenomena of somnambulism and clairvoyance. The essential difference between dream-visions and the impression of waking experience is the direction of the mental process, which in waking transmits its conceptions from the external senses towards the brain,—in sleep from the cerebral centres towards the external senses. In vivid dreams that activity of the brain-organism may affect the senses in a way resembling the promptings of volition. In moments of danger persons fleeing from an assassin or from a pursuing wild beast will shriek out for help; and perhaps ninety-nine of a hundred sleepers are occasionally apt to betray by similar exclamations the impressive-

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ness of a distressing night-vision. A considerable proportion of vivid dreamers carry on audible conversations. Some of them give utterance to abrupt phrases, suggestive of anger or fear, while others voice both their thoughts and the replies of an imaginary companion, and often seem to rehearse elaborate dramas of dream-life, interjecting their remarks with laughs or impatient epithets, and even changing the sound of their voice, to suit the *rôle* of the various *dramatis personæ*. Many sleep-talkers accompany their words by animated gestures. In the military hospital of Puebla, Mexico, we had a patient who in his dream-talks would often clench his fists, and still oftener clap his hands—not in token of applause, but, as it seemed, under the promptings of a desire to emphasize his disregarded demands. "*Andale*," he would grunt out in his guttural Spanish—"hurry up,"—"give me that bag back right away—*andale, demonio*!" and then clutch at the empty air and finally clap his hands in a way that could be plainly heard on the outside of the building. He had also a trick of suddenly pushing out his fist as if in the act of repelling a troublesome aggressor, but rarely moved his feet; and it would, indeed, seem that only five or six of a hundred sleep-actors ever leave their beds, but content themselves with such interludes as they can enact with their hands and occasional movements of their neck-muscles, as in nodding or shaking their heads.

Somnambulism is not always accompanied by attempts at audible conversation, but its proximate motive seems generally to be either an unusually vivid dream or the after-effect of a train of thoughts which has occupied the mind of the dream-walker in his waking-hours. The results of the latter mode of causation include many phenomena which our hyper-physical friends are specially apt to attribute to the inspiration, or the direct agency, of visitors from other-worldly spheres; but it is a suggestive fact that the effect of very similar antecedents of our waking experience can often be traced in ordinary dreams, as when a mother receives a letter announcing the serious illness of her son and in the dreams of the next night visits the sick-bed of her absent child. Similar after-effects of disquieting thoughts occasionally prompt sleepers to enact their dreams, and as we have seen in the foregoing paper, the remarkable results of that hypnotic activity can be explained by the circumstance that in sleep the mind is more fully concentrated upon a single problem of which the solution, in waking hours, would be confused or biased by conventional prejudices, as well as by the impressions of the external senses. Hence the frequent experience that somnambulists will execute feats—both mental and physical—apparently beyond the scope of their ordinary faculties. Dream-walkers will leave their beds and use an open window to reach a roof-top which in daytime they would hardly have ventured to ascend with the aid of a ladder, or walk safely along the edge of a precipice where dizziness would make the co-operation of the conscious sensorium a direct cause of danger. There is a story of two Scotch highlanders who happened to see a fish-hawk's nest in a crevice of a deep cliff overhanging a point of the sea-shore almost inaccessible on account of the violence of the breakers, and engaged in a dispute as to the possibility of reaching the nest from the top of the cliff. Their controversy finally led to a wager which the younger of the two friends proposed to settle on the next calm day, by clambering down the precipice with the aid of a common grappling hook. The incident had almost been forgotten, when one night Sandy saw his friend get out of bed and leave the room by sliding down a tree that could be reached from the top of a rustic balcony in front of the window. Wondering what his room-mate could be about, Sandy slipped down-stairs and peered about the yard and adjoining garden, but the night-walker had disappeared in the darkness. Early the next morning they found him on the front-porch of the house, where he had fallen asleep on an armful of sticks and reeds, which on closer inspection proved to be the nest of the fish-hawk. Near by lay a silken neckerchief, tied up in the form of a pouch, and containing two grayish-white eggs; but on awakening, the sleeper seemed wholly unable to account for his absence from the bedroom, though his scratched arms and shins attested the vicissitudes of his nocturnal adventure.

The propitious calmness of the night probably suggested the idea of the strange expedition; and there are several well-attested cases of dreamers recording the solutions of intricate mental problems, which some instinct or other seemed to warn them against trusting to the biased faculties of the waking mind or to the doubtful safekeeping of memory. "A distinguished British lawyer," says Dr. Abercrombie (*Intellectual Powers*, p. 306), "had been consulted respecting a case of great importance and much difficulty, and he had been studying it with intense anxiety and attention. After several days had been occupied in this manner, he was observed by his wife to rise from his bed in the night and go to a writing desk which stood in the bedroom. He then sat down and wrote a long paper which he carefully put by in his desk, and returned to bed. The following morning he told his wife that he had a most interesting dream; that he had dreamt of delivering a clear and luminous opinion respecting a case which had exceedingly perplexed him; and that he would give anything to recover the train of thought which had passed before him in his dream. She then directed him to the writing-

desk, where he found the opinion clearly and fully written out; and this was afterwards found to be perfectly correct."

Another circumstance which proves the identity of the mental process in ordinary dreams and a state of somnambulism, is the tendency to *assimilate incidental sense-impressions* to the topics engrossing the dreaming mind. We dream of a battle, and the pounding of a knocker on our neighbor's door is at once interwoven with the fabric of our dream-visions and falls on the ear like the booming of a distant cannonade. The rattle of an opening window shutter becomes the clatter of galloping amunition-wagons, the sound of booted feet, kicking off clods of snow, is metamorphosed into the plunging of a wounded horse, and the light of the neighbor's lantern (affecting the sleeper's retina through his closed eyelids) into the blaze of a musket, followed by a loud report—the slam of the closing door. No skill of a magic-lantern artist can exceed the ingenuity of a ghost-seer in projecting the phantoms of his cerebral organism upon the surface of external objects: A flitting shadow assumes the outlines of a human form and finally the unmistakable features of his departed friend; a faint mumble is recognized as the sound of a well-known voice, a spirit hand beckons from the darkness, and imagination supplies all the requisite details to complete the illusiveness of the vision.

In disease such visions often pursue the patient even into a state of half-waking consciousness. "A young lady of my acquaintance," says Dr. W. B. Carpenter, "was affected with a long and trying illness, in which all the severest forms of hysterical disorder successively presented themselves. The state of somnambulism usually supervened in this case upon the waking state, instead of arising, as it more commonly does, out of the condition of ordinary sleep. In this condition her ideas were at first entirely fixed upon one subject, the death of her only brother, which had occurred some years previously. To this brother she had been very strongly attached; she had nursed him in his last illness, and it was perhaps the return of the anniversary of his death, about the time when the somnambulism first occurred, that gave to her thoughts that particular direction. She talked constantly of him, retraced all the circumstances of his illness and was unconscious of anything that was said to her which had not reference to this subject. On one occasion she mistook her sister's husband for her lost brother; imagined that he was come from heaven to visit her, and kept up a long conversation with him under this impression. This conversation was perfectly rational on her side, allowance being made for the fundamental error of her data. Thus she begged her supposed brother to pray with her; and on his repeating the Lord's prayer, she interrupted him after the sentence "forgive us our tresspasses," with the remark: "But *you* need not pray thus; *your* sins are already forgiven." Although her eyes were open she recognized no one in this state, not even her own sister, who had not been at home at the time of her brother's last illness."

The author of "Intellectual Powers" mentions the even more suggestive case of an English officer whose dreams could be prompted or changed at will by words whispered into the sleeper's ears or objects brought into contact with his hands or lips, and who, by his actions, proved how completely his imagination supplied the details of the visions suggested by the scant data of such sense impressions: "At one time his mischievous friends conducted him through the whole progress of a quarrel which ended in a duel, and when the parties were supposed to be met, a pistol was put in his hand, which he fired and was awakened by the report. On another occasion they found him asleep on the top of a locker or bunk in the cabin, when they made him believe he had fallen overboard and exhorted him to save himself by swimming. They then told him that a shark was pursuing him, and urged him to dive for his life, which he did, with such force as to throw himself from the locker upon the cabin floor, by which he was much bruised, and, of course, awakened. After the landing of the army his friends found him one day asleep in his tent, and evidently much annoyed by the cannonading. They then made him believe that he was engaged when he showed an evident disposition to run away. Against this they remonstrated, but at the same time increased his fears, by imitating the groans of the wounded and the dying, and when he asked, as he often did, who was down, they named his particular friends. At last they told him that the man next to him had fallen, when he instantly sprang from his bed, rushed from the tent and was awakened by falling over the tent-ropes."

Dreams, as well as trance-actions, are, indeed, apt to reveal the true character of a person more readily than his ordinary conduct, and often more so than his waking thoughts. Those thoughts, even in reveries giving the freest rein to fancy, are constantly checked and biased by the day-dreamer's principles, circumstances, and notions of practical possibility, all of which are excluded from the purely inclination-guided caprices of his dream-life. Of course, those caprices cannot be accepted as a hint of the dreamer's actual intentions. They do not prognosticate the probability of what he would be apt to *do*. They merely indicate his inclination, and betray—often for the first time, even to his own mind, what he would *like* to do, in the absence of unpropitious circumstances. The influence of educational ethics, for instance, has no vote whatever in the councils of dreamland. "In dreams,"

says Miss Cobbe, "we commit acts for which we should weep tears of blood, if they were real, and yet never feel the slightest remorse. The familiar check of waking hours, 'I must not do it because it would be unjust or unkind,' never seems to arrest us in the satisfaction of our wayward fancies in sleep. A distinguished philanthropist, exercising for many years high judicial functions, continually commits forgery; and only regrets the act when he learns that he is to be hanged."

Disregard of circumstantial considerations, is, however, in dreams not limited to the moral aspect of our projects, and conceptions which in sleep excite our exultation with the consciousness of having solved a problem of vital importance, are on awakening dismissed with a sigh, as wholly inapplicable to the needs of practical life. We plan enterprises with the hoped-for assistance of friends whose funeral we attended a quarter of a century ago; we invoke the aid of gods whose very statues have lost their helping hands; the seed of our golden harvest is entrusted to a soil that has ceased to repay the trouble of tillage.

Such limitations of dream-conceptions are, however, sometimes compensated by their intensity; their very one-sidedness favors concentration, and the wholly abnormal clearness of dream-born recollections can be explained by the circumstance that the experience of former years has left on our memory traces of many things that cannot be defined in words, and cannot be conjured up by the word-circumscribed thoughts of our waking hours.

THE NEED OF AN ACADEMIC CHAIR FOR THE TEACHING OF EVOLUTION.

A SUGGESTION BY PROF. E. D. COPE.

With the permission of our distinguished contributor, Prof. E. D. Cope, of Philadelphia, we publish the following extract from a communication to Mr. E. C. Hegeler:

"There ought to be somewhere in America a chair, "or an institution devoted to the teaching of evolu- "tion from the basis upwards. Commencing with the "lowest forms of life and rising to the highest, there "should be an exposition by lecture and museum of "the genealogies of plants and animals to man, and a "statement of the laws deducible from the facts. The "evolution of mind should follow, in all its parts, "terminating in the highest aspects of intellect, feel- "ing, and will.

"Such a chair was created in Germany a few years "ago. To me the correct knowledge of evolution "involves that of every science and philosophy and "of practical life."

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. PENTECOST AND GEORGEISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

The Single-tax religion, which is to "solve the labor question" and "make Christianity possible," has grown very thin under the attenuating advocacy of Mr. Hugh O. Pentecost. With excusable vanity Mr. Pentecost exults because I paid him the tribute of saying that, "If Mr. George left the key to his problem in the hands of any man, he left it in the hands of Mr. Pentecost." I did say that; but when I said it, I thought that Mr. Pentecost was a more inspired and more competent apostle than he is. I cheerfully withdraw the opinion, and apologize for having uttered it. I think now that Mr. George put that key into his own pocket, and carried it away with him to England. Mr. Pentecost still persists in whittling the doctrine down to the common-place exaction known as *ground-rent*, imposed and collected after the manner of Chicago in the case of the First National Bank, and after the manner of New York in the case of the city docks. How much has Christianity been made possible in New York by the application of the Henry George theory to the city docks?

I am aware that Mr. Pentecost has the advantage of me in this discussion because of his greater learning, and his more extensive acquaintance with the subject. He is candid enough to acknowledge this himself, and politely says, that Wheelbarrow "does not know what he is writing about." As to himself he frankly says: "There can be no doubt, then, that I know what I am talking about. If anyone knows what Georgeism is, I do." There is such a cheerful egotism in all this, that I will not disturb the complacency of Mr. Pentecost by any language of resentment. I will merely, in a religious way, sprinkle a few coals of fire, or a few drops of hot water on his head.

Mr. Pentecost accuses me of "lamentable ignorance," but I will bear the reproach with resignation if he will only be civil to himself, and continue to describe himself with becoming pride as an "intelligent single-taxer." His opportunities have been greater than mine, and I shall never be able to compete with him in the graces of controversy and the eloquence of slang. I will reason with him as well as I can, without wishing to "prance into the ring," to "jump on him," or to "pin him down." I will not call him a "wriggler," nor appeal from his "high jinks," whatever they may be. In those prize-ring dialectics, where he is so "intelligent," I must confess to "lamentable ignorance." That style of grammar and diction still further dilutes the doctrine which Mr. Pentecost, with sectarian conceit, absurdly entitles "Georgeism." The more tenderly Mr. Pentecost nurses it with strong language, the weaker it grows.

I once heard a three-thimble artist at Epsom races rebuke the by-standers for "wriggling" after the nimble pea instead of selecting, in a straightforward way, the thimble which concealed it. The reproach appeared to me to be unjust, because the wriggling eye-search for the pea was due to the wriggling of the pea itself, under the three thimbles manipulated by the artist. I am told that three-card monte has the same peculiarities, and that it is only by ingenious mental wriggling that the by-standers can track the Jack of Clubs, and "pin him down." Now there are three thimbles called, respectively, "single-tax," "ground-rent," and "land-confiscation." Under which of them is "Georgeism"? Mr. Pentecost, accomplished in what he elegantly calls "illustrative tricks," and "sleight-of-hand performances," lifts up the "ground-rent" thimble and exposes the pea for an instant, but when the by-stander bets his money on it and lifts the thimble, he finds that the pea has fled. It is then under the "single-tax" or the "confiscation" thimble. The man who can follow "Georgeism" in

its wriggling journey under the three thimbles, must be himself a "wriggler" equal in quickness to the man who moves the thimbles.

"Don't be a-frightened, ladies and gentlemen," said the pop-merchant at the picnic, as the liberated corks flew out of the bottles with a noise like the firing of artillery, "don't be a-frightened; it's only ginger beer." "Don't be a-frightened," says Mr. Pentecost, "it isn't confiscation; it's only ground-rent; that's all there is to Georgeism." There is a melancholy deception here, in which Mr. Pentecost is himself deceived. I think that land confiscation is "all there is to Georgeism." It is that, or it is nothing. In this meaning of "Georgeism" lies its popularity, for "appropriating" land by government gratifies the landless. It may be, as Mr. Pentecost says, that "Wheelbarrow does not understand the single-tax doctrine," but Mr. George understands it, and he says, that "Georgeism" proposes "to take for the use of the community the *whole income* arising from land, just as effectually as it could be taken by *formally appropriating* and letting out the land." I think that is confiscation. I have no patent on my opinion; I adopted it from Webster, who, in defining the word "confiscation" borrowed from Henry George the very language I have quoted above. In defiance of the obvious meaning of the words, Mr. Pentecost persists in saying that they express nothing but ground-rent.

Having tried to show wherein the scheme *is* confiscation, I will now try to show wherein it is *not* ground-rent. In doing this, it becomes necessary to "wriggle" around after the nimble pea in its tortuous windings among the intricate meanings of the word "tax" and "rent." These words are used interchangeably by "intelligent single-taxers," to confound the moral distinctions between "rent," which government has no right to exact, and "taxes," which government has the right to impose. A tax is never levied by government upon its own land; rent is never drawn by government from land not its own. Whatever income is received by government from its own land is rent, assessed by special contract between the government and the occupier of the land, as a tax never is. A tax does not rest upon any special contract between the government and the tax payer. Its rate and amount are fixed by the government alone, at its own will. Ground-rent is a compensation rendered to the owner of land by the occupier of it; and no person other than the owner has any right to exact ground-rent for the use of land. Before government can "make Christianity possible" in the United States by exacting ground-rent from land, it must first own the land.

Mr. Pentecost, rather heedlessly I think, asserts that the George doctrine is already applied by the city of New York to the city docks, and by the city of Chicago to the First National Bank of Chicago. As to the New York matter I am not informed, but I know something about the First National Bank of Chicago, and I can assure Mr. Pentecost that the illustration is a very unfortunate one for him. The city of Chicago gets ground-rent from the First National Bank because the city *owns the land* on which the bank building stands. This rent has been assessed by mutual agreement between the First National Bank and the city of Chicago. It is rent fixed by contract, and not a tax imposed by the one-sided will of the city. Time was when the city owned the bank lot, and the adjoining lot. It sold the adjoining lot, and therefore obtains no revenue from it except the proportion of taxes levied upon it in common with other lots of equal value under the revenue law. From the lot which the city owns it obtains ground-rent; from the other lot it obtains taxes. Before it can obtain ground-rent from both lots the city must own them both, and before it can own them both it must confiscate or buy that adjoining lot. Mr. Pentecost sneers at the danger of "eviction" under "Georgeism," and innocently remarks: "The fear of eviction was not before the eyes of the men who built the massive buildings in Chicago upon the city ground-rent plan." True enough! But why? Because they had a seventy years lease of the land. Does Mr. Pentecost think that men will put up "massive buildings" without ample security of possession? Does he think that men would put up "massive buildings" if they supposed that "Georgeism" was among the possibilities of social or political change?

I do not know that Mr. Pentecost has ever been a school-teacher, but I suspect him, because he talks like the fretful schoolmaster under whose neglect I finished my education. I had struggled up to the rule of three, and half way through it, when I came to an "example" which baffled me. I appealed for help to the teacher, but he scolded me, and said that I was ignorant, and stupid, and that my efforts were all nonsense. He helped me a little with his cane, but he did not show me how to do the sum, and so I graduated there and then right in the middle of the rule of three. My school days ended and my child-labor began. I am still wondering how to work that sum. I have long since forgiven my teacher for not showing me how to do it, because I found out afterwards that he did not know. His reproaches were intended to conceal his own incapacity. Mr. Pentecost talks exactly like my poor old schoolmaster when he rebukes me thus:

"When Wheelbarrow says that under the George system, 'the *land itself* and not the value of the land' would be sold by the sheriff to satisfy the claims of the tax-collector, he talks nonsense. *How can land which is taxed by the government up to its full rental value have any selling value?*"

The "nonsense" consists in taxing the land up to its full rental value; but before exposing that, I must compliment Mr. Pentecost on the dexterity with which he conjured the little pea from the "rent" thimble to the "tax" thimble. It is now "taxes" and not "ground-rent" that he talks about. "How can land," he asks, "which is taxed by the government up to its full rental value have any selling value?" In this conundrum the "intelligent single-taxer" displays at least a glimmer of genuine intelligence. It appears to me that such land has no more selling value than the bung-hole of a barrel; and the paradox presented by the question stultifies the whole theory of Henry George. Land which is taxed up to its full rental value is confiscated and smitten barren by the law. It is barren to the owner because blighted by taxes equal to its product. It is barren to the government, which has taxed it up to the confiscation point, for no man will buy it thus incumbered. When I pointed out that anomaly, the "intelligent single-taxers" told me that I did not know what I was talking about, and that they only meant the rental value of the land *independent of the improvements*. The pea wriggled away again.

The conundrum put by Mr. Pentecost presents the distinction between "rent" and "taxes." It is true that only the *value* of land is taxed, but although the taxation is of the abstract, the collection is of the substance. Government may tax the key-hole of a house, but the house will be liable for the tax So, if the tax on the value of land is not paid, the land is answerable for the debt. If because of excessive taxation, or for other reasons, the land has no selling value, the government buys it, or "bids it in" for the amount of the taxes, and thus becomes the owner of the land, as the United States of America became owner of the Arlington estate at Washington. Not so with delinquent rent. In this case the owner of the land resumes possession of it in the last resource, and evicts the tenant for non-payment of the rent agreed upon. Rent is assessed by contract between two or more; taxes by the sovereign will of one.

I never said that "under the George system Tom Clark would be taxed $8 or $10 on his farm." I was merely quoting the opinions of some of my critics to that effect, and I was trying to show how erroneous their estimate must be, and that if all the public burdens be thrown upon land values, the share of Clark must be very much greater than that estimate. But what matter? The question of Clark's proportion is devoured by the larger theme, the proposition to "take for the use of the community" the *whole income* of his farm, and in this way deprive him of it altogether.

The amount of Clark's taxes is a trivial question in comparison with the proposal to confiscate his farm. WHEELBARROW.

POSITIVIST AND MONIST, NOT A COMTIST NOR SPENCERIAN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

YOUR correspondent, R. F. Smith (in THE OPEN COURT, No. 90), in "Comtists and Agnostics," fails to catch on to my article on The Universal Faith (in THE OPEN COURT, No. 87), and in a very readable way sadly misinterprets its drift and purpose. Therefore allow a few words of iteration and explanation.

Let me say for the hundredth time, as I did in that article, that I am neither a Comtist nor a Spencerian; that I swear in the words of no master, wear no collar, and only seek the True and the Good everywhere, and by every help I can. From that point of view who could fail to be interested in the fact of the general disagreement of the leaders of modern thought? Harrison thunders at Spencer, who returns the fire, and Prof. Huxley pours his broadsides into both of them, while the republican or anti-pápacy and anti-Comtist Positivists get in a stray shot as best they can. Amid this mutually destructive war the Monists appear upon the field with an OPEN COURT, into which they invite all contendents, with a view of final adjustment of as many of their differences as possible upon the higher ground of a Scientific Universal Faith.

My article sought to show that Prof. Huxley, the very father of the Agnostics, had made a statement of "a religion" upon which it seemed all could unite; except the Comtists, who could not without dropping their singular, inhuman, unevolutionary, and unscientific papacy; and except the Spencerians, "Spencer & Co.," because they were anarchistic, metaphysical dualists, and not Positivists, Monists, nor true and consistent Agnostics. Spencer was called a "Philosophic Balaam," because of his inconsistency in appearing as the appropriator of the four corner-stones of the Universal Faith, which Comte had put into position as the foundation of that Faith, only to break them up and make them useless as such foundation. How thoroughly Spencer & Co. have done that, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's denial, is manifest enough, *viz.*:

a) *The relativity of knowledge*, Spencer has practically destroyed by laying emphasis upon an unknowable Absolute, as the one object of exclusive religious awe or worship, Comte was a consistent relativist and Agnostic, and put his emphasis, both philosophic and religious, also upon the knowable and the human.

b) *The classification of the sciences*, Spencer took out of its real objective order from the stars to man, and divided it into abstract, abstract-concrete, and concrete, which ends most impractically with astronomy and sociology in the same concrete division, with no world between them!

c) Spencer then, in "The Genesis of Science," attacks and continues the attack on the law of "the three states" and the five states of history, viz.: from Fetishism, Sabeanism, Polytheism, Monotheism, to Positivism, or Monism, as I proposed to call it. The general result is to make a *pot-pourri* of history, and of the whole process of deanthropomorphization.

d) Then our Balaam tackles Humanity as a conscious organism, and insists that it should be of the jellyfish variety, without head or tail, and ending in "*Administrative Nihilism*" for its activity, as Prof. Huxley has humorously pointed out in his article never to be read enough.

Mr. Smith says that Spencer is in favor of all these corner-stones; to which I said and say, Yes! but in such a way as to blast them out, and make them of no use as corner-stones of any Universal Faith. For this very reason Spencer & Co. are leading a modern reaction in the name of science in favor of superstition and brutality, which every true Monist, Agnostic, Scientist and Humanitarian should join with Prof. Huxley in arresting as far as possible. Under the disguise of the Unknowable and the lead of Prof. Fiske, the twilight of the gods has a quasi-scientific sanction, which makes every theological vampire flap his wings with the hope that a new morning has come for him, and turn to his sucking again with delight. Thus the Spencerian idea of natural selection, and evolution, and of the "Coming Slavery," makes every human despot and oppressor exult that the fightiest is, after all, the fittest, and that might makes right; while the moral or human selection, which would give might to the right, is disowned as simply a sentimental weakness of philanthropic fools.

My article was thus a protest against both Comtism and Spencerism, in the hope that we might bring to view Monism as a higher and clearer reconciliative ground upon which real scientific Humanitarians, Positivists, and Agnostics could find a common home, leaving Harrison and Spencer, the Comtists and the Unknowables, to fight out their differences below, as simply *Papacy* vs. *Anarchy*: both of which are equally abhorrent to me.

This much it was needful to say, because Mr. Smith's short letter will be read by many who will not read my article referred to, and who will obtain an impression just the reverse of what was intended. His letter is a clear case of false labeling, which is the opprobrium of popular philosophic discussion. Nothing is more unfair than this wholesale naming business. Call a man a "Comtist," or "Spencerian," and it is commonly taken for granted that the limitations of those great men go to any one who happens to be thus named as their follower. Against this habit of being disposed of by a label, wholly false in fact, I protest.

Yours Respectfully,

T. B. WAKEMAN.

New York, May 19, E. M. 289.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXV. — Continued.

The lackey laid the table. Whenever he offered Mr. Hummel a dish, the latter gave him a withering look, and did not endeavor to make his office easy to him. While the servant was removing the things, Mr. Hummel began:

"Now permit me to talk of our affairs, it will be along account; have you patience for it?"

The evening had set in, darkness lay over the dismal house, the storm came on, the windows rattled, and the rain poured down. Ilse sat as in a dream. In the midst of the stormy scenes of the past day and the uneasy expectation of a wild night, the comfortable prose of the Park Street rose before her, where, fearless and secure, she was at peace with herself and the world, —so far as the world was not vexatious. But she felt how beneficial this contrast was; she even forgot her own position, and listened with deep sympathy to the account of the father.

"I am speaking to a daughter," said Mr. Hummel, "who is going back to her father, and I tell her what I have said to no one else: how hard it is to bear my child's wish to leave me."

He spoke about the child whom they both loved, and it was pleasant intercourse between them. Thus several hours passed.

* Translation copyrighted.

The lackey came again, and asked respectfully whether Mrs. Werner had sent Gabriel away.

"He has gone upon a commission for me," grumbled Mr. Hummel, to the inquirer; "he is looking after some money matters with which I did not choose to burden your honesty. If any one inquires from the city for me, I must beg, Mrs. Werner, to request this man to say that I am at home."

He again looked at his watch.

"Four hours," he said. "If the horse was good, and Gabriel did not lose his way in the dark, we may expect him every moment. If he has not succeeded, you may still be without anxiety; I will still take you from this house."

The bell below rang, and the house door opened—Gabriel entered. There was a gleam of pleasure in his countenance.

"Promptly, at ten, the carriage will stop before the inn," he said, cautiously; "I have ridden hastily in advance."

Ilse jumped up. Again the terrors of the day and anxiety for the future passed through her mind.

"Sit still," admonished Mr. Hummel again; "violent moving about is suspicious. I will meanwhile hold council once more with Gabriel."

This council lasted a long time. At last Mr. Hummel came back, and said, very seriously:

"Now, Mrs. Werner, prepare yourself; we have a quarter of an hour's walk. Yield yourself quietly to our guidance; all has been carefully considered."

Mr. Hummel rang. Gabriel, who had returned to the spy on the ground floor, entered as usual, and took several keys and a screw-driver out of his pocket, and said, cautiously:

"The first week we were here I closed the small back staircase and secured the door with a large screw; the people do not know that I have the keys."

He went to one of the back rooms and opened the entrance to a secret staircase. Mr. Hummel glided after him.

"I wished to know how I was to let myself in again," he said, returning to Ilse. "When I have taken you away some one must be heard moving about here as your spirit, otherwise all the trouble would be lost. Gabriel will take you down the back staircase, while I go out at the front door and keep the lackey in conversation. I will meet you a short distance from the house among the bushes; Gabriel will bring you to me, and I will be sure to be there."

Ilse pressed his hand anxiously.

"I hope all will go well," said Mr. Hummel, cautiously. "Take care to have a cloak that will disguise you as much as possible."

Ilse flew to her writing-table and in haste wrote these words:

"Farewell, beloved; I am gone to my father."

Again sorrow overpowered her; she wrung her hands and wept. Mr. Hummel stood respectfully aside. At last he laid his hand on her shoulder: "The time is passing away."

Ilse jumped up, enclosed the note in an envelope, gave it to Gabriel, and quickly veiled herself.

"Now forward," admonished Mr. Hummel, "out of both doors. I go first. Good bye, Mrs. Werner," he called out, through the open door; "I hope you will rest well."

He stepped heavily down the stairs, the lackey was standing on the last step.

"Come here, young man," shouted Mr. Hummel, "I wish to have you stuffed after your death, and placed before the council house as a model for later generations of the love of truth. When I return you may depend upon it I shall again give myself the pleasure of expressing my high opinion of you; then I will reveal to the Professor the consummate meanness of your character. I have a great mind to make your worthlessness known in the daily paper in order that you may become a scare-crow to the world."

The servant listened with downcast eyes, and bowed mockingly.

"Good-night, courtling," said Mr. Hummel, going out and closing the door behind him.

Mr. Hummel walked with measured tread from the house, turning to the left side where a path entered a thicket; there he concealed himself. The rain poured, and the wind roared in the tops of the trees. Mr. Hummel looked cautiously about him when he entered the darkness of the spot where Gabriel and Prince Victor had once spoken to one another of the ghosts of the castle. There was a slight stir in the thicket, a tall figure approached him and seized his arm.

"Good," said Mr. Hummel, in a low tone; "go back quickly, Gabriel, and expect me in time. But we must seek out dark paths and avoid the lights; you must conceal your face under your veil when we come into the open."

Ilse took the arm of her landlord and walked along, covered by the great umbrella which Mr. Hummel held over her.

Behind the fugitives the tower clock struck ten, when the outline of the inn outside the gate was seen against the darkened heaven.

"We must not be too early nor too late," said Mr. Hummel, restraining the steps of his eager companion. At the same moment a carriage came slowly towards them out of the darkness. Ilse's arm trembled. "Be calm," begged Mr. Hummel; "see whether that is your friend."

"I recognize the horses," whispered Ilse, breathless. Mr. Hummel approached the coachman's covered seat, and asked, as a password, "From Toad?"

"Ville," answered a firm voice. The Crown Inspector sprang down to Ilse; there was a little movement in the carriage, the corner of the leather curtain was lifted, and a small hand was put out. Hummel seized and shook it. "An agreeable addition," he said. Without speaking a word, the Crown Inspector unbuttoned the leather curtain. "My dear friend," cried a trembling female voice from within. Ilse turned to Mr. Hummel; "not a word," he said; "a pleasant journey to you." Ilse was pushed in; Mrs. Rollmaus seized hold of her arm, and held it firmly; and while the Crown Inspector was again buttoning the curtain, Mr. Hummel greeted him. "It gives me great pleasure," he said, "but for an exchange of cards this is not a favorable opportunity. Besides which, our classes, according to natural history, are not the same. But punctuality at the right time and goodwill were mutual." The Crown Inspector jumped upon the coachman's box and seized the reins. He turned the carriage, Mr. Hummel gave a farewell tap upon the wet leather curtain, the horses trotted off quietly, and the carriage passed into the darkness.

Hummel looked after it till the heavy rain concealed it from his view, cast one more searching glance down the now empty road, and hastened back to the city. He went to the Pavilion through the most remote part of the grounds; at the spot where Gabriel had put the lady under his charge, he dived into the deep shade of the trees, and made his way cautiously through the wet bushes to the back of the house. He felt along the wall. "Stop on the threshold," whispered Gabriel; "I will take off your boots."

"Cannot I be spared this court toilet?" grumbled Hummel. "Stocking-feet are contrary to my nature."

"All will have been in vain if you are heard on the staircase."

Hummel slipped up the stairs behind Gabriel into the dark room. "Here are Mrs. Werner's rooms. You must move backwards and forwards in the dark, and sometimes move the chairs, till I call you. There is now another spy, they are talking together below. I fear they suspect that we have something on hand. They look at me askance. The lackey every day carries the lamps from the sitting-room, and nothing must be altered; it would create suspicion if he did not hear some one moving about in the next room. When all is quiet, then the lackey leaves the house, and we can speak to one another."

"It is against my conscience, Gabriel," murmured Hummel, to remain in a strange house without the permission of the owner or lodger."

"Quiet," warned Gabriel, anxiously; I hear the man on the stairs; close the door behind me."

Mr. Hummel stood alone in the dark. He placed his boots near the arm-chair, walked around them, and sometimes gave them a push. "Very gently always," he thought, "for they are the movements of a Professor's wife. The demands which now-a-days are made on a householder exceed all imagination. An elopement from the house of a stranger, and acting the part of a lady in the darkness of night." The steps of men were heard outside, and he again pushed his boots. "Darkness in a strange house is by no means desirable," he continued, to himself. "I have always had a hatred of a dark room since I once fell down into a cellar; this gloom is only good for cats and rogues. But the most lamentable thing for a citizen is, that his boots should be withheld from him." He heard a light tread in the next room, and again moved the chair.

At last all became quiet in the house. Mr. Hummel threw himself back in the chair, and looked wearily around the strange room. A pale ray of light fell from without through a crevice of the curtains, and the tassel of the curtain and the gilded top of a chair glimmered in the darkness. Now at last Mr. Hummel might put on his boots, and then for a time he occupied himself with severe comments upon the world. His usual hour for rest had meanwhile come, and he was tired from his journey; he sank gradually into a dreamy state, and his last distinct thought was, "there must be no snoring in this princely darkness." With this intention he closed his eyes, and said farewell to the cares of the world.

In his sleep it appeared to him as if he heard a slight noise; he opened his eyes and looked about the room. He saw indistinctly that the wall looked different from what it had done. The large mirror that before stood there, seemed to have vanished, and it appeared to him as if a veiled figure stood in its place and moved. He was a courageous man, but his limbs now trembled with terror. He barricaded himself behind a chair. "Is this a magic lantern?" he began, with stammering voice; "if so, I beg you not to disturb yourself; I admire your skill, but have not my purse with me. But if you are a man, I should like a more distinct knowledge of the fact. I call upon you to show yourself in substance. I have the honor of introducing myself to you in this scanty light. Hatmanufacturer, Henry Hummel; my papers are correct —a passport to Paris." He put his hand into his breast pocket. "As a respectable citizen is bound to defend himself in these dangerous times, it has been inserted in my passport, *avec un pistolet*. I beg you kindly to bear this in mind." He took out a pocket pistol and held it before him. He again looked at the spot; nothing was to be seen; the mirror stood as before. He rubbed his eyes. "Stupid stuff," he said; "it was, after all, only a sleepy fancy."

(To be continued.)

COSMOS.

BY JOHN BEVERLEY ROBINSON

In thought I floated in the abyss of space;
Earth out of sight; sun indistinguishable;
Darkness about me; but, before my face,—
Above,—beneath,—a brilliancy afar
Of mighty galaxies together throbbing:
And with me, from some other tiny star,
A being whom my sight could not discern;
Whose voice I could not hear nor substance feel:
As thought answers to thought it spoke in turn:
"Greater than thine, thou 'roof and crown of things,'
My nature is; and others greater still
Inhabit atoms of these nebulous rings.
But not the mightiest of them all can frame
For the unbounded IS a worthy name."

BOOK REVIEWS.

MONUMENT FUNERAIRE A COURT SAINT ETIENNE. *Adolphe Samyn.* Liége: Ch. Claesen.

The form of this work is large quarto, beautifully illustrated; it is an essay by M. Adolphe Samyn, a Belgian architect, descriptive of a monument recently erected in the cemetery of Saint Etienne. The idea of the structure is best expressed by the sub-title of M. Samyn's monograph; namely, the application to funebrial architecture of comparative religious symbolism. The dominant principles of the main religious creeds of ancient and modern times—principles all of which the originator of the project regarded as essentially true—have been represented by signs, emblems, and descriptions. The style of architecture is, in main, Hindu—the style best adapted to the requirements of symbolic art. The appearance of the structure recalls to mind the tombs of ancient India; resembling a kiosk of small dimensions. The inscriptions and symbols are borrowed from India and Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, Gaul and Germania, Arabia and Persia, Egypt and Assyria. The conception is elaborate and original.

THE RUINS REVISITED, AND THE WORLD-STORY RETOLD. S. F. Walker. Lamone, Ia.: 1887.

This is an incoherent mass, a *pot-pourri* of geological, archæological, ethnological, and biblical scraps. It is without a single statement of purpose; it has neither unity nor plan. So far as we have been able to penetrate, we have not, with the exception of citations from other authors, found a single connecting thought between any two consecutive sentences. *μκρκ.*

"The Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin," show a widening field of usefulness for that organization. Additions have been made to their library, and manuscripts of local historical import obtained. It is claimed that no public exhibition hall in Wisconsin is annually inspected by so many visitors as the Art Gallery of the Historical Society. The annual address, by Mr. Frederick J. Turner, discussed the Character and Influence of the Fur Trade of Wisconsin.

The Democrat, a London monthly, is an active and intelligent advocate of social and national reform. The reports of Mr. Henry George's English tour occupy much space in its columns.

La Chronique Moderne, a new monthly publication, is an entertaining and attractive review of current literature and art. Editor, M. Robert Bernier. Publisher, Paul Sevin, 8 Boulevard des Italiens. It has many novel features, prints only unpublished romances and poems, and offers valuable notes of Parisian artistic life

NOTES.

Miss Marie A. Brown will lecture before the Society for Ethical Culture, early in June, on the Norse Discovery.

The Sitaharanam, of which this week's chapter does not appear, will be continued in our next issue.

Brentano's will issue simultaneously in London and New York the *Romance of an Alter Ego*, a new novel by General Lloyd Bryce.

The Proverbs of Solomon have been translated into Volapük. We have received from the translator, Mr. Samuel Huebsch, a copy of the work.

A feature of the June *Magazine of American History* likely to attract attention is the paper "Evolution of the Constitution," by William C. Bates.

An interesting essay on mental and bodily culture is Mr. Morrison I. Swift's pamphlet "The Physical Basis of Education." It inculcates many valuable lessons.

THE OPEN COURT will henceforth appear with uncut pages. This change of form, which we trust will meet the approval of our readers, has been made with a view to obtaining a larger margin in the bound volumes of the magazine.

"A Concept of the Universe," by Mr. E. W. McComas, of Fort Scott, Kansas, is a pamphlet of thirty-eight pages, offering a solution of the problem of existence. Its philosophy is highly speculative in character, and its science eclectic.

The Teachers' Outlook, the first number of which is at hand, realizes the high expectations we had entertained of it. Its columns are bright, and filled with instructive and entertaining matter. It is comprehensive in its reviews of current affairs, careful in its choice of scientific and literary subjects, and able in its presentation of opinion. (W. G. Todd, Des Moines, Ia.)

The work of G. A. Hirn, "The Constitution of Celestial Space," (Gauthiers-Villars, Paris,) has evoked considerable comment in the scientific world. "It is beyond a doubt," said M. Faye, before the Academy of Sciences of the Institute of France, "one of the most original and interesting works produced in recent years." We may have occasion in a future number to present a brief review of Hirn's theories.

The first issue of *The Universal Republic*, "An Occasional Magazine Advocating the Unity of Nations," came out in January. The magazine is published in London, edited by Mr. George Jacob Holyoake (Eastern Lodge, Brighton). As the prospectus states, "it is not issued for purposes of profit, but to put into the minds of the European world the idea of the amity of nations." The object is a serious and noble one, and we hope *The Universal Republic* will find a wide circle of readers.

On May 15. the first number of *Dawn*, a monthly magazine devoted to the cause of Christian Socialism, appeared. The new periodical is published in Boston and edited by the Rev. W. D. P. Bliss. Dr. R. Heber Newton, of New York, Mr. Edward Bellamy, of Chicopee Falls, Mass., and Mr. Charles R. Fitch, of Denver, Col., are among the contributors. Its objects are "to show that the aim of Socialism is embraced in the aim of Christianity and that, in obedience to the doctrines of Christ, the Church must apply itself to the realization of the social principles of Christianity." Apparently the conversion of Christianity is to be made a 'condition precedent' to the establishment of Socialism; certainly an indirect method to attain that which its projectors believe *per se* worthy of realization. In the "Declaration of Principles" we find much that is commendable and in the scheme of proposed legislative measures much to be endorsed. A valuable catalogue of works on Socialistic and Economic subjects is appended to the number.

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

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

REVIEW OF RECENT WORK OF "THE OPEN COURT."

The work of THE OPEN COURT, for the past six issues, covers a wide range of subjects. In an article in No 87, "The Universal Faith," Mr. T. B. WAKEMANN, of New York, discusses the foundations of a "monistic, positive, human, constructive religion." In the number preceding, an editorial essay points out and emphasizes the radical difference between religious Creeds and religious Faith. Then follow in Nos. 87, 88, and 89, respectively, the articles, "Agnosticism and Auguste Comte's Positivism," "Space and Time," "Formal Thought and Ethics." "Personality, Individuality, Consciousness," is the title of an essay (No. 87) by M. TH. RIBOT, the eminent French psychologist, translated with his consent from *Les Maladies de la Personalité*. It contains the gist, one may say, of the principles from which modern psychology sets out. Dr. FELIX OSWALD contributes, in No. 88, a paper on "Dreams and Visions," an interesting study; and in No. 89, Mr. A. H. HEINEMANN writes effectively upon "The Preservation of Moral Purity in Children."

In criticism, appears the striking article from the French of ALFRED FOUILLEE, entitled "M. GUYAU's Faith." The paper "The Transient and The Permanent in Theodore Parker" (No. 91), is Part I of a discourse held by Mr. MONCURE D. CONWAY at the dissolution of Mr. Parker's Society. Three articles (Nos. 90, 91, 92,) upon "The History of the People of Israel" are worthy of every reader's careful perusal. The author, Prof. CORNILL, is an orthodox theologian of Königsberg; his researches are marked by critical acumen, spirit, and above all a love of truth. A unique feature of the last few numbers is "The Sitaharanam," a translation from the Sanskrit, by Prof. ALBERT GUNLOGSEN.

In Economics, the controversy between "WHEELBARROW" and "SYMPATHIZER," Nos. 78, 85, 86, 88, occupies the first place. The subject is "Making Bread Dear." WHEELBARROW is well known to readers of THE OPEN COURT; SYMPATHIZER is a prominent Chicago citizen.

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No. 93. (Vol. III.—15.) CHICAGO, JUNE 6, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 cts.

THEODORE PARKER'S OPTIMISM.

A DISCOURSE AT THE DISSOLUTION OF HIS SOCIETY, FEB. 3, 1889.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

II.

No individual may, indeed, briefly sift Theodore Parker; but the humblest individual may recognize the revision which every generation must give to its predecessor.

As an example of the transiency alluded to, Parker's concept of deity may be adduced. Nothing can be more perfect than his ideal,—of a deity supremely wise, loving, and at work in all the laws of the universe, present in all events minute or vast. But, as he himself complained, no Bible, no creed, affirms the existence of such a deity.

Whence, then, does Parker derive his belief in that existence? From his own heart,—from every humane heart, judged by what it really loves and worships,—he got his moral ideal of God. Only listening close at his own heart does man hear the beat of an eternal heart.

Could you at this moment approach some man or woman kneeling before deified Vengeance,—or say, some trembling maiden, fearing that her gay week is offensive to her jealous God; and invest that maiden with powers equal to those of her God; you should see how different her ideal deity from the one she kneels to. She would rise from her knees, glide out of the chapel, and, ere to-morrow's sun, every bedside of pain should know her special providence; pallid cheeks would bloom again, the lame would walk, the blind see, the dumb speak, and bereaved hearts again clasp their beloved. That is what each of us would do had we the power; and that is what the humble Christians around us believe God did do when he once visited the earth, where he purchased power to save others by taking their agonies on himself—even going to Hell for them. His miracles of benevolence and assurance of faith were incidental to his great mission, which was to ransom man from the dark and evil powers of nature. This ransom, however, since God left the earth, can only affect the ransomed after death. For Satan is still prince of this world,—conveyed to him by an angry moment's curse. God must stand by his hasty word of wrath till he can undo it by an incarnate word of love. But the task is difficult. All that the tenderest mother would do for her child God would do for suffering humanity; but he cannot.

All this the humble Christian gets by revelation, founded on what he believes complete historical evidence. Whatever may be said of his science, his religious position is impregnable. He has a human God to love; not the author of man's evils but the martyr of man's ultimate deliverance from all evils; and the assurer, by miracles, by a bodily resurrection, of heavenly promises which sustain man under the afflictions of this Satanic world.

But now comes Parker to declare all this erroneous. The miracles are without evidence; the orthodox theory irrational; Satan is not the prince of this world, but God only. From the grass-blade to the galaxy, from the butterfly's summer day to the whole life of humanity, all is under the control of the all-wise, all-perfect, all-loving Father of the universe.

Having rejected supernatural revelation he had to find this perfect Being by revelation of nature. But nature has so many imperfections and evils, that Parker had to fall back on supernatural assumptions to support his natural theology. He assumed that whatever appeared evil was really good; that suffering was disciplinary, and would be compensated after death; and, as he could not respect a God less just than himself, he believed that even the animals would enjoy a happy future.

This theology was laid in faith, not in reason. A Roman Catholic may as firmly maintain papal infallibility despite all the papal crimes and massacres of history, claim that rack and thumb-screw were blessings in disguise, as much as the thousand cruel deaths of nature's infliction.

Early in Parker's ministry (1839-40) his faith was troubled by the gratuitous evils in nature,—such as the cat's torture of the mouse before devouring it.

> "Were I," he then wrote, "to draw conclusions solely from organic nature, what attributes should I ascribe to the cause of the world? Certainly not just the same I now give Him. But looking into my consciousness, I find there a different idea of God; so the first witness is insufficient—the last perfectly competent."

But why is consciousness more competent to characterize the cause of things than the things themselves? Why may not our Catholic set his consciousness of

papal perfection against the imprisonment of Galileo, and ingenious cruelties of the inquisition? But here Parker's manuscript abruptly ends. That dialogue between reason and faith was never recorded.

The problem was insoluble; for no matter what good end is served by agony and villainy they can only be excused by the admission that the end could not be secured otherwise. And that limit on omnipotence is the tomb of theology. The problem was given up by Parker.

During the next twenty years his faith went on declaring everything for the best, his reason proving many things for the worst. Slavery, for instance, and intolerance, injustice to woman, and manifold wrongs whose providential benignity was too much disguised for his eye of faith.

"In this age," he said in one sermon, "poverty tends to barbarize men; it shuts them out from the educational influence of our time."

Parker repudiated the devils, but the devils of his time recognized him; as he passed they cried, "What have we to do with thee?" "Nothing whatever," answered Parker. "Hast thou come to destroy us?" "Precisely!" His theology never interfered to say—"Ah, you are God's agents: continue your disciplinary slave-hunt, your educational trampling of that outcast; God foresaw it all, it is under his providence, and all will be blissfully compensated in the end."

In early youth I walked with Theodore Parker in the woods near Framingham. I asked about miracles. He said, it is difficult to define what is, or would be, a miracle. One can deal more securely with particular narratives of events, and, if they be marvelous, weigh the evidence to find if it be proportionate to the doubtfulness of marvelous narratives. After a time he stretched himself on the ground with lips close to the grass, as if inhaling its life for his wan cheeks. Then he spake words which I tried to write down when I reached home. There is, he said, a certain miracle-sense in man which should be respected. We are too near the divine mystery of existence not to clutch at everything that seems to declare it. Men feed that mystic part of them with fables, as when, without bread, they will eat grass rather than starve. But when they shall have grown so far as to find God in that flower, to love him in that sky, to read his scripture in their own hearts, all Nature will appear miraculous.

So did I listen to the gospel of the grass, the 'vedas of the violet,' from that great heart, with unquestioning faith; and when presently we returned to the grove, where he addressed an antislavery assembly, the evils of the nation did not for me contradict his filial faith in nature. The yelp of the bloodhound was heard on the air; the sordid politician, the double-tongued preacher, were portrayed, and not proved providential; but my optimism was undisturbed. Those vile phantasms would pass away, and there still would the green grass smile, and the violet, and their loving prophet.

But presently the prophet passed away; out of his beloved nature sprang an ugly cat,—so he called his consumption,—and fastened its claws in his side. And even while he was dying the voice of another interpreter of nature was heard,—that of Darwin. He was even more sweet and gentle than Parker, but represented a generation which walked by fact, not by faith. He proved that the evils we thought superficial and transient were inherent in the very organization of nature. It was not merely a cat torturing a mouse before eating it, or the invisible cat torturing Parker before consuming him; but the very principle of nature was predatory, the strong devouring the weak; the strata of the earth beneath our feet, the ruins of races, being successive cemeteries of populations tortured, slaughtered, burnt, buried, in the struggle for existence.

The optimism of Parker's theology might not pass away were it only a question of theology, or one of sentiment. The Darwinian theory might do away with it only in philosophical circles, were it only a theory. But society has been caught in an evolutionary revolution. The struggle for existence has compassed civilization. As huge saurians swam or stalked through primal swamps, so now pauperism, corruption, despair, crime, threaten to swamp civilization. These evils, wrongs, perils, have to be dealt with largely by religious enthusiasm, by existing organizations formed for human salvation. Among these there is now going on a survival of the fittest,—the standard of fitness being adequacy to the practical need of the times. The standard is not abstract truth; doctrines not true may sometimes serve in emergencies where truer ones would fail. Now, even were optimism theoretically true, it could hardly be turned to any practical aid in the salvation of men.

When Gouverneur Morris lost his leg a pious visitor showed him such moral advantages to accrue from the affliction that Morris begged him to send a surgeon to cut the other leg off too, so that he might be doubly blest. So will the suffering answer with tears and laughter those who would persuade them that diseases which massacre the innocents, drudgery that breaks men on its wheel, political and social corruption, are all the paternal providence of an immanent creator and father.

Already the naturalistic optimism of Emerson and Parker has been modified. We are now told by some that though whatever is, is not necessarily right, yet all is for the best,—in the long run. But there survives in this doctrine some of the old Calvinistic fatal-

ism, which proclaimed a universe working out divine decrees for both good and bad. Take away the bad decree, retain only the good, yet can you get for any cause the most strenuous service from the faith that its victory is a foregone conclusion? That man will work best who trusts to no dynamic stream of tendency making for righteousness, but feels success or failure dependent on his arm.

THE WORKINGMAN'S DOLLAR.

BY WHEELBARROW.

THE praiseworthy effort to prove that a pound of coffee weighing sixteen ounces, and a pound of coffee weighing fourteen ounces, can be made equal in value by Act of Congress is still going on. I am thankful to the finance teachers who have kindly taken me in hand, although I fear that I shall never be able to understand the "laws of money." I go down meekly to the foot of the class, and acknowledge myself the dullest pupil in the school. I cannot yet see that the silver dollars I get for my wages, each worth eighty cents, are just as valuable as gold dollars worth a hundred cents a piece, and I don't believe they are.

In a friendly criticism Mr. Albert of Kentucky gives me a lesson, and he tries with patient good temper to make the matter clear as mud, in this way: He says—"I would first advise 'Wheelbarrow,' the next time he gets hold of a greenback, to read it carefully. He will find the words 'on demand,' which are a distinctive feature of redeemable money, left out. Any lawyer will tell him that a promise to pay, without specified time of payment, is of no value." This leads me to suspect that Mr. Albert is a lawyer, which gives him a great advantage in the argument. It is very easy for him to refer me to a lawyer for information as to the legal obligation of promises to pay, but I cannot afford to get knowledge in that way. As it would cost me a week's wages and a dollar over to speak to a lawyer in Chicago, I went down to the public library and got a look at some law books on "Contracts," and they all said that a promise to pay without specified time for payment is a legal and moral obligation to pay the amount stated, of so much "value" that it will be enforced at law. This discourages me at the very start because it makes me doubt the wisdom of my teacher. If Mr. Albert's finance is as bad as his law, I fear that his instruction is of "no value."

Speaking of the greenbacks, Mr. Albert says: "For ten years the United States made no pretensions to exchange them for gold or silver, and yet they had a value varying from par to fifty per cent. discount. What gave them that value?" "Was it faith?" he says, "or the result of some natural law?" and he advises me at my leisure to "study out that conundrum." Well, I'll wrestle with it, and while I'm working it, will he tackle this one: What gave them the discount?

My first guess at the conundrum is this: Faith gave them value, and doubt gave them discount; just as they gave value and discount to the legal tenders of the Confederate States. The value and discount were regulated by the chances of their payment in gold, and the time of such payment. I was in several battles down South, and I noticed that whenever we got whipped the greenbacks got discount, and the graybacks got value, and *vice versa*. When Sherman took Atlanta the graybacks got so much discount that they have never had much value since.

The ancient assumption that a fish put into a vessel of water adds nothing to the weight of the whole, is adopted by Mr. Albert, and he coolly remarks: "As to the reason why the laborer's eighty cent silver dollar will buy as much as the boss's one dollar gold piece;" as if that fact were proved, when it is the main point in dispute. The reason, however, is pure magic; here it is: "All things have two values—the intrinsic value and the exchangeable value; money owes its value to both. The government can regulate the exchange value, it cannot affect the intrinsic value." That is to say, that money has a real, genuine value of itself, independent of the government, and a false value given it by Act of Congress. What Mr. Albert probably means is that government gives a *nominal* value to money, and that it circulates at that value within its own dominions. All this is but an evasion of the true question, which is: Ought governments to give a nominal value to money different from its real value, and thus cheat all men who work for wages? Government can give an exchangeable value to the yardstick, and decree that thirty inches shall be a yard, and it will be so, but government can never make ten yards of calico measured by the new yardstick equal in length or value to ten yards measured in the old way.

I am confident that Mr. Albert is in a whirl of confusion on the currency question, or he would not give us whole sentences utterly destitute of meaning, like this: "The government, by affording facilities to exchange silver, paper, nickel, and copper at par, or nearly so, it makes their exchangeable value equal to that of gold, after it has placed its stamp upon them." At par with what? "That pig," said the seller, "will weigh 200 pounds *on an average*." Does Mr. Albert mean silver, nickel, copper, paper, "at par" with one another, or with gold? And if either or both, at what standard? Ounce for ounce, or bulk for bulk? This obscure sentence is the most important in his article, because he bases all his argument upon it, quaintly remarking: "This explains why the silver dollar will buy as much as the gold one, and also why a grocer

can buy as much coffee in Brazil with the silver he receives in payment here."

There is a painful headache in all that inconsequent reasoning of Mr. Albert. That very miracle is just what the grocer cannot perform. He cannot buy coffee in Brazil and pay for it in silver dollars at par with gold dollars, for the obvious reason that gold dollars and silver dollars are not of equal value. In the market reports of the newspapers I find silver quoted like wheat, or oil, or pork. Nor can the government help the grocer to the value of a cent. It will not even try to help him, and Mr. Albert makes an inexcusable blunder when he says that the grocer "exchanges his paper or silver to the government, at a nominal discount to cover the transfer, and receives gold in return." He does nothing of the kind. The government will not give gold dollars for silver dollars. On the contrary, the government actually buys silver in the market, at the current price, whatever it is, then takes eighty cents worth of it, and stamps it, "One dollar: In God We Trust," and makes a clear profit of twenty-five per cent. This profit is a tax upon the wages of the workingman, who is compelled to take these dollars at their apocryphal or "exchangeable" value, instead of at their real value. "To increase the weight of the silver dollars," says Mr. Albert, would make them "heavier to carry about." That's true, but I'll try and stagger along under mine. As Mr. Albert is in error as to his facts, of course his arguments founded on them partake of their defects, and are valueless. If government can give an "exchangeable" value to silver dollars and make them equal to gold dollars, why will it not exchange one for the other? Why repudiate its own work, and dishonor its own coinage?

To be sure, I can go into a store and buy a dollar's worth of coffee, and the grocer will give me the same quantity, whether I pay him a gold, or silver, or paper dollar; but this apparent equality in value ought not to deceive anybody. It is evident that where payment can be made in different coins of the same denomination but of different metallic values, the merchant must fix the price of his goods on the presumption that he will be paid for them in the cheapest currency; if he gets the dearer coins occasionally, so much the better, but he cannot afford to count on them. During the war the prices of goods went up as the value of greenbacks went down. It could not be otherwise; and when I take my nine dollars, which I get as wages every Saturday night, and buy household comforts with it, I find fifteen or twenty per cent., and sometimes more than that added to the price of nearly everything I buy.

If the greenback is of "no value" because the words "on demand" are left out of its promise to pay, why does Mr. Albert contend that it is just as good as gold? And if it is of "no value" for any reason, why should it be imposed on me as wages for my work? The value of any promise in morals, in business, or in politics depends entirely on the size of the chance that it will be redeemed. The value of a greenback dollar, or a silver dollar, or a brass dollar, depends on the chance that it will be redeemed in the dearest money current in its life time, and, at present, this is gold. If silver dollars worth eighty cents apiece, and gold dollars worth a hundred cents apiece appear just now to circulate at mercantile par with each other in ordinary transactions, it is because there is a working promise somewhere in the machinery of the government to pay the twenty cents. Where is it? Let us see.

Mr. Albert kindly advises me to read the greenback, and I shall find the words "On demand" left out. Will he "change works" with me and read the legend on the silver certificate, and he will find the words "on demand" left in; but it is very careful not to say, "dollars payable to bearer on demand," but *silver* dollars. On the reverse side of it, that invidious dictinction is apologized for, and partly cured in the following agreement: "This certificate is receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues." Here is the working promise to make up the difference in value between the silver dollar and the gold dollar. The promise appears to me to be reliable enough within the sphere of the sum total of the public revenues, and perhaps, a little beyond that sum; but it is a precarious reliance for the laboring man, because it is liable to be broken at any time by law or by war.

THE PHYSICAL BASES OF PERSONALITY.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

Translated from the French by γνῶν.

I SHALL now dwell more at length upon the organic conditions of personality; inasmuch as everything depends upon these and they explain all the rest. Metaphysical psychology, with logical consistency, has paid no attention whatever to these conditions; for it derives its ego from above, and not from below. On the contrary, we shall maintain that the elements of personality must be sought for in the most elementary phenomena of life; the latter, in fact, stamp it with its own distinctive mark and character.

In every animal the basis of its psychic individuality is the organic sense—the sense of the body, usually vague and obscure, but at times very clear in all of us.†

This organic sense is that "principle of individu-

* Translation copyrighted.

† Incidentally, I may observe that a great metaphysician, Spinoza, plainly maintains the same thesis, although in different terms: "The object of the idea that constitutes the human soul is body....and nothing else." "The idea that constitutes the formal existence of the human soul is not simple, but composed of several ideas." (*Ethics*, part II. propositions 13 and 15. See also Scholia of prop. 17.)

ation" so eagerly sought for by scholastic doctors, for the reason that everything—either directly or indirectly—rests upon it. We may regard as highly probable, that according as we descend toward the lower animals this organic sense of body will more and more preponderate, down to the point where it actually becomes the entire psychic individuality. But, in man and with the higher animals, the turbulent world of desires, passions, perceptions, images, and ideas covers up this silent back-ground. Except at given intervals, it is forgotten, from the fact that it is not known. Here the same takes place as in the order of social facts. The millions of human beings, making up a large nation, as regards itself and others, are reduced to a few thousand men, who constitute its clear consciousness, and who represent its social activity in all its aspects, its politics, its industry, its commerce, and its intellectual culture. And yet these millions of unknown human beings,—limited as to manner and place of existence, quietly living and quietly passing away—make up all the rest; without them there would be nothing. They constitute that inexhaustible reservatory, from out of which, through a rapid or sudden selection, a few individuals rise to the surface; but these favorites of talent, power, or wealth themselves enjoy but an ephemeral existence. Degeneracy—always fatally inherent in that which rises—will again lower their race and themselves, while the silent work of the ignored millions will continue to produce other ones, and to impress upon them a distinctive character.

Metaphysical psychology only keeps in view the lofty heights; but purely internal observation cannot tell us much about what takes place within the body, and, as a matter of course, from the very outset, the study of general sensibility has been mainly the work of physiologists.

Henle (1840) defined general sensibility or "cœnæsthesis" as: "the *tonus* of the sensible nerves, or the perception of the state of average activity in which these nerves are constantly engaged, even during the moments when they are not excited by any external impression." And elsewhere: "General sensibility is the sum total, or the not yet unravelled chaos, of sensations that from every point of the body are being incessantly transmitted to the sensorium."* By the abovementioned term E. H. Weber even more precisely understands: an internal sensibility, an inward touch that imparts information to the sensorium concerning the mechanical and chemico-organic state of the skin, the mucous and serous membranes, the viscera, the muscles, and the articulated parts.

In France, Louis Peisse, a physician-philosopher, was the first to react against the doctrine of Jouffroy, who maintained that we do not know our own body except in an objective manner, as an extended, solid mass, similar to other bodies in the universe, situated beyond the ego, and foreign to the perceiving subject. Peisse proved, though in somewhat cautious terms, that the knowledge of our body, above all, is entirely subjective. His description of this organic consciousness seems by far too correct, not to be quoted entire.

"Is it certain," he says, "that we have absolutely no consciousness of the activity of the organic functions? If it be the question of a clear, distinct, and locally determinable consciousness, like that of external impressions, it is clear that we lack it; but we might possibly possess a kind of silent consciousness, obscure, and latent, as it were, the analogue, for example, of that of sensations which provoke and accompany the respiratory movements—sensations, which, although incessantly repeated, pass by unperceived. In fact, might we not regard that remarkable feeling which ceaslessly and without intermission, warns us of the presence and actual existence of our own body, as a distant, faint, and confused echo of the universal vital activity? Almost always, and wrongly, we confuse this feeling with the accidental and local impressions that in waking hours arouse, stimulate, and maintain the play of sensibility. These sensations, though incessant, make but a fugitive and transient appearance on the stage of consciousness, while the feeling in question lasts and persists, even beneath this ever mobile theatrical display.

"Condillac very appropriately called it the basic feeling of existence; Maine de Biran termed it, the feeling of sensitive existence. Through this feeling, the body incessantly appears to the ego *as its own*, and through it the spiritual subject feels and perceives itself to exist, locally, as it were, within the limited extent of its organism. Like a constant, unfailing admonisher, it renders the state of the body incessantly present to consciousness, and thus, in the most intimate manner, displays the indissoluble bond subsisting between psychic and physiological life. In the usual state of equilibrium, which constitutes the state of perfect health, this feeling, as I said, is continuous, uniform, and is always equal, which prevents it from reaching the ego and attaining the state of distinct, special, and local sensation. In order to be distinctly remarked, it must acquire a certain intensity. This organic feeling is then expressed by a vague impression of well-being, or of general distemper; the former denoting a simple exaltation of vital physiological action; the latter its pathologic perversion. But in such case it does not fail to localize itself under the form of particular sensations, connected with some certain region of the body. It often reveals itself in a more indirect, yet far more evident, manner, when it

* Pathologische Untersuchungen, 1848, p. 114. Allgemeine Anatomie. 841, p. 728.

chances to fail in any given point of the organism; for example, in a limb struck by paralysis. Such a limb still naturally clings to the living aggregate, but it is no longer included in the sphere of the organic ego—if we may use this expression. The affected limb ceases to be perceived by the ego as *its own*, and the fact of this only negative separation, is expressed by a particular, positive sensation, known to all, who have experienced a complete numbness of any member caused by cold or a compression of the nerves. The sensation is nothing more than the expression of the break or loss which the universal feeling of physical life suffers; it proves that the vital state of the limb in question really existed, though obscurely felt, and that it constituted one of the partial elements of the general feeling of life of the organic whole. In this manner any continuous, monotonous noise—as that of a carriage in which we happen to be riding—ceases to be perceived, although continuing all the time to be heard; for if it suddenly stops, its cessation will be instantly remarked.

"This analogy helps us to understand the nature and mode of existence of the basic feeling of organic life, which in this hypothesis simply would be a resultant "*in confuso*" of the impressions produced upon the living points by the internal movement of the functions carried to the brain, whether directly by the cerebro-spinal nerves, or mediately by the nerves of the ganglionic system."*

Since the time when this passage was published (1844) psychologists and physiologists have been at work studying the elements of this organic or general sense of the body. They have determined what each vital function contributes as its own share; they have shown how complex this confused feeling of life is, which, by means of incessant repetition has become ourselves; and that searching after it would be equivalent to seeking for ourselves. Consequently we know it only through the variations that raise it above, or lower it beneath the normal tone. The reader in various special works† will find the detailed study of these vital functions and their general physical contributions. It is not our purpose here to enter upon a special investigation of these topics, and therefore a condensed recapitulation will be sufficient.

In the first place, we have the organic sensations attached to respiration: the feeling of comfort produced by pure air; of suffocation from close air; those arising from the alimentary canal, and others, still more general, connected with the state of nutrition. Hunger and thirst, for example, despite appearances, have no precise localization; they simply result from a discomfort of the whole organism. They are the loud pleadings of a too impoverished blood. As regards thirst especially, the experiments of Cl. Bernard have shown that it arises from lack of water in the organism, and not from dryness of the pharynx. Of all the functions, general and local circulation exerts, perhaps, the greatest psychological influence, and its variations import the most from individual to individual, and according to the different moments, within the same individual.

Let us further recall to mind the organic sensations that arise from the state of the muscles: the feeling of fatigue, exhaustion, or its reverse; finally the group of muscular sensations which, associated to the external sensations of sight and touch, play such a prominent part in the creation of our knowledge. Even reduced to itself alone, in its purely subjective form, muscular sensibility will reveal the degree of contraction or relaxation of the muscles, the position of our limbs, etc.

If the reader will conceive for a moment the multitude and diversity of the vital actions just cited in a general way, he will be able to form a certain idea of what must be understood by the expression: physical bases of personality. Constantly active, they make up by their continuity for their weakness as psychic elements. Hence, as soon as the higher forms of mental life disappear, they pass to the front rank. A clear example of this exists in dreams (whether pleasant or painful) aroused by organic sensations; as night-mares, erotic dreams, etc. In these dreams, even with a certain degree of precision, we may assign to each organ the part that belongs to it; the sensation of weight seems mainly attached to the digestive and respiratory organs; the feeling of struggle and combat to affections of the heart. In more rare instances pathological sensations, unperceived during waking hours, will re-echo during sleep like premonitory symptoms. Armand de Villeneuve dreams that he is bitten in the leg by a dog; and a few days later that same leg is attacked by a cancerous ulcer. Gessner in his sleep fancies that he is bitten in the left side by a serpent; a little later on the very spot there developed an anthrax of which he died. Macario dreams that he has a very sore throat; he rises in normal health; but a few hours later is attacked by an intense amygdalitis. A man sees in a dream an epileptic; a short time afterwards he himself becomes one. A woman dreams that she speaks to a man who cannot reply to her, because he is dumb; at her waking she herself has lost the power of speech.

In all these cases we take for facts those obscure incitations which, from the depths of the organism, reach the nervous centres, and which, amid all its turmoil and perpetual mobility, conscious life hides from us instead of revealing.

It is clear that the exclusive faith which psychology

*Note to his edition of the "Rapports du physique et du moral," by Cabanis p. 108, 109.

†See particularly Bain: The Senses and Intelligence. Part I. Ch. II. and Maudsley: Pathology of the Spirit.

has so long accorded the mere data of consciousness, would throw into the shade the organic elements of personality; but, on the contrary, in a professional way, physicians, as a matter of course, were expected to cling to it. The doctrine of the temperaments, old as medical science itself, ever criticized and ever remolded,* is only a vague and fleeting expression of the principal types of the physical personality, such as furnished by observation, and with the main psychical traits that flow hence.

The few psychologists, accordingly, who have studied the problem of the different types of character, have sought their ground of support in this doctrine. Kant did so more than a century ago. If the determination of the temperaments at any time could become scientific, the question of personality would be greatly simplified.

Until this takes place, the most relevant point will be, to rid ourselves of the purely preconceived notion, that personality is a mysterious attribute, dropped down from the skies, and without antecedents in nature. If we simply cast a glance at the animals that surround us, we shall have no difficulty in admitting, that the difference between horses and mules, between geese and ducks, their "principle of individuation," can only be derived from a difference of organization and of adaptation to environment, with the psychical consequences that thence result; and that in the same species the differences of one individual from another cannot originally be owing to any other cause. In the natural order of things there is no reason for making an exception of man; apart from the fact that in man the excessive development of intellectual and emotional faculties causes illusion, and hides the primitive origin.

Does physical personality exist in nature? Understanding by physical personality the mere sense of a state of organized being; a mode of being where, by supposition, all consciousness, whether clear or obsure, actual or reproduced by some external circumstance, would be absent?

Evidently not as regards the higher animals; physical personality, in the sense explained, can be posited only as a very artificial abstraction. It is probable, that this form of psychic individuality, consisting simply in the consciousness which the animal has of its own body, exists in very low species, yet not in the lowest.

In the latter,—*e. g.*, in multicellular individuals composed of cells entirely similar among themselves,—the constitution of the organism is to such a degree homogeneous, that each element lives apart by itself, and each cell has its own particular action and reaction. But their entirety no more represents an individual than six horses, drawing a carriage in the same direction, constitute one single horse. Here there is neither coördination nor consensus, but simply juxtaposition in space. If, with certain authors, we attribute to each cell the analogue of consciousness (which only would be the psychic expression of their irritability), we should obtain consciousness in a state of complete diffusion. From one element to the other there would exist a degree of impenetrability, that would leave the entire mass in the condition of living matter, without even an external unity.

In a higher order, however, for example in Hydras, observation is able to prove a certain consensus in the actions and reactions, and a certain division of work. Yet the individual is very precarious. Trembly, by aid of his scissors, out of a single individual was able to make fifty. Inversely, of any two Hydras we can make one; it is sufficient to reverse the smaller, before introducing it into the larger specimen, in a manner that the two endoderms touch and merge into each other. If allowed to venture an opinion on this obscure matter, I should say that this kind of adaptation of movements might denote a certain, temporary, unstable unity, subject to circumstances, yet perhaps, not entirely destitute of a certain obscure consciousness on the part of the organism.

If we find that we are still too low, we may reascend the series (for every determination of this kind is arbitrary), in order to fix the point at which the animal has only the consciousness of its organism, of what it undergoes and produces—or, has but one organic consciousness. This form of consciousness, in the pure state, perhaps, does not even exist; for, as soon as any rudiments of the special senses appear, the animal transcends the level of general sensibility. But, on the other hand, does general sensibility alone suffice to constitute a consciousness? It is known, that the human fœtus makes efforts to extricate itself from any inconvenient position, to escape the impression of cold or of painful irritation; yet, are all these merely unconscious reflexes?

I hasten away from all conjectures of this kind. One thing, at least, is incontestable; *viz.*, that organic consciousness—(the consciousness which the animal has of its body and only of its body)—in the greater part of animal existence exerts an enormous preponderance; that it stands in inverse ratio to the higher, psychic development; and that, everywhere and always, this consciousness of the organism is the

*Henle has attempted recently (Anthropological Lectures, 1877, p. 103–130), to attach the temperaments to the different degrees of the activity, or *tonus*, of the sensitive and motor nerves. When this degree is at its lowest, we obtain the phlegmatic temperament. At a high degree, with a rapid exhaustion of nerves, we have the sanguine temperament. The choleric also supposes a high *tonus*, but with persistence in the nervous action. The melancholic temperament cannot be defined by the simple quantity of the nervous action; it supposes a high *tonus*, with the tendency to emotions rather than to voluntary activity.

basis upon which all individuality rests. Through it all is; without it there is nothing. Indeed, it would be impossible to imagine the contrary; for, do not external impressions—that first matter of all mental life—enter through the organism, and—what is still more important—are not instincts, feelings, aptitudes, proper to each species, to each individual, stamped and fixed by heredity in the organism—we know not how, but as proved by facts—with an unalterable solidity?

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

II.

As SITA cast her eyes on the gold-shimmering stag with its pretty gold-lined flanks and golden antlers; its beautiful ears like lazur-stone; its golden skin with wonderfully delicate hair—the pretty woman at once broke into a gladsome smile.

At the sight of this golden-haired stag, with antlers like pearls and coral, purple-colored tongue, and entirely like the reflection of the star-bespangled firmament—the graceful Sita with a prolonged smile said to Rama: "Lo, behold that golden-colored stag, with a body reflecting all the hues of precious stones! Look, O descendant of Kakutstha,* how the wonderful creature seems to approach confidently toward us! If in this Dandaka-forest there are many golden stags like this, then, surely, O Rama, this forest must indeed be beloved of human beings. When I look at this singular golden stag, an ardent desire arises within my soul—the joyful thought of possessing and spreading on the ground its skin, which is bright like Jambunada†—the golden river—as a soft couch to rest upon. This may, perhaps, be an unfair desire and unwomanly; but my whole soul has violently been captured by the form of this pretty animal."

The distinguished hero Rama, listening to this speech of his beloved Sita, cheerfully remarked to his half-brother, the son of Sumitra: "Behold, O Lakshmana, the heart of the beloved daughter of Videha is set on a stag! Then, still to-day this stag with its gorgeous skin must cease to breathe. Only, that you deal prudently with the princess, while I sally forth to fell this antelope with a single arrow of mine. O Lakshmana, I shall go forth and quickly kill this animal, in order to obtain its skin; but in the meantime you must not stir from hence, until I return. Still to day Sita shall pride herself in the splendid skin of this stag, as once in the antelope-carpet of her seat in the city of Ayodhya."

Perplexed and falling into deep thoughts at the sight of this stag, that shone with all the splendor of a Taramriga,* Rama's half-brother, Lakshmana, answered:

"As had been foretold us by the holy seers, the Rishis—pure like the sacrificial fire—this stag, O hero, is only a deceitful Raksha, called Maritcha, who already has killed a great many kings, who in high spirits, mounted on chariots and armed with bows, went forth to hunt in the forest.

"At the sight of this lovely form, all ablaze with precious stones, O you wisest of men, you ought to consider what in reality it is. Bear well in mind, O man-tiger,† that this is only a golden phantom-stag, for what connection can there possibly exist between gold and a stag? This stag has neither antlers of coral, nor eyes of pearls; this, I should think, is only a phantom-stag, and none but a Raksha-demon in the disguise of a deer."

Thus Rama's brother spoke, but Sita, of the pure smile, whose mind had been like bewitched by the treacherous vision, began to remonstrate, and said:

"O husband, this delightful deer has entirely won my heart! O strong-armed hero, do you bring him, and he will be such a pleasant toy to play with. Here in the neighborhood there roam about many pretty stags, also buffaloes and other wild game, but, O Rama, I never saw a stag like unto this in splendor and amiable docility. If you catch him alive, the singular animal will be an object of wonder; and at the expiration of our exile in the wood, when returned to our royal abode, this deer shall be an ornament of our inner appartments. But, if you catch this unrivalled stag dead, its skin, O king, will always be precious, and upon which I should love to rest myself, yonder in the soft grass."

Thus Sita spoke, and the illustrious Raghuid listening, and likewise admiring the stag-like animal, became confused and said to Lakshmana:

"O son of Sumitra, whether this be a phantom-stag or not, at all hazards, urged by an ardent desire, still to-day I must overtake and kill it. There is not a like stag anywhere in the world—not even in Indra's paradise or in the gardens of Kuvera—the god of riches. His hair is smooth and bright, and he is confidently roaming about in the forest. When he opens his mouth, look at his tongue, like the points of a burning flame, from his mouth emitting a sort of blaz-

* Rama is frequently called Kakutstha—the descendant of Kakutstha; Raghava—the descendant of Raghu; both names denote mythic kings. Sita and the Hindu wife generally addressed her own husband as Aryaputra—Aryason. Sita in the same manner is called Janakatmaja—the daughter of Janaka; Vaidehi—the daughter of the king of Videha, etc. In this paraphrase, in order not to bewilder the reader, I have avoided a too frequent repetition of these and other patronymics.

† Jambunada, the name of a mythic river.

* Taramriga, properly stag-star, here the name of a constellation—the λ Orionis, represented by an antelope-head.

* Naravyaghra, man-tiger, tiger among men, a distinguished hero, is a frequent epithet of Hindu-kings.

ing fire. Like unto molten gold, with feet like coral, with crescent-shaped flanks of a variegated silver hue, his whole body is indeed wonderfully beautiful, and sparkling like mother of pearl. Whose soul would not be allured by the vision of such an unrivalled deer? This remarkable animal has likewise entirely subdued myself. All kings, O Lakshmana, armed with bows, will ardently pursue a-hunting the animals of the forest, either for the sake of their flesh, or for mere sport. By the will of Shakra * have surely been created and allotted all gems that are found in the wilderness, all the various substances yielding pearls, precious stones and gold, all kinds of forest-timber, all wealth that is developed from seed and in a like manner the subjugation of this stag-like form must have been allotted to my share; and we certainly shall obtain wealth and gems worthy of a king. The graceful daughter of the king of Videha together with myself shall rest on the matchless golden skin of this deer. Neither cotton nor woven silk, neither the wool of sheep nor any costly tissue can match the softness of this animal. So at least I think. There exist only two incomparable stags—this auspicious animal, and that other divine one walking the paths of the heavens; this earthly one, and the constellation Taramriga. And if, as you tell me, O Lakshmana, he is that roaming phantom-stag, by whom powerful kings and princes, armed with bows, while hunting in the forest have been killed, in such case there is a yet stronger motive why I should destroy him.

"Once upon a time the evil Asura,† Vatapi, killed all the holy Brahmans he could, the which caused his belly to swell like a mule's. He for a long while also attempted to molest the holy hermit Agastya, but he was himself eaten by that high-souled penitent. While digesting him he arose, and with a smile spoke to Vatapi: 'You, O Vatapi, in your turn have now gone down into a Brahman's belly; and since all arrogance must be punished, therefore be now ground to death by me; and if any one ever ventures to despise an observant Brahman, who like unto me has subdued his senses, he shall certainly share your fate!' Therefore likewise this splendid deer, while thinking to overpower me, will itself find its death like that fiend at the hands of Agastya. Nay, I doubt not that I shall successfully overcome this royal stag. But you, O hero, mind well how in my absence you carefully protect my beloved Sita, and stir not hence until I return; for there are many Raksha-fiends abroad in the forest, bent on mischief."

The glorious hero Rama repeatedly imparted these orders to his excellent brother Lakshmana, and begged him to dismiss all fear.

* Shakra, the name of god Indra as ruler of the eastern regions.
† The Asuras were the enemies of the gods.

TO MR. É. LITTRÉ.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

I LAUNCHED my bark upon a lonely sea,
Though all I loved lay weeping on the shore,
And set my sail for climes unknown to me,
And bade my hopes farewell for evermore.
No chart had marked the unfrequented way,
And soon the giddy needle ceased to guide,
While lowering clouds that darkened all the day
Burst into storm and rent the surging tide.
Black rocks that lurked like foes along the night
Rose menacing, but still I struggled on,
Till, lo, afar a friendly beacon-light
Shone o'er the waste and led me to the dawn.
A stranger hand had fed a saving fire—
'Twas thine, O master! may it never tire.

PARIS, Sept. 16, 1873.

CORRESPONDENCE.

AN EXPLANATION BY MR. PENTECOST.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

Referring to Wheelbarrow's last article allow me to say:

1. The so-called single-tax contemplates the so-called taxing of land up to its full rental value, irrespective of improvements.

2. The so-called single-tax is, therefore, ground-rent by another name.

3. Georgeism does involve the practical confiscation of land by the government. In *form*, it leaves the present owner of land an owner still; but, in *fact*, the government becomes the owner, and the relation between the land-user and the government will be just that between the city of Chicago and the First National Bank.

Does Wheelbarrow object to the confiscation of the land by the whole people to the exclusion of the private legal owners? If so he is at present in the majority, just as they were once in the majority who objected to the confiscation of the slaves from their legal owners. But when a majority of the people of this country come to see that the private ownership of land is *a crime against humanity*, as chattel slavery was a crime against the negroes then, the land will be confiscated just as the slaves were freed. It is simply a question of education. *Now* it seems to most persons that the *legal* owner of land is its *rightful* owner, and therefore he is allowed to keep it; but when it is perfectly clear to most persons that land is *rightfully* the common property of all, then no individual will be allowed to own any land to the exclusion and injury of others.

Wheelbarrow seems to think that if he can fix the charge of confiscation upon Georgeism he has dealt it a heavy blow. On the contrary, that is what we Georgeites glory in. We mean to utterly destroy the private ownership of land by confiscating *ground-rent*—by doing just what I said at the start: having *ground-rents*, and nothing else, paid into the public treasury, just as the First National Bank pays *ground-rent* into the Chicago treasury. But under Georgeism there would be no taxes of any kind to pay. *Ground-rent* would be all that any one would have to pay to government. The land would all be confiscated—taken away from the present owners without compensation, just as we now take a stolen horse away from a horse-thief or away from him to whom the horse-thief sold him. The government would be the real landlord to whom all *ground-rents* would be paid.

Is there any possibility of Wheelbarrow's failing to understand the thing this time? Why does not some one coax him to read "Progress and Poverty?" HUGH O. PENTECOST

NEW YORK.

A QUESTION IN ARITHMETIC.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IF Thomas Clark owns an improved eastern farm worth $15,000, he pays taxes about as follows: Direct taxes, $150, Tariff taxes, $300, Total, $450.

The farm improvements are worth about $8,000; the land value is capitalized at $7,000. His single-tax, if it were in vogue, would be about $280. The single-tax would save him about $170 per annum. Is this confiscation or robbery?

Yours Respectfully,

POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y. WILLIAM C. ALBRO.

LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

WHY does Wheelbarrow insist that the George plan would tax Tom Clark on the full value of his *farm*, when the George plan exempts $300 of the $500 value, because it was the product of Tom's labor?

The *land, alone* was worth, as I remember.....$200
The improvements, ploughing, etc..... 300

Total, $500

Present system taxes him on the whole $500. The George system taxes him on the *value of his land, viz.:* $200, which is on only two-fifths of his whole *farm*. If usual interest was 5 per cent., the rental value of $200 would be $10, and this would be the extreme limit of his taxes—but public expenses don't generally require any thing like the full rental value.

Land is only a fraction of the value of Tom's *farm*. Rental value of land is a percentage of value of land, *i. e.*, is only a part of it. Why is it robbery to take for the public part of *a part*, and all right to take part of *all*. One takes part of value of land; the other takes part of value *of land* and *of improvements* and *of personal property*.

THOMAS WILLIAMSON.

NOTES.

A recent sermon by Mr. John W. Chadwick, "Birthdays of the Spirit," is well worth perusal. (George H. Ellis, Boston.)

The publication is announced, early in June, of a new novel by a well-known contributor to THE OPEN COURT, Mr. M. C. O'Byrne. Its title is "Upon this Rock." Mr. O'Byrne's novel is a vivid portraiture of the life of the Nineteenth century; of its social and intellectual aspects. The question of religious tolerance is a main feature. (Ellis, Moore & Bangs, Toronto.)

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVI. — Continued.

The door of the house was closed outside. For a while Mr. Hummel stood looking round suspiciously, and perspiration rose on his brow. At last he heard Gabriel's knock at the door; he opened it, took the light quickly from his hand, and approached the mirror so as to throw the light upon the frame and wall.

"It seems to stand firm as iron," he said to himself; "it was only a deception."

But he hastily seized his hat, and took the servant out of the room.

"I have had enough for to-day," he muttered; "I wish to get out of this house as quickly as possible. I do not like to have you remain here alone, Gabriel. Early to-morrow I will call for you; I have business for the whole day in the city. Endeavor to sleep; in our beds we shall both think of this intrigue and of her who is still seeking a secure roof for protection from night-storms and spirits."

Ilse traveled through the night; the rain poured in torrents around her, the storm howled through the trees, and the water splashed high from the ruts about the horses and carriage. It was only between the figures of the men on the front seat that she caught glimpses of the midnight sky, which hung heavy and dark above the fugitives. Sometimes a glimmer of light twinkled from the window of a house, and then again there was nothing but rain, storm, and black night. She maintained a terrified silence during the ghostly journey, Mrs. Rollmaus still clasping her hand. Ilse was driving into the world, a storm-lashed world, poor in light and rich in tears. There was uncertainty and fearful anxiety everywhere, whether she thought of the loved one whom she left behind her in the hands of the persecutor, or saw before her the troubled countenance of her father, and the fields of the estate where the young man dwelt whose neighborhood now threatened her with new trouble; but she sat erect.

"When he returns to the door over which the dark angel hovers, he will ask in vain for his wife. But I have done what I had to do: may the sovereign Lord of life watch over me."

There was the sound of a horse's hoofs behind the carriage; it approached nearer. Where the private road to the estate branched off from the highway, a cavalier galloped up on a foaming horse; he spoke to some one on the coachman's seat, the carriage and rider rushed forward side by side for a few moments, then the rider reined in his horse. The Crown Inspector threw a branch of a tree into the carriage.

"The rider has brought this for Lady Ilse; it is from the tree under her window, and the reckoning is paid."

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE LORD HIGH STEWARD.

AT the same hour in which Ilse was listening to the comforting words of her landlord, the carriage of the Lord High Steward was driving to the tower castle of the Princess. The Princess received the announcement with astonishment, and flew down to her reception-room. The Professor caused the chest with its contents to be taken to his room, and was in the act of bending over the manuscript, when the High Marshal entered below to deliver himself of his commission. Meanwhile the Princess awaited the old gentleman.

The Lord High Steward had been appointed to the honorable office of attendance upon the Princess:

* Translation copyrighted.

it was a considerate way of removing him from the person of the Sovereign. At the same hour every morning his carriage was to be seen standing before the wing of the castle which was occupied by the Princess. His personal relations to the young Princess appeared cool; in Court society he was treated by her with just as much distinction as was needful, and petitioners learnt sometimes that their requests were imparted to him. He was esteemed by the citizens on account of his benevolence, and was the only one of the lords of the Court concerning whom one never heard an unfavorable opinion. He dwelt in an old-fashioned house surrounded by gardens, was unmarried, rich, without relations, and lived quietly by himself. He was, it was supposed, without influence; he was not in favor, and was therefore treated by the young cavaliers with chivalrous condescension. He was, notwithstanding all this, indispensable to the Sovereign and the Court. He was the great dignitary who was necessary for all ceremonious affairs; he was counsellor in all family matters; he was ambassador and escort in all transactions with foreign powers. He was well known at most of the courts of Europe, had acquaintances in the great diplomatic bodies, and enjoyed the special favor of various rulers whose good will was of importance to the Sovereign; and as in our courts the reputation that one enjoys at foreign capitals is the standard of the judgment of the palace, the correspondence which he carried on with political leaders in foreign countries, and the abundance of broad ribbons of which he had the choice, gave him with the Sovereign himself an authority which was at the same time burdensome and valuable; he was the secret counsellor for the Court and the last resource in difficult questions.

The servant opened the door of the Princess's room with a profound bow to the old gentleman.. Indifferent questions and answers were exchanged, the Princess entered the adjoining room and intimated to her faithful lady-in-waiting by a sign that she was to keep watch in front. When the conversation was secure from the ear of any listener, the demeanor of the Princess altered, she hastened up to the old gentleman, seized him by the hand, and looked inquiringly at his earnest countenance:

"Has anything happened? No trifle could have caused you to take the trouble of coming into this wilderness. What have you to say to your little daughter,—is it praise or blame?"

"I am but fulfilling my duty," replied the old lord, "if I make my appearance in order to take your Highness's commands, and to ascertain whether the residence of my gracious Princess is suitably arranged."

"Your Excellency has come to complain," exclaimed the Princess, drawing back, "for you have not one kind word for your little woman."

The High Steward bowed his white head in apology:

"If I appear more serious than usual to your Highness, it is perhaps only the fancies of an old man which have intruded themselves at an unseasonable time. I beg permission to relieve myself of them by discussing them with your Highness. The health of the Sovereign is a cause of anxiety to us all: it reminds us of the transitory nature of life. Even the good humor of Prince Victor does not succeed in dissipating my troubled thoughts."

"How does my cousin?" asked the Princess.

"He overcomes the difficulties of being a Prince in a wonderful way," replied the High Steward; but he is sound to the core; he knows very well how to manage serious things cleverly. I rejoice," added the courtier, "that my gracious Princess feels warmly towards a cousin who is faithfully devoted to her Highness."

"He has always been true and kind to me," said the Princess, indifferently. "But now you have punished me severely enough. What you have to say to me confidentially must not be carried on in this way."

She took a chair, and pushed it into the middle of the room.

"Here, sit down, my worthy lord, and allow me to hold the hand of my friend when he tells me what makes him anxious on my account."

She fetched herself a low tabouret, held the right hand of the old lord between hers, looking earnestly into his eyes.

"Your Highness knows the way of giving me courage to make bold requests," said the courtier, laughing.

"That is more to the purpose," said the Princess, relieved; "I now hear the voice and hold the hand of him in whom I most love to trust."

"But I wish for your Highness a nearer and stronger support than myself," began the old lord, earnestly.

The Princess started.

"So it was that which occasioned your Excellency's journey?" she exclaimed, with agitation.

"That was the anxiety which occupied me. It is nothing—nothing more than an idea," said the High Steward, inclining his head.

"And is that to tranquilize me more?" asked the Princes. "What has hitherto given me the power to live but your Excellency's ideas?"

"When your Highness, while still in widow's weeds, was called home, the wish of the Sovereign, making it a duty to attend upon you, was welcome to me; because I thereby obtained the right of carrying on this conversation with your Highness."

He motioned with his hand to the seat, and the Princess again hastened to place herself by his side.

"Now when I see your Highness before me in the bright bloom of youth, richly gifted and fitted to con-

fer the greatest happiness on others and to partake of it yourself, I cannot forbear thinking that it is wrong for you to be debarred from the pleasures of home."

"I have enjoyed this happiness and have lost it," exclaimed the Princess. "Now I have accustomed myself to the thought of renouncing much. I seek for myself a compensation which even you will not consider unworthy."

"There is a difference between us of more than fifty years. A mode of life, proper for me, an unimportant man, may not be permitted the daughter of a princely house. I beg the permission of my beloved Princess," he continued, with a gentle voice, to draw aside to-day the curtain which has covered a dark image of your early youth. You were witness of the scene which separated the Sovereign from your illustrious mother."

"It is a dark recollection," whispered the Princess, looking up anxiously at the old lord; "my mother was reproaching the Sovereign,—it was something concerning the fateful Pavilion. The Sovereign got into a state of excitement that was fearful. I, then but a little girl, ran up and embraced the knees of my mother; he dragged me off, and—" the Princess covered her eyes. The old lord made a motion to stop her, and continued:

"The after-effect of the scene was ruinous to the life of a noble woman, and also to that of yourself. Then for the first time the diseased irritability which has since darkened the Sovereign's spirit displayed itself; from that day the Sovereign sees in you the living witness of his guilt and his disease. He has for years endeavored to wipe away from you that impression by kindness and attentions, but he has never believed himself to be successful. Shame, suspicion, and fear have continually ruined his relations with you. He will not let you go away from him, because he fears that in your confidence to another man you might betray what he would fain conceal from himself. He unwillingly gave in to the first marriage, and he will oppose a second, for he does not wish to see your Highness married again. But in the hours when dark clouds lie over his extraordinary spirit, he rejoices in the thought that your Highness might lose the right of secretly reproaching him. The thought that he did an injury to the princely dignity of his wife gnaws within him, and he is now occupied with the idea that your Highness might under certain circumstances forget your position as princess."

"He hopes in vain," exclaimed the Princess, excitedly. "Never will I allow myself to be degraded by an unworthy passion; it has not been without effect that I have been the child of your cares."

"What is unworthy of a princess?" asked the High Steward, reflectively. "That your Highness would keep yourself free from the little passions which are excited in the quadrille of a masked ball there can be no doubt. But intellectual pastime with subjects of great interest might also disturb the life of a woman. Easily does the most refined intellectual enjoyment pass into extravagance. More than once has the greatest danger of a woman been when under powerful external excitement, she has felt herself to be higher, freer, nobler than her wont. It is difficult to listen to entrancing music and to preserve oneself from a warm interest in the artist who has produced it for us."

The Princess looked down.

"Supposing the case," continued the High Steward, "in which a diseased man, in bitter humor, should meditate and work for such an object, the sound person should guard himself from doing his will."

"But they should also not allow themselves to be disturbed in what they consider for the honor and advantage of their life?" cried the Princess, looking up at the old man.

"Certainly not," replied the latter, "if such benefits are in fact to be gained by the playful devotion of a woman to art or learning. It would be difficult for a princess to find satisfaction in this way. No one blames a woman of the people when she makes a great talent the vocation of her life; she may satisfy herself as singer or painter and please others, and the whole world will smile upon her. But if my gracious Princess should employ her rich musical talent in giving a public concert, why would men shrug their shoulders at it? Not because your Highness's talent is less than that of another artist, but because one expects other objects in your life; the nation forms very distinct ideal demands of its princes. If, unfortunately, the ruling princes of our time do not find if easy to answer to this ideal, yet to the ladies of these illustrious families the serious tendency of the present day makes this more possible than in my youth. A princess of our people ought to be the noble model of a good housewife,—nothing more and nothing else: true and right-minded, firmly attached to her husband, careful in her daily duties, warm hearted to the needy, kind and sympathizing to all who have the privilege of approaching her. If she has intellect, she must beware of wishing to shine; if she has a talent for business, she must guard herself from becoming an *intrigante*. Even the great social talent of virtuosoship she must exercise with the greatest discretion. A well-weighed balance of female excellence is the best ornament of a princess; her highest honor, that she is better and more lovable than others, without parading it, with goodness and capacity in everything, and with no pretensions of any kind. For she stands too high to seek conquest and acquisition for herself."

(*To be continued.*)

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

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

REVIEW OF RECENT WORK OF "THE OPEN COURT."

The work of THE OPEN COURT, for the past six issues, covers a wide range of subjects. In an article in No 87, "The Universal Faith," Mr. T. B. WAKEMAN, of New York, discusses the foundations of a "monistic, positive, human, constructive religion." In the number preceding, an editorial essay points out and emphasizes the radical difference between religious Creeds and religious Faith. Then follow in Nos. 87, 88, and 89, respectively, the articles "Agnosticism and Auguste Comte's Positivism," "Space and Time," "Formal Thought and Ethics." "Personality, Individuality, Consciousness," is the title of an essay (No. 87) by M. TH. RIBOT, the eminent French psychologist, translated with his consent from *Les Maladies de la Personnalité*. It contains the gist, one may say, of the principles from which modern psychology sets out. Dr. FELIX OSWALD contributes, in No. 88, a paper on "Dreams and Visions," an interesting study; and in No. 89, Mr. A. H. HEINEMANN writes effectively upon "The Preservation of Moral Purity in Children."

In criticism, appears the striking article from the French of ALFRED FOUILLEE, entitled "M. GUYAU'S Faith." The paper "The Transient and The Permanent in Theodore Parker" (No. 91), is Part I of a discourse held by Mr. MONCURE D. CONWAY at the dissolution of Mr. Parker's Society. Three articles (Nos. 90, 91, 92,) upon "The History of the People of Israel" are worthy of every reader's careful perusal. The author, Prof. CORNILL, is an orthodox theologian of Königsberg; his researches are marked by critical acumen, spirit, and above all a love of truth. A unique feature of the last few numbers is "The Sitaharanam," a translation from the Sanskrit, by Prof. ALBERT GUNLOGSEN.

In Economics, the controversy between "WHEELBARROW" and "SYMPATHIZER," Nos. 78, 85, 86, 88 occupies the first place. The subject is "Making Bread Dear" WHEELBARROW is well known to readers of THE OPEN COURT; SYMPATHIZER is a prominent Chicago citizen.

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No. 94. (Vol. III.—16.) CHICAGO, JUNE 13, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 cts.

OF CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM.*

BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.

YOUR true Proteus is that which certain philosophers call the Unknowable. What we speak of familiarly as the chain of causation is in fact an endless series of confirmations, of which the subject is presented as the vague sense of a force surviving all change, but which itself, as the vanishing point of knowledge, eludes comprehension. The real Proteus, no Menelaus, wind-bound and starving, or any other son of man, may seize, much less hold. Apart from its forms, it is known only as the boundary of consciousness.

With respect to this ultimate reality, of which the phenomenal universe is a manifestation, men take various attitudes, which, however, may be reduced to two. One of these is the attribute of knowledge, in greater or less degree, not merely of the existence of the force, which both affirm, but of the nature, designs, and supernatural methods. This attitude is common to all theological systems, of which in our era Christianity is the chief. The other attitude is one of cheerful but reverent submission to the limits of the human mind as marked by the adumbration of this force, with a disclaimer of all knowledge concerning what lies outside of those limits. This is Agnosticism, with which the last survivor of theological systems, should they come to that, will have still to reckon; and it is the intention of this brief paper to define the attitude of Agnosticism, as abstractly the radical and irreconcilable foe of theological systems of every kind, towards Christianity, as their representative in the current time.

In fulfilling this intention, it is proper, first, to state explicitly the distinction between Christianity and Agnosticism.

What, then, is the distinguishing mark of Christianity? Not religion; for religion, pure and simple, is the emotion excited by a consciousness of the ultimate reality, and, hence, belongs alike to Christian and Agnostic. Not morality; for the code of morals adopted by Christianity existed before Christ, and, in point of fact, was formulated by Agnostics themselves, who, at any rate, claim an equal share in it. There remains only the Christian system of theology, of which the pivotal point is the plan of redemption; and this, strictly speaking, is what distinguishes Christianity from Agnosticism.

Of the three distinct elements that make up Christianity in the familiar but superficial acceptation, two, religion and morality, are not peculiar to it, and, saying the least, no more Christian than Agnostic. The real characteristic of Christianity, the core and essence of it, is the scheme of theology which hinges on the doctrine of the atonement. This is its own; at all events Agnostics lay no claim to it. But this only is its own. Christianity, stripped of the borrowed elements that enrich and adorn it, is only this, and nothing more.

And this, it is needless to say, Agnosticism rejects; not primarily on account of rational objections to the scheme in itself, with which Agnosticism as such has no special concern, but on account of the fallacy of attributing any scheme to what we can know only as an indestructible force, whereof, consequently, nothing can be legitimately affirmed save indestructibility, and which, as transcending the intellect, is simply another name for the limit of knowledge, the affirmation of knowledge beyond which is a contradiction in terms. That what lies beyond the grasp of our knowing faculties we cannot know, is a self-evident proposition, if not, indeed, an identical one. And what we cannot know we cannot legitimately affirm.

On this ground Agnosticism stands; presenting towards the Christian theology, as towards theology in every other form, an attitude of calm antagonism, at once thorough-going and uncompromising. But the scene of this antagonism, so far as Agnosticism may determine it, is none other than the serene domain of reason.

In the domain of action, Agnosticism, having defined its tenet, and recorded its protest against all tenets contrary to it, turns aside from the arena of polemics, and goes about the peaceful business of in-

* This article, it is proper to say, was prepared not only without reference to THE OPEN COURT, but without knowledge of it, which accounts for the absence of allusion to what has been said about Agnosticism in the editorial columns of this journal. Although now aware in a general way that THE OPEN COURT rejects Agnosticism under that name, I venture to let the article stand substantially as prepared, because, in the first place, it expresses my views, and, in the second place, the word *Agnosticism* is already popularized, and, above all, is significant of the point at which theology takes leave of science, and where, accordingly, it is the interest of science that the conflict between the two should centre; for, though religion and science are at one, theology and science are mutual foes, and can never lie down in peace together, unless, according to the familiar pleasantry, one lies inside of the other. Agnosticism, as I understand it, does not seem exposed to the reproach of dualism; if it is, the point of exposure, I think, may be easily guarded. P. R. S.

creasing knowledge within the province of the knowable, holding it neither necessary nor profitable to shoulder the musket of controversy, and mount guard on the frontier of the unknowable. That awful limit needs no sentinel to guard its inviolability; and, seeing that below in the field of knowledge the harvest is great but the laborers are few, those Utopian spirits that would harvest in the region beyond, fancying they can gather therein golden sheaves, may be wisely left to the consequences of their Utopianism; particularly as these, on the whole, form no unimportant factor in the development of man. And here emerges the consideration which controls the practical attitude of Agnosticism towards Christianity.

Institutions are the growth of experience, and, if they did not promise to serve pressing interests, would never arise, as they would quickly end, did they fail to redeem this promise; for men inevitably find out whether their pressing interests are served or thwarted, and, in the long run, regulate their action by the discovery. An institution rooted in the past, and flourishing in the present, therefore, must needs serve humanity, and, no matter how irrational in itself, shows an indefeasible title to the respect of men, not excepting those who may perceive its intrinsic absurdity. The history and status of such an institution not only vindicate its usefulness, but establish its right to exist until mankind has outgrown it, and a successor, more fit to serve the interests concerned as well as more in harmony with reason, is ready to supply the place of it; when it will crown its usefulness by passing away.

It follows that the true method of reforming or abolishing institutions is to assist mankind in outgrowing them, rather than directly to assail them, except of course in a way, and to a degree, that may quicken the growth which must eventually modify or supersede them. An institution, like any other agency, is best abolished by enabling the principal to do better without it; and this end is best promoted, not by trying to explode the institution, but by helping it to fulfill its mission.

Among the still thriving institutions that have come down from the past, Christianity unquestionably is one of the most august and beneficent; for, although it has no exclusive claim to morality or religion, and though its theology is visionary, it so combines the three as to make it, in the present phase of human development, an indispensable agency in guiding and refining men. The Christian theology, like every other theology, is a delusion, but the religion and morality associated with it are capital verities, which it serves to cherish and enforce, delusion though it is, as no truth can do, while men mistake the awe-inspiring fable for reality; since, by incorporating morals into its scheme of salvation, it puts upon its adherents, in form of right conduct, the tremendous pressure compounded of the fear of eternal punishment and the hope of eternal happiness, which, manifestly, so long as it operates in full or even partial vigor, no mere force of reason can adequately replace.

The interests of society, accordingly, require that this pressure shall not decrease faster than the force of reason shall increase; so that the influence which is to supersede it in the end may continually supplement it before the end, and the sum of moral restraint undergo at no time any damaging diminution. It is this consideration to which I have referred as controlling the practical attitude of Agnosticism towards Christianity. In effect, as already seen, the attitude is one not of antagonism but of concert.

Theoretically, indeed, Agnosticism rejects Christianity, as essentially a system of theology, equally groundless with every other system of the kind; practically, nevertheless, Agnosticism acquiesces in Christianity, as a provisional engine of morality and religion, with which men cannot afford to dispense, as they surely will not dispense, until it is rendered unnecessary by a superior agency, which, however, can only be the slow outgrowth of the moral and intellectual advancement of the race, whereto, be it confessed, Christianity itself must continue indefinitely, what it has been from its rise, one of the main contributors. As regards the moral nature of man, in other words, the theological part of Christianity, wherein lies its distinguishing character, as I beg to repeat, may be likened to the shell of the chrysalis, which is essential to the development of the insect, but which, when the insect is developed, bursts asunder, freeing the perfect creature; whereas, removing the shell prematurely would leave the insect to die, in lieu of developing. The only salutary way of cutting short the term of the chrysalis is to speed the development of the insect.

And it is solely in the spirit of this method that Agnosticism would abridge the sway of theology: it would get rid of it by development, instead of destruction. In fine, Agnosticism, regarding Christianity as a stage in the moral evolution of man, is content to wait for man to pass out of it, expediting his passage not by decrying the station, but by reënforcing his strength, and directing his eyes to the goal that beckons him onward, emphasizing, to be sure, whenever and wherever needful, the pregnant implication that the station is not the goal.

It thus appears, if I may be allowed to use without offense a commercial figure, that of the great theological houses which in the process of time successively do business between man and the power represented as his maker, Agnosticism adopts the faith of none, but takes stock in each, being the silent partner of all.

It remains for me to express the hope, which I sincerely do, that Christianity, as the reigning house in this age, may have no good reason to feel ashamed of the connection. And I venture to add the hope that Agnosticism will prove not less fortunate. Be all this as it may, the partnership, whatever its fortunes, will continue until, if ever, the spread of enlightenment puts an end to the business, winding up, in the midst of heaven on earth, the last establishment.

THE TEACHINGS OF THEODORE PARKER.

A DISCOURSE AT THE DISSOLUTION OF HIS SOCIETY, FEB. 3, 1889.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

III.

SIMPLE Theism is the recurrent clearing away of outlined symbols. It is always transitional. Mere theism has never been able to sway mankind as a finality. Men build no temples for abstract or causal gods; there is perhaps not one church in the world erected to any deity never seen in human form—no temple to Brahma, or Jehovah, or Allah, no church ever dedicated to Almighty God. Churches bear the names of human helpers, saints, saviours,—of Krishna, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, Luther, Wesley. Man is interested in man; theisms end in human incarnations.

Every religion begins with man adoring the universe and ends with the universe adoring man. And every special religious movement must run this course. Modern naturalism has run that course. All theology is now passing away before an enthusiasm of humanity which corresponds to what was called incarnation of God.

Speculations about divine personality will become attenuated like those about predestination, fore-knowledge, and the rest,—by desuetude. Men will be too much absorbed in human salvation to argue about abstractions. Jesus is becoming an archetype of all modern reformers.

The exalted and constructive theism of Theodore Parker paled his Christianity. To him Jesus was a great and good man who, not withstanding some limitations, taught the absolute religion—love to God and Man. Jesus Christ became his model man and teacher.

Unfortunately, the Jesus Christ of the New Testament is not a mere man: he is combination of a miraculous radical and a supernatural king. Parker objected to him as a king coming in clouds of glory to set his disciples on twelve thrones to rule over mankind, and as sending all who refused him worship into unquenchable fire. He did not see that Jesus as the poor man's champion was invested with popular superstition.

Jesus's denunciation of the rich and respectable as a generation of vipers, who cannot escape the damnation of hell, his inculcation of poverty as a beatitude and duty, of a socialism non-resistant in its own brotherhood but armed against outside authority, are not the voice of an individual man but of wide-spread fanaticism exasperated by oppression.

The morality of Jesus is related to the miracles. The son of kings born in a stable, was evolved into a Son of God, but also into a divine Son of Man born of a peasant woman. In the legend two forces, the imperial and the plebeian, struggle, like Jacob and Esau in the womb; they have contended with alternate success through history; and this day the crowned Christ on his throne is confronted by the Son of Man with his revolution,—coming not to bring peace but a sword.

Theodore Parker's method was, I think, influenced by his realistic conception of a Jesus who was unreal. He individualized as a reformer an incarnation of popular superstitions and hatreds, as well as of aspirations. Some of Parker's preaching seems to belong to the militant age, in which we saw every man not for us as against us. But that method is passing away before the evolutional age, which sees that every man is for us at heart, however his development may be arrested by circumstances.

We must abandon the notion that our opponents are hypocrites, or lovers of wrong, or time-servers, or blind leaders of the blind. We are all growing in the same rain and sunshine; the expanded flower must not misunderstand the bud's bitter taste, but shed on it fragrant pollen.

Otherwise the bud may misunderstand the flower, and not follow its expansion. Theodore Parker was gentle, affectionate, lowly; yet he was regarded by his opponents as bitter, sarcastic, arrogant; and even dear friends entreated him to be less severe. To one of these he answered:

> "While I feel great tenderness towards the preconceived notions of *individuals*, when I am to speak of a mass of doctrines that come between man and God, I think the blow must be strong enough to cut clean through, and let the light stream through the rent."

To another:

> "I say to you, what I never said before—not even to my wife—that after writing some of those sentences for which I am most commonly abused, I have been obliged to pause, then throw myself on a couch and get relief in tears. . . . He that reads my books twenty years hence—if I am not quite forgotten by that time—will not find in them the abuse, the sarcasm, the contumely, and all that, which so grieves you."

To this his appeal to the judgment of the future, you and I can this evening respond; and I believe the verdict must be that Parker was, indeed, tender to individuals. Yet, writing beneath the musket which another Captain Parker used at Lexington, he felt himself struggling in a revolution against great religious

and political oppressions. Therefore his words must be sometimes hard as bullets, though each tore his heart as it went forth. For it was the cause of God, of truth, of humanity, which his soul's honor dare not compromise.

It was the militant method. It was not logical in him; for if, as he affirmed, God was everywhere immanent, he must be at work in that same "mass of doctrines that come between Man and God." But this is the inevitable inconsistency of all who kneel to infinite perfection everywhere, then rise up to fight imperfection everywhere. It is the inconsistency which worships a father who sends his sunshine alike on just and unjust, but for the unjust has a practical "Depart, ye cursed!"

But the revolutionary method has been superseded by the evolutionary method. In the present stage of philosophy thinkers far inferior to Parker may discover in him survivals of the crusader, the Puritan, and in his doctrine unconscious remnants of dogmas he assailed. Even so the next generation will discover similar survivals in the most advanced minds of to day. For such are hereditary, and a man can rarely educate himself out of them. Therefore in estimating a teacher the main thing is what he added to his moral and intellectual heritage. And in the city of Boston which he helped to make the metropolis of culture and philanthropy, many witnesses remain to attest that, whatever may be the fate of some of his opinions, the personality of Theodore Parker, the human standard he erected, his moral elevation, his invincibility blended with humility, have made him a type of American character which shall never pass away. It will remain for honor when some of his speculations, and some which succeed them, shall alike be remembered only as religious fossils of the Nineteenth Century.

There will some day be centennials of spiritual independence, and of the union of religious colonies; and in that day every scrap of testimony concerning Theodore Parker will be searched for as now every scrap relating to Washington. He will be a far greater name then than now, for it will take a century to sum the results of his work.

One of your great "Athenians" told me that once, having conquered some prejudices, he went to the Music Hall to hear this setter forth of strange doctrines. What he heard was a notice that the great preacher was ill; and never again did Parker preach. Not the individual Parker,—not the transient orator. But last evening, as I listened to the orchestra in that hall, I saw that although the great organ, once set up with rejoicings, has been removed, the bronze Beethoven still stands; and though no work of his was named on the programme every strain had been touched by his spirit. And the Bostonians who went too late to hear the great New England preacher are still listening to him. Only last Sunday I heard Parker preach in Boston. He bore the outward appearance of Phillips Brooks, but that great-hearted sermon had never been heard had not Parker lived.

Theodore Parker while he wrote on paper also wrote on hearts, and much that only experience could interpret and estimate. I do not apologize therefore for giving you a brief transcript of what Theodore Parker wrote on my own life.

In my early youth, in Virginia, Carlyle's famous pamphlet had just quieted all our misgivings about slavery, when Theodore Parker's voice was heard. A Richmond editor published the whole of his discourse on Daniel Webster, much to the horror of his subscribers; he published it, he told me, from admiration for the power and moral courage of it. That discourse was a revelation to me. I supposed till then that all learned men believed slavery a divine institution, especially preachers. I did not learn till later what a peculiar preacher Parker was. Carlyle's casuistries were cleared away from that time, but I never read another page of Parker for a year or two.

When from terrible trials, attending abandonment of my Methodist ministry, I came on to enter the Divinity School, I was still a minor in several senses, —as lonely and sad and crude an exile as ever came with his pittance to a great city. I asked for the cheapest hotel. In a little diary, unread for 35 years, I have just found some hasty entries.

"1853, Feb. 25. To Boston. On the way the cars ran into a train—and smash! Reached Boston about 6. Put up at the Marlboro House; a very orderly, pleasant, and orthodox place. They have prayers morning and night, at which a piano with Æolian addition is used. After prayers there is singing till bed-time.

26th. I was introduced to many fine men and preachers. Dr. Young carried me about to look at various places. It was with a thrill I cannot describe that I saw the Cradle of Liberty.

27th. Went to hear Theodore Parker. His sermon was on good and evil temper. Text: "Better is a dinner of herbs where love is than a stalled ox and hatred therewith." I don't like him at all, and wish I had worshiped at King's Chapel with dear Mr. Peabody, whom, with his whole family, I love.

Afternoon. Went to hear Father Taylor. A good sermon, but I think the old man is failing. He insisted on my going to his house afterwards. He was at first inclined to be severe about my leaving the Methodist Church. "Brother," said I, "if I could only be like some of the New England Methodists, and say, I don't believe the Trinity, I would have done so; but Methodism here and in the Baltimore conference differ." The old man relented. "Well," said he, "our southern brethren are very strict about what they know nothing of."

Why I didn't like Parker's sermon on good and evil temper I know not. Being still a Methodist, except as to the Trinity, I may have been in the spiritual frame of the colored brother in Georgia, who was distressed when the Rev. Sam Jones, during a revival, thought it best to give his converts some exhortation of a moral

kind. "Brother Jones," said he, "when you preach about the Ten Commandments, you kind o' throw a damper on the whole thing."

I met Emerson about that time, and he told me to go again to the Music Hall. "There," he said, "you will hear the one sane voice." Another entry.

"March 10, 1853. Theodore Parker is helping me to find Ben Williams, a fugitive [slave] from our neighborhood, aunt Nancy's husband."

How well I remember that exploration of the negro quarters! Late in the night, as I was leaving Virginia, a woman belonging to my father implored me to find her husband, fugitive from a neighbor, hiding in Boston; to help him if he were suffering; to send her some tidings of him.

Then I learned how deep and far the pulses of Parker's heart had gone. I can hear yet the fervent "God bless you, Sir!" of those poor negroes on their great friend. He said, "Here is a Virginian seeking a fugitive, but do not fear him." They would have trusted me then if I had held handcuffs, and ere long I found my man.

As we were on our way, an old woman asked us the way to the Catholic Church. He gave her the direction, most politely, and remarked presently: "A heretic may point a soul to the true Church."

Meanwhile he was pointing me to the Music Hall, and there I heard the great sermons. Every one had the reality of an occasional utterance. There I sat with the people under his simple speech, listening breathlessly, with now a smile rippling over us, and now a tear falling, and went away fed, satisfied.

Most of us were poor in the Divinity School; we of Parker's flock used to walk from Cambridge and back to save the money; but we went back rich to our dinner (literally) of herbs. For the teacher had spoken to each intimately, to his condition; as, when the shepherd god Krishna played his flute, each maiden believed she had him for a partner in the dance. He was a great preacher. His thoughts were mother-thoughts; they were not only maternal, but bore other thoughts.

I remember one morning, when the fugitive slave, Anthony Burns, was imprisoned, his petition for the prayers of the congregation for his deliverance was found by the preacher on his desk. He opened, and slowly read it, then said: "I am not disposed to ask God to do our work." That one sentence is the seed of a new religion, and one that will be permanent.

Next day, when a secret council met to consider what should be done with the fugitive, Parker began his remarks with the words: "I cannot counsel a risk, I am not prepared to share;" and thereafter each adviser said calmly precisely what he was prepared to carry into action. And with equal responsibility his every word was spoken. His spirit was that of one who came not to be ministered unto but to minister.

One mournful day, when some graduates in divinity came to tell him that their choice of him to address their class had been overruled,—an unprecedented thing,—he calmed their indignation. None knew until after his death how deeply he had been wounded.

Ah, great-hearted teacher, the time has come when they with us say: "Blessed were he who should come with the love and power, and the fidelity of Theodore Parker!" And by thy stripes we, thy children, are healed. Thy work is achieved. Thy congregation may be dismissed. We are free.

TWO ERRORS OF AGNOSTICISM.

IN REPLY TO MR. PAUL R. SHIPMAN

Mr. Paul R. Shipman starts with the idea of the Unknowable, which he conceives as the substance that underlies all changes. It is the real Proteus, no Menelaus may seize, much less to hold. Mr. Shipman announces as self-evident that "what lies beyond the grasp of our knowing faculties, we cannot know."

This tautological judgment is formally correct. But we add, that every real existence lies within the possible grasp of cognition.

We observe in nature around us many processes taking place, and we notice that there remains something unchanged in all the changes. This may be called substance, but we object to its being characterized as unknowable. We know or at least can know all about substance that is real, and that is all we want to know; that which is unknowable in substance is unreal and non-existent. For the Unknowable is identical with the impossible, the self-contradictory, the unintelligible, that which has neither rhyme nor reason. Existence and knowability are identical.

Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is no immovable and unchangeable Proteus, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore does not mean absolute existence, but existence and the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely unknowable is therefore untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested; *i. e.*, without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility. Existence, reality, and cognizability are synonymous terms.

Insolvable problems are by no means such as are too profound for solution but such as are wrongly stated. This truth is splendidly illustrated in the following little poem* by Adeline V. Pond.

* *Wide Awake* for April, 1889, p. 336:

It was a small and foolish child who met the Great Wise Man,
And opening wide his Question-Bag, 'twas thus the child began:

"O, Great Wise Man, I've questions here that long have puzzled me,
And if you've answers that will fit, I'll buy me two or three.

"First, can I make a new pig's ear out of my old silk purse?
Is killing time like eating dates, or is it really worse?

"Next, what do little fishes do to keep their stockings dry?
And, since the water is so wet, how do they ever cry?

"Pray, what's the fish that gives us scales wherewith we weigh our words?
Could people really kill a stone, if they should use two birds?

"Then, last of all, please tell me, sir—and this is question seven—
Is't raining up or raining down, when they have rain in heaven?"

The Great Wise Man thought hard and fast: his finger-ends he bit;
He searched in vain his Answer-Book for answers that would fit.

At last he said: "I know great things; when I was very young,
In nine and ninety languages I learned to hold my tongue.

"And backwards, even when asleep, or standing on my head,
In child's Chinese and grown folks' Greek, my tables oft I said.

"The higher mathematics—they seem very low to me—
I know in Heidelberg's Great Tun how many gills might be.

"The thousand answers in my Book, will tell you things like those,
But what *you* ask I cannot tell: and so, there's no one knows."

The Great Wise Man went on his way, as great and wise men will;
I fear me much that foolish child is small and foolish still.

Mr. Shipman proposes a truce between Christianity and Agnosticism. He recognizes the merits of existing institutions and does not so much want them to be abolished as to be developed to higher and purer forms until the last establishment winds up "in the midst of heaven on earth."

We sympathize with Mr. Shipman in his appreciation of Christianity, but we cannot believe with him in that "heaven on earth"; a state of "absolute perfection," as Mr. Spencer expresses himself,—a state in which the adaptation to ends is perfect. Such an idea is not compatible with the law of evolution. We have in many respects reached the ideal of former ages, and nevertheless we are infinitely far from absolute perfection. Many of the most pressing needs of the past are now, under more favorable conditions, satisfied; but new wants have risen under the very influence of civilization, so that it appears as if progress itself were injurious, making us dissatisfied with things with which our ancestors were more than contented.

That heaven on earth, accordingly, is a chimera, which to him who is not able to create a heaven of contentedness for himself under the given conditions, always appears to be at a far distance, either in the past or in the future.

Schopenhauer says that human happiness may be likened to a fraction, the denominator of which represents our wants and the numerator their satisfactions. Every progress allows each of the two to increase; and it would be a vain hope ever to expect to have the millennium on earth realized. Absolute perfection is an impossibility.

Whether the doctrine of atonement is to be considered as "the real characteristic of Christianity, the core and essence of it," we shall not discuss. Christianity has differed greatly in different ages and among different people. We have no quarrel with Christianity and no one should have any objection to it, if it is to be considered as the religion of love. But we are at war with those who identify Christianity with Supernaturalism. The worshiper of the Supernatural, like the Agnostic, believes in the Unknowable; he will and he does greet Agnosticism as his strongest ally, for he says with Kant: "I must abolish knowledge in order to make room for belief."

Supernaturalism thus abolishes faith and places in its stead creed. Faith need not be in contradiction to science and philosophy. There is such a thing as rational faith. But creed stands in contradiction to positive knowledge. Creed is irrational as a matter of principle, as Augustine says: *Credo quia absurdum;* and creed, irrational creed, has its safest basis on the principle of Agnosticism. P. C.

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

III.

THE illustrious Raghuid having imparted these orders to Lakshmana and made up his mind to kill the deer, sallied forth in order to follow its track. He seized his bent bow, inlaid with golden ornaments, and fastened to it his quiver; he slung the golden-hilted sword across his shoulders, and clad in a coat of mail, he at once started for the forest in pursuit of the antelope.

Then Maritcha fled before him with the swiftness of the wind; but Rama soon closed in upon him. The fiend in his mad career through the Dandaka-forest trembled with fear of Rama, and at times he entirely disappeared out of sight, but in the next instant was seen again.

Rama followed with the utmost speed, while the stag at alternate intervals would be in sight, and as suddenly bound off, in its terror of being hit, enticing Rama still farther and farther. Seen, lost to sight, alarmed, again darting off, then slackening his pace, or stopping, thus Maritcha in his head-long flight sped through the forest of Dandaka.

When at last Rama coming up to the phantom-stag, thought to have him near enough, full of wrath he drew his bow; but the stag also had perceived Rama coming up bow in hand, and in a trice he had vanished out of sight, yet instantly again reappeared;

thus, at alternate brief intervals, near and far off, by his sudden starts mocking Rama, and enticing him still deeper into the wilderness.

Like the veiled orb of the moon in autumn from behind flitting, black clouds, so the stag by turns was concealed, and again revealed to the pursuing Rama.

And thus the Kakutstha Rama had to hunt the animal through the entire length of the forest in alternate fits of anger at the mocking illusion before him.

At last it was brought to a stop, while seeking a shelter beneath the grassy shades of the wood, and was seen closely surrounded by a multitude of stags, standing motionless, their eyes wide-open with terror.

The generous Rama also kept him in sight, and being resolved to dispatch him, he drew his powerful bow, and laid a deadly arrow on the string. Aiming at the stag, he sent off the fiery arrow, created by Brahma, and shot Maritcha through the heart—alas, the powerful missile struck him in the heart!

For a moment he struggled to rise, but from his wound he again sank to the ground; and there the big-toothed Raksha-fiend remained in all the glory of his assumed form. As he thus lay writhing with pain, his fearful groans were heard all around.

But then, in his hour of death Maritcha recalled to mind his master's love; and in a loud voice the evil one imitated Rama's voice, shouting: O Lakshmana! so that it echoed three times through the forest. Such was his disposition even in his hour of death!

For if Sita in her solitude from concern for her husband sends Lakshmana hither, then deprived of him, she would fall an easy prey to Ravana. This he bore in mind, while emitting the false sound, in his dying hour evincing his devotion to his master, Ravana. Then, leaving his stag-like form, he again assumed that of a Raksha; and in his death his body swelled to enormous dimensions.

But, on perceiving that he had felled only a hideous Raksha, Rama's soul at once flew back to Sita, and he felt overwhelmed with anxiety.

Looking with contempt upon the loathsome corpse of the killed Raksha, with a heavy heart he returned homeward, by the same path he had come.

IN MEMORY OF LIEUT. HUGH WILSON McKEE, U. S. N.*

(KILLED IN ACTION.)

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

When to the beat of muffled drums we follow
A comrade to the grave, with measured tread,
Solemn and slow,
We march to mournful music of the dead;
But as we turn to go,
Quickened step and cheerful strain
Lead us back to where remain
Life and strife and joy that laughs at woe.

It is not well that Death
Should take, with one man's breath,
The hope and courage of the friends that stay;
And cause, while summer shines
A blessing on the vines,
Despair to fill the heart that should be gay.

What strength we have we need
To plow and plant the seed
That came, a birthright, from the general store,
And make two blades of grass
To flourish, ere we pass
Away, where one blade used to grow before.

But let not Time that dries
The tear in Love's own eyes
Efface the memory of those who fall.
I drain a glass to-night,
In Death and Time's despite,
To shipmates gone before us, one and all.

And one more glass to those
Whom partial Fortune chose
To plant our colors where the laurels grow;
A bumper to the dead
Whose willing hearts have bled
In battle, with their faces to the foe!

Fill out the roll of Fame!
Let every date proclaim
Its own, and where they fell, by land or sea.
When those who rank have done,
I'll take, for 'Sixty-one,
The first man killed in action, Hugh McKee.

One versed in gentle ways,
With lips that loved to praise,
And simple-hearted, as the truly great;
Whose soul, in poet-wise,
Drank azure from the skies,
Whose red blood swelled the venging arm of hate:

Who durst, in times grown old
With worship of dull gold
And mean observance of an empty breath,
Choose honor, undefiled
With cant; and when she smiled
Beyond the waiting parapet, choose Death.

Ay, *choose!* not killed like one
Of thousands, having done
The simple duty of the soldier well;
But leading where the brave
Came all too late to save,
Within that far Corean citadel.

At Buena Vista, won
Though twice the setting sun
Could doubt, his father charged and saved the day;
And both, for this fair land,
Fell fighting sword in hand:
O Alma Mater, nourish such as they!

* Read at the dinner of the U. S. Naval Academy Graduates Association.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A PROFESSORSHIP OF EVOLUTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I MUST steal time just to say how fully I endorse what Dr. Cope says of a Professorship of Evolution. Just now our colleges are biologically stumbling about for lack of a clear conception of

this doctrine which takes up all the facts of history and reduces them to a science. So also our liberally inclined ministers with their churches are groping for the positive and generally grasping only the negative. The one want of our age is biology in our higher institutions, taught by men not under bondage to creeds, but bound only to facts and truths.

Truly yours,

CLINTON, N. Y., 1889. E. P. POWELL.

CONFISCATION.

A REPLY TO MR. HUGH O. PENTECOST,

THE communication of Mr. Pentecost in No. 93 of THE OPEN COURT, is tenderly introduced as an "Explanation." I call it a confession. I think I have a right to call it so, because I conducted the cross-examination which procured it. After evading me like quicksilver for about three months Mr. Pentecost now acknowledges that my interpretation of the vanity known as "Georgeism" was correct, and that in spite of his taunts, and insinuations to the contrary I did "understand the question," and did know "what I was talking about." Not often does a witness break down under cross-examination so completely as Mr. Pentecost has broken down. He now says:

"Georgeism does involve the practical confiscation of land by the government. In *form* it leaves the present owner of land an owner still; but, in *fact*, the government becomes the owner. * * *

"When a majority of the people of this country come to see that the private ownership of land is *a crime against humanity*, as chattel slavery was a crime against the negroes, then the land will be confiscated just as the slaves were freed. * * *

"Wheelbarrow seems to think that if he can fix the charge of confiscation upon Georgeism he has dealt it a heavy blow. On the contrary, that is what we Georgeites glory in. We mean to utterly destroy the private ownership of land by confiscating *ground-rent*. * * *

"*Ground-rent* would be all that any one would have to pay to government. The land would all be confiscated—taken away from the present owners without compensation, just as we now take a stolen horse away from a horse-thief or away from him to whom the horse-thief sold him."

Considering how these explanations contradict those which Mr. Pentecost gave us in THE OPEN COURT, Nos. 85 and 91, there is droll comedy in the question. "Is there any possibility of Wheelbarrow's failing to understand the thing this time?"

To that I answer: How can I fail to understand it? The purpose to confiscate is declared. How can any man fail to understand the "Georgeites" when they say: "We mean to utterly destroy the private ownership of land?" A reference to the former numbers of THE OPEN COURT will show that I always understood it so, and that Mr. Pentecost did not. If he did, he concealed his understanding from us by pretending that Tom Clark would be better off under "Georgeism," and that his farm would be burdened with taxes amounting to little or nothing. Mr. Pentecost now declares that the purpose of George'sm is to take Tom's farm away from him entirely, as if it were a stolen horse.

I earnestly call the attention of Mr. Albro and Mr. Williamson, who immediately follow Mr. Pentecost to his astonishing confession; and I ask them, not in taunt or triumph, but as fellow searchers after truth, whether it is not a waste of arithmetic to figure up the probable amount of Tom Clark's taxes, when only the *form* of his farm is to remain to him while the *fact* and substance of it are to be taken away?

The comparisons of Mr. Pentecoet are discordant and confused. There is no likeness between a slave and a farm, nor between the emancipation of a slave and the confiscation of land. The slaves were not confiscated; they were freed. It is true that Gen. Butler in the early part of the war did confiscate some slaves, under the prevarication that they were "contraband of war"; a mischievous pretense, which proved to be a sophism both in ethics and in politics, About the same time I had the honor to emancipate a slave who had taken refuge in my camp. I did it on grounds opposite to those assumed by Gen. Butler. I refused to give the negro up, not because he was a chattel forfeited, but because he was a man, and therefore impossible to be contraband of war. I expose the inaptitude of Mr. Pentecost's comparisons because it is the habit of social reformers to press into the service of their argument the emancipation of the slaves. We commit a solecism when we compare a scheme of serfdom to that splendid achievement of liberty.

I use the word serfdom with deliberation because the ownership of land has ever been the political distinction between a freeman and a serf. The ownership of land is the sign and title of a freeman, the inspiration of his patriotism. His very estate is called a freeholding, or a freehold, and he himself is called a free-holder. Every tenure below the grade of a freehold is politically "*base*," and I am informed that it is technically so in law. To confiscate all the farms in the United States, and to compel the farmers to hold their lands as tenants at will to "Government" would substitute a base tenure for a free tenure; it would practically reduce farming to a menial business, and farmers all to serfdom. Fancy the ragged condition of American freedom when all the farms and all the town lots in the country are confiscated by the government and thrown into politics. Imagine the confiscation done in 1889. The farms are all owned by the government and the letting them out begins. Would a democrat get a lease if a republican wanted it? Not one. The corruption growing out of such a system would breed Chaos. The spirit of freedom may die out everywhere else, but on the hearth-stone of the freehold the fires of liberty burn for ever. It is a perverted philanthropy which seeks to improve society by abolishing the freehold.

Again Mr. Pentecost invites me to read "Progress and Poverty." There is kindly patronage in the invitation, and I gratefully accept it, although I think that the weakest debater on any subject is the shiftless disputant, who, when he has had enough of the controversy throws a whole book at his adversary, and tells him to read that. However, I will read it once more to please Mr. Pentecost, and while I am about it, will Mr. Pentecost gratify me by reading Sir Thomas More's Utopia, and a few chapters in Don Quixote. WHEELBARROW.

INDIVIDUAL USEFULNESS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IN the many interesting articles upon poverty or labor reforms that have appeared in your paper there is one view that seems neglected. Both the incapacity of many poor, and the injustice of the circumstances surrounding classes of working people, need attention and removal. But since this after all depends upon the will and interest of humanity at large, some attention should be paid to finding a motive strong enough to arouse this will and interest. All know that if there were some widespread scheme for endowing each individual with powers to control circumstances, instead of the mere ability to succeed when all circumstances were favorable, the question would be settled. Many institutions are at work presumably in this very direction, Education, Religion, Charity; but in the first place it is no one's business to inquire whether they are doing the work well or ill, and in the second it needs the common sense of all the world, and this will never be given until it is proved that it would *pay* to elevate the masses.

Poverty never has existed because mother Earth could not furnish enough for all her children. There will never be enough truffles and diamonds to go round, it is true, but fortunately only a small number find them indispensable. As for necessities and comforts, science waits always on tip-toe to double and triple the resources as fast as we find the keys to unlock her undeveloped stores. But the greatest drug in the market is a class of in-

dividuals who have nothing in the world to do with hands and head but give the minutest attention and care, and who are sinking daily into greater incapacity because they are not giving it. The poorest of humanity has his fourteen hours a day to spend in some way, the most ignorant has a capacity for something. It is a self-evident truth also that lack of money is not the cause of poverty, and neither is it lack of work though this seems the most constant complaint. What is work? Only manufacturing, building, mining, washing and ironing, teaching, etc.? Because these, and a few other occupations satisfied our forefathers' needs, are there never to be others? There are countless occupations lying in the womb of the future, waiting for comprehensive thought to develop them and the executive ability to prepare untrained humanity for them. It is the thinking power that is lacking more means for work or people to do it, but no one seems to be raising a hue and cry about this want, serious as it is.

Why do business enterprises cease producing and throw their employees out of work? Because there is an excess of the supply over the demand; that is, there are not consumers enough. Then lack of consumers is the cause, not the selfishness of the producers; and this is the case in all the business walks of life. Musical interests suffer for lack of audiences, art for lack of buyers, hotels and restaurants for lack of those who must have the delicacies of life; educational institutions are never self-supporting for lack of those who value what they can give. Now if more consumers were an impossibility, there would be an ethical right to demand that producers guage their productions by this fact; but since consumers can be multiplied indefinitely, the blame must be shifted on the power that fails to multiply. Here waits this multitude of honest poor who barely live, and of the vicious and indolent who do not know what living is, and every individual of the number is a latent machine for consuming luxuries, wearing fine and expensive material, and keenly enjoying expensive pleasures; and every one who is lifted from this life of bare existence to one where it becomes a necessity for him to have the best of life, even if he has to work for it, is adding so much to the world's wealth.

It would be able to convince the thinkers and people of leisure, that it was not at all the workingmen's business to furnish themselves with the training that would enable them to conquer adversity and not constantly succumb to pressure of circumstances and so recruit the class below; that it was not even their business to furnish the motives for making the most of their abilities. They are already doing the heaviest half of the world's work. They give their time, their lives, their hope of heaven sometimes, to the doing of this work that enables the upper class to have every material benefit at hand with the freedom from care, and the broad cosmopolitan view that is vitally necessary for the working out of these complex problems. Does this entail no obligations upon every individual so benefited? A money return is not enough. It is thinking power that the world is suffering for. What is done with this dearly bought ease and leisure? As a rule it is spent in a frantic chase after pleasure, or a still more frantic effort to kill the time that is purchased with the sweat of the brow, the aching sinews, and the stifled aspirations of millions of working people. It is a fearful thought that the class that relieves the rest of the world from the drudgery and makes real living possible and worth while for them, should fare the worst of all.

Every being born into the world adds to the work and care of the world; but also, he brings with him his modicum of time and the ability to be fitted for some position, however humble, so that he may at least not retard the world's work. If he is not so fitted, he becomes a recipient without making a return, and so is a burden; some who possess millions are as truly a burden as a pauper. Every person not so fitted means that in some more favored walk in life some one else is also taking their share of the work of all and making no return.

MARY CRAGGE.

THE MONISM OF ALEXANDER POPE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I WOULD ask you how your Monism differs from these lines of Alexander Pope:

> "In Nature's chain, whatever link you strike,
> Tenth or ten thousandth breaks the chain alike
> Or in the full creation leaves a void,
> Where *one link's* broken the whole chain's destroyed.
> For all are but parts of one stupendous whole,
> Whose body Nature is and God the soul."

Pope was in the wrong, however, in writing, as now is proven to be false; namely if I well remember it:

> "The world in darkness dwelt and night,
> Until God said, let Newton be, then all was light."

For the true philosophy of light—the undulating—had been discovered by Wilhelm Huygens, and however desperately the followers of Sir Isaac Newton have since fought for him and his doctrine—the corpuscular—the true philosophy of light as taught by the great philosopher of Holland, has at length triumphed by the *experimentum crucis*. Nor was Sir Isaac Newton the first discoverer of the laws of gravitation? for Kepler, surnamed the "Legislator of the Skies," taught the principles of gravitation, and Descartes, if I recollect the name aright, had made the calculations of the distances of several of the planets before ever Sir Isaac saw that famous wormy apple fall. In a word, science in America, following in old English tracks, seems to be in deep ruts, and such criticisms as we see of Kant, and Spencer, Huxley and the rest, looks like the dialectics of the middle and dark ages wherein words and not substantial things were paramount. In the meantime what the world requires most must ever be a system by which the hungry may be fed and naked clothed in order to make peace on earth and good will to all mankind, for the origin of all evil is in want, and the true name of the Devil always must be want, in whatever Protean forms it may appear, whether in canonicals, or regimentals, or the rags of tramps going hungry as roaring lions and seeking what or whom it may devour. Nor is it any positive system of Political Economy that is most required now but rather a certain set of principles of social science, by which the exertions of mankind may be directed according to the exigencies of each case as the want arises and that according to the universal principle of adaptation according to the conditions at the time prevailing, with time and space, and benevolence and wisdom as conditions precedent. Respectfully,

NEW YORK CITY. CLINTON ROOSEVELT.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVII. — Continued.

The Princess sat near the speaker, her head supported on her arm, looking sorrowfully before her.

"My beloved Princess does not hear me speak in this way for the first time," continued the Lord High Steward. "I have often felt anxious about the dangers which a high-flown spirit and active fancy prepare for you, the cradle gift of an envious fairy, who has made your Highness too brilliant and attractive. It is owing to these brilliant gifts that you have not the same aristocratic nature as your illustrious brother, the Hereditary Prince. There is too lively a desire in you to make yourself appreciated, and to influence others. One

* Translation copyrighted.

can leave your brother with full confidence to his own good nature. Every attempt to persuade the soul of the much-tormented child has come to naught. But you, that delicate artistic work of nature which now gazes at me with those open eyes, I have endeavored constantly to guard from an over-refined coquetry of sentiment. I am now the severe admonisher to high duties, because I anticipate the dangers which this love of conquest in your soul will bring upon yourself and others."

"I hear a severe reproof in loving words," replied the Princess, with composure. "I should marry again in order to become distinguished."

"My dear Highness, I wish that you may obtain this great aim as the wife of a husband who is not unworthy of your devotion. Only in this way can a princess expect true happiness. Even this happiness cannot be gained without self-denial, I know it; it is difficult to every one to control themselves. To those who are born in the purple this virtue is ten times more difficult than to others. Forgive me," he continued, "I have become talkative, as often happens to us old people at Court."

"You have not said too much, my friend, nor too little," said the Princess, much moved. "I have always cherished the hope to live on quietly for myself, surrounded by men who would teach me the highest things that it is possible for a woman to acquire. On this path also I find tender duties, noble bonds which unite me with the best, and such a life also would not be unworthy of a princess; more than one have, in former times, chosen this lot, and posterity respects them."

"Your Highness does not mean Queen Christina of Sweden," replied the High Steward. "But to others also this lot has seldom been a blessing. Your Highness must remember that when a princess surrounds herself with wise men, she means always one man who is to her the wisest."

The Princess was silent, and looked down.

"We have now long discussed the possible position of a princess," began the old gentleman; "let us now consider the fate of the men who would be united by tender bonds to the life of an illustrious lady. Granted that she should succeed in finding a friend, who, without unseemly pretensions, would attach himself with self-denial and real devotion to the active and varied life of a princess. He must sacrifice much and forego much; the right of the husband is that the wife should devote herself to him, but in this case a man must fetter the powers,—nay, even the passions of his nature,—for a woman who would not belong to him, whom he could only cautiously approach at certain hours as a friend unto friend; who would consider him at first, to a certain extent, as a valuable possession and a beautiful ornament, but finally, under the best circumstances, as a useful bit of furniture. The greatest sufferer in such a position would be the artist or scholar. I have always felt compassion for the walking dictionaries of a princely household. Even men of great talent then resemble the philosophers of ancient Rome, who, with the long beard and the mantle of their schools, pass through the streets in the train of some distinguished lady."

The Princess rose, and turned away.

"Better, undoubtedly, is the situation of the man," concluded the High Steward, "whose personality allows him to guide, by silent work, the life-current of his high-born friend. Yet even he must not only himself lose much of what is most delightful in life, but, even with the purest intentions, he will not always be able to give pleasure to his princess. He who would be more than a faithful servant diminishes the security of his princely mistress. Should such chivalrous devotion be offered, a noble woman should hesitate to accept it, but to endeavor to attract it does not become a princess."

Tears rushed to the eyes of the Princess, and she turned quickly to the old man.

"I know such a life," she exclaimed; "one that has been passed in unceasing self-denial—a blessing to three ladies of our family. O my father, I know well what you have been to us; have patience with your poor ward. I struggle against your words; it is a hard task for me to listen to you, and yet I know that you are the only secure support that I have ever had in this life. Your admonitions alone have preserved me from destruction."

Again she seized his hand, and her head sank on his shoulder.

"I loved your grandmother," replied the old man, with trembling voice; "it was at a time when such things were lightly thought of. It was a pure connection; I lived for her; I made daily self-sacrifice for her. She was unhappy, for she was the wife of another, and her holiest duties were made difficult to her by my life. I guarded your mother like an anxious servant, but I could not prevent her from being unhappy and dying with the feeling of her misery. And now I hold the third generation to my heart, and before I am called away I would like to impress my life and the sufferings of your mother as a lesson on you. I have never been so anxious about you as I am now. If my dear child has ever felt the heart of a fatherly friend in my words, she should not lightly esteem my counsel now, whatever brilliant dreams it may dispel."

"I will think of your words," exclaimed the Princess. "I will endeavor to resign my wishes; but, father, my kind father, it will be very hard for me."

The old gentleman collected himself, and interrupted her.

"It is enough," he said, with the composure that befitted his office; "your Highness has shown me great consideration to-day. There are others who also desire their share of your Highness's favor."

There was a knock at the door. The waiting-woman entered.

"The servant announces that Lady Gotlinde and the gentlemen are waiting in the tea-room."

"I have still some business with his Excellency," answered the Princess, gently. "I must beg Gotlinde to take my place in entertaining our guest."

* * *

Evening had descended upon the castle-tower, the bats flew from their hiding-places in the vacant room; they whirled about in circles, astonished that they had awoke in an empty habitation. The owls flew into the crevices of the tower, and searched with their round eyes after the old arm-chairs, on which they had formerly waited for the stupid mice; and the death-watch, which the scholar had carried down from the lonely room, gnawed and ticked on the staircase and in the rooms of the castle among living men. The rain beat against the walls, and the stormy wind howled round the tower. The wife of the scholar was driving through the night, flying like a hunted hare; but he was pacing up and down his room, dreamily forming from the discovered leaves the whole lost manuscript. And again he wondered within himself that it looked quite different from what he had imagined it for years.

The wind also howled about the princely castle at the capital, and large drops of rain beat against the window; there, also, the powers of nature raged and demanded entrance into the firm fortress of man. The darkness of the night seemed to pervade the halls and the decorated rooms like gloomy smoke; only the lamps in the pleasure-grounds threw their pale light through the window, and made the desolate look of the room still more dreary. The melancholy tones of the castle clock sounded through the house, announcing that the first hour of the new day was come. Then again silence, desolate silence, everywhere; only a pale glimmer from the distance on the covers of the chandeliers and the golden ornaments of the walls. Sometimes there was a crackling in the parquet of the floor, and a draught of wind blew through an open pane upon the curtains, which hung black round the window like funeral drapery. Here and there fell a scanty ray of light on the wall, where hung the portraits of the ancestors of the princely house in the dress of their time. Many generations had dwelt in these rooms; stately men and beautiful women had danced here. Wine had been poured out in golden goblets; gracious words, festive speeches, and the soft murmur of love, had been heard here; the splendor of every former age had been outdone by the richer adornment of later ones. Now everything had vanished and withered; the darkness of night and of death hung over the bright colors. All those who had once moved about and rejoiced in the brilliant throng, had passed away into the depths. Nothing now remained of these hours but a dreary void and dismal stillness, and one single figure which glided about on the smooth floor, noiseless like a ghost. It was the lord of this castle. His head bent forward as in a dream, he passed along by the pictures of his ancestors.

"The timid doe has escaped," he whispered; "the panther made too short a spring: in rage and shame he now creeps back to his den. The powerful beast could not conceal his claws. The chase is over; it is time to set at rest the beatings of this breast. It was only a woman—a small, unknown human life. But the jade Fancy had bound my senses to her body; to her alone belonged whatever remained in me of warmth and devotion to human kind."

He stopped before a picture, on which fell the gloomy light of an expiring lamp.

"You, my steel-clad ancestor, know what the feeling is of him who flies from home and court, and has to give up to his enemy what is dear to him. When you fled from the castle of your fathers, a homeless fugitive, pursued by a pack of foreign mercenaries, there was misery in your heart, and you cast back a wild curse behind you. Still poorer does your descendant feel, who now glides fleeting through the inheritance that you have left him. To you remained hope in your hard heart; but I to-day have lost all that is worth the effort of life. She has escaped my guards. Where to? To her father's house on the rock! Cursed be the hour when I, deceived by her words, sent the boy among those mountains."

He dragged himself onward.

"The third station on the road to the end," he meditated, "is idle and empty play, and puerile tricks. So said the learned pedant. It coincides; I am transformed into a childish caricature of my nature. Miserable was the texture of the net which I drew around her; a firm will could have broken it in a moment. He was right; the game was childish: by a stroke of a quill I wished to hold him fast, and, before the art of the Magister had accomplished its purpose, I disturbed the success of the scheme by the trembling haste of my passion. When the news comes to him that his wife has fled, he also will pack up his books, and mock me at a safe distance. Bad player, who approached the gaming-table with a good method, to put piece after piece on the green cloth, and who in his madness flung down his purse and lost all in one throw. Curses

upon him and me! He must not escape from me; he must not see her. Yet, what use is there in keeping him, unless I encase his limbs in iron, or conceal his body below, where we shall all be concealed when others obtain the power of doing what they will with us? You lie, Professor, when you compare me to your old Emperors. I am alarmed at the thought of things which they did laughing, and my brain refuses to think of what was once commanded by a short gesture of the hand. A ball and dice for two," he continued; "that is a merry game, invented by men of my sort; as it turns up, one falls and the other escapes. We will throw the dice, Professor, to see which of us shall do his opponent the last service; and I will greet you, dreamer, if I am the fortunate one that is carried to rest. Does thy wit, philosopher, extend far enough to see thy fate, as happened to that old astrologer, of whom thy Tiberius inquired about his own future? Let us try how wise you are."

He again stood still, and looked restlessly on the dark pictures.

"You shake your heads, you silent figures; many of you have done injury to others; but you are all honorably interred, with mourning marshals and funeral horses. Songs have been sung in your honor, and learned men have framed Latin elegies, and sighed that the golden shower has ceased that fell upon them from your hands. There stands one of you," he exclaimed, gazing with fixed eyes on a corner; "there hovers the spirit of woe, the dark shadow that passes through this house when misfortune approaches it—guilt and atonement. It passes along bodiless to frighten fools, an apparition of my diseased mind. I see it raise its hand—it scares me. I am terrified at the images of my own brain. Away!" he called out, aloud, "away! I am the lord of this house."

He ran through the room and stumbled; the black shadow hastened behind him. The Sovereign fell upon the floor. He cried aloud for help through the desolate space. A valet hastened from the anteroom. He found his master lying on the ground.

"I heard a shrill cry," said the Sovereign, raising himself up; "who was it that screamed above my head?"

The servant replied, trembling:

"I know not who it was. I heard the cry, and hastened hither."

"It was myself, I suppose," the master returned, in a faltering tone; "my weakness overcame me."

* * *

In the early morning the Professor called to the Castellan, and rushed up the staircase of the tower. He went about the room, pushing boards and planks in all directions; he found many forgotten chests, but not that which he sought. He made the Castellan open each of the adjoining rooms; went through garrets and cellars; he examined the forester, who lived in a house near by, but the latter could give him no information. When the Scholar again entered his room, he laid his head on his hands; prolonged disappointment and the consciousness of his impotence overmastered him. But he chid and restrained himself.

"I have lost too much of the cool circumspection which Fritz said was the highest virtue of a collector. I must accustom myself to the thought of self-resignation, and calmly examine the hopes which still remain. I must not be ungrateful also for the little I have gained."

He could not sit quietly by the discovered leaves, but paced thoughtfully up and down. He heard voices in the court-yard; hasty running in the passages; and at last a lackey announced the arrival of the Sovereign, and that he wished to see the Professor at breakfast.

The table was spread among blooming bushes on the side of the tower that faced the rising sun. When the Professor entered under the roof which protected the place from rain and the rays of the sun, he found there, besides the household and Marshal, the forest officials and the Lord High Steward, who thought, with more anxiety than the Professor, of the sudden arrival of the Sovereign. The old lord approached the Scholar, and spoke on indifferent subjects.

"How long do you think of remaining here?" he asked, politely.

"I shall request permission to return to the city in an hour; I have accomplished what I had to do."

It was a long time before the princely party appeared. When the Sovereign approached them, all present were struck by his ill appearance: his movements were hurried, his features disturbed, and his looks passed unsteadily over the company. He turned first to the forester, who was in attendance, and asked him, harshly:

"How can you tolerate the disagreeable screaming of the daws on the tower? It was your business to remove them."

"Her Highness the Princess last summer requested that the birds be left."

"The noise is insupportable to me," said the Sovereign; "bring out the weapons, and prepare yourself to shoot among them."

As the practice of shooting was one of the regular country pleasures of the Court, and the Sovereign had, even in the neighborhood of the castle, frequently used his gun on birds of prey or other unusual objects, the Court thought less seriously of this commission than did the Scholar.

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PERICOSMIC THEORY OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE AND ITS SEQUEL —Preliminary to Cosmology and Philosophy Proper. By *George Stearns*. Published by the Author. Rockbottom, Mass. Price, $2.00 postpaid.

HEREIN the author has grappled with the grand problems of physics with such success that as Bacon said of the fruit of his own meditation, "he has judged it to be for the interest of the present and future generations that they should be made acquainted with his thoughts."

The concepts and beliefs of the author relating to his topics differ more or less from those now current among physicists, despite his protest that his theory "is strictly scientific."

Thus he grounds the entire *Cosmos* in Force. It would seem to be the notion of the author that the Universe in its totality may be imagined as an immense plum-pudding spinning about an axis, the dough of which is "The Ether," which as he is fully persuaded in his own mind is an atom—an indivisible unit of *concentric force*, p. 23. In this all-including atom of ether are distributed the material atoms which are also "infinitesimal globules of *concentric force*," p. 55. It is the belief of the author that the atomic plums of material concentric force would be driven by the ethereal concentric force to its centre, unless prevented by the revolution of the pericosmic ether with "condign" velocity so as to generate an equivalent "*excentric force*," p. 28.

From the best comprehension the reviewer has been able to gain after much re-reading and study—although he cannot see that the author is consistent with himself—*concentric force* is subject to two "categories," *static force* and *motoric force*. "Static Force is that which permits without motion; as gravity, the cohesion of atoms, or that of which the atoms consist," p 39 "Motoric Force is that which is inherent to its own vehicle," and the author gives as examples, rotation of atoms, gravitation, and planetary motion, p. 39. The author speaks also of *motific force*. "Motific Force is nothing but the "*virtual* cause of motion, the embrace of matter by the ether."

So it would appear that this goodly frame is a composite of drives, spins, and squeezes of force. Now drives, spins, and squeezes are themselves forces, so that force by the pericosmic theory is the *summum genus* of the physical universe. As to what force is, the author is explicit. It is "*the perpetual exertion of creative power* by the author of mundane existence," p. 263. "The concept of force is that of a power produced by some agent and sustained continuously by continuity of its inceptive agency," Preface, p. vii. "It, in all its guises, must be perpetually created." "There is but one modality of causation relevant to corporeal stability or endurance and that is the incessant creation of force * * * hence Theism, entailing by deduction all that is rationally desirable," Preface, p. viii.

How admirable the office of a master mind! Here by the simple recourse to "creative power" which every one fully comprehends, perplexity gives place to complete lucidity. But why should our author himself infringe on his own method? He will not ascribe the "colligation" of the properties of matter to the "immediate agency of creative power;" for, as he protests, "to do this were to abandon science and don the sacred veil of mystery," p. 35.

According to our author the all-including Ether is finite because "a concentric force must have a centre which is impossible without a circumference," p. 22. It is "discoidal," p 60, though "aboriginally spherical," p. 27; impenetrable, p. 21, yet "impleted with matter the atoms of which were widely dispersed," p. 60; which atoms move in the Ether, p. 61, "displacing" it, p. 46, and "distinct" therefrom, p. 33. It is frictionless, p. 50, yet its "vehicular motion" causes the atoms to move with it, p. 61. It is "incompressible," p. 21, yet elastic, p. 32; "perfectly impressible," p. 24, with its elasticity a function of its pressure, p. 24; perfectly solid (not rigid), p. 23, yet "collapses" behind moving bodies, p. 52. It must possess inertia for its rotation causes its "aboriginal" spherical shape to bulge out into its "discoidal" form, p. 60, and yet as we remember it is nothing but "concentric force."

Corresponding to the properties of the Ether the material atoms therein as well as the statics and dynamics of both are supposed with corresponding licenses. With such constituents has been erected "The Pericosmic Theory," in which "the Ether and Matter are to each other as the two pillars of an arch whose keystone is the shoulder of Atlas," p. 58.

We are free to say that we have not read this book of over three hundred pages through. Why should we? *Ex pede Herculem*. If a book assuming to discourse on American affairs should be handed us, the first pages of which manifested that its author supposed Americans to be negroes subsisting by buffalo hunting and governed by counts of counties: that its capital, Washington, was just across the line from British Columbia; that cotton was sheared off from the bark of the forest trees, and petroleum made from corn, we should be able to say with approximate truth that the book would prove contemptible.

Besides, by the systematic use of strange polysyllables in place of apt, familiar, and brief terms clamoring to be used, and the unnecessary use of a multitude of obsolete words of which 'to inchoate,' 'centrifugation,' 'coetaneous,' and 'indagation' are samples, the author makes a style of text that with his inadvertencies and confusions is more difficult to construe than a foreign tongue.

In fine, the serious notice of such books as this is a lapse from that becoming dignity that genuine science and philosophy should maintain save for the purpose of giving point to a lesson that these owe to themselves, to the unwary, and especially to the ignorant, conceited pretenders that perennially sprout in spite of the industry of the fool-killer. That these latter are not only not malicious but willing to devote their good money to disseminate their rubbish is insufficient excuse. The practical mischief effected by them in their uninstructed but officious devotion is much the same as though malice prompted. Self-dubbed as science or philosophy, their productions are most apt to engage the attention of those who are incompetent to discern their demerit, especially that pestilent class, ambitious to be singular and officious to defend, any paradox they may have patronized with their last gust of crudity. Real science and philosophy is thus defamed and balked of its proper due far more than by its open enemies.

It is interesting to contemplate the ecstacy of conceit that must possess these scientific and philosophic *dilettanti*. Mark the lofty contempt they must feel for the incompetence and inadvertence of the great army of plodding *savants*. They must regard them as so incapable and dull that in spite of exhaustive study of the works of the foremost men of all the world, and in spite of lifelong application after special preparation to their various specialties, they never once can think of the solutions of the difficulties they meet, until some stroller happens their way and by the magic of his superior mentality, unhelped by preparation or discipline, "heaves off" the open sesame.

Why should genuine science and philosophy "dissemble its love" for such virtual impostors? Why should not a spade be called a spade? Why should not those who comprehend the real situation tell the superficial quacks to go and inform themselves concerning the topics of their discourse and they will see the depth of their ignorance and conceit? What has science to do with an Ether that is both impenetrable and penetrable, frictionless and friction exercising, incompressible and elastic, solid and collapsing, inert and active? What has philosophy to do with creative power?

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

REVIEW OF RECENT WORK OF "THE OPEN COURT."

The work of THE OPEN COURT, for the past eight issues, covers a wide range of subjects. In an article in No 87, "The Universal Faith," Mr. T. B. WAKEMAN, of New York, discusses the foundations of a "monistic, positive, human, constructive religion." In the number preceding, an editorial essay points out and emphasizes the radical difference between religious Creeds and religious Faith. Then follow in Nos. 87, 88, and 89, respectively, the articles "Agnosticism and Auguste Comte's Positivism," "Space and Time," "Formal Thought and Ethics." "Personality, Individuality, Consciousness," is the title of an essay (No. 87) by M. TH. RIBOT, the eminent French psychologist, translated with his consent from *Les Maladies de la Personnalité*. It contains the gist, one may say, of the principles from which modern psychology sets out. Dr. FELIX OSWALD contributes, in No. 88, a paper on "Dreams and Visions," an interesting study; and in No. 89, Mr. A. H. HEINEMANN writes effectively upon "The Preservation of Moral Purity in Children."

In criticism, appears the striking article from the French of ALFRED FOUILLEE, entitled "M. GUYAU'S Faith." The paper "The Transient and The Permanent in Theodore Parker" (No. 91), is Part I of a discourse held by Mr. MONCURE D. CONWAY at the dissolution of Mr. Parker's Society. Three articles (Nos. 90, 91, 92,) upon "The History of the People of Israel" are worthy of every reader's careful perusal. The author, Prof. CORNILL, is an orthodox theologian of Königsberg; his researches are marked by critical acumen, spirit, and above all a love of truth. A unique feature of the last few numbers is "The Sitaharanam," a translation from the Sanskrit, by Prof. ALBERT GUNLOGSEN.

In Economics, the controversy between "WHEELBARROW" and "SYMPATHIZER," Nos. 78, 85, 86, 88, occupies the first place. The subject is "Making Bread Dear." WHEELBARROW is well known to readers of THE OPEN COURT; SYMPATHIZER is a prominent Chicago citizen.

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No. 95. (Vol. III.—17.) CHICAGO, JUNE 20, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 cts.

ELECTRICAL WAVES AND RAYS.

THE EXPERIMENTS OF PROF. HERTZ.

BY THOMAS J. McCORMACK.

Of the various methods by which the transmission of energy is effected, that of wave motion plays, in physical procedure, perhaps the most prominent rôle. In this manner, the energy that constitutes light, heat, and sound is propagated. Physicists, in the former two instances, have assumed that there exists in the universe an all-pervading, tenuous, subtile, and imponderable medium called the ether. This ether, by hypothesis, is the vehicle of those forms of motion which are manifested as the physical phenomena of light and heat. The evidence for the existence of the ether, or luminiferous ether as it is sometimes called, is entirely cumulative. We have no direct proof of its presence. Tentative experiments, and the universal applicability to physical phenomena of the laws deduced from its assumed properties, have alone verified it. In fact, the theory that light is a form of wave motion, generated in the luminiferous ether, has only within the last century received universal recognition; and that heat is an undulatory movement of the same medium, has been admitted only within the last fifty years. At the present day, it is the working basis of optical and thermal science.

Recently the attention of physicists has been directed to numerous phenomena which point to the conclusion that the medium of electro-magnetic action is identical, in the properties it exhibits, with the luminiferous ether. Various researches had established the intimate connection between light and electricity; the old dualistic theory of two kinds of electrical substances had been definitively overthrown and the unitary doctrine of Franklin gained supremacy. But the latter was not theoretically developed, and the researches first mentioned were not comprehensive enough to command conviction. In 1858, Clerk Maxwell, following in the foot-steps of Faraday, who was the first to assume a medium in space as the vehicle of electrical and magnetic action, published his theory of electro-dynamic phenomena. Maxwell suggested the idea of a medium whose properties would account for the phenomena of light *as well as* the phenomena of electricity; in other words, the medium of electro-magnetic action was identified with the luminiferous ether. The theory was philosophical, and its capital merit lay in the fact that it tended to the unification of two great branches of physical science.

Until the recent researches of Prof. Hertz, of Carlsruhe, however, this theory had not been confirmed by direct experimental proof. In a series of communications addressed to the Berlin Academy, Prof. Hertz has established, with a remarkable degree of certitude, the hypotheses propounded by Maxwell. It may now be said, without fear of refutation, that in the province of electricity we have to deal with wave motions. We may now speak, with scientific propriety, of rays of electricity; showing that, in the same manner as light, they also are subject to the laws of reflection, refraction, and polarization.

It is the purpose of this paper to present, in brief, the results of Prof. Hertz's investigations.

I.

The main difficulty in the way of verifying by experiment the theory of Maxwell arose from the enormous velocity with which electrical disturbances are propagated. Electrical actions are perceptible only at a distance of a few metres from the conductors in which they originate. They traverse that distance in a few hundred millionths of a second. And it seemed impossible, by a mechanical contrivance, to generate electric phenomena under conditions that allowed the experimenter to follow, in so short a space of time, the phase and manner of their production. But Hertz found a means of exhibiting, in a visible manner, a difference of phase representing a space of time less than the thousandth part of a millionth of a second. This means was the electric spark. The contrivance used was that commonly employed in electrical experiments: a conductor interrupted at some point, the ends formed by the break being furnished with small knobs, between which the sparks dart. This contrivance may be called, in the description to follow, a spark-micrometer or spark-transit.

The arrangement, from which the office of the spark may be shown, is seen in Fig. 3. Near a primary closed circuit, containing an inductorium *A*, from which the current proceeds, is placed another circuit, a rectangle of wire, interrupted by the spark-

micrometer *M*. Let a point *e* in the second circuit be joined by a wire with a discharging-rod of the inductorium. Now the difference of electrical state between any two points in the first circuit by virtue of which electricity performs mechanical work in moving from the one point to the other—comparable to the flow of water from a higher to a lower level—is termed the difference of potential. This difference of potential, or difference of electrical state, is by the connection made transmitted in both directions towards the spark-micrometer *M*. If the point *e* is equidistant from the two knobs of the spark-micrometer, and both parts of the second circuit are symmetrical, the difference of potential will arrive at both knobs in the same *phase* and no sparks will pass between them. But upon moving the point *e* either to one side or the other, a sharp stream of sparks is excited in the micrometer; showing that the difference of potential requires more time, in one branch of the secondary circuit, to reach the micrometer than in the other, and that the phases of the difference of potential are, at the same moment of time, different in the two knobs. Now we know that the velocity of electric propagation in wires is 20–30 cm in the thousandth part of a millionth of a second. Consequently, this difference of phase must represent a space of time correspondingly short.



Fig. 3.

It may now be shown that the transmission of the difference of potential in the second circuit is effected by a wave-motion; in other words, that electromotive force—the supposed force to which transfer of electrical action is due—is propagated by undulations. If a wire or other body through which a current is passing, be brought in the neighborhood of another wire, the familiar phenomenon of induction occurs; namely, a second current is set up in the second wire. Here the first wire is termed the primary conductor; the second, the secondary conductor. Now, in Fig. 4, let the primary conductor consist of two rectangular plates of brass, *A* and *A'*, perpendicularly set and joined together by an horizontal copper wire 60 cm in length. In the middle of the wire let a break be made, across which sparks may pass. This break we will call the spark-transit, and let the terminal knobs, or poles, of the same be connected each with a pole of an inductorium. The straight line *rs*, perpendicular to the wire and passing horizontally through the spark-transit, may be known, in the phraseology of Hertz, as the basal line; the zero-point of which lies, say, 45 cm away from the spark-transit. The secondary conductor here, is the circle-shaped copper wire (rad. 35 cm) seen in the figure, which is likewise broken to form a spark-transit. Behind the plate *A* was placed a plate *P* of equal size, from which a copper wire 1 mm in thickness proceeds. This wire was bent, in the manner represented in Fig. 4, to a point *n*, lying some 30 cm above the basal line, whence it ran parallel with the latter. At a distance of 8 mm from the zero-point it was terminated. The secondary conductor was now carried towards the free end of the wire in a manner such that its plane passed through the same; whereupon a stream of sparks, extremely weak, was visible. The sparks increased in length however, when the conductor was moved towards the zero-point; attained at a certain spot their highest value, and afterwards grew smaller. The points at which they all but vanished were situated approximately at an equal distance apart.



Fig. 4.

This phenomenon is hardly explainable otherwise than upon the hypothesis that the differences of potential existing at the origin of the wire, in the plate *P*, are propagated forward in the wire in the form of waves; so that at every point of the wire the potential varies between two extreme values, just as an ether particle, oscillating in a ray of light, executes vibrations about a position of equilibrium. Having arrived at the free end of the wire, the waves are thrown backwards, and by the intersection of the reversed waves with the original waves, permanent waves are formed with nodes and loops of vibration. The nodes of vibration are formed in the wire at the points where the sparks in the secondary conductor disappear.*

But the distance between two nodal points, or between two points where the disturbance is in the same phase, represents half a wave-length. A simple means, consequently, is afforded us of determining the length of a wave of electricity. This, in the present instance, Hertz found to be 2·8 m. The time of vibration and velocity of propagation also enters into consideration. From verified formulas Hertz deduced the value of both; the velocity of propagation was found to be in approximate agreement with the results obtained by other investigators.

A similar experiment, in proof of regular undulations, may be cited. Let the primary conductor *A A*¹ in Fig. 5 be conceived in a horizontal position. Facing the two knobs were arranged two metallic plates *a a*, from which two parallel wires proceeded, to a distance of 10–20 m. The observer took his position between the wires, so holding the secondary conductor *B* that its plane lay perpendicular to the two wires,

**Naturw. Wochenschrift*, IV. 1: Dr G. H. von Wyss.

and the break in the circuit uppermost. Starting from the extreme end of the wire, sparks several millimetres in length were observed. On coming nearer to the primary conductor, the sparks at once fell off and at a distance of 1·5 m from the end suddenly disappeared.



Fig. 5.

At a distance of 3 m, they reappeared, at 4·5 m they again vanished, and the phenomenon was periodically repeated at equal intervals. The same explanation will, as in the former case, account also for what happens here. The waves originating in the primary conductor are propagated to the end of the wire, where they are thrown back; the reflected and direct waves interfere and give rise to a system of fixed oscillations. (The nodes of vibration are marked in the figure by small crosses.) It is certain, therefore, that the primary conductor is the seat of isochronous oscillations, and that it sends forth regularly undulating waves.

In further support of the undulatory theory of electrical propagation, may be cited a well known phenomenon of accoustical science: the phenomenon of resonance. If a tuning-fork be brought in the neighborhood of a sounding-board capable of executing vibrations of exactly the same periodicity, the latter instrument will be set vibrating, and will produce a tone exactly the same as the original, and thus add to its intensity. Upon this analogy, Hertz reasoned that a current of uniform oscillation, under conditions otherwise the same, would have a much more-powerful effect by way of induction upon a circuit of the same periodicity of vibration, than upon one whose periodicity differred, be it, by only a slight amount. His experiments to establish this were successful. By altering the capacity or the potential either of the primary or the secondary conductor, the sparks produced in the latter were, as the case might be, stronger or weaker; and they attained their greatest length, when the capacities and potentials were so adjusted that the times of vibration deduced from their values were equal for the main and secondary circuit. When, in Fig. 4, the secondary conductor was 'attuned' to the wire *mn*, that is, when the times of vibration of the two conductors were equal, the sparks evoked in the adjusted circuit were always more powerful than when the times of vibration did not accord.

II.

And now to the more recent experiments demonstrating the properties of electrical rays in space. In the description of apparatus and phenomena, we shall adhere, as closely as the limits of the article allow, to the text of Prof. Hertz's memoir: *Ueber Strahlen Electrischer Kraft.**

The propagation of electric waves in space, Hertz had already succeeded in establishing. His efforts were now directed towards confining the action of electrical radiation and thus making its effects perceptible at much greater distances. To this end the device of a large parabolic mirror, into the focal line of which the primary conductor should be placed, was hit upon. The misproportion between the dimensions of the mirror used and the wave-lengths first employed (4–5 m) resulted in the failure of the original experiments. Afterwards, shorter wave-lengths were selected (one-tenth the former) and the mirrors so adjusted that the results exceeded Hertz's highest expectations. The following explanation of the apparatus used, will be a sufficient introduction to the description of the phenomena to follow. (See Figs. 1, 2_a, and 2_b.)

The primary conductor consisted of a cylindrical piece of brass 3 cm in diameter and 26 cm in length, interrupted midway by the so-called spark-transit, the poles of which were spherical surfaces 2 cm in radius. The length of the conductor was thus nearly equal to the half wave-length of the corresponding vibration in straight wires. The polar surfaces had to be frequently polished during the experiment, and carefully protected from illumination caused by simultaneous lateral discharges; otherwise the oscillations fail. The discharge is carried to the two sections of the conductor by two wires overlaid with a thick gutta-percha covering, entering near the spark-transit on either side. A small inductorium of Keiser & Schmidt was used. With the latter instrument sparks of 1–2 cm in length could be generated; for the experiment the poles were brought together to a distance of 3 mm.

The proof of electrical force present in space was, as usual, shown by the production of sparks in a secondary conductor, for which a continuous circuit was used, having approximately the same time of vibration as the primary. The secondary conductor had a diameter of only 7·5 cm and was made of a copper wire 1 mm thick. One end of the wire bore a polished knob of brass of several millimeters diameter; the other end was pointed and by means of a delicate, insulated screw adjusted at a very short distance from the brass knob. The experimenter had to deal with sparks of several hundredths of a millimeter in length, so that brilliancy more than length was a guide to their presence.

The circular conductor is not adapted for attachment in the focal line of a concave mirror; accordingly

* *Annalen der Physik und Chemie.* New Series. Vol. XXXVI, pp. 769–783.

the following arrangement was principally employed. Two straight pieces of wire, 50 cm in length and 5 mm in diameter, were fixed in a straight line, with their adjacent ends about 5 cm apart. (See Figure 2 *b*.)* From these terminals, two wires, 15 cm long and 1 mm thick, ran parallel to each other, at right angles to the first mentioned wires, and led to a spark-transit, constructed like that in the circular conductor. This arrangement is preferable to one in which the spark-transit lies in the line of the straight wire; for in the latter case, in order to observe and adjust the spark-transit fixed in the focal line, the observer necessarily obstructs the opening of the mirror.





THE PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICAL RAYS.

Placing, now, the primary oscillator in the centre of a spacious and open apartment, Hertz began to explore the surrounding field with his circular conductor. The greatest distance within which sparks were evoked in the secondary conductor, was 1·5 m; under favorable condition of the primary spark-transit, 2 m. The effect in any one direction is increased, if on the opposite side of the primary oscillator a level conducting screen be placed, at the proper distance, parallel to the same. If the distance chosen is very small, or a little greater than 30 cm, the screen operates detrimentally; but accumulatively if at a distance of 8–15 cm; at a distance of 45 cm its cumulative effect is feeble; and at greater distances, zero. From this fact and results obtained in former investigations, Hertz concluded that the undulation in the air corresponding to the primary oscillation had a half wave-length of 30 cm.

An additional increase of intensity was predicted, upon substituting for the level screen a concave parabolic mirror, with the focal line of which the longitudinal axis of the primary oscillator is made to coincide. The focal distance of the mirror must be chosen as small as possible, if the effect at a remote point is to be well concentrated. But the focal distance must not be much smaller than one-fourth of a wave-length, lest the direct wave immediately neutralize the effect of the reflected one. A focal length of 12½ cm was accordingly chosen, and the concave mirror constructed of a sheet of zinc 2 m long, 2 m wide, and ½ mm thick, bent in the proper form, over a wooden frame of exact curvature. The height of the mirror was 2 m, the width of the opening 1·2 m, its depth 0·7 m. The primary oscillator was fixed in the middle of the focal line. The wires carrying the discharge passed through the mirror; the inductorium and elements were behind the same, offering no interference.

Upon exploring the vicinity of the oscillator with conductors, no effect was perceptible behind and sidewise from the mirror; in the direction of the optical axis, however, sparks were produced to distances of 5—6 m. For greater distances, as for 9—10 m, sparks were perceptible in the neighborhood of a level conducting screen which was placed at right angles to the forward traveling waves. Here the waves thrown

* DETAILED EXPLANATION OF APPARATUS.

Fig. 1 represents a transverse and vertical section of the emitting mirror. The stand is constructed of two horizontal braces, parabolic in form, and of four wooden uprights fastened with screws to the braces and constituting thus a support for the latter. The specular metal is forced in between the braces and the supports, and secured to the same by numerous screws. Above and below the uprights extend beyond the metal, to be used as handles in moving the stand about. Fig. 2 *a* represents, upon an enlarged scale, the arrangement of the primary conductor. The two metallic divisions slide tightly into envelopes of strong paper, which are kept closed by two elastic bands of rubber. The envelopes are further secured to a small strip of wood by four supports of sealing-wax; the strip being fastened by rubber bands to a wooden stay, also visible io Fig. 1. The rubber-covered conducting wires enter two holes bored in the knobs of the primary conductor. This arrangement affords the various parts the necessary flexibility, and can be taken apart in few moments, which is required by reason of the surfaces of the poles having to be frequently polished. At the points where the conducting wires pass through the mirror, they are invested during the discharges with a bluish light. To keep the latter as far as possible removed from the spark transit whose capacity of action is thereby considerably weakened, the screen *s*. constructed of smoothly planed wood, is placed between. Fig. 2 *b* represents the secondary spark-transit. The two sections of the secondary conductor are similarly fastened to a stay of the frame by supports of sealing-wax and rubber bands. From the inner terminal points of these sections, the rubber-covered conducting wires pass through the mirror and bend towards each other. The upper wire carries a small brass ball for a pole. To the lower wire a piece of a watch spring is soldered which carries the second pole, a fine copper point. This point is purposely selected of a softer metal than the ball; without this provision the point easily penetrates into the ball, and the tiny sparks are lost sight of in the hollow formed. It is seen from the cut how the movements of the point are regulated by a screw pressing upon the spring, but insulated from it by a small glass plate. The object of the peculiar bend of the spring is to regulate the movement of the point with more accuracy than could be done by the use of the screw alone.

back from the screen strengthened, at certain points, those directly approaching. At other points, conversely, the consequence of the meeting was to weaken the effect. With the straight conductor, in front of the screen, distinct *maxima* and *minima* were discoverable, and in the circular conductor phenomena of interference, characteristic marks of constant waves, were produced. Four nodal points, thus, were distinguished; one in the screen, and the others at distances respectively of 33, 65, and 98 cm from the same. Approximately, therefore, the value of the half wave-length of the waves employed in the experiment was 33 cm, and the time of vibration one one-thousandth-millionth of a second; assuming the velocity of light to be here the rate of propagation. These phenomena were discernible only in the neighborhood of the optical axis. Hertz accordingly called the physical formation thus produced, an electrical ray, emitted from the concave mirror.

A second mirror, exactly like the first, was now constructed, and the rectilinear secondary conductor was so placed in it, that its two (50 cm in length) wires fell in the focal line, while the wires leading to the spark-transit passed, insulated, through the wall of the mirror. The spark-transit was thus brought directly behind the mirror and the experimenter could arrange and observe it without interrupting the course of the waves. Hertz believed that if successful in catching the ray by this arrangement, he would be able to detect its presence at much greater distances. The result verified his belief. The sparks were perceptible from one end to the other of the laboratory in which the experiments were conducted. The greatest distance the ray was followed, was 16 m. For purposes of experiment, however, a distance of 6—10 m is the most convenient, since the sparks in the secondary conductor, beyond this distance, perceptibly weaken.

The simple phenomena, now to be described, characterize the action of an electrical ray. Where not otherwise indicated, the focal lines of the mirror are always taken to be vertically placed.

RECTILINEAR PROPAGATION.

When a screen of sheet-zinc 2 m high and 1 m wide was placed between the mirrors, in a plane perpendicular to the direction of the ray, the secondary sparks would completely disappear. A screen of tin-foil or gold-paper had the same effect. If a person comes into the line of the ray, darkness follows in the secondary spark-transit; passing out of the field of the same, the spark-transit again becomes luminous. Insulators do not intercept the ray. It passes through a screen of wood or a wooden door. The secondary oscillator and mirror were placed in an adjoining, closed room, and to Hertz's surprise sparks were in this instance also evoked in the secondary transit.

Two conducting screens, 2 m high and 1 m wide, were stationed symmetrically to the right and the left of the line of the ray, perpendicular to the same. So long as the space between the screens is not smaller than the aperture of the mirrors, viz., 1·2 m, the secondary sparks are not effected. If the intervening space be diminished, the sparks decrease in intensity and when the distance between the screens is made less than 0·5 m, disappear.

Leaving the width of the space 1·2 m, but moving the screens symmetrically sidewise from the line of junction of the mirrors, the sparks vanished as before. If the optical axis of the emitting mirror was turned 10° to the right or left of the proper position, the secondary sparks grew perceptibly weaker; upon turning the same 15°, they disappeared.

The ray, accordingly, has an exact geometrical boundary; the "shadows" have not. Phenomena were easily producible, which were analogous to those of diffraction. Hertz did not succeed in observing maxima and minima at the edge of the shadows.

* * *

The reflection, refraction, and polarization of electrical rays will be illustrated in a subsequent number.

YOUTH AND OLD AGE.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

In the course of the last fifty years, biologists have repeatedly called attention to the curious fact that the growth of a human body from infancy to old age corresponds closely to the evolution of the human type from the lower forms of animal life.

A conclusive—perhaps, indeed, the most conclusive—argument in favor of Monism is the circumstance that the mind accompanies the body in almost every step of that progressive development. Nay, the slight divergence from the exact lines of the parallel is, in certain respects, more fatal to the delusions of mental dualism than the Darwinian theory is to the doctrine of special creation. A few years ago the physiologist Virchow was so far misled by the excitement of partisan controversy as to maintain that a large plurality of our dumb fellow creatures have no soul at all, and that only in the highest animals we can notice anything analogous to the phenomenon of a mental process. "For the benefit of a benighted world," remarks Karl Vogt, "the Herr Professor will perhaps condescend to explain at which precise stage of evolution that

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXIV.

mysterious entity, called a mind, suddenly enters the hitherto inanimate organism of a poor brute."

At which special period of growth, we might also ask, do our dualistic friends suppose their supernatural soul to have entered the tabernacle of the human body? There was a time when the nations of Europe, even on the shores of the Mediterranean, had scarcely emerged from the most brutish depth of barbarism, and when nevertheless their physical development could have furnished models for the chisel of a Phidias. It is equally certain that the mind of a child has not far advanced beyond the mental status of a cuttlefish at a time when its body already displays the essential characteristics of the human type. Of anything analogous to reason an infant of five or six months shows fewer glimpses than a newborn monkey or a newly hatched turkey-chick. One day after emerging from the shell of the egg young turkeys already stop their twittering cackle at the first warning of the parent bird, and at the approach of a hunter will scatter in all directions and manage to become invisible at half a minute's notice, crouching down flat under the projecting knob of a gnarled root or under a tuft of tangled weeds, and keeping absolutely still, till the rallying cry of the hen announces the departure of the enemy. Young monkeys will aid their mother in espying the first symptoms of danger and at once loosen their grip on her arms and cling closely around her waist when the sudden appearance of a panther gives the signal for a headlong flight through the tree-tops.

Young children, on the other hand, have to acquire the full use of their motive organs before their mind gives evidence of any decided advance above the level of a rather limited type of instinct; and it is a remarkable fact that the rapidly developing youngsters of certain savages show a corresponding degree of mental precocity. Bishop Heber and Mrs. Colin Mackenzie testify to the curious intelligence of Hindoo babies, who begin to prattle and take care of still younger infants at an age when an English child would be unable to crawl out of its cradle. The traveler Vambery speaks of a Turkestan girl of four years, who, in the absence of her parents, received a troop of strangers and asked them to excuse the scant accommodations of the little cabin, while she bustled about to collect the wherewithal of a breakfast; and Captain W. C. Baldwin (*African Hunting*, p. 224) mentions his experience with a still more precocious young Hottentot. "On the same day I was obliged to buy a little Massara boy," he says, "a toddling infant, certainly not more than *two* years old, whom a gang of native hunters had picked up in an abandoned camp. I could not bear the thought of leaving him to die of hunger and thirst in the desert, and his intelligence soon made me quite fond of him. * * * It was a sight to watch the waddling little brat come, armed with a stick twice as long as himself, to help me corral the oxen, and the way he toddled along to make the calf fast without my ever telling him! When my Kaffirs had left our camp, the poor little fellow slept at my feet, and somehow seemed to know that something was wrong, as he kept starting up and feeling for my knees, touching them with the greatest gentleness, and then lying down again."

After the sixth year the mental development of a child progresses with often astonishing rapidity, just as nations, unfettered by the trammels of priestcraft, are apt to rise rapidly from barbarism to a considerably advanced stage of civilization. Jean Jacques Rousseau justly remarks that it is far easier to civilize a healthy barbarian than to restore the lost health of an over-civilized nation, and the high state of culture attained by the conquering Saracens within less than a century after their exodus from the desert-camps of Araby, contrasts, indeed, strangely with the intellectual torpor of many once civilized races. But a still more curious fact is the general diffusion of intelligence among certain nations of pagan antiquity, who in industry and material resources were far behind many third-class powers of modern times. It would almost seem as if the very lack of industrial activity had left the Greeks of the classic era more leisure for abstract speculations, and a similar circumstance might partly explain the remarkable intelligence of care-free children. The smaller wants and less complicated social relations of childhood favor a greater distinctness of thoughts and feelings which in after years are dimmed by the gathering clouds of care. Business-worry is incompatible with day-dreams, and an American humorist is perhaps right that "Socrates would not have stood twenty-four hours wrapt in metaphysical abstractions, if he had been bothered with poll-taxes, municipal taxes, water-bills, gas-bills and contributions to the campaign-fund of half a dozen party candidates."

Another cause of intellectual precocity is found in the susceptible nervous organizations of childhood. "Dans l'enfance," says Bichat, (De la vie et de la mort, Art. 8, 6,) "le système nerveux, comparé au musculaire, est proportionnellement plus considérable que dans tous les âges suivans, tandis que, par la suite, la plupart des autres systèmes prédominent sur celui-ci." Hence the apparent paradox that intelligence often seems to decrease with the advance from childhood to puberty. "The mental capacity of the orang and other apes," says Cuvier, "is developed at a surprisingly early period of life, but reaches an equally early climax, or rather a turning-point, since it undoubtedly subsides during the ascendency of muscular force. The orang, in babyhood, astonishes every observer by its penetra-

tion, its cunning, and cleverness (son adresse), the adult orang is a stupid, brutal, and unmanageable beast."

The visitors of the Chimpanzee-house in the New York Central Park must have observed analogous facts; and those who deny a similar climax-period in the development of the human brain are apt to forget the difference between mental capacity and mental training. The high intelligence of the average Greek citizen in the age of Pericles would be rated still higher if we were to make allowance for the difference in the store of accumulated knowledge which our latter-day civilization has inherited as the bequest of every preceding age, and for similar reasons the intellectual capacities of childhood should be estimated in their relative, as well as in their direct, significance. A clever child in risking a controversy with a learned man has to contend with the same disadvantage that baffled the courage and strategy of the Circassian highlanders in their encounter with the rifle-armed Russians.

The receptive faculties of childhood manifest themselves in the rapidity of comprehension (greater aptitude in the acquisition of new languages, new doctrines, and arts), as well as in the fact that the mental tendencies of after years can generally be traced to the impressions of early youth. "The experiences of childhood," says Arthur Schopenhauer, "become, as it were, the types of our subsequent intellectual perceptions,—the categorical ideas under which we arrange our stores of theories and facts. Life amplifies, or slightly modifies, but almost never reverses, the verdict of dawning reason. In youth intelligence preponderates over the activities of volition. Hence, the bright, contemplative geniality in the expression of many young children—an expression so happily reproduced in the cherub-types of Guido and Raphael. * * * That plastic sensitiveness of the infant mind also explains the deep impressions left by the experiences of early childhood."

It has often been remarked that our impression on the first meeting with a new acquaintance is apt to be essentially correct, and the unbiased mental vision of childhood may for similar reasons be relied upon to arrive at conclusions more loyal to fact than the inferences of blue-spectacled erudition. In the light of that truth it is a significant circumstance that the philosophy of childhood is the extreme antithesis of monkish pessimism, and of the world-despising resignation which masks its turpitude with the appearance of saintly disinterestedness. Children are instinctive optimists. Their clearer vision recognizes health and happiness as the normal condition, disease and misery as abnormal discords, in the harmony of the universe, and their cheerful courage shames the sophistry of the whining world-renouncer who ascribes the results of his own decrepitude to the worthlessness of temporal existence.

That optimism is, however, compatible with a deep sympathy and an almost participative commiseration of real misfortune, and even with a keen appreciation of the charms of tragic poetry. It is a strange fact that the life loving Greeks were passionate worshipers of the tragic muse, while our canting pessimism seeks diversion in farces and burlesques; but a precisely analogous phenomenon is the elegiac tendency of gifted boys, who in after years may prefer the banter of Anacreon to the grandest pathos of Sophocles and Euripides. Byron in his boyhood often passed whole weeks in the solitude of the Scotch highland, "musing and brooding," as his biographer expresses it, or wandered about the waste fields of Newstead Abbey, misanthropy in his heart and a copy of Ossian in his coat-pocket. Twenty years after his friend Trelawney found him playing billiards and bandying bonmots with the gayety of a French dandy.

"'Now confess,' he said, 'you expected to find me a 'Timon of Athens,' or a 'Timur the Tartar,' and are you not mystified at finding me what I am—a man of the world—laughing at all things mundane?' Then he muttered, as to himself,—

> 'The world is a bundle of hay,
> Mankind are the asses who pull.'

"His conversation was anything but literary, except when Shelley was with him. The character he most frequently appeared in, was of the free-and-easy sort and his talk was seasoned with anecdotes of the great actors on and off the stage, boxers, gamblers, duellists, etc., appropriately garnished with the slang and banter of the day."

Childe Harold had become a Don Juan; though the friends who knew him best hinted that his hidden melancholy had continued to grow deeper and that his ostentatious mirth was akin to the grim humor of despair, like that of Vanini, whose black locks turned white in the dungeon of the Inquisition, but who cast laments to the winds when he learned that petitions would be in vain, anyhow, and that the tribunal of Toulouse had already purchased the pitch and pine-wood for his stake. A radical change in the humor, if not in the philosophy, of the great British poet, is, however, indicated by the altered tone of his letters and dramas; he evidently had begun to seek in satire the consolation which he once sought in elegies.

The literary tendency of the poet-philosophers Voltaire and Gœthe underwent an analogous change: the recluse of Ferney indulged in ditties and burlesques, and the man whose youth had voiced its musings in Werther, cheered his old age in the rose-garden of Hafiz. The chief secret of such apparent anomalies is perhaps the charm of contrast, though misanthropists are apt to explain them on a theory of their own. "The chief drawback to the happiness of

youth," says Leopardi, "is dependence, while independence and definite escape from the shams and the meanness of society often cheer the gloom of old age."

"Men of genius," says Schopenhauer, "in youth often suffer from a feeling of solitude, and in after years, on the contrary, enjoy the consciousness of emancipation. The former feeling is founded on inexperience in the real character of our esteemed fellow-men, the second on the lessons of closer acquaintance. As a consequence, the second half of life, like the second part of a musical period, inspires less vague longings but more restfulness. * * * The sorrow of youth consists mainly in unsatisfied yearnings for an unattainable ideal of happiness, the sorrow of riper age in a dread of probable—but possibly avoidable—misfortunes. Freedom from positive trouble at last becomes the sole desire of a storm-tossed navigator of life's treacherous sea, whose perils enable him to enjoy the peace even of a humble harbor."

In the experience of a normally organized human being the period of love is preceded by a period of friendships—the earliest manifestation of that altruism which, next to constructiveness, has perhaps done most to insure the victory of our species over all varieties of our physically superior fellow creatures. Dogs, horses, and elephants, with all their affection for their helpless young, will see a distressed brother succumb to odds without as much as an audible symptom of concern. Wolves will often attack and rend a wounded comrade, while even the lowest species of our Darwinian kinsmen, the flat-nosed Brazilian capuchines, are thrown in the wildest excitement by the sight of a fellow-monkey's peril. At the alarm-cry of a wounded baboon all the members of his tribe, and often all the neighboring tribes of the four-handed commonwealth, will rush in, regardless of consequences, and in a contest with a well-armed hunter may thus frequently sacrifice their own lives without being able to avert the fate of their imperilled relative. But in a state of nature that brother-love has undoubtedly a tendency to promote the welfare of the species, and long before the dawn of religious altruism the co-operation of mutual friends may have insured the survival of our semi-human ancestors.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LOOKING BACKWARD.*

It is the wrong title. It should not have been Looking *Backward*, but much rather Looking *Forward!* For the book is really a look forward into a world as yet unseen and unknown, a future dreamland like Thomas More's Utopia which, nearly four hundred years ago, pictured a state in which, as in Bellamy's future society, every man is employed in some useful labor but no longer than six hours daily; and all have equal incomes and are content to be able to satisfy their daily wants; and where both indolence and covetousness are unknown. The age of steam and electricity would naturally cause the author of "Looking Backward" to expect and promise a little more than the scant satisfaction of the necessaries of life for the members of his new society, and to picture a condition of splendor and luxury in the public life of the future to which a parallel does not exist in this age of ours. There are in Bellamy's dreamland the greatest variety and plenty of entertainments and enjoyments of life, of social intercourse, traveling, the most elaborate means of education, of intellectual treats with lectures, sermons, newspapers, and libraries accessible to all equally, with musical and theatrical entertainments and, of course, all kinds of parties and hops open to every inhabitant of the land alike. Nevertheless, in all the throng, you do not meet the coarse and ignorant, the filthy and repulsive, because universal and compulsory education has done away with all coarseness and ignorance; and universal and uniform wealth has removed filth and offense of every kind. It is the millennium which the author describes, the "heaven on earth" which philosophy and prophesy have been looking forward to ever since man made his appearance on earth. The book is most emphatically a "looking forward," a look into a future of mankind as desirable as it has hitherto been pronounced inaccessible and impossible by all the wise men of the present age who make bold to thoroughly comprehend the nature of man, with his capabilities, his chances of development, and all the possibilities of the evolution of the race in times to come.

Bellamy's story tells us that Julian West, its hero, in 1887, when thirty years of age, was put into a trance sleep by a mesmerist who failed to recall him to life. In that trance he lay in a subterranean chamber until, one hundred and thirteen years, three months, and eleven days later, he was resuscitated from his lengthy sleep by Dr. Leete, a retired physician in New Boston, A. D., 2000. The doctor begins almost immediately to give to West an outline of the changes the city of Boston and the country at large have undergone during that long sleep. The nation had gradually succeeded in making the government absorb all the private business establishments, one after another, until the nation, or society, had finished by being the sole, or exclusive, proprietor of all means of production and distribution. That change accomplished, the state of society in 2000 is a follows:

The producers are the whole people, every citizen being obliged to labor. The nation is organized as an industrial army composed of grades, guilds, divisions, and departments, and commanded by officers, generals, etc., similar to the groups, and trades-unions of the socialists. Every citizen is, in 2000, attending public school until he is twenty-one years old. At that age he enters the first grade of the industrial army to serve three years as a common laborer. At the end of that time he may select a trade and enter an apprenticeship lasting one year. Or he may enter an industrial school if his talents are found to warrant such a step. The entire period of service in the industrial army extends to the forty-fifth year of life after which time the worker is pensioned and may spend the rest of his days as he likes.

According to the scheme of distribution, the shares of all citizens are alike, that is, each individual's share of the production of the nation is equal in amount to that of every other individual. As a set-off to this equality of distribution, society requires "precisely the same measure of productive service" from every man

* 2000-1887. By *Edward Bellamy*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The book was noticed in a previous issue of THE OPEN COURT. But it is increasing in popularity and seems destined to achieve a deal of importance in the discussion of social questions now before the public. The Nationalist clubs which are rapidly spreading throughout the land, make the fanciful description of the new society contained in the book the foundation of their agitation. For such reasons it seems desirable that people should read the book and get acquainted with its principles. That is why a fuller notice of it is considered acceptable to such readers as are interested in the progress of social thought.

which means that each is required to "make the same effort, that is the best service in his power to give." All men who do their best, do equal service. For this reason there is an "invalid corps provided with light tasks fitted to their strength," every one of which is entitled to and receives a share of the production equal in amount to that of every other citizen. So, there is no room for charity.

Of the special advantages the scheme enumerates as prevalent in the new society of A. D. 2000, may be mentioned: the absence of crime, of law, and legislation and, consequently, of lawyers. There are, further, no more politicians. But the author holds tight to the physician's and the churches with preachers and sermons. Yet nobody need go to church: a touch upon the knob of a domestic telephone on Sunday morning will make the preacher's sermon audible in the family residence. And if you want to hear a concert, touch your telephone knob, and sit down in your rocking chair, and your room will resound with the choicest music.

To the inner life of woman in the society of A. D. 2000, the author devotes some of his best thoughts. He may be criticized for assuming "that the vacuum left in the minds of men and women by the absence of care for one's livelihood, has been entirely taken up by the tender passion," but he pictures a desirable ideal condition of society by saying that "there can be no marriage except those of inclination," and that the woman of the new age has "risen to the full height of her responsibility as the warden of the world to come, to whose keeping the keys of the future are confided. Her feeling of duty in this respect amounts to a sense of religious consecration." And further the author says the rule of marriage from love only "means that for the first time in human history the principle of sexual selection, with its tendency to preserve and transmit the better types of the race, and let the inferior type drop out, has unhindered operation * * * Every generation is sifted through a little finer mesh than the last. The attributes that human nature admires, are preserved, those that repel it, are left behind."

Space forbids to go deeper into the details of the attractive picture. Otherwise, mention might be made of how the author places the burden of the support of children upon the nation and, at the same time, preserves the integrity of the family; how he suggests a system of awards for public services free from the sordid lust of riches and personal aggrandizement, and how he imagines a satisfactory domestic economy without the necessity of menial service. The reader will find many more elevating ideas in the book a perusal of which will be found instructive as regards the change of society contemplated by the socialist thinkers of the day. Nevertheless, as to the feasibility of the scheme set forth with all the arts of the imaginative novelist, doubts and objections are in order, as the reader may find out by himself. A. H.

The *Art Amateur* for June has no very long articles, but a great variety of technical articles and notices of exhibitions.

Montezuma's note-book contains a great deal about what might be called the commercial side of art; and if "the pleasure is as great in being cheated, as to cheat," pictures must give a great deal of pleasure to both parties if we trust his stories. In fact, a picture should be so truly ours that it is inestimable, or it is hardly worth the having.

We are glad to learn that the Prize Fund Exhibition gives evidence of originality of thought and nationality of feeling among American artists. We are also pleased to hear of a really good ideal statue, Resignation, by Mr. Keyser, for the tomb of ex-President Arthur. The design is a standing female figure.

A favorable notice is given of a pastel exhibition. This style of art is very graceful and pleasing, but we fear it encourages that tendency to sketchy work too common among our painters and cultivates a taste for the merely pretty that does not lead to real progress.

One of the best articles is on Miniatures, and as it is numbered one we trust there are others equally good to follow. This charming style of portrait is now reviving among us and work that Holbein thought not unworthy of him, need not belittle any one. Another article treats of marine painting in water colors. The continuation of the article on pen drawing gives more technical directions than the first number, but the illustrations are less pleasing. An article on amateur photography and many designs for furniture and fancy with the usual correspondence complete the contents of this valuable number. E. D. C.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVII. — Continued.

The Sovereign turned to the Lord High Steward.

"I am surprised to find your Excellency here," he said; "I did not know that you too had taken leave of absence for this quiet life."

"My gracious master would have been surprised if I had not done my duty. It was my intention to have reported to your Highness to-day at the palace concerning the health of the Princess."

"So it was for that," said the Sovereign. "I had forgotten that my Lord High Steward is never weary of his office of guardian."

"An office that one has exercised almost half a century in the service of the illustrious family becomes in fact a habit," replied the High Steward. "Your Highness has heretofore judged with kind consideration the zeal of a servant who is anxious to make himself useful."

The Sovereign turned to the Marshal, and asked, in a suppressed voice:

"Will he remain?"

The Marshal replied, distressed:

"I could obtain no promise, nor even a wish from him."

"I knew it already," replied the Sovereign, hoarsely. He turned to the Professor, and violently forced himself to assume a friendly demeanor, as he said: "I have heard from my daughter of your campaign against broken chairs. I wish to have some talk with you alone about it."

They sat down to table. The Sovereign gazed vacantly before him, and drank several glasses of wine; the Princess also sat silent, the conversation flagged, the High Steward alone became talkative. He asked about a bust of Winkelmann, and spoke of the lively interest which the nation took in the fate of their intellectual leaders.

"It must be an agreeable feeling," he said, politely, to the Professor, "to be in a certain measure under the protection of the whole civilized world. In the majority of cases the private life of our great men of learning passes away uneventfully, but our

* Translation copyrighted.

people delight in occupying themselves with the course of life of those who have departed. If happy accident brings a person into contact with gentlemen of your standing, he must take care that he does not suffer for all eternity under the hands of later biographers. I confess," he continued, laughing, "that a fear on this point has robbed me of many interesting acquaintances."

The Professor answered, quietly:

"The people are conscious that they have by the labor of scholars first been raised from misery; but with greater experience in political life, their interest in the promoters of our present culture will assume more moderate proportions."

"I have told the Sovereign that you have found something here," remarked the Princess, across the table.

"There has been a remarkable discovery made in an ancient sepulchre," interrupted the High Steward; and he gave a diffuse account of a funeral urn.

But now the Sovereign himself turned to the Scholar.

"Surely you may hope to find the rest?"

"Unfortunately, I do not know where to search further," replied the Professor.

"What you have found, then," continued the Sovereign, with self-control, "is unimportant."

It did not please the Professor that the conversation should again turn upon the manuscript; he felt annoyed at having to talk about his Romans.

"It is a few chapters from the sixth book of the Annals," he replied, with reserve.

"When your Highness was at Pompeii," interposed the High Steward, "the inscriptions on the walls attracted your attention. In those days a beautiful treatise upon the subject came into my hands; it is fascinating to observe the lively people of lower Italy in the unrestrained expression of their love and their hatred. One feels oneself transplanted as vividly into the old time by the naïve utterances of the common people, as if one took a newspaper in one's hand that had been written centuries ago. If any one had told the citizens of Pompeii that at the end of eighteen centuries it would be known who they, in accidental ill-humor, had treated with hostility, they would hardly have believed it. We indeed are more cautious."

"That was the hatred of insignificant people," replied the Sovereign, absently. "Tacitus knew nothing of that, he only concerned himself about the scandal of the court. Probably he also held office."

The Princess looked uneasily at the Sovereign.

"Is there anything in the contents of the parchment leaves which would be interesting to us ladies?" she said, endeavoring to turn the conversation.

"Nothing new," replied the Scholar. "As I had the honor of telling your Highness, the same passage was already known to us from an Italian manuscript: it is about small events in the Roman senate."

"Quarrels of the assembled fathers," interposed the Sovereign, carelessly. "They were miserable slaves. Is that all?"

"At the end, there is another anecdote of the last years of Tiberius. The disturbed mind of the prince clung to astrology: he called astrologers to him to Capri, and caused those to be cast into the sea whom he suspected of deceit. Even the prudent Trasyllus was taken to him over the fatal rock path, and he announced the concealed secret of the Imperial life. Then the Emperor furtively asked of him whether he knew what would happen to himself that day? The philosopher inquired of the stars, and called out, trembling: 'My situation is critical; I see myself in danger of death.' At this passage our fragment breaks off. The incident may have been repeated—the same anecdote attaches to more than one princely life."

A couple of daws flew round the battlements of the tower, they cawed and screamed, and told one another that underneath there stood a sportsman who was seeking his game. The Sovereign suddenly arose.

"There must be an end to the screaming of these birds."

He beckoned to the forester. The man approached, and placed a weapon in his hands. The Sovereign placed the but-end on the ground and turned to the Professor, while the Princess, disquieted by the last words of the Scholar, stood aside with her suite, struggling for composure.

"The Princess has told me," began the Sovereign, "that you have some hesitation as to fulfilling a wish that we have all much at heart. I hope that the hindrances may not be insurmountable."

"It becomes me," replied the Professor, delighted by the kind words of the Sovereign, "to weigh calmly so honorable a proposal. But I have other things to take into account besides the cause of learning."

"What others?" asked the Sovereign.

"The wish of a loved wife," said the Professor. A sudden convulsion shook the limbs of the Sovereign.

"And how do you consider your relations to me?" asked the Sovereign, in a hoarse voice.

The Scholar looked at the man, from whose eyes darted a look of deadly hatred and malignity. He saw the muzzle of the weapon directed toward his breast, and the raised foot of the Sovereign feeling for the trigger. The flash of lightning impended, there was no room for flight, no time for movement; the thought of the last moment passed through his mind. He saw before him the distorted countenance of the Emperor Tiberius, and he said, in a low voice:

"I stand on the verge of death."

"The Sovereign is sinking," called out the High Steward.

He threw himself with outstretched arms towards his master, and seized his hands. The Sovereign tottered, the weapon fell to the ground, he himself was received in the arms of those who hastened toward him. The Princess flew up to them, and looked inquiringly into the pale face of the Scholar.

"The Sovereign has been attacked by a sudden dizziness," answered the latter calmly.

"My master is losing consciousness," cried the High Steward. "How are you, Mr. Werner?"

The hands of the old man trembled.

The Sovereign lay senseless in the arms of his attendants, and was carried to the castle.

The by-standers expressed with much concern their terror at the event and the Princess hastened after the stricken Sovereign. Before the High Steward followed, he said to the Professor, whilst giving him a searching look:

"It is not the first time that the Sovereign has been taken ill in such a manner. Was that a surprise to you? You did not know that the Sovereign was suffering in this way?"

"I know it to-day," replied the Scholar, coldly.

A few minutes afterwards the High Steward entered the room of the Professor, who was preparing for his journey.

"I come to beg your indulgence," began the High Steward; "for I must trouble you with an acknowledgment which is painful to me. You have talked much lately in my presence to the Sovereign of the Cæsarian madness of the Roman emperors. What you then said was very instructive to me."

"I now find," replied the Professor, gloomily, "that the place was ill chosen."

"More than you assume," replied the courtier, drily. "To me it was peculiarly instructive, but not so much what you said as that you said it. I should not have thought it possible that any one would so acutely reason upon the past, and so completely give up all judgment of that which was around him. You then told a sick man the story of his own disease."

"I have just discovered that," replied the Scholar.

"The Sovereign is diseased in mind. It is now necessary that you should know it. I have a second confession to make to you. I discover that I have misjudged you."

"I shall be glad if your present opinion is more favorable to me than the former one," replied the Professor, with dignity.

"In your point of view, yes," continued the High Steward. "I have for a long time regarded you in your relations here as a cautious man, who was cleverly following out his objects. I have learnt that you are not that, but something different."

"An honorable man, your Excellency," replied the Professor.

"We have nothing to reproach one another with," rejoined the courtier, bowing; "as you misjudged the Sovereign, so did I misunderstand you; but my mistake is the greater, for I am an older man, and I have not the excuse of a specially intellectual mind, which sometimes makes it difficult for a man to judge correctly of other natures. But we have both one excuse. It is seldom easy to form a just estimate of those who have grown up in other circles, and show a different combination of virtues and weaknesses. We are all liable to be confused in our judgment, according as our self-respect is satisfied or wounded. Where genial tendencies find no response, displeasure erects a barrier; and where powerful tones echo sympathetically to one's breast, there is the danger of too rapid intimacy. Thus I have put too low a value on your honorable openness and candor. I now pay the penalty, for I have to confide to you a secret that I have no doubt you will accept with proper regard."

"I assume that your Excellency does not make this communication to me without a specific cause."

"There is a plan for keeping you in our city," interposed the High Steward.

"Proposals of this nature have been made to me since yesterday."

The High Steward continued: "It is not necessary for me to be anxious about your answer. You have learnt the meaning which is concealed under a veil of civility. Do you know why the Sovereign made you the proposal?"

"No; up to this morning I have not doubted that a certain personal feeling of kindness, and the view that I might be useful here, were the motives."

"You are mistaken," replied the High Steward. "It is not a wish to keep you here merely for passing private interests. The real motive is, as appears to me, the freak of a diseased mind, which sees in you an opponent, and fears a sharp-sightedness that will remorselessly disclose to the world a diseased spirit. You were to be fettered here; you were to be cajoled, watched, and persecuted. You are an object of interest, of fear, and of aversion."

The Professor rose.

"What I have experienced and what you tell me compel me to leave this place instantly."

"I do not wish," said the High Steward, "that you shall depart from here with displeasure, if this can be avoided; both on your own account and for the sake of many of us."

The Professor went to the table, on which lay the parchment leaves.

"I beg your indulgence if I do not regain my composure immediately. The situation in which we are placed is like that of a distant century; it stands in fearful contrast to the cheerful security with which we are wont to consider our own lives and the souls of our contemporaries."

"Cheerful security?" asked the High Steward, sorrowfully. "In courts, at least, you must not seek this, nor under any circumstances in which the individual passes out of private life. Cheerful security! I must ask whether we have it in this century? It would be difficult to find a time in which there is so much that is insecure; in which the old is so decayed, and the new so weak."

The Professor raised his head, astonished at the bitter complaints of the old man. The High Steward continued, indignantly:

"I hear everywhere of the hopes that one has in the nation, and I see an abundance of young student-like confidence. There is not much mature power, and I do not blame a sanguine man if he places his hopes on it; nay, I even admit that this youthful spirit is in fact the best hope that we have. But I am an old man; I cannot among these novelties find anything that commands my respect, where they affect the interests of private life. I feel the decay of vital power in the air which surrounds me. My youth belonged to a time when the best culture of the nation was to be found at Court. My own ancestors have for six centuries taken an eager part in the follies and crimes, and also in the pride, of their times; and I have grown to be a man in the conception that princes and nobles were the born leaders of the nation. I see with sorrow that they have for long, perhaps for ever, lost this lead. Much of what you lately said exactly coincides with the last decades that I have passed through. It has been a sorrowful time; the hollow weakness in the life of the people has in a great measure deteriorated the higher classes. But there has not been altogether a deficiency of honorable and powerful men. What time has been entirely without them? But what should be the noblest blossom of the national strength is just what in this empty shallow time is most deeply diseased."

The Professor interposed:

"It is a cause for sorrow; but where, perhaps, the individual loses, the whole gains?"

"Undoubtedly not," replied the courtier; "if only the gain to the whole was certain. But I see with astonishment that the greatest concerns of the nation are carried on, on all sides, with school-boyish pettiness. Much that is valuable is lost; nothing better is gained. The delicacy of feeling which formerly expressed itself beneficially in all forms of intercourse, and the discreet management of important affairs, become rare. If these advantages did not suffice to form the character, as is perhaps needed in the present, they made life pleasing and beautiful. A secure feeling of superiority, and a gracious rule over others, was general at courts and in business; of this we are deprived. Diplomacy has ceased to be distinguished. One sets bluntly to work; not only nobleness of feeling, but even the pleasing show of it is wanting; an uncertain pettiness, a grumbling, irritable, reserved character has gained the upper hand at courts, and in diplomacy ill-bred frivolity, without knowledge and without manly will. Our princes rattle about like accoutred idlers; the old court discipline is lost, and one feels oneself incessantly on the defensive, and seeks for safety in senseless attacks. It is impossible not to feel that by these acts one is irretrievably going downward."

The Professor smiled at the sorrow of the old lord.

"I do not blame you," continued the High Steward, "if you do not feel the misfortune of this change as deeply as I do. It is only a pity that it should always be the highest earthly interests which are thus trifled with."

"But is this misfortune so general?" replied the Professor.

"Some splendid exceptions have not been wanting," said the High Steward; "some were granted us at a time when we played the greatest tragedy before the world, as if here and there to preserve a bright romance. They have scarcely been wanting in a country which possesses the five qualities which are necessary to form a good court: an upright sovereign, an amiable princess, a high-minded statesman, some intellectual court ladies, and a superior spirit among the cavaliers. But these requisites are seldom found."

"Were they ever frequent?"

"They were the pride of our nation at the time from which my earliest recollections date," replied the High Steward.

"Just at this time we gained something else of which we may still be proud," rejoined the Scholar. "There was a short period during which the Court became the home of the most liberal culture of the time, and it was only through the rare political circumstances of our nation that this leadership was possible. Now it has passed into other circles, and we have exchanged the increased capacity of many for the distinguished culture of individuals."

(*To be continued.*)

Green be the turf above thee,
Friend of my better days;
None knew thee but to love thee,
Nor named thee but to praise.

—*Ben Jonson.*

GEMS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

IV.

[Adapted from an Old Song.]

Where is now my poet gone,
Who upon the prairie
Sat and sang to me alone—
Me—his forest fairy?
"Maiden, dost thou ask me why
Godlike genius should die?"

V.

IN GERMANY'S BEAUTIFUL LAND.

In Germany's beautiful land,
Full many a poet hath sung,
The singers are dead in the sand,
Their lyres are all broken, unstrung.

But long as the stars shall go round,
And illumine this dark earthly sphere;
So long shall sweet voices be found,
To charm us with poetry here.

The homes of the heroes shall fall,
In mouldering ruin lie low;
But from the old mansion or hall,
A lovely new Spring-tide shall go.

—*Eichendorff.*

VI.

MY WISH.

I often wish my life were free,
That I from men might hie away,
O'er rivers calm glide pleasantly,
'Neath quiet skies of softest gray:

Where birds might flit about my feet,
And worldly strife no more pursue;
The elements to rock and greet
Me, laving me in pearly dew;

Where, sailing close by pebbly beach
(Without forsaking my light bark),
The wild rose-bud I still could reach,—
Then rove again, blythe as the lark.

The grazing herds on distant hills,
The freshly springing flowers of May,
The purpling grapes, the purling rills,
The fragrance of the new-mown hay;—

All these I'd view in purest light—
A ray that ever clearer seems;
At Nature's fountains, cooling, bright,
I'd quaff,—and dream but happy dreams.

—*Von Platen.*

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

TO INQUIRE, in a spirit of truth, into the history of the different ideas of God, formed by different men, at different times, is surely worthy of the highest powers of man's intellect. But you will kindly allow me to say, with sincere respect, that our idea of God is one thing, God Himself is quite another. Granted, that our ideas are concrete and abstract, universal, particular, transcendental, adequate or inadequate, etc., we cannot possibly have an adequate idea of God in the sense of comprehension, for an adequate idea "includes not only all that is of the essence, but all accidents and relations of its object." We can never in this world or the next *comprehend* God. For He is infinite, we are finite.

Moreover, it is not surely a legitimate argument to say that different men at different times have had ridiculous, grotesque, *manifestly* absurd ideas of God, therefore there is no God, Creator and Ruler of the Universe who will reward or punish.

Again the argument of modern men of science is surely not legitimate since they can present no more than a comparatively scanty knowledge of the component parts in nature, and of the action of the parts separately and collectively. Such is astronomy, such biology, such geology, and so on.

The parts, and the action of the parts, in nature, is one thing: the origin or first cause of nature is quite another.

Back of the origin of species by natural selection, is the origin and nature of life.

It will not do for them to argue with intelligent men, saying, we know the parts and the action of which nature is *made* up, therefore it is *not made* by God. MICHAEL CORCORAN.

LINCOLN, NEB.

[The remarks of Mr. Corcoran were suggested by a "careful reading" of the pamphlet "The Idea of God" and various editorial articles in the columns of THE OPEN COURT. A reference to the essay "Phenomena and Noumena," No. 82, will sufficiently explain the difficulty that "our idea of God is one thing, God Himself another." The nature of *comprehension* is discussed in "Is There Anything Unknowable in Causation," No. 59. The argument attacked in the second paragraph was never advanced by THE OPEN COURT.—ED.]

NOTES.

Scribner's for July will contain a number of short and entertaining stories. The idea is to issue a "Fiction number for Midsummer reading."

M. Alfred Binet promises, before long, to contribute to our journal a series of papers on the Psychology of Unconsciousness. The articles will undoubtedly contain many new and important suggestions.

Prof. Holden's article in this month's *Himmel und Erde* is accompanied by beautiful photographic representations of the first and last quarters of the moon. The photographs were taken with the great telescope at the Lick Observatory.

Our correspondence relative to the Single-Tax question increases. The publication of the majority of the communications has necessarily been delayed. We promise our correspondents that extracts, at least, from those letters will be published that touch upon points not already discussed.

In Mr. Paul Shipman's article, "Of Christianity and Agnosticism," published in our last issue, the following typographical errors are to be corrected. Page 1667, first column, fourth line, read *transformations* instead of *confirmations;* fourteenth line, ibid., *attitude* instead of *attribute:* and p. 1668, first column, last line, *in favor of* instead *in form of.*

The New Review, the first number of which is now out, seems destined to eclipse many a more pretentious contemporary. Its merits are brevity and cheapness; it contains ninety-six pages of printed matter and costs but 15 cents a copy ($1.75 a year). The contributors are prominent publicists, and the subjects of vital interest in politics, science, and art It is a magazine of the highest order and within the reach of all. (Editor, Mr. Archibald Grove; publishers, Longmans, Green & Co., London and New York)

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Scientific Pamphlets.

THE OPEN COURT is in receipt of a number of the latest re-publications of the

Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift,

in pamphlet form, which will be sent postpaid to any address for the price marked.

DR. V. SCHLEGEL. Ueber den sogenannten vierdimensionalen Raum. 20 Cents.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word Gon by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

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AGNOSTICISM AND THE THEORY OF LIFE.

BY M. C. O'BYRNE.

The adequacy, or rather efficacy, of philosophy in reconciling the mind to the prospect of approaching death is only called in question by those whose judicial qualifications are restricted either by a comparatively weak and defective natural intelligence or by narrowness of education, or by both. There is, I believe, a hymn very popular among certain denominations of Protestants, one verse of which affirms that

> "Jesus can make a dying bed
> Feel soft as downy pillows are."

Only those who have witnessed the dissolution of some faithful Christian can understand how absolutely the mind may, in that supreme moment, be so filled with hope, that the throes of the great agony may go almost unheeded. This condition at the last moment of life cannot be properly termed one of ecstasy, inasmuch as that would imply (ἐξίστημι) not merely exaltation, but displacement or subversion of the intellectual faculties, and because we know from actual observation that persons animated by this confident expectation have maintained to the last great tranquillity of mind and manifested unimpaired faculties.

Only that which, for want of a better term, we must call anti-Christian fanaticism would venture to deny that religion is thus able to supply what Steele, in one of his letters to Pope, called "a cheerful dying spirit," the spirit so gloriously represented in the final stanza of the great ode of the eighteenth century Maker:

> "The world recedes; it disappears!
> Heaven opens on my eyes! my ears
> With sounds seraphic ring:
> Lend, lend your wings! I mount! I fly!
> O grave, where is thy victory?
> O death, where is thy sting?"

Surely there is nothing to be gained from the refusal to acknowledge that religion is potential in assuring to those who have, like the apostle Paul, "kept the faith" and "fought a good fight" that which Cicero termed the *clara mors*, a bright, a lustrous death? Where the belief has been honest, the conviction unshaken, there of necessity has the life been accordant therewith, so that, save in the improbable case of an absolute phrontistic metamorphosis at the last moment, we ought logically to expect that the last act of faith would take the form of an assured conviction like that of Paul: "Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day."

With all due respect to the now fashionable Agnosticism,—which, however, I can hardly avoid considering as, at least in some cases, a convenient refuge for those who are "too weak to bear the insupportable fatigue of thought,"—I must confess that this Christian certainty, however "astonishing" the creed upon which it is founded may appear to the couched eye of reason, seems to me to be infinitely preferable to the absolute uncertainty which sees no absolute, and which refuses, —as I understand it—"to choose between materialism and idealism"* or to accept the autocentric thesis of the Hylo Idealist which reconciles and incorporates these otherwise incompatible assumptions. Of a similar opinion in this regard is the parent of the term Agnostic who,—whatever the case may be with the ever-increasing multitude that now shelters itself beneath the title as though it were a fixed and final barrier to ontological speculations,—has recently declared that he is "much disposed to think that the encouragement, the consolation, and the peace afforded to earnest believers in even the worst forms of Christianity are of great practical advantage to them."†

This is unquestionably a remarkable concession, even when followed by an allusion to certain deductions which "must be made from this gain on the score of the harm done to the citizen," etc.; because there are many who will maintain, on purely utilitarian grounds, that a theory of life which, on the testimony of those by whom it is repudiated, can in the hour of trial afford encouragement, yield consolation, and provide ultimate peace must assuredly preponderate when thrown into the balances against those evils whose injurious influence it can thus modify and reduce.

No less evident is it, in my opinion, that Christianity as "a religious philosophy" will always appear superior to M. Comte's Positivism, at least so long as the latter fails to convince mankind that in and by means of its seven fundamental sciences all those emotions and promptings of the human mind which have hitherto found expression in supernatural religions and metaphysical systems can be satisfied. Up to the present, science has, while dissipating the forms of

* Professor Huxley, "Science and Morals: a Reply."
† "Agnosticism," Prof. Huxley in *Nineteenth Century*.

old beliefs and rendering negation with respect to them not merely possible but necessary, by no means and in no degree superseded religion itself. Indeed, as Mr. Spencer so clearly shows, it has rather enlarged "the sphere for religious sentiment" with every accession it has made to the sum of human knowledge, the widening of the field of vision having from the very beginning of science "been accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder." * The mystery of the "Great Enigma" † not only transcends but it has swallowed and absorbed the many mysteries of older religious systems, so that the human mind stands awed and amazed in the presence of "an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." Recognizing such an Energy, it is scarcely possible for us to be content to stifle the instigations of our nature by consenting to term it the Unknowable and by dubbing ourselves Agnostics. We are, as Mr. Spencer allows, continually prompted to imagine some solution,—and prompted moreover by the intellect no less than by volition and feeling, since the incentive is distinctly said to attend upon or result from the analysis of knowledge. Instead, therefore, of liberating the world from theologism, Agnosticism has discovered a Deity whose overpowering vastness is not the less awe-inspiring because it may be expressed by a privative algebraic formula, a Deity already identified by some Christians with God "the mind and spirit of the universe," ‡ a Deity that may yet be worshipped as the Unknown God was adored by the Agnostics of Athens, § a Deity in whose pancratic attributes the "two or three" who "are gathered together to worship the Unknowable," profess "their unwearying belief," "even if no weak brother with ritualist tendencies" has yet been heard to cry, "'O x", love us, help us, make us one with thee!'" ‖

With some such apparent perversity as we sometimes find displayed between brothers or other members of a family, the Agnostics and the Positivists are now somewhat estranged. Indeed, we may almost affirm that they are rivals in a race for public favor, the apostles of the Humanitarian Religion labelling Agnosticism the "temporary halting-place" of a-symmetric scientific men (the "Christian philosopher" calls them sciolists), while on the other hand those Agnostics who agree with Mr. Spencer that the religious consciousness is a sentiment that can never be lowered, have little or no respect for that retrogressive religion which adapts old machinery to new uses, and which would claim for the part,—for that "whole of human beings" which Spencer declines to admit to godhood,—that "veneration and gratitude" which the Agnostics do not feel called upon to display toward the mysterious All in which all parts cohere.

Reverting, however, to the affirmation that philosophy is able to reconcile the mind to the prospect of imminent death, and to the implication that Christianity can only be suppressed by a theory of life capable of satisfying those emotions and promptings which have hitherto found expression and satisfaction in supernatural religions and ontological systems, we shall find that a philosophy based upon nescience, which, as it were, hangs its head, if it does not tremble, in the presence of an Unknowable Cause of things, can never do this.

Worse than all the gibing, threatening ghosts that haunted the dreams of Clarence in the Tower would be the dread suggestion of *perhaps* standing with uplifted finger at the bedside of one dying with apparently unimpaired mental faculties. At such a moment and under such conditions the memory is so active that De Quincey's identification of its extraordinary vigor of operation in the last extremity with the book of doom alluded to in the Bible is by no means overstrained or unjustifiable. "It has been," he wrote, "remarked, and I think justly, that the dread book of account which the Scriptures speak of, is in fact the mind itself of each individual; of this at least I feel assured, that there is no such thing as *forgetting* possible to the mind." *

The well known verses recited by the Emperor Hadrian when dying are, I consider, quite as remarkable for the solicitude they manifest as they are for the apparent volatility which, by the use of so many caressing diminutives, doubtless effectually concealed the speaker's anxiety.

> "*Animula, vagula, blandula,*
> *Hospes comesque corporis,*
> *Quo nunc abibis in loca?*
> *Pallidula, rigida, nudula,*
> *Nec, ut soles, dabis joca?*" †

Gibbon affirms of Hadrian that "the ruling passions of his soul were curiosity and vanity," and I fear that in this instance we must recognize little more than another example of the ruling passion strong in death. However capricious his ordinary nature, we must conclude that the man who thus interrogated his supposed vital principle respecting its destination was disturbed and perhaps alarmed by his inability to re-

* "Religion: A Retrospect and Prospect," by Herbert Spencer.

† Ibid.

‡ Vide "Agnostic Metaphysics," by F. Harrison, p. 1.

§ "I found an altar with this inscription, To THE UNKNOWN GOD [Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ]. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship," etc. Acts of the Ap., XVII. 23.

‖ "The Ghost of Religion," by F. Harrison.

* "Confessions of an English Opium Eater." Compare also Ribot's "Diseases of the Memory" The reader will, of course, see that the physiological explanation is here beside the question.

† "Dear little vagrant, charming spirit,
Guest and host of the body,
Whither now wi't thou depart?
Little pale, rigid, forlorn one.
No more, as thou wert wont, shalt thou bandy jests."

turn a satisfactory encouraging answer. This hypothesis of a vital principle, however irrational it may appear, is at any rate inexorably logical in its demands. Whether or not we regard it as a partial entity originally broken off from the Supreme Idea, the Real Existence, and suffering defluxion,* which is Platonism, it is self-moved and always moving; or as a self-moving monad passing through various imperfections and avatars toward its final blending or amalgamation with the Divine ethereal soul,—which is Pythagoreanism; or as the identity in conscious relation (*Idee*) of Being and Non-Being, Subject and Object,—which is Hegelianism; or as a living soul breathed into the organism by a personal Divinity,†— which is Christianity,—it is immortal. There ought to be no doubt in our minds on this subject, no pretentious relegation of it to the recesses where loud-mouthed Ignorance thrusts all that it cannot demonstrate to the senses, wrapped in the thin tissue of a flimsy rhetoric and labelled "*Of this we have and can have no knowledge.*" He who is able during his last hours to make and enjoy a *jeu d'esprit* upon Charon and the passage of the Hateful River ‡ must have his judgment securely anchored to the belief that the Plutonian shore with its vagrant ghosts was but a figment of the imagination, a conviction, doubtless, no less satisfactory than that of the philosophic Julian, who, dying in the arms of victory, looked forward with pleasure to his approaching union with the divine αἰθήρ of the universe.

When we find that many of the greatest of our race have agreed that "whatsoever that is which thinks, which discerns, which wills, which flourishes, it is heavenly and divine, and must necessarily be everlasting," § the plea of no knowledge is surely but a poor justification for systematically endeavoring to weaken the belief of the millions who find encouragement and a sure ground of hope in the doctrine of immortality.

Still more difficult must it be to make such a negative propaganda appear conformable to duty or propriety if it should prove that the proposed succedaneum consists mainly of a few general maxims derived principally from the old beliefs, but destitute of their authoritative basis and incentive. More even than this, the true philanthropist would probably hold that there could be no actual justification for interfering with this doctrine on the positive ground of the nonexistence of a soul or vital principle if it were certain or even probable that the sociological results of weakening or impairing the belief would be found otherwise than beneficial either by the individual or the community.

In that extraordinary compound of physiology, kinetics, and mysticism, Hinton's "Life in Nature," we are able to recognize the disquietude occasioned by the cogency of those demonstrations of material forces, powers, and laws, which have done so much toward the elimination of various long-cherished notions on the subject of eschatological causation,—of the ultimate energy operating throughout and behind all nature, like the artificer and controller of some cosmically-colossal Strassburg clock,—just as Lavoisier's quantitative analysis annihilated Dr. Priestley's interesting Principle of Levity, Phlogiston, almost before it had come within sight of its ἡλικία, or prime of life.

Why so many specialists are thus disposed to vex themselves over the possible consequences of a general acceptation of generalizations based upon data furnished by their own researches, we need not now inquire. It may well be that we could present a reasonable explanation of this their apprehension, as we certainly could of the causes which induced the mathematician Cotes to fulminate against Materialism, taking his texts from Newton's "Principia," or of those which led their *facile princeps*, Michael Faraday, into the sloughs and quagmires of a drivelling Sandemanianism.

Mr. Hinton is a writer whose conceptive restrictions are rather one-sided, inasmuch as he manifests some fertility of imagination in the cause he has at heart,—namely, the substitution of one ideology for another. Arguing from the supposed or apparent deadness of inorganic matter, he concludes that man is spiritually the deadest thing in the universe, and he suggests that if we can only realize that all "partial life" is but seeming or phenomenal, we may be ultimately able to discover the "very Life,"—with a capital letter,—which is the universe, or in other words once and for all to solve Mr. Spencer's great enigma. He says:

"In the view we thus take many advantages are found. Our thought of nature is at once simplified and elevated. Instead of feeling ourselves to be a fixed centre, before which a mechanical universe marches with dead footsteps, we rise to take conception of a larger and sublimer universe, of worthier ends and grander sweep, upon the very tide of which our little lives,—nay, man's own larger life is borne; the true order and course of which includes the changing consciousness of man, painting so upon eternity for him a visionary time; which has for one of its least elements the pulsing of his heart and throbbing of his brain, which is enriched with all his passion, and bears his life-blood as a drop in its warm bosom; all being faintly imaged to his unperceiving eyes in changing garniture of earth and sky, from year to year.

"Thus we do not seek any longer to attach our marvellous consciousness to these passive things which seem, but cannot be, its

* Plato, "Phædrus," where Socrates expounds the idea (*form, nature, figure*) of the soul. This defluxion or wing-drooping of the imperfect soul is followed by a junction with a terrene body, the result of the union being a mortal animal. The mythus is poetical, but no Sophist such as Gorgias, would term it, as does Lewes, the "poetry of philosophy."

† Gen. ii. 7; Eccl. xii. 7; Luke xxiii. 43.

‡ Vide Dr. Adam Smith's account of the last days of David Hume.

§ *Itaque quicquid est illud quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est; ob eamque rem, æternum sit necesse est.*—Cicero.

causes. It has a worthier, a more reasonable source. These material things,—which are found to be mere 'phenomena,'—and their changes,—in which there is no change,—are not the causes of that which we experience; they are the appearances which a deeper cause, unseen, brings up before us." *

Much of this is so efflorescent in its verbiage that were Mr. Hinton an Agnostic, instead of being the apostle of a particular kind of esoteric *gnosis,* he might fairly dispute the bays with the proudest peripatetic professor of rhetorical pyrotechnics who has hitherto exploited the evangel of Know-Nothingism as the basis of the larger hope within him. Carrying his repudiation of auto-centricism to the extreme verge of absolute separation of subject and object, he disposes of our ideas by simply terming them "phenomena," using that word in the limited (though customary), not strictly etymological sense of unreal appearances.

From this point the elenchus is comparatively easy, the result being not merely the denial of the ability to "fathom existence by thought," but the complete subordination of the intellect as a guide to truth to those other phases or divisions of the unextended mind which we call emotion and volition,—the latter being controlled or led by the former.

"The idea, which naturally arises when the shortcoming of the intellect is realized, that we have no power of knowing, is based only on forgetfulness of the fact that we have powers which mere intellect does not include, and to which the intellect may be made the servant. If our thoughts have not authority, our hearts may be made judges

"This is given to us in the seeming denial of our power to know. We may translate all that the intellect can apprehend into moral terms; may read in it a spiritual significance; may affirm *that*,—duly fulfilling the conditions of the case,—to be the truth. From that which the heart knows we have to trace, as an appearance, that which the intellect and the sense perceive." †

This is an extraordinary conclusion to draw from what, in a previous paper,‡ I have designated Agnosticism *in excelsis.* Discarding the misleading intellect, we are asked to become omphalopsychites, and illuminated by the "divine light of Mount Tabor" find in quietism assurance of progress in true knowledge, consolation and lasting peace.

Because of our inability to throw the house out of the window, we are invited to close the only apertures through which we receive light; because we cannot transcend our ultimate noumenon and proplasm, the brain, in its loftiest function we must concentrate sentiment and volition, thereby forming a chromatic lens capable of revealing all the mysteries of the "very Life" of the universe microscopically mirrored in the epigastrium.

If this be the logical result of that Agnosticism which "has, in virtue of its inherent vitality, permeated all creeds, while it is antagonistic to none," * we may safely conclude that these creeds have been re-vaccinated with a very old-fashioned prophylactic against philosophy. However the present confusion of utterances may trouble us, our feeling of insecurity is hardly so overpowering as to induce us to submit to be thus inoculated with the virus of credulity. If the choice were to be made, we should rather prefer the Hegelian doctrine of the identity of contraries and of the objective existence of Non-existence, which,—especially in England, where certain ecclesiastical institutions are deemed worth preserving,—is now growing in favor among those who seem to feel the necessity of reconciling the sign military † of Christianity, by which the faithful are separated from the infidels, ‡ with rational positive knowledge.

The professors of divinity have now for many years seen philosophy, starting from the vantage ground afforded by science, depreciating that creed in the estimation of the people and divesting it of authority. The divine light of the quietists can avail nothing with the moderns, but theologians and the many who dread the consequences of overthrowing the present theory of existence are now disposed to think their cause somewhat less hopeless than they had begun to consider it. Nothing but utter necessity would have driven the English to those "dogmas of Germany" which, says Lewes, they formerly "held as the dreams of alchemists," and which he elsewhere likens to a "miserable hut" looming like a mountain through a fog of verbal quibbles, absurdity, and "the genuine insanity of Logic."

The insular contempt for "professional philosophers" is now lost sight of in the pressing necessity felt by the schoolmen and divines of England to buttress their theologism and its moral system by that very philosophy which they have so long disdained perhaps for its non-marketable character. Behind the fog, and squarely posited on what Lewes so contemptuously terms a miserable hut, there stands an almost Athanasian trinity in unity,—the unconditioned Abstraction (the Father), the conditioned Reality (the Son), and these two in conscious identity (the Spirit). § Just as Plotinus, with his hypostases, came to the rescue of Christianity in its first conflict with philosophy, so does the hitherto contemned Hegel,—or rather his system,—find himself drawn across the

* "Life in Nature," chap. XII.
† "Life in Nature," chap. XIII.
‡ THE OPEN COURT, No. 73, p. 1419.

* "The Creed of a Modern Agnostic"; by Richard Bithell, B. Sc., Ph. D.; London, Routledge, 1883.
† "Nostri signaculum cordis—militiæ sacramentum."—*Ambrosii Op., Tom. 1, De Virg.*, lib. 3.
‡ "Symbolum cujus signaculo fideles ab infidelibus secernuntur." *Maximi Taurinensis Op., Hom. in Symb.*
§ Compare the creed of St. Athanasius: "Pater a nullo est factus: nec creatus, nec genitus. Filius a Patre solo est: non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus. Spiritus Sanctus a Patre, et Filio: non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens."

waters of the North Sea to demonstrate the sweet reasonableness of the established Church of England.

Not for a moment would I wish to be understood as covertly insinuating that selfish or sordid motives are hidden behind this evident anxiety to effect a reconciliation between faith and reason. Even though the self-assurance inspired by numbers were mine,—instead of my being one of a very small minority,—I should insinuate nothing so injurious to my own reputation. Apart from that earnest attachment which we call faith there are, there must be, serious apprehensions with respect to the moral consequences of substituting one theory of life, which has for thousands of years favorably affected the development of humanity, by another which has never been tested.

Who can wonder that the extravagant exaltation of Nescience has so far weakened the sense of duty that many timorous souls are shrinking in horror at the prospect of a future wherein ethics shall be founded on the shifting sands of hedonism and empirically suggested selection? It is not by consenting to ignore it that this apprehension can be set at rest, but rather by demonstrating,—as on page 1217, No. 56, of this journal,—that moral anarchy can never originate where the due development of every side of human nature ensures the corresponding incentive of an active desire to live in harmony with all that is or that will be revealed as cosmical law. If we succeed in making this clear to the ordinary intellect, the fear-inspired anti-revolutionary passion of reaction which now stands in the way of progress will give place to a soberer condition, enabling those who may be said to control the destinies of mankind to realize that in the body politic, as in the individual organization, disturbance and agitation indicate a disease to be counteracted by the "exhibition" of remedies calculated to relieve.

When thrones and altars shall become unnecessary to social progress because of the development of justice and the power of self-government, "the *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* of the individual citizens," * they will in due time quietly disappear as the nebulæ consolidate into suns. Ill-advised endeavors to perpetuate them by opposing barriers will only cause that to become a destructive torrent which otherwise would continue to be a tractable stream, or to produce excrescences which, like the wen in the apologue, will contaminate the whole body on which they appear.

On the other hand, by honestly consenting to that educative process which subordinates the imagination to the judgment,—although the present supernatural theory of life has to be discarded,—we shall secure the wished-for continued higher evolution of reason and moral feeling; and if we are true to the monistic principle of fashioning our conduct with the view of establishing perfect harmony between ourselves and the infinite and eternal All of which we are, each to himself, the centre, we cannot fail to attain that condition of perfect sanity which has been termed rational holiness.

The so-called *lux benigna* of an infallible revelation may be withdrawn, and with it many long-accredited and venerated institutions may disappear, but when we have secured the absolute equilibrium of our organization in its subjective and objective aspects, we shall have found a light to "lighten the nations" in whose steady, unwavering lustre we shall be able to

"*Bring white hairs unto a quiet grave.*"

* J. S. Mill: "Prin. of Polit. Econ.," Vol. II., book iv, chap. 7, sec. 2.

ALTERATIONS OF PERSONALITY.

BY TH. RIBOT.

Translated from the French by γνν.*

It has been seen, in a former paper † upon the present subject, that the basis of psychic individuality in animals is the organic sense, the consciousness of organic existence; and it has been further seen that this consciousness arises from organic sensations.

If, accordingly, we admit that the organic sensations proceeding from all the tissues, organs, and movements produced—in a word, from all the states of the body—are in some degree and form represented in the *sensorium*; and if the physical personality be only their sum total, it follows that personality must vary as they vary, and that these variations admit of all possible degrees, from simple distemper to the total metamorphosis of the individual. Instances of "double personality," about which there has been great discussion, (we shall later speak of it,) are but an extreme case. By dint of patience and careful investigations we should find in mental pathology enough observations to establish a progression, or rather a continuous regression from the most transient change to the most complete alteration of the ego.

It is an incontestable fact, that the ego exists only on the condition of continually changing. As regards its identity this is only a question of quantity. Its identity will persist as long as the sum of the states that remain relatively fixed is greater than the sum of the states that are added to or detached from this stable group.

For the present we have only to study the irregularities of personality that are immediately connected with organic sensations. Since, by itself, general sensibility has only a very feeble psychic value, it produces only partial disorders, except in cases where the alteration is total or sudden.

By way of a beginning, we shall here notice a state which can hardly be called a morbid state, yet probably is well-known to all, and consists in an alternate

* Translation copyrighted.

† No. 93 of THE OPEN COURT.

feeling of exuberant vitality or of depression, without apparent cause. In these states the usual tone of life changes, rises, or falls. In the normal state there is a positive "euphory"; neither comfort nor discomfort arise from the body. Often, on the other hand, the vital functions become exalted; activity superabounds and seeks to expend itself; everything seems easy and profitable. This state of well-being, at first entirely physical, is propagated to the whole nervous organisation, and arouses a multitude of pleasant feelings, to the exclusion of contrary ones. Everything looks bright. At other times the reverse will happen, as in states of disease, despondency, listlessness, impotence and—as consequences of grief—in fear, in painful and depressing feelings. At such times everything looks black. In either instance, however, there is no news, no event, in fact, nothing external to us, to justify this sudden joy or sadness.

Surely, in an absolute sense, it cannot be here said, that personality has been transformed. Relatively it has been so. The individual man has been changed, is not the same as before to himself, or better still, to those who know him. This, when translated into the language of analytic psychology, simply means, that this personality is constituted by elements, some relatively fixed, but others variable; that the variability having by far exceeded its average value, the stable portion has been affected, yet has not disappeared.

Now, if instead of disappearing merely to return after a brief delay to the normal state, we suppose that this change persists (a supposition that is daily realized); in other words, if the physical causes that induce this change are permanent, instead of being transitory, in such instance there is formed a new physical and mental habitude, and the centre of gravity of the individual shows then a tendency to displacement.

This first change may then give rise to others so that the transformation is constantly on the increase. For the present I shall not discuss this subject at length. I simply wished to prove that from a normal state we may by imperceptible stages descend to the state of complete metamorphosis; or that it is purely a question of degree.

In studying the disorders of personality, it is impossible strictly to determine those that have their immediate cause in the perturbations of general sensibility, because these latter by a secondary action excite psychic states of a higher order (hallucinations, feelings, and morbid ideas). I shall limit myself to instances in which they appear to preponderate.

We shall find in the "*Annales médico-psychologiques*"* five observations, which the author has grouped under the title: "An aberration of the physical personality." Without caviling about the title, which, perhaps, conveys somewhat more than it ought, we are shown in the examples quoted how an unknown organic state, an alteration of the cœnæsthesis, *i. e.* of the organic sense, without any external cause, may produce a feeling of corporeal annihilation. "In the fullness of health, and in the possession of exuberant vitality and strength the person experiences an ever increasing sensation of weakness, to such a point, that every moment he has the fear of falling into syncope, and of ceasing to exist." Otherwise the sensibility remains intact; the patient eats with appetite, and if we attempt to oppose his will, he will react with the utmost energy; still he will keep repeating that he feels like one dying; that he is slowly passing away; that there are left to him only a few hours to live. Very naturally, upon this purely physical foundation at the same time there are grafted any number of delirious conceptions: one subject believes himself to be poisoned, another maintains that some demon has entered into his system, and is actually "sucking away his life," etc.

Let us, however, confine our attention to the immediate consequences of the physical state. We here encounter that state of despondency, already described, and known to everybody, yet here in a much more serious and stable form. The mental distemper increases in proportion and systematizes itself. The individual tends to be no longer the same. This forms a new stage toward the dissolution of the "ego," although as yet far from having been reached.

This beginning of a transformation, due to exclusively physical causes, is also met with in persons who maintain that they are enveloped in a veil or cloud, cut off from the world, insensible. Others seem to enjoy with delight the lightness of their bodies; will feel as if suspended in mid-air; believe they are able to fly; or have a feeling of heaviness either in the whole body, in certain limbs, or in a single limb that seems stout and heavy—all of which phenomena are naturally explained from disorders of the muscular sensibility. "A young epileptic at times felt his body so abnormally heavy, that he scarcely was able to support it. At other times he felt so light that he believed he did not touch the ground. Sometimes it seemed to him, that his body had assumed such huge dimensions that it would be impossible to pass through a certain door-way."*

In the case of the latter illusion, which relates to the dimensions of the body, the patient feels himself much smaller or much larger than in reality he is.

The *local* perversions of general sensibility—although by nature limited—are not of less psychologic importance. Some subjects will assert, that they no

* Sept. 1878. 5e Série, tome XX, pp. 191–223.

* Griesinger: "Traité des Maladies Mentales," trans. Doumic, p. 92.

longer have teeth, mouth, stomach, intestines, brain: which can only be explained through a suppression or alteration of the internal sensations that exist in the normal state and contribute to constitute the notion of the physical ego. To the same cause—at times aggravated by cutaneous anæsthesia—we must refer certain cases in which the patient believes, that one of his limbs or even his whole body is of wood, glass, stone, butter, etc.

After a while, he will say, that he has no body at all, that he is dead. Instances of this kind are really encountered. Esquirol speaks of a woman who believed that the devil had carried off her body; the surface of her skin was completely insensible. The physician Baudelocque, during the last period of his life, had lost all consciousness of the existence of his body: he maintained that he no longer possessed head, arms, etc. Finally, there is a widely known instance related by Foville. "A soldier believed himself to be dead ever since the battle of Austerlitz, at which he had been seriously wounded.* When asked about his condition, he would answer: 'You wish to know how fares old Lambert? He is no more; he was carried off by a cannon-ball. What you see there is not himself, but only a wretched machine that has been made in his likeness; you ought to ask them to make another.' In speaking of himself, he never said 'I,' but 'that thing.' His skin was insensible, and often he would fall into a state of complete insensibility and immobility, lasting several days."

In the case just mentioned, we enter into the realm of serious perturbations; meeting for the first time with an instance of double personality, or more strictly speaking, a discontinuity, a lack of fusion between two periods of psychic life. The present case might be explained as follows. Before his accident, this soldier, like everybody else, had his organic consciousness—the sense, the feeling of his own body: his physical personality. After the accident an internal change was brought about in his nervous organization. Concerning the nature of this change, unfortunately, we can only form hypotheses, the effects alone being known. Whatever it may have been, it resulted in giving birth to another organic consciousness—that of a "wretched machine." No kind of amalgamation had been effected between the latter and the older consciousness—the recollection of which had tenaciously remained with the patient. The feeling of identity, accordingly, is lacking; because in the organic states as well as in others, this feeling can only result from a slow, progressive, and continuous assimilation of the new states. Here, the new states did not enter the old ego as an integral part. Hence, that odd situation in which the old personality appears to itself as having been, and as being no more, and in which the present state appears as an external, strange thing, and as not existing. It may be remarked, in fine, that in a state where the surface of the body no longer yields sensations and where those that do arrive from the organs are equivalent almost to none at all; where both superficial and deep sensibility is extinguished—that in such a state the organism no longer excites those feelings, images, and ideas that connect it with higher psychical life. The organism is simply reduced to the automatic acts that constitute the habitude or routine of life, or properly speaking, it becomes "a machine."

Strictly viewed, we are, indeed, allowed to assume, that the only personality in this example is the personality which recollects; we must nevertheless acknowledge, that it is of a very extraordinary nature, existing only in the past; and that, instead of calling it a person, it would be more correct to call it a memory.

What distinguishes the above-mentioned instance from those of which we shall speak elsewhere, is precisely this, that here the aberration is altogether physical, springs solely from body and bears solely upon the body. The old soldier did not believe himself to be *another* (Napoleon, for example, although the latter also had been at Austerlitz). The present case is as free as possible of intellectual elements.

The illusion of patients or convalescents, who believe themselves double, must also be referred to perturbations of general sensibility. At times there is pure and simple illusion without doubling, where the morbid state is projected outward, and the individual alienates a part of its physical personality. Such, are the cases of the patients, of whom Bouillaud speaks, who having lost the sensibility of half of their body, imagine to have beside them in bed an other person, or even a corpse. But when the group of organic sensations of a morbid nature, instead of thus being alienated, clings to the normal, organic ego and for some time coexists with it, without fusion, then and for just this space of time the patient believes that he has two bodies." A certain convalescent from a fever believed himself to consist of two individuals, of which one was in bed, while the other was walking about. Although without appetite, he ate a great deal; having, as he said, two bodies to feed."*

"Pariset, in his early youth having been overcome by an epidemic typhus, remained several days in an extremely low state, verging on death. One morning there suddenly awoke a more distinct feeling of himself. He began to think, and seemed to experience a genuine resurrection; but, strange to say, at the same instant he had, or believed to have,

* Michéa, Annales Médico-psychologiques, 1856, p. 249 et seqq.

* Leuret, Fragments Psychologiques sur la Folie, p 95.

two bodies; and these bodies seemed to him to be resting in two different beds. In so far as his soul was present in one of these bodies, he felt recovered, and enjoyed delightful repose. In the other body his soul suffered, and argued with itself: Why am I so well in this bed and so ill and oppressed in the other? This thought preoccupied him for a long while. Pariset himself—a man most subtle in psychological analysis—has many times told me the detailed history of the impressions which at that time he experienced."*

In the above we possess two instances of double *physical* personality. Although as yet we are not far advanced in our study, the reader, at all events, is able to see, how the two cases referred to, when closely examined, are really unlike. The current term of "double personality" is but an abstraction. As soon as we translate it into concrete facts, into authentic observations, we shall only find diversity. Each case, as it were, asks for a particular interpretation; and *a priori* we certainly might expect one. Personality—as we maintain, and as we shall further attempt to prove—being a very compound complex, it clearly follows that its perturbations likewise must be multiform. Each case shows it as differently decomposed. Disease becomes a subtle instrument of analysis, and affords us knowledge that is inaccessible by any other method. The main difficulty is to interpret it satisfactorily; but even errors will only be transitory, since the facts which the future has in store will serve either to verify or rectify them.

* Gratiolet, "Anatomie Comparée du Système Nerveux, Vol. II, p. 548.

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

IV.

SITA heard the loud challenge from the wood, and she thought it like her husband's voice.

At once she said to Lakshmana: "Go quickly in search of Rama, for my heart is filled with evil forebodings. I have heard a repeated loud call, like of some one in great distress; hasten, therefore, O son of Sumitra, to the assistance of your elder brother, your faithful companion and ally! Speed to the rescue of your brother, imploring aid; he must have fallen into the violent hands of Raksha-fiends, like a king into the jaws of roaring lions."

Listening to her exaggerated speech, as women's often will be, Lakshmana replied to Sita, whose eyes from fear seemed ready to start out of her head: "It is not possible that my brother be vanquished, not even by all the powers of the three worlds or by the entire host of Suras and Asuras." And he further spoke somewhat sternly to Sita:

"This Raksha-fiend could not hurt my brother even in his smallest finger; therefore, O lady, why thus alarmed? And mindful, moreover, of my brother's command I must not go, even if told so by you." To this Sita, the daughter of Janaka, impatiently replied:

"Lakshmana, you are your brother's foe under a friend's disguise, if you do not hasten to his aid, being in such a predicament. You wish his ruin, I should think; there is no brotherly affection in you; therefore you stay, with the greatest indifference, looking upon Rama's sovereign glory.

"O Lakshmana, you wish Rama killed for my sake, and therefore you take no heed of the words uttered by me; but bereft of Rama I would not live one single moment longer. Therefore, O hero, do my bidding, and without delay protect your brother! Surely, if Rama be in a predicament, what then are you more unto me, who am not going to live one instant longer, if you do not start in search of Rama?"

Then Lakshmana replied to the daughter of the king of Videha, who had spoken this in a voice, stifled by tears of sorrow, and looking like a timid, trembling hind: "O lady, among all gods and men, Gandharvas and birds, Rakshas and Pisatchas, Kinnaras, reptiles and terrible Danavas,* there is not, O you fair one, a single who is a match for Rama. Like unto great Indra himself, although but a man, Rama is invulnerable in battle. Therefore, desist from this language. I cannot leave you here alone without Rama. O daughter of Videha, you are a pledge entrusted to my care by the magnanimous, truthful Rama, and I cannot leave you here alone. And moreover we have already, O dear lady, performed many valiant deeds against these cruel Rakshas for the clearance of Janasthana—so may you ever be happy! The Rakshas in the forest will besides often imitate various sounds; therefore do not mind a merely wanton wish for doing harm. Rama's glorious strength is unutterable; without reflecting you cannot compare it to that of any other; therefore may you not speak thus. Be then easy at heart, and leave off all this anxiety. Your husband will soon return, when he has killed that wonderful antelope. The sound that you heard, O lady, surely was not his own voice; for if even placed in a difficult predicament, Rama never would utter an undignified sound."

Thus addressed, the excited Videha, with reddening eyes in an angry tone replied to Lakshmana, although he had spoken but fairly:

"O you unworthy, merciless destroyer of men, and

* All names of demi-gods and demons. The Gandharvas were the heavenly musicians; the Kinnaras, a class of demi-gods in the retinue of Kuvera, god of riches; the Danavas, a race of Titans, enemies of the gods, and sons of Danu, the daughter of Kasyapa, the latter a mythic Hindu seer.

the ruin of families! I might take you for a fond lover, and that therefore you have spoken in this way. It is not fair between brothers, O Lakshmana, what would be bad even among men, who like you are pleased to walk in darkness. You are surely the only foe, threatening Rama in the wood, and it is for my sake that you dissemble; or is it perchance at the instigation of Bharata?* But I, having obtained my Indivira-like, Kamala†-eyed Rama, how could I stoop to love a husband of a meaner extraction? I rather look forward to the funeral fire and beside Rama I shall never touch another man—not even with my foot!" Thus Sita, like the daughter of a Sura, spoke to Lakshmana, all the while weeping, and beating her breast with her hands. At these harsh and heart stirring words, Lakshmana with great emotion, in a humble attitude replied to Sita: "You being to me like a higher divinity, I cannot answer; but an extreme language like this, O daughter of Mithila, does not beseem women. The temper of women all over the world is ever the same—fickle, refractory, obstinate, and often working the ruin of their brothers. May all the living creatures that stir in this wood listen to me, while protesting that you have abused me, when as was my duty I only spoke the truth. Woe to you; you will surely perish, since in your womanly perverseness you thus suspected me, when I only remained true to my master's word!"

Having uttered this harsh speech, after a while, filled with compassion, he began to speak to Sita as always he had been accustomed: "I shall indeed go in search of Rama, and may you be blessed, O you fair one! May all the good genii of the forest watch over you, although evil forebodings besiege me! On my return I hope to find you with Rama." Lakshmana thus addressed Sita, and she with streaming eyes answered: "Without Rama, O Lakshmana, my only hope will be the river Godavari; I shall either strangle myself, or die from exposure in the wilderness, or rather fling myself into the blazing funeral fire; for beside the noble Rama I shall never touch another man—not even with my foot!" Thus Sita spoke in her grief to Lakshmana, bitterly crying, and beating her bosom with her fists. The son of Sumitra, at the sight of the fair, weeping woman, who had become a picture of distress, sought to comfort her; but Sita said nothing more to her husband's brother. Lakshmana then took leave of Sita, with folded hands and civilly bowing. The inspired hero again cast a transient glance at the daughter of Mithila, and thereupon set out in the direction leading to Rama's presence.

*Bharata, Rama's half-brother.

†Indivira, the blue Lotus (*Nymphæa Cærulæa*); Kamala, also a kind of Lotus (the *Nelumbium Speciosum*).

CORRESPONDENCE.

EXTRACTS FROM OUR CORRESPONDENCE UPON THE SINGLE-TAX QUESTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I LIVE in a town of 3,000 inhabitants. Nearly all the vacant lots are owned by an English Land Company. Three years ago I bought from this company a lot: size, fifty feet front, for which I paid one hundred and ninety dollars. I built a cottage on it, in which I live. The Land Company owns a lot contiguous to and exactly like mine. It also owns many others all around me. * * * My lot without improvements, and the company's lot by mine, are now worth three hundred dollars each.

Last year my city, county, and state taxes on my house and lot were about fifteen dollars. On the Englishmen's lot, the taxes were about one dollar and fifty cents. * * *

It is very possible, therefore, that ten years hence the lot by mine will belong to the Land Company. It is also probable that each of these lots will then be worth one thousand dollars, and that in the ten years I will pay fully $200 taxes on mine—possibly more. And that the company will pay about $25 on their lot, which, counting the natural accumulations on the amounts, we pay out each year. It will be an actual cost to me of about $400, and to the company of about $50. So, aside from the fact that I, by improving my lot, will do my share in increasing the value of all my neighbor's property; and also will expend my labor in the town, and in trade and otherwise, distribute a large share of the products of my labor among my neighbors, this community will charge me $400 in the next ten years for making a profit of $700, and will charge these Englishmen $50 in the same time for making $700. And none of the $1,400 will be produced by the Englishmen or me, except what part we create as one of the whole community.

The total taxes, two lots, for ten years will be $225. My share $200, Englishmen's $25. Under Henry George's system with the same assessment, if the Englishmen chose to retain the use of their lot, they would pay $112 50 and I would pay $112.50.

JEROME LYNCH.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IF private property in land be just, then is the single-tax confiscation. There can be no confiscation of land because as against the State no man owns land.

"Absolute private property in land has no legal existence and is an impossibility being incompatible with civil government."

No man absolutely owns land. "He may hold it is true an *estate* in the land. This *estate* consists of three things: the right of possession, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposition subject to the right of the State to alter or defeat it and subject to the right of the State to tax it." * * *

The compensation granted by the State when it resumes possession of its land, as for instance when it wishes to erect a schoolhouse is for the violation of the implied lease. "But there is no violation of any contract real or implied when any rate of taxation or rent is fixed by the State." * * *

I am aware that the State has allowed the essentially political character of land to be lost sight of, because, until recently, of the plentitude of land.

I am also aware that it has treated land as though it were actually private property. But no man holds or can hold land on any other ground than that which I have described nor can he have any right to object when the State demands rent for its land whether it is collected by rent or tax. * * *

Wheelbarrow may object to the single-tax as an economic measure, but when he attempts to affirm the existence of absolute

private property in land, he has raised up a mightier adversary than Mr. George—the combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world. WM. C. WOOD, M. D.

GLOVERSVILLE, N. Y.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I HAVE carefully considered Georgeism as expressed by Mr. Pentecost. I have come to the conclusion that the *disadvantages* of it are, all but one, such as *time* would rightfully adjust if the *advantages* are such as would warrant waiting for adjustment. But there is one I cannot see how "Father Time" or any one else can adjust. It is the fact that there are *improvements* that become so incorporated with the land that their value *cannot* be separated. Now Mr. Pentecost evades this point. In fact he does not seem to comprehend it, for he recommends farmers to calculate what their farms are worth without improvements! Taking it for granted that improvements do not mean simply buildings, fences, and the like, if there lives a farmer who can make the calculation, I will confess that I know *nothing* of farming, if I *have* made it a study. He says Wheelbarrow does not understand when any body ought to understand what "the full rental value of the land *itself*" is; yet he takes it for granted that *he* understands the mysteries of making a first class farm.

It would be a waste of space to give any more object lessons to show how improvements disappear for he has entirely failed to digest those already given.

Now I wish to show how the difficulty would be solved. Such improvements as serve to increase the producing capacity of the soil would be taxed to their "full rental value" if the "land *itself*" was taxed the "full rental value," thus putting a stop to improvements of this kind, for what *fool* is going to spend labor and money ONLY to increase his tax bill? While buildings of very little use to any one but the owner could be built as fine as the owner pleased without increasing tax.

I think Wheelbarrow's bread would be dearer than ever but perhaps he could steal a fine house and eat it!

And how about forests? The "full rental value" would tax *nearly* all the forests out of existence. One-fourth of all land, at least, should be in forest. This would make lumber lower than the forest owners could afford, even without *any* tax.

Yours Truly,

MILL GREEN, MD. CHAS. M——.

NOTES.

It is announced that the Lincoln History, so long continued in the *Century*, will conclude with the six ensuing papers.

We call the attention of our readers to an able and suggestive article in the *Forum* for July, by Bishop Potter. The subject is "The Scholar in American Life."

A correspondent, Mr. Horace P. Biddle, of Logansport, Indiana, informs us, that the lines quoted at the bottom of page 1690 of the last issue of THE OPEN COURT, are by Fitz-Green Halleck, and not by Ben Jonson. They were written on the death of Joseph Rodman Drake.

The well-known and standard work of Archbishop Trench, "English Past and Present," has been published in pamphlet form, in two parts, by the Humboldt Publishing Company, of New York. A book that should be thoroughly studied by every student of English is thus placed within the reach of all.

A work which has created quite a stir in German theological circles is "The Struggle for Salvation," by Wilhelm Bender. It is an attempt to place religion upon a modern standpoint; to lay its foundation anew upon the lines of modern science. A critical review of the book, by P. Michaelis, will shortly be published in THE OPEN COURT.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVII. — Continued.

"In this also there is a loss," returned the High Steward; "distinguished men have become rare. I am ready to acknowledge the advance which the citizen classes have made in the last fifty years. But the capacity which a people develop in trade and commerce is seldom united with secure self-respect, nay, seldom also with that firmly-established position which is necessary to political strength. Too frequently we find a wavering between discontented insolence and over-great subserviency; covetousness abounds, and self-sacrifice is small. Wealth increases everywhere; who can deny that? But not in the same degree a comprehension of the highest interests of the nation."

"Time will improve," rejoined the Scholar, "and our sons will become firmer and freer; here too our future belongs to those who work laboriously."

"Much may be lost," said the High Steward, "before the improvement which you expect becomes great enough to secure to those who are struggling onward a salutary and active participation in the affairs of government. I am too old to nourish myself with hopes, and therefore cannot adopt your sanguine conception of our situation. I wish for the good of our nation, in whatever way it may come. I know it has passed through crises more critical than its present swaying between a decaying and a rising culture. But I feel that the air in which I live is growing more sultry; the tense excitement of contrast more dangerous. When I look back on a long life, I sometimes feel horror at the moral pestilence that I have contemplated. It was not a time of gigantic vices like your Imperial era, but it was a time in which, after short poetic dreams, the weakness of petty souls ruled and brought distraction. The figures which in this lamentable time have passed away will appear to posterity, not fearful, but grotesque and contemptible. You, Professor, live in a new epoch in which a younger generation awkwardly endeavors to rise. I have no sympathy for the new style. I have not the courage to hope, for I have no power to promote the culture of the younger generation."

He had risen. The old man and the young, vigorous man, the diplomat and the scholar, stood opposite to each other; the one an advocate for the world which was tending downwards; the other a proclaimer of a teaching which was unceasingly to renew the old world; secret sorrow lay on the calm countenance of the old man, and feeling, vigorous feeling, worked in the animated features of the younger: a high mind and a refined spirit were visible in the open countenance of both.

* Translation copyrighted.

"What we had to say to one another," continued the High Steward, "is said. I have endeavored to make amends for my mistake in regard to you. May the gossiping openness with which I have exposed myself to your judgment be some small compensation for my having been so long silent. It is the best satisfaction that I can give to a man of your sort. As respects the diseased state of mind of others, which was the subject of our conversation, there need be no further words between us; both of us will endeavor to do what is our duty concerning the men that are entrusted to our care, to preserve them from danger and to guard ourselves. Mr. Werner, farewell. May the occupation which you have chosen preserve your joyful confidence in your time and your generation for as many years as I bear on my head. This highest happiness of man, I, an insignificant individual, have painfully felt the want of, as did your great Roman."

"Allow me, your Excellency, to express one request to you," replied the Scholar, with warm feeling. "Often may the unpractical activity of the new apostles evoke a bitter smile from you, and the unfinished work which we pioneers of learning throw off will not always satisfy the demands which you make upon us; but when you are compelled to blame us, remember, with forbearance, that our nation can only bear within it the guaranty of renewing youth so long as it does not lose respect for intellectual aspiration, and retains its simple honesty, in love and hate. So long as the nation renews itself, it may inspire its princes and leaders with new life; for we are not Romans, but staunch and warm-hearted Germans."

"Nero no longer ventures to burn the apostles of a new doctrine," replied the High Steward, with a sad smile. "May I say something kindly from you to the Sovereign, as far as is compatible with your dignity?"

"I beg you to do so," replied the Professor.

The Professor hastened to take leave of the Princess. She received him in the presence of her ladies and the Marshal. Few words were exchanged. Upon expressing the hope of seeing him soon again at the capital, speech almost forsook her. When he had left the room, she flew up to her library and looked down on the carriage into which the chest was being put. She plucked some flowers which the gardener had placed in her room, and fastened them together with a ribbon.

"His eye looked upon you, and his voice sounded in the narrow halls in which you are passing your life. It was a short dream! No, not a dream, a beautiful picture from a new world.

"As the womanly heart submits, in loving devotion, to the stronger mind of a life-companion, her eye fixed upon his, such is the happiness of which I have had a presage. Only once has my hand touched his, but I feel as if I had lain on his heart, invisible, bodiless. No one knows it, not even himself, I alone felt the happiness. Light, airy bond, woven of the tenderest threads that ever were drawn from one human soul to another, thou must be torn and blown away! Only the consciousness remains that the inclination which drew two strangers together has been forever a blessing to one of them.

"You, earnest man, go on your path, and I on mine; and if accident should bring us together, then we shall bow civilly to each other, and greet one another with courtly speeches. Farewell, my scholar. When I meet with one of your associates, I shall henceforth know that he belongs to the silent community, in whose porch I have humbly bowed my head."

From the tops of the trees on which the princely child was looking down the birds were singing. The carriage rolled away; she bent down, and held the nosegay with outstretched hand; then with a powerful swing she threw the flowers on to the top of a tree; they hung among the leaves; a little bird flew out, but the next moment he again perched by the nosegay, and continued his song. But the Princess leaned her head against the wall of the tower.

The Scholar drove to the city with the chest he had found beside him. More rapid and stormy than on his coming were the thoughts that flitted through his soul; he hastened the coachman, and an indefinite anxiety fixed his looks on the rising towers of the capital. But amidst all, he ever saw the figure of the High Steward before him, and heard the sorrowful words of his soft voice.

"Immeasurably great is the difference between the narrow relations of this Court and the mighty greatness of Imperial Rome; immeasurably great also the difference between the troubled Court lord and the gloomy power of a Roman senator. And yet there is something in the structure of the soul that has this day displayed itself to me which reminds me of a figure from a time long past; and what he said sounds in my soul like a feeble tone from the heart of the man whose work I seek in vain. For just as we endeavor to explain the present from the past, so do we interpret circumstances and figures of a past time in the light of the men that live around us. The past unceasingly sends its spirit into our souls, and we unceasingly adapt the past to conform to the needs of our hearts."

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE MAGISTER'S EXIT.

PROFESSOR RASCHKE was sitting on the floor of his room. The bright colors of his Turkish dressing-gown were faded; constant perseverance in scientific service had given it a tinge of pale grey, but it still continued worthily to cover the limbs of its master. The Professor had seated himself by the side of his

eldest son Marcus, in order to facilitate the latter's study of the first book of A, B, C. While the little one, tired of the pictures, was resting, his father made use of the pause to draw a small copy of Aristotle out of his pocket. He read, and made remarks with a pencil, not observing that his son Marcus had long thrown away the picture book, and with the other children danced round their father.

"Papa, take your legs away; we can't get round them," exclaimed Bertha, the eldest, from whom, indeed, one might have expected greater discretion.

Raschke drew in his legs, and as after that he found his seat uncomfortable, he desired the children to bring him a chair. They brought the chair, and he supported his back against it.

"We can't get around yet," cried the dancing children.

Raschke looked up. "Then I will sit upon the chair."

That was satisfactory to the children, and the noisy hubbub continued.

"Come here, Bertha," said Raschke; "you may act as my desk." He laid the book on her head whilst he read and wrote; and the little one stood as still as a mouse under the book, and scolded the others because they made a noise.

There was a knock; the Doctor entered.

"Ha, Fritz!" called out the Professor; "I hardly recognized you; I must try to recall your face. Is it right to set your friends aside in this way, when a friendly greeting might do you good? Laura has told me what has happened to your dear father. A heavy loss," he continued, sorrowfully: "if I am not mistaken, two hundred thousand."

"Just one cipher too much."

"It matters little," replied Raschke, "what the loss is, compared with the sorrow it occasions. I should have been with you, Fritz, at that time. I started immediately, but a circumstance interfered with my intention," he added, embarrassed. "I have long been accustomed to go to your street in the evening, and—well—I got to the wrong house, and with difficulty found my way back to the lecture."

"Do not pity me," replied the Doctor; "rejoice with me—I am a happy man. I have just now found, what I despaired of obtaining, Laura's heart and the consent of her father."

Raschke clapped the Doctor on the shoulder, and pressed first one hand, then the other. "The father's!" he exclaimed; "he was the hindrance. I know something of him, and I know his dog. If I may judge of the man by his dog," he continued, doubtingly, "he must be a character. Is it not so, my friend?"

The Doctor laughed. "There has been an old enmity brooding over our street. My poor soul has been unkindly treated by him, like the Psyche in the tale of Venus. He vents his anger upon me, and gives me insoluble tasks. But beneath all his insolence, I perceive that he is reconciled to my attachment. I anticipate happiness, for I am to-day to accompany Laura to Bielstein. On my friend's account alone have I wished to start earlier on this journey. I cannot rid myself of one anxiety. I am disturbed that the Magister is in the neighborhood of Werner."

Raschke passed his hand through his hair. "Indeed," he exclaimed.

"I have distinct reasons for this," continued the Doctor. "The dealer who was said to have brought the forged parchment strip of Struvelius to the city was sent to me by the mother of the Magister. I dealt severely with him, as was natural; but he assured me that he knew nothing of such a parchment, and never had sold such a sheet to the Magister. The anger of the man at the false assertion of the Magister has made me very anxious. It confirms a suspicion that I have expressed in a letter with respect to the genuineness of another piece of writing which has been mentioned to me by Werner from the capital. I cannot help fearing that the Magister himself was the forger, and a terror comes over me at the thought that he is now exercising his art upon our friend."

"That is a very serious affair," exclaimed Raschke, pacing up and down, disquieted. "Werner trusted the Magister implicitly."

The Doctor also paced up and down. "Only think, if his noble confidence should make him the victim of a deceit. Fancy what a bitter sorrow that would be to him. He would long struggle sternly and self-tormentingly with a painful impression, which we should not be able to obliterate without great effort."

"You are quite right," said Raschke, again passing his hand through his hair. "It is not in him to be able to overcome moral delinquency without great exitement. You must warn him at once, and that face to face."

"Unfortunately I cannot do that for several days; meanwhile, I beg of you to make Professor Struvelius acquainted with the statement of the dealer."

The Doctor went away. Raschke forgot Aristotle, and meditated anxiously on the treachery of the Magister. Whilst so doing, there was a knock, and Struvelius, with Flaminia, stood at the open door.

Raschke greeted them, called his wife, begged them to sit down, and quite forgot that he was in his Turkish dressing-gown.

"We come with one wish," began Flaminia, solemnly. "It is with respect to our colleague Werner. My husband will impart to you what has moved us both deeply."

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE TWO CHIEFS OF DUNBOY. An Irish Romance of the Last Century. By *J. A. Froude.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

This is a story that ought to be read by every American, because the moral of it presses at this moment with alarming weight upon American statesmanship. In the ghastly presence of the Cronin tragedy, it will not do to say that Mr. Froude has exaggerated the conspiracies and plots that were part of the social life of Ireland a hundred and thirty years ago. In this romance the Americans may read the history, and learn the origin of that barbaric scheme of change, which, transplanted from Europe less than fifty years ago, has taken firm root in American soil, the scheme of conspiracy and murder.

It has been fashionable, for certain reasons, to class Mr. Froude's histories among the romances of the day. He now gives us a romance containing history which in the face of Chicago evidence, his most hostile critics will not venture to dispute. Mr. Froude has given us in the form of a novel, a very dramatic sketch of Celtic Ireland in the eighteenth century. As a novel, it will have ten readers, where, perhaps, as a history, it would have had but one. It is the very irony of Irish luck that Mr. Froude's enemies in Chicago, while denying the correctness of his pen-pictures of characters, actually furnish the most tragic evidence that they are unfortunately true. At the same time every fair-minded Englishman will sympathize with Mr. Froude in his condemnation of the stupid, criminal, and avaricious policy adopted by the English for the misgovernment of Ireland. He draws a terrible indictment against the statesmen of England in the following words:

"When the actions of men are measured in the eternal scale, and the sins of those who had undertaken to rule Ireland and had not ruled it are seen in the full blossom of their consequences, the guilt of Morty, the guilt of many another desperate patriot in that ill-fated country, may be found to bear most heavily on those English statesmen whose reckless negligence was the true cause of their crimes."

The two chiefs of Dunboy are Col. Goring, an Englishman upon whom the estate has been cast by confiscation from its ancient owners, and Morty O'Sullivan, the hereditary owner, who had forfeited his inheritance by treason. Morty O'Sullivan was chief of the O'Sullivan sept, and it is a strange coincidence that this name, justly, or unjustly, is prominent in the Cronin tragedy. Col. Goring and Morty O'Sullivan are the rival heroes of the story.

Col. Goring is a soldier of the Stonewall Jackson, Henry Havelock, and Chinese Gordon type, and it is very evident that Gordon was the model used by Mr. Froude in moulding the character of Goring. In fact, he writes "Gordon" sometimes instead of "Goring." The printer followed copy, and Mr Froude in revising the proof-sheets failed to notice his own mistake. Goring plants an English colony on the Dunboy estates, and develops the mining, manufacturing, and fishery industries. He is also commander of about a hundred miles of coast, with the duty of preventing smuggling within his jurisdiction. He is governed in all his actions by religious duty, and is morally and physically above the sense of danger. Knowing that he may be assassinated at any moment he goes about his work unarmed and unattended, sometimes miles away from home. He believes that he is "the servant of God," and that he will be spared so long "as it is God's will." He furnishes most of the employment and charity for the peasantry round about, and yet he knows that as a protestant and a "Saxon" his life is forfeited according to their national and religious code. One morning after he had relieved a crowd of people, some with money, some with food, some with clothes, and some with medicine, he said to a friend:

"They believe in me, and I suppose that in their hearts they have a regard for me. Yet of all the men you have seen here to-day there is hardly one who would not try to shoot me if he was so ordered by the secret societies."

So long as this is true in the United States to-day, it is idle to deny that it was true in Ireland, a hundred and thirty years ago.

Col. Goring expected that the Irish would oppose his enterprises, and hamper him in the performance of his duties. This was natural, but he was amazed that the English officials in Ireland thwarted him at every step, and even censured him His colony was Presbyterian, although he himself was of the established church, but his people found out that they could not worship in their own way, nor teach their children the rudiments of knowledge without breaking the law. The colonists rather than violate their own consciences or the laws of the land abandoned the settlement and sailed for America. In like manner the barbarous laws restricting Irish trade had made smuggling a patriotic duty, and Col. Goring found that his efforts to suppress smuggling were not approved by his superior officers. His duty was to enforce the laws, and he was expected to wink at their violation. No less a personage than the protestant Archbishop of Dublin said to him, and with good reason too, "You cannot live in Ireland without breaking laws on one side or the other." Goring could not understand such loose political morality as that. It was incomprehensible to his English mind. He was betrayed to his death exactly as Dr. Cronin was, but up to the last moment of his life he maintained that a law which ought not to be enforced ought to be repealed.

Morty O'Sullivan was a fanatic of another type. He was a Celtic chief whose lands and whose people had been conquered by the Saxon. His overmastering passion was hatred of the English, and his religious duty was to uproot them from the soil of Ireland. He would not be satisfied with anything less than their utter extermination. He was a brave and chivalrous man, a soldier polished at the court of Austria. He had fought with Prince Charles at Culloden, had escaped to the continent after the battle, was outlawed by the English, his land confiscated, and a price set upon his head. After gaining distinction in the Austrian army, he threw up his commission that he might accept the command of a French privateer to harass the English coast, to prey upon English commerce, to protect the contraband trade between Ireland and France, to supply arms to the Irish, to conduct the correspondence between the Irish chiefs and the government at Versailles, and finally to organize an insurrection in Ireland which was to be assisted by a French army landed at Bantry Bay.

As Col. Goring's efforts to establish English law in Ireland were thwarted by the English, so in another way Morty O'Sullivan's efforts to establish Irish law in Ireland were thwarted by the Irish. He could never get his countrymen to rise to the dignity of war; they would not go farther than a conspiracy, and conspiracy was hateful to the soul of Morty O'Sullivan. In the anguish of disappointment he one day said:

"None are braver than we when cow's tails are to be cut off, or the enemies of the country shot from a hiding place. But to stand up and fight the Saxon in an honorable field as the Scots did with Bruce and Wallace, that is beyond us, and therefore we are what we are."

There is pathos in the despair of Morty O'Sullivan when he finds that his countrymen will not follow him to fight with the English in the open field. He rejects all their importunities to draw him into conspiracies to assassinate. He says:

"We call ourselves patriots and we have not the spirit to face our tyrants like men. We are false to one another. We shall be false to any friend that trusts us.

"The sun will never shine on free Ireland till she has learned to face her conquerers with better weapons than the murderous knife."

Mr. Froude's romance appears at an opportune moment, and the lesson of it will not be lost. Habitual conspiracy deteriorates a people, and a people who merely conspires and assassinates will never be a match for a nation that fights. M. M. T.

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

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Buud des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man s conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE ELECTRICAL EXPERIMENTS OF PROF. HERTZ.

[The electrical researches of Prof. Hertz, of Carlsruhe, form one of the most important contributions to modern science. They show that electricity acts in the same way and according to the same laws as light and radiant heat. (Nos. 95 and 97.)]

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PAYMENT IN PROMISES TO PAY.

BY WHEELBARROW.

It is generally conceded that a promise by one man to pay another a hundred dollars is not payment, but there are some persons who believe that "Government" has the magic power to pay ten thousand million dollars with its own promises to pay. They even expand the miracle so that a citizen debtor can pay his debts by the simple "tender" of one of those promises of "Government." Several gentlemen who believe in this impossible alchemy have criticized my doctrine of dollars, with tart sarcasm which reminds me of crab-apple vinegar. I will turn the other cheek to them by a few words in reply. I will first notice Mr. Albert of Kentucky.

Mr. Albert abandons his former position. He admits that he was wrong on his law point, and he changes his argument as to the work performed by government in balancing the value of gold and silver dollars. In his first criticism he said that the American grocer could buy as much coffee in Brazil with the silver dollars he receives in payment for it here as with gold dollars, because "he exchanges his paper or silver to the government at a nominal discount to cover the transfer, and receives gold in return." Being shown his mistake he now says that the government "does not do it directly, but indirectly, by receiving gold, silver, or paper at the same value and indiscriminately for taxes and duties." "Upon this hint I spake," said Othello, and I think that Mr. Albert spoke those words on a hint from me, but they must vexatiously entangle him because in the preceding sentences he impressed it upon me that "paper shall not be accepted in payment of duties." This, he was careful to remind me, is printed on the reverse side of the greenbacks themselves. Mr. Albert calls my arguments "nebulous." No doubt they are nebulous to him, and so I fear is every kind of knowledge, for his brain is wrapped in clouds; yet he frankly admits that he is "a well-informed man."

How queer it is for "a well-informed man" to say that "a promise to pay without any specified time for payment is of no value," and that "*nominal* value is a term unknown in political economy, for it cannot be defined." I confess, as Mr. Albert kindly says, that it is a subject of which I know little. I have had no time to study political economy, but in the few books on the "dismal science," which it has been my privilege to read, the term is often mentioned, and this must be my excuse for using it. Jevons on "Money," page 75, treats of the distinction between the *metallic* value and the *nominal* value of coins. The statutes of the United States frequently speak of the "*nominal* value" of the money we are using now. It is a pity that our statesmen should have been so ignorant as to speak of "nominal value" in the very laws of the land. Had they consulted "a well-informed man" he would have warned them that "*nominal* value is a term unknown in political economy for it cannot be defined."

A critic who makes those fundamental mistakes is not entitled to any further reply. We cease to discuss the rules of rhetoric with a man as soon as we discover that he has not yet mastered the alphabet; so the man who shows that he has not yet learned the alphabet of finance is not entitled to the tribute of argument which we extend to a capable disputant. I must decline therefore to notice the rest of Mr. Albert's errors, except incidentally in my reply to that comical person, Mr. J. Allen, of Wyoming Territory, who has danced into the controversy looking very much like little Breeches in the poem, "peeart, and chipper, and sassy."

Once upon a time a pugnacious Arkansaw traveler came suddenly upon a very exciting tournament. Goaded by a love of glory, he inquired, "Is this a free fight?" They told him it was. "Count me in," he said; and in he went. After the lapse of a minute and a half, he again remarked, "Is this a free fight?" They answered, "Yes." "Count me out," he said, and left the meeting without waiting for the benediction. Mr. J. Allen rushes with kindred bravery and want of discretion upon a like experience. He knows little enough to say that "'Wheelbarrow' entirely overlooks the real cause of the depreciation of silver dollars; it is nothing more nor less than the lack of the legal tender qualification necessary to make it a bona-fide dollar." He has not yet got far enough in his alphabet to know that silver dollars *are* a legal tender, and yet he has the nerve to criticize and explain the American financial system.

A finance critic who does not know that the silver

dollars of his own country are a legal tender could hardly be historically accurate, and he is not to be held responsible for the following mistake: "The first sixty million dollars of greenbacks issued by this government were a legal tender in the payment of all dues, and were in no sense based upon gold, and a better money was never uttered." Now, it is a curious fact that this celebrated sixty million dollars was not legal tender at all. Of course, the good or bad character of those dollars is a matter of opinion. Mr. Allen thinks "a better money was never uttered." I think worse money has been uttered, but that was very bad. Speaking of that famous sixty millions, the American Cyclopædia makes the following flattering remarks. It says, those notes "did not enter freely into circulation, and there were instances of soldiers having to submit to the loss of a discount on those received for pay of from four to twenty per cent. in the District of Columbia." "Better money was never uttered," says Mr. Allen, although, at Washington, where it was made, soldiers paid in that money for defending the Capitol itself, were cheated by it from four to twenty per cent.

Listen to this: "A nickel," says Mr. Allen, "which is neither gold nor silver, *nor redeemable in either*, will purchase just as much coffee as five cents in silver." Here, again, he reasons upside down. The nickel does that just because it *is* redeemable. On that subject I find in the Revised Statutes of the United States the few feeble remarks following, that is to say:

"The five-cent and three-cent copper nickel, and one-cent bronze coins shall be a legal tender at their *nominal* value for any amount not exceeding twenty-five cents in any one payment, and

"The Secretary of the Treasury is required to redeem in lawful money all copper, bronze, copper-nickel, and base metal coinage of the United States."

The faith of the people that they will be redeemed according to the promise of the law gives them currency, exactly as faith gives value to milk tickets. This morning I was roused from slumber before daylight by the milkman "rapping, rapping at my chamber door." I got up and let him in. He gave me a quart of milk, and I gave him a paper ticket, about the size of a silver dollar. At certain times I buy a dollar's worth of tickets, and file them away for use when wanted. These tickets are not milk, they are merely securities redeemable in milk. Although they are not "*legal tender*" I have faith in them, because the dairyman has never failed to redeem them at their *nominal* value, a pint of milk for a red ticket, and a quart for a yellow one. If he should fail in business, my milk tickets on hand would be like the paper money of a broken government—worthless. But the metal money of a country up to its full bullion value, never fails. The coins of Alexander the Great have survived a hundred nations, and are good to-day.

The promise of redemption gives the greenbacks value. This promise is not only printed on the face of them, but has been solemnly written by Congress in the law of March, 1869. It contradicts the assertion that they are dollars, and this denial has been enrolled among the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribunal has decided that,

"The dollar note is a promise to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coin dollar of the United States. These notes are obligations, they bind the national faith. They are therefore strictly securities."

On that principle greenbacks are exempt from taxation. The Supreme Court has decided that also, on the ground that they are not dollars, but merely securities of the United States, and therefore not taxable either by the nation, or by any city, or county, or State.

I feel like making an apology for degrading controversy by answering the statement of Mr. Allen that if the world were to demonetize gold, a gold dollar would be worth only five cents, and the equally wild assertion that it would be worth about fifteen cents if the United States were to demonetize gold. The American gold dollar contains 25.8 grains of gold. According to Mr. Allen the value of the metal is fifteen cents, and the United States by coining it into a dollar adds an extra value to it of eighty-five cents. Do I not owe an apology to the reader for noticing such exuberant error?

Coinage adds the merest trifle to the value of the metal coined. This is proven by the fact that gold bullion is nearly equal in value to the same quantity of gold in eagles or in sovereigns. I think the four hundred shekels of silver paid by Abraham for the field of Machpelah were not coins, for they were *weighed*, not *counted*, and yet they were "current money with the merchant." When the sons of Abraham passed under the dominion of Rome, and those shekels bore the "image and superscription" of Cæsar, their value relatively to the other silver round about them was not changed. The coining of them simply dispensed with the trouble of weighing them. The "image and superscription" merely said to the merchants, "You need not weigh this piece; Cæsar hath already weighed it, and vouches that it contains so many grains of silver." And wherever those shekels are to-day, whether in shillings or in dollars, whether bearing the image of Queen Victoria, or our own Goddess of Liberty, the "image and superscription" upon them only testify to their weight. Whatever additional value they obtain by reason of their "*legal tender*" quality, is a dishonest value, the measure of their usefulness in cheating creditors and poor men out of their wages.

There is a playful innocence in Mr. Allen's fairy-

like vows of what he would do with gold and silver had he the power. He would reverse the laws of the universe, and make water run up-hill instead of down. He would demolish what he calls the "idol" gold, and erect a paper "idol" in its place. He would make gold inferior to silver, and then "base both of them upon a paper standard, making them redeemable in United States Treasury Notes, and then demonetize both of them." Many similar miracles he would perform by the same power. All this is like the boasting of the poetical child, who delights us with airy promises of what impossible things he would do if he were King of France.

THE ELECTRICAL EXPERIMENTS OF PROF. HERTZ.

BY THOMAS J. MCCORMACK.

II.

THE experiments cited in No. 95 under the title "Production of Electrical Rays," offer conclusive evidence that an electric oscillation is propagated in space as a form of wave-motion. We found that the interposition of a screen produced phenomena of reflection; nodes and loops of vibration were discovered; the reflected waves *interfered* with the forward traveling waves. But the laws of reflection may be more perfectly illustrated than by the production of phenomena of interference. It was found possible, namely, to separate the incident and the reflected wave-systems. The following was the method employed.

The two concave mirrors were so stationed with reference to each other that their openings faced in the same direction and their axes converged at a point about three metres distant. Of course no sparks were evoked in the spark-transit of the receiving mirror. Thereupon a level, vertical screen, of thin sheet-zinc, 2 m high and 2 m wide, was placed at the intersection of the axes in a position such that it stood at right angles to their median line. A brisk stream of sparks was received, which was produced by the ray reflected from the screen. When the screen was turned about its vertical axis some 15° out of its proper position to the one side or the other, the sparks vanished. Consequently, the reflection is regular and not dispersive. On moving the screen away from the mirrors, while still keeping the axes convergent upon it, the sparks slowly fell off. But even at a distance of ten metres, the sparks were still perceptible; the waves having thus had to travel a path of some twenty metres. This arrangement, Hertz remarks, might be advantageously employed in comparing the velocity of propagation in air with the less rapid velocities of propagation in other substances, as, for instance, in cables.

To obtain a reflection of the ray at an angle of incidence varying from zero, the ray was conducted through a hallway along a partition-wall through which led a folding-door. In an adjacent room into which the door opened, the receiving mirror was placed; its optical axis passing through the centre of the door and cutting the direction of the ray at right angles. The level conducting screen was then so stationed, vertically, that it formed both with the ray and the axis of the receiving mirror an angle of 45°. At once a stream of sparks was excited in the secondary conductor which even the closing of the door did not interrupt. When the reflecting screen was turned some 10° out of the proper position, the sparks disappeared. The phenomenon is therefore regular in its action and the angles of incidence and reflection equal.

By placing shadow-casting screens at the various points in the line of the path, it was shown that the ray could only travel from the source of the disturbance by way of the level mirror to the secondary conductor. In every instance here, the secondary sparks vanished; whereas the screens when placed at points in the remaining space did not intercept the ray.

REFRACTION.

When a ray of light passes obliquely from a rarer to a denser or from a denser to a rarer medium, it does not continue in the prolongation of its path, but is deflected from its course. This phenomenon is called refraction. It follows a definite law. The angle of incidence always bears a constant relation to the angle of refraction; this constant relation is known as the index of refraction.

To ascertain whether a ray of electricity in passing from the air into an insulating medium, suffered refraction, Hertz caused a large prism of mineral pitch to be constructed.* The basal surface was an equilateral triangle, the sides of which measured 1·2 m; the angle of refraction was nearly 30°; the height of the prism, with the refracting edge vertically placed, was 1·5 m. The prism was laid upon a proper foundation at a height such that the centre of its refracting edge lay at an equal altitude with the primary and secondary spark-transits. Hertz first assured himself that a refraction took place, and after having attained an idea of its magnitude, instituted the following experiments.

The emitting mirror was brought, at a distance of 2·6 m, to a position facing the first refracting surface, and so stationed that the axis of the ray lay accurately directed toward the centre of gravity of the prism and struck the refracting surface at an angle of 65° from the direction of the posterior surface. By the side of the refracting edge of the prism and by the side of the surface opposite, were placed two conducting screens

* The prism weighed about twelve cwt. Since it would not have been easily manageable as a whole, it was cast in wooden boxes into three equal parts, 0·5 m in height; the boxes were left about the prisms, their presence not affecting the action of the ray.

which cut off every other passage for the ray except that through the prism. On the side of the transmitted ray a circle of 2·5 m radius was drawn upon the floor, about the centre of gravity of the base of the prism as centre. In this circle the receiving mirror was then so moved about that its aperture was continually directed towards the centre of the circle.

When the receiving mirror was placed in the line of the prolongation of the incident ray, no sparks were received; the prism threw a total shadow in this direction. But sparks were evoked when the mirror was pushed in the direction of the posterior surface of the prism; first appearing at the point where the angular displacement from the original position, as measured in the circle, amounted to 11°. The stream of sparks increased in intensity until an angular deviation of about 22° was reached, when they again fell off. The last were obtained at a deflection of about 34°.

When the mirror was placed in the direction of the greatest effect and moved backwards from the prism on the radius of the circle, the sparks could be followed to a distance of 5–6 m. Hertz's assistant, by taking his position before or behind the prism, caused the sparks unmistakably to disappear—a proof that the effect actually passed through the prism and was not transmitted by any other path to the secondary conductor.

Again, without altering the position of the prism, the focal lines of the two mirrors were horizontally placed, and the experiments repeated in this position. No variation from the experiments described was noticed.

The refractive index corresponding to a refracting angle of 30° and a deflection of 22° near the minimum of deflection, is 1·69. The optical refractive index for pitchy substances is given at 1·5 to 1·6. The inexactness of Hertz's determination and the impurity of the stuff employed does not admit of a great importance being attached to the amount and significance of the discrepancy.

POLARIZATION.

The ether particles in a ray of light oscillate transversely to the line of propagation. Ordinarily they move in all directions about the line of propagation. But under certain circumstances all the vibrations may be reduced to one common plane. In the latter case the ray of light is said to be *plane polarized.*

The property of polarization may be acquired by reflection. When light at a certain angle of incidence falls upon a reflecting surface, all the vibrations of the rays reflected occur in a common plane. If such a polarized reflected ray fall upon a second reflecting surface, it will again suffer reflection provided the planes of reflection of the two surfaces are parallel; if they are at right angles to each other the ray will be quenched. In this instance the two surfaces, or mirrors, form a *reflecting polariscope;* the first mirror is a polarizer, polarizing the light, and the second an analyzer, determining its properties.

Now the manner in which our ray of electricity in the experiments cited, was produced, shows unquestionably that the ray is formed by transverse vibrations and that it is plane polarized, just as a ray of light is. The following experiment will convince. Let the receiving mirror be turned about the ray as axis, until its focal line, and with it the secondary conductor, comes into a horizontal position; the secondary sparks will gradually disappear and when the focal lines of the two mirrors are horizontally crossed, none are visible—even though the mirrors be brought very near each other. The two mirrors act as polarizer and analyzer of a polariscope; the ray of electricity is quenched—just as in the polariscope, when the plane of reflection of the analyzer is at right angles to the plane of reflection of the polarizer, the ray of light is quenched.

Polarization may occur by refraction. Light passing through certain substances does not follow the ordinary law of refraction. In Iceland spar an incident ray is split into two: it is said to be doubly-refracted. Doubly-refracted rays are also found to be polarized; that is, their vibrations occur in a common plane. In tourmaline, which is likewise a birefractive substance, that ray only is transmitted whose vibrations are executed *parallel to the axis* of the crystal. Consequently, if a ray of light impinge upon two superposed plates of tourmaline, the ray will pass unaffected if the axes of the two plates are parallel; so also if they are oblique to each other, for then the ray is resolved into two components, *one* of which is parallel to the axis. It will, accordingly, be seen, that if where the axes of two plates of tourmaline lie perpendicular to each other, in which case there is darkness, that light will appear if a third plate be obliquely introduced between them. For the light is twice resolved, and in each case *one* of the resolved components is parallel to the axis of the tourmaline plate. The two tourmaline plates are a simple form of the so called polariscope; the first plate is the polarizer and the second the analyzer.

To illustrate the phenomena of polarization described, Hertz constructed an octagonal wooden frame, 2 m high und 2 m wide, strung with copper wires 1 mm in thickness; the wires were parallel to each other, and each was 3 cm apart from the adjacent ones. The two mirrors were then set up with parallel focal lines, and the wire screen was so placed between the two, in a position perpendicular to the line of the ray,

that the direction of the wires cut the direction of the focal lines at right angles; in this case, the screen did not perceptibly affect the secondary sparks. But when the screen was so introduced that its wires lay parallel with the focal lines, the ray was totally intercepted. With regard to the transmitted electrical energy, therefore, the screen in this instance acts towards the ray precisely as a plate of tourmaline towards a plane polarized ray of light.

The focal line of the receiving mirror was again brought into a horizontal position, when, as before, no sparks appeared. The result was the same, when the screen was introduced, so long as the wires were either vertically or horizontally placed. But if the frame was so stationed that in the either of the two possible positions, its wires were inclined 45° to the horizontal line, the effect of introducing the screen then was the production of bright sparks in the secondary spark-transit. Plainly, the screen resolves the incident vibration into two components, and permits only that component to pass which falls at right angles to the direction of its wires. This component is inclined at an angle of 45° to the focal line of the second mirror, and, resolved a second time by the mirror, is able to act upon the secondary spark-transit. The phenomenon is throughout the same as the illumination of the dark field between polarizer and analyzer of a polariscope by an obliquely introduced plate of tourmaline.

A further distinction is to be noted here. "We are able," says Hertz, "by the means employed in the present investigation, only to detect electrical force. The electrical vibrations, when the primary oscillator is placed in a vertical position, take place unquestionably in the plane passing vertically through the ray, and are not present in the horizontal plane. From the experiments made with slowly alternating currents, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the electrical vibrations are accompanied by vibrations of magnetic force, which occur in the plane passing horizontally through the ray and do not appear in the vertical plane. The polarization of the ray, accordingly, does not consist so much in the fact that vibrations take place only in the vertical plane, as, rather, that *the vibrations in the vertical plane are electrical, and those in the horizontal plane magnetic, in character.* The simple question, in which of the two planes of a ray the vibration takes place, without stating whether the inquiry is for magnetic or electrical vibration, admits of no answer.

* * *

Returning now to the last experiment upon reflection, Hertz found it possible by the aid of the circular secondary conductor to determine, in the ray, the position of the plane of undulation. Both before and after reflection from the level screen it lay at right angles to the ray and had consequently described, in the reflection, an angle of 90°.

In the experiments upon reflection hitherto described, the focal lines of the concave mirrors stood in a vertical position, and the plane of oscillation was at right angles to the plane of incidence. In order to produce a reflection in which the oscillations would be performed *in* the plane of incidence, Hertz placed the focal lines of the concave mirrors in a horizontal position. The same phenomena as in the former position were observed and no difference even of intensity was noticed in the ray in the two instances. But, if the focal line of one of the mirrors is vertical, and that of the other horizontal, no secondary sparks whatever are seen. The conclusion was, that the inclination of the plane of oscillation to the plane of incidence was not changed by the reflection so long as the inclination is of one of the preferred values mentioned. But universally this statement does not hold good. "It is questionable," says Hertz, "whether after reflection generally the ray is still plane polarized."

A further experiment may be mentioned, with regard to reflection from electrically anisotropic surfaces. The two concave mirrors were placed as in the first described experiment on reflection; their openings faced in the same direction and their axes converged at a point three metres distant. But at the point of intersection of the axes, in this instance, was placed, as reflecting screen, the octagonal frame of parallel copper wires already mentioned. The result was that when the wires cut the direction of the vibrations at right angles, the secondary spark-transit was not illuminated, but was lit up as soon as the wires coincided with the direction of the vibrations. The analogy between the partially conducting surface and the plate of tourmaline is limited, accordingly, to the part of the ray that passes through the screen. The part that does not pass through is absorbed by the plate of tourmaline but reflected from the surface here employed. If the focal lines of the two mirrors, in the experiment last described, be crossed, it is impossible by reflection from an isotropic screen to evoke sparks in the secondary conductor. Hertz was convinced, however, that by reflection from an anisotropic wire-screen sparks could be called forth; provided the screen were so placed that the direction of the wires was inclined to the two focal lines at an angle of 45°. This phenomenon is clearly explainable from what has been said with regard to the action of a ray of light transmitted through three tourmaline plates.

* * *

"The physical formations just investigated," says Hertz, "we have introduced as rays of electrical force. We may, after what we have seen, designate them perhaps, as optical rays of very great wave-lengths. I,

at least, regard the experiments cited as in high degree calculated to remove all doubt regarding the identity of light, radiant heat, and electro-dynamic undulatory motion. I believe that scientists will now be able confidently to profit by the advantages that the acceptance of this identity ensures for the theory of optics as well as the theory of electricity."

DILETTANTEISM IN LITERATURE.

There are two classes of artists, *Virtuosi* and *Dilettanti*. The Virtuosi are professional artists who have studied and learned their art, and who practice it to make a living. They are, as a rule, skilled in their profession and other folks gladly pay them for the privilege of enjoying their work. Dilettanti, however, practice art not for the purpose of gaining a livelihood, but for their own amusement. That which is serious work to the former, is to the latter mere play and pastime.

Virtuosi pursue their calling (whatever it be, music, painting, or poetry) for the sake of gain, but Dilettanti from pure love of art. Virtuosi, being obliged to study and struggle in order to keep abreast with the general progress, practice their art constantly to the terror of themselves and to the enjoyment solely of others; while Dilettanti, we are told by Virtuosi, labor merely for their own amusement and eminently to the terror of others.

This, being true of art, applies with full force to literature, and we may add that the shortcomings of both classes, of the Dilettanti and the Virtuosi, are more injurious here than even in music, which is the most intrusive of the arts.

It is but fair that authors and artists should earn for their work a well deserved share in dollars and cents. But they are the prophets of humanity, they deal in the highest treasures of our race, and although, like the priests of religion, they should receive payment for their services, they should not attend to their work for the sake of money and still less should they yield to the temptation of following a vulgar taste which pays well. A manufacturer who produces, and a merchant who palms off on his ill-bred customers the patterns of their *mauvais goût* may be excusable; a poet or an artist who lowers himself in this way for the sake of gain justly deserves our contempt. He profanes the holiest ideals and instead of elevating his fellow-beings, he poisons their imagination and retards their progress.

Mercantile art and literature has lost its title to nobility; it becomes obnoxious and will easily be made serviceable to low purposes.

Such are the faults to which the work of Virtuosi, of the professional caste, is often subjected, if they become slaves of lucre, be it from poverty or from greed. In a country, however, where the moral spirit is a living presence we need not be afraid of any deterioration in art and literature since encouragement to a depraved taste would be too slight to recompense a sacrifice of the nobler aspirations of higher ideals.

The dangers that threaten art and literature from dilettanteism appear less injurious, but may become just as bad by a luxuriant growth of a semi-civilization springing from the rich soil of uncultured wealth. The Dilettante, as a rule, is a harmless person so long as he knows his imperfections. He keeps his paintings or poems in his desk, and if he is a musician, plays his piano in solitude. But let him be a man of influence, and he too easily receives the praises of his so-called friends and is thus inveigled into inflicting his crude productions upon a patient world. A country in which many Dilettanti of this kind prosper, will suffer no less from it than another country may from mercantilism. Let the general taste of a country be moral in its nature but indiscriminative, and these Dilettanti will prove to be the thorns amid which the good seed will be smothered.

The danger of dilettantism is not that of immorality but of ignorance; and ignorance, especially if it lies within our power to mend it, is also a vice; at least the consequences of both are the same. Dilettanti in literature not only fill the world with their verses, but they venture into all fields. They not only write on philosophy, on theology, on economics, on psychology, and worst of all on *belles lettres*, but they are bound to have their productions published. They have no idea that in order to write on a subject they should be familiar with the literature of their topic. They do not care for that which has been proposed by others on the subject. The less they know the more original they conceive themselves to be, originality being the chief aim to which they aspire.

For the benefit of Dilettanti in literature, it must be stated that their work will perhaps be very useful for their own education and self-training, but in so far as the world at large is considered, they will contribute little or nothing to the progress of humanity. And if indeed something good come out of this Nazareth, it will be an exception.

And why?

Ideas in philosophy, in science, and in literature cannot be created from nothing; they develop like living organisms. In order to make a new scientific discovery, one must be familiar with the existing state of scientific research. Archimedes with all his genius could not have invented the phonograph; but very likely he would if he had had all the knowledge of Mr. Edison. It is obvious, accordingly, that certain discoveries and inventions lie as it were in the atmosphere and are often made simultaneously by two dif-

ferent men who know nothing of each other's labors. Thus the differential calculus was invented by Leibnitz and by Newton; the nebular hypothesis by Kant and La Place; the idea of the common descent of all animals through evolution, by Treviranus and La Marck. It is not the man who out of his own genius, from the depths of his soul, brings forth the new ideas; it is the old ideas that enter his mind and are there transformed so as to be reproduced in a maturer and truer shape. Accordingly, if we intend to contribute to the general progress of mankind, we must first acquire the present store of knowledge. If we believe that we are such geniuses as to be able to do without it, we shall (if we have sufficient intellectual strength) at best make discoveries that have been made centuries before us. We never heard of them; how can we know that they have been refuted long ago and are now replaced by other and more advanced views?

Virtuosi have the advantage of being in possession of the acquisitions of mankind in their branch, but they often suffer from being educated in a certain school, from having imbibed all the prejudices of a one-sided partisan conception. Most Dilettanti are free from the effects of a misguided training. Therefore they are usually more open to progress, and it happens frequently that a Messiah comes from out their ranks—instead of appearing in the class of the recognized professional Virtuosi. Such was the case with Wagner who describes his life in the *Meistersinger* where Walther introduces new lays; he is rejected by the professional class of *Singers*, but the old master Hans Sachs recognizes in him the genius of a new epoch.

It need not be said that if a prophet indeed arises from the Nazareth of dilettanteism, he must first pass through the severe school of self-education in order to raise himself to the present level of his craft. Being, however, independent in his work, he preserves a freshness of mind which most of his professional coworkers lack. He is not ensnared by the time honored prejudices of the guild and not imposed upon by venerable masters, whose authority, justly deserved in other respects, gives strength to their errors. While most of the professional class are so well versed, so stable in the methods of their craft, that their brain nerves have become ossified, he remains impressive and impartial. His judgment is not pre-captured, not secretly pledged to or predisposed for the old theories, and this virginity of his mind renders him fit to create new theories and progress beyond the present state.

That which is most desirable, therefore, is neither the orthodox and fossilized wisdom of the professional Virtuoso, nor the sportive levity of the Dilettante, but a combination of the virtues of both without their offensive faults. The workers of humanity that labor in the mines of man's intellectual life, must perform their task from pure love of their work, not for mere enjoyment, but with unerring, unflinching earnestness, and zeal.

P. C.

INFIDELITY.

BY DR. R. B. WESTBROOK.

[From the *Freethinkers' Magazine* for July.]

"WHAT is infidelity, and who may with propriety "be called infidels? The words *infidel* and *fidelity* are "from the same Latin root, *fidelis*. In the former the "prefix *in* (not) is used while in the latter it is omit-"ted. The original, *fidelis*, means *faithful*, from "*fides*, faith. The word faith does not primarily and "necessarily refer to *what* one believes, but to his "*fidelity* to *whatever* he believes. The more com-"prehensive and practical meaning of the original "word relates specially and primarily to the matter of "faithfulness to a *trust* or contract, and hence, in the "language of the *law*, adultery is denominated "*in-"fidelity*," because it is a violation of the marriage con-"tract. By palpable perversion of language, and "doubtless out of deference to ecclesiastical bigotry "and arrogance, lexicographers have added to the "original and real philological meaning of the word "an arbitrary and utterly unjustifiable definition, "founded entirely upon the puritanic *usus loquendi*, "and applied it to the matter of a *creed*, what one *be-"lieves* regarding the dogma of a single *sect*, as to the "infallible inspiration of its doubtful Scriptures—"doubtful as to their origin, doubtful as to what they "really teach, and equally doubtful as to the real "character and teachings of the alleged founder of "the sect. Against this perversion I firmly protest "and refuse to be called an *infidel* until I shall have "been proved *unfaithful to a trust*. According to the "real meaning of the word, I would as soon be called "a *defaulter* as an *infidel*.

"In my judgment independent investigators and "freethinkers have not been wise in tacitly accepting "an opprobious name without an earnest denial and "an indignant retort. No class of men on earth are "more free from *infidelity* than those who are vilified "as infidels by those to whom the stigma properly "belongs. In behalf of the Rationalists and Liberals "of the world, I flatly deny that they are *infidels*, and "boldly retort by charging the rankest *infidelity* upon "the paid, professional Christian clergy, with few ex-"ceptions, in that they are *unfaithful* in the search "for truth, often suppress it when they happen to find "it, and as frequently suggest the false, and even un-"faithfully and dishonestly preach what they do know "to be false! Such men are the real infidels.

"I close with a kindly hint to some of our ration-

"alistic writers and speakers who sometimes use the "expression '*orthodox infidelity*,' or similar words. "Herein I think our 'Homers' are caught 'nodding'! "Has it come to this that there are men in our *Liberal* "ranks who are not only willing to be stigmatized as "*infidels*, that is, as *defaulters* and *unfaithful* persons, "but tacitly admit that they belong to a SECT having "a 'shibboleth' or standard of orthodoxy like other "sects? Can it be true that some *Freethinkers* cannot "tolerate *free-thinking?* Let Liberals beware lest "they fall into the secret snares of the narrow bigots "who 'profess and call themselves *orthodox* Chris-"tians'! Let Freethinkers have no tests of 'good "and regular standing' except those of moral char-"acter, manly honor, and mental freedom."

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

V.

Now the younger Raghuid, after thus having rudely been provoked, proceeded in the direction of Rama, leaving Sita alone in the forest.

But Ravana, perceiving how both Rama and Lakshmana had been enticed away by Maritcha, began now to consider, how his own purpose could best be attained; although the dutiful Lakshmana, reluctant and bewildered, did not venture to advance very far.

In the meanwhile he, the majestic Dasagriva,* commenced moving toward the daughter of Videha, in the disguise of a mendicant penitent. He beheld the fair girl forsaken in the wood, left there alone by the two brothers, like twilight and dark night, deprived of their sun and moon.

The foolish lord of the Rakshas, on seeing the matchless woman thus lonesome, began to think with himself, that this would be the right time for approaching her during the absence of her husband and Lakshmana; and having quickly bethought himself, Ravana suddenly stood before Sita in the disguise of a wandering Bhikshu.†

He was clad in the brown garment of his order, wearing the prescribed lock of hair on the top of his head, with an umbrella and sandals; a sack was slung across his left shoulder, and in his hands he carried three bamboo-sticks, and the earthen jar for collecting alms.

Then all trees and plants growing in the wood of Janasthana, all birds and beasts at the sight of the fiend were paralyzed with terror; the winds were hushed into calm at the swift approach of the lord of all Rakshas, bent on cruel mischief, and the river Godavari ceased to flow. And then also in the neighboring Pantchavatya-forest * all birds and deer fled off in wild terror, Ravana in the meantime having come within sight of Rama's abode. The wicked fiend, thus, in his disguise of a wandering Bhikshu approached the beautiful Sita, immersed in grief at her husband's prolonged absence. He accosted the daughter of Videha, ill-concealed under his disguise, as a well by treacherous brambles; or not unlike the slow planet Saturn, when he moves toward the chaste star Tchitra.†

Ravana stopped and fixed his glance on Sita, the spotless wife of Rama, of the beautiful teeth and lips and lovely like the full moon.

She was sitting within a bower of leaves, shedding copious tears, abandoned by Rama and Lakshmana—a prey to sorrowful thoughts. In him she beheld the dark, moon-less night, while his covetous eye, though unable to carry hence the charming body of the Videha, remained immersed, and like fascinated at the sight. The evil-minded rover of the night approached still nearer to the Lotus-eyed daughter of Videha, dressed in yellow silk;‡ and wounded by the darts of the god of love, there in the solitude he began to speak to her, counterfeiting the modest tone of a Brahman; for indeed she glowed all over her person like gold or like Sri §—highest goddess in the three worlds, without her Lotus; but now, alas, Ravana began to praise her.

"O you soft-smiling, soft-eyed fair one! You are blooming like the wood yonder before us! Your swelling bosom, in its loveliness matching the choicest pearls, is indeed charming! Who are you, like a golden statue, in your yellow, silken garments, and wearing a wreath of blue Lotus? Are you modesty, renown, the goddess Sri, beauty, the divine Lakshmi ‖ herself—which of all these are you, O you fair one—you who seem so unfettered and free? Like the pointed mountain-peaks yonder are your pretty, white teeth. Your eyebrows are well penciled, delicate, and a fit ornament to your beautiful eyes. The expression of your countenance is wonderfully enhanced by those cheeks, O you Sundari! ¶ They are glowing like beaten gold and naturally charming. Your ears are well-formed, and your delicate hands possess the soft red of a Lotus-leaf; your hair is divided by a parting-line;

* Epithet of Ravana, denoting the one of "ten necks."

† A wandering Buddhistic mendicant. This, of course, is an anachronism. There were no such in Rama's day. At a later time, however, the Brahmans in their hatred of the Buddhist fraternity identified these heterodox mendicants, both male and female, with tramps, impostors, and disreputable characters.

* The 'tapovana' of the text properly denotes a wood inhabited by anachorets.

† Tchitra, the foremost star in Virgo.

‡ Yellow was the royal color in India.

§ Sri, Ceres, goddess of plenty.

‖ Lakshmi, wife of Vishnu, and goddess of happiness, etc.

¶ Sundari, name of a goddess. All the oriental epithets bestowed by Ravana upon Sita are not suited to the taste, of Western nations, and have partly been omitted and others slightly modified.

your fingers and the palm of your hand are so delicate and divine! And your lovely well-shaped feet in their quick, alternate motion resemble the tender buds of a Lotus-flower; a pair of jet-black pupils are sparkling in your large, pure eyes, O you fair-haired one, and only one hand might easily span your elegant, lithe figure.

I never on earth beheld any goddess, Gandharvi, Kinnari, Yakshi, or any living woman like you. You surpass everything in the world, and your holy beauty will never fade. And yet, my anxiety is aroused at seeing you living in this dangerous wilderness; O may you not for your welfare's sake dwell here! This is the abode of the lawless Rakshas, while lofty palaces, pleasant suburban groves, parks, Lotus-lakes, Indra-gardens and other enchanted grounds are only worthy of being inhabited by you.

Your Lotus-wreath, your jewels, and dress being all so choice, I should think that your husband must be the same. O may you not stay here, lying on the ground, suffering and feeding on roots in the wilderness—though worthy of joy, yet debarred from all happiness! Who are you then—for unto me you seem a divinity—perhaps one of the Rudras, Maruts, or Vasunas? Unto which of these divinities belong you? Are you indeed a Gandharvi or an Apsaras?* Yet, hither never used to come Gandharvis or Apsarasas, neither demi-gods nor men. This is the abode of Rakshas only—so how came you hither? None are here but jackals, lions, tigers, elephants, bears, hyenas, and wolves; and how are you not afraid of all these? And do you not fear to live in this wood amidst gigantic, swift, and furious elephants? Say then, who and whose are you, and whence have you come; for what motive have you alone ventured to invade the dreaded abode of the Rakshas?

In such words the daughter of Janaka was addressed by the evil-minded Ravana. At first she had been startled, seized with fear and mistrust; but the disguise of the Brahman again inspired her with confidence; and Sita accordingly replied to Ravana, disguised as a Bhikshu, but afterwards discovering to her great regret, that a Raksha had entered her dwelling in a penitent's garb. At first Sita honored him with every attention due to the guest, and fetching water from the wood, offered it to him; even speaking a blessing upon the saintly impostor. Ravana, while admiring the graceful princess, bent on his service, at the same time had firmly made up his mind to carry her away by force; he now imagined that he had reached his purpose and beholding her in the solitude anxiously waiting for the return of her husband, who had gone a-hunting and for Lakshmana, alas, he felt deeply satisfied.

*Apsarasas, the heavenly dancers; all the other names are also those of demi-gods.

CORRESPONDENCE.

EXTRACTS FROM OUR CORRESPONDENCE UPON THE SINGLE-TAX QUESTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I DO not wish to champion Mr. Pentecost, or to strike Wheelbarrow over his shoulder, for Mr. P. is amply able to manage his own cause; but, in a friendly way, I wish to show "W." that it is the merest quibbling to hunt for a mare's nest in words that may in a certain sense be synonyms. When ground-rent is taken for taxes, rent and taxes become interchangeable terms. * * * The question is not whether we shall tax or confiscate, for these terms mean the same thing in this connection, but in what proportion shall we take from the individual. Shall we take in proportion to each man's industry or accumulation or in proportion to the land or natural opportunity that the individual owns. * * *

Mr. P. makes a mistake in comparing the legal status of a horse—very properly private property—with land, which cannot be made private property. What the individual requires with land is secure possession, not ownership. The horse thief would laugh at your denial of ownership while leaving the horse in his possession; it is the last thing you would think of doing, but it is the very thing proposed by Georgeites with regard to land—common ownership but private possession.

Permit me, Mr. Wheelbarrow, to remind you of the old saw: "People who live in glass houses should not throw stones." You express it as your opinion that the ownership of land constitutes the political distinction between a freeman and a serf. Such a proposition is so shallow and so transparent that the man who holds it ought never to touch Mr. P.'s glove nor that of any other man who has "seen the cat." Had you thought, beyond the end of your nose, you would have seen that in any country, or under any government, where land is bought and sold freedom becomes a thing of purchase, and not a natural right, and, as we say, "the man with longest purse knows the persimmon."

It is a proposition that no man can dispute, that if either factor of production is made a commodity, slavery is the inevitable result—chattel in the one case, industrial in the other. You can stand upon this proposition as upon a rock, and standing upon it you must accept the single tax. * * *

When I was a young man, scarcely out of the years of my boyhood, I led men to battle and to death fighting for the emancipation of the chattel slaves, and now that our heads are growing grey, I would Heaven we could fall in to emancipate the industrial slaves—our own children. WM. CAMM.

MURRAYVILLE, ILL.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

"WHEELBARROW" still in wordy warfare makes it hard to believe that he finds any real difficulty in comprehending the George theory, or that he can imagine a proposition "to take for the use of the community the whole income arising from the use of (Tom Clark's) land," equivalent to a proposition "to take for the use of the community the whole income of his farm." There may be a mental aberration which corresponds with color blindness and renders its victims unable to distinguish differences that are easily perceived by persons with normal faculties. If "Wheelbarrow" is thus affected he deserves sympathy, but uncharitable people will dismiss his case with the remark that none are so blind as those who will not see.

The income arising from Tom Clark's land is the sum which other men would pay him for permission to work for themselves on this land stripped of buildings, fences, and other improvements, which have been placed upon it by human exertion. The amount

of this income can easily be determined by the local assessors from comparison with neighboring unimproved land of the same natural capabilities and corresponding proximity to population. Their income is rent and this only is what Mr. George proposes shall be taken for the use of the community. The income of Tom Clark's farm is quite another matter. A farm is land in cultivation. Cultivation necessitates labor, and capital increases the efficiency of labor. The crops which Clark produces are the income of his farm. But this income includes the income arising from the application of labor, and the income arising from the use of capital, in addition to the income arising from the land. Mr. George concedes Tom's absolute right to the entire income of the farm, except the rental value of the land as above mentioned. * * *

In Book VIII, Chap. II, Progress and Poverty, Mr. George in plain words proposes "making land common property by confiscating rent" and to "assert the common right to land by taking rent for public uses." For this purpose, he says, "The machinery already exists. Instead of extending it, all we have to do is to simplify and reduce it" so as "to abolish all taxation save that upon land values" and "to appropriate rent by taxation." In a late speech in Manchester, Eng., Mr. George says: * * * "Although in form we propose to substitute one tax for other taxes, yet it is merely in form. * * * In reality what we propose is to abolish all taxation, because the imposition of a tax on land-value would only be in form a tax. In its nature it is but taking for the use of the community the rent which is due to the community." There is no "melancholy deception here." It is all so simple and straightforward that "the wayfaring man though a fool need not err therein." J. K. RUDYARD.

EAST NORTHPORT, N. Y.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WHILE decrying Georgeism, the ultimate goal of which is the Nationalization of land by means of a single land-tax, Wheelbarrow, who boasts in THE OPEN COURT of June 13th of having demolished Mr. Pentecost by extorting from him the confession that Georgeism involves confiscation, has not a word to say about the practical confiscation of small freeholds such as Thomas Clark's under our present usurious system of taxation and sales for delinquent taxes, constantly going on now all over the United States.

All the difference there is between Wheelbarrow and Henry George and his disciples is simply this: The latter propose to do the identical thing and nothing more for the benefit of the commonwealth what Wheelbarrow and his fellow reformers have been doing all along and are doing now for the private benefit of Lord Wheelbarrow and a few other private individuals who have adopted the "mighty scarce" gold dollars as the standard measure of all values. After all there is some analogy between a slave and a farm, for the hire of the one as well as the other is a source of revenue to its owner, and the abolition of slave labor will surely be followed by the abolition of private ownership in land which is fast reducing free labor to a worse condition of servitude than negro slavery was before the war. * * *

This now irrepressible conflict between vested and national rights is constantly spreading over wider acres and Irish evictions are no longer uncommon occurrences here in free America, the public highways of which are thronged with homeless tramps God made the land for all men to dwell therein and not for but a few to speculate therein and corner it, and how long the American people will rest content to be despoiled of their inheritance by our present land system the Lord only knows. F. HESS.

GONZALO. I' the Commonwealth I would by contraries
Execute all things; * * * riches, poverty,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none.
No occupation; all men idle, all.
SEBASTIAN. Yet he would be king on't.—*The Tempest.*

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. — Continued.

Raschke started up from his chair. Struvelius, whose emotion was only visible in his bristly hair, began: "We were called yesterday to the police-station. When the brother of Magister Knips fled to America, his things were taken possession of on the application of petty creditors, and as the greater portion of his effects were at his mother's house, they were taken away from there. Amongst them were utensils and portfolios which evidently did not belong to the fugitive, but to his brother; one of those portfolios contained tracings after the style of manuscripts, unfinished attempts to imitate old writings, and written parchment sheets. The officials had been surprised at these, and requested me to inspect them. It appeared upon closer observation that the Magister had long been occupied in acquiring the skill of imitating the characters of the Middle Ages. And from the fragments I have found in the portfolio, there can be no doubt that he has other forgeries in his collection, some of which answer exactly to that parchment strip."

"That is enough, Struvelius," began his wife. "Now let me speak. You may imagine, dear colleague, that Werner at once occurred to us, and that we were greatly alarmed lest the husband of our friend should get into trouble through the deceiver. I asked Struvelius to write Professor Werner, but he preferred to inform him through you. This method also appeared most satisfactory to me."

Raschke, without saying a word, took off his dressing-gown, and ran in his shirt-sleeves about the room, searching in all the corners. At last he found his hat, which he put on.

"What are you about, Raschke!" exclaimed his wife.

"Why do you ask?" he said, hastily; "there is no time for delay. I beg your pardon, Mrs. Struvelius," he said observing his sleeves, and again put on his dressing-gown, but in his excitement he still kept on his hat, and thus attired, seated himself opposite his friends. Bertha, at a sign from her mother, gently took his hat off.

"A quick decision is necessary in this case," he repeated.

"There is no reason," continued Struvelius, "for withholding the property of the Magister from his mother; but, meanwhile, they would willingly allow you an inspection of the writings."

"That I do not wish," exclaimed Raschke; "it would spoil the day for me. Your judgment, Struvelius, satisfies me."

* Translation copyrighted.

There was some further excited interchange of views, and the visitors left. Again Raschke rushed stormily about, so that the skirts of his dressing-gown flew over the chairs.

"Dear Aurelia, do not be frightened; I have made up my mind. I shall set out to-morrow."

Mrs. Raschke clasped her hands together.

"What are you thinking of, Raschke?"

"It is necessary," he said. "I despair of shaking the firm views of Werner by letter. My duty is to try whether persuasive words and detailed representations will have greater effect. I must know in what relation my friend stands to the Magister. From certain intimations of the Doctor, I fear the worst from the activity of the forger. I have a short vacation before me, and I cannot employ it better."

"But, Raschke, you wish to travel!" asked his wife, reproachfully. "How can you engage in such an undertaking?"

"You mistake me, Aurelia; in our city I sometimes do loose my bearings, but in foreign parts I always find my way."

"Because you have never yet been alone in foreign parts," replied the prudent wife.

Raschke approached her, and raised his hand warningly.

"Aurelia, it is for our friend, and one must pay no regard to trifles."

"You will never get there," rejoined his wife, with sad foreboding.

"It is much easier to speed through half the world in a secure vessel than to go on two legs through our streets; half acquaintances are the most unreliable."

"Then the money for the journey, Raschke?" whispered Mrs. Aurelia, in a low voice, that the children might not hear.

"You have in your linen cupboard an old black savings-box," replied Raschke, slily. "Do you think I know nothing of it?"

"What I have collected in that is for a new dress-coat."

"You wish to take away from me my old one?" asked Raschke, indignantly; "it is well that I have made the discovery. I would now travel to the capital even if I had no occasion for it. Out with the box!"

Mrs. Aurelia went slowly, brought the savings-box, and with silent reproach, put it into his hands. The Professor tossed the money, together with the box, into his breeches' pocket, threw his arm round his wife, and kissed her on the forehead.

"You are my own dear wife," he exclaimed; "and now there must be no delay. Bring me Plato and Spinoza."

Plato was the silk cap, and Spinoza the thick cloak of the Professor. These treasures of the house were so called because they had been bought with the money earned by two books on those philosophers. The impression which the works had made on the learned world had been very great, but the remuneration very small. A commotion arose among the children, for in winter these beautiful articles were sometimes brought out for a Sunday walk. The little troop ran with their mother to fetch them.

"Be sure and bring them back, Raschke. I am so afraid you will lose one of them."

"As I have told you, Aurelia, in traveling you may depend upon me."

"I will write a few lines to Werner; he must take care that you keep them both. I will put the letter in your coat pocket, if you will only give it to him."

"Why not?" exclaimed Raschke, courageously.

The following morning Mrs. Aurelia accompanied her husband to the point from which the coach started and took care that he came to the right place.

"If you were only safely home again!" she said, piteously.

Raschke kissed her gallantly, and seated himself on his traveling-bag.

"The seats are remarkably high," he cried out, with his legs dangling. His traveling companions laughed, and he said, civilly, "I beg the gentlemen to excuse me."

* * *

The lamps burned, and the moon shone through the white mist on the walls of the Pavilion when the Professor returned there. No ray of light fell from the windows. The house stood gloomy and abannoned, and a blue phosphorescence seemed to glimmer above it. The door was closed; the lackey had disappeared. The Scholar pulled the bell. At last some one came down the stairs. Gabriel appeared, and gave vent to a cry of joy when he saw his master before him.

"How is my wife?" asked the Professor.

"Mrs. Werner is not at home," replied Gabriel, shyly. He beckoned his master into the room: there he gave him Ilse's letter. The Professor read the lines, and held them in his hands as if stunned. This also was a manuscript which he had found. It informed him that his wife had gone from him: every word went like a dagger to his heart. When he looked at Gabriel he perceived that he did not yet know all. The servant told him what had happened. The Scholar pushed the chair from him; his limbs trembled as in a fever.

"We will leave this house immediately," he said, faintly; "collect all the things."

Like a Romish priest who prays in secret devotion to his God, he had veiled his head from the sounds which sought to penetrate his soul from the

outward world. He had closed his ears and eyes to the figures that moved about him. Now fate had torn the veil from his head.

"Mr. Hummel would not depart before your arrival," continued Gabriel; "he is in great haste."

"I shall go to his inn; follow me," said the Professor; "but first mention at the castle that I have departed."

He turned away and left the house. As he passed by the castle, he cast a wild look on the windows of the room which the Sovereign inhabited. "He is not returned yet; patience," he murmured. He then went, as if in a state of stupor, to the inn. He ordered a room, and inquired after his landlord. Immediately afterwards Mr. Hummel entered.

"Good news," began the latter, in his softest tone; "a messenger from the Crown Inspector brings me the report that they have all made a safe journey. It must have been a matter of caution that there is no letter for you."

"It was indeed a matter of caution," repeated the Scholar, and his head sank heavily on his breast.

Mr. Hummel seated himself close to him, and whispered in his ear. At the last words the Professor sprang up in terror, and a groan sounded through the room.

"A man is not a screech owl," declared Mr. Hummel, pacifyingly; "and it would be unjust to expect of him that he should be able to distinguish in the darkness the head from the tail of a rat; but every householder knows that there are also worthless contrivances of architecture. These intimations I make to you only, to no one else. I sent my card a few days ago to your father-in-law. Little Fritz Hahn has, in your absence, become a Doctor Faustus, who will carry off my poor child under his fiend's cloak to Bielstein. May I announce your arrival there?"

"Say," replied the Scholar, gloomily, "that I will come as soon as I have settled matters here."

He held Mr. Hummel firmly by the hand, as if he did not like to part from the confidant of his wife, and led him down to the hall. New travelers had arrived there, and a little gentleman in a cloak and a beautiful silk traveling-cap, turned, without looking from under a large umbrella, to the Professor, and said:

"I should be much obliged if you would show me to a room, waiter. Am I in the right place here?"

He mentioned the name of the city; the Professor took the gentleman's traveling-bag from him, seized him by the arm without saying a word, and took him rapidly up the stairs.

"Very polite," exclaimed Raschke, "I thank you sincerely, but I am not at all tired; my only wish is to speak to Professor Werner. Can you arrange for an audience with him?"

Werner opened his room, took off his hat, and embraced him.

"My dear colleague," cried Raschke, "I am the most fortunate traveler in the world: usually a pilgrim on the highroad is contented if no misfortune happens to him, but I have met in the carriage with modest and thoughtful men. The conductor on changing carriages carried my cap after me, and some one kindly accompanied me to this house; and now when, for the first time, I stand on my own feet, I find myself in the arms of him whom I came to see. It is a pleasure to travel, colleague: at every mile-stone one observes how good and warm-hearted the people are among whom we live. We are fools that we do not deliver our lectures in carriages; the anxieties of our wives are unjustifiable; a man can manage by himself."

Thus did Raschke exult.

"Who lives in this room—I or you?"

"You may remain with me or have the adjacent room, as you please," replied Werner.

"Then with you; for I wish to be without you, my friend, as little as possible."

"You come to a man who is in need of consolation," said the Scholar. "My wife is with her father; I am alone," he added, with faltering voice.

"You look to me like a traveler who draws his cloak around him in bad weather," exclaimed Raschke; "therefore what I bring you will at any rate not disturb you in cheerful repose. My business as messenger is to lower a human soul in your eyes; that is hard for us both."

"I have to-day experienced what would shatter the foundations of the strongest structure. There can be but little that would shock me now: I am composed enough to listen."

Raschke seated himself by him and told his story. He fidgeted about on the sofa, slapped his friend on the knee, stroked his arm, and begged for composure.

Again was a veil drawn from the head of the seeker, who had believed himself to be speaking alone with his God. The Scholar was silent, and did not flinch.

"This is fearful, friend?" he said, at last.

With that he broke off, and the whole evening he did not say a word about the Magister.

The following morning the Professors sat together in Werner's room. Werner at last threw the two parchment sheets on the table.

"With these at least the Magister has had nothing to do. I myself fetched them out of the old rubbish: there lies the missal on the chest. It demands great self-control for me to look at that dearly-bought acquisition."

Raschke examined the parchment.

(To be continued.)

SELECTIONS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

VII.

"Dying! yet thou smilest ever;
Self-consuming—how canst sing?"

THE POET'S ANSWER.

O Love, you use me cruelly!
I sing, yet must I say
My heart is aching, sighing:
The tapers there decay,
Yet shed a light in dying.

Love-pain sought once a distant star
To dwell in some secluded spot;
It found me ere it wandered far,
And now, alas! it wanders not.

—*Goethe.*

VIII.

IN MY BARK.

SILVERY clear a gleam of beauteous light
Follows on my bark in this dark hour;
Such thy influence upon the night
Of my life—a heavenly soothing power.

Every glimmer on the billows there,
Vanishes with a succeeding tide;
But thy soul on mine shines ever fair,
And thy light forever doth abide.

—*Meissner.*

IX.

REST.

HOLY night! the systems of the worlds
Calmly move through the celestial sphere;
Light and peace—are they of heaven alone—
Known not unto mortal here.

Like to spectral forms that haunt and fade
Are—amid earth's turmoil and its woe—
Our most sacred and exalted moods—
Holiest sentiments we know.

Wears the gallant victor dying wreaths?
Earns he but the laurels that decay?
Leaving them at last on earth's dull shore,
Does he sink and pass away?

Give me rest! O Peace, I crave but thee;
Thine the face I seek in yonder sky;
Darkness all around me, tired, astray,—
Peace! O let the pilgrim die.

—*Tiedge.*

NOTES.

It is with deep regret that we learn of the death of an honored contributor, Mr. Xenos Clark. Mr. Clark's contributions to THE OPEN COURT began with the first number.

An esteemed contributor, whom official position has brought into contact with the manifold forms of human degradation, with Pauperism, Lunacy and Crime, writes; "In such a position a man needs a theory of the universe which affords room for hope, here as well as hereafter, to enable him to perform his daily round of duty, without such a depression of spirits as would be crushing. A religion of progress, and an ethics based upon that, gives one inspiration and strength, and makes the part that one has been chosen for, such of the kind given me to do, a source of profound gratitude. I write thus because I feel it due to you, and the promoters of your journal, to tell you how I am helped by it."

The Vermont Microscopical Association announces the offer of a prize of two hundred and fifty dollars for each discovery of a new disease germ. Microscopists, and all interested, are referred for further information to C. Smith Boynton, Secretary of the Association, Burlington Vt.

Mr. George J. Romanes, the English scientist, will contribute to THE OPEN COURT of July 11th, an article entitled "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms." Mr. Romanes writes in reply to the criticisms of M. Alfred Binet. In the preface to a work by the latter author, "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY, M. Binet took issue with Mr. Romanes as to the stage of animal development at which psychological powers first appear. The two standpoints, apparently, were radically different. M. Binet's conclusions were based upon accurate investigations into the life of microscopic organisms; he asserted that "psychological phenomena" are found in unicellular organisms, in lower-class beings, and are not superadded at higher stages in the course of zoölogical development. The studies of Mr. Romanes had led to the contrary conclusion, and, from this arose the occasion of M. Binet's critical remarks.

"Light on the Path" is the title of a little pamphlet of sixty-eight pages which the Theosophical Book Company of Boston have recently issued. It is termed a "treatise for the personal use of those who are ignorant of the Eastern wisdom and who desire to enter its influence." The title-page is stamped with an equilateral triangle. The equilateral triangle, in fact, seems to be an important factor in the initiation of neophytes into the wisdom of the East. It symbolizes the rigidity, necessity, universality, etc., of theosophical doctrines—their equality of relation. Instance the following logical specimens: rule 9) Desire only that which is within you; rule 10) Desire only that which is beyond you; rule 11) Desire only that which is unattainable. After the infliction of twenty-one canons similar to the above-quoted, the author concludes: "they are the first of the rules which are written on the walls of the Hall of Learning: Those that ask shall have. Those that desire to read shall read. Those who desire to learn shall learn [*sic*!]"; and in substantiation of this, the equilateral triangle is again mysteriously appended. We have been unable to master the occult philosopy of "Light on the Path."

The disclaimer of Dr, R. B. Westbrook, which appears in the columns of the present issue as a reprint from the July *Freethinker's* magazine, was prompted by the utterance of various liberal papers that "the President of the American Secular Union was not orthodox in his infidelity." Dr. Westbrook objects, with force and propriety, to the unwarranted intrusion upon honest and fearless men of an opprobrious epithet. But a word should be said in defence of that good and faithful servant, the lexicographer, whom Dr. Westbrook so harshly arraigns. The perversion of language which led to the present use of the word "infidel," cannot be attributed to the lexicographer. The lexicographer has not "added to the primitive and philological meaning of the word an arbitrary definition of his own; he never had that power; he records simply what the creative genius of a language gives forth. But unfortunately for many English words that creative genius was puritanical. A similar, though inverse, process is discoverable in 'miscreant.' 'Miscreant' originally denoted a wrong-believer. But rascality and unbelief became in some way identified in the Christian mind, and now the bona fide miscreant, as a supplement to his knavery, must bear the additional philological stigma of heathenish unbelief. The process, whether it has beautified or perverted a word, is a natural and constant one.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.*

BY GEORGE JOHN ROMANES.

Under the above title M. Binet has just published an English translation of some interesting articles which within the last year or two he has supplied to the *Revue Philosophique*. Moreover, in a preface which he has written expressly for this "American Edition," he devotes more than half his pages to a criticism of my psychological work in its relation to micro-organisms. For this reason, and also because the subject is one of much interest *per se*, I should like to reply in an American periodical to the criticisms which M. Binet has addressed to an American public.

It is needless to say that M. Binet is a *savant* of high standing, who has done, and is doing, admirable work in psychology. Therefore I should be sorry if it were to turn out that there is any serious discrepancy in our views touching the psychological questions that are involved by a study of life in its lowest forms. But, as I hope now to show, it appears to me that M. Binet has greatly exaggerated the amount of difference that obtains between us.

According to M. Binet, the unicellular organisms display "most of the psychological properties which Mr. Romanes reserves for this or that higher-class animal": indeed, he goes so far as to say, "we could, if it were necessary, take every single one of the psychical faculties which Mr. Romanes reserves for animals more or less advanced in the zoölogical scale, and show that the *greater part* of these faculties belong equally to micro-organisms." This statement of his case, however, I can only regard as in an extraordinary measure hyperbolical. For, without going beyond the diagram in my works to which he here especially refers, if this statement of his case were to be taken literally, we should have to suppose that M. Binet is prepared to prove that the *majority* of the following emotional and intellectual faculties occur in micro-organisms, namely: 1) pleasure and pains; 2) memory; 3) surprise, fear, primary instincts; 4) sexual emotion, association by contiguity; 5) parental affection, social feelings, sexual selection, pugnacity, industry, curiosity, recognition of offspring, secondary instincts; 6) jealousy, anger, play, association by similarity; 7) affection, reason; 8) recognition of persons; 9) sympathy, communication of ideas; 10) emulation, pride, resentment, æsthetic love of ornament, terror, recognition of persons, understanding of words, dreaming; 11) grief, hate, cruelty, benevolence, understanding of mechanisms; 12) revenge, rage, use of tools; 13) shame, remorse, deceitfulness, ludicrous, incipient morality.

Now I should scarcely have deemed it worth while to have enumerated these things, if M. Binet had not repeatedly stated—and this with all the emphasis of italics—that, taking the above list of psychological faculties as named by me in what I suppose to be the order of their appearance throughout the animal kingdom, he can prove that the "*greater part*" of them belong to micro-organisms. Of course the statement is on the face of it too absurd for comment. As a matter of fact, and according to his own subsequent showing, the only question that can possibly arise in this connection has reference to the first three or four of the above thirteen levels of psychological growth—or, which is the same thing, to the first six or seven among the forty-five psychological characteristics which I have named, and to which he alludes. Obviously, therefore, M. Binet cannot mean what he says. But as he no less certainly does mean that in his opinion I have not allowed enough to the unicellular organisms in respect of "psychic life," it seems desirable that I should take up the challenge which he has thrown down.

The psychological faculties with which M. Binet *expressly* credits these unicellular organisms are fear, surprise, memory, and consciously selective discrimination within certain very moderate limits of mental capacity. With regard to surprise and fear he says: "We may reply upon this point, that there is not a single infusory that cannot be frightened, and that does not manifest its fear by a rapid flight through the liquid of the preparation. If a drop of acetic acid be introduced beneath the glass-slide, in a preparation containing quantities of Infusoria, the latter will at once be seen to flee in all directions like a flock of frightened sheep."

In proof of memory he says: "Every time an animal repeats the same action under influence of the

* A Reply to the Criticisms of M. Alfred Binet advanced in his recent work, "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms" (Open Court Publ. Co., Chicago, 1889).

same excitations, that fact proves that the animal is possessed of memory."

Lastly, in proof of consciously selective discrimination, amounting to the psychological level of "instinct," he quotes against me an observation on *Difflugia urceolata*, by Prof. Verworn. From this observation it seems that "the *Difflugia urceolata*, which inhabits a shell formed by particles of sand, emits long pseudopodia which search at the bottom of the water for the materials necessary to construct a new case for the filial organism to which it gives birth by division. Two facts are to be remarked in this observation: first, the act whereby *Difflugia* collects the materials for providing the young individual with a case, is an act of preadaptation to an end not present, but remote; this act, therefore, has all the marks of an instinct. Further, the instinct exhibits great precision; for the *Difflugia* not only knows how to distinguish, at the bottom of the water, the materials available for its purpose, but it takes only the quantity of material necessary to enable the young individual to acquire a well built case."

Now, even if these facts were adequate to sustain the interpretation here placed upon them, they would still not have been available for the purpose of criticizing my book. For, on the one hand, they were not observed until after the publication of that book, and, on the other hand, I expressly state in the book itself that the psychological classification there given was given in accordance with the evidence which up to that time had been forthcoming. But, disregarding this point, I maintain that the facts are very far indeed from being capable of sustaining M. Binet's interpretations. In the first place, they obviously do not present "all the marks of an instinct." In point of fact, they only present one of the marks of an instinct —*i. e.*, that of "preadaptation to an end not present, but remote." M. Binet, indeed, appears to suppose that every such "act of preadaptation" must be regarded as *ipso facto* evidence of adaptation due to instinct—or, in other words, that preadaptation and instinctive adaptation are synonymous terms. But a very little thought would have dispelled this idea. The distinguishing "mark" of an instinct is, not that the action which it prompts should be preadaptive only, but further that it should be due to consciousness: not only must it be adjustive; it must also be mental. And the fact of its being adjustive does not in itself furnish any evidence that it is also mental. Each diastole of the heart is "an act of preadaptation" with regard to the next systole; but this fact does not in itself give us any reason to conclude that the action of the heart is instinctive. And, of course, hundreds of other vital activities might be quoted (especially during embryonic life) which are all preadaptive in this sense, without furnishing any evidence at all of being therefore instinctive. In short, the evidence of any action being instinctive must consist in evidence of its being due to an element of mind; and this is just the evidence which is wholly lacking in the case of *Difflugia*. The bare fact that it performs this act of preadaptation furnishes no justification of the statement that *Difflugia* "knows" what it is about while performing such an act—or, indeed, that it presents so much as the condition to knowledge of any kind (*i. e.*, consciousness).

So much, then, for M. Binet's claims on the score of "instinct." Next, as regards his claims for "memory," I have merely to ask whether any man of common sense will agree with his criterion of memory—namely, "that every time an animal repeats the same action under influence of the same excitations, that fact proves that the animal is possessed of memory." The absurdity of this statement may be shown even upon "the paragon of animals," man himself. For, let a man have all his mental faculties suspended (*e. g.*, by a heavy dose of chloroform), and all the lower reflex mechanisms will continue to respond to their several "excitations." Breathing, for instance, will continue as regularly as ever—each breath being due to the "excitation" supplied by an accumulation of carbonic acid in the blood: will M. Binet therefore contend that each inspiration is due to the memory which a man retains of his previous inspirations even when memory of all else has been obliterated? Or will he affirm that, when in full possession of all his faculties, and against the utmost force of his own volition, his pendent leg will give a jerk every time I strike his kneecap, therefore the "action" of his leg is due to his "memory" of the previous "excitations"? Now, if the absurdity of his criterion of memory admits of being thus rendered apparent even in the case of the highest and most intellectual of animals, *a fortiori* this absurdity becomes more and more apparent the further we descend through the animal series, until, by the time we arrive at the Protozoa, it reaches what I can only designate as the acme of nonsense. Furthermore, in the very book which he is criticizing I am careful to state, "that the earliest *analogy* we can find to memory is to be sought in living tissues other than nervous, and that it occurs in protoplasm." The following are some of the examples given, and they are much better (because less equivocal) than any of the instances referred to by M. Binet. "When a constant current is allowed to pass for a short time through a bundle of muscular fibres, in the direction of their length, and is then opened, a change is found to have been produced in the excitability of the fibres, such that they are less excitable than before to a stimulus supplied by again passing the current in the same direction,

and more excitable to the stimulus supplied by passing the current in the opposite direction. This memory of a muscle touching the direction in which a galvanic stimulus has passed endures for a minute or two after the current has ceased to pass (Frog). I have found this curious fact to hold in the case of muscular tissues of various animals, from the Medusæ upwards. Another equally good instance of what may be termed protoplasmic memory is to be found in the facts of the so-called 'summation of stimuli,' which occur more or less in all excitable tissues, *i. e.*, wherever living protoplasm is concerned. These facts are that if a succession of stimuli are applied to the excitable tissue, the latter becomes progressively more and more quick, as well as more and more energetic, in its response; each stimulus leaves behind it an organic memory of its occurrence."*

Lastly, substantially the same remarks have to be made touching my critic's views upon "surprise" and "fear." Merely on the ground that certain unicellular organisms will display increased activity under stimulations supplied by concession, "acetic acid," etc., he immediately concludes that these animalcula are "frightened like a flock of sheep." Here, as elsewhere, I can only wonder that a psychologist of M. Binet's attainments can have written with thoughtlessness so inexcusable.

The truth of the matter appears to be that M. Binet has never put to himself the simple question: What, in our study of comparative psychology, are we to take as our criterion of mind? Yet this is clearly the most elementary of all questions lying at the base of such study—in fact, it is the question which must be answered before we can be in a position so much as to begin that study. In my own works I have considered it more fully than anybody else; yet my critic nowhere alludes to the criterion which I have there laid down, and in virtue of which I have abstained from expressly accrediting the unicellular organisms with any such degree of psychic life as he claims for them. For this reason—as well as for others which will be stated further on—I can only conclude that M. Binet has either never read my books at all, or else that he has so far forgotten them as to rely for his criticisms only on the diagram of psychological faculties which occupies the first page of the one to which he alludes. The criterion of mind in question is as follows:

"Does the organism learn to make new adjustments, or to modify old ones, in accordance with the results of its own individual experience? If it does so, the fact cannot be due to merely reflex action, for it is impossible that heredity can have provided in advance for innovations upon, or alterations of, its machinery during the lifetime of a particular individual."

Possibly enough, this criterion may not meet with M. Binet's approval; but, if so, he ought to have criticized the criterion itself, and not the practical results to which its application logically leads. Moreover,—and this constitutes my principal reason for inferring that he has not read my works at all,—he appears to be unaware that its practical application does result in conceding to the unicellular organisms an apparent measure of "psychic life" as high as any for which he contends on the basis of his own examples. In other words, I have myself quoted observations on the psychic life of these organisms which are even more indicative of such life on their part than are any of the facts mentioned by M. Binet. For example, after giving some observations of my own, a chapter in "Protozoa" proceeds as follows:

"But, without denying that conscious determination may here be present, or involving ourselves in the impossible task of proving such a negative, we may properly affirm that until an animalcule shows itself to be teachable by individual experience, we have no sufficient evidence, derived or derivable from any number of such apparently intelligent movements, that conscious determination is present. Therefore, I need not wait to quote the observations of the sundry microscopists who detail facts more or less similar to the above, with expressions of their belief that microscopical organisms display a certain degree of instinct or intelligence as distinguished from mechanical, or wholly non-mental adjustment. But there are some observations relating to the lowest of all animals, and made by a competent person, which are so remarkable that I shall have to quote them in full. These observations are recorded by Mr. H. J. Carter, F. R. S., in the 'Annals of Natural History,' and in his opinion prove that the beginnings of instinct are to be found so low down in the scale as the Rhizopoda. He says: 'Even Æthalium will confine itself to the water of the watch-glass in which it may be placed when away from sawdust and chips of wood among which it has been living; but if the watch-glass be placed upon the sawdust, it will very soon make its way over the side of the watch-glass and get to it. This is certainly a remarkable observation; for it seems to show that the Rhizopod distinguishes the presence of the sawdust outside the watch-glass, and crawls over the brim of the latter in order to get into more congenial quarters, while it is contented with the water in the watch-glass so long as there is no sawdust outside.'"*

The chapter goes on to quote certain observations even more suggestive of mental action than the above; but enough has now been said to show that M. Binet

* Mental Evolution in Animals, pp. 112-113.

* Animal Intelligence, p. 19.

is not entitled to represent my works as having ignored the class of facts with which his own are concerned. On the contrary, the only difference between us has reference to the degree of certainty with which we severally conclude, on the basis of such facts, in favor of conscious intelligence on the part of these lowly organisms. In M. Binet's opinion it is enough to state such facts, and directly to conclude from them in favor of such intelligence. In my opinion, on the other hand, we are not entitled to arrive at this conclusion in so unreserved a manner; and, therefore, in drawing up the psychological diagram to which M. Binet refers, and which everywhere assigns mental faculties to the class of animals where there is first any *unequivocal* proof of their occurrence, I have merely left the question open as to whether, or how far, we are entitled to accredit the micro-organisms with psychic life. And this for the following reasons, which I quote from the book that forms the subject of M. Binet's criticism.

"It is clear that long before Mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of organization to become amenable to the test in question, (*i. e.*, the Criterion of Mind above mentioned,) it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does not learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore conclude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropriate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element, is wholly absent; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal does learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evidence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion of mind applies to the upper limit of non-mental action, not to the lower limit of mental."*

Or, as the passage goes on to state, if our evidence of mind in the lower animals must always depend on inferences drawn from actions, the cogency of such evidence must necessarily diminish as we recede from minds inferred to be like our own, towards minds inferred to be less like our own. Therefore, when we come to the case of very low organisms, such as those which we are now considering, we ought to remember that we are in a region where analogy has reached a vanishing-point: we ought to feel the highest degree of uncertainty in attributing merely adaptive action to any such process of intelligent volition as, *mutatis mutandis*, it might have betokened if performed by ourselves. Unless it can be shown that the action is not merely adaptive, (*i. e.*, not merely the possible result of natural selection having operated for countless time on non-intelligent material,) but also capable of being varied in accordance with the results of individual experience; we have no right to conclude that it presents any subjective counterpart.

The importance of bearing these considerations in mind is sufficiently exemplified by M. Binet's own treatment of "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms." Thus, to take only one example, in his opinion the best evidence he has to give of the occurrence of such life in these organisms is furnished by spermatozoa and spermatozoids in their behavior towards ova and ovules. In particular, he regards the selective persistency with which these mobile cells seek out their physiological partners for the purposes of fertilization, as furnishing the most cogent proof he has to present of purposive determination on the part of unicellular organisms. Now, it is of course unquestionable that all the activities in question are highly suggestive of intelligence; but, to say the least, it is equally possible to suppose that all these activities may be due to special endowments which have been gradually conferred by natural selection on highly specialized, though wholly unintelligent, cells, for the purpose of more and more efficiently discharging their special functions. And this view of the case is strongly supported by some recent highly interesting researches, which M. Binet quotes without appearing to perceive that such is their obvious implication.

The researches in question may be briefly described as follows.

Going upon the supposition that the spermatozoids of cryptogamic plants must be attracted to the female cells by means of some emanations from the latter acting as appropriate stimuli to the former, Prof. Pfeffer of Tübingen tried at random a large number of chemical solutions, in order to find if any of them would succeed in attracting the spermatozoids. Eventually he found that spermatozoids of certain ferns are infallibly attracted by a solution of malic acid, so that if a pipette be filled with this solution and dipped into a watch-glass of fluid containing the spermatozoids, the latter will crowd from all parts of the fluid into the pipette. Now, as malic acid occurs in the ferns, it is easy to see how natural selection may have utilized this substance for the purpose of guiding spermatozoids to female cells: survival of the fittest can very well have acted on the spermatozoids through countless generations—always favoring those to which malic acid acted in any degree as a stimulus, until malic acid now constitutes an unfailing attraction. Yet, if so, there need never have been any "psychic life" in the matter: the spermatozoids are attracted to their physiological correlatives in a manner as purely "mechanical" as particles of water are

* Mental Evolution in Animals, pp. 21–22.

attracted to sulphuric acid by their chemical affinity for that substance.

Upon the whole, then, I cannot feel that M. Binet's criticism is in any way successful. In so far as he really differs from me—and this is certainly less than he supposes—his objections appear to arise from his having neglected to read my works.

CARLYLE'S RELIGION.

WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

CARLYLE was the most remarkable religious phenomenon I have ever encountered. I have preserved some reminiscences of him in that aspect which I have never published, wishing to study them more carefully, and in the light of the facts which his biography promised.

Mr. Froude's romance which passes for the biography of Carlyle,—but which is not even realistic romance to others who knew its subject personally,—has by no means recognized the strange combination of hereditary and original elements in his spiritual being. Nor can it be clearly discovered from Carlyle's writings. The sweeping, sometimes biting, skepticism of his conversation did not get into his books. Only those who knew him personally could detect it in his Life of Stirling. To the average reader the diatribes of that volume appeared directed mainly against religious insincerities in general. Professor Francis William Newman told me that when the book appeared Carlyle's friends congratulated each other that he had at last spoken out boldly. But it is difficult to find in the charming biography a distinct negation or affirmation of any theological doctrine.

It was still possible, when a passage appeared in his Life of Frederick, affirming his (Carlyle's) faith in Calvin's fatalism, for the Presbyterians to claim that the great author was on their side. It must be admitted, however it may be explained, that this famous apostle of self-truthfulness never extended his principle to open testimony against discredited dogmas. Speaking once of my predecessor in the South Place pulpit, William Johnston Fox, M. P., he said: "I once went to hear him; he was a polished and powerful orator; but he was appealing to a crowd of people on matters of which they were no judges at all." In his distrust of the populace I suspect he shared the notion of many Europeans, that superstition makes men more governable.

One evening we were talking of Strauss, whom I had recently visited. "His *Leben Jesu*," said Carlyle, made a strong and wide impression, but its views were not unfamiliar to me. Various persons had reached similar conclusions, but would never have dreamed of proclaiming them to the world. He married an actress who made him miserable, and he had to separate from her; a good many people thought it a proper punishment of his heresy." The latter remark was made with a smile. Speaking of the Unitarian leader, Rev. James Martineau, he said, "Yes, I have met him several times. Once in a small company where a discussion about Christianity became warm, Martineau sat at an end of the room with his eyes closed, as if asleep; but I could see that he knew everything that was going on. I never cared much for Unitarianism. The best men I have known go that far must needs go much farther."

But Carlyle drew the line of compromise at reticence. When he was at Edinburgh, on the occasion of his installation as Lord Rector of the University, I was with him a good deal, and remarked his restlessness under the incidental religious ceremonies. I can readily believe the following story of whose truth I was assured by a Scotch gentleman. Carlyle was invited to pass some days in a country-town, in Scotland, with an old college-mate. They had been fellow-skeptics, and many a time had between them disposed of Christianity. But his old friend had become rich, the leading man in town, and naturally a zealous supporter of the kirk. He invited the parsons and deacons to meet Carlyle at dinner. According to usage the host said grace himself; it was a grace so long, unctuous, canting, that Carlyle could not stand it, but broke in with—"Oh, F——, this is damnable!"

Carlyle was a Calvinist who had lost his creed. To others such loss has been the dropping of a fetter; to Carlyle it was a breaking of the link that connected him with all he really loved. The real feeling is told in his pathetic poem "The Night Moth." He bowed to Gœthe as a master, but could never quite forgive him for shattering his little shrine in the cottage at Ecclefechan. Gœthe could easily become the happy man of the world, dress in velvet, and amuse himself with lords and ladies, and the Weimar theatre; but when Carlyle's supernatural visions faded they left him a peasant, surrounded by poor and ignorant people, and without either capacity or taste for the career of a man of the world. His youth had been devoted to preparation for a profession,—that of the Pulpit,—from which he had to turn at the moment when family and friends were ready to usher him with plaudits on a career whose splendor was prophesied by his genius. He had made desperate efforts to find some way of honestly remaining in the old homestead of faith; but all had been in vain; and it was no doubt this experience which broke out in rebuke of his college comrade in skepticism, who had sold his soul to the village parsons and deacons for the fine mansion to which he had visited his friend.

Scotch skepticism is generally more keen and incisive than that which one meets in England. In conversation Carlyle was sometimes so bitter against Christianity that it appeared as if he felt a sense of personal wrong. One evening, talking of William Maccall, with whom John Stirling had a notable correspondence, Carlyle said: "I remember Maccall; I have lost sight of him, but remember a vigorous way of expressing himself. I recall his breaking out in conversation about elevating the people: 'What can you do for a people whose God is a dead Jew!' A fair enough question. If I had my way the world would hear a pretty stern command—Exit Christ!"

One Christmas evening he said: "I observed some folk at the corner a little drunker than usual this morning. Then I remembered it was the birthday of their Redeemer."

I was present one evening when some one asked: "Mr. Carlyle, can you believe that all these ignorant and brutal millions of people are destined to live forever?" "Let us hope *not*," was the emphatic reply.

He had never been in a church of any kind since the visit to South Place already alluded to, when one day in the country, he was persuaded by some ladies to go and hear a famous Methodist. He returned furious about the prayer, which he summed up in these words: "O Lord, Thou hast plenty of treacle,—send us down a flood of it!"

And all the while there was a strong survival of Calvinism in Carlyle, which led him to divide the world into saints and sinners, sheep and goats,—to worship those, and doom these to unquenchable burnings—of course of the purely metaphorical kind represented in his own frequent "damns."

It was pathetic, too, to note the tenderness with which he clung to every shred of scripture which his intellect could honestly admire. This was shown in his enthusiasm for the book of Job,—which, however, once led him into a droll predicament. During one of his latest visits to Scotland he passed a night in the mansion of an old gentleman whom he had reason to esteem. In the evening this gentleman said: "Mr. Carlyle, it is my custom to read the scriptures to my family and servants before retiring; but your room is ready, and you need not remain if you do not wish it." "Wish it!" exclaimed Carlyle, impulsively,—"Why, I'll conduct the reading myself." The delighted host summoned children and servants, and placed the large Bible before Carlyle, who straightway turned to his favorite (though not much studied) book of Job. Unfortunately he hit on the chapter of Job's cursings: "Let the day perish wherein I was born"—and so on. Carlyle proceeded with faltering tones,—increasing nervousness,—a growing perception that the pessimist invectives were not suited to the children and servants; but when he had got out "Why died I not from the womb"—he groaned, closed the book with a slam, and stalked out of the room.

As life was closing—so that it was an effort to hear what the old man said—his mind wandered back to the old hearthstone, to his parents, and he sometimes seemed striving to realize their views. One afternoon he said feebly to Mr. Justice Stephen who had called, "That fire is rather hot. It seems a curious thing that people should have believed that they were to be punished by fire." "The belief," said Sir James, "came from a time of cruel and savage punishments." "It would be very uncomfortable to continue in that grate through eternity; and yet my father, one of the ablest men I ever knew, believed that such would be the fate of most people,—he believed it as much as his own existence."

Carlyle's ideas of deity were vague, but in his last years sometimes spoke as if he were not certain there might not be a devil. Once after he had been thundering against certain particular evils which excited his wrath, I said: "We who believe in evolution regard all these as temporary arrests of development." "It might," he answered with a smile, "astonish you if I were to say where I believe these evils come from. Let us walk!" There was something in his manner which kept me from pressing the subject. He was now, however, in the year before his death,—a period when religious "survivals" are apt to show themselves. There were none of these, however, from which the orthodox could obtain any satisfaction. Even were it true that Carlyle inclined to suspect there might be a devil, it was at a period when theology had just explained the devil away. His disbelief of the Christian scheme was complete and final. Indeed, though myself a heretic, I have at times thought that Carlyle's character might have been more humanized had he felt deeper sympathy with the spirit which has imperfectly and superstitiously, yet with a true and tender sentiment, found its expression in the Legend of Jesus.

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

VI.

THE beautiful daughter of the King of Videha was set a-thinking by this gallant speech of Ravana; but at last she answered:

"I am the daughter of Janaka, the magnanimous king of Mithila—so may you ever prosper—and I am the wife of the noble-minded Rama. For a whole year I lived happy in Rama's dwelling, blessed with love, and enjoying all earthly pleasures.

"Thereupon, after more than a year, the old king, having consulted his ministers, made preparations for anointing my husband king.

"But the unworthy *Kaikeyi*,* as his favored wife, having wrung from my father-in-law the promise of granting her any first request, as the highest boon begged for the expulsion of my husband.

"'I shall never rest,' she said, 'I shall neither eat nor drink, and it will be the cause of my death, if Rama be crowned. Be true, O king, unto your promise, and grant me the favor which you bestowed upon me a long while ago. Let my son, Bharata, be crowned, and still to day send Rama into the wilderness. At once dismiss Rama for the period of fourteen years to wear an hermit's clothing of bark and hides, and let my son Bharata be crowned.'

"At these words of Kaikeyi my father-in-law entreated her with many touching words, and would not do her bidding.

"But my heroical husband, Rama, renowned in the world for his faithfulness and virtue, was only bent on the good of all his fellow-men, even although his father, the glorious king Dasaratha, from his infatuation for Kaikeyi did not order Rama to be crowned.

"When for the expected ceremony Rama went into his father's presence, my husband was addressed in the following words by Kaikeyi:

"'Listen, O Rama, to my words! You have been banished by your father. To Bharata I give this kingdom, enjoying deep peace; but you must dwell for fourteen years in the wilderness. Depart therefore at once, O Kakutstha, and prevent your father from breaking his word.'

"And then in his father's presence Rama merely assented to what Kaikeyi had spoken, neither remonstrating nor uttering an indecorous word.

"Such is the origin, O Brahman, of the generous and constant vow of Rama; and his half-brother, the hero Lakshmana, departed along with him as his companion and ally. Lakshmâna, however, having suggested to Rama certain generous thoughts, the observant Rama at once replied: 'My soul shall ever adhere to what is true!' And thereupon he set out with me, and the noble Lakshmana followed us, bow in hand.

"And ever since, O holy Brahman, we three who forfeited our kingdom through the word of Kaikeyi, have been roaming about in the deep wood fearlessly; and now we live here in this forest full of wild animals. But you, be cheerful. You will be allowed to remain here until my husband returns, bringing with him a choice head of game from the forest.

"But now in your turn tell me in truth your tribe and family. For what motive, O Brahman, do you roam alone in the wood of Dandaka? I doubt not that Rama will receive you well; for he loves all holy men, and speaks kindly to them."

To Sita thus speaking kindly, the Raksha, wounded by the darts of the god of love, replied as follows:

"Then listen, woman, who I am, whence I came, and mark well my words.

"Under this disguise there has come hither, of his own accord to see you, he who drove into flight the worlds along with the immortals and all the highest divinities. I am Ravana, the most powerful, and by whose command his brother Kharas holds this wood of Dandaka. I am a half-brother of Vaisravana.*

"I am a son of Visravas, a hero of the blood of Orasa,† and a grandson of the great seer Pulastya. By the self-existing Brahma I have been granted all the highest gifts; and I can move and change my form at pleasure. As Dasagriva I am also famous in the world and renowned through my valorous deeds—I am indeed Ravana, O Sita of the pure smile!

"Gazing at the lovely form before me, bright like a golden statue in your yellow silken dress, I have forgotten all love for my own wives. For I own, O daughter of Mithila, a large number of wives—all pretty women; and of all these in my eyes you shall be the only and supreme queen. Lanka,‡ the loveliest Isle of the Ocean, is my residence, surrounded by the sea. My castle is built high upon a mountain-peak, adorned with lofty battlements of beaten gold, and defended by deep moats; and within there are high-roofed palaces, in the three worlds renowned like Indra's residence in Amaravati.

"Such indeed is the grand abode of the dusky Rakshas—the work of Visvakarma, the skillful artificer of the gods, and measuring well-nigh thirty Yojanas§ in extent. Here, O Sita, you shall ramble contented with me through the pleasant groves, and never regret this savage wilderness. I shall crown you the queen of all the valiant Rakshas, and among all their comely wives you shall be the foremost. Five hundred female slaves shall attend on you; therefore, be my wife, O you fair one! I am Ravana—knowing all science, endowed with all sanctity—therefore love me!"

Thus addressed by Ravana, the graceful daughter of Janaka, burning with indignation contemptuously answered to the Raksha:

"But I purpose to remain true to my husband, Rama, who himself is firm like a mountain, and inaccessible like the vast ocean. Yes; I am devoted to a prince—a hero, to the illustrious, valiant Rama; and like a lioness the lion, so do I proudly follow Rama. You, on the contrary, only a vile jackal, how dare

* Rama's Stepmother.

* Kuvera, god of riches.

† Orasa or Urasa, the name of a district.

‡ The Island of Ceylon.

§ A Yojana was 5, according to others the distance of 8 miles.

you covet an unapproachable tigress? I could not be touched by you any more than could a sun-beam! You fancy to see a multitude of golden trees before you, O you wretched demon, when you think you are able to carry off the faithful and beloved wife of Rama. Any one who wished to carry off by violence the wife of Rama, might as well try to wring the prey from a strong, swift, and angry lion—the terror of the forest. Ah, you are licking with your tongue a sharp razor, you are pricking your eyes with a needle, when your impure mind dares to covet the beloved wife of Rama. Will you venture to wrest from a jealous tigress her brood, while attempting to bribe the beloved wife of Rama? You fasten a rock around your neck, and wish to cross the ocean. You wish to walk on the sharp points of iron-spears, such indeed you appear to me when you presume to molest the beloved wife of Rama. Would you carry burning embers in the folds of your mantle, thus thinking to carry off Rama's wife, blessed by fate? Or would you hazard to touch with your hand an angry, hissing, poisonous Krisna-serpent, thus daring to covet me?

"From you to Rama there intervenes all the distance from a jackal to a noble lion of the forest; from a drop of water to the vast ocean; from a noble Surastra* to a vile Sauviraka—that is the difference between you and Rama—the difference of beaten gold and black steel; of sandal-wood and a vase of vile clay. You resemble Rama no more than an elephant does a cat, or a crow does the Garuda-bird of Vishnu, or a peacock resembles a Lava-bird;† in one word, the difference between Rama and you is that of a crane and a vulture.

"Therefore, relying confidently on my ever watchful hero, Rama, armed with bow and arrows, if even carried away by you, no evil would betide me, any more than if a pearl could be swallowed by a fly. It may have been possible to carry away Indra's wife, Saci, or even Uma herself, the wife of Siva; but I, the wife of Rama, could not be carried away by you, O Ravana."

Such was the reply of the virtuous Sita to the insolent words of the Raksha, and in the agony of her distress she trembled like a Kadali-tree, when stripped of all its sling-plants by a huge wild elephant.

But Ravana, inexorable like death, at the sight of her tears as a means of intimidation began relating all about his family, his power, and high deeds.

SELECTIONS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

X.

Why, O why must wander ever?
Goodness compasseth us round:
Learn that happiness is never
Far, and always to be found.

—*Gœthe.*

* Names of certain Hindu tribes.
† The Lava-bird seems to be the *Perdix Chinensis.*

XI.

TO A ROSE.

Yesterday a little Rose-bud
Sleeping in moss-covered hill;
And to-day more lovely still,
All surpassing in thy beauty.

Wert thou dreaming in the night,
Of the miracles before thee?
Of the Spring-time bending o'er thee?
And the advent of the light.

—*Chamisso.*

XI.

EARLY SORROW.

Lightly snow lies on the branches
Of the trees just come to leaf;
Lightly sorrow falls on musings
Of youth's hope untried by grief.

Speedily doth first snow vanish—
Soon as it the sun doth feel;
Early sorrow leaves a furrow
Which no after-joy may heal.

—*Moritz Hartmann.*

XIII.

O SPRING-TIDE, COME!

O Spring-time, come! Let the green leaves unfold;
Awake within the hedge the wild bird's song;
Adorn the cheerless way-side all along
With bloom; and tint the fleecy clouds with gold!

When songs of mirth sound gaily from each tree;
In streamlets, rustle; and in hedge-rows, bloom;
Perchance my soul—grown solemn as the tomb—
Shall leave behind its dark despondency.

Yet, woe is me! Alas, if I must seek
My consolation from bliss passed away,
And vainly ask this hour that it shall paint
For me the joy of which I no more speak.
O Spring, hath not thy gladness power to sway?
Must I be left unto my heart's complaint?

—*Ernst Schultze.*

LOVE'S INTUITION.

BY JOHN BOSS.

That sever thee and me are many lands,
Whose mountains, tow'ring heavenward, defy
My tardy foot; whose arid, shifting sands
By desert winds are wafted far and high,
Wide seas divide us, rivers swift and deep,
Yet hold we converse while the world doth sleep.

When I, at even's sympathetic shade
Steal forth, fleet messengers of thought I send
Abroad; and when they far enough have strayed
To meet some thought of thine, toward me they bend,
And, answering the love I sent to thee,
Bring sweet report that thou dost dream of me.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THOUGHTS ON THE BRUNO CELEBRATION.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

The Italian nation has at last achieved its own deliverance, has obtained its own freedom. For nearly twenty years it has enjoyed temporal and political liberty, and during that time has made strides which have placed it in the front rank of European nations.

But now, this Whitsuntide of 1889, comes the news that it has celebrated a greater deliverance. The outward freedom was complete; but now the declaration has gone forth of the independence of the mind and soul.

"*Viva la Libertà del pensiero!*" was the cry that rolled along the streets of the capital that is least of all associated with freedom of thought, and where still dwells the shadow of the ancient power of ignorance and suppression of all knowledge that can free the mind. But that power is under an eclipse: the light of knowledge and the glow of intelligence have come into men's minds, and ignorance, superstition, charlatanry, and fraud must forever skulk within their haunts of darkness.

The scene recalled the events of 1870, for veteran Garibaldians were there, marching at the head of the long procession, amid vociferous cheers from a dense yet orderly multitude.

At the Vatican the event was appreciated in all its significance. One of the Ambassadors to the Papal court, and many families belonging to the clerical party, left the city in protest against the demonstration. Some busy clericals went round to the Cafés and tried to persuade the proprietors to close for fear of disturbances. This advice must surely have been given in order to provoke the hungry crowd to acts of violence. As it was, however, all passed off well.

The last three days—says a correspondent—the Pope has seen no one, and no longer goes into his garden. He has declared that the event was even more portentous than those of 1870, for at that time the temporal power only was attacked, for political and national reasons, while to-day it is his spiritual authority and moral influence—the only powers left to him—that are being overthrown. When the Pope takes views such as these, we may be sure that he feels his position seriously weakened.

Bruno was a philosopher, and above all things a searcher after truth. He was therefore a champion of free thought, and it is in this character that he is now receiving the somewhat tardy honors of the Italian nation. In his writings he dwells on his love for truth and wisdom, comparing it to the ardent passion, so often celebrated by poets, of a lover for his mistress. Indeed, he places his own divine ardor in the quest of wisdom far before the highest or purest earthly suit: and welcomes death itself, if that be the destined end of his fervent pursuit of wisdom.

"*Non temer, respond' io, l'alta ruina!*
Fende sicur le nubi, e muor' contento
S'il ciel si illustre morte me destina!"

Bruno's hostility to the church arose as a matter of course from a recognition of the thin and flimsy nature of the veil of morality thrown by the priests over their own utter selfishness and hypocrisy. As a writer in the *Antiquary* (London) for March, 1889, says of the period in which Giordano Bruno lived: "Perhaps in no age was religion less lovely than under the form of the Roman Catholicism of the sixteenth century, as presented in Italy. Indeed, in any real sense of the word, religion there was none. The church still existed, it is true, but it was the church in her political aspect. The Papacy itself had become half pagan. Virtue was at as low an ebb as religion. Men flattered and truckled for places, and women forgot all dignity and modesty in their anxiety to become the wives and mistresses of such successful mates. This state of affairs aroused Bruno's powers of wit and sarcasm, and he published his *Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante*,—the Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast. It was practically on account of this satire on the church—an unpardonable offense in the eyes of the Inquisition—that Giordano Bruno suffered martyrdom on the spot where his statue now stands.

The fact of his martyrdom has been doubted, but from the April number of the *Antiquary* there seems to be little if any doubt remaining. The principal evidence is a letter from Gaspare Schoppi, or Scioppius, who witnessed the event. Mersenne mentions Bruno as "*un athée brûlé en Italie*" in a work printed in 1624. The Imperial Ambassador Wacker, resident in Rome at the time, writes a letter to Kepler informing him of the event. The archives of the inquisition contain full records of the trial and sentence: which are confirmed by independent documents in the Vatican. The archives of *San Giovanni Decollato* contain a notice of Bruno's execution, dated in mistake Thursday, February 16, 1600. Thursday fell on the 17th of February in 1600, and this is the date given in the letter of Scioppius, and in the Vatican and Inquisition records. The enthusiastic commemoration of that Sunday is therefore justified. It honors a real martyr, a martyr for the truth, for liberty of thought, for real wisdom as opposed to the conventional hypocrisies of a surface morality,—and it testifies to the emancipation of a people, once the most priest-ridden in the world, from the bondage of ignorance, or of still more fatal false beliefs. No longer is Rome the city of the Popes: no longer can it be called a city of religious bigotry, if the temper of the people be such as is indicated by this demonstration.

Since 1870, as has been said, Rome and Italy have made vast strides. Yet vaster possibilities are opened up in the vistas of the future; and though Rome will never again be the seat of a ruler of the world, yet she may take a forward rank in the universal march of progress towards the truth, one, immutable, and eternal.

London, Eng. John B. Shipley.

NOTES.

The contribution by Mr. George John Romanes, occupying the first pages of our present issue, is offered in reply to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet, in the preface to his recent work, "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms." Although the principal passages in which the points of difference between these two gentlemen are emphasized, have been cited in full by Mr. Romanes, our readers will derive from the discussion much greater profit by a re-perusal of M. Binet's remarks, or, at least, by a recurrence to the note respecting the same in No. 97 of The Open Court.

"On Faith as an Intellectual Function" is the title of a little treatise of forty eight pages, by Robert Park M. D., which we have received from Messrs. Watts & Co. of London. Dr. Park styles his essay "a first contribution to a religion of eufidelity." Eufidelity is defined as "the positive aspect or status of the intellect in view of the agnostic philosophy. * * * It recognizes in human nature itself the fountain and well-spring of morality and the divine idea. * * * It founds upon science as the true criterion of rectitude of belief and aspires after truth, beauty, and goodness in theory and practice. This is religion in its essence, and with science it has no quarrel. * * * Religion is essentially the binding together of people by a common knowledge of all that tells most and best towards the evolution and happiness of the race; the happiness depending upon the physical well-being, and the latter depending upon a knowledge of the laws of nature and their observance." The creed of the new church should consist, says the author, of a number of axioms; *e. g.*, 1) "Reason has the highest place in the economy of human faculties, and it is the clear duty of every one, each for himself, before abandoning reason for faith, to exercise reason in order that faith may not be mere credulity;" and 2) "Faith is the co-ordination and organization of the mental and physical acts of life, in harmony with certain intuitive and acquired ideas as to a future state and a Supreme First Cause and man's responsibility as a moral being." Our readers may obtain from the statements given an idea of Dr. Park's propositions. Evidently "Agnostic Philosophy," as here used, is not the Agnosticism of Mr. Spencer.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. — Continued.

Raschke examined the parchment.

"Highly valuable," he exclaimed, "if it is genuine, as it appears." He hastened to the chest and examined the missal. "Probably the initial letters of the book will afford some evidence as to whether the missal was used in the cloister of Rossau," he said. "I regret that my knowledge of monastic customs does not extend to this test."

He opened the chest and took up the contents. Of the absence of mind which usually disturbed him nothing was to be observed: he looked round with sharp eyes, as if he were searching the dark words of a philosopher.

"Very remarkable," he exclaimed. "Only one thing surprises me. Has the chest been cleaned out?"

"No," replied Werner, irritably.

"The three companions of a century's repose are wanting—dust, cobwebs, and grubs; yet there ought to have been something on the inside of the lid or on the bottom, for the chest has crevices which allow of the entrance of insects."

He rummaged again, and examined the bottom.

"Under a splinter of wood there hangs a bit of paper."

He drew out a tiny piece of paper, and a deep shadow passed over his noble features.

"Dear friend, compose yourself, and be prepared for an unwelcome discovery. On this fragment there are only six printed words, but they are the characters of our time: it is a piece of one of our newspapers, and one of the six words is a name well known in the politics of our day."

He laid the bit of paper on the table. Werner stared at it without saying a word; his countenance was changed; it seemed as if one hour had done the work of twenty years of care.

"The things were unpacked by me and again put back; it is possible that the paper may have fallen in."

"It is possible," replied Raschke.

The Professor jumped up, and sought in great haste for his pocket copy of Tacitus.

"Here is the reading of the Florentine manuscript, comparison with the parchment sheets will throw light on it." He compared some sentences. "It appears an accurate copy," he said, "too accurate—awkwardly accurate."

He held the manuscript searchingly towards the light; he poured a drop of water on the corner of the parchment and wiped it with a towel; the next moment he flung towel and parchment to the ground, and clasped his hands over his face. Raschke seized the leaves, and looked at the damaged corner.

"It is true," he exclaimed, sorrowfully; "a writing that had been on the parchment six hundred years would leave other traces on the material."

He paced hastily up and down, his hands in his coat pocket, rubbed his face with the towel, and, perceiving his mistake, threw it away from him.

"I only know of one word for this," he exclaimed—"a word that men unwillingly allow to pass their lips—and that word is villainy!"

"It was a piece of vile and rascally knavery," exclaimed Werner, in a strong voice.

"Here let us stop, friend," begged Raschke; "we know that a deception has been intended; we know that the attempt has been made lately; and when we compare the place of the discovery and your presence here, we may assume as a fact, without doing injustice to any one, that the trick was intended to deceive you. Of the person who has practiced it we have only suspicion, well-grounded suspicion, but no certainty."

"We will make it certainty," explained Werner, "before the day becomes many hours older."

"Undoubtedly," replied Raschke, "this certainty must be obtained, for suspicion ought not to continue in the hearts of men; it destroys all ideas and thoughts. But the ultimate question remains: For what object was the deceit practiced? Was it the willfulness of a knave? If so, the wickedness of it is not, to an honorable mind, thereby lessened; yet it is not the worst kind of turpitude. But if it was deliberate malice with intent to injure you, then it deserves the severest condemnation. On what terms are you with the Magister?"

"It was deliberate malice to injure a man, body and soul," replied the Professor, with solemn earnestness; "but the doer was only the tool—the idea was that of another."

"Hold," cried Raschke, again, "no further; this also is only suspicion."

"It is only suspicion," repeated the Professor; "therefore I seek for certainty. When I wished to go to the country castle I was detained from day to day under trivial pretexts; the Magister was absent not long ago for a day from the work which was entrusted to him; he excused himself on the score of illness, and as he was profuse in his excuses I was struck by a shyness in his manner. There was a wish to keep me here for reasons which you, in your sphere of feelings, can scarcely understand. It was hoped to attain this object by exciting the fanatical zeal with which I was afflicted, without entirely contenting it. Such is my suspicion, friend; and I feel myself mis-

* Translation copyrighted.

erable, more miserable than I have ever been in my life."

He threw himself on the sofa, and again concealed his face.

Raschke approached him, and said, softly:

"Does it distress you so much, Werner, that you have been deceived?"

"I have confided, and deceived confidence gives pain; but in my sorrow I feel not only for myself, but for the destruction of another who belongs to us."

Raschke nodded his head. He again paced vehemently about the room, and looked angrily at the chest.

Werner rose and rang the bell.

"I wish to speak to Magister Knips," he said, to Gabriel, who entered. "I must beg him to take the trouble of coming here as soon as possible."

"How will you speak to him?" asked Raschke, stepping anxiously before his friend.

"I need so much consideration myself," replied Werner, "that you need not fear my violence. I also have been laboring under a disease, and I know that I have to speak to one who is more diseased than I."

"You are not diseased," exclaimed Raschke, "only shocked, as I am. You will say what is necessary to him, for the rest you will leave him to his own conscience."

"I will only say what is necessary," repeated the Professor, mechanically.

Gabriel returned, and reported that the Magister would call when he left the Museum in the evening.

"How did the Magister take the message?" asked Raschke.

"He appeared alarmed when I told him that the Professor was stopping at the inn."

The Professor had ensconced himself in a corner, but the philosopher left him no rest; he kept talking to him about the occurrences at the University, and compelled him to take part by frequent questions. At last he expressed a wish to take a walk, to which the Professor unwillingly consented.

Werner led him through the gate of the city; as they walked along he briefly answered the lively talk of his friend. When they came to the inn from which Ilse had got into the carriage of the Crown Inspector, the Scholar began, with hoarse voice:

"This is the road along which my wife escaped from the city. I came early this morning along this same road, and at every step I felt what is the deepest humiliation to man."

"Before her was light, and behind her darkness," exclaimed Raschke.

He talked of Ilse, and now thought of the commission which his children had given to their aunt.

Thus the afternoon passed. Werner again sat brooding in his room, when Gabriel announced the arrival of the Magister. Before Raschke hastened into the next room, he once more pressed the hand of the other, and, looking imploringly at him, said:

"Be calm, friend."

"I am calm," replied he.

Magister Knips had profited by the refining influence of the Court. His black suit had been made by a tailor who had the princely coat of arms above his workshop; his hair was free from feathers, and his vocabulary had been replenished with new expressions of respect. He now looked furtively and defiantly around him.

Werner measured the man as he entered with a steady look; if, before, he had had a doubt of the guilt of the Magister, he now recognized it. He turned away for a moment in order to struggle with his aversion.

"Examine this," he said, pointing with his finger to the parchment leaves.

Knips took a leaf in his hand, and the parchment trembled as he cast a shy glance upon it.

"It is another forgery," said the Professor; "the reading of the first Florentine manuscript, and even the peculiarities of its orthography, are copied with a careful accuracy which would have been impossible to any old transcriber. The writing, too, betrays itself to be recent."

The Magister laid the sheet down, and answered, with hesitation:

"It appears undoubtedly to be an imitation of an old script, as the Professor has already discovered."

"I found this work," continued the Scholar, "in the tower of the castle in the country, inserted in that torn missal, laid in that chest, and concealed among old furniture. And you, Magister, have prepared this leaf, and you have concealed it in this place. That is not all. Long before, in order to put me on a false track, you placed the register of a chest in the old records; you invented the figures 1 and 2 for the chests, and further, you yourself wrote the register in order to deceive me."

The Magister stood with lowered head, seeking for an answer. He did not know on what confession of others these deliberate assertions were grounded. Had the Castellan betrayed him? Had the Sovereign himself exposed him? Terror came over him, but he replied, doggedly:

"I did not do it."

"In vain do you seek to deceive me anew," continued the Scholar. "If I had not already sufficient ground to say to your face that you did this, your demeanor in the presence of this sheet would be ample

evidence. No sound of astonishment, no word of horror at such an attempt at forgery escaped you. What true scholar would look upon such a thing and remain silent, if his own conscience did not close his mouth? What have I done to you, Magister, that you should inflict upon me this bitter anguish? Give me some excuse for your action. Have I ever injured you? Have I ever aroused in you secret ill-will against me? Any reason that will make this abomination comprehensible will be welcome to me; for I look with dismay on this depravation of a human soul."

"The Professor has never given me any ground for complaint," replied Knips, submissively.

"Nevertheless," said the Professor, "in cold blood, with indifference, with malicious levity, you have done your worst to me: it was wrong, very wrong, Magister."

"Perhaps it was only a jest," sighed the Magister; "perhaps it was only put in that way to him who prepared the writing. He only perhaps acted by the command of another, not by free choice, and not of his own will."

"What power on earth could command you to practice towards another so deliberate a piece of knavery?" asked the Professor, sorrowfully. "You yourself know right well what consequences this deception may have for myself and others."

Magister Knips was silent.

"I have done with you," continued the Scholar. "I shall say nothing of the plan which this falsehood was to serve, nor make any further reproaches concerning the injury that you have practiced towards a man who trusted in your honor."

He threw the parchment under the table. Knips seized his hat silently to leave the room.

"Stop!" exclaimed the Professor; "do not move from the spot. I must be silent as to what you have endeavored to do personally against me. It is not so much on account of this manuscript that I have sent for you. But the man whom I see before me, on whom I look with an abhorrence that I have never yet felt, is something more than an unscrupulous tool in the service of a stranger; he is an unfaithful philologist, a traitor to learning, a forger, and deceiver in that in which only honorable men have a right to live, a cursed man, for whom there is no repentance and no mercy."

The Magister's hat fell to the ground.

"You wrote the parchment strip of Struvelius; the trader has informed against you in your native city. Your writings are confiscated and are in the hands of the police."

The Magister still remained silent. He fumbled for his pocket-handkerchief and wiped the cold sweat from his brow.

"Now, at least, speak out," cried Werner. "Give me an explanation of the fearful riddle, how any one who belonged to us could willfully destroy all that made his life noble. How could a man of your attainments become untrue to science in so despicable a way?"

"I was poor and my life full of trouble," replied Knips, in a low voice.

"Yes, you were poor. From your earliest youth you have worked from morning to night; even as a child you have denied yourself much that others thoughtlessly enjoy. You have in this way the secret consciousness of having obtained for yourself inward freedom, and a humble friendship with the great spirit of our life. Yes, you have grown up to be a man amidst countless sacrifices and self-denials which others fear. You have thus learnt and taught what is the highest possession of man. In every proof-sheet that you have read for the assistance of others, in every index of words that you have drawn up for a classical work, in every word that you have corrected, in every number that you have written, you have been obliged to be truthful. Your daily work was an unceasing, assiduous struggle against what was false and wrong. Yet more, and worse than that, you have been no thoughtless day-laborer; you have fully and entirely belonged to us; you were, in fact, a scholar, from whose learning many with higher pretensions have frequently taken counsel. You not only treasured in your mind a mass of rare knowledge, but you well comprehend the thoughts to which such knowledge gives rise. You were all this—and yet a forger. With true devotion and self-denial, you united malicious willfulness; you were a confidential and assiduous assistant, and at the same time a deceiver, bold and mocking like a devil."

"I was a tortured man," began Knips. "He who has lived otherwise does not know how difficult it is, in the service of science, to be ever following in the foot-steps of others. You have never worked for others who knew less than yourself. You do not understand the feeling that possesses one when others use haughtily, without acknowledgement and without thanks, what one has given them from one's own knowledge. I am not insensible to friendship. The Professor was the first who, in the last lines of the introduction of his maiden work, mentioned my name because I had been of use to him. And yet I have done less for you than any other of my old patrons. The copy which you then gave me I have put in the place of honor among my books. Whenever I have felt tired from my night's work I have read those lines; I have seldom experienced the like kindliness. But I have felt the torment of having more knowledge than I had credit for, and I have had no opportunity to work my way out of my narrow sphere. That has been the cause of all."

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTHMEN. A letter to Judge Daly, the President of the American Geographical Society, on the opinion of Justin Winsor, that "though Scandinavians may have reached the shores of Labrador, the soil of the United States has not one vestige of their presence." By *Eben Norton Horsford*. Published by the author for private circulation.

This effort by Prof. Horsford to resolve the Norse discovery and settlement of America out of its nebulous state into a set of fixed facts, with dates and locality fully determined, is, if not conclusive, the most powerful, as well as the most useful, that has yet been made. Said discovery is either altogether myth or tradition, or it is veritable history; too much has already been proven to admit of its being myth, hence but little more testimony is needed to bring it within the domain of authentic fact. The data of the discovery, the year 1000, is established, as is also the date of the visit of the first bishop appointed for the colony, Vinland, namely, 1121, which implies a settlement covering the intervening period, for as J. A. Blackwell states, in his notes to Mallet's "Northern Antiquities," "It certainly does seem strange—if we may rely on the Icelandic annals for the record of events occurring in Greenland—that a bishop should undertake such a voyage from a mere motive of curiosity." The next question is: Where was Vinland located? It is this that Prof. Horsford endeavors to answer.

Justin Winsor simply cites George Bancroft's opinion, in the words quoted on the title-page, and endorses it; it cannot be said that he has investigated the subject at all, although in preparing his imposing chapter, "Pre-Columbian Explorations," for his "Narrative and Critical History of America," he has ransacked bibliographies, American collections, and sources of all description to an extent so overwhelming as to have led any logical and candid mind straight to the facts. But the only conclusion he arrives at is the following: "It is still a doubt how far we exchange myths for assured records, when we enter upon the problems of Pre-Columbian explorations, which it is the object of the present chapter to discuss." Justin Winsor fully demonstrates his disqualification for writing on the subject, and also puts on record the fact that the Massachusetts Historical Society discouraged the erection of a statue to Leif Erikson, in Boston, "on the ground that no satisfactory evidence existed to show that any spot in New England had been reached by the Northmen."

Prof. Horsford is thus more than justified in his attempt to fix the location of Vinland. To ascertain this he first studies the descriptions in the Icelandic Sagas, of the climate, soil, vegetation, etc., of Vinland, and the experiences of the Norse colonists there, and states the result: "As to the fitness of *Labrador*, a region of rocky desolation, ice-bound for more than half the year, to be the *Vinland of the Northmen*, where according to the Sagas cattle did not need to be housed in winter, where grapes abounded and corn grew spontaneously,—a land of forests and meadows,—there is among students of geography no difference of opinion." Given that Vinland was *somewhere* on the Atlantic coast, and *not* in an ice-bound region, nor yet in a tropical one, it *must* lie within the limits of New England and the Middle States; and as this tract of country is distinctly indicated, under the names of *Norvega* and *Norumbega*, in three maps that the author adds to his work: "Ortelius, 1570; Solis, 1598; and Botero, 1603, the conclusion that Vinland and Norumbega are identical is not wide of the mark. One does not need to be told," he affirms, "that the Norvega in smaller type against the character that stands for a settlement is in the country which Leif called *Vinland*, and which centuries later was known as Norumbega. As I have for four years been engaged on the History of Norumbega, I do not propose to go into it here. This fragment is introduced merely to illustrate that this bit of comparative philology *alone*, to one capable of appreciating it, contains the solution of the problem of the Northmen."

Prof. Horsford next states confidently: "As to what impress may have been left by Northmen on the soil of the United States, that is not a matter of authority, but of what may be found by examination. Should it turn out after all, that the Landfall of the Northmen had been found, and also the site and remains of the houses Leif and Thorfinn built and occupied in Vinland, *what then?*" This landfall he claims to have found, and the least the public can do is to examine his evidence fairly and justly, before pronouncing judgment. Here is where it is: "If any one interested will walk from the junction of Elmwood Avenue with Mt. Auburn Street,—the residence of Prof. Lowell, in Cambridge,—a few rods down the street to Gerry's Landing, and then follow the ancient Bank Lane to the point of crossing the rivulet draining the eastern slope of Mt. Auburn into the Charles, he will be at the site of the objects of interest which had once been there, and which I had predicted might there be found. There are in the inequalities of the surface the remains of two long log-houses, and huts or cots,—possibly not less than five huts,—along a declivity of moderate grade, 'some nearer, some farther from the water,' as the Sagas say."

The work contains two fine heliotypes of the landing-place of Leif and Thorfinn, and charts of these sites, Charles River, and vicinity, prepared by George Davis and L. M. Hastings, Civil Engineers.

MARIE A. BROWN.

WORD STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By *Marvin R. Vincent*, D. D. Vol. II. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. $4.00.

The work of Dr. Vincent, now professor of sacred literature in the Union Theological Seminary of New York, is a contribution to the critical study of the New Testament. It represents the labor of many years of research, conducted while Dr. Vincent officiated as pastor of the Church of the Covenant in New York City. It is not addressed to critical scholars, but is intended principally to illuminate the path of the English student of the English Bible. Prof. Vincent has collected and sifted from critical commentaries, lexicons, and etymological treatises, a mass of material relating to the study of Greek synonyms and the history, force, literal interpretations and relations of the words of the New Testament; he has divested all this of technicalities and thrown it in a form adaptable to the purposes of the English student. In the preface to Vol. I, the author says: "The present work is an attempt in a field which, so far as I am aware, is not covered by any one book, though it has been carefully and ably worked by many scholars. Taking a position midway between the exegetical commentary and the lexicon and grammar, it aims to put the reader of the English Bible nearer to the standpoint of the Greek scholar, by opening to him the native force of the separate words of the New Testament in their lexical sense, their etymology, their history, their inflection, and the peculiarities of their usage by different evangelists and apostles. The critical student of the Greek Testament will therefore find himself here on familiar, and often on rudimental, ground, and will understand that the book has not been prepared with any design or expectation of instructing him. It has in view, first of all, those readers whose ignorance of Greek debars them from the quickening contact of the original words, and to whom is unknown the very existence of those tracks which the Greek scholar treads with unconscious ease and in clear light."

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At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

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SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion, from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

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POETRY AND SCIENCE.

BY PROF. CALVIN THOMAS.

It seems to be very generally believed that poetry has in our day lost somewhat of its former power and prestige in the lives of men. Who has not heard of our "modern prosaic age" and our dethronement of romance? Occasionally, to be sure, some one like the author of an article on "Our Noble Selves" in a recent English review, insists that the much lamented decadence of poetry is for the most part an illusion caused by lack of a proper perspective; and that we of to-day not only have as good poets as our grandfathers earlier in the century had, but actually care as much for poetry as they did. But this seems to be only the opinion of an optimistic few; the majority of those who discuss the question appear to look upon the decadence of poetry as a fact beyond dispute. And when they try to explain it they usually have recourse to the ever increasing prevalence and pressure of the scientific spirit.

It is argued, or more commonly it is simply assumed, that the genius of poetry and the genius of science are enemies. Poetry, we constantly hear, thrives on myths and marvels and seeks to perpetuate them, while science puts an end to them by explaining them in terms of every day fact. Keats proposed a toast in execration of Newton for destroying the poetry of the rainbow. Schiller elaborates the familiar theme in his poem "The Gods of Greece", mournfully contrasting our modern "whirling ball of fire" with the old "golden chariot of Helios." The idea of restoring to life its lost poetry and mystery was the starting-point of German romanticism; this it was which led a large number of men to turn their longing eyes back to the Middle Ages as a time when life had warmth and color as well as light; when the breach between faith and reason, superstition and scientific knowledge, did not yet exist. This same conviction of the flatness and prosiness of the present time in comparison with a more or less remote past, inspired much of the work of Thomas Carlyle. It seemed to him that the "Minerva press," the "diffusion of knowledge," and the increasing tendency to observe, analyze and discuss, were eradicating from men's souls the capacity for worship and admiration. Hence that strange book of his upon "Heroes and Hero-worship."

But now when we look back calmly upon these solicitudes, how fantastic they appear. The poetry of the rainbow has not really suffered at all at the hands of modern physics. It has flourished just as well since Newton's time as it did before. Men may no longer believe in the myth of Iris, or in Elohim's covenant with Noah, but the poetry of the rainbow is still there. The myths themselves were forms of it and now the form has changed. That is all. The charm, or, if you will, the mystery of the bow in the clouds, is as potent as it ever was, in fact, is heightened rather than weakened by our scientific knowledge. Schiller deplored the *Entgötterung* of nature, because he thought, or feigned to think, that thus a beautiful well-spring of poetry had been lost; but he was himself the destined discoverer of new springs that, for him and his time, far more than made good the loss. Solar physics has not interfered with the poetry of the sky, nor has the loss of dryads, nymphs, and tritons destroyed the "divinity" of sea and land. We have from Goethe, Byron, Shelley, Wordsworth and Emerson a poetry of nature that touches the human spirit much more deeply, and tunes it to far finer issues than the old Greek myths ever did for those who believed in them. The period when the Romanticists were turning their weary eyes back to medieval Catholicism in search of poetry seems to us one of the most poetic epochs in history; it was the time of the Revolution, of the Napoleonic wars. Or again, if we look back to the era when Carlyle was thundering against the wretched "gigmanity" of his contemporaries, it does not seem to us especially unheroic. In fact, we see in Carlyle himself and in some of his London neighbors much more satisfactory "heroes" than several of those whom he saw fit to glorify.

It is impossible for those who live at any particular epoch to see it as it will be seen by those that come after. So as regards the prosaic, unromantic character of the present age, if we had nothing in evidence but the subjective impressions of men now living (even though they were our wisest men), we might rest assured that the much talked-of decadence of poetry is largely illusory. For if, looking out upon the actual

state of affairs in any country, say our own, which is generally regarded as the most prosaic in the world, we seemed to note a dearth of original, powerful poetic production, we should merely infer that poetry was then and there passing through a temporary eclipse and might be expected to re-emerge soon in all its old power and authority. But those who take the gloomier view of this question now usually profess to rely not on anybody's subjective impression, but on the general argument that science is hostile to poetry, and ours is a pre-eminently scientific age. Now our present concern is with the first clause of this argument and it does not lie in our path to look into the second very closely. If it did, we might perhaps find some reason to doubt whether ours is a pre-eminently scientific age in any sense which could greatly affect this question. As long as men keep learning more and finding new applications of the added knowledge, each age is in a sense more scientific than the preceding one. The French encyclopedists regarded themselves as the inaugurators of an Age of Reason, but they were not so. The Age of Reason dates back to the beginning of the human record, as does the Age of Religion and the Age of Poetry. Nevertheless it is hardly to be doubted that the last half of the nineteenth century has witnessed a general energizing of the scientific spirit. Authority began to count for less, investigation for more. Within the last few decades men have become familiar as they never were before not only with the practical applications of scientific discovery, but with the general *modus operandi* of scientific work. There are vastly more workers than there ever were before. And with increasing familiarity goes, in the main, increasing respect. The scientic spirit is in the air. It is by no means as universally diffused as is sometimes represented; but it affects the church more or less, the home and the school considerably, and every-day life mightily. It is slowly percolating through the mass of men and doing its inevitable work upon all the earlier presuppositions of human life. Thus the question whether the spirit of science and the spirit of poetry are essentially incompatible becomes a really interesting and vital one. If they are, it will not do to talk of an eclipse of poetry; we must rather suppose that it has entered on a real decadence and that its power and authority are destined to go on waning in proportion as those of science increase. How is it, then, with respect to this fundamental incompatibility?

Coleridge once said that the real antithesis of poetry is not prose, but science; and in commenting upon the words of Coleridge Mr. Theodore Watts, the writer of the excellent article on Poetry in the new Encyclopædia Britannica, makes this remark: "Indeed, with the literature of fact, as opposed to the literature of power, poetry has nothing to do. Facts have no place in poetry until they are brought into relation to a human soul." Some confirmation of this general view appears to be afforded by the experience of Darwin. Readers of Darwin's autobiographical memoir will recall the striking passage in which he speaks of the gradual atrophy of his own interest in poetry and of his capacity for appreciating it. Is this case typical? Does it describe a necessary effect of the scientific spirit upon the mind's poetic susceptibilities? And if so, why? Here it would be natural to turn attention to Goethe as the great modern exemplar of the entire compatibility of the scientific and the poetic temperament. But let us instead approach the problem analytically.

Our reasoning upon this matter must depend entirely on our conception of poetry, which is, notoriously, a very difficult thing to define. Let one but make for himself some narrow and dogmatic definition of poetry; for instance, let him regard the whole art as subject to the canons which apply to particular types of the lyric, and he can easily reach the position of Coleridge. In fact, he can make his formulæ do any wonders *ad libitum;* especially if, like a recent writer in the *Saturday Review*, he has previously identified "science" in his own mind with the dissection of crayfish. But what gives anyone the right to proceed in this way? The conception "poetry" is, as Watts himself points out, fluid and changeable. It varies with different peoples and with the same people at different epochs. We can not distinguish it sharply from prose, or from metrical rhetoric; nor can we affirm with much unction whether it is more closely akin to music or to the plastic arts. If we attempt such distinctions, we are simply dogmatizing, and the next generation may throw our dogmas to the winds.

But without trying at a formal definition—and thus adding one more to the long string of failures from Aristotle down—we may at least say that three elements, or factors, are, more or less equally, more or less generally, associated in the minds of men with the idea of poetry; these are the formal, the inventive, and the psychical factors; for brevity let us say, the form, the fiction, and the message. These factors are distinct enough to be kept apart in thought, though in fact they often blend all but inseparably. The history of poetry is the history of the varying accentuation, in various forms of art, and at different epochs, of these three elements. Now it is the form, now the fiction, and again the message which most engages men's minds and seems to them to constitute the essence of poetry. But who shall tell us what this essence really is? Our English word "poet," from the Greek ποιέω, to make, accents the constructive formal element. As

a rule we give the name of poetry only to metrical language, and there are theorists who would make meter the one absolute *sine qua non* of poetry. This would require us to give the name to a rhymed multiplication table, which does not do the work of poetry at all, or does it to an infinitesimal degree, and at the same time to refuse the name to "Ivanhoe," which does the work of poetry in a very high degree. The German nomenclature is different. The verb *dichten*, from the Latin *dictare*, goes back to the Middle Ages when the poets, who often could not write, "dictated" their musings to an amanuensis. Thus the word came to connote most prominently the idea of "inventing," and to-day, as is well known, the title of *Dichter* belongs to a Dickens as much as to a Tennyson. So also *Poesie* is freely applied by the Germans to prose fiction. Even we talk of prose-poems and of poetical prose.

What is to be gained by refusing the name of poetry to a vast body of literature which does the work of poetry? If a piece of writing gratifies the instinct for beauty of form, if it presents a fiction that is eminently interesting, and if it contains a message which is the self-revelation of a highly gifted spirit, we have poetry in its highest manifestation. But if a piece of writing does any one of these in a high degree, without at the same time altogether neglecting the other two, it does to some extent the characteristic work of poetry. Beauty of form may relate to rhythm, to verbal expression, or to the symmetry of the whole. The fiction may have a wide range from a fleeting fancy to the tale of the "Divine Comedy." In the lyric it may on occasion be reduced to zero, since it is the nature of the lyric to be chiefly form and message. The message, too, admits of endless variety. Just now, indeed, we regard it as of the essence of poetry that its message be aglow with the warmth and color of personal feeling. We care for melody, sentiment, vision, and will not permit our poet to argue with us. With Pope and Dryden it was not so. They cared indeed for correctness, but they did not mind mechanical monotony, and they looked upon the appeal to reason as the supreme function of poetry. The exquisite workmanship and the labyrinthine sinuosities of impossible emotion which we now admire, or pretend to, would have seemed to them almost contemptible. Were they not then poets? Is logical, ratiocinative, didactic verse a "legitimate" form of art? If not, how are we to pigeon-hole Schiller's "Song of the Bell?" To talk of the legitimate in such connection is to talk of fashions.

Taking, now, this broad view of poetry, and a correspondingly broad view of science as trustworthy knowledge more or less systematized, and of the scientific spirit as that spirit which leads men to try to get at trustworthy knowledge by using their wits to that end, let us shape our inquiry thus: If the scientific spirit is hostile to poetry, which one of the elements of poetry does it interfere with?

First, is it the formal element? Certainly not. As well contend that accurate knowledge of anatomy interferes with sculpture. The atmosphere of scientific knowledge is distinctly favorable to the mastery and to the appreciation of poetic form. The great masters of form have been men of learning. Milton, whose unfailing touch in matters of rhythm was held by Matthew Arnold to be his grand distinction, was at home in all the science of his day. Our own scientific age, whatever else may be said of its achievements in poetry, has nowhere allowed the formal element of it to deteriorate. It may be true that the scientific temper, caring as it does more for substance than for form, does tend to predispose the mind against poetry that is all form and without substance. But this is surely no very forceful indictment of science as an enemy of poetry. The modern bard who has only a manner of saying must e'en content himself to be neglected for the great ones of the past who had not only a manner of saying, but also something to say. The only point here insisted on is that the scientific spirit does not of itself incapacitate either the artist in shaping, or his public in enjoying, the purely formal element of his work.

Is it then the inventive element of poetry that is endangered by science? This again can hardly be argued. Invention does not count for much just now, except in prose fiction, and it seems to count for less and less even there. But it has counted in the past and may count again; and so far as it does count, it depends upon the same faculties of mind that are called into play in a great deal of the best scientific work. For science is not merely natural science, nor is this merely the patient dissection of crayfish. The real, characteristic work of the man of science begins with synthesis; it is the building up of a mental fabric out of all the data at hand, while the poet's is the building up of a mental fabric out of data selected by him for his purpose. For the poet imagines nothing, can imagine nothing, the elements of which are not data of Nature. His gods, and angels, and demons, his griffins, gorgons, and chimeras, and all their operations, are simply compounds of what he has seen and heard. Now the building up of such a mental fabric, whether it be science or poetry, is, where it has to do with concrete things, essentially a work of the constructive imagination. And this is true not only of such mental fabrics as the nebular hypothesis, the theory of a glacial epoch, or of the origin of species by natural selection, but it is true also in large measure of the historical sciences. The portrayer of a nation's

history, of a man, an epoch, a movement, needs *vision* just as the poet needs it. He must *see* his objects moving before his mind's eye, and, other things being equal, the excellence of his work as science will be in proportion to the vividness with which he sees. His procedure is that of an artist. The splendid portrait of Julius Cæsar in Mommsen's "Rome" is an achievement of the constructive imagination just as much as is Shakespeare's Cæsar. And each aims in its way at truth; the difference lies not in the way of working, but in the kind of truth aimed at. The scientific spirit may, though it certainly does not always, dispose the mind unfavorably toward wild and fantastic fictions in poetry, but it does not of itself interfere either with the use or with the appreciation of the constructive imagination. Does poetry on its own account any longer need wild and fantastic fictions?

It must be, then, in the message of poetry, if anywhere, that the seat of its antipathy to science is to be sought. And here undeniably the case for Coleridge's view is somewhat stronger. It is urged that the message of poetry is, properly, fervid, ecstatic, intuitive, deals with facts only as related to the human soul, and makes its appeal to feeling, fancy, imagination; while that of science is calm, ratiocinative, analytic, considers facts for their own sake, and makes its appeal to the reason. I am far from wishing to deny all validity to these antitheses, but it is easy to make too much of them. The old fictions of inspiration, divine *afflatus*, and so forth, undoubtedly have a reality back of them. That reality is a psychical state involving intense mental preoccupation, an exaltation or a sudden rush of feeling, and a heightened power of intellectual vision. But now, these states of consciousness are not the peculiar dower of a few; all men are more or less subject to them, which means that there are very many kinds and degrees of inspiration. The essence of the poet's message cannot lie in the fact that it proceeds from a more or less wrapt psychical state, since that is true of much other mental performance besides poetry, and is not always true of poetry. No one supposes that the opening lines of the "Æneid" were thrown off at a white heat any more than the opening lines of Macaulay's History. At most the language used above can apply only to the lyric mood and it does not always apply to that. There are good lyrics that are as calm and contemplative as the very Muse of Science herself. We must give up the idea that the power of the poet's message lies in his occasional mysterious inspiration. *That* mystery is, as with other brain-workers, very much a matter of business and of will. Goethe likens his own poetic ecstasis to a state of somnambulism; but the state lasted, while "Werther" was under way, for four weeks. This means that he could recall it each morning; and we know that in later life he became something of an expert in "commanding his poetry." How, then, does the ecstasis of "Werther" really differ from that intense mental preoccupation with which he was wont, and with which many a man is wont, to pursue a purely scientific problem?

Largely illusory, too, is the distinction that science is literature of fact, while poetry is literature of power. As was remarked in another connection, it is not true that science considers facts for their own sake; it considers them as related to some further synthesis of the mind. Until we have that the facts are only the raw materials of science. And the same facts may be at the same time the raw material of poetry. Take the well known verses of Goethe:

> "Ueber allen Gipfeln
> Ist Ruh';
> In allen Wipfeln
> Spürest du
> Kaum einen Hauch;
> Die Vögelein schweigen im Walde,
> Warte nur—balde
> Ruhest du auch."

No one will deny the fine lyric effect of these lines; if any one does, alas for his theories! But the first six lines are simply statements of fact. They are the raw material of either science or poetry, according to the nature of the mental synthesis to which they may be related by what follows. If the author had related them to some statement, say concerning the atmospheric conditions of Mt. Kickelhahn at a particular time of the day, they would have been science; as it is, he has related them to his own personality, giving us a glimpse of a perturbed soul longing for peace, and they are poetry. So impalpable is the line that divides the two; a word, a breath changes the one to the other.

But some one will say, not so impalpable after all; facts related to thought are science, related to feeling they become poetry. True in a sense, but the sense in which it is true does not take us far. Such terms as thought and feeling, mind and soul, fancy imagination, will, and what not, do not correspond to any separate air-tight compartments built by mother Nature in the human mentality. That mentality is one and indivisible. The states of consciousness to which we give these and other similar names have a common root and their branches are inextricably intertwined. What moves the one sways, or may sway, all the others.

I conclude, then, that the idea of any radical antithesis between poetry and science is at the bottom untenable. Poetry is in no danger of a general blight from the pressure of the scientific spirit. It may be that one can not be at the same moment under the dominion of the scientific and of the lyric mood. But he can be the one to-day and the other to-morrow; nor need his predilection for the one mood (unless he

deliberately starves half of his nature, as Darwin did and regretted doing) interfere with his appreciation of what belongs to the other. It is here much as it is with the far-famed conflict of religion and science. Not religion, only at the utmost religions, have anything to fear from the advancement of science, and the goal of the future is not the subjugation of one by the other, but a more and more perfect synthesis of the two. So it is not poetry, but at the most certain historical manifestations of poetry, that can be endangered by the onward march of the scientific spirit. Poetry and science have so far gone hand in hand and have played parts of equal prominence and value in the history of humanity. So it will be also hereafter; for both have their roots deep down in primal human instincts that are imperishable.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SALVATION.

BY P. MICHAELIS.*

Prof. Wilhelm Bender, of the university of Bonn, ranks at the present time, as a conspicuous reformer in German theological circles. Among his professional colleagues at least, he is to be regarded as the first who has earnestly endeavored, and succeeded in the endeavor, to construct anew the foundations of religion on the lines of modern science.

At bottom, there is nothing strictly new in what Bender says; it is new only for theology. Nearly the same thoughts, suggestively at least, are to be found in the works of Feuerbach and others; although the merit must be granted Bender of having once for all severed the anthropological character of religion from its dependence on philosophical speculation, and of having brought religion into firm connection with historico-critical methods of investigation. In other words, the attempt of Prof. Bender is, to bring religion, this highest form of the human mind's activity, like all other expressions of the mind of man, within the modern standpoint of evolution. This intention is evidenced in the very title of his latest publication, "The Struggle for Salvation,"† which plainly rests upon Darwin's "Struggle for Existence." This little monograph is admirably adapted as an introduction to the views of Prof. Bender. It is addressed to the cultured public of Germany and the entire world, and by no means exclusively to theologians. It will be our endeavor here, to present the salient points of this new conception.

* * *

The gifted anchorite of Bruckberg, Ludwig Feuerbach, in his work *Wesen des Christenthums*, was the first to advance the idea, that the true meaning of theology is anthropology; in other words, that deity is only a copy, or, if it be preferred, an ideal copy of man. All that we predicate of God is a predication of human nature. All attempts to establish an essential difference between God and man are resolved into naught, so soon as we thoroughly investigate the problem by speculative philosophical methods. Religion is a dream of the human soul. The gods realize what men aspire after. "The gods accomplish," says he, "what men desire; that is, they fulfil the laws of the human heart. What men are only in soul, the gods are in body; what the former achieve only in volition, fancy, and heart, only spiritually, as it were—for instance, the power of being suddenly present at some remote spot—the gods can accomplish physically. The gods are the able-bodied, incarnate, and realized wishes of man—the obliterated boundaries that nature has placed on the human heart and will; they are beings endowed with unfettered will—beings whose powers of body are exactly equal to their powers of will. * * * The God of the Israelites, at the behest of Joshua, commands the sun to stand still; at that of Elijah sends down the rain; and so also the God of the Christians, as a signal proof of his own divinity, namely, of his power to grant all wishes to man, calms by virtue of his simple word the raging sea, heals the sick, and resurrects the dead. In all this the simple wish and simple word are proclaimed as a higher power controlling nature."

Feuerbach himself, from his extreme Hegelian point of view, had understood that religious life also was realized according to a definite law of development. Man wants to subjugate the world; man aspires to convert the unpropitious, uncanny character of nature into an intelligent, compliant factor in perfect harmony with all human cravings. But his views of the proposed aim must needs vary with the advancing growth of reason. So long as he remains himself a purely physical being, the objects of his worship are likewise physical objects. So soon as he has become a political being, his Godhead likewise becomes political, and wholly distinct from nature. In such case abstract, moral powers—the majesty of the law, the power of public opinion, of honor, and virtue—will be raised high above man's physical existence; while at the same time the empire of nature is lowered into a mere attribute and instrument of the political and moral power. Then does Zeus wield his thunderbolt, and inexorably strike down the offenders against his laws, all perjurers and evil-doers; then also Jehovah, amidst thunder and lightning, compels the Israelites to walk in all the paths that he has bidden them. In other words, whenever the will and reason of man have been raised above nature, his Godhead also must become a supernatural being. The absolute control of nature then becomes his loftiest conception, the

* Translated from the *Deutsche Gegenwart* by *νῦν*.

† *Der Kampf um die Seligkeit* (Bonn, Max Cohen & Sohn).

highest essence and object of all his worship and religion.

And thus man fictitiously imputes to the Godhead his own wishes and aspirations. He attributes to the world a particular purpose; views the world according to the laws of finality, and seeks in it for a living providence, disposing all things for his best welfare. The supreme control of the gods is thus narrowed, as man progresses, and the celestials themselves are, after a fashion, sublimated along with all human development. But, since natural providence, must always have its definite limits, so at all times there will still remain ample room for the Godhead. "The gods know and speak to me; they clearly determine all that nature leaves in darkness and uncertainty, and surrenders to chance. The domain of the fortuitous, of the positive, individual, unforeseen, incalculable, is the domain of the gods—the domain of religious providence. And oracle and prayer constitute acts of religious consecration, because man seeks to make what is fortuitous, obscure, and uncertain, an object of providence, of certitude, or of trust." Feuerbach thereupon sums up his entire theology in the very pregnant sentence: "The supersensual behind the sensual is man before the sensual."

That which less satisfies us in Feuerbach's ingenious and acute exposition is its decided speculative bias. It frequently looks as if actual facts were violently forced to enter the line of ideas that make up his system. And, besides, its amalgamation with a philosophical system is all the more to be regretted, since, with the overthrow of the latter, that also which is true in it, itself seems to have fallen in the general ruin. The circumstance, too, that in our own days a wide-spread repugnance to all philosophical speculation has extensively gained ground, explains why ideas of this kind have now for a time been neglected. It is therefore all the more a source of satisfaction, that these ideas, independently of speculative hypothesis, have now been tested exclusively by the truth which they contain, and solely by the formal application of valid scientific laws, as generally admitted in our day.

In this consists the first advantage that Bender enjoys over Feuerbach, to which may be added, that in our own time the comparative history of religion has made a very great advance beyond the point it occupied forty years ago. This particular province, formerly entirely neglected, is now being cultivated in numerous universities by very eminent teachers, and surprising facts are daily brought to light. Only from such results, doubtless, can be laid the genuine foundation of a serious discussion of the character of a religion that lays its main stress on man. For, however hostile to all history may be a view of religion that exclusively rests on revelation, still an historical and anthropological investigation of the nature of religion is only imaginable under the assumption that such an hypothesis can be proved by historical facts.

It is not Prof. Bender's smallest advantage over his predecessor that he perfectly controls this religio-historical material, as might be shown from many details, although, of course, there is no intention of imparting this vast material *in extenso*, but rather to make it the basis of deeper investigation. In fact, this could not be done by aid solely of the available material of a few occidental religions; only more recent ethnographical investigations allow us a comprehensive survey of this luxuriant domain, and present at the same time to our view certain particular sides of religiousness, which, to the student, gain perhaps in value, even through the very oddness of their first aspect. Finally Prof. Bender agreeably differs from Feuerbach by his greater discretion.

Still Prof. Bender does not seem entirely fair when he maintains that he no more agrees with Feuerbach than with Schleiermacher, Biedermann, and others. For, as a matter of fact, it was Bender who first consistently disregarded the factor of the Godhead. But he justly guards against Feuerbach's rash inference regarding deity as a pure product of human wishes, and proves, on the contrary, that the belief in divinity rests upon very real foundations.

Science, Bender maintains, cannot regard as its aim either the creation or the destruction of the ideals of man. It is the office, sole and simple, of science, to understand and explain them; but we shall not be able to obtain a correct comprehension of religious life, if we start from a religious ideal which does not tally with reality. Such an ideal, however sublime, would be liable to be regarded as an empty reverie. On the contrary, we must point out the firm soil from which it grew in the history of the development of our race and in the laws of our own life, as still to-day it might grow there. The attempt to regard religion as something absolutely apart, as a phenomenon unsusceptible of comparison with any other, has been definitively proved a shallow conception. Prof. Bender adopts the very opposite methods. He endeavors to conceive religion as flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone; not diviner and not less godly; not better and not worse; not truer and not less true, than all the other spiritual activities of man; rearing indeed its head high into the sky, but with its feet deeply rooted in the common mother earth, from which all life springs. This, certainly, may destroy the dazzling aureole of holiness of which religion ever loved to make a pompous exhibition, but as an indemnification for the loss we may perhaps discover something which actually turns religion into a necessary

and victorious weapon of man in the struggle for existence. Prof. Bender aims to prove that *religion everywhere is a manifestation of the activity of man, and never of the activity of a deity*—in other terms, that the Godhead can claim no other and no greater share in the origin and growth of religion than the share assigned it by religious faith in the origin and development of all things in the world. And, scientifically speaking, this is really the only tenable point of view. So long as it is only mortal man who professes religion, and not God, so long also must we explain religion as we do all other human things. Any other explanation accepting the auxiliary addition of a "supernatural" influence, has, to modern science, entirely lost all intelligible meaning.

Every form of human activity, all human civilization, from agriculture and practical handicraft to art, science, law, and morals, must be conceived and understood as a grand reciprocal action between the world and man. And that religion, evidently, must stand in the self-same relation, sufficiently appears from the fact that historically it is intimately interwoven with the life of the world. We cannot avoid regarding it otherwise than as a natural phenomenon, accompanying the advancing stages of human culture; as *one* weapon among the many other weapons, which man lays hold of in his unflagging struggle for existence. Nay, even when in certain aspects and forms religion appears to detach man from the life of the earth, it still continues faithfully in his service; for religion then holds forth to man the hope of that salvation and bliss, in a higher world, which he seeks for in vain on this earth. Yet the necessary disposition of things, according to which this reciprocal action between the world and man takes place, constitutes precisely the so-called struggle for existence. In this way only are obtained, preserved, and propagated the beneficent acquisitions of human civilization. All human society is developed and perfected in this struggle for existence. But man would not continue the struggle if existence afforded him no pleasure; if from the struggle he did not expect to derive an increase of his possession, of his strength, the satisfaction and felicitation of his personal being.

Thus, not only does the instinct of self preservation, but likewise an instinct of self-improvement in harmony with the laws of nature, forcibly thrust the requisite arms into the hands of society, and teach it to use those weapons to the advancement of the common weal. And from out of this universal combat for existence, as a pure necessity of nature, there arises the ideal of a more perfect condition of life, which, though its realization be postponed to the end of all time, yet constantly hovers above human society like a star of guidance.

We have to understand, and bear in mind this truth, if we wish to understand the origin and development of religion. For, just as religion itself was born from out this struggle for existence; as it adapted itself unto all the forms that this struggle assumed in the course of the development of the human race; as it actually sprang from the same motive elements from which civilization sprang; so likewise religion ever served, and still serves the same objects that make for and condition the advancement of human civilization. Rightly understood, the ultimate aim of religion, in fact, is the improvement and happiness of human society. Religion has ever adapted itself to all interests and purposes, to every means and institution that man, according to his respective stage of culture, was compelled to adopt and employ.

In man's earlier stages of social development his most vital interests were centered in the preservation of life and health, of possession and family; in success in the hunt and in war; and all these, moreover, were the main objects of his religious worship and of his most ardent invocations. In a like manner, in our own day, to the immense majority of human beings the provision of food, clothing, and shelter forms the principal object of all labor, and at the same time of their sincerest prayers. If this truth has often been overlooked, the oversight must be imputed to the supernatural character of our education; for it is unquestionably true that our most passionate supplications uncontrollably well forth from the combat for life in which we are constantly involved: when our toilsome efforts are threatened with failure, or some windfall of fortune brightens our paths; when some beloved fellow creature is seen struggling with an insidious disease, or when mighty nations rise to fight the battle of existence with weapons in hand. And religion in the same manner accompanies the human struggle for the possession of purely ideal goods, upon the care of which the preservation and progress of society are in no less degree dependent. For man everywhere wishes for the success of his work, and is animated by the hope, that his efforts may be accompanied by success. But this wish in itself is only the elementary form of religion. Every single effort or task affords a motive for the creation of a religion; for our work does not only and exclusively depend on ourselves, but far more on all the fortuitous external circumstances amidst which our efforts are made. In so far, accordingly, as religion is only an ardent wish for success, it primarily lacks a definite content, and it only acquires the latter through the interests that man wishes to realize.

From all this we may gain a sufficiently clear insight into the primeval rise of religion. That which man aims at obtaining, is never entirely dependent upon his own laborious efforts, but upon external cir-

cumstances and conditions of existence, which we fail perfectly to perceive and to control. Man, indeed, in the course of the development of civilization makes astonishing progress; in the struggle for existence he learns to employ more and more perfectly the weapons at his disposal; and so, by the very development of civilization itself the domain of his wishes becomes limited,--indeed, with the form of our civilization changes likewise the form of our wishes. Still, there always will be left a considerable remnant of incalculable possibilities, and at all times there will also exist a motive for the creation of a religion; in other words, man, through his aspirations and wishes, will never cease to endeavor to correct the extant deficit between that which he wishes and that which he has.

Nevertheless, this wish for success, must primarily be regarded as only the soil on which religion grows. Here a further question arises: Under what conditions does this wish adjust and mould itself into faith and worship, into all that which in the strict sense of the word we are accustomed to call religion? For although many may not have passed beyond that elementary form of religion, yet, as a rule, the urgent cravings of their own needs, and the pressure of the surrounding conditions of existence will lead much farther. The vague and erratic desire for help will regulate itself according to the standard of experience which man acquires in the struggle for existence. Therefore man turns to the world of reality and seeks in it for his gods. His god simply means helping power, supreme assistance. Concrete beings, whose preponderating influence he long has experienced, become the exclusive objects of his worship—the sun, earth, lightning, plants, and animals, and gifted individuals; in fact, all that might be expected to help him in the struggle for existence. Unto all such he might sacrifice and pray, and adapt himself, not from any theoretical conviction of finding in them higher beings, but purely in the practical expectation, that in their turn they likewise will adjust themselves to his own life interests, and will promote them. In this manner the religious evolution of man is not purely arbitrary, but like the advance of civilization, a reciprocal action with the world. Man prays for help to the Godhead to satisfy the natural and temporal interests of existence; and the controlling forces and regulations of nature and of history mediate between man and divine assistance. The province of religion and the work of civilization are coincident.

In a like manner also the development of religion is analogous to the course of evolution of human civilization. Religion indeed does not call forth the progress of civilization, but, on the contrary, an advance in the development of civilization actually causes the transformation of religious faith. Science manifestly has transformed all religious faith. By teaching a correct knowledge of the forces and laws of nature science destroyed natural religion. Science further divested the legendary heroes of their divinity while showing how all, even the noblest and most beneficent personalities of history, one and all, are subject to human limitations and to earthly finiteness. Still, as science alone cannot produce civilization, neither does it determine the progressive development of religion. We ought rather to assume that all forces co-operate to effect this end. In every stage of civilization they, taken together, create some peculiar ideal of existence, in which all interests are represented as satisfied, and all aims as having been successfully attained. And each life-ideal is again reflected in the idea of a supreme power, which controls the universe to the sole advantage of that ideal, and warrants for its realization. This ideal changes incessantly, along with the successive stages of civilization by which it is conditioned and called forth; but in each stage such an ideal is indeed the necessary result.

This, in brief, is what the author understands by natural religion. He thereupon shows that supernatural religion, seeking to relegate the realization of human aspirations to another world, simply arose from man's despairing of a successful consummation of that earthly struggle for existence. While subjecting supernatural religion to a searching criticism, the author proves that to our modern state of knowledge this kind of religion has forever lost all intelligible meaning; our faith and religion, on the contrary, ought in turn to accommodate themselves to the life-ideal, which some day must be realized in the whole of humanity. The dead religion, which, by aid of supernatural forms of faith and of works, pretends to open a phantastic beyond, must soon be transformed into a living religion that adapts itself to the noble struggle which man even here on earth must endure for the sake of his eternal salvation.

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

VII.

At this passionate and harsh speech of Sita, Ravana knit his brow and answered:

"But I am Ravana, O you woman of noble descent; I am the powerful Dasagriva, from the face of whom all gods have fled in terror—all Gandharvas, Pisatchas, and reptiles.

"My own half-brother, the wealthy King Vaisravana, even without a motive by me, was felled in

battle; from fear of me having abandoned his royal residence, and ventured to confront my anger.

"King Naravahana*, as is known, dwells on Mount Kailasa, noblest of mountains; and from him my valor won my splendid self-moving chariot, called Pushpaka, on which I ride through the air.

"At the mere sight of my angry face, O daughter of Mithila, the ten regions of the world hide themselves from fear; and even God Indra, with all his furious host of Suras, boasting to be a match for Ravana, were once by me defeated in battle; and whether armed with the fetters† or without them, Varuna, the lord of the waters, went away vanquished by my resistless strength.

"Even Yama,‡ armed with his black bludgeon—a deadly weapon in battle, was by me driven far into the southern regions; and from fear of me he never since has even ventured to stir.

"All those kings of the earth, with all the gods at their head, before my presence from abject fear will scatter in every direction.

"Wherever I come the wind is hushed into calm; and I can chill even the burning sun-beams, so that they grow pale and cold. Where I move or stop, the leaves of the trees cease to quiver, and the rivers cease to flow.

"Far off in the sea lies my stately residence, Lanka, an abode worthy of Indra's Amaravati, crowded with my bold Rakshas. It is surrounded by extensive bright walls, with gilded turrets pleasant to the eye; with arched gates of lazur-stone and adamant; rich in elephants, horses, and chariots, resonant with strains of music and adorned with groves of trees, bearing all kinds of costly fruit.

"There, O Princess Sita, you shall dwell with me, in happy oblivion of all men and women; and enjoying all human and divine pleasures, you also would soon forget Rama, himself but a mortal man. His father, King Dasaratha, having placed his favorite son on the throne, sent his elder son into the wilderness, as one of much inferior valor.

"And what could you expect to do with a fool like Rama, exiled from his kingdom, and moreover a penitent?

"Therefore, do not repulse from you the lord of all Rakshas, who, wounded by the darts of the god of love, of own free impulse has approached you. But, if you do reject me, O my fair girl, a great evil will surely betide you!"

Thus entreated, Sita, incensed with wrath, with reddening eyes scornfully spurned him from her with her feet, as is said the Apsaras Urvaci once did with Pururavas;* and there in the solitude she further addressed the following angry words to the lord of all Rakshas:

"And you, who treacherously slew your own brother, King Vaisravana, endowed with every high quality, have you again come hither to perpetrate evil?

"Be sure, O Ravana, that the Rakshas, of whom you are the wicked, foolish, sensual king, must needs all perish.

"Indra, forsooth, might live, although losing his wife Saci, but were I to be carried away, Rama, certainly, would die; and you, O king of the rovers of the night, after robbing Indra's wife Saci, may have preserved your own life; but in committing this evil deed against Rama, you will surely perish—even were you the God of Death himself!

"Hard pressed in battle by the entire host of Brahmans and Siddhas,† you shall be hurled to the infernal regions of the god of death Yama, struck by the flaming arrows of Rama."

* Naravahana is another name of Kuvera, God of Riches.

† "The fetters" relate to the manner in which Indra and the Suras overpowered and bound Ahi, the world serpent.

‡ The God of Death.

* The story of Pururavas (son of Budha) and of Urvaci, is told in the Vishnu Purana, 399.

† Siddhas, a class of demi-gods. In this cloka or strophe, the words "Sriyam-iha vipulam vihaya raudrim" have provisorily been omitted.

NOTES.

The first of the essays of M. Binet, treating of the psychology of various forms of hysteria, will appear in our next issue.

Life-Lore begins, with July, its second year. The success of this popular magazine of Natural History has been merited. The character of its illustrations and content-matter is exceptionally high, and has ensured it in the past, as we hope it will do in the future, a wide-spread circulation. (W. Mawer, London.)

In conjunction with the essay of Prof. Calvin Thomas, "Poetry and Science," may be read the editorials "Classical and Romantic Art" and "Tragedy and the Problem of Life," in Nos. 46 and 48 of THE OPEN COURT. THE OPEN COURT would not compose the conflict between poetry and science by broadening the scope of art, but rather by limiting it and by excluding every tendency to Romanticism as an expression of dualism.

The theory of Max Müller, of the identity of language and reason, set forth in his recent works upon the Science of Thought, has in almost every instance in which the view has been combated, been grossly misunderstood. Critics refuse to accept the definition of thinking as a process of adding and subtracting, of combining and separating; they make the term embrace almost every psychical act, every act that is predicable of life, sensations, passions, intuitive judgments, etc., and then proceed coolly to annihilate a doctrine which they have virtually themselves erected. Thus Professor David Swing, in the *Chicago Evening Journal*, of July 6th, writing of the wondrous mysteries of "Conscious Life," incidentally refers to the doctrine of the identity of thought and language in a similar fashion. Professor Swing cites the action of fishes in seeking the friendly hand that feeds them as conclusive evidence that fishes think; and clinches his proposition by the remark that "thus the question which has long puzzled philosophers can be settled by a two-year old sun-fish." Prof. Swing's article is a charming study in imaginative natural history. But even speculation has its limits, and it is hardly reverential, much less scientific, to maltreat a philosophical truth merely to adorn a popular tale.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. — Continued.

The Magister suddenly stopped.

"It was pride," said the Professor, sorrowfully, "it was envy, that burst forth from an oppressed life against more fortunate ones, who, perhaps, did not know more; it was the craving for superiority over others."

"It was that," continued Knips, plaintively. "First came the idea of mocking those who employed and despised me. I thought, if I chose, I had you in my power, my learned colleagues. Then it became a purpose and took fast hold on me. I have sat many nights working at it before I went so far, and frequently have I thrown away what I have done, Professor, and hid it under my books. But I was allured to go on, it became my pride to master the art. When at last I had done so, it was a pleasure to me to make use of it. It was less for the gain than for the superiority it gave me."

"It is easy," replied the Professor, "to deceive men of our sort where they are accustomed to place firm confidence. Where the acuteness that we acquire in our work is not brought into play, many of us are like children, and he who is colder and wishes to deceive may easily for a time play with us. It is a weak glory to exercise the art of Satan against the innocent."

"I knew that it was a devil with whom I was dealing; I knew it from the first day, Professor, but I could not guard myself from him. Thus it was," concluded Knips, seating himself exhausted on the chest.

"Thus it was, Magister," exclaimed Werner, raising himself up; "but thus it cannot remain. You were one of us, you can no longer be so. You have done an injury to the highest good which is granted to the race of man—the honor of learning. You yourself knew that he who endangers this honor is a mortal enemy to our souls. In our realm, where error daily threatens the limited powers of individuals, the determination to be true is a preliminary which none can be wanting in, without involving others in his own destruction."

"I was only an assistant," sighed Knips, "and few cared about me. If others had esteemed me as a scholar it would not have happened."

"You considered yourself so, and you had a right to do so," rejoined the Professor. "You felt the pride of your learning, and you well knew your high vocation. You well knew that you also, the humble Magister, had your share in the priestly office and in the princely office of our realm. No purple is nobler, no rule is more sovereign than ours. We lead the souls of our nation from one century to another; and ours is the duty of watching over its learning and over its thoughts. We are its champions against the lies and spirits of a past time which wander amongst us clothed with the semblance of life. What we consecrate, lives; and what we condemn, passes away. The old virtues of the Apostles are required of us—to esteem little what is earthly, and to proclaim the truth. You were in this sense consecrated, like every one of us; your life was pledged to God. On you, as on all of us, lay the responsibility for the souls of our nation. You have proved yourself unworthy of this office, and I grieve, I grieve, wretched man, that I must separate you from it."

The Magister jumped up, and looked imploringly at the Scholar.

The Professor spoke impressively:

"It is my duty both towards you and others to speak out. What you have done to my fellow professors, and what you have prepared for similar attempts, cannot remain secret. Honorable men must be warned against the art which you have been led by a demon to exercise. But in this last hour in which you stand before me, I feel that I have done too little to help you against temptation. Without intending to be unkind, I have perhaps sometimes undervalued you, in comparison with others, and have forgotten how hard was your daily life. If you have ever felt depressed and embittered by my severity, I now atone for it. For when I, short-sighted, erring man, advised you to accept a position which was to raise you out of external need, I participated in your guilt, by exposing you to new temptation here. That gives me bitter pain, Magister, and I feel the anguish of this hour."

Magister Knips sat exhausted and cowering on the chest: the Scholar stood over him, and his words sank like blows on the Magister's head.

"I cannot conceal the fact, Magister, that you are a forger; you can never again move in our circle; your career is closed by your transgression, you are lost to learning, lost to all who took an interest in your work. You have vanished from the place which you held amongst us; nothing remains but a black shadow. Human powers laboriously trained, a spirit of uncommon acuteness and fullness, are lost and dead to us; and I mourn over you as over a dead man."

The Scholar wept, and Knips covered his face with his hands. Werner hastened to his writing-table.

"If you require means to maintain your ruined life in some other neighborhood, here it is. Take what you require."

He threw some money on the table.

"Try to conceal yourself where no member of our community will meet you. May all the good become your portion, which is still possible for you to have

*Translation copyrighted.

on earth. But fly, Magister; avoid those places where one shall think of you with the sorrow and repugnance that the faithful workman feels towards one who is untrue."

Knips rose; his face was paler than usual, and he looked distractedly about him.

"I need no money," he said, with faint voice; "I have enough for my journey. I beg of the Professor to care for my mother."

The Scholar turned away, the strong man sobbed. Magister Knips went to the door; there he stopped.

"I have the Homer of 1488; tell my mother to give you the book. Though the thought of me be painful, yet keep the book. It was a treasure to me."

The Magister closed the door and went slowly out of the house. The wind drove through the streets; it blew against the back of the Magister, and hastened his steps.

"It drives," murmured Knips again; "it drives me onward."

At the open square he remained standing in the wind; looking towards the clouds, which were passing in hasty flight beneath the moon. Distorted figures hovered in the grey vapor and glided over his head. He thought of the last proof-sheets which he had read in his native town, and spoke some Greek words; they were verses from the Eumenides of Æschylus:—

"Rush on! rush on! rush on! ye messengers of vengeance!"

He went up to the castle, and remained standing before the lighted windows; the four black steeds which brought the Sovereign back from the tower castle to the city dashed past him, and he clenched his bony fist at the carriage. He then ran round the castle to the park side. There, against a tree, beneath the windows of the Sovereign's apartment, he cowered; looked up to the castle, and again raised his fist against the lord of it, and sighed. He looked up at the dark boughs that towered over him, gazed at the sky and the grey flitting shadows which coursed along under the moon, and desperate thoughts passed through his mind:

"When the moon vanishes that will be a token to me also."

He looked long at the moon. Amidst his wild thoughts a Latin sentence entered his confused brain: "'The moon and the earth are but as little points in the universe;' that is beautifully said by Ammianus Marcellinus. I have compared the manuscripts of this Roman; I have made conjectures on all sides with respect to his mutilated text; I have pored for years over him. If I do here, in order to vex this ignorant lord, what was done to Haman, all this preparation for my Roman would be lost."

He rushed from under the trees and ran to his dwelling. There he collected all his possessions, put his small copy of Ammianus into his pocket, and hastened with his bundle to the gate.

They say he went to the same country to which his brother had gone before him—far off in the West.

He passed away, he hid his head—an unfaithful servant, and at the same time a victim of science. All his life long he had pondered over written words; now the living words, which penetrated from another soul into his, drove him from his home. Day and night he had been surrounded with the letters of books and learned writings which had flowed from the pen on to the white sheets; but the blessing of living words which pass from the mouth to the ear, and echo from heart to heart, had failed him at the right time; for what is in common use with us is also our highest boon. Its power is as mysterious to us to-day as it was to our ancestors; the generation of our literary period, accustomed to contemplate tones in their imaginations, and to estimate the powers of nature by measure and weight, seldom think how powerfully the echoing word from the human heart rules within us; it is mistress and servant, it elevates and annihilates us, it produces disease and health. Happy the living being in whose ear it sounds full and pure, who incessantly receives the soft sound of love and the hearty call of friendship. He who is deprived of the blessing of the conversation which flows from warm hearts, wanders among others as a living being in whom the spirit is separated from the body, or like a book that one opens, makes use of, and puts away at pleasure. The Magister had sinned by the written word; a cry of agony uttered by a human voice had frightened him into the misty and silent distance.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

BEFORE THE CRISIS.

THE cattle lowed and the sheep-bells tinkled, and the springing blades of wheat waved in the wind. The eldest daughter of the family was again walking in the garden, surrounded by her brothers and sisters. What has become of the glad brightness of your eye and the hearty child's laugh, Lady Ilse? Your countenance has become serious and your demeanor subdued; your looks scan critically the men about you and the paths that you tread, and calm commands sound from your lips. Your home has not made your heart light, nor given you back again what you lost among strangers.

But it zealously exercises its right to be loved by you and to show you love; it recalls familiar images to your soul, and old recollections awake at every step; the people whom you fostered faithfully in your heart, the animals that you cared for, and the trees that you planted, greet you, and labor busily to cover with bright colors what lies gloomily within you.

The first evening was painful. When Ilse, accompanied by her neighbor, entered her home a fugitive, striving to conceal what tormented her, amidst the terror of her father and the inquisitive questions of her brothers and sisters, anger and dismay once more threw their black shadows over her. But on the breast of her father, under the roof of a secure house, together with the feeling of safety, her old energy revived, and she was able to conceal from the eyes of her loved ones that which was not her secret alone.

Another painful hour came. Ilse was sitting late in the evening, as years before, on her chair opposite her father. After her story was told, the strong man looked down anxiously, used hard words concerning her husband, and cursed the other. When he told her that even in her father's house danger threatened her, when he desired her to be cautious at every step, and when he told her that in her childhood there had been a dark rumor that a maiden from the house on the rock, a child of a former possessor, had been the victim of a distinguished prince, she raised her hands to heaven. Her father seized them and drew her towards him.

"We are wrong to forget in an uncertain future how mercifully Providence has guarded you. I hold you by the hand and you stand on the soil of your home. We must do what the day requires, and trust everything else to a higher Being. As for the talk of strangers we care not; they are weather-cocks. Be calm and have confidence."

The younger children chattered innocently; they asked about the charming life at the capital, they wished to know accurately what their sister had gone through, and above all how the Sovereign of the country had treated Ilse, he whom they thought of as a holy Christ, as the unwearied dispenser of joy and happiness. But the elder ones were more cautious in their language without exactly knowing why, with that kind of natural tact which children show towards those whom they love. Ilse accompanied her sister Clara through the upper floor, they arranged the room for the guests who were expected, and placed an immense bunch of flowers in the room which Mr. Hummel was to occupy. Her brothers took her through the kitchen-garden into the narrow valley, and showed her the new wooden bridge over the water to the grotto, which their father had built as a surprise for Ilse. Ilse passed by the swollen brook, the water rushed yellow and muddy over the rocks, it had overflowed the small strip of meadow by its banks and flowed in a strong stream down the valley to the town. Ilse sought the place where she once, under the foliage and wild plants, lay concealed, when she read in the eyes of her Felix the acknowledgement of his love. This cosy nook was also flooded; the stream ran muddily over it, the flowers were broken down and washed away, the alder bushes covered to their upper branches, and reeds and discolored foam hung round them: only the white stem of a birch rose out of the devastation, and the flood whirled round its lowest branches.

"The flood is passing away," said Ilse, sadly; "in a few days the ground will again be visible, and where the verdure has been injured the mild rays of the sun will soon restore it. But how will it be with me? There is no light so long as he is not with me, and when I see him again how he will be changed? How will he, so serious and zealous, bear the cold wind of adversity that has passed through his life and mine?"

Her father watched her carefully; he talked to her more frequently than formerly. Whenever he returned from the field he told her of the work that was doing on the farm; he was always taking care not to touch on thoughts that might give her pain, and the daughter felt how tender and loving was the attention of the busy man. Now he beckoned to her from a distance, and near him was walking a thick-set figure, with a large head and comfortable aspect.

"Mr. Hummel!" exclaimed Ilse, joyfully, and hastened with winged footsteps towards him. "When will he come?" she called out, with eager expectation.

"As soon as he is free," replied Hummel.

"Who detains him there?" said the wife, looking sorrowful.

Mr. Hummel explained. At his report the wrinkles on Ilse's forehead disappeared, and she led her guest into the old house. Mr. Hummel looked astonished at the tall race that had grown up on the rock: he looked with admiration on the girls and respectfully at the heads of the boys. Ilse did not to-day forget what becomes a good housewife in welcoming a guest. Mr. Hummel was happy among the country people, and delighted with the flowers in his room; he took the sprightly lad Franz upon his knee, and made him drink almost too much out of his glass. Then he went through the farm with the proprietor and Ilse; he was clever in his judgment, and he and his host recognized in each other sound common sense. At last Ilse asked him frankly how he was pleased with her home.

"Everything is magnificent," said Hummel; "the development of the family, their curly heads, the flowers, the cattle, and the domestic arrangements. Compared to the business of H. Hummel, it is like a gourd to a cucumber. Everything capacious and abundandt, only to my taste there is too much straw."

Ilse was called aside by her father.

"The Prince is preparing to depart. He has expressed a wish to speak to you first. Will you see him?"

"Not to-day. To-day belongs to you and our guest, but to-morrow," said Ilse.

(To be continued.)

SELECTIONS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

XIV.

HOPE.

HOPE on hope falls to the ground,
Yet the heart shall hope again;
Wave doth over wave resound,
Yet the sea they cannot drain.

Waves shall rise and waves recede,
Such the life of the great sea;
Hearts shall hope and hearts shall bleed,
Such is life for you and me.

—*Rückert.*

XV.

THE BROOK.

EVENING shadows falling
Over wood and lea,
All the world is peaceful,
Far as eye can see:

All except the brooklet
Swiftly-flowing, near;
Rushing, tumbling, alway
Are its waters clear.

Evening cannot soothe it—
Murmuring it goes;
Vesper-bell shall never
Bring it sweet repose.

—*Hoffmann von Fallersleben.*

THE RICH MAN'S QUESTION.

BY MARTHA AGNES RAND.

'SHALL I walk the world alone,
Leave other hands to mould
Mankind, and live, a peaceful drone,
Upon my hoarded gold?
Saying: 'Why should I weep
Because of want and shame?
I earned the down on which I sleep—
Let others make a name.'

"No! for a by-gone strength has built
The place of ease that I hold to-day,
And courage must ever war with guilt
To hew rough steps in the stubborn way
Of Progress. Then work! with hand, with brain,
Ere morning's lustre fade to-night—
Not for reward or gain,
But for the soul of Right.

"Shall I say: 'But life is brief;
Why strive 'gainst what must be?
Best let them battle, joy and grief—
I walk—unwittingly
My footsteps doom to death
A thousand throbbing lives,
For life and death must mingle breath,
And thus the great world thrives.'

"No! there are sickness and sin enough
Lying plainly before the sight.
While crime is human, while hearts are tough,
There will be ever a wrong to right.

No! let me weave in the One Great Plan
My feeble thread of toil, and trust,
And helpfulness. I can!
And as I live, I must."

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PROGRESS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS SHOWN IN THE HISTORY OF THE TOLERATION ACTS. *Philip Schaff*, D. D., LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. $1.50.

In December, 1888, Dr. Schaff prepared a paper upon "The Progress of Religious Freedom as Shown in the History of the Toleration Acts," for the first annual meeting of the American Society of Church History, held in the city of Washington, D. C. The present treatise, the distinguished professor informs us, is an "enlargement" of that paper; it forms a companion-piece to the essay "Church and State in the United States"; it is an important chapter of church history, "almost ignored in European works," and never yet the recipient of proper attention; it can moreover "best be written from the American standpoint because America reaps the benefit of all preceding Toleration Acts and has successfully tested, by an experience of a full century, the system of religious freedom on the basis of legal equality and a peaceful separation of church and state."

An Edict, or Act of Toleration, Dr. Schaff defines to be "a grant of civil government which authorizes religious societies dissenting from the State religion to worship according to the dictates of conscience without liability to persecution." Dr. Schaff begins with the Edict of Constantine the Great, portrays the transition from intolerance of Christianity to intolerance by Christianity, carries us through the Middle Ages, and through Modern Europe to the ending of the religious wars and the Treaty of Westphalia; and then proceeds onward through the era of secular politics to the present status in Europe and America. Translations of original documents (the Edict of Constantine and the Edict of Nantes) are appended. Throughout, the narrative is accurate and, in the main, impartial. The work forms, in itself, a finished chapter of history.

One criticism, however, may be advanced. Dr. Schaff, whether in deference to a sentimental popular notion, or prompted by actual good faith, seems still to cling to the political and theological fiction of "absolute rights." Speaking of the difference between toleration and liberty we read: "The one is a concession, the other a right; the one a gift of man, the other a gift of God. * * * Religious liberty is a natural, fundamental, and inalienable right of every man." And yet in the same chapter, Dr. Schaff, appealing to the legal maxim, *Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*, directly admits that the State is the arbiter of this "natural and inalienable right": the State defines its extent, and interprets its meaning, and deals with it as it deals with every "natural right." The criterion, "What the State permits it commands," is applicable here; and to call the negative conduct of a political sovereign "a gift of God" and "a natural right," is a violence to philosophy as well as a wilful non-recognition of fact. The same insidious inaccuracy lurks in utterances like "There is a law above all human laws." The "human law" is the positive command of a political sovereign, over which a sanction impends; the "law above," as regards its authoritative character, is an unwarranted figurative extension of the word in its original sense; it can only denote the invariable succession of observed phenomena, and in the present instance, it denotes the highly uncertain succession of the phenomena of individual conscience—conscience, the accident of environment and, too often, of ecclesiastical fatalism. That dictum, however reverently uttered, places the anarchist on the same footing with the enlightened theologian. *μκρκ.*

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

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[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion, from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

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No. 100. (Vol. III.—22.) CHICAGO, JULY 25, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 Cts.

PROOF OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

BY ALFRED BINET.

The psychologists of France, during the past few years, have been diligently at work studying the phenomena of double consciousness and double personality in hysterical individuals. The same problems have also been the subject of numerous investigations in foreign countries, especially in England and in America; and the phenomena of automatic writing, which are now so often described in the scientific periodicals of both the above-mentioned countries, are evidently due to that doubling of personality which is so manifest in a vast number of hysterical people.

I wish to devote a series of articles to these problems, which are of such high importance to the psychology of normal states as well as to the psychology of nervous diseases. After briefly recurring to the results of my previous studies, published in the *Revue Philosophique*, the *Archives de Physiologie*, and in the *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Sciences*, I shall set forth, with more or less extensiveness, my recent observations.

In approaching so delicate a subject we must in the first instance insist upon a question of method. When we undertake to expound such strange phenomena as those of the doubling of consciousness, at the first blush we naturally provoke astonishment and even doubt. In truth, is it not the idea extraordinary, that in hysterical individuals there should exist two distinct personalities, two egos united in the same person? I have frequently had occasion to speak of the doubling of consciousness to persons who were unfamiliar with science, and even to physicians, and I can verify the fact, that people as a rule regard the phenomena in question as highly doubtful; for they imagine that there do not yet exist precise experiments adequate to establish this duplication of personality. In fact, in order to recognize and admit exceedingly delicate intellectual perturbations of this order, we must be presented with objective, palpable, and actual evidence of their existence. The experimentalist must strive not only to discover the psychological phenomena which explain so many manifestations of mental alienation, but he must also, and with equal care, seek the method of experiment that commands conviction and that renders such phenomena clear and evident to everybody.

The idea of such a method has guided me from my earliest researches, and I have particularly endeavored to discover the simplest possible experiments, such as might be repeated at the bedside of patients without previous preparation by any physician that might be first called in. It is doubtless interesting to know, that at the present day we possess the means of clearly exhibiting the duality of persons in hysterical patients, without being obliged to resort to the hypnotizing of our subjects or to submitting them to any complex and ill-defined influences. The patient, in the normal condition, is almost as if awake, and the process employed to reveal the two personalities which he contains is as direct and as simple as that which consists of counting the beatings of his pulse.

Before presenting the recent researches that I have made, I believe it profitable first to recapitulate the processes of investigation employed. I may add that the results that I have obtained, have been fully confirmed by the researches of other authors, among whom I shall cite my friend, M. Pierre Janet, who has recently published a very interesting work upon this topic.*

In performing our experiment we must have recourse to hysterical patients who in certain parts of the body present a more or less extended region of insensibility (anæsthesia). Nothing is more common than hysterical anæsthesia. At times it will appear in the form of small islets, of small spots irregularly scattered about. An hysterical patient, for example, may exhibit a small anæsthetical spot in the palm of his hand. On forcing a pin into this spot, or pinching the skin, or burning it, the subject will not experience the slightest sensation of contact, or sensation of pain; while, nevertheless, a few centimeters away from it the same excitations will produce a very keen and painful reaction. With other patients the anæsthesia reveals a more regular distribution; it may, for example, comprise an entire limb, as an arm which has become insensible from the extremity of the fingers to the shoulder-joint. With other patients the distribution of insensibility is even still more remarkable; the patient is divided into two halves by a vertical plane extending through the breast to the back, so that one half of his body—head, trunk, arm, and leg—is com-

* *L'automatisme psychologique.* Paris: 1889. F. Alcan.

pletely insensible, while the half corresponding preserves its normal sensibility. Finally, it is not rare to meet with hysterical persons whose insensibility extends to the entire body; but in such cases the insensibility is generally more marked in one half of the body than in the other.

Let us now turn to a patient exhibiting an insensibility extending to an entire limb. Let us first assure ourselves by means of a few painful tests that this insensibility is not simulated. Several means are adaptable for this purpose. Thus, whenever a patient feigns the loss of sensibility, if, without warning him, we suddenly excite his skin from behind a screen and he betrays a movement of surprise, it is a proof that he has felt the sensation. When we allow an electric current of increasing intensity to pass through his limb, there certainly must arrive a moment, in which the pain is so intense that he cannot any longer endure it. But genuine insensibility will come out victorious from all such tests. Let us add that with hysterical individuals the power of pressure upon the dynamometer, in the insensible members, is generally weakened, and that the time of physiological reaction is prolonged. The tests described, accordingly, may be regarded as sufficiently numerous and competent to defeat any attempt at imposition.

I suppose, now, that we are occupied with a patient who exhibits a genuine anæsthesia, controlled by all the clinical tests which the modern physician has at his command. I shall take for granted, further, that this insensibility, limited to a single limb,—the right arm, for example,—affects all the tissues of the limb; that not only the skin, but muscles, tendons, and articular surfaces have lost all trace of sensibility. The patient feels neither puncture nor compression; neither pinching, faradization, nor passive movements impressed upon his limb, when we have taken care to hide from him the sight of his limb by the interposition of a screen.

Under the above-mentioned conditions the experimentalist seizes a finger of the insensible hand, and impresses upon the finger in question alternate movements of flexion and of extension; the patient, be it understood, not being able to see his own hand, does not know what is being done to him; he does not know whether they are bending or stretching one of his fingers. Nevertheless, it frequently happens that the finger thus manipulated spontaneously continues the movement which the experimentalist has impressed upon it; we may observe that it bends and straightens out again five or six times. The very same thing would happen if we had caused the wrist or elbow to perform passive movements.

Now, what does this experiment prove, which admittedly is very simple and easy of repetition? Evidently, in order that the finger should spontaneously repeat the movement that has once been impressed upon it, it is necessary that the movement in question should have been perceived. The patient nevertheless declares that he has not felt, or experienced, anything in his finger. We must, accordingly, suppose that an unconscious perception of the movement has been produced; there doubtless has been a perception; the perception has engendered a similar movement—this too seems evident; but neither the sensation nor its motory effect have entered within the circle of the subject's consciousness. This little psycho-motory performance has been accomplished without his knowledge, and so to speak, quite outside of him.

Let us complicate our experiment a little, in order the better to understand it. The eyes of the subject are throughout kept concealed behind a screen. We now place some familiar object into the insensible hand; for instance, we thrust a pen-holder or a pencil between the thumb and the index-finger. As soon as the contact takes place the two fingers draw together, as if to seize the pen; the other fingers bend half-way, the wrist leans sideways, and the hand assumes the attitude necessary to write. In the same manner by introducing the thumb and index-finger within the rings of a pair of scissors we cause the subject to perform the movements of one who wishes to cut. These experiments, of course, may be varied indefinitely; further instances, however, would be superfluous; the two given amply suffice for the purposes of our analysis.

Here also the entire transaction takes place outside the consciousness of the subject; the pen-holder was seized by the anæsthetic hand, without the subject's perceiving, in a conscious manner, any contact, and without his knowing that he held a pen-holder in his hand. Now, this very simple act, performed by the hand, is an act of adaptation; it implies, not only that the object has been felt, but also that this object has been recognized as a pen-holder, for if the object had been a different one a different act of adaptation would have taken place. In this manner, the sensation must be said to have provoked an unconscious perception, an unconscious reasoning, an unconscious volition. In short, the event happened just as if the pen-holder had been thrust into the sensible hand; as if the subject had felt the object, had recognized it and decided to write; with the sole difference, however, that apparently the whole process was without consciousness.

The theories of Huxley and of several English authors concerning the part played by consciousness in psychological phenomena seem here to find direct application; yet, as a matter of fact, this is only

apparently so, as we presently shall see. According to Huxley consciousness is an epi-phenomenon, a superfluous phenomenon, superadded to the physiological process, but which reacts no more upon that process than the shadow of the individual upon the individual itself; you may suppress consciousness, and yet all physiological phenomena will continue to be produced automatically just as before; objects will continue to be perceived; unconscious reasonings will develop, followed by acts of adaptation.

Let us add a new complication to our last experiment, and we shall find as a result, that Huxley's hypothesis is manifestly too simple to explain it. Up to this point we have limited ourselves to the production of movements in an insensible region; these movements, however, were very elementary, and would not betray a well-developed thought. We may essay to provoke certain acts of a more intellectual character and of decidedly higher organization. The following is an example selected, as the preceding ones, from among many others.

We put a pen into the anæsthetic hand, and we make it write a word; left to itself the hand preserves its attitude, and at the expiration of a short space of time repeats the word, often five or ten times. Having arrived at this fact, we again seize the anæsthetic hand, and cause it to write some familiar word, for example, the patient's own name; but in so doing, we intentionally commit an error in spelling. In its turn the anæsthetic hand repeats the word, but oddly enough, the hand betrays a momentary hesitation when it reaches the letter at which the error in orthography was committed; if a superfluous letter happens to have been added, sometimes the hand will hesitatingly re-write the name along with the supplementary letter; again it will retrace only a part of the letter in question; and again, finally, entirely suppress it.

Plainly, when the experiment successfully reaches this degree of complication, we cannot explain it by merely invoking unconscious phenomena. The correction of an orthographic error by the anæsthetic hand indicates the presence of a guiding thought; and it is not perfectly clear, why the thought that directs the movements of the writing should be unconscious, while that which controls the movements of the word should alone be regarded as conscious. It would seem more logical to admit, that in these patients there exist two distinct consciousnesses. The first of these consciousnesses gathers up the sensations proceeding from the sensible members; the second is more especially in connection with the insensible regions.

In this manner we are able to verify that doubling of consciousness which in recent years has become the object of so many investigations. There may certainly have been given more striking examples of the phenomena in question; and there have been published observations in which the two consciousnesses are to be seen each performing a different task, and reciprocally ignoring each other. But all these curious observations are generally presented under conditions so very complex that it is difficult to combine them for the purposes of a correct verification. The methods of investigation, relative to hysterical anæsthesia, that we have just set forth, at least possess the merit of furnishing a strict proof of double consciousness.

This, however, does not imply that the methods employed yield results with all patients indiscriminately. Many hysterical individuals do not react at all when the experiments mentioned are being performed upon them. But we must mistrust all purely negative experiments, which simply prove that people did not know how to set about the business in hand. I have advanced the hypothesis, that when we are unable to provoke the repetition of the movements, or acts of adaptation, in anæsthetic regions, our failure is due to a defect in the organization of the second consciousness; the excitation brought to bear upon the insensible region is perfectly perceived, but it does not directly lead to a determined movement; there are no actual associations, ready to play between sensations and movements. Repetition of the experiments, however, may produce these necessary co-ordinations.

At this point, accordingly, we are in possession of precise observations; we know that in hysterical individuals there exist phenomena of double consciousness, and using this as a starting-point, it now remains for us, in the following papers, to develop our knowledge of this phenomenon through additional experiments.

YOUTH AND OLD AGE.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

II.

THE decrepitude of old age has long been a favorite theme of Pessimism, but here, too, it remains true that "the worst evils are abnormal, and the sorest woes a consequence of man's interference with the harmony of creation." In a state of Nature the decline of old age is swift, but brief. Up to within a few weeks of their last day the creatures of the wilderness, on approaching the normal term of their existence, enjoy a degree of vigor abundantly sufficient to make life, on the whole, a blessing rather than a curse. So far from being abandoned to the evils of exhausted vitality, the patriarchs of gregarious mammals remain the acknowledged leaders of their herd; the time-steeled vigor and experience of old stags and bulls generally more than compensate a decline of agility.

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXIV.

Primitive nations, too, consider death simply the end of life: an end generally sufficiently long postponed to enable individuals to reap the fruits of their labors. The history of the patriarchs abounds with the records of men who preserved their mental and physical vigor to an extreme old age; but such records are not confined to the period of semi-mythical traditions. Sophocles and Euripides wrote their master-pieces at an age which enabled them to review the experience of three different generations. Xenophon had passed his eightieth year when he left his hunting-lodge at Scillus in Elis and settled in Corinth to devote the remaining years of his life to literary pursuits. At an age of ninety-two Juvenal could still hold his own against his literary rivals, and the last works of Plutarch give no evidence of mental decline. The traveler Bougainville wrote his memoirs in his eighty-fifth year and three years later was still able to read without the aid of spectacles, which he thought "should be left to centennarians and the victims of eye-diseases." Baron Frederic de Waldeck disdained the offer of a carriage on his archæological exploring trips in the neighborhood of Paris where he began to collect antiquities and copy old inscriptions after passing his ninety-seventh year. The Persian poet Saadi had passed the maximum of the Hebrew psalmist, when he wrote his *Gulistan*, or Garden of Roses, and in his 103d (according to other biographers even his 107th) year revisited his native town of Shiraz to prevent the forfeiture of a small inheritage. Fleury, Ximenes, and Richelieu repeatedly undeceived their political opponents who founded their intrigues on the supposed dotage of the veteran statesman, though Sultan Mohammed Baber went perhaps too far, in refusing to employ any counsellors who had not tested their theories by the experience of at least sixty years.

It has often been argued that the respect shown to old age (like the deference to the weakness of the female sex) is exclusively a product of an advanced stage of civilization; but an altruism of that sort manifests itself often in the customs of savage nations, and even in certain species of animals. The naturalist Brehm mentions the "patriarchal authority" which the aged males of the Hamadryas baboon exercise over the younger members of their tribe, who continue their homage even after the grizzly Nestor of their community has been crippled by a shot or by an encounter with the prowling giant-cats of the Abyssinian mountains. Rats have been known to assist their aged relatives at the risk of their own lives, and storks often delay their autnmnal migrations to await the recovery of a wounded old leader, and resort to a more desperate expedient only if that recovery becomes evidently hopeless. In that case the tribe assembles on a secluded meadow of the North-Holland marshes, and after an animated debate, the interest of public welfare prevails over all other considerations and the hopeless invalid is killed on the spot. "A friend of mine," says Dr. Charles Letourneau, "brought up a couple of canary birds, who had come direct from the Canary islands, and put them both together into a garret of his country-house at Nanterre. This couple, well fed, and almost free in their actions, increased and multiplied. Fifteen or sixteen years afterwards this garret was inhabited by a large swarm of canaries, and among them was some mixture of the green canary, for strangers had been introduced into the family. The mother bird, then seventeen or eighteen years old, was so enfeebled by her great age that she could hardly flutter. She could barely drag herself up to join in the common meal. Two of her descendants perceived this and came to her assistance. They took care of her until her death, as much as nearly two years afterwards. They fed her from their own beaks, as they would a little one; and what is more singular, the old grandmother welcomed them by beating her wings, as the young ones do. This could not be strictly called an instance of filial love, for the two charitable birds were only distant relatives of their female ancestor."

It is a curious fact that the veneration of old age has been carried to the greatest length by *conservative nations*, who by a natural association of ideas, transfer their deference to ancient customs to the venerable survivors of former generations. The progressiveness of Anglo America has perhaps never been equalled in any country or at any period of the world's history, and foreign travelers in the United States have more than once expressed their surprise at the flippant irreverence of the rising generation in their conduct towards their parents and old persons in general. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the *pietas* or filial reverence of the ancient Roman republicans, had been a universal character-trait of antiquity. The Athenians, the most progressive nation of the Mediterranean coast-lands were notoriously deficient in that virtue of their conservative neighbors, as evinced by numerous anecdotes, but perhaps still more strikingly by a proverb which the most disrespectful representative of young America might hesitate to translate in its literal sense:

Ἔργα νέων, βουλαὶ δὲ μέσων, πορδαὶ δὲ γερόντων.

The Spartans, with their strict adherence to the ordinances of an ancient lawgiver, would probably have lynched the author of that proverb, and during a visit to an Athenian playhouse their ambassadors rose to offer their seats to an old man whose entrance had been calmly ignored by the young men of his own city.

The most conservative nation of the world, the Chinese, inculcate filial respect as the highest of all

virtues. "The emperor's authority," says Captain Medhurst, "is founded on an ancestral and patriarchal respect almost boundless in its ethical influence. Veneration for old age is a law of the state. Infirm old men, too poor to hire litters, are often seen in the streets of Pekin, seated in little hand-carriages, dragged about by a troop of eager children, who seem to compete for the honor of anticipating the old man's desires. As they pass, the young people about receive them respectfully, and leave off for the moment their play or their work. The government encourages these feelings by giving yellow dresses to very old men. This is the highest mark of distinction a private individual can receive, for yellow is the color reserved for the members of the imperial family."

Religion, with nine tenths of the Chinese population, has become a system of ancestor-worship. The poorest field-laborer keeps in his cottage a set of idols (often mere wooden blocks with a symbolic inscription) representing the *manes* of his forefathers, to whom he pays his periodic devotions, and renders his thanks whenever an unexpected turn of good luck suggests the intercession of his tutelary spirits. "After the death of the parents," says Father Huc, "their children continue to celebrate each decade of their existence as though they were still alive. To forsake one's own father is a crime that they rarely commit. Asylums for the aged, benevolent societies for affording them assistance, are very numerous, and in some cities date from a very early period."

An almost inconceivable contrast with such institutions form the customs of certain barbarous races; but the apparent cruelty of their conduct towards the old and infirm is often dictated by exigencies of adverse circumstances, as in Kamtchatka, where the frequent migrations of the half savage herdsmen entail hardships which persons of an advanced age could hardly hope to survive. "The new Caledonians," says the author of 'Ethnographical Studies,' "who regard the head of their family as a sacred object, carry their aged parents to a secluded spot and leave them there to die, to save themselves the distress of witnessing their decline under a hopeless disease. They sometimes shorten that decline by burying them alive and the victims take the whole thing as a matter of course. Nay, the old people will often ask for death, and will calmly walk towards the ditch into which they are felled by a blow on the head. The same custom is generally practiced in one of the Fiji islands, where it has been endorsed by the religion of the natives, for religious ideas are most frequently first prompted by the requirements of a people or race. The Fijians believe that a man goes into a future life exactly in the same condition as that in which he has left the present. There was therefore a very strong argument to prevent him from falling into decline. Hence arose the duty of the children to warn their parents in time, and to kill them was considered their last act of earthly gratitude. A mortuary feast was held to which friends and relations were invited; then the victims walked quietly towards their ditch, and after a tender farewell, the sons would, with their own hands, strangle their parents. The Esquimaux either buried their old relatives after they had strangled them, or they shut them up in an *iglou* of ice."

The historian Strabo staggered the belief of his countrymen by mentioning the custom of an Asiatic tribe (the Massagetæ) who "kept dogs for the special purpose of devouring the aged and sick, whence they were called the dog buriers;" but Russian travelers report an exactly similar custom from western Kamtchatka where old people are killed and, *for their own good*, thrown to the dogs of the tent-village, "as the surest way of being helped to a condition of happiness in the next world, the dogs themselves being so honest and good!"

We read of Northland warriors rushing into certain death to earn the rewards of a heaven reserved for the victims of war; but in that and all similar cases, it is more than probable that the act of self-sacrifice was facilitated by an instinctive pessimism: the life-weariness, by which Nature, in the evening-hour of existence, contrives to reconcile her children to the approach of the endless night.

THE SITAHARANAM; OR, THE RAPE OF SITA.

AN EPISODE FROM THE GREAT SANSKRIT EPIC "RAMAYANA."

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY PROF. ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

VIII.

(*Concluded.*)

But at these words of Sita the majestic Ravana, who also bore the name of Dasagriva, merely rubbed his hands together, and began to swell into an enormous body.

The disguised pilgrim rose to a giant stature, and changed himself into the congenital form of Ravana, the dreaded lord of the rovers of the night, in an instant having quitted the modest garb of the mendicant Bikshu, and recovered his own repulsive form, black like death.

And there he stood, with an immense forehead, blood-shot eyes, a broad chest, huge arms, teeth like a lion, shoulders like a bull, of a multifarious body, lurid aspect, all over his black body bristling with hair, in blood-red garments, with ear-rings, bracelets, and neck-lace of beaten gold.

The rover of the night thereupon addressed the richly dressed Sita, who was half-dead with terror at this frightful transformation:

"If in this native form of mine you do not desire

me for your husband, I shall take possession of you by force; for, although you may boast the power of that imbecile, Rama, you can hardly, O you foolish woman, entertain a correct notion of my own matchless strength.

"With both arms I can lift the earth, myself standing in mid-air; I can drink up the ocean, and in battle I can vanquish death itself.

"I can hide the luminous orb of the sun, and with my sharp arrows cleave the earth asunder. Behold, O foolish woman, how suddenly I have changed my form, and how like a lord I can grant any wish!"

The daughter of Videha indeed beheld before her Ravana, and stared into the glaring eyes of the angry Raksha-fiend.

He was standing before her with his blood-shot eyes and horrible ten faces, armed with bow and arrows, like a lurid cloud, black and ungainly in his blood-red garments and golden ornaments; and still fixing his glance on that pearl of women—the glorious daughter of Mithila—Ravana could not refrain from further addressing Sita:

"O daughter of Videha, how can you love that Rama, dressed in a penitent's garb, made of the bark of trees,—only a wasted, weather-beaten, stupid fool? If you wish for a husband renowned in the three worlds, then love me, who in your presence so long have been extolling your virtues. You shall suffer no harm, no unkindness at my hand. Only abandon your love for a mortal man, and grant it to me. Do not fear me, my dear maiden, simply because I am a Raksha. It is myself who certainly shall be in your own power!

"For a whole year I shall not address you a single, unkind word, until you have dismissed all thought of Rama—deprived of his kingdom, baffled in his pursuits, and, moreover, only a mortal.

"For what virtues, indeed, O you foolish girl, who think yourself so wise, can you persist in loving a man like Rama, who for a woman's word leaves his kingdoms and his own kindred, to go to live like a fool in this lonely forest, haunted by beasts of prey?"

And after addressing these words to the daughter of Mithila, the evil-minded demon proceeded to lay violent hands on Sita, as the son of the moon, Budha, once did with Rohini, the daughter of Daksha.*

Then bitterly crying Sita offered all the resistance she could and wrathfully replied:

"Oh, you shall be vanquished by the glorious strength of Rama; with all your followers you shall perish, O you vile, wicked Raksha!"

At such words of the daughter of Videha the dark features of the fiend lit up; his eyes darted fire, and, with a fearfully threatening brow, his left hand Ravana laid round the neck of the Lotus-eyed Sita, and wound his right arm round her body.

Thus caught by the strong Raksha, Sita screamed loudly: "O husband, O hero Lakshmana, you do not protect me!"

Then all the genii of the forest fled off in terror at the sight of the mountain-high, sharp toothed Raksha.

In his frantic eagerness he shot high into the air, soaring aloft with the struggling wife of Rama, as the Ahi-serpent once did with the wife of Indra; having seized her in his arms, like a Garuda-bird darting through the air, he carried her along with him, as the world-serpent Ahi had done with the wife of Indra.

The unearthly, golden phantom-chariot, with its span of wild braying asses was seen close by, and the animals by their horrible loud braying frightened Sita beyond measure; and lifting her into his arms, he made the daughter of Videha mount his chariot.

The beautiful woman when thus caught by the fiend piteously cried: "O husband, husband!" she shouted in her distress, invoking her consort, who was far away in the forest.

And while carried along through the air by the lord of all Rakshas, she helplessly continued shouting like a raving fury, and as one entirely out of her mind:

"O strong-armed Lakshmana, you who are devoted to your elder brother,—do you not know, that I am being carried away by the evil-minded Raksha?

"Have you not, O hero, been trained by Rama? O faithful, famous, valiant, virtuous Lakshmana, do you not see how I, defenseless creature, am being carried off by Ravana? Ah, you have been trained by wicked Rakshas, methinks, since you do not avenge an evil deed like this and punish Ravana?

"The fruits of a godless deed are manifest, and its fruit to Ravana shall certainly be death.

"Alas, how Kaikei and her friends will now rejoice, that I, a lawful wife, should thus be carried far away! Truly, how to-day the vile Kaikei will be pleased—she who drove Rama with his wife into the lonely wilderness!

"Thus, I greet thee for the last time, O Janasthana, and bid you farewell, ye trees and flowers; be quick to tell Rama, that Ravana carries away Sita!

"I salute thee, proud, lofty mountain Prasravana; you also quickly tell Rama, how Ravana carries away Sita!

"I greet thee, O fragrant, flowery woodland—at once announce to Rama, that Ravana carries away Sita!

"And you also, high-sounding river Godavari, with your flocks of swans and wild geese—without delay tell to Rama, that Ravana has carried away Sita!

"I revere you all good genii, dwelling in this forest, rich in all kinds of plants; you also proclaim that I have been violently wrested from my husband!

*Budha was the regent of Mercur, and Rohini, the daughter of Daksha, was also one of the so-called Nakshatra, or Lunar mansions.

"I invoke the aid of every living being, haunting this forest; all birds and strong beasts of prey, I invoke your aid!

"I wish you to announce to Rama, that in his absence, and in the absence of the wise hero Lakshmana, I have violently been dragged away by Ravana.

"Yet, tell him also, that although helpless and struggling, the wife, dearer to him than life, has been carried away, she well knows that he, my generous hero, will not fail to rescue Sita,—were it even from the infernal regions of Yama,—the God of Death him self!"

THE MODERN FRANKENSTEIN.*

BY GEORGE M. GOULD, M. D.

SOME time ago I was present at a lecture wherein the speaker, in alluding to a certain skull, incidentally spoke of it as belonging to "the criminal type of crania." A brain that had been hardened either by world-wear, by chemical action, or by the lecturer's logic, was also alluded to as belonging to "the crime class." There was in all this a sort of "taken-for-granted" air of assurance that aroused in me a multitude of questionings and doubts. The gentleman was an adept, I, a novice, and I felt I ought also to adopt the "already settled," "it-goes-without-saying," air with which he calmly put aside what I had supposed the inexorable laws of nature and of sociological evolution. Have we indeed "changed all that," I said to myself,—and I went home seriously to ask myself when a man becomes an embezzler or "boodler," kills his mistress, guzzles too much whisky, gets cranky or clean daft, or kicks his wife, if it is all because his "atypical" skull or brain determined his atypical conduct. It is, indeed, true that we must always hold ourselves ready to reconsider the truth of such old bits of bigotry and dogmatism as that two and two make four, or that it is advisable for most of us to take food in order to live very long. In this modest and submissive mood I asked for instruction I read without prejudice whatever I could find on the question by alienists, neurologists, cerebrologists, craniologists and penologists, and I regret to say that I have found in my reading that the medical profession is pretty generally leaning toward the view that not only insanity but also crime is the result of disease. All through this literature I have found the terms, "Homicidal Mania," "Moral Insanity," "Inheritance of Criminality," "Insane Criminals," "Moral Anæsthesia," "Negro, Simian, and Fœtal Peculiarities," etc., etc.

One writer says that "inebriates are grown and manufactured, as much so as cotton and wool, and the machines to work them into fabrics"; another says, "the true thief is born, not made." "The passion for gambling may be acquired by the fœtus *in utero*," is another dictum of a famous writer. "The brains of criminals exhibit a deviation from the normal type, and criminals are to be viewed as an anthropological variety of their species," says Benedikt, the Moses of this "peculiar people." The popular plebifications of so-called "Science" concerning "A Family of Criminals," "The Famous Jukes Case," and the everlasting reappearance of the six-fingered and six-toed gentry in the devil's popular bible, the Sunday Newspaper,—such things as these make us wish that sterility had also been an inherited quality of the mothers of certain newspaper "scientists" and writers. To be brief, let us crowd the matter into a sentence and say, that the tendency of this school is to wipe out the distinctions between morals and medicine, obliterate the line between sanity and insanity, and exonerate every criminal from responsibility on the assumed ground of a special neurosis or a defective brain. This is the *tendency*, more or less plainly expressed or implied, but, at least, necessitated by the premisses and by a frank logic.

But is it either a good tendency or a true conclusion? Is it either good science or good sense? Is it good morals? I believe it is neither, and these are some of my reasons for so disbelieving:

1. It is asserted that criminals and the insane have "defective, retarded, and aberrant brain development," and that therefore their crimes and follies are anatomically or pathologically necessitated. The common conclusion of the studies of Benedikt *, Badik†, Ten Kate and Pavlosky‡, Corre and Rousel§, Marro and Lombroso ‖, Lombroso¶, Varaglia**, Mills††, Tenchini ‡‡, etc., is that the brains and skulls of these classes are atypical or unsymmetrical. This statement is both true and untrue. I mean that as an abstract statement it is probably true and may be willingly admitted. But I wish first to illustrate the spirit of many of these inquiries by a quotation from Benedikt, who frankly says of his observations that "they were collected as the result of an *a priori* conviction that the criminal is an overloaded individual having the same relation to crime as his next of blood-kin the epileptic, and his cousin the idiot, have to their encephalopathic condition." Others have been less blunt in avowing their prejudice but it seems to have governed the studies of most. Moreover, if you look for atypism you shall certainly find it: Why? Because it is to be found in criminals and the insane just as well as in other good folk. It may reasonably be doubted if there is a perfectly symmetrical skull or perfectly typical brain in the world. What do we mean by typical? Correspondence to an ideal perfection and symmetry. But such actualities nowhere exist. No man ever saw a symmetrical leaf or tree, a symmetrical skull or brain. And yet despite their determination to find it, if possible, Badik and others are forced to confess that but a part of their criminal skulls and brains were "aberrant," "unsymmetrical," "negroid," or "simian." It may be said that the contention of the more moderate is that in the classes considered there is greater atypism than in the average member of the community. But that is not proved. The conclusion of the investigations so far proves only that a certain number of criminal brains and skulls are atypical. Very well! But what about those that, so far as discoverable, are normal? And what about those sane folks with atypical skulls? The Greek skeptic shown the offerings of rescued shipwrecked mariners who had in the hour of peril devoted these presents to the god, calmly asked, where also were the offerings of those *not* saved. No large, careful, and scientific measuring of the sane and moral has been made and compared with that of the insane and criminal. Clevenger doubts if any differences could be found in such a comparative examination. Science means prevision, but if the brains and crania of the ten last dead from the State Prison, the Insane Asylum, and yesterday's railroad disaster were gathered, there is no expert or set of cerebrologists in the world could either put the thirty brains back in their proper cases or designate with any certainty to what class of the three any one belonged. No man from the criminal history of the life alone can tell you in advance a single peculiarity of the brain of

* Read before the Medical Jurisprudence Society of Philadelphia, May 14, 1889.

* The Brains of Criminals.

† Summary in Phila. *Med. Times*, Vol. XV, 1884, p. 50.

‡ *Sur quelques Crânes, etc., Rev. d'Anthrop.*, Paris, 1881.

§ *Etude d'un Serie de têtes, etc., Rev. d'Anthrop.*, Paris, 1883.

‖ *Reflessi tendinei, etc., Arch di Psichiat*, Tornio, 1883.

¶ *La pazzia Morale, etc., Arch. di Psichiat*, Tornio, 1882. *Fosso occipitali, etc., Arch. di Psichiat*, Tornio, 1883. *Sul mancinismo motorio, etc., Gior. d. r. accad. di Med. di Tornio*, 1884.

** *Note Anatom., etc., Arch. di Psichiat*, Tornio, 1885.

†† On arrested and aberrant Devel., etc., Jour. Nerv. & Ment. Dis., September 1886.

‡‡ *Note sur la crête, etc., Actes Cong. Internat. d'anthrop. Crim.* Rome, 1886.

the man hung to-day. The cranium and brain of Pigott are said to have been of exceptional symmetry and perfection, and yet he invented Pigottry, having first practiced it all his life. The skull of an excellent physician of this city, has, on account of its astonishing asymmetry, been noticed and marvelled at across the amphitheatre. It is needless to say he belongs, "*sans phrase*," to the non-anatomical school of cerebrologists.

Thus not only is the so-called fact not proved, and so far utterly without significance, but the interpretation of the fact is a *non sequitur*. It does not follow, nor is it proved, that defective, aberrant, atypical, or simian brains and skulls, imply immorality or insanity. Functional defect there may be, but neither scalpel nor microscope has proved any other to exist. If he does not know from what animal it came, no expert could tell whether a sheep's brain or that of a tiger were the more crime-producing one. *Post hoc* is not *propter hoc*, as philosophers have to be warned a hundred times a day. How tired we get hallooing at these *propter hoc* hunters to call them from the way their game has *not* taken. Away they go again after their *post hoc*, whilst all the time their Reynard, their *propter hoc*, sits calmly on the fence watching and chuckling at them "Deficient gyri-development and asymmetry" may necessitate the poor owner to be a thief or a lunatic, but I think the shape of the pisiform bone should also be considered. Artemus Ward said he knew a man in Oregon who hadn't a tooth in his head, not a single tooth, and yet this same man could beat the base-drum better than any other man he ever heard.

I cannot forbear to empale another and related pleasantry of these logicians: this is the unjustifiable humanity-conceit that like a hideous Jack-in-the-box springs at you in the sneer of the words "simian," "negroid," "reversion to the animal type," etc., when speaking of these atypical brains. I ask in all sincerity and seriousness, if we are a jot more moral than our remote simian forefathers? Nay, are we not even less so? Take a thousand members of the New York and Chicago Stock Exchange, and a thousand monkeys in a cage or in their native woods,—which set of gentlemen will break the eleven commandments the greater number of times *Anno Domini*, 1889? As to the shameless "negroid," who was the greater sinner, the white slave-holder or his victim? Or read the astounding and horrible record revealed in the official statement of the pardons granted convicts by the Governor of South Carolina, also in the year of our Lord, 1888.* Such facts as this last, and such theories as we are discussing, almost make one say, as the joker did of life, it is one-half *if*, and three-fourths *lie*.

2. In the second place, this theory is contradicted by the law of biologic evolution. Throughout the countless ages of organic development, life has preceded function, and function has preceded morphology.†

Habitual action creates peculiarity of structure; desire begets its own instruments. Character is inherited before its organs, if it have any, appear. Nay, more; character, in truth, creates its organs. How in the name of common sense could it be otherwise?

Hunger existed before stomachs, eating produced teeth, fighting begot horns, the snake's enemy existed before his fangs and poison-sacs. In precisely the same way, if crime and crankiness have an anatomical basis, it is because rascality and folly preceded any structural instrumentalities or peculiarities. If we are seeking the *origin* of crime, we cannot, in the name of reason, expect to find it by the cart-before-horse logic of supposing an organ can exist prior to the desire and function of which it is the instrument.

3. A sound metaphysic, psychology, and cerebrology, each, also drives a nail in the coffin. The morality or sanity of a man is his action and nature as a unit; these qualities relate only to conduct as a whole. There can be no conceivable localization of function of morality or reason. These things consist in the use the mind puts all its centres to; they refer to the *animus* of the soul itself that inhabits and uses all organs as its instruments. Interference with the action of a part or the whole of the brain, nay, even non-development of the brain as a whole, cannot change the true quality of the action of the mind; it can only lessen its effectiveness. The hand of a liar and the hand of an honest man do not differ. It is the liar and the honest man that are different. If the hand do not differ neither can the brain centres that mediate between desire and function. I know very well to speak before modern scientific men of "the soul" and as if there were a somewhat behind cerebral ganglia using them like a master does tools, is quite certain to raise many smiles, and secure one the pitying contempt due to the stupid worshiper of some semi-barbaric image when the newer and more elegant faith is the vogue. The fashionables enjoy the sweetness of their supposed superior wisdom; the poor dolt the sweetness of his fetich and his faith. But, in crying, "Great is Diana," the fashionable worshipers of Materialism should remember that the walls of logic and of fact that shelter the old spiritualistic boobies and their altars are quite as firm as ever. *Omne vivum ex ovo* is the legend of the doorway, and Archebiosis is the myth. Many of the supposed arch priests of materialism are in fact traitors in this respect,—Spencer and Huxley,* for example.

4 But the happiest of the funeral-attendants will be ethics. Determinism is the ally of Materialism. The step from this belief in the anatomical nature of crime and loss of self-control, to absolute fatalism, is a small one indeed. If we lie because a gyrus gets kinked or is wanting, rob the till because of our simian kind of brain, and choke the girl to death that jilts us because of our cerebral asymmetry, then it follows that every sane act and thought and emotion is pre-determined by our neurological anatomy. The delight in which certain logic-choppers revel in breaking down the barriers of self-dependence and the belief in individual freedom is quite wonderful. It is hardly explainable except upon the somewhat insulting assumption that, themselves feeling and desiring no moral freedom, they prefer the tyranny of structure as an excuse for not following the higher law. Benedikt has a funny story that he, of course, tells in all seriousness. He says he asked an "intelligent counterfeiter" if circumstances permitting, he would again repeat his crime. For a reply the intelligent counterfeiter said: "When I die, I will you my skull and brain." The old Dryasdust sagely observes that this answer was more correct than any given by philosopher or criminalist as to the psychology of crime. I could not help thinking I would like to have seen the glittering leer of the counterfeiter, evidently a fine joker, as "flattering his humor to the top of his bent," his victim turned away. The curb-stone logic of the matter is that if asymmetry produces crankiness and crime, then, in the future, all that embryonic cranks and criminals will have to do to excuse their depraved desires is to consult a professor of this new phrenology, and, the diagnosis of "atypism" once settled, they will hasten home to indulge their "inherited neurosis" and "moral anæsthesia" by crack-walking, wife-beating, intelligent counterfeiting, or the innocent pleasures of "homicidal mania."

* See *The Nation*, April 4, 1889.

† *Hydra viridis*, for example, has no eyes and is yet sensitive to light; no brain or nerves and yet lies in wait for prey, pursues and fights, or flees from danger. Turned inside out it lives and digests as well as before. It holds live worms down with an arm when they try to get out of its stomach. Any part reproduces all. Cut off the bottom of its stomach and it goes on eating the same as ever, the food of course, falling out of the bottom—in this last respect not unlike certain fact-gatherers without a logical stomach-bottom to digest their large eating.

*(See Spencer's Biology, Vol. I, pp. 222, 253, etc.) Spencer's position is well known. Here is a gem from Huxley: "Cells are no more the producers of vital phenomena than the shells scattered in orderly lines along the sea-beach are the instruments by which the force of the moon's gravity acts upon the ocean. Like these, the cells mark only where the vital tides have been and how they have acted."

If Guiteau had known his brain was "congenitally asymmetrical," the disappointed office-seeker would probably have tried his marksmanship on an earlier president. It may be that fatalism is true, but, if so, this universe is a stupendous and horrifying failure and farce, and the theory that premises fatalism had better pause before thus giving the lie to both God and man.

Are we not indeed fully conscious, we who are honest and true, that within us burns a light no trick of matter can quench, a power to resist the weaknesses and the tyrannies of flesh and desire, and that in all our lives, there is, or may be, a moral force and an intellectual prevision to which heredity is the obedient slave?

5. Moreover, just as inevitably as this theory leads to fatalism and hence to immorality, it also leads to economic injustice. All things good or bad are measurable by the tally-stick of financial justice. I protest that the general tendency of this hypothesis, and of its corollaries, is to create lunatics and criminals, and to shield criminality with the cloak of insanity. As a result, the expense of maintaining the defective and criminal classes, and of keeping up both the sham and the reality of legal justice, is increasing faster than the population. This expense has to be borne by the producer; who is he? The producer, whom present methods do in reality punish, is he that quenches in himself the beginnings of folly and unwisdom; is he that throttles in their inception the promptings of over-indulgence and disregard for others rights; he that works for himself rather than scheme and cheat others out of their earnings. In other words the popular practice and theory punishes a man for preserving his sanity and honor by burdening him with the support of the thriftless and the depraved.

6. Lastly this wearisome absurdity is to be condemned because it is contrary to God's law—pardon me, I mean, the law of natural selection—and unavoidably creates the evil it deplores. It is no more nor less than a reward held out to all neurasthenics, and hysterics, all lazy-bones and cheats, to indulge their criminal leanings and inordinate appetites. Since time began wise and kind old mother nature has found that, loving the many as she does rather than the few, the only true love of all is the law, *Vauriens and vicious to the wall?* Civilization has suddenly grown wiser than the divine or cosmic source whence it sprang and thinks it has found a better way. But is not a man to be written down as an ass that scorns his father and mother? The modern conceit that we know better than God and nature, seems but simply more egregiously and more impiously long-eared.

It is the glory of fine minds and hearts to bear as their secret motto, *socii Dei sumus;* but the modern paraphrase is, *socii diaboli sumus.* By our brutal pity and by our cruel sympathy we are piling up the burden of the future, in our coddling of debility and in our nursing of deceit, both of which—easy is the descent to hell—hasten to full-fledge into slum, asylum, and prison problems. Pity without justice is itself crime. There is no greater sinner against society than the indiscriminate alms-giver. By encouraging self-delusion, and discouraging self-control, this theory of anatomically necessitated crime operates to deteriorate the average virility of the race and so immensely increases suffering. There is always a vast horde of incarnate canine appetites in human society restlessly awaiting the slipping of the leash of law and labor to rush baying after the temptations of indulgence, vice, and crime. That society and that science are the better assured of perpetuity that tighten rather than cut both collar and leash.

It will have been noticed, and you doubtless have marveled, that I face and treat this problem in a novel way; it may be thought that I have allowed feeling rather than reason to dictate, and that my tirade were better addressed to the vulgar many rather than to the scientific few. But it has been with "malice aforethought" that I have thus written, believing as I do that the present so-called "scientific" attitude of the profession as to this matter is in truth inexplainable otherwise; I mean to say that this tendency to erase the words responsibility from the dictionary of law and sociology is itself the unreasoning, unscientific voice of our age and generation. Unconsciously but none the less truly, it is flattery of the *Zeitgeist*, and flattery of that capricious and greedy goddess is for clear-thinking and straight-seeing people the one unpardonable sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost. The *Zeitgeist* and the *Heilige Geist* are two quite different things. The *Zeitgeist* is never in the right. *Vox populi* is never *vox Dei.**

We have, for example, to close the book from sheer shuddering, when we read of the malignity and *diablerie* with which criminals and lunatics were treated in the past. It seems impossible that so-called criminals were slowly roasted for hours or days while the spectacle was made the gayest of all festal occasions by laughing maidens and flirting cavaliers. The smell of burning flesh and the writhings and cries of the agonized victims were sweet to these strange fiends. We can hardly believe that idiots and madmen were chained in filth for years, kept immersed in ice-water for days, whirled in rotating machines till their tormenters were tired, etc., etc. We flatter ourselves, however, when we think we are wiser. Our present lachrymose barbarism is in the first place quite as cruel to some one and is explainable only as the contrary swing of the pendulum to the opposite extreme.

One extreme always begets its opposite in the fickle passions of popular feeling. Physicians should at least know something about the law of action and reaction. It is quite as true law in history as in pathology. We have only substituted an indirect and weak maleficence for a direct and brutal malevolence. Never for a moment have we thought that our feelings should have had no voice in the matter, but that justice, utility, and prophylaxis should have been the rules. This question cannot be studied apart from its relations and historical connections. It is a sociological question, and all such questions and theories must be judged by their results, logical, or actual. A thing may be true in itself but false in its relations and pernicious in its consequences. Many true things are untruths. Establish foundling-hospitals where the brats of lubricity are cared for better than the sweater-babies, and at once concupiscence doubles and trebles the number of illegitimate and syphilitic starvelings. The world's greatest statistician, Dr. Farr, stigmatizes the shame of race deterioration that we permit in allowing the imbecile, idle, criminal, and defective classes to breed, *ad libitum.* Prof. A. Graham Bell† says by permitting intermarriages we are actually producing a deaf-mute variety of the race.

And this brings us to the essence of the whole matter: the origin of criminals and the mentally diseased. Suppose for argument's sake, we admit that some lunatics and even some criminals are what they are by the force of organic and anatomical necessity. What then? Only this, that we are then bound to ask how the "moral anæsthesia" and "cerebral atypism" came into being. In obedience to what necessity or desire, in response to what peculiarity of the environment, did these defective brains and skulls arise? The bat's wing, the seal's fin, a cat's paw, a horse's foot, a man's hand,—these modifications of one primal organ were moulded by the needs of the creature and the actions of the environment into their different shapes. These two things, then, we have to consider; first, the rascal or fool *per se*, his needs, desires, tendencies, etc., and second the environment, that creates and encourages the rascal and fool.

As to the first inquiry, I again assert that if law breakers or wrecked minds are such by the stringent necessity of their inherited cerebral defects—a fact I by no means admit—then it follows that we must go to the parents. It cannot be argued that heredity forces us back *ad infinitum*, either to the biblical Adam

* *Maximus erroris populus magister.* Coke.

† *Science*, April 17, 1885.

or to our simian ancestry. In this case we are not "bound to go the whole ourang": because, on the one hand, the old myth, wise as it was, was not science; and again, because old mother nature, left to her own grand wisdom, soon cuts short both crank and criminal with summary kindness. At the farthest we shall only have to go back but one or two generations to find the criminal and the lunatic in the making. The eye that pierces shams sees it all about every day, this subtle secret manufacturing. However heinous and horrible, all lunacy and all iniquity began at some time with slight and repetitive, but always conscious, departures from right living and right thinking.* The duty of sound minds, sound medicine, and sound science is to check and stop these departures. Withstand beginnings, is the logic of all health, mental or moral.

Like a bear by the ears materialism always lugs in this question of heredity wherewith to frighten the children of the spirit. But with amazing illogicality it begs the whole question in cooly assuming that only matter can inherit, whilst every fact of embryology and organic evolution shows it is the soul, the spirit, the character, that inherits, and that moulds the organs of mind into shapes consonant with its own immaterial heritages. It may be asked: If structure is not inherited, what then is inherited?—and I, in turn, ask: If structure is inherited, *when* is it inherited? Is there any recognizable atypism in the fœtus? No, it only exists some 20 or 40 years after the *tendency* has been inherited, and after conception has taken place. Tendency was inherited, and tendency, if you please, produced the atypism or the criminal. The ovum or spermatozoid, a structureless cell of the most primitive protoplasm, so small that it is invisible to the naked eye, contains the summary of millions of past lives and the possibilities of millions to come, for each bearing numberless inherited peculiarities even to the curl of hair and peculiarity of speech. Where is the inherited structure in this tiny speck of matter? *The inheritance of power to make structure is NOT the inheritance of structure.* The liar puts his brain to lying uses; the same brain could mediate truth quite as well. The lie is not in the brain; it is in the liar. If you please, the liar and his brain are two quite distinguishable somewhats. Moreover, this so-called "iron law of heredity" is very flexible steel, ay, is utterly limp in the hands of evolution. "The instances in which accidental deformities are *not* transmitted," says a great biologist, "out-number those in which they are inherited." Did Shakespeare, Cæsar, Bismarck, Washington, and thousand such, draw their genius from an ancestry ever growing and straining to the culminating bloom? Not at all. The imps of determinism have not yet caught all the birds of freedom either with the lime of a whipster's logic or with the net of assumed facts.

(To be continued.)

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.†

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. — Continued.

On the morning of the day following, Professor Raschke entered his friend's room prepared for the journey.

"Has the Magister disappeared?" he asked, anxiously.

"He has done what he was obliged to do," replied Werner, gloomily. "Whatever his future life and fortune may be, we have done with him."

Raschke looked anxiously on the furrowed countenance of his colleague.

"I should like to see you on the road to your wife, and better still, with her on the road back to us."

"Have no doubt, friend, that I shall seek both roads as soon as I have a right to do so."

"Ilse counts the hours till your return," said Raschke, in still greater anxiety; "she will not be at rest till she has fast hold of her loved one."

"My wife has long been deprived of rest while she was with me," said the Scholar, "I have not understood how to defend her. I have exposed her to the claws of wild beasts. She has found from strangers the protection that her own husband refused her. The indifference of her husband has wounded her in that point which it is most difficult for a woman to forgive. I have become a mere, impotent dreamer," he exclaimed, "unworthy of the devotion of this pure soul, and I feel what a man never should feel—ashamed to meet my excellent wife again." He turned his face away.

"This feeling is too high-strained, and the reproaches that you angrily make yourself are too severe. You have been deceived by the cunning prevarication of a worldly wise man. You yourself have expressed that it is ingloriously easy to deceive us in things in which we are not cleverer than children. Werner, once more I entreat of you to depart with me immediately, even though by another road."

"No," replied the Scholar, decidedly; "I have all my life long been clear in my relations with other men. I cannot do things by halves. If I feel a liking, the pressure of my hand and the confidence that I give does not leave a moment's doubt of the state of my heart. If I must give up my relation to any one, I must have the reckoning fully closed. I cannot leave this place as a fugitive."

"Who demands that?" asked Raschke. "You only go like a man who turns his eyes away from a hateful worm that crawls before him on the ground."

"If the worm has injured the man, it is his duty to guard others from the danger of like injury, and if he cannot guard others, he ought to clear his own path."

"But if he incurs new danger in the attempt?"

"Yet he must do what he can to satisfy himself," exclaimed Werner. "I will not allow myself to be robbed of the rights that I have against another. I am called upon by the insult to my wife; I am called upon by the ruined life of a scholar, whom we both lament. Say no more to me. Friend, my self-respect has been severely wounded, and with reason. I feel my weakness with a bitterness that is the just punishment for the pride with which I have looked upon the life of others. I have written to Struvelius, and begged his pardon for having so arrogantly treated

* Justice Stephen recognized this when he says in reference to crime that the excuse of defective mental power, etc., does not hold "if the absence of the power of self-control has been produced by his own default."

† Translation copyrighted.

him in the uncertainty that once disturbed his life. Here is my letter to our colleague. I beg you to give it to him, and to tell him that when we meet again I wish to have no words upon the past, only he must know how bitterly I have atoned for having been severe with him. But, however much patience and consideration I may require from others, I should lose the last thing that gives me courage to live, if I went from here without coming to a reckoning with the lord of that castle. I am no man of the world who has learnt to conceal his anger beneath courtly words."

"He who seeks to call a man to account," exclaimed Raschke, "should have the means of getting firm hold of his opponent, otherwise what should be satisfaction may become a new humiliation."

"To have sought this satisfaction to the utmost," replied Werner, "is in itself a satisfaction."

"Werner," said his colleague, "I hope that your anger and indignation will not draw you into the thoughtless vindictiveness of the weak fools who call a brutal playing with one's own life and that of others satisfaction."

"He is a prince," said the Professor, with a gloomy smile; "I wear no spurs, and the last use I made of my bullet mould was to crack nuts with it. How can you so mistake me? But there are things which must be expressed. There is a healing power in words; if not for him who listens to them, yet for him who speaks. I must tell him what I demand of him. He shall feel how my words are forced down into his joyless heart. My speaking out will make me free."

"He will refuse to hear you," exclaimed Raschke.

"I will do my best to speak to him."

"He has many means of preventing you."

"Let him use them at his peril, for he will thereby deprive himself of the advantage of hearing me without witnesses."

"He will set all the machinery that his high position affords him in motion against you; he will use his power recklessly to restrain you."

"I am no bawling soothsayer who will attack Cæsar in the open street, to warn him of the Ides of March. My knowledge of what will humble him before himself and his contemporaries, is my weapon. I assure you he will give me opportunity to use it as I will."

"He is going away," said Raschke, anxiously.

"Where can he go to that I cannot follow him?"

"The apprehension that you will excite in him will drive him to some dark deed."

"Let him do his worst; I must do what will give me peace."

"Werner!" cried Raschke, raising his hands, "I ought not to leave you in this position, and yet you make your friend feel how powerless his honest counsel is against your stubborn will."

The Professor went up to him and embraced him. "Farewell, Raschke. As high as any man can stand in the esteem of another, you stand in mine. Do not be angry if, in this case, I follow more the impulse of my own nature than the mild wisdom of yours. Give my greeting to your wife and children."

Raschke passed his hands over his eyes, drew on his coat, and put the letter to Struvelius in his pocket. In doing so he found another letter, took it out, and read the address. "A letter from my wife to you," he said; "How did it come into my pocket!"

Werner opened it; again a slight smile passed over his face. "Mrs. Aurelia begs me to take care of you. The charge comes at the right moment. I will accompany you to your place of departure; we will not forget the cap or cloak."

The Professor conducted his friend to the conveyance; they spoke together, up to the last moment, of the lectures which both wished to give in the approaching term. "Remember my letter to Struvelius," were Werner's last words, when his friend was seated in the carriage.

"I shall think of it whenever I think of you," said Raschke, stretching out his hand from the carriage.

The Professor went to the castle for a last conversation with the man who had called him to his capital. The household received him with embarrassed looks. "The Sovereign is just starting on a journey, and will not return for some days; we do not know where he is going," said the Intendant, with concern. The Professor, nevertheless, desired him to announce him to the Sovereign, his request was urgent; the servant brought as an answer that his master could not be spoken to before his return; the Professor might impart his wishes to one of the aides-de-camp.

Werner hastened to the adjacent house of the Lord High Steward. He was taken into the library, and gave a fleeting glance at the faded carpet, the old hangings, which were covered with engravings in dark frames, and on the large bookshelves, with glass doors, lined within, as if the possessor wished to conceal what he read from the eyes of strangers. The High Steward entered hastily.

"I seek for an interview with the Sovereign before his departure," began the Professor. "I beg of your Excellence to procure me this audience."

"Pardon my asking you your object," said the High Steward. "Do you wish again to speak to a sufferer concerning his disease?"

"The diseased man administers a high office, and has the power and rights of a healthy one; he is answerable to his fellow-men for his deeds. I consider it a duty not to go from here without informing him that he is no longer in a condition to perform the duties of his position."

The Lord High Steward looked with astonishment at the Scholar.

"Do you insist on this interview?"

"What I have learned since my return here from the country compels me to do so; I must seek this interview by every possible means in my power, whatever may be the consequences."

"Even the consequences to yourself?"

"Even these. After all that has passed, the Sovereign cannot refuse to hear me speak before I go."

"What he ought not to do he will yet try to do."

"He will do it at his peril," replied the Professor.

The High Steward placed himself in front of the Professor, and said, impressively:

"The Sovereign is going to Rossau to-day. The plan is secret. I accidentally learnt the orders which were given at the princely stables."

The Scholar started.

"I thank your Excellence from my heart for this communication," he exclaimed, with forced composure. "I will endeavor to send a speedy warning beforehand. I shall not start, myself, till your Excellence has seconded my efforts to speak to the Sovereign before his journey."

"If you seek an audience through me," said the High Steward, after some consideration, "I will, as an officer of the Court, and from personal esteem for you, immediately convey your wish to the Sovereign. But I will not conceal from you, Professor, that I consider a criticism from you upon past events as very risky in every point of view."

"But I am thoroughly impressed with the conviction that the criticism must be made," exclaimed the Professor.

"To the Sovereign alone, or before others?" asked the High Steward.

"If the ears and mind of the Sovereign remain closed, then before the world. I shall thus fulfil an imperative duty to all who might suffer from the dark fancies of this disordered mind; a duty from which I, as an honest man, cannot escape. If calm remonstrance will not move him, I shall publicly arraign him before the rulers and people of our nation. For it is not to be borne that the conditions of ancient Rome should again rise to life among our people."

"That is decisive," replied the High Steward.

He went to his bureau, took out a document, and presented it to the Scholar.

"Read this. Will you renounce a personal interview with the Sovereign if this paper is signed by his hand?"

The Professor read, and bowed to the High Steward.

"As soon as he ceases to be what he has been, I shall consider him merely as an afflicted man; in this case my interview with him would be useless. Meanwhile I repeat my request to procure an audience before the Sovereign's departure."

The High Steward took back the document.

"I will endeavor to act as your representative. But do not forget that the Sovereign travels to Rossau in another hour. If we ever see each other again, Mr. Werner," concluded the old lord, solemnly, "may both our hearts be free from anxiety about that which sometimes one esteems lightly, as you do at this moment, but which one does not willingly allow one's self to be robbed of by the intervention of another."

The Professor hastened to the inn and called for his servant.

"Show me your fidelity to day, Gabriel: none but a messenger on horseback can arrive at Bielstein in time. Do your best, take courier's horses, and put a letter into the hands of my wife before the Court carriages arrive there."

"At your command, Professor," said Gabriel, with a military salute, "it is a hard ride even for a hussar; if I am not detained in changing horses, I trust to be able to deliver the letter in due time."

The Professor wrote in haste, and despatched Gabriel; then he returned to the dwelling of the High Steward.

* * *

The Sovereign was lying wearily on his sofa, his cheeks pale and his eyes dim—a thoroughly sick man.

"I had formerly other thoughts, and could, when I had touched the keys, play more than one melody; now everything changes itself into a discordant measure: she has gone, she is in the neighborhood of the boy, she laughs at her foolish wooer. I see nothing before me but the track on the high road that leads to her. A strange power eternally strikes the same notes within me, a dark shadow stands near me and points with its finger incessantly to the same path; I cannot control myself, I hear the words, I see the road, I feel the dark hand over my head."

The servant announced the High Steward.

"I will not see him," said the Sovereign, imperiously. "Tell his Excellence that I am on the point of departing for the country."

"His Excellence begs admittance," it is a question of an urgent signature."

"The old fool," murmured the Sovereign, "usher him in."

"I am unfortunately much pressed for time, your Excellence," he called out to him, as he entered.

(To be continued.)

I am a villain: yet I lie, I am not.
Fool, of thyself speak well: fool, do not flatter.
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
And every tongue brings in a several tale,
And every tale condemns me for a villain.

—King Richard III.

SELECTIONS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

XVI.

IN MY LIFE SO DREAR AND LONELY.

In my life so drear and lonely,
Once a vision bright appeared;
But the radiance faded from me,
And the night comes that I feared.

When the children crouch in darkness
Through the ghostly watches long,
They, to banish their vague terrors,
Gleefully unite in song.

Silly child am I! The shadows
Fall on me and fear impart;
Though my rhymes may not delight you,
Sing I must to ease my heart.

—*Heine.*

BOOK REVIEWS.

A GIRL GRADUATE. *Celia Parker Woolley.* Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

The book evidences a thoughtful study of life, and a kindly sympathy with the aspirations and trials of young womanhood. Without any great originality of plot or incident, it holds the attention and interests by its truth. It is not an imaginative tale, but is evidently drawn from life, the outcome of much careful notice and just judgment of others' lives and motives.

The growth of character in the heroine is well portrayed, with the effects that varying influences and added knowledge produce. Two of the characters, Maggie's sister and brother-in-law, form a good contrast. Equally high-minded and noble in thought and action, they represent to some extent the different effects of egoism and altruism on others—the good influence of the one grudgingly admitted, as stern fact must always be, but the admonitions of the other eagerly sought for, carefully heeded and acted upon.

Perhaps the most winning character in the book is that of the puzzled, humble, true-hearted foreman, Thomas Dean, who says:

"Our children—they get beyond us somehow; I don't mean less lovin' 'n obedient, but they get beyond us," and there is an excellent scene between the rector and his wife, in which the author shows how easily missed are the opportunities of tact. Poor Miss Graham is made the peg on which to hang the various fads of the day, and an incongruous creature she is. There is a good deal of witty talk between the heroine and Sidney Gale. He invites her to drive and speaks of the moon-light.

"I've seen the full moon," she said, superciliously.

"I was afraid you had. I'd throw in a couple of comets and the aurora borealis if I could, but there's no pleasing some people." Gale expresses a good deal of sense in a witty way, and one is inclined to say of him, as Miss Graham does of Maggie, "I liked her better than I thought I should at first."

As a story, the book is not of the thrilling type, but page after page tells of experience gathered from many sources, with a keen and kindly insight, and a deep sympathy with the pervading sorrow of humanity; and told, with not the least approach to sermonizing, in such a way that every reader, who has been an on-looker as well as actor in life must recognize the justice and truth of many a philosophical observation. J. F. H.

The Art Amateur for July is filled with matter of unusual interest. In "My Note Book" are notices of recent works of three artists, in whom Americans are interested, who exhibit at the Royal Academy.

Mr. Herbert Herkomer's "Chapel of the Charter House," is spoken of with discriminating praise, while we are glad to say that Mr. Sargent's portraits are severely criticized. No amount of technique can redeem a portrait if it deserves such a criticism as this. "The right eye appears severely contused and the whole left side of the face paralyzed."

We are glad to see mention of a fine portrait of the well known Sculptor Wm. Story, by his son. It is less gratifying to note that he has sent to the Salon a picture of Charlotte Corday—painted in twelve days. Such *tours de force* are dangerous experiments to say the least.

The biographical sketch of Ludwig Knaus is interesting, as it is always of value to trace the development of an artist's thought. He followed his own taste in painting simple scenes from life and showed an admirable power of "telling a story" which brought him fame and success. Such subjects as "A Hungry Stomach has no Ears," "The Amateurs in Comedy," "The Funeral," "The Organ Grinder," etc., show the path which he followed. Several admirable sketches illustrate the paper.

Another interesting article is the Review of Prof. A. H. Church's "Manual of Color." Prof. Church treats his subject both from a scientific and an artistic standpoint and he appears to have brought together a great deal of valuable observation and information.

Hints on Portrait Painting are given from a lecture by Hubert Herkomer. They are timely and suggestive Among the designs are some rich specimens of pottery, one being an old Rouen Cider Jug. The decorative department is rich and varied and full of valuable suggestions to the Amateur. E. D. C.

NOTES.

Prof. Max Müller's new book on "Natural Religion," being the Gifford lectures delivered last year at Glasgow, will be shortly issued by Longmans, Green & Co., of New York.

The forthcoming number of the *Century* will contain a chapter on the religion of Abraham Lincoln. He professed no creed, was the communicant of no church; yet his life was one of intense religious thought, of reverence and faith.

Christian Life, a little paper published at Jacksonville, Ill., by Caldwell Bros., is devoted to the realization of physical and mental purity in the marital relation. The tone is reverent, the suggestions practical, and its lessons imperative.

"Upon This Rock," the new novel by M. C. O'Byrne, recently announced as being ready for publication, has been unavoidably delayed. We are requested to inform subscribers and others that the work will be issued in a few weeks.

Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. announce that the series "Epochs of Modern History," which has acquired such widespread popularity among cultivated readers, will be supplemented by a few volumes on the critical periods of the history of America. They will provide, it is intended, a continuous history of the United States from the colonial epoch to the present time.

Dr. Gould, in the paper read before the Medical Jurisprudence Society of Philadelphia, and published in our present issue, rather roughly handles the principle of determinism. But we believe that the attack is directed mainly against a sentimental perversion of that doctrine. For there is a distinction between outward constraint or force, and necessity; the exercise of 'freewill' lies as much within the domain of necessity, of law, logically fixed, and dependent on character, as the rule of determinism; the contrary doctrine would lend caprice to every moral action and uncertainty to every scientific phenomenon. If conduct is to have an ethical value, it must result of necessity. To quote from a former editorial of THE OPEN COURT (p. 888): "Freewill and Determinism do not exclude each other. * * * Indeterminism is unthinkable in science as well as morals. It would make every action morally indifferent and scientifically indeterminable."

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

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

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

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[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion, from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

The Open Court.

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No. 101. (Vol. III.—23.) CHICAGO, AUGUST 1, 1889. { Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 Cts.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONSCIOUSNESSES OF HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.*

BY ALFRED BINET.

Whenever we chance to discover a new fact, we seldom describe it correctly. As a rule, we regard it as simpler than in reality it is. The observers who first investigated double consciousness in hysterical persons occupied themselves particularly with putting in a clear light the phenomenon of the separation of the two consciousnesses; this was, in fact, the first thing to be done. But the study of the numerous relations existing between these separate consciousnesses was almost entirely neglected. It is our purpose, in this paper, to recapitulate and present, in an abridged form, the results of investigation on this topic; and I am convinced that some day it will furnish the clue to a great number of phenomena of mental alienation. Inward voices supposed to be heard by demented individuals, their fixed and impulsive ideas, the delirium of possessed persons, are very probably phenomena produced by the doubling of consciousness, and by the influences that one of the consciousnesses exerts upon the other.

For the time being we shall remain true to the methods that we have followed in our previous study. We shall eliminate all complex and ill-defined observations and adhere, by preference, to small, simple, and precise experiments, easy of repetition, which, without teaching us the phenomena in their total development, at least yield an imperative proof of their reality, which certainly must be regarded as a decided advantage.

Automatic writing furnishes the first illustration of the relations between the two consciousnesses. It is a most important phenomenon and is worth the trouble of being carefully studied. An examination of the scientific collections of England and America shows that in those countries the subject is frequently investigated. Professor William James has recently sent me a work in which he recapitulates certain very curious experiments performed by him upon normal individuals, or, at least, individuals who were supposed to be such. The results obtained by him afford me particular interest, since they closely resemble those obtained by myself with hysterical individuals.

Automatic writing forms part of a class of movements that have now for a long time been the subject of inquiry in France, and which may be described under the general name of unconscious movements produced by ideas. As a result of numerous observations it is now a well-known fact that with excitable individuals every idea produces in the body unconscious movements which at times are so precise and clear, that by registering them we are able to guess at the person's thoughts. The method of the experiment is frequently the following. The individual is asked to think of a word, a number, or of any object whatsoever, and at the same time a pen is thrust into his hand, with the assurance that his thoughts will be divined. It frequently happens then, that the person, although not feeling any movement in his hand, will spontaneously write the word that he has thought of. This experiment affords an elementary instance of the operation known as thought-reading, and we at once understand how any clever experimentalist may be able to dispense with the use of the pen, and to guess at a man's thought by simple contact with the hand.

As might be readily expected, such movements provoked by ideas are produced in hysterical persons with the greatest facility. When a pen-holder is placed in the hand of an anæsthetic subject, the automatic writing will be produced without his knowledge, and we are thus able to learn the most secret thoughts of the patient. A careful study of these movements will furthermore prove, that they are less simple than is generally supposed. They are no mere reflex-movements produced by ideas. This is proven by the fact that the manner in which the idea is expressed depends upon the attitude given to the anæsthetic hand. Thus, we ask the subject to think of the number 3. If he holds a pen in his hand he will write the figure 3. If he has no pen, and if before the experiment we have several times shaken the fingers of the insensible hand, the subject will raise his finger three times; the same will apply to the wrist or to the movement of any other member. If the subject has a dynamometer in his hand he will press three distinct times upon this instrument. If the experimentalist himself assumes the initiative by raising the finger of the subject a certain number of times, the finger after having yielded three times to the impressed movement will stiffen, as

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if it thus wished to inform the experimentalist of the number that had been thought of. All these experiments, and particularly the last, show the intervention of the second consciousness in the expression of the idea of the number three. The first consciousness furnishes the idea, and the second consciousness determines the manner in which the idea shall be expressed; there is, accordingly, a concurrence of the two consciousnesses, a collaboration of the two egos for one common task.



Automatic writing of a patient called Lavr . . . . ., an hysterical subject totally anæsthetic. The patient gazed fixedly at a blue cross; the position and arrangement of the cross, by simultaneous contrast, caused the production of a yellow color about the cross. During this time the right hand, into which, without the patient's knowledge, a pen had been slipped, did not cease to write: "*bleu* (blue), *jaune* (yellow), *bleu, jaune, etc.*".

By a singular phenomenon the automatic writing does not limit itself to making known what takes place in the principal consciousness of the subject; it is at the same time in the service of the second consciousness, so that, according to the nature of the cases at issue, the first consciousness sometimes directs the hand of the subject and at other times the second consciousness. We have collected several observations which leave no doubt on this point. Let us begin with the very simplest.

Letting the subject hold a pen in his anæsthetic hand, we trace a letter, or some such sign, upon the back of the hand. The automatic writing will at once reproduce the word that has been traced; the word itself, be it understood, not having been perceived by the principal consciousness, because the excitation was performed upon the skin of an anæsthetic member, and because anæsthesia in some way is the barrier separating the two consciousnesses. If the word has been reproduced, it accordingly must be because the second consciousness has perceived it, and consequently this simple experiment proves that the second consciousness can express itself by automatic writing.

It may be remarked, in passing, that automatic writing affords us a very convenient means of exploring the sensibility of any apparently anæsthetic limb; and we are also able by employing this method to measure the sensibility with an æsthesiometer. In fact, nothing is simpler. Let us prick the insensible hand with one of the points of a pair of compasses: the automatic writing will trace a single point. Thereupon let us apply at the same time both points, and the automatic writing, after a little practice, will be able to tell us whether the points have been distinguished or confounded; their distance apart, in millimeters, will give us the respective degree of sensibility. Every time that I applied this method to hysterical subjects I was able to verify that notwithstanding anæsthesia sensibility had remained normal; we can easily understand that the contradiction here is only in the terms employed.

Automatic writing does not only serve to express sensations perceived by the second consciousness; it is likewise able to express the thoughts that this second consciousness spontaneously combines. Hysterical persons have been found who, when a pen was put into their hands and their attention diverted, began to write, unconsciously, entire well-connected phrases, recitals, confessions, etc. The principal subject —the one with whom we communicate by word—suspects nothing, and does not see what his anæsthetic hand is doing; it is the second consciousness which employs this mode of expression. I myself have made this experiment upon a subject, and other authors have likewise reported several instances.

The latter form of experiment is evidently the one that approaches nearest to the experiments upon automatic writing which at the present time are being conducted in England and America. They consist in asking a person to place his hand upon a planchette that can serve for the purposes of writing and to remain immovable without thinking of anything. When the subject is nervous it will sometimes happen that the planchette becomes agitated and begins to write thoughts entirely foreign to the subject; the latter remains motionless and has no consciousness of anything. It may be assumed, with great likelihood, that under such conditions an intellectual doubling of the subject takes place, analogous to that which we have observed in our hemi-anæsthetic, hysterical patients. Only, in the case of an hysterical individual, the doubling is easier, in consequence of the insensibility which reigns in a part of the body; it being easily comprehensible that the acts of the second consciousness, produced by preference in the insensible regions, remain

unknown to and concealed from the principal consciousness. It may happen, however, with certain non-hysterical subjects that experiments of doubling bring about a transitory anæsthesia, and Mr. W. James has recently observed, that while one of his patients was writing with the planchette he did not feel the painful excitations inflicted upon his arm, whereas the second consciousness perceived them distinctly, and complained of the same by means of the automatic writing.

Such complications of phenomena produce consequences which it is easy to foresee. It may happen that at the moment at which the principal consciousness wishes to write a word, the second consciousness may have the same intention, and may wish to write an entirely different word: hence a conflict. A very simple experiment will illustrate this conflict. Let us seize the anæsthetic hand, and let us cause it to trace behind a screen the word "Paris." We know that this word will be repeated several times. Thereupon addressing ourselves to the principal subject, we will ask him to write the word "London." The subject, entirely ignorant of what has just taken place, eagerly seizes the pen with the intention to carry out our wish, but to his utter astonishment the indocile pen instead of writing London, writes Paris. Is not this a phenomenon analogous to those irresistible impulses which, in madness, consciously reveal themselves,—impulsions to theft, murder, arson, etc., which suddenly manifest themselves to the great surprise of the patient, the latter submitting to the impulse without comprehending it. It is evident that these kinds of experiments are destined to throw a flood of light upon several still obscure points of mental pathology.



Experiment performed upon P. Sch . . . ., hysterical, hemi-anæsthetic right hand. The subject, with eyes closed, holds in his right insensible hand a rubber tube fastened to a registering apparatus. We ask the patient to think of a number, and not to make any movement. It may be seen from the above tracing that the patient from time to time squeezes the tube that he holds in his hand five successive times; this movement is at the same time involuntary and unconscious. Minimum velocity of the cylinder, a complete revolution in one minute.

In the preceding exposition we have studied the motory relations of the two consciousnesses; we have seen them either uniting their efforts to accomplish the same act, or conflicting with regard to something to be accomplished. But there exists a second kind of relations between the two consciousnesses; namely, the relations of sensations and of images. It may happen that the sensation which has possession of a first consciousness awakens an associated image in the second consciousness, so that, by a unique intellectual process, one of the parts will be conscious for one of the egos, and the other for the second ego. The facts pertaining to this order of relations are extremely curious and instructive. We shall limit ourselves to those that are the simplest and most easily produced.

Let us once more turn our attention to an anæsthetic, hysterical patient; we will make a series of impressions upon his insensible hand; our subject feels absolutely nothing. It would, accordingly, be idle to ask him how many impressions we have made, because he does not even suspect that his hand has been pressed. And yet, the highly extraordinary fact remains, that the subject, although apparently not having felt anything, possesses an idea of the number of excitations that have been made upon him. The following is proof: Let us make ten punctures in the insensible hand and thereupon let us ask the subject, who, as a matter of course, has not seen his hand, which is hidden behind a screen, to think of some number and to name it; very frequently the subject will answer that he is thinking of the number ten. In the same manner let us put a key, a piece of coin, a needle, a watch into the anæsthetic hand, and let us ask the subject to think of any object whatsoever; it will still happen, yet less frequently than in the preceding experiment, that the subject is thinking of the precise object that has been put into his insensible hand.

It is important to note, that in all these cases the subject believes he is thinking voluntarily and without constraint; the experimentalist, while compelling him to think of the number ten, not depriving him of the illusion of his freedom of will.

How shall we explain this result? How is it possible that, in consequence of an excitation not felt, the subject should have a determined idea? We shall be able to explain everything by supposing simply, that the unconscious peripheral excitation, for example the puncture of the anæsthetic hand, awakens, by way of association, corresponding phenomena of ideation. But in reality matters are more complex. We have to admit rather, that when we excite the anæsthetic hand, in different ways, by puncture or by contact with an object, the second consciousness perceives the sen-

sation, counts the punctures, recognizes the object, and, for the purposes involved, abandons itself to more or less complicated intellectual acts. These intellectual acts are the final stage of the process, which has had its origin in a sensation; now this final point, this result, this conclusion is the thing that alone penetrates into the first consciousness. For example, when punctures are made in the skin, one of the consciousnesses counts the sensations, finds their sum total, and this sum-total it is that reaches the other consciousness, not indeed under the form of tactile sensations, but under the abstract form of a number.

To sum up. From the foregoing we perceive that the separation of the two consciousnesses does not interrupt all communications between them. The associations of ideas, of images, perceptions, and movements, that is, of all that pertains to the sphere of lower psychology, is preserved nearly intact; and hence an idea in the first consciousness provokes a movement in the second, and inversely, a sensation perceived by the second consciousness can awaken an idea in the first consciousness.

In the next number we shall apply these results to the study of the hysterical eye.

MONISM AND EVOLUTION.

REMARKS BY THE REV. H. H. HIGGINS AND MR. EDWARD C. HEGELER.

In a recent communication to Mr. Edward C. Hegeler, the Rev. H. H. Higgins, President of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, and likewise an honored contributor to The Open Court, gives expression to a thought in criticism of Monism which, though not intended for publication, we deem it violative of no principle of etiquette publicly to present and answer. The pertinent and fearless manner in which Mr. Higgins has stated his remarks, will of itself afford a justification.

Mr. Higgins speaks of his admiration for Mr. E. P. Powell, and the merit of Mr. Powell's work, "Our Heredity from God," continuing: "With all his "faults, and they are many, he is a child of nature "still, and so, I think, are you; but with a stern sense "of the inevitable in the millstone-grit of Monism, "into which if we are absorbed by intussusception, or "any other process, good-bye for us, sweet evolution, "and let the sun mercifully grow cold at once."

To which, in reply, Mr. Hegeler remarked: "You "compare Mr. Powell's 'Our Heredity from God' "with our Monism. The words 'our heredity from "God' are dualistic still; '*we are phenomena of God*' "(meaning the All therewith), is the definition from "our standpoint. In this view your words 'good-bye "for us, etc.' will not do.

"The higher form of life,—comparing ours to that "of savages and animals,—has come through work "and struggle; and through such, with the avoidance "of waste and useless effort, and the greater efficiency "of the quantity of work at our command through "science, a much higher life is still to come. And "an immense time is still in store for that; as Geology, "Astronomy, etc. show. Inevitably this is to be "the course of events. If our race does not follow "this course another will—our race perishing.

"As long as the sun shines upon our earth as now, "the same quantity of life will,—I have a right to this "conclusion,—be in action here. But the quality of "life can change and if, as the end of earthly evolu-"tion, the sun does grow cold and the quantity of life "gradually decreases on earth, let us work and strug-"gle for a higher quality of life up to the end without "any reservation. Perhaps we shall fall in battle at "the zenith of earthly evolution contending for that "higher quality of life."

THE MODERN FRANKENSTEIN.*

BY GEORGE M. GOULD, M. D.

(*Concluded.*)

Among the causes tending in the individual, to produce slight, oft-repeated, and conscious infringements of moral and psychological laws, not a few must be laid to the charge of the biological laws under which we have arisen and exist. The presence of the grinning death's-head behind every smile and at all our feasts; the incertainty of the modern mind as to life's continuance, and even as to the goodness at the heart of things; the stupendous and execrable tricking of every personality by the *duperie* of sexual passion; the subtle and inscrutable diseases lurking everywhere to pounce upon us; the earthquake, storm, cold and pest bringing palsy to endeavor, and ruin to labor; the hunger and the animal appetites always to satisfy or conquer—all these are but indications that life is a warfare, and that our cosmic father has designs and facial lineaments very different from those of Christian benignancy. *Sunt lacrimæ rerum.* In the struggle of life, the weak, the unlucky—for what else can you call many such?—give away mentally or morally, give way under these diabolical teasings or downright thunderbolts of destiny, and man answers nature's inhumanity and brutality and trickery, with the same arguments: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο,—the word became flesh;—the criminal and the shattered mind are in these cases the products of nature's inscrutable inethicality, children of a strangely cruel parent, which the remaining strong and honest have to care for. And thus burden begins.

But this part of our burden is a small one in comparison with that chargeable to society's wronging of the individual. It is the oldest, truest of truths: man is man's worst enemy. When one looks out over history, through the long catalogue of bloody and iniquitous centuries, when one looks among the present nations with their standing armies of professional killers, their protective tariffs, their monopolistic laws and *laissez-faires*, their crime-breeding and lunacy-nursing deviltries, one almost feels like the old pessimist who wished he could go to the moon in order to be able to spit upon the whole human race at one time. Take a couple of instances: both examples of crime and mental-disease producing agencies of portentous power and both wholly remediable: Do you know that hundreds of thousands of English men and women are

* Read before the Medical Jurisprudence Society of Philad'a, May 14, '89.

dying from starvation, disease, and slavery, at from 10 to 25 cents a day for ceaseless 12 to 16 hours of daily toil?* Unless they do this, the choice for women is between death and harlotry; for the men between death or crime; for both it is death or disobedience to moral or mental laws. Do you know that whilst this is so, there are many ignorant little monkeys annually making more money as horse-jockeys than we give the President of these United States. Beaconsfield said that "the Turf was a vast engine of national demoralization," and Runciman, who believes heartily in horse-racing, says, "our faith, our honor, our future as a nation, are being sacrificed" to this spirit of gambling and corruption bred directly and kept up by the race-course.†

This is but one instance of the way we allow the gambling spirit to ruin a nation, our "poor best," Christian England. We, in our own way, are going the same road. We have our Louisiana Lottery, and in every city and hamlet of the land, our bucket-shop. Faro is unfashionable, but never was more cowardly and hypocritical gambling so ruinously wide-spread as now. Cock-fighting and dog-fighting are the noble amusements of a large portion of the American people, and we spend more on those amazing and nauseating things, the comic opera that is unmusically tragical, the variety theatre that is without variety, and the actresses that do not act, than upon education, and religion, and good government combined.

Take as another example the question of prohibition. It has been tried in three States. After 36 years the best citizens of Maine are as a unit in favor of continuing it.‡ The picture may be a little overdrawn but *The Medical and Surgical Reporter* says: "The effect of prohibition in Kansas is indicated in a recent article in the *Topeka* (Kansas) *Capital Commonwealth*, replying to questions in regard to the effect of the prohibitory liquor-law in that State and the sentiments of the citizens in regard to it. From this article we learn that drunkenness and crime have diminished 80 per cent. since the saloons were closed in Kansas; that pauperism has decreased very materially, while the welfare of the people and the prosperity of the State have improved in equal proportion."

In his farewell address to the Kansas Legislature last January, Governor Martin said that no observing and intelligent citizen has failed to note the beneficial results already attained. Nine-tenths of the drinking and drunkenness prevalent eight years ago has been abolished. Crime has diminished enormously; thousands of homes where vice, and want, and wretchedness once prevailed are filled with peace, plenty, and contentment. Although the population has increased rapidly, the number of criminals in jail has decreased steadily. Many of the jails are empty, and all show a marked falling off in the number of prisoners they contain. In the capital city (Topeka) with 60,000 inhabitants, not a single criminal case was on the docket when the then present term of court began. The business of the police courts had dwindled to one-fourth of its former proportions, and in the cities of the second and third class the occupation of the police courts is practically gone." But we have to remember that these are but three States out of forty, and that drink and rum pursue their course the world over.

In the same way, turn wheresoever we may, we find the same ruthlessness and recklessness. Harlotry is permitted and is a festering source of moral and physical corruption and infection in the heart of every city. Faith-cure, quackery, medical mascottery and hoodooism are actually fashionable in a certain world of elegance and ignorance. Political bribery and official malfeasance is the joke of the day, and both joke and boodler are the disgrace of American life; he who bribes the most and the most slyly is rewarded with the highest offices in the land. Capital nursed by monopolies and protective tariffs and other discriminating laws buys its way to the votes of legislatures, governors, and judges, and breeds hate and crime in the hearts of the oppressed. "Civilized poverty," says Duncan, "is the bot-bed of insanity." We may curse nihilism, scorn socialism, sneer at co-operation, ignore Henry Georgeism, pooh-pooh profit-sharing, eat our good dinner and be indifferent to the whole economic pother of the "idealists," but only one who combines the qualities of an ass with those of an hyena can forget or deny that a civilization is unjust and doomed wherein thousands of *roués* and rake-hells can live lives of debauchery, idleness, and luxury, whilst the millions who feed them drag out their sad days in want, wretchedness, and ceaseless toil.

Now the moral of all this is that these things, one and several, by the consent of all statisticians, economists and psychologists, are profound, persistent, and necessary causes of crime and insanity. The maxim of Quetelet that society prepares crime whilst the criminal only executes it, is of course but a partial truth, but it is a great, a solid, and an unconquerable truth. There is no escape from a social or communal responsibility in the production of law-breaking and mental wreckage. And it is precisely this secret, subtle, haunting sense of guilt in the public conscience that lies at the bottom of the disgusting tendency at which medicine has simpered and ogled, to cry, "Poor fellow, he was crazy; he shouldn't have brained his baby, but he was not responsible. Let's build him a nice big asylum, and feed him, and hire attendants and doctors to wait on him. If he amuse himself knocking the attendants over the head, and tearing their clothes off, the black-eyed attendant must only smile and say, "Poor fellow!"

We shall soon illustrate in a large historical way the mediæval story of the peasant and his son who returning one evening past the gibbet noticed that one of the wretches that had been condemned "to die upright in the sun" was wriggling about not dead. In pity they cut him down, resuscitated him and took him home. He soon proved such a worthless, workless, thieving lout that 'i' the dark o' the moon' they took him back in disgust, and strung him up again on the gibbet.

The expert on the witness-stand prostituting the name of medicine and of science to cover some scoundrel with the tear-proof cloak of insanity is a sorry sight indeed. He may be sincere and honest; if so, our verdict would be that of the Welch jury: "not guilty; but we recommend him not to do it again." It reminds one of what the joker said of a glass-eye: Every body can see through it except the wearer. In considering the subtileness and intricacies of their diagnoses, so well as the contradictoriness of the testimony of rival experts, one thinks of the cannibal chiefs' reply as to what had become of the missionaries.

* See *Lancet*, for example, March 9, 1889, as to the wages of the chain and nail-makers of Cradley Heath.

† One hundred thousand dollars or a million, are frequently made or lost by a single man or company at a single race, by jockeying a horse, or creating an abscess in his jaw. This is Runciman's picture of but one of many of the strata of social crime created by this engine of pollution: "People hardly believe that there are thousands of sturdy, able-bodied men scattered among the great towns and cities, who have never worked and who never mean to work. In their hoggish way they 'feed well and lie warm,' and they subsist like odious reptiles fed from mysterious sources. Go to any suburban race-meeting and you will fancy that Hell's tatterdemalions have got holiday. Whatsoever things are vile, roguish, bestial, abominable, belong to the race-course loafers. To call them thieves is to flatter them, for their impudent knavery transcends mere thieving; they have not a virtue; they are more than dangerous, and if ever there comes a social convulsion, they will let us know of their presence in an awkward fashion, for they are trained to riot, fraud, bestiality and theft on the fringe of the race-course. * * * The country swarms with clubs where betting goes on all day and sometimes all night. The despicable dupes are drawn in one after another; agonized parents pray for help; employers chafe at the carelessness and preoccupation of their servants. The dupes sink to ruin unpitied and still the crowd steps on to the brink of the chasm. * * * Our faith, our honor, our future as a nation, are being sacrificed." (*Contemp. Rev.*, April, 1889.)

‡ There is report that, as an offset to the good results in Maine, more opium is used in that State than in a dozen others combined, and one druggist in Portland is said to have sold 25,000 hypodermic morphine syringes in the past few years.

"Alas!" he said, "they gave us so much good advice, we *had* to put them to death mercifully."

In the old days of the childhood of the race the troubled conscience got rid of communal responsibility by heaping its sins metaphorically on a poor little goat or sheep and shoo-shooing it over a precipice. It was crude; it was a funny bit of psychological legerdemain; it was hard on the goat, but—it was satisfactory. Modern scape-goat worship is a poor substitute. It also is crude, and it is jugglery, but is unsatisfactory. The future will see through the trick and will find it horribly expensive. The Chinese way is doubtless a little of the opposite extreme, but it doesn't load up the future: they regard insanity not as an extenuating, but as an aggravating circumstance in connection with crime.*

There is another reason why the communal conscience and responsibility cannot be downed. Not only do we make bad laws, fail to make good laws, and leave good laws unexecuted, but we are more or less conscious that the community is full of unarrested, unpunished criminals and insane. As every brain and skull, rigidly considered, is atypical to some extent, so every one is guilty of more or less scoundrelism; we are all a little daft. Often, too, the difference between the criminal behind iron bars and the criminal behind social custom is simply a difference of intellect. The first simply got caught. Maudsley well says, "There is a sort of tacit conspiracy in the social world to believe itself more virtuous than it is." This also coincides with the common impudence that tries to make crime and mental disease the result of ignorance and humble social position, the fact, of course, being the exact reverse. Modern education and modern wealth are at last but a sort of taking down the bars, and a training in jumping, whereby selfishness may get into forbidden clover. The sharp, educated, super-refined urban population would rot in its weakness and corruption if the stupid, honest country lads and lassies did not transfuse their blood and virtue and health into its veins every day.

To sum the matter up: Is the origin of crime and mental disease to be sought in the individual or in the influence of the environment? Undoubtedly in both, but it agrees with what evolution teaches as to the origin of faculty, and it corresponds with what we learn by a study of the laws and customs of our modern life, to lay by far the larger burden of responsibility on forces outside and beyond the government of the errant one. In unison with this comes also the thought that towards this view tend the lessons of a true religion and a large kindness. To see how outraged, groping, suffering, and enduring humanity clings to rightness of conduct and sanity of mind, leads us to the profoundest honor and reverence of our kind.

All of these considerations are of the greatest interest and far-reaching value, so far as concerns the origin and the prophylaxis of crime and insanity, but my contention would be pointless and my logic most lame if I did not at once add, that so soon as the overt act, that is, the proved criminal or mentally incompetent, stands before you, his judge, the whole question of responsibility or irresponsibility sinks at once and wholly out of sight. No judge or jury or expert should have anything whatever to do as to the prisoner's responsibility for his act. The whole Gordian knot is cut at one quick stroke by the staring, evident fact that nothing less than divine omniscience is in the least capable of deciding the question, or of meting out the punishment according to guilt. It is a bald, hideous, and stupendous absurdity, this ridiculous assumption either of power or of right on the part of any human being to explore the hidden recesses of the mind and to decide how far sanity has been driven out, and how far that strange mystery of individuality has sinned against its own light and by its own consent.* Every good, modest, and large intelligence knows this is so and mourns the barbaric shame that keeps the enormity upon our statute books.

As a necessary corollary you will have foreseen that, in my view, the death penalty should be abolished. Words fail me to express the hideousness of this last relic of savagery in an age of so-called civilization or even of good sense. There is not a single thing that can be said in its favor that is not at once annihilated by a spark of common sense or common justice. Whilst private retaliation and vengeance were allowed, an eye for an eye and a life for a life were excusable; but in taking away from the wronged man the right to kill his injurer, you have left retaliation and vengeance behind as unworthy and useless examples of barbarism. Lord Bramwell's deterrent theory of punishment collapses like a soap-bubble when you probe it with fact or logic. It is on a par with Niemeyer's approval of the dictum of the wife of a Prussian general that whooping-cough is only curable with the rod; and also Prof. Ruhle's recommendation of the shower-bath and birch-rod in certain cases of chronic vomiting. It is said that Quinet's mother used to hire a strapping fellow to come every Saturday and thoroughly thrash all the children, just on general principles! The courts, judges, and experts should act in the same way with the whole human race, for we are certainly all guilty. If the deterrent theory is the right one, then why do we not execute children and the insane. There is not the least doubt that both children and very many insane love their lives, and are even more keenly alive to the fear of punishment than most criminals, and yet, hang a child, and outraged society would justifiably rise in horror and mob sheriff, jury, and judge. Indeed, it may with much truth be urged that the so-called deterrent effect often has a stimulative effect. Dr. Guy tried to show that the execution of a lunatic was always followed by a crop of new murders. Bramwell asserted that many lunatics relied on immunity from punishment for crime on the ground of their own lunacy. Every resident or nurse in an insane asylum will acknowledge that there is more deviltry than insanity about many of their cases, and that if the fist or some equally servicable, but less brutal means could be used in return, much of the combined *diablerie* and lunacy would disappear. Humanity recognizing the incompetency of the deterrent theory has turned from it with the bungling make-shift and stop-gap of insanity, and at the present rate every villain will soon be excused as a crank.† The mere financial aspect of judicial murder is enough to condemn it. A man commits a crime; you spend thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars to try him (because of your deterrent and punishment theory it is of infinite importance that no mistake be made), and then after this you spend thousands more to kill him. But his life is certainly of some financial value. It is worth $14,600 at the age of 21, according to the present average rate of wages and probability of duration of life. You have spent several thousands of dollars to procreate and raise him to manhood; he is capable of working for you all his life; you have the right of making him work for you;—and yet you kill him in the most expensive way possible. I call that very lunacy of justice and the most egregious of follies.

The whole modern idea of punishment is a relic of barbarism and should be eradicated from jurisprudence, since by its very nature it can neither be just nor prudent.‡

* With its 300,000,000 inhabitants China has no asylum for the insane. At the Shanghai hospital where 22,000 patients are treated annually, there were but eleven cases of insanity among the number.

* A ridiculous example of this is to be seen in the April, 1889, number of the Journal of mental science, where a believer in his own power to penetrate the mystery of mind and crime gets sadly tangled in his own nets. A poor hectored and starving workman finding the sorry farce of life a bitter tragedy, kills his own beloved baby, rather than permit self and child to continue the bootless struggle. As if "enteric fever" or the "span of his arms" had anything to do with it! Such "science" is enough to make the angels weep.

† "Society having manufactured its criminals has scarcely the right to treat them in an angry spirit of malevolence."

‡ Lord Justice Frey said that "Punishment is an effort of man to find a more exact relation between sin and suffering." I would say that civilized

The essence of the English law consists in the statement that "to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be proved that at the time of committing the act the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong."

The essence of my protest consists in this:

1. No human power in a specific case can decide as to either point, and it is folly to pretend to do so.*

2. The tendency of both theories is to increase the evil, not limit it.

3. If we do our first duty: deprive both classes of liberty and of power to reproduce their like, and try to cure them, it doesn't make a fig's difference which theory is right, because both must then be ignored. The only sensible position is simply this: when a person either by crime or incapacity to care for himself has forfeited his right to freedom, then the people must take that freedom away. We have no earthly right to kill in return for crime done. We should reorganize the treatment of criminals and lunatics upon the sole principles of protection of the community and reformation of the law-breaker and mind-reader, to the utter exclusion of the idea of punishment or of deterring others,—the whole upon the most economic basis possible. Protection, reformation, economy; it is self-evident that these should be the ideals aimed at; but it is just as indubitable that present methods except bunglingly and partially neither aim at, nor secure either, but instead do often seem as if devised to secure the reverse. They certainly do not protect the community in hardly any imaginable way; they exaggerate and create both crime and lunacy, and no dozen of prize boodler aldermen could have invented a more expensive system of not doing justice, and of fleecing the tax-payer. As illustrative of the financial aspect: it is costing Great Britain something like twenty millions of dollars a year to care for her insane, and the amount will rise to thirty millions within ten years. It is simply impossible to estimate the bills of the police, the judge, and the jailor in the cause of crime.

As to social protection, every one knows it is a farce only equalled by the pretense that it does protect. In the recoil from the old heathen judicial murder, and, in lachrymose snivel, we adjudge most criminals lunatics, or if we can't do that, we put them in a pandemonium that, with caustic malevolence, we call a penitentiary, and a little later, with full powers of reproducing their like, and with hate, not penitence, in their hearts, we let them slip back into the bosom of the community, by the mysterious fatuity of a discharge from an asylum superintendent overburdened with his load, or a pardon by a possible political bummer miscalled a Governor. Then if Dean Swift were turned deity he could not have instituted a more sardonically bitter stroke than that now perpetrated by the greatest state of our civilized and Christian America: that of supporting in enforced idleness her malefactors who beg for work, and who from want of it, are going mad at the rate of thirty-seven in the past six months.

If we turn to the idea of reformation a still more remarkable spectacle is offered us. So far as the "penitentiary" is concerned, it is more apt to make everybody else penitent except the criminal. Even pretense at reformation has long ago passed into a joke of the chaplain, and if, while working out his sentence, the poor devil of a criminal do not lose the last ray of morality and hopefulness it is no fault of the system. If on the other hand, we look for a therapeutic zeal commensurate with the dogmatism of the school that holds mental diseases to be wholly physical, we are astounded to find that cure* and cause are things of little interest. It is no less an authority than Tuke that says† "we seek in vain in our asylums for any evidence of the systematic inquiry into the treatment of these conditions. The public thinks that madness can be eliminated by entertainment, and the Superintendent is bound to work up to this theory. These great etablishments instead of developing into great hospitals for the cure of disease, have done little more than maintain a high character as model lodging houses for the insane." This indictment is nailed with the fearful charge that but one contribution to the pathology or therapeutics of insanity worthy to be called scientific has appeared as an offset or rival to the giant strides of progress in every other department of science and medicine. In fact, what ingenuity could devise a better method of making, exaggerating, and confirming madness than to huddle hundreds and thousands together suspected or convicted of mental defect? That this is so, even Tuke admits, and says further: "What every case demands as the primary condition of recovery is separate and individual treatment and consideration."‡

In olden times the piano-forte-tuners used to have an octave in which all the dissonances and discords of the whole keyboard were gathered, that they didn't know how to distribute and harmonize. They called this octave, "the Devil," and the player, of course, had to avoid it as much as possible, or touch it very gingerly.

The pith of the whole matter consists in the fact that in our life the sociological tuner cannot confine his "Devil" within the limits of one octave. By dint of an unmorality that is only equalled by the development of sly cunning, the modern intellect has got ahead of the antique conscience and is fast leaving criminal jurisprudence as a curiosity of "ye olden time." That is to say, like the modern piano-tuner, we have, so far as true criminality is concerned, succeeded admirably in distributing "the devil" throughout the whole seven octaves of society. But as regards lunacy the old plan of the single octave has been rigidly adhered to with the inevitable result that the devil is overrunning his octave and threatening to absorb a big part of the key-board. In 1879 Professor von Krafft-Ebing, the well-known alienist, estimated that in the most civilized peoples there was one insane person to every 500 of the population. More recent statistics show the proportion to be more nearly one to every 300, or 400. All statisticians are agreed that the greater the civilization, the higher the ratio of the insane, and that without exception the increase is far higher than that of the population.§ In less than a dozen modern nations there are to-day about a million lunatics. While the general population doubles, the number of the insane increases three, or four fold. The number is kept much lower by what may be called the obverse of the medal; the fact of suicide, that is also growing three or four times faster than population. The number of idiots, blind, deaf-mutes, and criminals, is likewise increasing more rapidly than the people who have to support and care for them. We have now probably six or seven, perhaps eight hundred thousand such folk as one of our burdens in this country.

In view of the rapidly increasing load would it not be advisable to remodel our penal laws and those regulating the treat-

jurisprudence should have nothing whatever to do or say about sin, suffering, or the relation between the two.

* It is gratifying to see that a halt is called by the Supreme Court of New York: according to a late decision the expression of an opinion on the part of a physician that a man is insane on any other ground than that he is dangerous to himself or others renders the physician liable to a suit for damages.

* In 1870 Sir Arthur Mitchell found that out of 1297 patients admitted into Scottish Asylums in 1858, 474 died in the asylums, 412 were then alive as chronic lunatics, and 411 had died, or were alive, sane. This is a worse mortality than hydrophobia.

† Nineteenth Century, April, 1889.

‡ Walford says the mortality in public institutions is ten times as great as the general morality.

§ In Great Britain the average annual increase of lunatics in asylums has been 1580, and the gross registered increase 45,881. In Paris the number in 1872 was one lunatic to 1212 of the population. In 1886 the proportion was one to 1091.

ment of lunatics in some way that shall accomplish the decrease and not the increase of these classes? Would not this end be sought more rationally by the following means:

1. The complete eradication from legislation and jurisprudence of all ideas of punishment and of the deterrent effect of the same, sentence to loss of freedom being given upon certain proof either of criminal act or incapacity of self-support or self-control.

2. The establishment of a non-political, highly paid State Board of Control of the highest Medical, Legal, and Administrative ability, which shall have charge of the combined Defective, Dependent and Delinquent classes, the discharging or pardoning power to reside in this Board alone.

3. The Treatment of these classes to be organized so far as possible upon an economic basis, but always with the sublime and steady purpose of Cure in view.

4. The Protection of the Community, and the safe-guarding of the future against the inheritance of criminal and unsound taint, by the euthanasia of idiots, monstrosities, etc., the interdiction of marriage of paupers, and of the physically unsound, and by the asexualization of the law breaker and the mentally unsound.

The thoughts underlying this writing might be summarized as follows:

1. The unvarying testimony of statistics and students of sociology is that the defective, dependent, and delinquent classes and suicide, as a whole, are, in all civilized nations, steadily and continuously increasing much faster than the increase of the communities supporting them; this shows that something is radically wrong as to the causes and the societies producing these classes; it is, indeed, a wrong that cannot fail in time to bring society to a very literal *reductio ad absurdum,—seu ad lunaticum.*

2. Though not wholly, this wrong is found to consist chiefly, in the vicious structure of society, economically and morally, in a perniciousness of ideal and custom that can but yield a fruitage of criminality and mental wreckage.

3. The half-conscious, half-smothered feeling of this communal responsibility, co-operating with the criminal's efforts by legal technicality, and by medical aid, has served to the same end by legalizing and excusing crime in the community, or by covering it with the cloak of insanity.

4. The aid rendered by a certain school of medical writers and experts to this morbid tendency has been based upon the theory that crime and mental disease are simply the effects of criminal or cerebral atypism and brain disease, and therefore anatomically necessitated. This theory is not only not proved, but is disproved by a number of unanswerable facts, and considerations, and is a stultifying argument to use by those whose field of medical study has shown the least progress, and in which therapeutics has hardly entered.

5. Our legal sentences should be divested of all thought of punishment or of deterrent effects, the asylum and penitentiary combined and put under one management, the clinical examination and study of the pathogenesis of these conditions furthered, and all with the sole end of cure and of prophylaxis.

To hasten the flow of dreary hours a gifted woman once wrote a gruesome tale of how a cunning but shortsighted delver and experimenter in lifes' mysterious genesis, got together many old and foul gatherings from cemetery and from dissection-room, and created a living monster, of wonderful growth and power, but without a touch or breath of divinity. Love and sympathy of a certain kind it indeed sought and hungered for, but the miserable wretch was shunned by all. It soon became conscious of its own moral deformity and hideousness, and in detestation of its own life it came to hate the author of its being. Growing ever more powerful, it restlessly and viciously plotted the injury and ruin of its unfortunate creator.

CORRESPONDENCE.

PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

HAVING had a job of work to do in another part of the State, I am in arrears to the critics who testify against me in Nos. 96 and 97. I beg a little space that I may pay to all of them the respect of a reply.

Mr. Lynch makes a strong case, and the object-lesson he presents is valuable. It shows how unfairly taxation may be apportioned between the resident owner of a town lot, and the non-resident owner of the adjoining lot, who holds it for speculation only. In this inequality lies the popularity of Mr. George's doctrine. I think this wrong can easily be righted by fairer methods of assessment, but will Mr. Lynch explain how it can possibly be cured by sweeping both lots into the gulf of confiscation?

Mr. William C. Wood, of Gloversville, N. Y., overwhelms me with the portentous warning that I have "raised up a mightier adversary than Mr. George—the combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world." This reads like the challenge of the circus bills which I see on the fence across the street, a style of literary composition greatly affected in these days, and which I have always admired. It gives a piquancy to the double chestnuts of the clown, and the double somersaults of the man who jumps over eight horses and an elephant. I enjoy a friendly wrestle in THE OPEN COURT with men of my own calibre, or with men a trifle heavier than I am, but I do not care to try a fall with "the combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world." I think it is hardly fair to bring such a combination against me. However, as Mr. Samuel Weller said on his way to the swarry, "I'll try and bear up agin such a reglar knock down o' talent." I will do the best I can.

Mr. Wood confines himself to massive law, and he gives authority to his legal argument by adding M. D. to his name, as if the discussion were a mere matter of measles or lumbago. A doctor prescribing law is like a lawyer prescribing physic. To rely on either prescription is hazardous. "The cobbler to his last" is an old proverb, I forgot the Latin of it; indeed I never knew it, but the philosophy of it is good in any language, and will keep in any climate. To be sure, a blacksmith may make a watch, but he is liable to leave out some important wheels necessary to its perfect mechanism. A doctor may draw a tooth, and still not be able to draw a bill in chancery, because he is liable to leave out some important wheels essential to the perfect mechanism of the bill. When I want a patch put on my boot I go to a cobbler; when I want a fever cured I go to a doctor; and when I want a bit of law, I go to a lawyer for it, if I can afford to do so. It costs more than the jurisprudence I get from the tinker, albeit, he is a wise man among kettles, but it is cheaper even at the higher price. For these reasons, not feeling competent to contradict the law of land as asserted and expounded by Dr. Wood, I consulted a lawyer, and he told me that Dr. Wood was wrong on every point, for which misfortune, being a doctor and not a lawyer, he is not at all to blame. My legal adviser, not having time to attend to the matter, told me to consult a New York lawyer by the name of Kent, and I did so.

Without any legal assistance I could see at a glance that some of Dr. Wood's law was error. For instance, this: "No man absolutely owns land. He may hold, it is true, an *estate* in the land. This *estate* consists of three things; the right of possession, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposition." I could see in a moment that this curious bit of law came out of the surgery, because my landlord, the man who owns the house in which I live, has not the right of possession. He is owner of the house and lot,

but the right of possession is in me. He has given me a lease of the place for one year. From this I think that several men may own several estates in the same piece of land, according to the quantity of interest that each man hath therein. I may incidentally mention that Blackstone agrees with me in this, which is a fortunate thing for Blackstone.

With praiseworthy self-confidence Dr. Wood expresses his medical opinion that even such right in land as a man may have is "subject to the right of the State to alter or defeat it." I did not need legal advice on this part of the subject because I remembered that this "right of the State" is expressly denied by the American constitution, wherein it is declared that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Here the right of the citizen to own land, even as against the State, is recognized and protected by the organic law. So long as the constitution remains as it is now, the State has no right to "alter or defeat" the estate of ownership which a man may have in his land. I also remembered that once I "entered" a forty acre tract in Iowa, for which I paid the government fifty dollars. In return for the money I received a patent from the United States transferring the estate from the government to me, and my heirs and assigns for ever. There was nothing said in the deed about the right of the government to resume the title to the land and to confiscate it after scooping my fifty dollars into the treasury. My ownership of the forty acres was complete as soon as I received the patent, and that ownership was made secure to me by the Constitution of the United States.

Dr. Wood, in the dogmatic style which professional men employ, asserts that "absolute private property in land has no legal existence and is an impossibility being incompatible with civil government." I offer as evidence against that statement one of the most conspicuous facts in civilization, the government of the United States, under which men actually enjoy the right of absolute private property in land. I find in the United States, compatible with private property in land, a very good quality of civil government. It is not perfect by any means, but comparatively speaking it is a fair article of government as governments go. It is quite certain from this evidence that absolute private property in land has a legal existence in the United States, and is not incompatible with civil government; but it is not at all certain that civil government of the best quality could exist without the right of private property in land.

I am somewhat acquainted with real estate, having dug and wheeled a good deal of it, but I am not quite so familiar with the law of land as I am with the weight of it on a shovel. I therefore make the following statements on the authority of my legal adviser, Chancellor Kent, of New York. He once wrote a book entitled "Commentaries on American Law," I think that was the name of it, and speaking of land-ownership in the United States, he says:

"Though the law in some of the United States discrimi ates between an estate in free and pure allodium and an estate in fee-simple absolute, these estates mean essentially the same thing; and the terms may be used indiscriminately to describe the most ample and perfect interest which can be owned in land. The words *seizin* and *fee* have always been so used in New York whether the subject was lands granted before or after the revolution; though by the act of 1787, the former were declared to be held by free and common socage, and the latter in free and pure allodium.

"The New York Revised Statutes have abolished the distinction, by declaring that all lands within the State, are *allodial*, and the entire absolute property invested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective estates."

In order to ascertain the meaning of "allodium," which I thought must be some kind of metal, I searched in Webster's dictionary, and there I found the following definition of the word: "Allodium, land which is the absolute property of the owner; real estate held in absolute independence, without being subject to any rent, service, or acknowledgement to a superior." This is about as plain as print can make it, and it must be quite a revelation to Dr. Wood that all lands in his own State are *allodial*, and the entire, absolute property invested in the owners. It is to be regretted that Dr. Wood neglected to examine the subject a little before writing his commentaries on the law of real estate, because they are so "incompatible" with those of Chancellor Kent, and so curiously at variance with the Revised Statutes of New York. The law of New York making all the lands *allodial* is the law of all the States, and on this matter Chancellor Kent makes the following remarks:

"In many of the States there were never any marks of feudal tenure, and in all of them the ownership of land is essentially free and independent."

Dr. Wood tells us he is aware that the State has treated land as though it were actually private property. Chancellor Kent has now told him the reason why. The State treats land as though it were actually private property, because it actually *is* private property, declared to be so by the law, and protected as private property by the constitution of the United States. From all this it appears that it is Dr. Wood who is combating "the combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world." WHEELBARROW.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIX. — Continued.

"I do not wish to make a long demand upon the time of my most Serene Lord," began the courtier. "Prof. Werner begs that your Highness will consent to receive him before his departure."

"What is the cause of this importunity?" exclaimed the Sovereign; "he has already been here, and I have refused him."

"I must be permitted to make the respectful remark that after all that has passed, the honor of a personal interview cannot well be refused him. Your Highness would be the last to approve of so marked a violation of seemly considerations."

The Sovereign looked vindictively at the High Steward.

"All the same, I will not see him."

"Besides these considerations, it is not advisable to refuse this interview," continued the old lord, with emphasis.

"Of that I am the best judge," replied the Sovereign, carelessly.

"This person has become privy to certain things, the exposure of which, for the sake of the princely dignity, must be avoided, even at a heavy sacrifice, for he is not bound to keep the secret."

"No one will listen to an individual, and a dreamer at that."

"What he will divulge will not only be believed, but will excite a storm against your Highness."

"Gossip from bookworms will not hurt me."

"This person is a highly-respected man of character, and will use his observations to demand of the whole civilized world that the possibility of similar occurrences at this Court should be made impossible."

* Translation copyrighted.

"Let him do what he dare," cried the Sovereign, with an outbreak of fury, "we shall know how to protect ourselves."

"The exposure may yet be guarded against; but there is only one last and radical remedy."

"Speak out, your Excellence; I have always respected your judgment."

"What inflames the Professor," continued the courtier, cautiously, "will become generally known; at all events it will produce a great sensation and dangerous scandal; nothing further. It was a personal observation only that he was compelled to make at the foot of the tower; it was a conjecture only which he gave vent to beneath the same tower. According to his assertion, two attempts have been made, and yet neither has been followed by evil consequences. To be able to provoke the public judgment of the civilized world on such grounds is doubtful. However upright the narrator may be, he may himself have been deceived. Your Highness remarks rightly that the irritation of a single scholar would occasion disagreeable gossip, nothing further."

"Most admirable, your Excellence," interrupted the Sovereign.

"Unfortunately there is one important circumstance that I have not yet added. With respect to that personal observation at the foot of the tower, the Scholar has a witness, and *I* am that witness. When he calls upon me for my testimony and speaks of my personal observation, I must declare that he is right, for I am not accustomed to consider half-truth as truth."

The Sovereign started.

"It was I who restrained the hand," remarked the courtier; "and because that simple scholar is in the right, and because I must confirm his views concerning the state of my gracious master's health, I tell you there is only one last and radical remedy." The High Steward took the document out of the portfolio. "My remedy is, that your Highness should, by a great resolve, anticipate the storm, and high-mindedly consent to make this declaration the expression of your will."

The Sovereign cast a look on the paper, and flung it away from him:

"Are you mad, old man?"

"Insanity has not yet been discovered in me," replied the High Steward, sorrowfully. "If my gracious master would but weigh the circumstances with his usual acuteness! It has unfortunately become impossible for your Highness to carry on the duties of your high calling in the way you have hitherto done. Even if your Highness considered it possible, your faithful servants are in the painful position of not partaking of this opinion."

"These faithful servants are my High Steward?"

"I am one of them. If your Highness will not consent to give your princely approbation to this project, consideration for that which is dearer to me than your Highness's favor will forbid my remaining in your service."

"I repeat the question, have you become insane, Lord High Steward?"

"Only deeply moved; I did not think that I would ever have to choose between my honor and my service to your Highness."

He took out another document from the portfolio.

"Your resignation," exclaimed the Sovereign, reading. "You should have added to it, 'with permission.'" The Sovereign seized the pen. "Here, Baron von Ottenburg, you are released from your office."

"It is no joyful thanks that I express to your Highness for it. But now it is done, I, Hans von Ottenburg, express to you my respectful request that your Highness would still, at this hour, be pleased to sign the other document. For in case your Highness should hesitate to fulfil the earnest entreaties of a former servant, this same request, from now on, will be forced upon your Highness's ear in many ways, and by persons who would not use so much consideration for your Highness as I have hitherto done. Till now there has been one who has begged of you, a professor,—now there are two, he and I,—in another hour the number will become burdensome to your Highness."

"A former High Steward, a rebel!"

"Only a petitioner. It is your Highness's right, of your own free will, to make the high decision to which I endeavor to influence you. But I beg you once more to consider that it can no longer be avoided. Your Highness's Court will, in the next hour, be brought front to front with the same alternative as myself; for my regard for the honor of these gentlemen and ladies will compel me, on the same grounds which have led to my decision, not to be silent with respect to them. Without doubt, the gentlemen of the Court will, like me, approach your Highness with earnest entreaties, and, like me, will resign in case their entreaties are unsuccessful, and without doubt your Highness will have to find new attendants. Respect for the honor and the office of those who rule under you will oblige me to make the same communication to your Highness's ministers. True, these also might be replaced by less important servants of the State. But further, from loyalty and devotion to your Highness's house, from anxiety about the life and welfare of the Hereditary Prince and his illustrious sister, as well as from attachment to this country in which I have grown gray, I see myself obliged to appeal to every Government connected with ours for an energetic enforcement of this my request.

As long as I was a servant of the Court, my oath and allegiance compelled me to silence and careful regard for your Highness's personal interests. I am now relieved from this obligation, and I shall from henceforth advocate the interests of our people in opposition to those of your Highness. Your Highness may yourself judge what that would lead to; this signature may be put off, but can no longer be avoided. Every delay makes the situation worse; the signing will no longer appear as the voluntary act of a high-minded decision, but as a necessity forced upon you. Finally, let your Highness bear in mind that the Professor has made in the Tower Castle another important observation,—another with respect to the conduct of a certain Magister; it is my destiny to know much which does not belong to the secrets of my department."

The Sovereign lay on his sofa, with his head turned away. He folded his hands before his face. A long oppressive silence intervened.

"You have been my personal enemy from the first day of my reign," suddenly put in the Sovereign.

"I have been the faithful servant of my gracious master; personal friendship has never been my portion, and I have never simulated it."

"You have always intrigued against me."

"Your Highness well knows that I have served you as a man of honor," replied the Baron, proudly. "Now, also, when once more I beg of you to sign this document, I do not stand upon the right which many years of confidence give me with your Highness; I do not advance as an excuse for this repeated importunity the interest that I have been entitled to take in the dignity and welfare of this princely house; I have another ground for relieving your Highness from the humiliation of a public discussion of your Highness's state of mind. I am a loyal and monarchically-minded man. He who has respect for the high office of a prince is under the urgent necessity of guarding this office from being lowered in the eyes of the nation. This he must do, not by concealing what is insupportable, but by extirpating it. Therefore, since that scene in the tower, there has been this struggle between me and your Highness, that I, in order to maintain your Highness's exalted office, must sacrifice your Highness's person. I am determined to do so, and there consequently only remains to your Highness the choice of doing that which is inevitable, of your own free will, and honorably in the eyes of the world, or dishonorably and at the instance of importunate strangers. The words are spoken; I beg for a speedy decision."

The old lord stood close before the ruler. He looked firmly and coldly into the restless eyes of his former master, and pointed with his finger fixedly to the parchment. It was the keeper conquering the patient.

"Not now—not here," exclaimed the Sovereign, beside himself. "In the presence of the Hereditary Prince I will take counsel and come to a decision."

"The presence and signature of your ministers are necessary for the document, not the presence of the Hereditary Prince. But as your Highness prefers signing in the presence of the Prince, I will do my self the honor of following your Highness to Rossau, and beg one of the ministers to accompany me for this object."

The Sovereign looked reflectively down.

"I am still a ruler," he exclaimed, springing up; and seizing the signed resignation of the High Steward, he tore it up. "High Steward von Ottenburg, you will accompany me in my carriage to Rossau."

"Then the minister will follow your Highness in my carriage," said the old lord, calmly. "I hasten to inform him."

CHAPTER XL.

ON THE ROAD TO THE ROCK.

Towards the quiet country town which pious colonists had once built about the monastery walls of praying monks, and towards the rock on which the heathen maiden had once whispered oracles to her race, were now hastening along different roads horses and wheels, together with living men who were seeking the decision of their fate; here joyful, rising hopes—there downward, declining powers; here the pure dream of enthusiastic youth—there the destructive dream of a gloomy spirit. In the valley and over the rock hovered the spirits of the country; they prepared themselves to receive the flying strangers with the hospitality of home.

The early dawn sent its pale glimmer into Laura's study; she stood by her writing-table, and cast a lingering look on the familiar book in which, with rapid hand, she had written the concluding words. She fastened the book and the Doctor's poems together, and concealed them under the cover of her trunk. She cast another look on the sanctuary of her maiden life, and then flew down the stairs into the arms of her anxious mother. It was a wonderful elopement—a quiet Sunday morning, a mysterious light, gloomy rain-clouds, contrasting strongly with the deep red glow of morning. Laura lay long in the arms of her weeping mother, till Susan urged her departure; then she passed into the street, where the Doctor awaited her, and hastened with him into the carriage; for the carriage was ordered to wait in a deserted place around the corner, and not before the house; upon this Laura had insisted. It was a wonderful elopement—a modest, sedate traveling-companion, the object of the journey the house of a loved friend, and, lastly, a large leather bag containing cold meat and other victuals, which

Mrs. Hahn herself carried to the carriage, in order that she might once more kiss her son and Laura, and bless them amid tears.

Spitehahn had for several days found it difficult to bear his lonely existence; since the departure of the learned lodgers he had been much disturbed, but when the master of the house also disappeared, there was no one to recognize him. This morning he cast cold glances on Laura as she hovered round her sorrowing mother, and looked askance at Susan when she carried the great traveling-trunk to the carriage; then he sneaked out into the street in order to give expression to his hatred of the neighboring house. But when Mrs. Hahn hastened to the carriage with the leather bag, he saw that something was wrong and he crept after his neighbor from across the way; and whilst she mounted on the step of the carriage to warn her Fritz of the sharp morning air, and to kiss Laura once more, he sprang upon the footboard and ensconced himself under the leather apron of the coachbox, determined to abide his time. The coachman seated himself, and supposing the dog belonged to the travelers, cracked his whip and started off. Another look and call to the mother, and the adventurous journey began.

Laura's soul trembled under the pressure of passionate feelings, which were called forth by this long-desired but dreaded hour. The houses of the city disappeared, and the poplars on the high road seemed to dance past. She looked anxiously at her Fritz, and placed the tips of her fingers in his hand. He smiled, and pressed the little hand warmly.

His cheerfulness was a support to her. She looked tenderly into his true face.

"The morning is cool," he began, "allow me to fasten your cloak."

"I am very comfortable," replied Laura, again putting her trembling hand within his.

Thus they sat silently together, the sun peeped modestly from behind his red curtains and smiled on Laura, so that she was obliged to close her eyes. Her whole childhood passed before her in fleeting pictures; and finally, she heard the significant words of her friends at her last visit. Her godmother had said to her, Return soon again, child; and Laura now felt with emotion that this return was at an immeasurable distance. Her other godmother had kindly asked, When shall we see each other again? and a touching echo sounded in Laura's heart, Who knows when? All Nature was stirring in the fresh morning: a flock of pigeons flew across the field, a hare ran along the road as if racing, a splendid cluster of blue flowers grew on the border of the ditch, and red roofs shone from among the fruit trees. Everything on earth looked green and hopeful, blooming and waving in the morning breeze. The country people who were going to the city met them, a peasant sitting on his waggon smoking his pipe nodded a good morning to Laura, who held out her hand as if she wished to send a greeting to the whole world. The milkwoman in her little cart, who was going to sell her milk, also greeted her, saying, "Good morning, Miss Laura." Laura drew back, and, looking alarmed at Fritz, said:

"She has recognized us."

"Without doubt," replied the Doctor, gaily.

"She is a gossip, Fritz; she cannot hold her tongue, and will tell all the servant girls in our street that we are driving together along this road. This distresses me, Fritz."

"We are taking a drive," replied the Doctor, triumphantly; "going to pay a visit to some one; we are going to act as sponsors together in the country. Do not mind these trifles."

"It began by our being sponsors together, Fritz," answered Laura, tranquilized. "It has all been owing to the cat's paws."

"I do not know," replied Fritz, slyly, "whether this misfortune did not originate earlier. When you were quite a little girl I kissed you once."

"I do not remember that," said Laura.

"It was for a basket of colored beans that I brought you from our garden. I demanded the kiss, and you consented to give the price, but immediately after wiped your mouth with your hand. From that time I have liked you better than all others."

"Do not let us talk of these things," said Laura, troubled; my recollections of old times are not all so harmless."

"I have always been kept at a distance," exclaimed Fritz, "even to-day. It is a shame. It must not go on so; I must have some serious talk about it. Travelling together as we are, it is not fitting that we should use the stiff *you* in talking to one another."

Laura looked reproachfully at him. "Not to-day," she said, softly.

"It is of no use now," replied Fritz, boldly. "I will no longer be treated as a stranger. I once heard the honest *thou* from you, but never since. It pains me."

Laura regretted that. "But only when we are quite alone," she entreated.

"I propose it for all time," continued Fritz, undisturbed, "otherwise there will be continually mistakes and confusion."

He offered her his hand, which she shook gently, and before she could stop him she felt a kiss on her lips.

(*To be continued.*)

SELECTIONS FROM THE GERMAN.

TRANSLATED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

XVII.

GOOD DEEDS.

Good deeds, although in silence done,
Live on forever, every one—
Rare flowers that Time cannot forget,
Bright-glowing stars that never set.

—*Claudius.*

XVIII.

TO ONESELF.

Be wholly undismayed; be calmly unsubdued;
Though envy should oppose and petty jealousy;
At harmony with self, complain not bitterly
Though Fortune, Time, and Place be with thy will at feud!
What saddens or uplifts, elected is of Fate.
Take hold of circumstance; waste nothing in regret;
Do that which must be done; thy chance is coming yet;
That which thou livest for shall crown thee soon or late.

Man blames or praises—what? An ill or lucky star.
Heed not the multitude, but view things as they are;
For all rests with thyself. Let phantoms not beguile;
And ere thou farther go, be sure thy soul to scan.
Who his own ruler is and himself conquer can,
Shall subjugate the world, unswayed by it the while!

—*Paul Fleming.*

XIX.

FAREWELL.

Hark! 'tis the shepherd sounding,
Afar, his evening strain;
The rustling of the forest
And stream makes a refrain.

Behind yon hill is shining
A glow of sunlight rare—
My soul, spread now thy pinions
And waft me over there!

—*Eichendorff.*

XX.

JOY.

Joy! O beauteous spark of heaven—
Daughter from Elysium sprung,
Tread we with enthusiasm
All thy holy courts among!
Thine the talisman uniting
Those whom fortune would divide;
All mankind become as brothers
If thy happy smile abide!

—*Schiller.*

NOTES.

The Cosmopolitan for August contains an article by Cardinal Gibbons on "The Dignity, Rights, and Responsibility of Labor."

In the *Revue Philosophique* of July appear the following essays: "De la Possibilité d'une Méthode dans la Science du Réel," M. F. Evellin; "L'Energie et la Vitesse des Mouvements Volontaires," M. Ch. Féré; "Les Formes les plus élevées de l'Abstraction," (conclusion), M. F. Paulhan; Analyses, Comptes-Rendus, etc. The researches of M. Féré are accurate and exhaustive.

The following are the contents of *Mind*, for the present quarter: "The Psychology of Belief," Prof. William James; "The Psychological Work of Herbart's Disciples," G. F. Stout; "The Empiricist's Position," Prof. A. Bain; "On Some Facts of Binocular Vision," J. H. Hyslop; "Motor Objects and the Presentation-Continuum," M. E. Lowndes; with the usual critical notices, reviews, etc., in the several departments of philosophy and psychology.

Biblia, and The Building News, is the title of a little journal whose purpose is "educating and interesting the people in Building and Loan Associations." In effect, it is two papers in one, for the greater part is devoted to the exposition of Biblical science; it contains essays exegetical and critical, the Book of Genesis in the original Hebrew, with an interlinear translation, and promises to print in like manner the New Testament in the original Greek.

A correspondent, Mr. Michael Corcoran, of Lincoln, Nebraska, writes us in criticism of Mr. Shipley's letter "Thoughts on the Bruno Celebration." Mr. Corcoran regards the Pope's admission that his "Spiritual authority and moral influence are being overthrown" as merely a facile stroke of policy, a "way of saying 'I told you so,'" and thus fortifying in the future the position of the church and ensuring the acceptance of papal advice. Mr. Corcoran also protests against the inconsiderate deification of liberty of thought. Mr. Corcoran thinks that the constant repetition of the cry for free thought has become wearisome to the public; there existing no necessity of this clamor for a privilege which every individual possesses.

The Humboldt Publishing Co., 28 Lafayette Place, New York, have recently issued "The Story of Creation—A Plain Account of Evolution," by Edward Clodd, F. R. A. S, and "The Pleasures of Life," by Sir John Lubbock. Writing of the former work a London critic says: "Surely the astounding history of the evolution of the visible universe has never been told more popularly, perspicuously, and pleasantly than in this volume." Our readers who have neither the time nor the courage to read the more voluminous works on the subject of evolution will be much pleased with the concise and vigorous account given in this latest book by Mr. Clodd. The latter of these two publications constitutes Part II of "The Pleasures of Life." The subject is divided into thirteen sections: Ambition, Wealth, Health, Love, Art, Poetry, Music, The Beauties of Nature, The Troubles of Life, Labor and Rest, Religion, The Hope of Progress, and The Destiny of Man. Sir John Lubbock's work is mainly a collection of well-selected and annotated quotations; it is the view of mankind on the pleasures of mankind's life.

We quote the following from "The Abuse of Fiction," by Mr. Walter Lewin, in the August *Forum*. We hope that the opinion expressed will remain uppermost in the minds of our readers, when, leaving occasionally the pages of The Open Court, they seek, in the literature of fiction, supplementary intellectual enjoyment. "Not many years ago," says Mr. Lewins, "philosophy "being in a tangle, as it often is, the cry was raised, 'Back to "Kant"; and for fiction, when the time is ripe, the cry must be, "Back to Scott.' * * * His work is genuine; it 'never grows old "or stale;' we can 'return to it again and again'; it has 'the "coolness and clearness and deliciousness of the water fresh from "the fountain-head.' Scott is unconscious alike of his art and of "what is termed moral purpose; he is '*un*moral,' to use Mr. Ash-"croft Noble's phrase. Like Shakespeare, he has no theory to "uphold. He is content to report clearly and truly just what is, "without deductions or suppression. Nevertheless, or rather, just "because of this, his novels are rich in benefit to every healthy "mind, and are what all novels should be and all true novels "must be, a moral force in the world. The novels of the future "may be romantic, or psychological, or homely, or all three; the "only essential condition is that they shall be true in the sense "that 'Waverley' and 'The Heart of Midlothian' are true."

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion, from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

THE STRUGGLE FOR SALVATION.

[A critical review of a work of the same title, by PROF. BENNER, which has recently attracted much attention on the Continent. A careful study of the evolution of religion. From the German of P. MICHAELIS (No. 99.)]

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BY ALFRED BINET.

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What is much less known, is the reason, the mechanism, of this anæsthesia of the retina. The many experimentalists who have hitherto studied the subject in question, have pointed out a number of peculiar features rather difficult of comprehension, in fact so strange and striking, that some have ascribed them to simulation on the part of the subjects. To furnish a precise and clear instance of this, we may state, that there are hysterical individuals who, with both eyes open, perceive colors which they cannot distinguish with one of their eyes alone; while it seems even more wonderful that there should be hysterical persons who do not see at all with one eye, when that eye alone is open, but whose unilateral blindness disappears as soon as the function of vision is performed simultaneously with both eyes.

Let us dwell for a moment upon the instance given, and later we shall endeavor to explain it.

We have for examination an hysterical person who has entirely lost the sight of the right eye. Let us place before the patient's eyes a 'box of Flees'; that is, a box furnished with two eye-holes. On the bottom of the box are placed two points of different colors, the one to the right, the other to the left; and by a skillful arrangement the patient sees with his right eye the point situated to the left, and with his left the point situated to the right. This is the method employed to detect shamming and simulation; for instance, in the case of soldiers drafted for the army. Thus the shamming individual, who pretends not to see with his right eye, will say that he does not see the point which appears to the right; but that is the point which is seen by the left eye. The hysterical individual acts somewhat differently, for he actually sees the two points—that to the left, and that to the right; he accordingly sees with both eyes.

A great many hypotheses have been advanced in order to explain these apparent contradictions—anatomical hypotheses, like that of M. Parinaud, and psychological hypotheses, like that of M. Bernheim. For the time being we shall leave this matter aside. It will be far more profitable to begin by setting forth our recent observations; for a simple observation can often better point out the incorrectness of an hypothesis than any number of arguments.

Experiments which we have made in the preceding essays with reference to the insensibility of the sense of touch in hysterical subjects, have shown us of what nature this insensibility really is. As a matter of fact the hysterical subject is doubled; he possesses two distinct consciousnesses; and one of these consciousnesses accurately perceives all the excitations that have been impressed upon the insensible region.

We might already suppose, 'a priori', that insensibility of the retina cannot in any respect differ from insensibility of the skin in hysterical persons. The facts that we have previously set forth, confirmed by different authors and derived from our own experiments, are too significant not to be general. But, we cannot be satisfied with purely theoretical views.

I long sought in vain for some simple, decisive, and purely clinical experiment which might prove that the sensibility of the retina, in cases of hysterical anæsthesia, was only dissociated and not destroyed. Chance, aided in some degree by perseverance, has enabled me to establish the following fact. We place the hysterical subject before a scale of printed letters, and tentatively seek the maximum distance from the board at which the subject is able to read the largest letters. It frequently happens with hysterical persons that the vision of forms at a distance is very imperfect; a circumstance which may be owing either to weakness of visual acuteness or to a defect in the mechanism of adjustment. For the present we are not attempting to distinguish these two facts from one another.

After having experimentally determined the max-

* Copyrighted under "Psychological Studies."

imum distance at which the subject can read the largest letters of the series, we invite him to read certain smaller letters that are placed below the former. Naturally enough the subject is unable to do so; but, if at this instant, we slip a pencil into the anæsthetic hand, we are able, by the agency of the hand, to induce automatic writing, and this writing will reproduce precisely the letters which the subject is in vain trying to read.

This process of experimentation has the pre-eminent advantage of taking the subject in his natural condition—while awake and at rest; for the power of automatic writing persists with him, and this automatic writing has moreover the advantage of revealing to us the latent depths of consciousness that remain unknown to the subject.

After the investigations which we have made upon the hysterical anæsthesia of the skin, an explanation of the preceding phenomenon seems to me wholly superfluous, and I shall be satisfied with the assertion that the second consciousness possesses a stronger visual acuteness than the first consciousness.

It is highly interesting to observe, that during the very time the subject is repeatedly declaring, that he does not see the letters, the anæsthetic hand, unknown to him, writes out the letters one after another. If, interrupting the experiment, we ask the subject to write, of his own free will, the letters of the printed series, he will not be able to do so, and when asked simply to draw what he sees, he will only produce a few zig-zag marks that have no meaning.

Let us further remark, that although the subject maintains that he sees nothing, the automatic writing nevertheless reproduces all the letters marked on the black-board with perfect regularity, without omitting a single letter, beginning at the first and finishing with the last. We must, accordingly, suppose that during the experiment the second consciousness directs the line of sight, without the knowledge of the principal subject.

The visual acuteness of this second consciousness in the subjects which I have examined has seemed to me to be equal to the normal acuteness. If we place the subject at too great a distance from the black-board the automatic writing will begin to hesitate; the subject will thereupon commit real mistakes; for example, he will read "Lucien" instead of "Louisa," which, incidentally observed, proves that the phenomenon wrongly bears the name of automatic writing; an automaton does not mistake; the second consciousness, on the contrary, is subject to error because it is a consciousness, because it is a thing that reasons and combines thoughts.

In the course of investigations of this kind there sometimes arise certain perturbations which are very important to understand, and which afford a fresh proof of those manifold relations existing between the two consciousnesses that we investigated in a former paper. Thus, when the subject is convinced that he cannot read the letters on the board, it may happen that the automatic writing, controlled by this state of consciousness, will confine itself to translating the same, so that the anæsthetic hand will indistinctly trace the words which the subject is muttering in a low voice to himself, as "I do not see, I do not see...."

A second perturbation arises from the fact, that the subject, during the time that the hand is unconsciously writing the word, believes he has a vague perception of this same word. In reality this is only an illusory perception. To produce this phenomenon we have to call into play the automatic writing, by putting a pencil into the anæsthetic hand; and, as a matter of fact, it is the more or less vague perception of these movements of automatic writing that makes the subject believe he has a visual perception of the word, whereas he has only a visual image of the same. Even this image, at times, is rather vague. Thus, one of our subjects, while his hand wrote the word "Marguerite," said he thought he saw the name of a woman. But, how could it be possible to perceive, with his eyes, that a word is the name of a woman, if hê could not spell the word in question? Evidently, in this case, visual or muscular sensations belonging to the second consciousness, have provoked in the first consciousness an idea of the same kind.

We have already observed an analogous fact in the experiments before reported upon the anæsthesia of the skin and of the muscles; we there saw, that if we shake twice in succession an insensible finger, the subject will think of the number two. The perception of the movements of the finger by the second consciousness had called forth in the domain of the first consciousness an analogous idea, expressed in an abstract form.

Let us remark, in passing, that through these experiments there possibly exists a means of studying abstract ideas.

We have now studied the perception of forms in an eye presenting a weak visual acuteness. The same function may be studied in a completely amaurotic eye, that is, in an eye afflicted with total blindness. It is rare to meet with hysterical patients in whom insensibility of the retina reaches the verge of blindness; but we can very easily produce this phenomenon by way of hypnotic suggestion. I have had occasion to study two hysterical subjects in whom by suggestion all manner of vision had been suppressed in the right eye. I was easily able to establish the fact, that after closing the left eye of the subject, and putting into his anæsthetic hand, without his knowledge, a pencil, the au-

tomatic writing was brought to reproduce all the letters which we passed before the amaurotic eye. This amaurotic eye, accordingly, did see, notwithstanding its apparent blindness; in other words, the second consciousness was the one that saw; it had not been struck with blindness at the same time as the first consciousness.

This latter experiment enables us absolutely to reject any anatomical theory that has been designed to explain the singular phenomena of which we have spoken at the beginning of this paper. We have said that certain subjects, who with their right eye do not perceive a certain color—for example, violet—will, when seeing with both eyes, easily distinguish this same color, even when, owing to the experimental arrangement employed, the color mentioned is not placed in the visual field of the left eye. This experiment, and many others of a similar kind, lead us to suppose, that the conditions of binocular vision are different from those of monocular vision.

To speak a little more precisely, it has been admitted that there exist two different kinds of visual centres within the cerebral cortex; in the first place monocular centres, which act, when only one eye is open; and further, binocular centres, that perform their functions when both eyes are at the same time open. Cerebral physiology, with its usual complacency, has furnished more than one argument in favor of this hypothesis, which, however, ought to be regarded as open to considerable suspicion. This being admitted, nothing seemed more easy than to explain, how and why hysterical individuals see certain colors when both eyes are open, and not when only one eye performs its functions; people have thought, that it was owing to the fact, that with such subjects the binocular centre is spared while the monocular centre alone is affected.

The last of our experiments absolutely refutes this theory, showing us that a subject with an amaurotic eye is able to register through automatic writing the objects that are placed before it during monocular vision. The monocular centre, accordingly, if it really exist, cannot be any more affected than the binocular centre.

We shall not linger any longer upon this study of visual anæsthesia, which once again proves to us the importance of the doubling of consciousness in hysterical persons, and the necessity of knowing this process of doubling, in order to understand certain symptoms, at first sight so strange, and yet at bottom so logical, which are met with, at every side, in hysteria.

We now know the most elementary facts at the basis of mental dissociation, and we may attempt to plunge to a still greater depth into the study of the phenomenon described.

PARIS, June, 1889.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORMS OF CRIME.

BY LUDWIG FULD.*

EDWARD VON HARTMANN, in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious," speaks of the fallacy of assigning the causes of the decrease of murder, of robbery, and of similar deeds of violence to the moral betterment of mankind. He would find the explanation of these facts solely in the more perfect organization of civil society and in a stricter administration of protective justice, which now makes the perpetration of crime more difficult than it was during the less perfect stages of the development of civil society.

Kant, as we well know, held a different view. The sage of Königsberg believed that, although not living in an age of absolute moral perfection, yet ours was one of civilizing influences, and he attributed this diminution of the more grievous crimes to the improvement of mankind,—an explanation which Hartmann most emphatically refused to recognize. The latter's exposition appears to be far more in conformity with the actual status of the question, although the severe inflexibility of Hartmann's favorite method of formulation greatly impairs the practical truth and value of the theory he sets forth.

The fact of the matter is that the criminal impulses of man are the same as in bygone times. There has been no radical change; on the contrary, they have merely assumed other and different forms in their attacks upon society and its expressed sovereignty, the law.

Those criminal propensities that in olden times gave rise to the fearful excesses which are told us in ecclesiastical and secular history, exist just as much to-day as of old. The change has been in *this* respect only, that they cannot now so openly seek gratification as formerly, but are compelled to choose their field of operation in the dark and hidden by-ways of social life: a fact which is accounted for by the consolidation of the power of the state and the vigorous administration of protective laws.

The great law of the transmutation of forms does not prevail in the world of organisms alone; its validity in the world of crime must likewise be recognized. The life of a nation is like the life of an individual. Just as the latter has his periods of childhood, of youth, of manhood, and of old age, so has the great organized body, society, corresponding periods of growth, maturity, and decline. The criminal instinct manifests itself differently, however, during the different periods of the life of the individual:—to have first called attention to which is the great merit of that gifted, epoch-making social-scientist, Adolphe Quetelet. So, a glance at the criminal activity of a people, as seen in the different stages of their develop-

* Translated from the German by μκρκ.

ment, will show that the same thing with reference to them is true. The impulsive, uncontrollable nature of a nation in its youth favors the commission of all manner of violent excesses, whereas at this period of their civilization, the covert and more refined violations of the law are unknown. This seems to be the reason for that deep contempt in which, among youthful nations, the secret malefactor is held and in which he who openly defies the law does not share. The Mosaic law and other Oriental systems of jurisprudence offer us proofs of this phase of the development of crime. In Greece and in Rome the evidences of this are no less plain than in the laws of the Teutonic nations that flourished in the first part of the Christian Era. Violent injury to human life, the infraction of personal liberty and honor in every conceivable form, are the crimes of this period. In the course of development the vitality of a race decreases and its superfluous energy asserts itself in other and different fields; the State and the Law gather strength; this prevents open violence to society and the forms of crime, therefore, conform to the newly established conditions. Instead of open violence we now have secrecy and cunning; subtlety now characterizes the expression of the criminal instinct, and the nearer a people approaches the senility of its civilization the more marked does this characteristic of refinement become.

The totality of a people's intellectual and technical acquisitions naturally determine the forms that crime assumes. Acquaintance with the more modern appliances of science and art gives rise to new types of crime; a truth which can be traced through all the pages of history. When the poisons of the Orient and the secret of their use became known in Rome, the murders by poisoning, and especially those committed by women, increased enormously. Livy has handed us down an exceedingly interesting account of the wholesale prosecution of a number of prominent Roman matrons who were indicted for this crime.

During the Middle Ages—when poisoning was also practiced with great predilection by women—this crime went hand in hand with that of administering love-potions—a practice which originating in the Orient, prevails even to-day, to some extent, in the West of Europe, and opens to us a view into a really unfathomable abyss of moral degradation. From the time of the crusades and the beginning of a more active intercourse with the Orient, especially with the Levant, Germany acquired a more accurate acquaintance with the mysteries of love-potions and the art of poisoning, and the penal regulations of medieval law as well as the remarks of authors prove that this art found a not unimpressionable public. Especially in Italy did this crime luxuriate. It is universally known with what virtuosity Alexander VI. Borgia understood this art, and was perhaps excelled in it only by his son Cæsar. It is known too, that this abominable plague of the Renaissance period was imported into France by Catharine de Medici and her Italian banditti, and that it gave rise to crimes there that have been fabulously misrepresented by the French romancers.

The introduction and extension of the great agencies of commerce as well as of the means of communication and of intellectual intercourse afford new opportunities for the display of the instinct of destruction. Whereas, formerly, dams, bridges, locks, and buildings were the objects upon which this unbridled Vandalism vented its rage and hate, to-day it is chiefly the railroads, the telegraph lines and—where already introduced—the telephone, against which the passion of destruction is directing itself. With the introduction of the telegraph in Cabul a perfect craze arose among the natives for destroying the lines. Before this they took especial delight in doing every possible damage to the gardens and grounds of the European officials, but now this instinct of Vandalism directed its attacks against the telegraph-poles and wires. The authorities could only ensure the system a successful development by forthwith stringing up to the damaged poles every malefactor that fell into their hands. After this expedient had been resorted to a few hundred times the telegraph poles were left unmolested.

Every invention and every discovery, even before their utilization has affected the onward progress of the human race, is chosen by the criminal instinct to express itself in. We may say with Ovid—"*In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas corpora.*" No period elapses in the course of a people's history in which new types of crime do not spring up, and in which the criminal instinct, with the aid of the acquisitions and possibilities of that stage of civilization, does not attempt to evade the law.

Of not less importance for the forms of crime than the above-mentioned influences, is the industrial and economical condition of a people. If a nation is still in its nomadic period, gaining an existence by hunting, fishing, and tending their cattle, the forms of its criminal activity are wholly different from those it selects, when the settled agricultural state has been entered upon.

Again the forms of crime of this period vary materially from those it assumes when the industrial, mechanical, and commercial stage of national existence has been reached. During the nomadic period of a nation's development only the simplest forms of the violation of the rights of property can appear and most especially the primitive form of all, theft and appropriation. The more refined forms of these

crimes are not even possible with an agricultural people given as they are chiefly to the pursuit of husbandry. Not until industry has reached such a development as characterizes a people in its manufacturing era, not until, in consequence of an active domestic and foreign commerce, of an elaborated specie and credit system, of a perfected method of exchange and of a most minute and detailed division of labor,—not until, as the result of all this, the period of a people's mercantile activity has begun, are the studied methods of infringing the rights of property possible. Only after the numerous divisions and ramifications of industrial life have become so organized that the destruction of one of the countless meshes of this net-like tissue would disarrange the rest, does this refinement of fraud and swindle show itself, does this subtlety in the art of despoiling and overreaching the less crafty and cunning, appear.

During the agricultural period the thief exercises his penchant for stealing in the appropriation of the fruits of the field and garden, or of the products of cattle-raising: among a highly advanced industrial people the acquirement by false and fraudulent representation of credit is practiced. Even to-day this does not rank as a great difficulty, if a certain amount of tact be used. Bankruptcy and real-estate swindles are not possible in an agricultural state; they appear only among mercantile peoples. The manipulator of the stock-exchange who by circulating false alarms, pockets thousands in an hour and thereby reduces to beggary the most honorable people is not a figure seen in the primitive stages of the development of human society.

In imperial Rome which shows so many points of resemblance with the life of our time, the wealth of the nation was deeply impaired by the real-estate and corn swindles. After the Thirty Years war, the speculators committed great excesses. John Law plunged France to the verge of bankruptcy, and the railroad-operations of Ofenheim, Strousberg, and their fellow-speculators have in our day robbed the national wealth of Germany and Austria of hundreds of millions. Is this not proof enough that the desire to acquire treasure by underhand methods is the same at all times and that only in the form of its expression does it exhibit diversities?

The usurer furnishes us with a trenchant instance of this. The impulse to accept excessive compensation for temporarily granting the disposal of a certain piece of property seems to be deeply rooted in man: for at all times and in every nation do we discover denunciations of usury and penal sanctions against the usurer. It stands to reason, though, that in the agricultural period the usurer is quite a different person from what he is in a financial and commercial era. In the first instance his operations are rather rudimentary: a much larger amount of natural products must be returned than was given. In the latter instance, his activity is marked by a refinement of form: he buys and sells outstanding debts, or perhaps fictitious claims, or is engaged in some still more complicated transaction where punishment would be hardly possible.

Despite this difference it is always the same crime. That austere republican, Brutus, who could so easily reconcile it with his democratic principles to accept forty-five per cent. on his provincial speculations in grain, committed the same offence as the modern pawn-broker who appropriates thirty-six per cent. from unprotected citizens. There is no difference between the grain-speculator of ancient and medieval times who, in order to get rid of his garnered stores at outrageous "corner"-prices, speculated upon distress and scarcity, — no difference between him and the land-jobber, the real-estate shark of the Nineteenth Century, these parasites of our peasant population, who by frequent advancements and subsequent foreclosures gradually obtain possession of whole estates.

We should not allow this variation of form so to confuse us as to lose sight of the uniform tendency of criminal action; although the old Roman patrician may so little resemble the pawn-broker and the farm-destroyer of modern times.

The course of the evolution of a nation's civilization is thus of mighty influence upon its criminal activity. The crimes which in our time arouse the righteous indignation of European civilization, occupy a singular position only because of their peculiar forms, whereas the criminal impulse at their bottom had been known in times past.

We must familiarize ourselves to the fact that the forms of criminal expression also adapt themselves to the exigencies of a period that travels with steam, writes and converses by means of electricity, and sketches with the light of the sun. The achievements of our era in all departments, thanks to our technical and industrial progress, and above all to the discoveries of the natural sciences, have been extraordinary. And so the crimes which these acquisitions, and the complexity of their relations have called forth, have followed a similar course of evolution and attained a like wonderful stage of complexity. Just as much as other forms of life, the forms of crime, in their constant modifications, are an expression of the evolution of human society.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A CASE OF CONSCIENCE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

THE following affecting and impressive letter will perhaps interest many of your readers. Mr. Matthews has, during the last two years, been the priest in charge of St. Mary's (Roman

Catholic) Church, Bath, England. He was ordained at Glasgow in 1876. Few priests of his communion are better known than Mr. Matthews in the west of England. M. C. O'BYRNE.

"TO THE CONGREGATION OF ST. MARY'S: My very dear "Friends,—I have to make an announcement which will be pain-"ful alike to yourselves and to me. It shall be very brief, for it "is sad to me to part from you; it will be sadder for you to learn "the cause. After long and anxious thought and study I have ar-"rived at the conviction that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, "though possessing many excellencies, are full of legendary and "mythological statements, and that they possess no claim to, and "manifest no evidence of, divine inspiration; that the Roman "Catholic Church has no claim to be regarded as a divinely-con-"stituted authority; that the Papacy is a human institution, "gravely compromised to error and superstition, and therefore in-"jurious to the spiritual and temporal welfare of mankind; that "Jesus Christ, though a holy man and ardent reformer, was not "the great God of the Universe, but the son of Joseph and Mary; "that neither demoniacal spirits nor a place or state of everlasting "torment have any existence in fact, but originate in ancient my-"thologies. With these convictions, which I have striven against "for a long time without success, it would be dishonest for me to "continue as a priest, teaching only the pure theism of natural "spiritual religion, which I profoundly believe and desire to pro-"mote. I therefore this day return to our excellent and kind "bishop the sacerdotal faculties entrusted to me by his lordship. "I retire from the midst of you with a heart full of kindness and "gratitude to you all. All the confidences, spiritual and temporal, "of my ministry will be faithfully observed. As soon as I can get "my house off my hands I shall leave it, as my continued presence "close to the church would be a painful reminder to us both of a "past full of happiness until doubt agitated my mind. These "doubts I have been careful not to unfold to any of you, and I "have provided for you the ministry of worthy priests ignorant of "my mental conflict. With a sad and loving heart, then, I com-"mend you, my dear and valued friends, to the Eternal Father of "Spirits, and let us ever remember one another in the presence of "the All Holy One.—Bidding you all a sorrowful farewell, I re-"main, always affectionately yours,

"ARNOLD JEROME P. MATTHEWS.

"2 Burlington street, Bath, July 9, 1889."

THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

MY entire article, the extracts from which Wheelbarrow so roughly criticizes, consisted mainly of quotations from eminent legal authorities together with notes and references. The editor of THE OPEN COURT in his desire to accommodate a number of correspondents omitted the latter, leaving the quotations to stand the fire of Wheelbarrow's objections.

Wheelbarrow "could see at once" that the first bit of law, he criticizes, "came out of the surgery." But the surgeon copied it verbatim from "The Limitations of Police Power," by Christopher G. Tiedeman, professor of jurisprudence at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

Wheelbarrow's argument that an estate in the land does not consist, as Tiedeman says, it does, of these three things, *viz.*, the right of possession, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposition, because in the exercise of those rights the holder might choose to lease it, is absurd.

Equally absurd is Wheelbarrow's claim, "that these rights are not subject to the right of the State to alter or defeat it (Tiedeman) in the face of the fact that the State is constantly exercising that right in the condemning land for public uses. For, although the State through its courts fixes a compensation for the destruction of these three rights, it *forces* the holder to submit to its disposition regardless of his wishes or consent.

"But a tax laid upon land is of the nature of rent," says Tiedeman, "falling where the land lies and not as in the case of personal property, where the owner resides. The proceeding being *in rem*, against the thing, and not *in personam*, against the person.

The statement that absolute private property in land had no legal existence, that as against the State no man absolutely owns land, but that land is always subject to administration by the State, is justified at length by Sheldon Amos, Examiner at the Inns of Court, London, and may be found in his work on the "Science of Law," published in this country by the Appletons. Wheelbarrow can find it in the public libraries of Chicago.

I was well aware that the lands of the State of New York were declared allodial. But that declaration was not intended nor does it exempt the land from the superior ownership of the State, the right of eminent domain being freely exercised therein.

The object of that declaration was to clear the titles of land in the State of New York from the indefiniteness arising during its colonial existence when it had been partitioned out among the patroons and immigrant noblemen of Holland and England. Many lands, especially in the heart of the State where I reside, having some "acknowledgement" due to "a superior *landlord*, attached such as a dozen chickens, a few bushels of wheat per annum "so long as grass grows and water runs."

The "absolute property vested in the owners," that Wheelbarrow speaks of, always being subject to the superior jurisdiction and ownership of the State.

"For," says Tiedeman, "surely the right of eminent domain can rest only upon the claim that the State is the absolute owner of all lands situate within its dominions, which consequently renders all landholders merely tenants of the State."

WM. C. WOOD, M.D.

THE COMING FIGHT FOR CONFISCATION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IN No. 97 of THE OPEN COURT I am confronted by three new adversaries who reinforce my critics like the historic "men in buckram." I regret that these disputants exhibit personal feeling, and show some signs of irritation. Peevish personalities weaken an argument, and they show some debility of thought. I will reply to them, so far as I am able to do so, in their order.

Mr. William Camm begins by contradicting some statements made by Mr. Pentecost in his controversy with me. I take no interest in that, believing with Mr. Camm that Mr. Pentecost "is amply able to manage his own cause." I will answer Mr. Camm, and in doing so, I must compliment him on his refined phraseology. There is such delicate courtesy in saying to a man during a friendly conversation with him, "Had you thought beyond the end of your nose." People whose thoughts are worth anything think behind and a little above the nose, a habit which I fear is not practiced by Mr. Camm. When he shall have acquired that habit he will not say "the man with longest purse knocks the persimmon," nor will he talk about "hunting for a mare's nest in words that may be synonyms."

Mr. Camm, in his elegant way, referring to my proposition that the ownership of land has ever been the political distinction between a freeman and a serf, says: "Such a proposition is so shallow and so transparent that the man who holds it ought never to touch Mr. P's glove nor that of any other man who has 'seen the cat.'" I am glad that my propositions are "transparent," for Mr. Camm's are not very clear, nor could clearness be expected of a man who gets enlightenment from the sight of a cat. How did the mere sight of that cat inoculate Mr. Camm with feline wisdom? It is not easy to reason intelligently with men who, in the

inflammation of self-conceit, can boast for lack of argument, that they know all about it because they "have seen the cat;" yet people thus mentally infirm, have the nerve to overturn and reconstruct the whole social and political constitution of the United States.

"What the individual requires with land," says Mr. Camm, "is secure possession, not ownership." What is ownership but security of possession? To secure a farmer in the possession of his land, the laws of the United States confer upon him the absolute right and title to it, so that no man may molest him in his quiet possession of his farm. His right of ownership is made perfectly secure to him by the constitution of the State and by the constitution of the United States. Not even the government itself can trespass upon him. It cannot even run a highway across his land for public uses without paying him "just compensation." What security of possession will a man have under the single tax or confiscation plan, which Mr. Camm, very innocently says, "mean the same thing in this connection."

Mr. Camm informs us how bravely he "led men to battle and to death fighting for the emancipation of the chattel slaves, and now that our heads are growing grey, he would to heaven we could fall in to emancipate the industrial slaves—our own children." There is a little fustian in the style of that sentence, arising probably from too much looking at cats, but we can forgive that in gratitude for the valorous deeds done by Mr. Camm. I am rather proud of Mr. Camm for *leading* his men to battle, because there were so many other commanders who *followed* their men in, and at a very healthy distance. I also congratulate Mr. Camm that although he led his men "to death," he managed to preserve himself. Like Captain Sir John Falstaff, of martial renown, he led his men "where they could be well peppered," and like Sir John, he was not peppered himself.

Mr. Camm, with the old bravery bubbling in his veins, wants to "fall in" again, and fight more battles, "to emancipate the industrial slaves." When I carelessly used the word "serf" in describing the landless, Mr. Camm was offended, and rebuked me for it. He, himself, now calls them "slaves" and wants to fight for them. He once fought for emancipation, and now he wants to fight for confiscation. I can assure him that there never was a finer field for his valor than is presented in the United States today. Let him open his recruiting office at once. Before the farmers of this country will submit to the confiscation of their lands, there will be the liveliest fight that has ever been seen upon this earth. I advise Mr. Camm to beat the long roll and "fall in" without further delay.

Mr. J. K. Rudyard comes next. He, too, in poverty of reasons, flings in his little personalities after this fashion: "Wheelbarrow still in wordy warfare makes it hard to believe that he finds any real difficulty in comprehending the George theory. There may be a mental aberration which corresponds with color-blindness. If Wheelbarrow is thus afflicted he deserves sympathy, but uncharitable people will dismiss his case with the remark that none are so blind as those who will not see." Mr. Rudyard, of course, classifies himself among the "uncharitable people," and speaks in their style. For the opinions of uncharitable people I care very little; they are as a rule neither sensible nor kind. Only the opinions of charitable people are of any value to me.

I do not think it can be fairly said that I have ever had any difficulty in comprehending the "George theory." I have taken Mr George at his word, and given his language its accepted meaning. If it has an occult meaning known only to those who have "seen the cat," I may have some difficulty in understanding him. It surprises me that so many of Mr. George's disciples fail to comprehend him; for instance, Mr. Rudyard, who, while quoting from Book VIII, Chap. II, "Progress and Poverty," is so wilfully blind that he will not see the "George theory" as it is proclaimed in that very chapter. If, as Mr. Rudyard so courteously says, "It is all so simple and straightforward that a fool need not err therein," why does Mr. Rudyard err therein? Why does he quote from Chap. II just enough to hide, and not enough to explain the "George theory?"

"I thank thee, Jew, for giving me that word," said Gratiano to Shylock, and I thank Mr. Rudyard for giving me Book VIII, Chap. II, "Progress and Poverty." In that chapter, Mr. George declares the injustice of private property in land, and then he shows us the "straightforward" way in which he proposes to abolish it. Why was Mr Rudyard so wilfully blind that he would not see the following choice bits in Chapter II:

> "We have seen that private property in land has no warrant in justice, but stands condemned as the denial of natural right.
>
> "We should satisfy the law of justice, we should meet all economic requirements, by at one stroke abolishing all private titles, declaring all land public property, and letting it out to the highest bidders in lots to suit, under such conditions as would sacredly guard the private right to improvements."

I think a man who can read and write must be wilfully blind if he will not see the intent and purpose of that language. The qualifying clause at the end of the last sentence is pure deception like the saving clauses in a party platform. What can any honest man think of the following "straightforward" method by which Mr. George proposes to abolish all private titles "at one stroke":

> "I do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate private property in land. The first would be unjust, the second needless. Let the individuals who now hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call *their* land. Let them continue to call it *their* land. Let them buy and sell, and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell, if we take the kernel. *It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent.**

Here the "straightforward" plan begins with a juggle of words, a distinction without a difference between the confiscation of land, and the confiscation of rent. Is it "straightforward" statesmanship which proposes to take the *kernel* of a man's fortune from him and leave him only the *shell* of it, which is nothing? This legerdemain is conspicuous all through Chap II, Book VIII, "Progress and Poverty." In that same chapter, Mr. George, after showing to his disciples the deadfall or trap into which the farmers are to be decoyed by incantations and conjurations about the abolishing of all taxation except the taxation of land values, says:

> "That is the first step, upon which the practical struggle must be made. When the hare is once caught and killed, cooking him will follow as a matter of course."

Certainly, as a matter of course. And the farmer, who is so blind that he will not see the hook within the bait, who will stupidly walk into the trap, deserves to be "caught and killed." I hope that Mr. George when he catches him will cook him, and cook him well, even as Molly Bell did cook Bob Ridley's possum. I hope that Mr. George will use him

> "To make a fry, and to make a stew,
> And a roast, and a boil, and a barbecue."

Reading in Book VIII, Chap. II, "Progress and Poverty," the "straightforward" means by which private property in land is to be destroyed, and noticing the very large number of men who are captured by the "melancholy deception," I exclaim with Shakespeare:

> "Is't possible the spells of George should juggle men
> Into such strange mockeries?"

As to Mr. F. Hess, he takes it out in scolding, and he wanders away from the question to talk about matters which are not in the debate. There is a little oil of vitriol in the sarcasm about "Lord Wheelbarrow" who has offended Mr. Hess by adopting gold dollars as the standard measure of all values. I have never done so. I have merely asked that my wages be paid in gold dollars because they are dear money, and I prefer to be paid in that. I have

* The *italics* are by Mr. George.

been cheated so much and so often by "cheap money" for dear work, that I have wished that some law might be passed requiring that laborers be paid in the dearest money current at the time.

Mr. Hess complains because I have "not a word to say about the practical confiscation of small freeholds such as Thomas Clark's under our present usurious system of taxation and sales for delinquent taxes." Well, the reason why I did not speak about it was, that I was talking about something else; but if confiscating Tom Clark's farm for non-payment of taxes is an act of injustice, what does Mr. Hess think of Mr. George's proposition to confiscate every man's farm for non-payment of taxes amounting to "the *whole income* and the *full annual value* of the land"?

I do not know of any "Irish evictions" here in "free America." I know of some American evictions here, and I think they ought not to be allowed quite so easily as they are; but how will it be under Mr. George's system, when every farmer will be evicted at the bidding of "the highest bidder" for the use and occupation of the farm? I wish that no man could be evicted from his home; Mr. George's plan will evict everybody. Under his system the American home would be abolished. WHEELBARROW.

BOOK REVIEWS.

ETHICAL RELIGION. *William Mackintire Salter.* Boston: 1889. Roberts Brothers.

"Ethical Religion" sounds like a discord, and the jarring of the quarrelsome words can be distinctly heard. Mr. Salter has failed to bring them into harmony. He has rather shown us in eloquent style the present state of hostility between ethics and religion. He himself can hardly hope to see them reconciled, because neither the theologians nor the moralists will permit a reconciliation.

It is not easy to change the meaning of the important word "religion." It stands for duty as ethics does, but for duty of a different kind. It stands for duty to God, as ethics for duty to man. It acknowledges at least one God as the author and governor of all the world. It includes the worship of God through a thousand forms of prayer, praise, and adoration. It also gives visible expression to faith and worship in ceremonial rites and services which are of no use to ethics, and with which Ethics will have nothing to do.

Religion will never give to ethics an equal partnership in the plan of salvation. It asserts dominion over ethics, and prescribes the boundaries of morality. It regards the lowest duties in the codes of religion as higher than the highest duties in the codes of ethics; religion is dowered with divinity, ethics with humanity only. Religion soars to heaven on the wings of angels, while ethics plods wearily upon the earth. The kingdom of ethics is of this world. Ethics is tolerated and prescribed by all the theologies, so long as it acknowledges the superior jurisdiction of religion, the churches tell us that "mere morality" cultivated at the expense of religion is sin.

It is true that any man may make for himself a code of faith and morals out of his own conscience and intelligence. He may proclaim it his religion, and it will be so, but if it include not faith, prayer, worship, and the other accepted meanings of the word religion, he must explain himself, a task which is not incumbent on the Christian, the Mahommedan, or the Jew. So, Mr. Salter, anxious to give to ethics the advantage of the word religion, is compelled to explain what he means by Ethical Religion. His book shows that he means the highest conception and practice of human duty, separate from all theology, and unadulterated by idolatry of every form, whether Christian, Pagan, Heathen, or Moslem. He would make ethics the sublime and all sufficient rule of human conduct under the name of Ethical Religion. He would appropriate the word Religion for its sentimental value, and reject all that is expressed by it in the prevalent understanding of the word.

The manner in which Mr. Salter has explained what he means by Ethical Religion will be satisfactory to the ethical side, but the religious half of the combination gets a very small number of shares in the capital stock of the joint association. The argument is that ethics furnishes the most reliable rule of duty, and serves all the good purposes of religion. It may therefore be called a religion wherein worship gives way to morality.

Hugh Miller said of his uncle Sandy, the stonemason, that "conscience was in every stone he laid." So it may be said of Mr. Salter's book; he puts conscience into every page. It is carefully written, some of it, no doubt, laboriously written. It glows with sympathy for suffering humanity and is animated by a love of justice and a scorn of evil. It is elevated in sentiment, eloquent in language, pure in thought. It appeals to man in behalf of man and its exhortations are to duty for the sake not of gods or angels, from whom we expect usurious interest, but for the sake of women and children who can pay us nothing in return. Mr. Salter believes that a man who does his duty for the sake of getting a reward in heaven will never get to heaven, but if he does get there he will find some other angel enjoying the reward. He says it in better language, of course, but his meaning is that.

"A moral action," says Mr. Salter, must have no motive of self-interest behind it; and "what were the gain moreover, if men were made moral under the hopes and fears of another world?" This is well expressed, and the sentiment is good. The inference drawn from it is a little too sweeping; there may be some gain even in a moral action of inferior quality. Such gain, however, in too precarious to be relied on. The man who figures with a slate and pencil the profit and loss on honesty, and chooses honesty because he finds a balance on that side, will bear watching. He is liable to take back the gain which society has made by his moral action like the good little boy, who, goaded by the eloquent promises of the preacher, put three months' pocket money into the missionary fund, and the next day stormed and cried until they paid him the money back. The man who contributes to earth on heavenly security will take back his contribution if he can.

Mr. Salter evidently regards all infusions of religion with ethics as an adulteration of ethics, for he says: "What does religion add, then, to ethics? Nothing, that I can see; and what it attempts to add is generally at least, *Aberglaube*, superstition." And yet Mr. Salter, anxious to exalt ethics to the rank of religion minus the superstition of it, anxious to make it the supreme code of human conduct with a higher dignity and title than it has now, borrows the word religion and attaches it to ethics, but in the very nature of their opposite claims Ethics and Religion must fail to harmonize. The creeds of all the world will unite in declaring that a mixture of ethics adulterates religion and that only so much of ethics is lawful as the churches patronize. All the creeds will declare that compromise between ethics and religion is impossible on any other terms than those dictated by the creeds. Mr. Salter himself sees this and laments it, for he says: "We often hear, and I am sorry to hear from religious teachers particularly, slighting and contemptuous words about morality." Certainly, whenever morality appears as a rival of religion, and declares itself sufficient into salvation.

Ethical Religion will not have either prayer or worship in it, according to Mr. Salter, for he says: "It is nothing else than a changed thought of the nature of religion which I have in mind, namely, that it can be no longer for rational men to-day to worship or pray, but to have the sense of a task." This is a very important change in the nature of religion. It is in fact, the abolition of the ecstasy of prayer and worship, and the substitution for them of the "task" of working for others on the lines of

justice, benevolence, and truth. If there is to be any praying at all in Ethical Religion, it must be to man for the help of man. The waste of prayer by the churches is thus finely rebuked by Mr. Salter. "Could you, O Churches, but open the hearts of your worshipers, as you seek to move the heart of God, the need for all other prayer would soon be gone."

That is a grand sentiment, and there is practical utility in prayer of that kind, but it is not Ethical Religion, it is Ethics; and religion will have nothing to do with it. Religion without its essential attributes is like air without oxygen, its vital principle is gone. "The old religions," says Mr. Salter, "leave us on our knees in rapt contemplation and worship, the new will summon us to stand erect." Very well, but if we cling to the word religion, can we escape its influence? So long as we acknowledge the power of the word, will not the spirit of it move us backward? Shall we not gradually cease to stand erect, and at last seek happines again by falling on our knees "in rapt contemplation and worship"?

Those remarks do not in the least impair the value of the book itself. Claiming for ethics the highest rule of life, its argument is very strong, while its appeals for justice, truth, and liberty are full of inspiration. Its precepts are of the highest value, for they are all founded in *practical* morality. They impose on us the task of working for the happiness of others in this world instead of the selfish pursuit of our own happiness in the world to come. It is of little consequence perhaps, whether it is called Ethical Religion, or Religious Ethics; it is an eloquent call to duty, calm in temper and refined in language. It criticizes the faults of our social and religious life with sharp censure, but more in sorrow than in anger. It comes as a valuable helper in the cause of social reformation. M. M. T.

We have received the second volume of "American Notes and Queries: A Medium of Intercommunication for Literary Men, General Readers, etc." (Westminster Pub. Co., 619 Walnut St., Philadelphia. $3.00 a year). "Notes and Queries" is an invaluable agency of literary and historical information. The subject-matter of Vol. II. covers a wide range of interesting topics: "Folk-lore, the origin of proverbs, familiar sayings, popular customs, quotations, etc." Those who must constantly seek information not accessible in works of reference, can be recommended to no more reliable and satisfactory source than "Notes and Queries."

NOTES.

We propose, in our following number, to begin a series of essays by M. Th. Ribot, translated with his permission from the "Psychology of Attention," under which title they will appear.

M. Alfred Binet informs us that he will reply during the course of the present month, to the remarks of Mr. Romanes, which appeared in No. 98 of THE OPEN COURT, and were written in defense of the standpoint that M. Binet had criticized in his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organism." M. Binet hopes to be able to satisfy Mr. Romanes, while still upholding the position he has taken.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XXXIX. — Continued.

Laura looked at him tenderly, but then immediately drew back and ensconced herself in a corner of the carriage. Fritz was quite different to-day from usual; he looked confident and bold. In the house he had always been modest, while Laura had more than once thought of this relation, and had written in her book: "When two human beings are united in soul they ought to let each other know it." Now he used little ceremony. He looked boldly out of the carriage, and when they met travelers did not retreat as she had done after meeting the milkwoman, but looked as if challenging notice, and greeting people first.

"I must begin about the Hindus," she said to herself, "in order to turn his thoughts to other subjects."

She asked him about the contents of the Veda.

"I cannot think of it to-day, exclaimed Fritz, gaily. "I am too happy to think of the old books. I have only one thought in my heart: 'Laura, the dear girl, will become mine.' I could dance in the carriage for joy."

He jumped up from his seat like a little boy.

Fritz was fearfully changed; she did not know him again; she withheld her hand from him, and looked at him, suspiciously, askance.

"The heavens are covered with clouds," she said, sadly.

"But the sun shines above them," replied Fritz; "it will come out again in a few minutes. I propose that we examine the great leather bag which my mother gave us; I hope there will be something good in it."

Thus did the prose of the Hahn family betray itself, and Laura observed with secret regret how eagerly the Doctor rummaged the bag. She had, however, in her excitement thought little of her breakfast, so when Fritz offered her some of its contents she extended her little hand for it, and both ate heartily.

Something darkened the seat next the coachman; a misshapen head showed itself at the window, and a discordant snarl was heard in the carriage. Laura pointed terrified at the apparition.

"Merciful heavens, there is the dog again!"

The Doctor also looked angrily at the hostile figure.

"Drive him away," cried Laura; "make him run home."

"He will hardly find his way back," replied the Doctor, thoughtfully; "what would your father say if he were lost?"

"He has been the enemy of my life," exclaimed Laura; "and must we now take him with us into the world? The idea is insupportable, and a bad omen, Fritz."

"Perhaps we shall meet a wagon that will take him back again," said the Doctor, consolingly; "meanwhile we must not let him starve."

In spite of his aversion he handed him some breakfast, and the dog disappeared again under the apron.

* Translation copyrighted.

But Laura continued disturbed.

"Fritz, dear Fritz," she exclaimed, suddenly, "you must leave me alone."

The Doctor looked at her with astonishment. The *you* was an orthographical error which must be atoned for. He was again about to give her a kiss, but she drew back.

"If you love me, Fritz, you must now leave me alone," she cried out, wringing her hands.

"How can I do that?" asked Fritz; "we are traveling for good into the great world."

"Get up on the box by the coachman," begged Laura, imploringly.

She looked so serious and depressed that Fritz obediently stopped the carriage, descended from it, and climbed upon the coach-box. Laura drew a deep breath, and became more tranquil. Her words had influenced him. Intractable as he was, he would do much to please her. She sat alone, and her thoughts became more cheering. The Doctor turned round frequently, knocked at the window, and asked how she was. He was very tender-hearted, and full of loving attentions.

"The whole responsibility for his health rests on me," she thought, "what hitherto his dear mother has done for him now becomes my duty. A delightful duty, dear Fritz. I will keep him from working at nights, for his health is delicate, and every day I will go walking with him, in the coldest weather, to accustom him to it."

She looked out of the carriage, the wind was stirring the leaves; she knocked at the window:

"Fritz, it is windy, you have no shawl on."

"I shall no longer use one," called out the Doctor, "this effeminacy must be shaken off."

"I beg of you, Fritz, not to be so childish. Put one round you, or you will certainly catch cold."

"With a *you*, I will certainly not put it on."

"Take it, my darling Fritz, I beg of *thee*," entreated Laura.

"That sounds quite different," said Fritz.

The window was opened, and the shawl put out.

"He is firm as a rock," said Laura, seating herself again. "Complaisant as he appears, he knows well what he chooses to do, and, contrary to his own convictions, will not give in, even to me. That is all for the best, for I am still a childish creature, and my father was in the right; I need a husband who will look more calmly on the world than I do."

It began to rain. The coachman put on his cloak, and Fritz spread his plaid and enveloped himself in it. She became very anxious about Fritz, and again knocked at the window.

"It is raining, Fritz."

This the Doctor could not deny.

"Come in, you will get wet and catch cold."

The carriage stopped, and Fritz obediently got down and entered it, while Laura wiped away the raindrops on his hair and shawl with her pocket-handkerchief.

"You said *you* four times," began Fritz, reprovingly. "If it continues thus, you will have a large reckoning to pay."

"Be serious," began Laura, "I am in a very solemn mood. I am thinking of our future. I will think of it day and night, dearest one, that you may not feel the loss of your mother. Your dear mother has always taken your coffee up to you, but that is unsociable, you shall come over to me and take your breakfast with me; your Hindus must grant this half-hour to me. About ten o'clock I shall send you over an egg, and at dinner-time you will come over again to me. I shall take care that the cooking is good; we will live simply, as we are accustomed, and well. Then you shall tell me something about your books that I may know what my husband is occupied with, for this is a wife's right. In the afternoon we will take a walk together in the streets."

"What do you mean?" asked Fritz, "'over there,' 'here,' 'in the streets'? Surely we shall live together."

Laura looked at him with open eyes, and a blush slowly mantled over her face up to her temples.

"We cannot, as man and wife, live in different houses?"

Laura held her hand before her eyes and remained silent. As she did not answer, Fritz drew her hand quietly from her face, and large tears rolled down her cheeks.

"My mother," she said, softly, as she wept.

So touching was the expression of her grief, that Fritz said, sympathizingly:

"Do not grieve, Laura, about her, we will live where you like, and exactly as you think fit."

But even these kind words could not comfort the poor soul, whose maidenly anxieties cast a shadow over her future. The colored haze with which her childish fancy had invested her free life in the neighborhood of her loved one, had been dissolved.

She sat silent and sad.

The coachman stopped before a village inn to refresh himself and his horses. The young landlady stood at the door with her child in her arms; she approached the carriage and civilly invited them to alight. Laura looked anxiously at the Doctor; he nodded, the carriage door was opened. Laura seated herself on a bench in front of the door, and asked the young woman questions about her family, in order to

show the self-possession of a traveller. The woman answered, confidently:

"This is our first child, we have been married scarcely two years. Excuse me, but I suppose you are a young married couple."

Laura rose hastily, her cheeks glowed a deeper red than the rising sun, as she answered with a low "No."

"Then you are engaged without doubt," said the woman, "that can be seen at once."

"How could you discover that?" asked Laura, without raising her eyes.

"One sees evidence of it," replied the woman, "the way in which you looked at the gentleman was significant enough."

"A good guess," exclaimed the Doctor, gaily; but he also colored slightly.

Laura turned away and struggled for composure. The secret of her journey was apparent to every one. It was known in the city and was spoken of in the villages. Her betrothal had been settled by the talk of strangers. Yet her parents had not laid her hand in that of her lover, nor had any of her friends wished her happiness, but now the stranger on the high road came and told her to her face what she was.

"If the woman had known all,—how that I was eloping secretly with Fritz Hahn, without betrothal or marriage,—how would she have looked upon me?" thought Laura.

She entered the carriage before the coachman had finished feeding the horses, and again tears flowed from her eyes. The Doctor, who did not anticipate this change of mood, was about to enter, when Laura, quite beside herself, exclaimed:

"I beg of you to sit by the coachman, I feel very sad."

"Why?" asked Fritz, softly.

"I have done wrong," said Laura. "Fritz, I should like to return. What will that woman think of me? She saw right well that we were not engaged."

"But are we not?" asked the Doctor, astonished. "I consider myself as decidedly engaged, and the friends to whom we go will clearly look upon the affair in that point of view."

"I conjure you, Fritz, to leave me alone now; what I feel I cannot confess to any human being; if I become calmer I will knock at the window."

Fritz again climbed on the coach-box, and Laura passed a sorrowful hour in the solitude of her carriage.

She felt something strange on her cloak, looked with alarm at the empty seat, and started when she saw the demon sitting next her, the enemy of her life, the red dog. He stretched out his forefeet, and raised his moustache high in the air, as if he would say: "*I* am carrying you off. The Doctor is sitting on the box, and I, the mischief-maker, the misanthropist, who have caused so much sorrow to this poetic soul, who have been cursed in her journal in both prose and verse, I, the common and unworthy being who used to lie at her feet, sit by her side the gloomy figure of her fate, the spectre of her youth, and the bad omen of her future life. I lie in the place where, in her childish poetry, she has long dreamt of another, and I mock at her tears and anxiety." He licked his beard and looked from under his long hair contemptuously at her. Laura knocked at the window, resolved to leave the carriage herself and sit upon the box.

* * *

Meanwhile the mothers sat anxiously in the hostile houses. Since her daughter had left, Mrs. Hummel trembled for fear of the anger of her husband. She knew from Laura that he had not objected to the journey to Bielstein, and only wished to appear unconscious of it in order to maintain his defiant character towards his neighbors. But of what was to follow, he would give no information; when it came to a decision as to what was to become of Laura and the Doctor, she felt there was everything to fear from him. Mrs. Hummel had encouraged the journey in order to compel the consent of the family tyrant; but now she felt distrustful of her own cleverness. In her sad perplexity she put her mantle on, over her morning dress, and hastened out of the house to seek consolation from her neighbor.

The heart of Mrs. Hahn was burdened with similar cares; she also was prepared, in her morning dress and mantle, to go over to Mrs. Hummel. The women met outside the two houses, and began an exchange of motherly anxieties. They made use of the neutral ground that lay between the hostile domains for quiet intercourse, and forgot that they were standing in the street. The bells sounded and the church-goers returned, yet they were still standing together talking over the past and future. The comedian approached them elegantly dressed; as he drew near he made a dramatic salutation with his hand. Mrs. Hummel looked with anxiety at her favorite guest, she feared his conjectures and still more his sharp tongue. His face was radiant with pleasure and his gestures were sympathetic.

"What a surprise," he exclaimed, in the tone of a warm-hearted uncle; "what an agreeable surprise? The old quarrel made up; wreaths of flowers from one house to the other; the discord of the fathers is atoned for by the love of the children. I offer my hearty congratulations."

"What do you mean?" asked Mrs. Hummel, perplexed.

"An elopement," exclaimed the comedian, raising his hands.

Both mothers looked terrified.

"I must beg of you, in your remarks, to have more regard for the real state of things," replied Mrs. Hummel with offended dignity.

"An elopement," again exclaimed the gentleman triumphantly. "Quite in conformity with the humor of this house; it is a master-stroke."

"I feel confident from our old friendship," said Mrs. Hummel, "that you do not mean to insult us; but I must earnestly request you to have regard, at least, for propriety."

The comedian was astonished at the reproaches of his patroness.

"I only repeat what I have just been informed of by post." He drew out of his pocket a neat letter. "I hope that the ladies will convince themselves." He read aloud: "'I beg to announce to you the betrothal of Dr. Fritz Hahn with my daughter Laura, and their elopement this morning from her parents' house. Yours humbly, Hummel.' This quite answers to the character of our humorous friend."

The ladies stood aghast. Then the rustling of a silk dress was heard, the godmother came up hastily, her hymn-book in her hand, and called out while yet in the distance:

"What does one not live to see? You naughty people! Is it right that the friends of the family should first learn from the preacher in the church what is happening here?"

"What do you mean?" asked both ladies, quite confounded.

"That the bans of your children have been proclaimed in church to-day for the first, second, and third time. There was general astonishment, and though you have acted in so unfriendly a way as to keep it a secret, all your acquaintances were delighted. Now the whole city is full of it."

Without speaking a word the two mothers flew into each others' arms in the open street, midway between the houses. The comedian stood on one side with his hand in his breast pocket, the godmother on the other with folded hands.

* * *

It was also a troublous Sunday on the estate of Ilse's father. During the previous night a waterspout had burst on the hills, and a wild flood poured down where formerly the brook ran between the meadows. The oldest people did not remember such a rush of water. Before this the brook had been much swollen by the rains of the previous week, now it roared and thundered through the narrow valley between the manor-house and the sloping hills, and overflowed the fields where it was not defied by the steepness of the country and rocks. Furiously did the water rush and foam over the rocks and about the heads of the willows, carrying away the hay from the meadows in its course, uprooting reeds and tearing off branches of trees, and also the ruins of habitations, which, though far above, had been reached by the flood. The people of the estate stood by the edge of the orchard, looking silently upon the stream and the ruins it bore along with it. The children ran eagerly along the side of the water, endeavoring to draw toward them with poles whatever they could reach. They raised loud cries when they saw a living animal floating along. It was a kid standing on one of the boards of the roof of its stall. When the little creature saw the people standing near, it cried piteously, as if begging to be rescued. Hans put out a well-hook, caught hold of the plank, the kid sprang ashore and was taken in grand procession by the children to the farmyard and there fed.

Ilse was standing at the new bridge leading to the grotto. It had only been built a few weeks, and was now threatened with destruction. Already the supports were bending on one side. The force of the water worked against the lower end, and loosened the pegs. The foam of the water whirled round the projecting foot of the rock, which formed the vault of the grotto, and the power of the rising water made deep furrows in the flood.

"There comes some one running from the mountain," exclaimed the people.

A girl came hastily round the rock, with a large kerchief full of fresh-mowed mountain grass on her back. She stopped terrified on the platform of the rock, and hesitated about crossing the unsafe bridge.

"It is poor Benz's Anna!" exclaimed Ilse; "she must not remain there in the wilderness. Throw your burden away—be brisk, Anna, and come over quickly."

The girl passed rapidly across the bridge.

"She shall be the last one," commanded Ilse. "None of you shall attempt to go upon it, for it will not bear the pressure long."

Her father came up.

"The flood will subside to-night if fresh rain does not fall; but the injury it has done will long be remembered. Below, at Rossau, it appears still worse; it has overflowed the fields. Mr. Hummel has hastened down, as he is anxious about the bridges on the road on which his daughter is coming. In the village the water has entered some of the houses; the people are preparing to move to our farm-yard. Go down and help them," he said, turning to some laborers, and continued, in a low tone, to his daughter: "The Prince has gone to the village to examine the damage there. He wishes to speak to you; would you like to see him now?"

"I am ready," said Ilse.

(To be continued.)

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THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

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[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

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MAN has been characterized as "the animal untiring in the search for causes"; and this intellectual curiosity serving as a spur to investigation and therefore as an aid to progress, has doubtless done much towards securing to man his position as the supreme animal.

In slowly emerging from the state of animalhood into that of manhood, primeval man must have gradually come to recognize in himself volitions and motives for those volitions as *causes* of certain events within the sphere of his own activities; and reasoning from the less to the greater, he must early have drawn the inference that motives and volitions (similar in kind to his own) were also causes of the various phenomena occurring in the world of nature around him. Thus anger being associated in his own experience with bluster, and injury with retaliation, the lightning and the tempest came to be regarded as expressions of the fury of the gods—the earthquake and the pestilence as their modes of vengeance upon offending man. In short, the primitive philosophy was that known as anthropomorphism, a crude system of theology, whose numerous gods were merely very much exaggerated men.

Comte has said that every branch of knowledge has passed through three successive stages—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientifical stage; and although this theory of intellectual progress has been condemned as failing in many particulars, it may nevertheless be admitted to have a certain general application. According to the theological philosophy, all things have been created by some supernatural being who is recognized not only as their source, but as their final cause—their *raison d'être*. Thus in the fetichistic theology, man is regarded as the sport and victim of numerous cruel and capricious gods; and in the Calvinistic system, it is taught that God not only created man for his own glory, but that the souls of men are saved or lost, as the case may be (and whatever this may mean), for the same glorious end.

According to the various metaphysical systems of philosophy, a certain essence or immaterial principle exists in things (without, however, being actually a part of them), this mysterious something being the real cause of the phenomena manifested. Even the profound Kepler, after making a mathematical demonstration of the laws which he had discovered, offered as an explanation of one of them the theory, that a mind dwelt in each of the planets, directing its movements in such a way as to cause the *radius vector* to pass over equal areas in equal times. In still later days the phenomena of life have been referred to a "vital principle" resident in living matter, though forming no part of it. It was as a sarcasm on this kind of reasoning that Dean Swift ascribed the virtues of a "meat-jack" to an "inherent meat-roasting principle," and that Molière in his famous comedy, *Le Malade Imaginaire*, made the doctor impute the narcotic properties of opium to a native dormitive principle.

Theology has culminated in the merging of all the gods in one Supreme Being, such traits of character having been progressively attributed to him as have successively satisfied the growing refinement of the human ideal—the entire history of which is condensed into Comte's famous '*mot*,' that "man has created God in his own image." But as the standard of character has steadily risen with advancing civilization, men have found an ever increasing difficulty in reconciling the mixed events of providence with the just, benevolent, and paternal character ascribed to the overruling power. Hence the correlative conception of a devil, only slightly inferior in power to the Supreme Being, was inevitable and has long served a useful purpose in sharing the responsibility of a state of mundane affairs otherwise inconsistent with the divine character; and although this horn of the dilemma has rather fallen into disgrace in these latter days, the faithful still cling to it with a sort of logical instinct, feeling that a dilemma has no logical value when deprived of one of its horns.

As in theology all gods have been merged in One, so in metaphysics a like unification has been attempted and a voice has been heard crying in that wilderness proclaiming a new gospel of peace, according to which the various 'essences,' 'noumena,' and what-nots of every conceivable feather, not even excluding the

* A paper read before the Contemporary Club of Philadelphia, Jan. 8, 1889.

ding-an-sich are reduced to a single immense negation —the Unknowable of Mr. Herbert Spencer—which is described as lying *perdue* behind all phenomena and although absolutely unknowable, nevertheless a reality (albeit a mysterious one) which underlies and is the fruitful source of all that is known.

As it is difficult to understand how true ideas of God can have emerged by a refinement of ever so great a number of false ones, so we are unable to see in Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable any real advance on the various metaphysical abstractions which have preceded this, the grandest abstraction of them all. The modern conception of God (at least in its purer phases) has ceased to be anthropomorphic; but the human mind being incapable of any radically different conception, the tendency is also towards a pure abstraction in the conception of God. The last stages in these two systems of thought (the theological and the purely metaphysical) thus approach each other; and the great Jehovah, who

> "—moves in a mysterious way
> His wonders to perform;"

appears to be identical with the equally mysterious reality of Mr. Spencer—although when pressed on the point of attributing a moral character to the Unknowable, Mr. Spencer declined to answer.

Mr. Matthew Arnold thought perhaps to give a certain definiteness to the ever fading conception of God in his significant phrase—"The eternal power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Now, evolution tends on the whole towards perfection and therefore "makes for righteousness"; but much importance is attached to the words, *not ourselves*, in Mr. Arnold's phrase; and evolution implies the coöperation of living organisms in the upward struggle. May then this power, not ourselves, be identified perchance with the environment which is recognized as playing the leading part in the drama of evolution?

It is scarcely probable that Mr. Arnold would have accepted such an interpretation of his phrase, since the idea of beneficence is involved in all conceptions of the power which makes for righteousness; and while the constant action of the environment upon the human race is such as to ensure progress and thus make for righteousness, no beneficence is displayed in nature; there is no recognition of individuals, no sympathy for suffering, no respect for persons, in her onward march which is accomplished by the inexorable extinction of the weak in a pitiless competition with those who are stronger or otherwise better fitted than themselves to survive. The so-called "cosmic theism," which Prof. Fiske in this country has done much to popularize, fails to point out any power in nature, *other than ourselves*, that manifests either love or pity; and such a theism not only lacks a scientific basis but is retrograde rather than progressive. As shown by Mr. Conway,* it embodies the bitter injustice of Calvinism, rather than the "sweet reasonableness" of Mr. Arnold.

But whether sweet or bitter, none of these theories have any genuine claim to scientific recognition; and the positive thinker rejects the doctrine of the Unknowable as not only undemonstrable but unthinkable. Neither can he accept the proposition of an eternal power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness, in the sense intended by Mr. Arnold, since such a doctrine conflicts with the facts of nature and life. Both must be repudiated along with the other theological dogmas which have flourished in the past or which still cling to a precarious existence among ourselves; for the positive philosophy is concerned with real things and with the framing of such hypotheses as offer logical explanations of observed facts. No thoughtful mind will, however, depreciate the innumerable beneficent influences which have emanated from the religious bodies representing the various theological ideas which have prevailed at different stages of the world's history—a rich legacy which we gratefully accept with respectful memories of the theoretical systems whose declining days cast backwards a melancholy light which softly blends with the dawning effulgence of a higher and purer philosophy.

The physical sciences have fully reached the positive stage of treatment. The "carpenter theory" of the universe has disappeared—even the creationists admitting a modified form of evolution; a "vital principle" is no longer offered as an explanation of the activities of living bodies; the *vis medicatrix naturæ* has quietly left the stage amicably hand in hand with the demon of disease, and the universal natural forces are recognized as prevailing in living bodies no less than in inorganic matter. An equal degree of progress has not, however, been made in all departments of thought, and although a science of morals has long existed in name, the subject of morals too seldom receives scientific treatment.

Comte has suggested that the point of departure of the individual and of the race being the same (a profound biological fact), the phases of development of individual minds correspond to the three epochs, already referred to, of the intellectual progress of the race, *viz.:* that we are theologians in childhood, metaphysicians in youth, and positivists or scientific thinkers in maturity. It is proposed in what follows to assume the position of maturity, according to Comte, and to examine the subject of morals from the positivist's point of view.

(*To be concluded.*)

* See "The New Cosmic Calvinism," by Moncure D. Conway.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

INTRODUCTORY.

WITHOUT attempting at present to define or to characterize attention, I shall take for granted that every one sufficiently understands what the term means. It is a matter of much greater difficulty to know at what point attention begins, and where it ends; for it embraces all degrees from the transient instant accorded to the buzzing of a fly, to the state of complete absorption. It will be conformable to the rule of a sound method only to study cases that are marked and typical; that is to say, those which present at least one of the following two characteristics: intensity and duration. When both these coincide, attention is at its maximum. Duration alone reaches the same result through accumulation: as, for instance, when one deciphers a word or a figure by the light of several electrical sparks. Intensity alone is equally efficacious: thus a woman will take in, in the twinkling of an eye, the complete toilet of a rival. The feeble forms of attention can teach us nothing: at all events, it is not from these that we must begin our study. Before we have yet traced the broad outlines of our work, it would be idle to note the more delicate aspects, and to waste time with subtile differences. The purpose of this series of essays is to establish and prove the following propositions:

There are two well-defined forms of attention: the one spontaneous, natural; the other voluntary, artificial. The former—neglected by most psychologists—is the true, primitive, and fundamental form of attention. The second—the only investigated by most psychologists—is but an imitation, a result of education, of training, and of impulsion. Precarious and vacillating in nature, it derives its whole being from spontaneous attention, and finds only in the latter a point of support. It is merely an apparatus formed by cultivation, and a product of civilization.

Attention, in these two forms, is not an indeterminate activity, a kind of "pure act" of spirit, acting by mysterious and undiscoverable means. Its mechanism is essentially *motory*, that is, it always acts upon the muscles, and through the muscles, mainly under the form of a cessation; and as epigraph of this study we might choose the words of Maudsley, that "the person who is unable to control his own muscles, is incapable of attention." Attention, under these two forms, is an exceptional, abnormal state, which cannot last a long time, for the reason that it is in contradiction to the basic condition of psychic life; namely, change. Attention is a state that is fixed. If it is prolonged beyond a reasonable time, particularly under unfavorable conditions, everybody knows from individual experience, that there results a constantly increasing cloudiness of the mind, finally a kind of intellectual vacuity, frequently accompanied by vertigo. These light, transient perturbations denote the radical antagonism of attention and the normal psychical life. The progress toward unity of consciousness, which is the very basis of attention, manifests itself still better in clearly morbid cases, which we shall study later under their chronic form, namely, the 'fixed idea,' and in their acute form, which is ecstacy.

Already from this point, without passing beyond generalities, we are able by the aid of this clearly marked characteristic—the tendency toward unity of consciousness—to reach a definition of attention. If we take any adult person, in good health, and of average intelligence, the ordinary mechanism of his mental life will consist in a perpetual coming and going of inward events, in a marching by of sensations, feelings, ideas, and images, which associate with, or repel, each other according to certain laws. Properly speaking, it is not, as frequently has been said, a chain, a series, but it is rather an irradiation in various directions, and through various strata; a mobile aggregate which is being incessantly formed, unformed, and re-formed. Every one knows that this mechanism has been carefully studied in our day, and that the theory of association forms one of the solidest acquisitions of modern psychology. Not, indeed, that everything has been done; for, in our opinion, the part sustained by the emotional states has not been sufficiently taken into account as the latent cause of a great number of associations. More than once it happens that an idea evokes another, not by virtue of a resemblance which would be common to them in their character as ideas, but because there is a common emotional fact which envelops* and unites them. There would thus remain the task of reducing the laws of association to physiological laws, and the psychological mechanism to the cerebral mechanism that supports it; but we are still very far from this ideal point.

The normal condition is plurality of states of consciousness, or—according to the expression employed by certain authors — polyïdeïsm. Attention is the momentary cessation, to the exclusive benefit of a single state, of this perpetual progression: it is a monoïdeïsm. But it is necessary, clearly to determine, in what sense we use this term. Is attention a reduction to a sole and single state of consciousness? No; for inward observation teaches us, that it is only a *relative* monoïdeïsm; that is, it supposes the existence of a master-idea, drawing to itself all that relates to it, and nothing else, allowing associations to produce themselves only within very narrow limits, and on

* Translation, by γνῶν, copyrighted under the title "The Psychology of Attention."

* See good instances in J. Sully: "Illusions," Chap. VII

condition that they converge toward a common point. It drains for its own use—at least in the proportion possible—the entire cerebral activity.

Do there really exist cases of *absolute* monoïdeïsm, in which consciousness is reduced to a sole and single state entirely occupying it, and in which the mechanism of association is totally arrested? In our opinion, this we meet in only a few, very rare cases of ecstacy, which we shall analyze later on; still it is for a fleeting instant only, because consciousness disappears when placed beyond the conditions that are rigorously necessary to its existence.

Attention (we here once more and for the last time recall the fact, that we shall only study the clearest cases) consists accordingly in the substitution of a relative unity of consciousness for the plurality of states, for the change which constitutes the rule. Yet this does not suffice to define attention. A very bad toothache, a nephritic colic, or intense enjoyment produce a momentary unity of consciousness, which we do not confuse with attention proper. Attention has an object; it is not a purely subjective modification: it is a cognition, an intellectual state. This is an additional characteristic to be noted.

This is not all. To distinguish it from certain states which approach it, and which will be studied in the course of our work (for example, fixed ideas), we must take account of the adaptation that always accompanies it, and which, as we shall attempt to establish, in a great measure constitutes its character. In what does this adaptation consist? For the present, let us limit ourselves to an entirely superficial view.

In cases of spontaneous attention, the whole body converges toward its object, the eyes, ears, and sometimes the arms; all motions are arrested. Our personality is captured, that is, all the tendencies of the individual, all his available energy aim at the same point. The physical and external adaptation is a sign of psychic and inward adaptation. Convergence is a reduction to unity substituting itself for that diffusion of movements and attitudes which characterizes the normal state.

In cases of voluntary attention adaptation is most frequently incomplete, intermittent, without solidity. The movements stop, yet to reappear from time to time. The organism converges, but in a languid, reluctant sort of way. Intermissions of physical adaptation are a sign of intermissions of mental adaptation. The personality has been captured only partially and at intermittent moments.

I must ask the reader to pardon the circumstance that these brief remarks are somewhat obscure and insufficient. Details and proofs will come later. It was merely a question of paving the way for a definition of attention which, I believe, I can present in the following form: "It is an intellectual monoïdeïsm, accompanied by spontaneous or artificial adaptation of the individual." Or, if we prefer another formula: "Attention consists in an intellectual state, exclusive or predominant, with spontaneous or artificial adaptation of the individual."

CONVICT LABOR.

BY WHEELBARROW.

I SEE by the papers that the Trade and Labor Assembly held a largely attended meeting on Sunday. Judging by a report of the proceedings, the members worked very hard at the wasteful industry of chopping sand. Convict labor was the subject of debate. This contemptible question is unworthy the dignity of a Trade and Labor Assembly. Until mechanics and laborers can rise to a grander theme than competition with convicts, and until they can conquer their fears of "over-production," they will accomplish nothing worthy to be done, either for themselves or others. By keeping down upon this lower plane, they proclaim themselves a lower caste dependent upon the charity of some, the extravagance of others, waste by everybody, and merciful acts of the legislature forbidding other people to work. They persist in limiting production, because they think that scarcity is beneficial to workingmen. It appears to me that this opinion is a serious mistake, and that the very opposite is true.

The speakers did not agree with each other on the question of convict labor. Mr. McLogan repeated the old opinion that convicts should not be allowed to work at mechanical trades, but should be confined to the "building of country roads." "This plan," he said, "would recommend itself to the rural districts." In a former article I showed the unfairness of this plan. I showed the injustice of giving convicts wheelbarrows and shovels, and setting them to work in competition with me. I showed that if convicts must be employed at useful work, they should be employed at that which is most profitable, and if they must compete with labor, they should compete with that labor which gets the highest wages, because that is most able to stand the competition. So long as knights of the wheelbarrow work upon the roads, they want convicts employed at some other kind of labor—watchmaking, for instance, or fancy needlework, anything that they don't have to do.

Mr. McLogan stated that the employment of convicts upon the public roads was the "English system." I doubt this. I think it is a mistake. I have traveled afoot over many of the country roads in England looking for a job, but I never saw any convicts working on them. Still, this is only negative evidence, and Mr. McLogan may have positive evidence the other way.

What of it? Is the scheme practical for us? If not, it must be admitted that the discussion of it is a tiresome chopping of sand. If what Mr. McLogan calls the "rural districts" are to be won over to the support of his plan, they must be persuaded that it is advantageous to them, and must be assured of an equal distribution of its profits. There are probably about 50,000 miles of public roads in Illinois, and about 5,000 convicts, although I hope there are not so many. This would give the "rural districts" one convict to each ten miles of road, making it necessary, therefore, to have less roads or more convicts. In 1862 the regiment that I belonged to was marching through Tennessee, and every night when we went into camp a lot of negroes had to be provided for, who had left the plantations to follow the flag of liberty. Our colonel distributed those negroes among the different companies as servants—so many to each mess. One evening he noticed a disturbance in the camp and inquired the cause of it. "Why," said a disputant, "our mess ain't got its full ration of nigger." The fatal objection to Mr. McLogan's plan is that it would be impossible to give each "rural district" its full ration of convicts.

Mr. George Schilling had another plan; he thought "that penitentiaries might be made self-supporting by turning them into farms, whose surplus produce could be used to feed the poor." The objections to this plan is that it might make an "over-production" of pork and potatoes, and place the convicts in competition with the farmers. Mr. Schilling, I am sure, will admit upon reflection, that he also was chopping sand. If there are in the Joliet penitentiary a thousand convicts, they ought to be able to cultivate a farm of 20,000 acres. Now, in order to keep them from running away, it will be necessary to chain them and handcuff them. This will somewhat impair their efficiency as farm hands, and the harvest home will show a very small quantity of "surplus produce" to be distributed among the poor.

Perhaps Mr. Schilling intends to have the farm walled in; if so, I am in favor of his plan. To put a high wall around 20,000 acres of land would make a good deal of "work" for brickmakers and masons. It would create employment for shovelers and hod-carriers, to both of which professions I have had the honor to belong. It would make a job for me, and this, according to a very popular philosophy, appears to be the chief business of laws and government, to give a job to *me*, and take it away from *him*.

Since writing the above criticism on the proceedings of the Trade and Labor Assembly, the justice of my position has been vindicated in a very instructive way. The city government of Washington, impressed by the wisdom of Mr. McLogan's plan, passed an ordinance to the effect that convicts must not compete with the aristocracy of mechanics, but must "work upon the roads." Thereupon the noble order of scavengers arose in their might, and threatened revolution. They would not allow unsavory criminals to come "between the wind and their nobility." The ordinance was repealed, and revolution averted.

I take this opportunity to explain my position on the important subject of "organized labor." I have been regarded by many able and useful organs of the workingmen as an opponent of Trades Unions, Knights of Labor, and labor associations generally. This is a mistake. I have said over and over again that in the present pressure of monopoly upon labor, it would be the very imbecility of resignation if workingmen should not organize themselves in Trades-Unions for their own protection. I have merely criticized such of their laws and regulations as I thought were founded on error and injustice. I am not discouraged because the workingmen in their trades-unions disagree with me in their theory of social economics, if that is the correct phrase. It is not of much consequence, just now, whether workingmen in their associations are thinking right or wrong; the sublime encouragement is that they are beginning to think at all. They will think right in time.

That many of the doctrines now held by the trades-unions will be radically reversed by them, I have no doubt whatever. The unnatural dogma that every workingman is the "competitor" of every other workingman must go. It makes the death or illness of every wage-worker a benefit to all the rest, a doctrine which in its full development would make society a hideous thing to live in. In its place must come the nobler and the manlier principle that every worker is the helper and the friend of every other. The trades-unions will reverse the opinion that scarcity is a desirable thing, and substitute for it a belief in the blessings of abundance. They will see that not "over-production," but "under-production" means hunger to the poor man's child.

Once upon a time I worked on a railroad at a place called Longueil, just opposite Montreal. I had to work from daylight until dark, and slept in a barn. I got a dollar a day, and the shoveling was hard, for the land round there was rocky and tough. One day, when my muscles were very tired, I tried to sneak up the plank with a light load, when the boss roared out, "Tom, fill up the 'barrow; you wouldn't put out a yard of dirt in a week." Thinking the whole matter over that night, I imbibed this industrial heresy, that in order to my happiness the laws of society should be framed, not so as to make more work for me, but less. It occurred to me also that in order to have more food, more clothing, more wages, and less work, I

ought to encourage the multiplication of all the comforts of life, and then seek by proper laws a fairer distribution of them, and in that heresy I expect to die.

LINES TO AN AMERICAN LAUREATE.*

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

"Think you Truth a farthing rusblight,
to be pinched out when you will?"
Anti-Apis, by J. R. LOWELL, 1851.

"O HAPPY days when men received
From sire to son what all believed—"†
We love the Past as well as you
But really, Master, is it true
That "nobody had any Views"
That he was anxious to diffuse,
"Insisting all the world should see
Camels and whales where none there be?"
Were there not always men more wise
Than other men, about the skies?
With often such a power to back them
That if the rest rebelled they'd whack them?
I think if you reflect you'll own a
Number of such, including Jonah,
All harping on the same old whale
Till people swore the cloud smelt stale
And plucked their courage up to scoff it
As very like a scheme of profit.
Now competition makes them dish
A varied choice of fresher fish
And sauces dosed with metaphysic
For every stage of dogma phthisic.

For heaven's sake don't "watch and wait
The last life-crushing coil of Fate"—
"Men feel old systems cracking under'em"?
Cheer up, and hang their old "conundrum
Which once Religion solved, but she
Has lost"—Ah, has she then?—"the key."
You ask,—can Science get around it?—
She doesn't say she can, confound it!
But while the parsons fume and splutter
She'll change the price of bread and butter.
She does it, and not only so
For petty lumps of hardened dough;
She'll break, and break with bloodless strife,
The corner in the Bread of Life!

It's true that "admirable Huxley
Cannot explain to me why ducks lay":
These gentlemen of science now
Give up the *why* and seek the *how*;
Missing that often, but agreed a
Baby has not been hatched since Leda;
Nor solve the mysteries of love
With hypothetic swan or dove.

"Who gets a hair's-breadth on by showing
That Something Else set all agoing?"—
Because old dames are sprung from others
Must men deny their own grandmothers?
Surely they'll call you indiscreet
For talking so, in Beacon street.
Your science is enough to shock
The seasoned nerves of Plymouth Rock.

Perhaps, indeed, you "might as well
Obey the meeting-house's bell
And listen while Old Hundred pours,"
But mind you don't mistake the doors:—
Here, where they stretch a point, you'd be all
Right, but next door you're damned to Sheol.
(You must have heard them lately dwell
Upon these ins and outs of hell.)

"If Heaven it reached not, yet its roll
Waked all the echoes of the soul,
And in it many a life found wings
To soar away from sordid things."
That wax-work boy we read about
Flew grandly till the sun came out;
But soaring leads to falls and bumps
That land us in the doleful dumps.
Truth's wings are short but every feather
Is guaranteed to stand the weather
And though it's natural we should mope
Analysis and telescope
May teach our children not to cry
Because the moon is hung so high.

It all depends on how we're taught
And ten to one if you'd been caught
Young, and well fed on solid facts
Instead of sermons, psalms, and tracts,
You'd not be "flattening your poor nose
In hope to see beyond your toes,"
But smiling through a different glass
Upon the boys and girls that pass
And breathing perfume from the roses
We'd blend with laurel for such noses.

When the veiled years shall bear the pall
That loving hands have spread o'er all
That now remains of childish hope
Beyond the pale horizon's slope,
Our hearts will turn to meet the sun
Like flowers when the dark is done.
Meanwhile in scientific way
I'll prove that you were wrong to say
That "nothing dances any more"
By dancing to this nursery score;—
Once on a time a little boy
Who might have been his mother's joy
Fell in a dump and pined away
Because he wouldn't go and play
But sat and sat and sat before
A tightly fastened closet door
Inside of which were pots in rows
All filled with jam—as some suppose.
He cried and cried and cried and cried
Till his tears gave out, and then he died;
All from the loss of appetite
For wholesome food—and served him right!

I must confess, that metaphor
About the wall without a door
Surrounding that "Great Mystery"
Produced a strange effect on me.
Your longing for "a pin-hole peep"
Made me feel something like the deep
And strong emotion that would work us
When, boys, we went to see the circus
And pitied those the scale of prices
Condemned to certain small devices.

* Copyright, 1887, by Louis Belrose, Jr.
† See poem by J. R. Lowell: *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1887.

You keep a key because, you say,
It's possible that nature may
"In her good-will to you and me
Make door and lock to match the key."
But though she's fond of making matches
Her favorite line is not dead-latches
And even this good-will, I take it,
Is nothing more than what we make it.
However, it won't hurt at all
To plant a flower by your wall;
It's really not the place to mingle
Wit with cacophonic jingle.

SONNET.

How many hearts since first with upturned eyes
Our fathers sought the silent waste and kneeled
Have burnt their offering in flames revealed
To no man's sight, beneath unconscious skies!

Lost in the void, innumerable, they rise
And err amid the dark of space, congealed
With fumes from altar, stake, and battle-field
That reeked with blood of human sacrifice.

O Heart, our earth is cold for waste of love!
Without thy warmth there is no fire can heat
The poor man's hearth—What need the Gods above?—

Without thy warmth no raging blast is meet
To fine our gold and cure the curse thereof,
Without thy flame no torch for wandering feet.

CORRESPONDENCE.

HOW TO ARRIVE AT LAND-VALUES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I WILL try to make plain how I get at land-values and what my estimate of the farmer's taxes are for. In the cities there is beyond question a market price for vacant lots. In the country the unimproved lands have a price much varied by conditions, such as mountainous, swampy, wooded and accessibility, etc. We can have no difficulty with these classes of lands.

The only trouble we can possibly have, it seems to me, will be as to the price of improved farming-lands; here we must distinguish the land-value from the value of the improvements upon some particular piece of land under consideration. Just at the present time, because the business of the country under our land-system does not make it necessary, we do not have the required distinction already worked out. In fixing our estimates for argument, we must do the best we can under the circumstances. In England, I suppose, the case is different. There the ground-rent is a valuation fixed upon the annual use of the land and is a fair equivalent of *economic rent*, and is about what we expect the rate of the single tax to be. A fair *ground rent* and a fair *single tax* being the *same*, one can be as easily and as justly determined as the other. Nor can I think of any reason why as just results may not be reached in America as in England when once we have had an equal experience.

Suppose we know the market-price of a farm. We can then estimate the value of the improvements. This we can get at in this way. What would the farm sell for if the barn burned off? The value of the barn is revealed. So we may mentally annihilate the house, the fence, the orchards, until we reach a fair estimate of the naked land. You may say this is only guessing. It is no more guessing than the fixing of any other market-prices *before* an actual sale. It is good enough even as evidence to offer in a court of justice.

Very often a part of a farm containing no buildings is sold to an adjoining farmer, or to one who wishes to put up buildings and have a small country-place. In these cases the improvements on the part sold are often of so small value as to be of no practical account. There seems to be no difficulty in fixing the value, which is practically a land-value and is a tolerably safe guide to the value of all similar lands in the same neighborhood. As referee in a foreclosure action, a few years ago, I sold about sixty acres of tilled land, part of an improved farm (containing the usual farm buildings, with no improvements, however, on the part sold, except an old rail fence) for $45 per acre. Eight or ten years previously the same land in practically the same condition was sold for $100 per acre. Here is a loss growing out of our capitalization of land-values that could not have occurred had the single tax been in operation. Individual losses are as much to be deplored as the taking by individuals of the "unearned increment." Indeed, it is more pitiable when a great loss falls upon an individual than when distributed over the community.

The $150 estimated taxes on a $15,000 farm in this county is the estimate of a tax-collector and was approved of as about right by some twenty-five to thirty farmers at a little meeting of farmers, that I had the pleasure of addressing on the subject of the single tax. It is intended to include in the sum state, county, town, and school-taxes. The road-tax in this part of the state is generally worked out by days' work and is not therefore included.

I see that the *Standard*, Henry George's paper, has published an article entitled "Land-Values in the United States." In looking over the Encyclopedia Britannica, ninth edition, I found that under the name of each county of England it gives the population and the annual land-value. A little calculation for the figures of the two, or three, counties that I had time to glance over I found that the annual land-value is from $30 to $35 per capita. This, as we capitalize land-values in this country, would be $600 to $700 per capita and corresponds very closely with the results reached in the *Standard* article above referred to.

If on further study it becomes evident that there is an almost constant relation between land-values and population, varied, no doubt, by soil, climate, social, and individual habits of the people, we will have an absolute demonstration of the hypothesis that land-values are determined by population; or, in other words, that every one contributes to the value of land. The conclusion that that value, say $600, which one's existence adds to the land ought to belong to that person, if to any individual, will be accepted without argument as indisputable. For it is inconceivable that any one should seriously maintain that a value that the life of Jones creates should, without consideration, become the property of Smith. If it can be shown that such ownership by Smith results in the practical slavery of Jones, enlightened humanity will hasten to dispossess Smith of his slave even if to do so it must dispossess him of his land-values, however acquired. Nor will such dispossession be an act of injustice to Smith; it will be simply an act of justice to Jones. It is thus we regard the abolition of slavery.

If it is impracticable to put each one in possession of just his share of land-value, then we ought to see if it can be practically secured to his benefit in a public, or general, hand that will gather up all values thus created and expend them for the benefit of all. It by no means follows that because a distribution directly to each person is impracticable, even incomputable, because humanity in the creation of these values is as a living stream passing over the land, that indirectly and by regarding a great mass of humanity, a state or a nation, as a unit substantial justice may not be done to each and all. If it proves to be so attainable, ought we not to work earnestly to secure it? Have we not already such promise and such hope that from henceforth we owe it to ourselves, to all, to give our best efforts to the study of this problem.

POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y., 1889. WILLIAM C. ALBRO.

THE SINGLE TAX AGAIN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IT is gratifying to the readers of THE OPEN COURT to learn that Wheelbarrow accepts Mr. Pentecost's advice to re-read "Progress and Poverty," as it is possible that he may thereby gain some information in regard to Mr. George's land-theory. He, in return invites Mr. Pentecost to a perusal of Sir Thomas More's "Utopia" and to Cervantes "Don Quixote." It is evident that he is himself familiar with the last-named book, as may be seen by his imitation of that doughty hero's celebrated battle with the windmills, which he mistook for giants. In a like manner, Wheelbarrow valiantly attacks something he doubtless deems Georgeism, and spurs his jaded hobby-horse, "Tom Clark's farm," into the thick of the fray, until, like its prototype, Rozinante, it is well nigh spent.

Wheelbarrow appears haunted by the idea that under the single tax, Tom Clark's farm would be taken away from him, and poor Tom thrown an outcast on the highway ; or perhaps he fears the farm would be swept from under Tom's feet and the unhappy man left suspended in space where the land used to be.

It is strange that he cannot see that the single tax would leave Tom in absolute possession of his farm, and so long as the land about him was unappropriated, and free to whoever chose to use it, he would enjoy its possession free of all taxes whatever. When, however, the land all around him was in use, a village had sprung up and he was in the enjoyment of communal advantages, in consequence of the increased population, his farm would acquire a value distinct from his labor, and entirely due to the presence of the community. *That* value would be taxed into the common treasury, to be used for the benefit of Tom himself as well as his co-heirs in the goodly heritage of these United States, and the single tax would cover all governmental and public expenses in lieu of all other taxes.

It is hard to see how Tom is to be injured by this proposed substitution for manifold taxes of one tax, which is in fact no tax at all, but a rent paid to all for the use of a common property. Perhaps though, Tom does not care to partake of communal advantages, or to pay for the enjoyment of the same. Perhaps that was the cause of his aforetime fleeing from the haunts of man and far from the madding crowd, and settling himself on such an undesirable section as can be bought nowadays for $2.50 an acre. If this is the case, there is but one thing for Tom to do. As fast as population comes about him, he must sell out his improvements, and, like little Joe, "keep moving on." If such is his strange humor, he can easily keep ahead of civilization and the single tax.

But if, on the contrary, Tom has been driven to that lonely exile by the unjust monopolization of land nearer home, and would like, twenty years from now when population has gathered about his isolated farm, to revenge himself on society by pocketing the increased value its presence has given his land, it is quite true that Georgeism will "confiscate" his ability to do so on the very sound basis that two wrongs do not make one right.

Wheelbarrow does not like Mr. Pentecost's comparison of the present movement toward the emancipation of the industrial slaves of to-day and the emancipation of chattel slaves a quarter of a century ago, and says, "we commit a solecism when we compare a scheme of serfdom to that splendid achievement of liberty." He also says, "there is no likeness between a slave and a farm, nor between the emancipation of a slave and the confiscation of land."

Hold on, Wheelbarrow. In your next paragraph you confute yourself, and are guilty of a sentiment so allied to Georgeism, that it leads one to think that you are in reality a friend of the single tax, and are simply setting yourself up a willing target for Georgeites to launch arrows at, all for love of the cause.

You say, "I use the word serfdom with deliberation, *because the ownership of land has ever been the political distinction between a free man and a serf. The ownership of land is the sign and title of a free man*, the inspiration of his patriotism. His very estate is called a free-holding or a freehold, and he himself is called a freeholder. Every tenure before the grade of a freehold is politically base, and I am informed that it is technically so in law."

So after all these weeks of controversy, you acknowledge the only point Georgeites contend for : that the private ownership of land involves the serfdom of all the landless ones, of those men who being obliged to pay toll to their fellowmen for permission to use the soil, occupy the grade you describe as "politically base" and as "technically so in law," whatever that last phrase may mean.

This great mass of landless serfs, you declare, have also no inspiration for their patriotism, since it is ownership of land which inspires that emotion.

It is worthy of remark, however, that it is not these politically free men and patriotic land-owners who do the fighting. Curiously enough, it is the "politically" and "technically base"; the unpatriotic masses in all countries who shed their life's blood on the battle fields, to preserve the land of their so called country for the ownership and inspiration of a few other men.

But if the ownership of land does mark the distinction between freemen and serfs, as Mr. George has been teaching for the past ten years, what has Wheelbarrow to say to the making of *all* men free, by making *all* men *land-owners—all* equal shares in the common bounties of nature. There is no escape from the conclusion, a landless man is a serf. To deprive men of the right to the use of the earth is to make slaves of them in fact, whether they are called so in name or not to the men who own the land.

The single tax restores to the disinherited those rights on which their freedom depends, and it is the only way in which it can be restored, for as two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time, so though all have equal rights to all portions of the land of their country, only one can enjoy its possession, and the equal right of the others can only be maintained by the payment of the one who appropriates it of the greater value it possesses over lands unappropriated and fresh to use.

Wheelbarrow fought for the freedom of his black brother. Will he not join in this bloodless strife for the emancipation of the human family from the chains of tyranny and serfdom ? or are his eyes so blinded by the dust of Tom Clark's farm that he cannot see God's universe beyond it ? TRICYCLE.

OWNERSHIP OF LAND.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IN the single-tax discussion in your paper lately much good space has, I think, been wasted in attacking and defending various persons, and in quibbling over words and phrases, so that the real question has been almost buried. It is not so important to know what Mr. George or any one else meant by certain phrases, as it is to know what is a just land system, and how we are to get it.

Your contributor touched the heart of the question when he wrote :

"No person other than the owner has any right to exact ground-rent for the use of land."

Is this true ? Is it just that land should have an "owner" ? No, and no again.

For, consider what it means to be an "owner" of land. "Ownership" of land to-day means the possession of certain privileges. If all these privileges are just, ownership of land is just.

What are these privileges ? Broadly speaking, they are two. First, the privilege of peaceably occupying land for use. Second, the privilege of controlling land which the "owner" is not using.

The first is a right ; the second is a wrong.

The first stands directly on Nature. Peaceable occupation of land, more or less exclusive according to the kind of use made, is fundamentally necessary, and therefore just.

The second is plainly needless, and necessarily interferes with the rights of others. It is therefore unjust and tyrannical.

Man is a tenant of the Earth, with a short lease. Land is to him the first necessity of life. As long as he lives, then, from his very nature and position, man has a right to use land. This right cannot be sold or leased, for it is as much his—after the bargain as before—he might as well bargain away his shadow, as his right to use land.

Contrast these simple, self-evident truths with the practice of to-day, upheld by law and custom. Our customs say that "A man may obtain, in any one of several ways, a privilege of land-control which does not die with him, but endures, forming the foundations for the rights of his heirs and assigns, to all generations. Having acquired it, he may use the land, or keep it idle, as he likes. He may sell or will this privilege to another, or only a part of it, imposing on all future buyers and users such conditions as he chooses. These they must obey under penalty of losing, not only the land-privilege, but also any improvements they may have put on it, for we still cherish the stupid maxim of our ancestors, "the land holds the buildings."

Or, he may lease it for what he can get for it, to some one who has failed to get one of these magical, everlasting privileges, and is, consequently, living in civilized society only by permission of some one who has one. What absurdities and injustices do these customs involve! A mortal acquiring immortal rights. A man of one generation dictating conditions to generations following. A human creature exacting rent from his equals, for the privilege of living in a civilized community. An aristocracy founded on transferable privileges. Private veto-power over other men's labor. No! These privileges cannot be just, for they ignore the nature of man and his necessary relations to the land. "Ownership" of land, like the Mahometan faith, rests on "an eternal truth and a necessary lie."* It is true that every man has a right to as much control over land as is needful for his use and enjoyment of it, and for the security of the fruits of his labor. It is not true that this right exists after his death or that he can by any possibility get possession of any other man's land-right, or lose his own, while he lives. The question is, how shall we get rid of the unjust privileges, without letting go the rights?

Bearing in mind the principle that every governmental reform should be, on the whole, an *abolition*,—tending toward simplicity, and leaving individuals freer from coercion than before, the most obvious remedies would seem to be these:

In the case of unimproved land, to refuse governmental assistance to the holders of paper titles against would-be settlers, meanwhile protecting such settlers from the interference of the owner or his agents, as much as from any other interference.

Similarly, in the case of improved lands, to refuse government assistance to the holders of paper-titles against the owners of the improvements on the land.

To refuse to record warranty deeds, or to enforce the provisions peculiar to them.

To refuse to enforce any *conditions* in deeds, old or new.

In general to assume that occupancy and use give the best title, and to refuse to consider any suits at law for the purchase-money or rent of land, apart from, or over and above, the value of the improvements on it.

These measures, although direct, and embodying essential elements of the proposed reform, would probably fail to stop trading in land, because they do not recognize, any more than our present laws do, the peculiar nature of ground-rent, which, however much its growth may be said to be forced by our unnatural conditions, seems to have its own laws, based in the nature of man and of the world.

Whenever a civilized community is growing, land-rent is growing, not always perceptibly, often hidden by the fluctuations of false or speculative rent and purchase-price, but growing, all the same.

As the gross amount of land of all kinds within a certain distance of that community is limited in quantity, simple growth in numbers, other things being equal, will cause no-rent land within that circle to become rent-bearing, and will cause the rent-bearing land to increase in value, whether in use or not. And everything which makes residence in that community more desirable will increase the rental value of land in and around it. Now, every man has not only a right to use land, but also an equal right with every other man, and to allow some men to use valuable land while others must be content with cheap land, is a denial of their equality of rights. The natural way to recognize this equality, in practice, is for the former, in some way, to pay to the latter the difference in rent, or, what amounts to the same thing, as long as we have public expenses, for all who use or control rent-bearing land to pay rent, depending upon the value of the said land, into the common fund, for public uses.

This is the single-tax—an unfortunate name, by the way, for, as "Wheelbarrow" says, it is not a tax at all, but rent. But such it is, whatever name we give it, and whatever its other virtues or conveniences, its chief merit is, that it will do away with "ownership" of land, in the present comprehensive sense of that word. That is, without taking anything from security of tenure for use, and without making the land a bit less useful, it will take away the value of the perpetual privileges we buy and sell, and will practically enforce equality of land-rights, making the aforesaid direct measures nearly or quite superfluous.

Curiously enough, however, your correspondent holds that while government has a right to collect taxes, it has no right to collect land-rent. But the fact is, that it has a superior right, because the rental value of land is made by the presence and the labors of all, and it is quite impossible to say in what proportions the various individuals have helped to that result.

Income-taxes, improvement-taxes, tariff-taxes, have no such basis in justice. They rest chiefly on convenience, and are unjust in principle; the first two, because they fail to discriminate between incomes and property earned by the individual, and incomes and property taken as monopoly gains, or tribute, and the third, because they deny freedom of production (of which exchange is a part), and tax people, largely, in proportion to their necessities.

THEODORE P. PERKINS.

LYNN, Mass.

* Gibbon: "Decline and Fall."

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XL. — Continued.

Ilse went towards the village with her father; there she ascended to the churchyard.

"I shall remain in the neighborhood," said he. "When the Prince leaves you, call me."

She stood by the side of the wall, looking at the grave of her dear mother and at the spot where the old Pastor reposed with his wife. The branches of the trees which she had planted here hung over her head. She remembered how fond her old friend had been of dilating on the fact that everything was just the

* Translation copyrighted.

same in the great world as in his village, the nature and passions of men were everywhere alike, and that one might make the same experience in their little valley as amidst the tumult of the Court.

"Here my father is master," she thought, "and the people are accustomed to obey us, his children, and to regard us as we do our rulers. And their children, too, might experience what others have had to experience, were their master an evil-minded man. Yet they may ask for justice at any moment and find protection.

"How will he, the proud man, bear that his wife should not find justice or protection from the injury which has been done to both her and him? We ought to do good to those who injure us. If the wicked Sovereign should now come to me sick and helpless, ought I to receive him in my house? and ought I to place myself by his couch, when such a mark of kindness might expose me to fresh insult? I have worn a white mantle; the stain which he has cast upon it, I see every hour, and no tears wash it away. He has taken from me my pure robe; shall I also at his bidding give him my gown? O high and honorable precept, taught me by my departed friend, I tremble to obey. It is a struggle between duties, and the thought of my Felix says to me, 'No.'

"I have done with the young Prince too, however innocent he may be. I know that he once sought encouragement from the simple woman with all the warmth of his heart, and my vanity has often told me that I have been a good friend to him in his high yet lonely life. Fearfully have I atoned for this vain pride. He also from henceforth must be a stranger to me. What can he still wish from me? I imagine that he thinks exactly as I do, and only wishes to take leave of me for ever. Well, I am prepared for it."

The Hereditary Prince came along the footpath from the village. Ilse remained standing by the wall of the churchyard, and bowed calmly to his greeting.

"I have made known at the capital my wish to travel," began the Prince; "I hope my request will be granted. And I have therefore come to say farewell to you."

"What you now say," answered Ilse, "shows that I have rightly judged your Highness."

"I had little opportunity of speaking to you in the city," said the Prince, shyly; "it would grieve me if you should deem me capable of ingratitude or of coldheartedness."

"I know the reasons that kept your Highness away," replied Ilse, looking down; "and I am thankful for your good intentions."

"To-day I wish to tell you, and at the same time your husband," continued the Prince, "that I shall endeavor to make what I have learnt with you useful for my future life. I know that this is the only way in which I can thank you. If you should ever hear that my people are contented with me, you may feel, gracious lady, that I have to thank, above all, you and yours for the strengthening of my sense of duty, for an impartial judgment of the worth of men, and for a higher standard of the duties of one who has to guard the welfare of many. I shall endeavor to show myself not quite unworthy of the sympathy you have accorded me. If you learn from others that it has benefited me, think kindly of me."

Ilse looked at his excited countenance; there was the gentle, honest expression which she had so often watched with anxious sympathy; she saw how deeply he felt that something had interposed between him and her, and how thoughtfully he endeavored to spare her. But she did not fathom the deep and powerful grief of the young man, the poetry of whose youthful life a father had destroyed. She did not guess that the punishment which could not reach the father had fallen upon the innocent soul of the son. The injury that the father had inflicted had clouded the happiest feeling of his young life—his warm friendship for the woman to whom he clung with enthusiastic admiration. But the kind-hearted Ilse understood the full worth of him who now stood before her, and her cautious reserve disappeared; with her old frankness, she said to him: "One must not be unjust to the innocent, nor be untrue to those whose confidence one has had, as I have yours. What I now wish for your Highness is a friend. I have seen that this is what your life needs, and I have observed, too, how difficult it is to avoid forming a low estimate of men when one's sole companions are servants."

These kind words of Ilse broke down the composure which the Prince had been struggling to maintain. "A friend for me?" he asked, bitterly. "Fate early disciplined me; I am not permitted to seek for or enjoy friendship; poison has been poured over the love that I felt. Forgive me," he suddenly said; "I am so accustomed to complain to, and seek comfort from you, that I cannot help speaking of myself, although I know that I have lost the right to do so."

"Poor Prince," exclaimed Ilse, "how can you look after the welfare of others, if your own life is void of light? The happiness which I desire for your Highness's future life is domestic love, a wife that understands you, and would become the friend of your soul."

The Prince turned aside to conceal the pain that this speech occasioned him. Ilse looked at him sorrowfully; she was once more his good counsellor as before.

A beggar-woman crept round the wall of the churchyard.

"May I beg of you to day?" began a hoarse voice, at Ilse's back. "When it is not the father, it is the son."

Ilse turned round; again she saw the hollow eyes of the gipsy, and cried out, dismayed, "Away from here."

"The lady can no longer drive me away," said the gipsy, cowering down, "for I am very weary, and my strength is at an end."

One could see that she spoke the truth.

"The troopers have hunted me from one boundary to another. If others have no compassion on me, the lady from the rock should not be so hard-hearted, for there is old fellowship between the beggar and her. I also once had intercourse with noble people, I have abandoned them, and yet my dreams ever hover over their golden palaces. Whoever has drunk of the magic cup will not lose the remembrance of it. It has again and again driven me into this country, I have led my people here—and they now lie in prison, the victims of the old memories that pursued me."

"Who is this woman?" asked the Prince.

The beggar raised her hands on high.

"In these arms I have held the Hereditary Prince when he was a child and knew nothing; I have sat with him on velvet in his mother's room. Now I lie in the churchyard on the high road, and the hands that I stretch out to him remain empty."

"It is the gipsy woman," said the Prince in a low tone, and turned away.

The beggar-woman looked at him scornfully, and said to Ilse:

"They trifle with us, and ruin us, but they hate the remembrance of old times and of their guilt. Be warned young woman, I know the secrets of this noble family, and I can tell you what they have tried to do to you, and what they have done to another who flourished before you on yonder height, and whom they placed, as they did you, in the gilded prison, over whose portal the black angel hovers."

Ilse stood bending over the beggar woman, the Prince approached her.

"Do not listen to the woman," he exclaimed.

"Speak on," said Ilse, with a faint voice.

"She was young and finely formed like you, and like you she was brought to that prison, and when the mother of this man removed me from her service because I pleased the Sovereign, I was appointed to serve the stranger. One morning I was made to ask for leave of absence from the imprisoned lady, because she was to be alone."

"I entreat of you not to listen to her," implored the Prince.

"I listen," said Ilse, again bending down over the old woman, "speak low."

"When I came back the next morning I found a maniac in the house instead of the fair-haired lady, and I escaped from the place in terror. Do you wish to know through which door madness made its way to that woman?" she continued in a low murmur. Ilse put her ear to her mouth, but sprang suddenly back and uttered a piercing shriek, hiding her face with her hands. The Prince leaned against the wall and wrung his hands.

A loud call sounded from the carriage-road, and a man hastily approached; he held out a letter while still at a distance.

"Gabriel!" exclaimed Ilse, hastening towards him. She tore the letter from him, read it, and supported herself convulsively against one of the stones of the churchyard. The Prince sprang forward, but she held out the letter as if to stop him and exclaimed:

"The Sovereign is coming."

The Prince looked terrified at Gabriel.

"He is hardly a mile from here," announced the exhausted servant. "I overtook the princely carriage, and succeeded in getting ahead of it. The horses are struggling along the unfinished road, but the bridge between this and Rossau is now scarcely fit for horsemen or carriages; I was obliged to leave my horse behind; I do not believe they will be able to cross it, except on foot."

Without saying a word the Prince hastened down the road to Rossau. Ilse flew with her letter in her hand up the rock to her father, who came with Mr. von Weidegg to meet her.

"Go and pay your respects to your master," she called out wildly, to the Chamberlain. "My Felix comes!" she called to her father, and sank upon his breast.

People were collected near the temporary bridge between Rossau and Bielstein. Gabriel also hastened back to the water; he had met Mr. Hummel there, who was passing up and down along the bank looking across the stream.

"The world is wretchedly small," exclaimed Mr. Hummel, to his confidant, "people always meet again. One who has been galloping, like you, should take care of himself; you are exhausted, and look greatly changed. Sit down on this log and rest yourself like a sensible man."

He pushed Gabriel down, buttoned his coat, and patted him on the cheek with his large hand.

"You must be in great need of refreshment, but the best we have here is a water-perch, and I do not like to treat you like a despicable New Zealander, who in the booths at a fair consumes five cents-worth of raw whitings. Take the last restorative of a Parisian traveler."

He forced him to take a piece of chocolate.

A few steps from them, at the bridge, stood the Prince with folded arms, looking at the water, which on the side of Rossau had spread itself over the meadows and low fields about the town. Rapidly did the expanse of water increase; on the nearest part of the new road, which had not yet been paved, puddles of water gleamed between the heaps of sand and the wheelbarrows of the workmen; the road projected like a dark strip out of the muddy flood. A few individuals were coming from Rossau; they waded through the thick mud of the road and supported themselves timidly by the smooth poles which supplied the place of the bridge-rails. For the water rushed violently against the beams instead of flowing deep under the arches, and the spectators on the Bielstein side called aloud to them to make haste. The Chamberlain hastened down to his silent master and looked anxiously in his face. He was followed by the Proprietor.

"If I could do as I wished, I would break these tottering planks with my own hands," he said, indignantly, to Mr. Hummel.

"The carriages are coming," called the people. The Sovereign's carriage with four horses drove at a rapid trot through the gate of Rossau. Beside the Sovereign sat the Lord High Steward. The former had during the wearisome journey been in a state of gloomy stupor; an occasional wild word, and a look of intense hatred, was all his intercourse with his companion.

The courtier had in vain endeavored to draw the Sovereign into quiet conversation. Even the consideration of the two servants sitting at the back of the open carriage could not restrain the Sovereign's mood. Exhausted by the secret strain of this journey the old gentleman sat, the attendant by his invalid, and his sharp eye watched every movement of his companion. When they drove out of the town into the open country, the Sovereign began, musingly:

"Did you recognize the horseman that overtook us in such haste?"

"He was a stranger to me," said the High Steward.

"He conveyed information of our arrival; they are prepared to receive us."

"Then he has done your Highness a service, for they would hardly have had any anticipation at the hunting-lodge of your Highness's important resolution."

"We are not yet at the end of our drama, Lord High Steward," said the Sovereign, tauntingly; "the art of foreseeing the future is lost. Even your Excellency does not understand that."

"I have always been satisfied with observing cautiously what surrounds me in the present, and I have thereby sometimes guarded myself from being disagreeably surprised by the future. If by any accident I should myself be prevented from carrying out my *rôle* in the drama of which your Highness speaks, I have taken care that others shall act my part."

The Sovereign threw himself back in his seat. The carriage went on through the mire, the horses floundered, and the coachman looked back doubtfully.

"Forward!" called out the Sovereign, in a sharp voice.

The Hereditary Prince awaits your Highness at the bridge on foot," said the High Steward.

They went on at a good pace, the coachman with difficulty restraining his horses, who were frightened at the glittering expanse of water and the roar of the flood.

"Forward!" again commanded the Sovereign.

"Permit the coachman to stop, your Highness; the carriage cannot go further without danger."

"Do you fear danger, old man?" exclaimed the Sovereign, his face distorted with hatred. "Here we are both in the water—the same fate for us both, Lord High Steward. He is a bad servant who abandons his master."

"But I wish to restrain your Highness also," replied the High Steward.

"Forward!" cried the Sovereign again.

The coachman stopped.

"It is impossible, most gracious master," he said; "we can no longer go over the bridge."

The Sovereign jumped up in the carriage, and raised his stick against the coachman. The man, frightened, whipped his horses; they reared and sprang off to one side.

"Stop!" cried the High Steward.

The frightened lackeys readily jumped down, and held the horses. The High Steward opened the carriage door, and scrambled out.

"I beseech your Highness to alight."

The Sovereign sprang out, and, casting a look of vindictive hatred at him, hastened forward on foot. He stepped on the bridge, and the flood roared around him.

"Stay back, father," entreated the Hereditary Prince.

The father laughed, and advanced over the tottering planks; he had passed over the middle of the bridge and the deepest part of the stream; only a few steps more and his foot would touch the shore of Bielstein. At that moment there rose up near the bridge a bent figure, that cried out wildly to him:

"Welcome to our country, Gracious Lord; mercy for the poor beggar-woman. I bring you greeting from the fair-haired lady of the rock."

"Away with the crazy creature," exclaimed the Chamberlain.

(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS.

A Defense of Judaism Versus Proselytizing Christianity. *Isaac M. Wise.* Cincinnati and Chicago: *The American Israelite.* Price, 75 cents.

The Same. Seventieth Birthday Souvenir from the Author, with Portrait.

The little work of Dr. Wise is put forth in answer to the question, why the Israelite cannot embrace Christianity. In substance Dr. Wise's position is as follows. Judaism is the religion of intelligence. Judaism denationalized is universal religion, for it is in full accord with what reason dictates and conscience directs. The Israelite, in judging those not within the pale of Judaism, does not discover a sinner in every human being, nor does he see the gates of hell ajar for all who do not believe as he believes. The man who lives up to the dictates of his conscience and to the best of his knowledge, of whatever creed he be, is no sinner; "all good men will inherit their share in eternal life and bliss;" there is therefore, in the eyes of the Israelites, no necessity for proselytizing. The proselytizing mania, in fact, has ever been accompanied by misery and inhumanity; it has shown itself to be the opposite of true religion; it has shown itself to be in contradiction to the highest principles of conscience, right conduct, love, morality, and justice. The covenant of the Israelites with God was made "for us and our children *forever*"; it was everlasting, "everlasting like the hills and the mountains"; "by the will of God and the testimony of the Sacred Scriptures every Israelite and his descendants are obligated and sworn to remain faithful to their colors," and, therefore, "any one who steps outside of the family of Israel is a deserter, a renegade, who perjures his ancestor and rebels against the will of God." The Orthodox Christian, by his belief in Scripture, is bound to admit this conclusion, and consequently when he "saves a soul" by conversion, *ex hypothesi* he sends one to perdition. "We have then a right to maintain," says Dr. Wise, "that the proselytizing mania is no longer, or in fact never was, under the control of rational argument or the dicta of conscience." Dr. Wise then states that the Jew cannot accept Christological dogmas "because he knows that the story upon which these dogmas are based is not true and cannot be true as told by their accredited authors and understood by their dogmatic expounders." Thence he proceeds to develop that thesis; rejecting the evangelical story from historical motives; showing that the testimony of the miracles is inadmissible; maintaining that salvation is promised to all men who do not wilfully destroy the divine in human nature, and that "mundane happiness" depends on morality and reason and not on Christology. Dr. Wise, examining, in full, Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, the Psalms, and Zachariah, finds no Christology in the Bible. Christology, in fine, the author asserts, can never become the religion of all mankind.

Agnosticism and Christian Theism: Which is More Reasonable? 24 pp. Price, 10 cents. *Charles Watts.*

The Superstition of the Christian Sunday: A Plea for Liberty and Justice. 26 pp. Price, 10 cents. *Charles Watts.*

The Glory of Unbelief. 24 pp. Price, 10 cents. *Charles Watts.* Toronto: *Secular Thought* Office.

In the first of these three pamphlets Mr. Watts concludes for the reasonableness of Agnosticism. The discussion embraces (1) What is Agnosticism? (2) Its relation to the Universe and Christian Theism; (3) Is it sufficient to satisfy man's intellectual requirements?

In "The Superstition of the Christian Sunday," Mr. Watts inquires into the origin of the Sabbath, discusses Sunday as an institution, points out the inconsistency of Sabbatarian practice, contrasts Sabbatarianism and morality, and closes with a plea for a free Sunday and a day of rest.

The "Glory of Unbelief" is an eloquent review of the important rôle that Skepticism has played in history and the development of thought.

In the *Art Amateur* for August "Montezuma" in the Note Book gives a very lively account of the American Exhibition at the Paris Exposition. If any one wishes a striking specimen of impartial criticism (if that means a cut now on this side and now on that, as the monkey divided the cheese between the two cats, leaving the expectant reader as much without an opinion as said cats were without cheese) he may be delighted with the remarks on the noted portrait painter John L. Sargent.

The critic speaks in one place of the elegant portrait of Madame W. "as she stands full of grace against the warm gray background," and next of two other portraits "neither of which," he says, "can be gratifying to the friends of the sitters." Another portrait "is painted with much distinction," while of a picture of a Mad. K. it is severely said, "The loudness of the color is in keeping with the vulgarity of the pose, and in fact of the whole picture, the lady is holding up her train clutching it with both hands as if in celebration of washing-day." Either Mr. Sargent is a very unequal artist or his critic changes his moods very quickly. The reader may come to the conclusion that he had better not make up his mind about Mr. Sargent in a hurry, and so the artist may get more justice than he would from a more flattering notice. Theo. Child says good things of the English pictures and French sculpture, but what will please us most is "On the whole, the exhibit of the United States is very remarkable and as satisfactory as could be expected." How much this remark means we should like to be told. The illustrated article on pen-drawing is very interesting. A full account is given of the sale of the Secretan pictures which has attracted so much attention chiefly on account of Millet's "Angelus." The results of the sale were over a million dollars. Since this notice was written the newspapers inform us that the "Angelus" will come to America after all. This would seem hardly right if we did not recall that Millet was recognized in this country as soon as, or sooner than in his own.

The other articles are mostly technical, valuable to the amateur worker rather than to the general public. E. D. C.

Die heutige Nationalökonomie in England und America (The Present State of Political Economy in England and America), by Gustav Cohn (Leipsic: Duncker & Humboldt, publisher), is a bright sketch of what England and America are doing in political science.

An interesting illustration of ecclesiastical evolution is contained in the recently published pamphlet of William James Potter, entitled "The First Congregational Society in New Bedford, Massachusetts." The exposition of Mr. Potter is historical and formed the subject of three long discourses prepared to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the building of the present church of the Society, of which Mr. Potter is now the pastor. The pamphlet is 151 pages in length; valuable documents and letters are published in the appendices.

"Germanik English: A Scheme for Uniting the English and German languages on Saxon and English bases in such a way as to obtain a language understood by the whole Germanic Race almost at first sight and one that can most easily be learned by Russians, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and the African tribes for commercial and missionary purposes on account of being built on a concentrated homogenous base, and on account of furnishing a key to all the higher derived and compounded words; A language scheme requiring the least preliminary study to understand,"—is the self-explanatory title of a pamphlet of 64 pages, by Elias Molee, Proprietor and Editor of the Bristol News, Bristol, Day Co., Dak. No philological comment is necessary.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion, from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS TALK THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

PROOF OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONSCIOUSNESSES OF HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

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[A series of original investigations, with new and unpublished experiments, by the French psychologist, M. ALFRED BINET, upon the psychology of hysteria; including an examination of double consciousness, "automatic writing," and the various forms of anæsthesia. (Nos. 100, 101, and 102.)]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.

[With No. 103 begins a series of essays, by M. TH. RIBOT, upon the psychology of attention, translated from the French with the sanction of the author. These studies are of the highest import to students; it being a subject not as yet thoroughly investigated.]

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No. 104. (Vol. III.—26.) CHICAGO, AUGUST 22, 1889. Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 10 Cts.

A FESTIVAL OF FAITH AT PLYMOUTH.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE two hundred and sixty-ninth anniversary of the embarkation of the Pilgrims for New England has witnessed the first celebration of their venture which can be called national. Festivities of Forefathers Day have been kept up by societies of New England people throughout the country, but the nation has regarded Plymouth Rock as a partly sectional, partly religious symbol. But the Rock has had its national importance. It has an almost ludicrous physical smallness when one sees it, for the reason that it looms so large in pulpit and patriotic eloquence. It has witnessed the transformation of the first church founded by the Pilgrims to Unitarianism. The phases of political faith in the country may be gathered from the orations beside that Rock of Winslow, Webster, Everett, Choate, and Wendell Phillips. If my reader is puzzled about Winslow, let me say that Edward, son of Gov. Winslow, delivered the first oration at Plymouth in honor of the Pilgrims. That was in 1774, and in 1775 the same gentleman was an ardent loyalist guiding Lord Percy against the people of Lexington. The "Old Colony Club" of 1769 consisting of seven members was germ of the Pilgrims Association of to-day, which has managed to enlist the nation, to raise $200,000, to build a canopy over the Rock, and to set on a hill the colossal figure of "Faith." It bears the names of the Pilgrims to whom, the inscription says, it is "erected by a grateful people in remembrance of their labors, sacrifices, and sufferings for the cause of civil and religious liberty." The statue is made of 14 granite blocks, is 36 feet high, and stands on a pedestal 45 feet. I cannot find the name of the artist responsible for this figure, and thereat do not wonder.

In the absence of artistic merit one may give the figure a realistic-allegorical interpretation. A cynical critic explained that the downward look of "Faith" (though one finger points upward) signifies the godliness that is profitable for this world—exemplified in this instance by the expenditure of $200,000 for works that should not have cost a fourth of the sum. But Faith's earthward look fairly represents the fact that the Pilgrims meant to found their City of God in this world. The cumbrous blocky figure embodies Calvinism militant. The upward finger proceeds from a fist doubled to deal with the Indians, and also with any who should seek heaven otherwise than the one finger directs. This "Faith" founded Harvard College, and wears Greek drapery; but she clutches her open Bible as if about to hurl it at a Quaker. Her face is that of a Medusa who turned hearts to stone, until some rebelled and turned her to stone.

Supporting the monstrosity are four seated figures, each 14 feet high—Liberty, Law, Morality, Education. Liberty is a Hercules, with helmet and lion's skin, but somewhat Indian-like. Congress paid for "Liberty," and the American Law Association for "Law." This figure manifestly meant to resemble Webster—holds a book and seems to be giving a judicial opinion, which the American Daniel never did. "Education" is a respectable schooldame who favors the Bible in schools, as one may infer from her holding the Decalogue. "Morality" is a theological type, on her breast being the High Priest's jewel with its twelve stones. Beneath these heroic figures are panels of fair but conventional workmanship, representing the Embarkation, the Landing, the Treaty with Massassoit, and the Compact signed in the Cabin of the Mayflower. Although the latter sculpture is just under a female "Education," no woman is present.

Plymouthian "faith" was much tried on August 1, the day of dedication. About daybreak something like a waterspout deluged the region, and was followed through the morning by a succession of storms. From a veranda where I found refuge, I looked out on this storm, and reflected that it was just such a southwestern storm that drove the Pilgrims, bound for Virginia, to this beautiful haven. So to the eyes of "Faith" it might appear an impressive part of the celebration; but to the citizens who had taken such pains with their decorations, the storm was a fire-breathing dragon, roaring angry responses to the cannon at the Rock. However, the shining spear of the dragon-pursuer appeared in the west, about noon, and the decorative morning-glories expanded again. The decoration which most interested me was on the front of an old shop, which was overhung with quaint bits of colonial furniture. They appeared far away—as if fragmentary survivals of election and reprobation. In one such piece of colonial furniture, John Carver's chair, ex-Gov. Long sat while presiding over

the banquet. In a marquee sat some fifteen hundred people, their feet in water, dined and listened to the addresses. From the platform some expected faces were conspicuously absent. The President had not the historic sense to be the first chief magistrate to visit Plymouth Rock, though he was in the neighborhood; and Secretary Blaine passed by to Maine rather than play second fiddle to the Southern democrat selected as orator of the day, on a platform inscribed—

> "Plymouth Rock and Jamestown,
> The Pilgrim and the Cavalier,
> Once diverse, hereafter forever one."

The selection of Congressman Breckenridge, of Kentucky, as the orator was felicitous. He represents much more than Kentucky. He is perhaps the most historical Southerner living. His grandfather offered in the Kentucky legislature the famous nullification resolutions of 1798, afterwards made a little less radical by Madison for Virginia. His uncle was the States-Rights' candidate against Lincoln. The family is from old Virginia, one of the earliest to embrace the Presbyterianism of which this Congressman's father was a distinguished preacher. At the present day it is the Presbyterianism of Virginia and Kentucky which most nearly represents the "Faith" symbolized by that bit of Plymouth Rock under stony "Faith's" feet. The Pilgrims did not reach Virginia eight generations ago as they hoped, but they reached it. A Puritan Sabbath, a hard Calvinism, unknown in New England, are familiar in Virginia and in Kentucky—once one of its counties. It has even conquered the Episcopal church. The Bishop of Virginia,—a lineal descendant by blood of the first apostle of Presbyterianism in the South (Davies),—will not preach in a church where there is a flower. Thus it happens that these Plymouth folk had to go South for a Puritan orator. Mr. Breckenridge had to be preceded by a theistic prayer from the pastor of the first church, now Unitarian. These facts made the orator's figure almost unique. He is a very fine looking gentleman, with silvered hair and a silvery voice, more eloquent than any orator which New York and the West have left in Massachusetts. No man of equal culture could be found in the North prepared to confess the "faith" of the Pilgrims.

But even this rather "blue" Presbyterian was compelled to repudiate the bigotry and intolerance of the Pilgrims and the Puritans,—between whom his distinction was rather technical and antiquarian. He said: "It may even be that for opinion's sake death was inflicted; but no people can remain narrow who hold it to be of divine obligation that every child shall be taught to read and know the Bible." So it appears that even in the last refuges of Puritanism men are reading out of the Bible the many passages demanding death for opinion's sake. There was another suggestive passage in the oration. He spoke of the "freedom" of the Pilgrims as an essential part of their relation to God. "A soul brought consciously face to face with God is necessarily thereafter a free soul." I was reminded of the fact that in the early Virginia colony the clergy were inclined to maintain that the baptism of a negro liberated him. The question was referred to England where it was decided in the interest of the masters. If families of the rank of the Breckenridges in Virginia and Kentucky had earlier worked out this generalization, about the necessary freedom of a soul face to face with God, some modern American history might be less deplorable.

The way in which this impressive orator glorified the faith of the Pilgrims, but repudiated—albeit gently—some of the works by which that faith was shown, and told us that reverence for them meant progress, and that to act and believe as they did might be the most unloving return for their toil, was fitly followed by the singing of Mrs. Hemans's hymn about the breaking waves dashing high on a rock-bound shore. Dr. Channing once visited Mrs. Hemans and told her that there were no dashing waves at Plymouth, and no rock-bound shore. The poetess burst into tears. But she would have been consoled had she known that the Old Colony folk would go on singing her hymn all the same beside their placid beach. So also we go on singing the praises of the Puritans beside a new moral coast which knows not their rock-bound dogmas, nor their cruel theocracy. On my journey I stopped at Sandwich, eighteen miles from Plymouth, where about 244 years ago some earnest members of the congregation of Rev. Mr. Batcheller came to the conclusion that ceremonies and sacraments were irreligious. They became Quakers before George Fox was heard of. These pious people were compelled to assemble in a sort of natural amphitheatre in the woods, where the very "whip-poor-wills" sang of their scourges. Among those persecuted people of Sandwich was an ancestor of Daniel Webster, and an ancestor of John G. Whittier. But we go on singing after Mrs. Hemans (herself a heretic) that the Pilgrims "left unstained what there they found—freedom to worship God."

THE EVOLUTION OF MORALS.*

BY FRANCES EMILY WHITE, M.D.

(*Concluded.*)

THE phrase, the evolution of morals, contains in itself a theory of the origin and development of morals, *viz.*, that not only the moral code but the moral sense itself has grown out of something which has preceded it in the history of the race, and which bears to it the relation of cause, as that term is ordinarily

* A paper read before the Contemporary Club of Philadelphia, Jan. 8, 1889.

employed; and as the entire series of animal forms, from moner to man, is believed by the biologist to have originated through the interactions of primitive matter and its physical environment, so morality may, we believe, be shown to have originated in the interactions of primitive man and his environment, physical and social.

Morality is understood to consist in the conformity of conduct to rules of right; and the query, What is right? is answered by the precept, "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise," thus declaring the court of appeal, as to the morality of any given act, to be the individual conception of what is good.* There is then no absolute standard of morals, as there is no absolute weight of bodies; and as the weight of things terrestrial varies according to their distance from the earth's centre, so the moral code of any people varies according to its remoteness from the centres of civilization; and it is recognized as a fact that the most intelligent races and nations are also on the whole the most moral—intelligence and sympathy (the twin corner-stones of morality) growing up under like social conditions. The growth of morals is thus inseparable from general development, and if it be admitted that the degree of civilization of a people, at any given period of its history, has been determined by antecedent conditions, it follows that the moral sense in common with other human faculties has grown out of these conditions. The nature of the reply to the question, What is right?, in any given case, will therefore depend on the degree of moral intelligence and of capacity for sympathy on the part of the individual to whom the question may be addressed. In certain lower phases of civilization a human scalp is worn as a badge of distinction; war is considered justifiable among even the most enlightened people; our laws as well as instincts warrant the killing of another in self-defense; homicide is not then absolutely wrong. The story is related of a promising convert to Christianity, in a land where cannibalism enjoys the kind of sanction which belongs to all time-honored institutions, who cut the Gordian knot of his difficult situation as the husband of two wives (which he had been taught to regard as unchristian) by eating the less attractive and less useful of the two; and it may be safely said that there is almost no wrong known to humanity which has not during some period in the history of the race received both legal and religious sanction. But if there were, in the human mind, an innate faculty or principle of conscience, implanted there as a trustworthy guide to conduct, these great differences in ideas of right could not exist. On the contrary, the individual conscience is largely a reflection of the sentiments and beliefs of the community at large.

An exceptional case is afforded by the reformer, who holds a place in the domain of morals comparable to that of the discoverer in the domain of science. Through his own personal influence, by means of purer conceptions of duty and higher views of the relations of men to each other, he elevates the existing standard of morals in his own community which henceforth becomes a centre of moral progress.

Conscience may then be defined as *moral intelligence illuminated by sympathetic feeling;* it dictates the kind of conduct with which an intelligent and disinterested spectator could wholly sympathize.*

The new-born infant can not be supposed to have a conscience; but as the study of embryonic forms has shown that the development of each human being is an abbreviated history of that of the entire animal series, so the study of the gradual development of the moral sense from earliest infancy throws a significant light on the origin and real nature of that sense. Conscience is evidently born of the early experience of consequences, and at first consists purely in the association of the fear of punishment with forbidden acts; but as sentiments of love and respect for others develop under the compelling influences of kindness and manifest superiority, the fear of displeasing the objects of these emotions becomes associated with the earlier motive and thus a higher kind of conscience grows. When finally the justice, *i. e.*, the usefulness of the various requirements of society is recognized, still another link is forged in the chain which binds us all and conduct is thenceforth controlled by a threefold power—the fear of consequences to ourselves, the dread of giving pain to others, and an unwillingness amounting, when fully developed, to an absolute refusal to do violence to one's own sense of fitness—an idea which Kant so forcibly expresses in saying, "I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity," and embodied in the 'categorical imperative' when duty holds up its naked law in the soul, exacting obedience at any sacrifice. The last factor in this triple product of experience becomes permanent through the development of the sympathies as well as of the reason, since the utilitarian principle implies the welfare of all, subordinating individual interests to the general good.

The light of modern science, in gradually penetrating the mists which enshroud the dawn of the human family, is revealing a state of things in which it is difficult to discern even the germs of modern morality. The pictures of this period, so graphically delineated by Mr. Darwin and others, represent savage man engaged in a hand to hand struggle for existence not only with the blind forces of nature, as yet wholly unsubdued, but

* See author's article "The Relations of the Sexes." *Westminster Review*, April, 1879.

* See Prof. Sedgwick's article, *Ethics*, in Encyclopedia Britannica.

with his savage brother and still more brutal neighbors of the jungle, the desert, and the sea; a struggle in which the winning forces are brute-cunning and brute-strength, and the prizes the satisfaction of the animal appetites and passions necessary for the preservation of the individual and the species.

The gulf which separates such a grade of existence from the present seems impassable even to the most active scientific imagination; but it is being gradually bridged, and each new fact rescued from the oblivion of the remote past adds another chapter to the lengthening story which will, no doubt, sometime carry back the history of man to its beginnings; and the hiatus which separates the character of the lower animals from that of even the lowest human races (which is however far less conspicuous than that existing between the latter and the best examples of humanity) will one day be filled with a history of slow but continuous evolution resulting from the natural interactions of man and his environment.

Mr. Darwin (whose statements probably find confirmation in the observations of most of his readers) cites not a few instances among the lower animals of sympathy towards those in distress, of mutual affection, of obedience to their leaders, of faithfulness to each other in situations of common danger—in short, of traits which in ourselves are called moral; and he says:—"The social instincts which no doubt were acquired by man, as by the lower animals, for the good of the community, will first have given him some wish to aid his fellows and some feeling of sympathy. Such impulses will have served him at a very early period as a rude rule of right and wrong; and with the aid of active intellectual powers, and the effects of habit, they naturally lead to the golden rule, and this lies at the foundation of morality." *

In the history of animal life on the globe, then, we find the starting-point of our inquiry as to the origin and development of morals, since social conditions are determined primarily by physical conditions; and this introduces an element still more fundamental in the development of the moral sense, *viz.*, the capacity for feelings of *pleasure and pain.* That there is an organic connection between pleasure and acts beneficial to the organism, and between pain and acts injurious to the organism was recognized by Aristotle, who regarded pleasure as the inseparable accompaniment of well-being and all activities as attended and perfected by pleasure, the latter being more desirable, *i. e.*, greater, in proportion to the excellence of the activity—thus disposing beforehand of Bentham's repulsive saying that "pushpin is as good as poetry, quantity of pleasure being equal." Hobbes also defines pleasure as motion helping vital action, and pain as motion hindering vital action; and Mr. Herbert Spencer has pointed out that even the slight pleasurable sensation induced in passing from darkness into light quickens the pulse and raises the tide of life. Painful sensations on the contrary depress the spirits and lower the vitality. Hence the utilitarian doctrine implies that right and wrong could have developed only among beings capable of pleasure and pain, and that primarily only pleasurable actions are right; from which has developed the logical converse that only right actions are truly pleasurable.

Socrates identified the useful as the beautiful; similarly it must be admitted that the useful is the moral—useful first to the individual (for natural selection works through individuals and will not produce anything injurious to them), and second to the community of individuals; and it is through the agency of usefulness that all endowments, whether physical, intellectual, or moral, tend towards perfection. When, therefore, a moral precept has ceased to be useful, it has ceased to be moral.

Pure altruism is impracticable because suicidal—it fails of survival in the struggle for existence; but in the higher grades of social development ministration to the welfare of others becomes essential to our own happiness; and the lower more selfish satisfactions are continually subordinated to this higher kind of egoism which, thus transfigured, becomes truly altruistic in the consciousness of happiness to be conferred.

Thus, as pointed out by Mr. George Henry Lewes,* the seeming opposition which exists between egoism and altruism disappears in the final analysis, and the two classes of motives become identical.

The real power, then, which controls conduct, both in individuals and in society, is on the one hand experience of the uniformity of natural laws and the inevitable penalties attached to their violation; and on the other hand the capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain—the primary guide to action, (*i. e.*, to conduct) and the original source of sympathy. The desire for approbation and the dread of disgrace, the so-called instinctive sentiments of honesty and honor, the finer traits of character which go to the making of nature's noblemen, may all in the final analysis be traced back to man's necessity of adapting himself to his environment—the physical environment first, the social environment last. So the voice of conscience in the soul, the sense of obligation which controls our lives, the sting of remorse which makes life miserable after a base act, are different expressions of a deep-seated aversion, both inherited and acquired, towards certain kinds of conduct which are indelibly

* See Descent of Man; by Charles Darwin.

* See Problems of Life and Mind.

associated with their evil consequences; and this whole philosophy may be summed up in the following statement which we owe to Mr. Lewes: "The organism and its environment are the factors of which life is the product";* the term "life" being extended to embrace the entire human history.

The sources of life, even in its simplest phases, are the sources of morals; and the doctrine of some superhuman or special origin of conscience from which it derives an otherwise impossible authority is of the same untenable nature as that of the special creation of animal species.

It is true, that when we contrast the crust of the earth with the living beings which swarm upon its surface, the inorganic soil and atmosphere with the warm blood and palpitating tissues of the body and brain, the resemblances seem few and far to seek, the differences many and conspicuous; but the chemist knows that all alike consist of the same kinds of matter.

"When order out of chaos came,
And nebulæ condensed in space;
When stars lit up their lambent flame
And planets found their ether-place;
E'en then the fateful atoms mixed
Which hid these [forms] in their embrace." †

"Earth has tree and fruit within it;
Life and thought, the clod;
Stones spring up to love and duty
From the sun-kissed sod." ‡

"But though light-hearted man forget,
Remembering matter pays her debt;
Still through her motes and masses draw
Electric thrills and ties of law,
Which bind the strengths of nature wild
To the conscience of a child." §

If, then, we recognize the fact that the physical organism is a part of the universe of matter, we cannot escape the conclusion that the emotional, intellectual, and moral energies of man are also necessary concomitants of his physical organism; hence the truth of the saying that a fossil jaw-bone containing but a single tooth reveals something of the character of the animal of which it once formed a part.

Many will, no doubt, be disposed to disown the element of fear as the foundation of the moral sense, just as many consider it not only degrading to humanity but derogatory to the Almighty to admit man's derivation from the lower animals. "Just as though God couldn't create man without developing him up out of protoplasm!" once exclaimed a venerable objector to the Darwinian hypothesis. "Doubtless, God could have created a better fruit than the strawberry, but doubtless He never did," said Sydney Smith.

Mr. Darwin traces the origin of music to the emotional cries and calls of the lower animals, mainly those associated with the reproductive and maternal instincts.* Music is on this account, however, none the less delightful and elevating, and the distinctions between good and bad music are none the less clear. Nor can the fact (if it be accepted as a fact) that ideas of morality have been evolved from the sensations and emotions of what we are pleased to call the mere animal nature, obliterate the distinctions between right and wrong. While in the broad philosophic sense—whatever is, is right—to the individual, that alone is right which represents the highest and best of which his nature is capable. Conscience, from whatever source derived, sways our conduct and is an absolute authority from which there is no appeal. The precept, "love thy neighbor as thyself," supplemented by the far finer sentiment—love thy friend better than thyself—represents an ideally perfect state of feeling; and the conduct growing out of such feeling, the ideally perfect conduct.

In that startling history of a criminal family obtained from the records of "the Jukes,"† it is clearly shown that heredity depends on permanence of environment and that a change of environment may in time bring about a complete change in the character of the individual—a striking proof of the unity of moral and physical laws; for while air-breathing animals, for example, could never have been developed in an environment of water, there is abundant evidence of their having been developed from water-breathing animals by means of a gradual change of environment; and the facts brought out in the study referred to of the records of several generations of the Juke family strikingly confirm the foregoing conclusions based on the general principles of biology.

The practical bearings of such a philosophy are obvious; and it is clear that the weaknesses, the incompetencies and the criminal tendencies of society must be met in more effectual ways than with so-called religious ceremonies and sermons; that the sooner the strong, the intelligent, the sympathetic, and the pecuniarily competent members of the community realize the fact (of which the entire history of the human race is a demonstration), that they themselves are the only beneficent providence to whom their weaker brothers can effectually look for aid and sympathy, for protection against themselves and their surroundings, the better it will be for all classes of society; that instead of spending money and time and energy in importuning a supposed omniscient, omnipotent, and purely benevolent being to do the helpful thing, the sympathetic thing, even what poor humanity would regard

* G. H. Lewes: loc. cit.
† "A Chatelaine of Flowers," by author; *Penn Monthly*, May, 1880.
‡ "A Fantasy," by author; *American Naturalist*, March, 1879.
§ Emerson.

* Loc. cit.
† See the "Jukes": A study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity, by R. T. Dugdale.

as the fair and honest thing, for the imperfect creatures whom he is supposed to have made for his own good pleasure, rational and sympathetic people should undertake the more rational and sympathetic task of themselves helping the helpless or, better still, of putting them in the way of self-help, by strengthening the feeble knees, by lifting up those who are cast down, by sharing the burdens of those who labor and are heavy-laden, and thus giving rest to their souls.

> "For Mercy has a human heart;
> Pity a human face;
> And Love, the human form divine;
> And Peace, the human dress." *

It then appears that the science of right living takes into account the whole nature of man and recognizes the fundamental fact that the various systems of ethics prevailing at the present day, the moral sense of communities and the individual conscience, have alike developed in accordance with the general principles of evolution; that it is not to some obscure recess of a cloud-capped mountain, engraven by divine fingers on tables of stone and supernaturally delivered to a chosen people that we must look for a moral code; nor to a divine principle breathed into the human soul from some superhuman source that we must refer for the origin of the moral sense; but to the nature and mind of man himself and to the conditions of his inevitable environment.

> "Speak it firmly, these are gods;
> All are ghosts beside." †

There are certain associations of words and ideas which are dear to us mainly on account of their familiarity; they are like the faces of old friends which represent qualities that please us. But suppose we discover in the progress of events that the traits of character which we had valued in some friend are wanting—that they had never existed except in imagination; the face loses its charm, the attraction is gone.

So it is with some of our former notions of things. But shall we mourn over the extinction of the ideas of our childhood as we come to a maturer age? Have both poetry and religion been slain on the altar of science? Surely not. Though the dryads have forsaken the woods and the naiads the fountains; though Jupiter no longer thunders from Olympus and the law of gravitation has usurped the chariot of Phœbus; the music of the babbling waters, the grandeur of the mountains, the warmth and life and glory of the sunshine remain.

And though modern science, like Moses of old, has dashed to pieces the tables of stone upon which the moral law was written—though the moralist no longer looks to a supernatural source for a guide to conduct—morality has not suffered nor will it suffer by this change, since the foundations of morality lie as deep as those of the race itself, and through natural conditions which govern the existence of the race, the final prevalence of an ideal morality is assured.

Thus through Fetich-worship, a tribute levied by fear; through Sex-worship, from the sensual rites and emblems of which is probably derived the idea of a higher creative power; through Fire-worship, which implies a sentiment of gratitude for the beneficent influence of the sun's rays upon the earth's cold crust; through Buddhism whose devotees attempt an uprooting of the instinct of self-preservation, and aspire to the blessed Nirvâna as the highest good; through Judaism, whose Jehovah is a tribal God interested mainly in the triumphs and well-being of his chosen people; through Christianity, whose "Father in Heaven" is an expanded and universalized derivative of the gods of the Greeks and the Jews; through these and other phases of groping after the light, humanity has slowly and painfully climbed upwards, "trailing clouds of glory" along the pathway of a past heroic in many chapters of its history; a pathway stained with the blood of lofty spirits held in the iron grasp of conviction of truth—moral, religious, scientific—(for every department of progress has had its martyrs) and strewn with the amaranthine-flowers of self-forgetting friendship, of unchanging love, of the unswerving devotion of great hearts unwilling to beat for less than all humanity; toiling upwards on such a pathway, it cannot be doubted that the passionate human spirit has caught many a glimpse of the sublime figure of Truth and will, in some possible though it may well be far distant future, touch with triumphant hands the very hem of her garment.

* William Blake.
† Emerson.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

SPONTANEOUS ATTENTION.

I.

Spontaneous attention is the only existing form of attention until education and artificial means have been employed. There exists no other kind in most animals and in young children. It is a gift of nature, but very unequally distributed among individuals. Still, whether strong or weak, everywhere and always *it is caused by emotional states.* This rule is absolute, without exception. Man, like animals, lends his attention spontaneously only to what concerns and interests him; to what produces in him an agreeable, disagreeable, or mixed state. As pleasure and pain are only signs that certain of our tendencies are being satisfied or crossed; and as our tendencies are what is deepest in us; as they express the very depths of our

* Translation, by γνλν, copyrighted under the title "The Psychology of Attention."

personality, of our character; it follows that spontaneous attention has its roots in the very basis of our being. The nature of spontaneous attention in any person reveals his character, or, at least, his fundamental tendencies. It tells us, whether a person is frivolous, vulgar, narrow, open, or deep. The janitor's wife will spontaneously lend her whole attention to the gossip of her neighbors; the painter to a beautiful sunset, in which the peasant only sees the approach of night; the geologist to the stones he chances to find, in which the uninitiated only see worthless pebbles. Let the reader look into himself and around him; the examples are so easily found, that it is useless to dwell longer upon them here.

It might be a subject of wonder that so evident and striking a truth (for spontaneous attention without an anterior emotional state would be an effect without a cause) should not long ago have been recognized as a common acquisition of psychology, if indeed the majority of psychologists had not obstinately persevered in the exclusive study of the higher forms of attention, that is to say, in beginning at the end.* It is highly necessary, on the contrary, to dwell upon its primitive form: without the latter nothing is intelligible, nothing explainable, everything is vague, and we should remain without the guiding thread of our study. Accordingly, we shall not hesitate to multiply the number of our proofs.

Any man or animal, hypothetically incapable of experiencing either pleasure or pain, would be incapable of attention. There could only exist for him certain states more intense than certain other ones, which is an entirely different matter. It is accordingly impossible to maintain, in the same sense as Condillac, that if amid a multitude of sensations, there is one that predominates by its intensity, it is therewith "transformed into attention." It is not intensity alone that acts, but, above all, our adaptation, that is to say, our tendencies, as they happen to be crossed or satisfied. Intensity is but an element, and oftentimes the least important. Thus, we may observe how spontaneous attention is natural and devoid of effort. The idler, who loafs around in the street, will stare with gaping mouth at a procession or passing masquerade, and preserve perfect imperturbability so long as the procession lasts. If at any time effort appears, it is a sign that attention changes in character, that it becomes voluntary, artificial.

In the biographies of great men, traits abound, which prove, that spontaneous attention entirely depends upon emotional states. These traits are the best, because they show us the phenomenon in all its force. Instances of great attention are always caused and sustained by great passions. Fourier, says Arago, remained turbulent and incapable of application until his thirteenth years: he was then initiated into the elements of mathematics, and forthwith became a different man. Malebranche, by chance, reluctantly takes up Descartes's treatise "*de l'Homme*"; the perusal of it "caused such a violent beating of the heart that from hour to hour he was compelled to lay the book aside, and break off its perusal, in order to breathe freely"; and he becomes a Cartesian. It is useless to speak of Newton, and many others. Some perhaps will say: Such traits are the marks of a dawning vocation. But what indeed is a vocation but attention, discovering its way, its true bearings for the rest of life? No finer instances of spontaneous attention could be given, for the former does not last for only a few minutes or an hour, but forever.

Let us examine a different aspect of the question. Is the state of attention continuous? Yes, apparently so; but in reality, it is intermittent. "What is called giving attention to one thing, is, strictly speaking, the following a *series* of impressions or connected ideas, with an ever renewed and deepening interest. For example, when we witness a dramatic representation.... And even a prolonged attention to a small material object, as a coin, or a flower, involves a continual transition of mind from one aspect to another, one set of suggestions to another. Hence it would be more correctly described as making the object the *centre* of attention, the point from which it sets out and to which it continually reverts.*

Researches in psycho-physics, of which we shall speak later, show that attention is subject to the law of rhythm. Stanley Hall, while studying with great care the gradual changes of pressure produced upon the tips of the fingers, has established the fact, that the perception of continuity seems impossible, and that the subject cannot have the feeling of continuous augmentation or decrease.

Attention chooses between different degrees of pressure, in order to compare them. Certain errors in the notation of astronomical phenomena are also due to these oscillations of attention.†

Maudsley and Lewes have compared attention to a reflex motion; it would be more proper to say, a series of reflexes. Any physical excitation produces a movement. Similarly a stimulation coming from the object produces an incessantly repeated adaptation. Deep and tenacious cases of spontaneous attention

* The psychologists who have clearly seen the importance of the emotional states in attention, are so few, that I am only able to quote Maudsley, "Physiology of Mind," Chap. V; Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind," Vol. III, p. 184; Carpenter, "Mental Physiology," Chap. III; Horwiez, "*Psychologische Analysen*," Chap. I, and a few of Herbart's disciples, particularly Volkmar, "*Lehrbuch der Psychologie*," Vol. II, Sec. 114.

* J. Sully, Outlines of Psychology. Chap. IV.

† "American Journal of Psychology," 1887, No. 1. "Philosophische Studien," 1888, Vol. V, p. 56, and following.

have all the characteristics of unassuaged passion, which unceasingly re-commences in the effort to satisfy itself. The dipsomaniac, before a filled glass, will swallow its contents; and if some malignant fairy, as soon as it was emptied, refilled it, he would never stop. Erotic passion acts in like manner. Vicq d'Azyr maintained that monkeys could not be trained, because they cannot be made attentive (which in the first place, is not true). To this Gall retorted: Show a monkey its female, and you will find out whether it is capable of attention. When confronting any scientific problem, the Newtonian mind acts in the same manner; it falls a prey to a perpetual irritation, which holds it in its power without cessation or rest. No fact is clearer, more incontestable, more easily verified than this, namely, that spontaneous attention depends upon emotional states, such as desires, satisfaction, discontent, jealousy, etc.; its intensity and its duration depend upon their intensity and their duration.

Let us here note a fact of considerable importance in the mechanism of attention. This real intermission in an apparent continuity alone renders possible any long attention. If we keep one of our eyes fixed upon any single point, after a while our vision becomes confused; a cloud is formed between the object and ourselves, and finally we see nothing at all. If we lay our hand flat upon a table, motionless, and without pressure (for pressure itself is a movement), by slow degrees the sensation wears off, and finally disappears. The reason is, that there is no perception without movement, be it ever so weak. Every sensorial organ is at the same time both sensitive and motory. As soon as absolute immobility eliminates one of the two elements (motility), the function of the other after a while is rendered null. In a word, movement is the condition of the change, which is one of the conditions of consciousness. These well-known facts, of common experience, make us understand the necessity of these intermissions in attention, often imperceptible to consciousness, because they are very brief, and of a very delicate order.

(To be continued.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

DR. WOOD, replying to my remarks about that bit of law which I thought came "out of the surgery," says, "The surgeon copied it verbatim from 'The Limitations of Police Power,' by Christopher G. Tiedeman, professor of jurisprudence at the University of Missouri." In that statement Dr. Wood makes an important mistake. He must have copied from his own memory, and not from Professor Tiedeman's book. Here is what Professor Tiedeman says:

"An estate has, in respect to the real property, the three elements, the right of possession, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposition, subject to the right of the state to defeat it, *and appropriate it to the public use, or for the public good.*"

Dr. Wood carelessly omitted the words in italics, and substituted for them the following words, "*and subject to the right of the state to tax it.*" He also reinforced the word "*defeat*" by the word "*alter*," which is not in the original text. Of course, a writer is not bound to quote all that his authority says, but he ought not to halt in the middle of a sentence, and leave out its qualifying and explanatory clause, especially when, as in this case, the very essence of the statement is in the omitted words. This shows the danger of making a "verbatim" copy from memory, instead of book.

Dr. Wood makes another mistake when he quotes Professor Tiedeman as saying, that an estate *consists* of three things, the right of possession, the right of enjoyment, and the right of disposition. Professor Tiedeman could hardly have said anything so comically "absurd." It would be as if a man should say, "a dollar consists of three things, weight, color, and size." These qualities may be elements of a dollar, as the rights of possession, enjoyment, and disposition may be elements of an estate in land. Even as Professor Tiedeman made it, the statement is incorrect, because a man may have an estate in land without either of the "elements" known as the right of possession or the right of distribution.

Dr. Wood says:

"The statement that absolute private property in land has no legal existence, that as against the state no man absolutely owns land, but that land is always subject to administration by the state is justified at length by Sheldon Amos, Examiner at the Inns of Court, London, and may be found in his work on the Science of Law."

That is another mistake; and I fear Dr. Wood has again trusted to his memory. It must have been some other book that betrayed him into error. I do not know what Mr. Amos "examines" at the Inns of Court in London, probably the wines and liquors, which, I am told, are very good at the inns of London. "Examiner at the Inns" is, no doubt, a refined expansion of the plebeian word "gauger," as we speak it in this country. I do not admit his claims to legal rank, nor his right to speak as a judicial authority, but I do recognize his right to publish an essay on the Science of Law, and his further right to be quoted correctly, or not at all. His views and opinions ought to be fairly quoted or let alone. Mr Amos's views are in strong contrast and opposition to those ascribed to him by Dr. Wood. Mr. Amos tries to show not only the moral dignity, but also the social value and the political necessity of private property in land. I will make a few extracts from his essay on the "Science of Law," and I will be very careful to copy him "verbatim."

"One of the most important steps out of savagery into civilization marked by the fact that security of tenure depends upon some further condition than the mere circumstance of possession." Page 151.

"The moral aspirations and needs of individual man are scarcely less signally sustained and gratified by ownership than the material." Page 155.

"It is obvious, that, apart from the possibility of ownership, the position of man, as a moral being, is pitiable and even contemptible in the extreme." Page 155.

"Nor is it merely that the absence of ownership prevents the most precious qualities and elements of human nature from being properly cultured and developed. It prevents those qualities and elements from so much as existing at all." Page 156.

"From the above considerations it will be seen what is the meaning of the favorite view of the great school of German jurists, to the effect that ownership increases man's power (*Vermögen*) or physical and moral capacity." Page 157.

And much more of the same character, wherein the civilizing and refining influence of private property in land is "justified at length." It is true that Mr. Amos asserts the power of the state to correct the abuses of land-ownership, but he claims that the right of private property in land is a very necessity of the state, of more importance to its welfare than it is to the welfare of the land-owner himself.

Dr. Wood takes a very heavy fall when he drops from the clouds of state-ownership to the hard ground of "eminent domain." The right of eminent domain is not founded on ownership, but on the political right of sovereignty, and it applies to persons, and personal property, as well as to land. It may take anything for public uses, and even the citizen himself, as was done by the United States during the war. The state does not take the citizen or his horses or his cattle, nor levy taxes by any right of ownership, but by right of eminent dominion or domain. On this subject, Judge Cooley, referring to the mistake that the right of eminent domain is based on ownership, says,

"More accurately it is the right which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand."—Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, page 524.

The right of eminent domain is recognized in the Constitution of the United States, but limited so as to exclude the doctrine of state-ownership. The citizen is called the "*owner*" of the land, and the government cannot deprive him of it except for public uses, and even then it must pay him "*just compensation.*" Chancellor Kent says,

"The right of eminent domain or inherent sovereign power gives to the legislature the control of private property for public uses, and for public uses only."—Kent's Commentaries, Vol. II, 239.

I am criticized for using the phrase "*absolute* private property in land," and I am solemnly reminded that *absolute* ownership cannot exist where the state has the right to confiscate for taxes. This criticism is a metaphysical doubt, not an argument. We are told by men learned in philosophy that the "absolute" cannot exist in this world. This may be ideally true for anything I know to the contrary, but we are dealing with actualities, and must use such words as express the facts of life. I am not responsible for the word "absolute." I found it in familiar use by the "combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world." "Fee-simple *absolute*" has been a law phrase for centuries. Chancellor Kent says:

"The title to land is essentially *allodial* and every tenant in fee-simple has an *absolute* and perfect title."—Kent's Commentaries, Vol. III, 488.

Even Webster, in his definition of allodium, describes it as "land which is the *absolute* property of the owner." The explanation is easy; the law used the strongest words it could find in order to give emphasis to the right of private ownership, and in order to deny the claim of ownership in the state.

What amazes me more than anything else in the controversy is the statement of Dr. Wood, that he "was well aware that the lands of the state of New York were declared allodial." How a citizen of New York, well aware of that fact, could rise in his place and deny the existence of private ownership is a puzzle that I fear will never be explained.

I think that Dr. Wood has correctly quoted Professor Tiedeman in the following extract. "Surely, the right of eminent domain can rest only upon the claim that the state is the absolute owner of all lands situate within its dominions." This is nothing but the private opinion of Professor Tiedeman, and is of no more value than any other man's opinion because it has no judicial authority to support it. As well say that the right of eminent domain over horses and cows rests upon the claim that the state is the absolute owner of all the live stock within its dominions.

The doctrine of state-ownership is merely a tradition still running along under the momentum of the Norman conquest It has no longer any vitality even in the law of England. Blackstone calls it a "fiction," and Chancellor Kent remarks: "The King is by fiction of law the great lord paramount and supreme proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom." The fiction is practically obsolete in England, and it has been expressly abolished in America. Even Dr. Wood's authority Mr. Amos, "Examiner at the Inns," says:

"On the other hand the Crown, from whom lands are sometimes held by a tenure involving nothing more than the performance of some ancient service, *is not considered as owner of the lands.*"

And the learned author of the article "Real Estate," in the Encyclopedia Britannica, says:

"The law of real estate in the United States is the law of England modified to suit a different state of circumstances. The main point of difference is that in the United States, the occupiers of land are generally wholly or in part *owners* and not *tenants* as in England."

I have not written on the legal aspects of this question from my own learning or authority, because I am not competent to do that, but I have quoted the decisions and opinions of men who hold the highest rank as jurists in this country, men who have no social speculations to advance, and who explain to us the law as it actually is, and not as they may think it ought to be. From these authorities, I think, it is very clear that private property in land has a legal existence in the United States, and that the right of eminent domain does not include the state-ownership of land.

WHEELBARROW.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XL. — Continued.

The Sovereign gazed fixedly at the wild figure; he tottered, and supported himself by the rails. The Hereditary Prince flew towards him; the father drew back with a shudder, lost his footing, and rolled down the side of the slippery planks into the flood.

There was a loud scream from the bystanders; the son sprang after him. The next moment half-a-dozen men were in the water—among the first, Gabriel, cautiously followed by Mr. Hummel. The gigantic form of the Proprietor towered above the stream; he had grasped the Sovereign, while Gabriel and Hummel seized the Prince. "The Sovereign lives," called out the Proprietor to the son, laying the unconscious man on the shore. The Hereditary Prince threw himself down by his father on the ground. The latter lay on the gravel road, the beggar-woman holding his head; he looked with glazed eyes before him, and did not recognize his kneeling son, nor the furrowed countenance of the stranger who bent over him. "He lives," repeated the Proprietor, in a low tone; "but his limbs cannot perform their office." On the other side of the water stood the High Steward. He called out to the Chamberlain in French, then hastened back with the carriage to Rossau, in order to reach a safer crossing. It was with difficulty that the carriage was brought back. Meanwhile, on the Bielstein side, a plank was torn off the half-destroyed bridge and the Sovereign laid upon it and carried to the Manor. The children of the Proprietor ran ahead and opened the door of the old house. In the hall stood Ilse, white as marble. She had been told by her brother that the Sovereign was saved from the water; he was approaching the

* Translation copyrighted.

house, to two generations of which he had been a curse and a terror. She stood in the entrance-hall no longer the Ilse of former days, but a wild Saxon woman who would hurl the curses of her gods on the head of the enemy of her race; her eyes glowed, and her hands closed convulsively. They carried the exhausted man up the steps. Then Ilse came to the threshold, and cried:

"Not in here."

So shrill was the command, that the bearers halted.

"Not into our house," she cried the second time, raising her hand threateningly.

The Sovereign heard the voice; he smiled, and nodded his head graciously.

"It is a Christian duty, Ilse," exclaimed the Proprietor.

"I am the Professor's wife," cried Ilse, passionately. "Our roof will fall upon that man's head."

"Remove your daughter," said the Hereditary Prince, in a low tone. "I demand admittance for the Sovereign of this country."

The Proprietor approached the steps and seized Ilse's arm. She tore herself away from him.

"You drive your daughter from your house, father," she exclaimed, beside herself. "If you are the servant of this man, I am not. There is no room for him and my husband at the same time. He comes to ruin us, and his presence brings a curse!"

She tore open the gate into the garden and fled under the trees, burst through the hedge, and hastened down into the valley; there she sprang upon the wooden bridge, from which she had shortly before driven the village people; the flood roared wildly beneath her, and the woodwork bent and groaned. A rent, a crack, and with a powerful spring she alighted on the rock on the other side; behind her the ruins of the bridge whirled down to the valley. She stood on the rocky prominence in front of the grotto, and raised her hands with a wild look to heaven. Her eldest brother came running behind her from the garden, and screamed when he saw the ruins of the bridge.

"I am separated from you," exclaimed Ilse. "Tell father, he need not care for me; the air is pure here; I am under the protection of the Lord, whom I serve; and my heart is light."

CHAPTER XLI.

IN THE CAVE.

The dark water gurgled and streamed through the valley; the reflection of the setting sun shone on the bay-windows of the old house; the wife of the Scholar stood alone beneath the rock overhanging the entrance to the cave. Where once the wives of the ancient Saxons listened to the rustling of the forest-trees, and where the wife of the hunted robber hurled stones on his pursuers, now stood the fugitive daughter of the Manor on the Rock, looking down on the wild surging of the water, and up to the house where her husband's foe was resting in the arm-chair of her father. Her breast still heaved convulsively, but she looked kindly on the brown rock which spread its protecting vault above her. Below her roared the wild, destructive flood, while around her the diminutive life of nature carelessly played. The dragon-flies chased one another over the water, the bees hummed about the herbs of the sloping hill, and the wood-birds chanted their evening-carols. She seated herself on the stone bench, and struggled for peaceful thoughts; she folded her hands and bent her head; and the storm within her bosom spent itself in the tears that flowed from her eyes.

"I will not think of myself, but only of those I love. The little ones will inquire after me when they go to bed; to-night they will not hear the stories of the city that I used to tell them, to put them to sleep. They were all wet after their fishing, and in the confusion no one will think of putting dry stockings on them. In thinking of other things I have forgotten to care for them. The youngest persists in wishing to become a professor. My child, you do not know what it is you wish. How much must you learn, and what a change will come over you! For the work which life accomplishes in us is immeasurable. When I formerly sat here near my father, I believed, in my simplicity, that the higher the office, the more noble were the men, and the most exalted of all the best, and that all that was important on earth was done by great and refined minds. And when the two scholars came, and I talked about books with Felix for the first time, I still imagined that everything in print must be indubitable truth, and every one who wrote, a thoroughly learned man. Many think thus childishly. But I have been an obstinate thing, and have vehemently opposed myself to others, even to my husband, who stood highest in my opinion."

She looked with a sad smile before her, but immediately afterwards bent her head, and again the tears poured from her eyes.

She heard the call of her brother from the garden.

"Holloa, Ilse! are you there? The strangers are still in the house; they are making a sedan chair for the invalid; he is to be taken to the ranger's lodge. Father is busy sending out messengers. The bridge at Rossau has also been carried away by the water; we cannot get to the town, and no one can come from the town to us. We feel very anxious about your getting back to us."

"Do not mind about me, Hans," said Ilse; "tell the girls they must not be so engrossed with the strangers

as to forget our dear guest. Greet the children for me; they must not come to the edge of the water to bid me good night, for the bank is slippery."

Ilse placed herself at the entrance of the cave and looked all about. Early that morning she had seated herself here, and when the water began to rise high, she had hastened over the wooden bridge to warn her brothers and sisters. Her work still lay on the bench, together with a book that had been given her by the Pastor when she was a girl. It was the life of the holy Elizabeth, written by one of the most zealous ecclesiastics of her church.

"When I first read about you," she thought, "Saint Ilse of the Wartburg, my distinguished namesake, your life touched me, and all that you did and that was told of you appeared to me as an example for myself. You were a pious, sensible, and amiable woman, and united to a worthy husband. Then the longing for higher honor in his knightly order, and martial fame, made him blind to the nearest duty of his life, and he left you and the people of his home, and went to the wars in the far-off land of Italy. Two long years he wandered and fought, and finally returned, weary and worn. But he found not his beloved wife as he had left her. In the solitude that surrounded you, you had yearned for your husband, and your overpowering sorrow had brought you to ponder upon the great mysteries of life; your own life had been full of longing, and for this you had become a pious penitent. You wore a garment of hair, and scourged your back; you bowed your head and thoughts before an intolerant priest. You did what was not right nor seemly; to please your God, you laid the leper in the bed of your dear husband. In your over-strained piety you lost your warm heart and the modesty of womanhood; you were canonized by the clergy; but you, poor woman, in your striving for what they called the grace of God, had sacrificed human feelings and duties. It is not good, Ilse, that man and wife separate without great necessity."

Again a voice sounded from the other side of the water.

"Do you hear me, Ilse?" cried her father, from the other bank.

"I hear you," answered Ilse, raising herself.

"The strangers are going away," said the father; "the invalid is so weak that he cannot injure others; you are, in truth, separated from us. It is becoming dark, and there is no prospect of being able to repair the bridge over the water before night. Go along the valley on your side over the hill to Rossau, and there remain with some one of our acquaintances until morning. It is a long way round, but you may reach it before night."

"I will remain here, father," Ilse called back; "the evening is mild, and it is only a few hours till morning."

"I cannot bear, Ilse, that my wilful child should sleep beneath the rocks in the very sight of her home."

"Do not mind about me. I have the moon and the stars over me; you know that I do not fear the dwarfs of the cave, nor on my mountain the power of man."

The twilight of evening fell on the deep valley, and the mist rose from the water; it floated slowly from tree to tree, it undulated and rolled its long, dusky veil between Ilse and her father's house. The trunks of the trees and the roof of the house disappeared, and the grotto seemed to hover in clouds of air separated from the earth amidst indistinct shadows, which hung round the entrance of the rock and fluttered at Ilse's feet, then collected together and dissolved.

Ilse sat on the bench at the entrance, her hands folded over her knees, appearing in her light dress, like a fairy woman of olden times, a ruler of the floating shadows. She gazed along her side of the shore on the mountain-path that led from Rossau.

The distant steps of a wanderer sounded through the damp fog. Ilse took hold of the moist stone. Something moved on the ground near her, and glided indistinctly forward—perhaps it was a night-swallow or owl.

"It is he," said Ilse, softly. She rose slowly, she trembled, and supported herself against the rock.

The figure of a man stepped out of the white mist; he stopped astonished when he saw a woman standing there.

"Ilse!" called out a clear voice.

"I await you here," she answered, in a low tone. "Stop there, Felix. You find not your wife as you left her. Another has coveted that which is yours; a poisonous breath has passed over me; words have been said to me which no honest woman ought to hear, and I have been looked upon as a bought slave."

"You have escaped from the enemy."

"I have, and therefore am here; but I am no longer in the eyes of others what I once was. You had a wife free from all taint; she who now stands before you is evilly talked of, both on account of father and son."

"The noise of tongues dies away like the surging of the water beneath your feet. It signifies little what others think when we have done what is satisfactory to our own consciences."

"I am glad that you do not care for the talk of others. But I am not quite so proud and independent as I was. I conceal my sorrow, but I feel it always. I am lowered in my own eyes, and, I fear, Felix, in yours also; for I have brought on my own misfortune—

I have been too frank with strangers, and given them a right over me."

"You have been brought up to trust in those who hold high positions. Who can give up loyal trust without pain?"

"I have been awakened, Felix. Now answer me," she continued, with agitation, "how do you return to me?"

"As a weary, erring man, who seeks the heart of his wife and her forgiveness."

"What has your wife to forgive, Felix?" she again asked.

"That my eyes were blinded, and that I forgot my first duties to follow a vain chase."

"Is that all, Felix?" Have you brought me back your heart, unchanged to me as it was before?"

"Dear Ilse," exclaimed her husband, embracing her.

"I hear your tones of love," she exclaimed, passionately, throwing her arms round his neck. She led him into the grotto, stroked the drops of water out of his damp hair, and kissed him. "I have you, my beloved one; I cling firmly to you, and no power shall ever again separate me from you. Sit here, you long-suffering man; I hold you fast. Let me hear all the trouble you have gone through."

The Scholar held his wife in his arms, and related all. He felt her tremble when he told her his adventures.

"Indignant anger and terror impelled me along the road to Rossau after the Sovereign," he said, concluding his account, "and the delay for change of horses seemed insupportable to me. In the town I found a crush of vehicles worse than on a market-day; before the inn a confused noise of wheels, and the cries of men, drovers, and court-lackeys, who could not cross the water. In the city I learned from strangers that the foe of our happiness had been overtaken by a fate which pursued him to the water. We have done with him, and are free. They called out to me that the bridge on the way to you was broken. I sprang out of the carriage in order to seek the foot-path over the hills and the road behind the garden. Then the dog of our landlord ran past me, and a coachman from our city came up to me and stated that he had brought Fritz and Laura to the town, but that they had gone further down the stream in order to find a crossing. You may believe that I would not wait."

"I knew that you would seek this path," said Ilse. "To-day you are come to me—to me alone; you belong only to me; you are given to me anew, betrothed to me for the second time. The habitations of men around us have disappeared; we stand alone in the wild cave of the dwarfs. You, my Felix, to whom the whole world belongs, who understand all the secrets of life, who know the past and divine the future—you have nothing now for a shelter but this cleft of the rock, and no covering but the kerchief of poor Anna for your weary limbs. The rock is still warm, and I will strew the grass of our hills as a couch for you. You have nothing, my hero in the wilderness, but the rocks and herbs, and your Ilse by your side."

The stillness of night reigns about; the stream rushes gently around the roots of the brambles; and the white mists hang like a thick curtain over the cave. Dusky phantoms glide along the valley; they hover, in long white dresses, past the rocky entrance, down into the open country, where a fresh breath of air dissolves them. High above, the moon spreads its white, glimmering tent, woven of rays of light and watery vapors; and the old juggler laughs merrily over the valley and down upon the rocky grotto. As the delusive moonlight harasses mortals by its unreal halo, so do they harass themselves by the pictures of their own fancy, in love and hate, in good and bad humor; their life passes away whilst they are thinking of their duty and err in doing it, whilst they seek truth and dream in seeking it. The spirit flies high, and the heart beats warm, but the hobgoblin of fancy works incessantly amidst the reality of life; the cleverest deceive themself, and the best are disappointed by their own zeal.

Slumber in peace, you children of light! Many of your hopes have been deceived, and much innocent trust has been destroyed by rough reality. The forms of a past time—forms that you have borne reverentially in your hearts—have laid a real hold on your life; for what a man thinks, and what a man dreams, becomes a power over him. What once has entered in the soul continues to work actively in it, exalting and impelling it onward, debasing and destroying it. About you, too, a game of fantastic dreams has played. If at times it has given you pain, it has still not impaired the power of your life, for the roots of your happiness lie as deep as it is granted man, that transitory flower, to rest in the soil of earth. Slumber in peace under the roof of the wild rock; the warm air of the grotto breathes round your couch, and the ancient vaulting of the roof spreads protectingly over your weary eyes! Around you the forest sleeps and dreams; the old inhabitants of the rock sit at the entrance of the cave. I know not whether they are the elves in whom Ilse does not believe, or the old friends of the scholar, the little goat-footed Pans, who blow their sylvan songs on their reed pipes. They hold their fingers to their mouth, and blow so gently in their pipe that it sounds sometimes like the rushing of the water or the soft sigh of a sleeping bird.

(To be continued.)

THE EXILE AND THE LEAF.

BY MARTHA AGNES RAND.

An exile dwelt on a lonely spot,
  A rocky isle in a vast grey sea,
A barren isle, where grass grew not,
  Nor homeliest flower, nor shrub, nor tree.

One morn upon his window-sill
  He found a fresh green linden leaf,
And hailed it with a joyous thrill—
  "Whence came you to this desert reef?

"Whence came you to my yearning eyes?"
  He sobbed, "Dear leaflet, fluttered you
Straight down from radiant Paradise?
  Who sent you to me? whisper—who?

"Or did a sailor, stout of brawn,
  Tarry for shelter here last night,
And, noiseless, push away at dawn,
  Leaving this pledge to charm my sight?

"Ah! whether God or man has brought
  You, priceless gem, to gladden me,
I'll take you, love you, all my thought
  Shall be with you!" And tenderly

The exile kissed the leaf. And lo!
  The barren isle became a grove
Peopled with shapes of long ago,
  A garden fair, replete with love.

The reef was spread with old-time flowers,
  And many a well-loved form was seen,
And simple songs rang through the bowers,
  And daisies nodded from the green.

And so, whene'er he fixed his eyes
  Upon the leaflet in his hand,
Sweet memories led him 'neath the skies
  That roofed his boyhood's far-off land.

The dark waves lapped his rocky home,
  The sea-gull screamed, the wind blew wild,
But the exile felt nor wind nor foam,
  And as he slept that night he smiled.

For a human heart was the reef apart,
  And hope the leaf from an unknown bough—
That hope which comes to the desert heart,
  We know not whence, and we know not how.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Coming Creed of the World. A Voice Crying in the Wilderness. *Frederick Gerhard.* Philadelphia: 1884. W. H. Thompson. Price $1.25.

The author writes in the preface: "A business friend had introduced to me a youth, sixteen years old, of the name of Eunom Philippi. I have never met, in the long course of my life, a purer, nobler, more modest young man than he. He was soon thoroughly at home in my house, and was treated like one of my children. We had many and long conversations, and on one occasion the subject of religion and church came under discussion. When I expressed the views of Christianity, in which I had been educated, and which I had followed hitherto, he asked me with that charming modesty which was peculiarly his own: 'But, dear Mr. Gerhard, is there not perhaps a faith more sublime and blissful than Christianity?' I do not remember what reply I made to this, but I know that at that moment a veil was drawn from my eyes, and I saw before me, as it were, a light shining through the dark night around me. From that moment I began to *reflect* upon the serious problems of life. For more than forty years—I am now in my eightieth year—I have seriously considered the subject." The religious view presented by Mr. Gerhard is "the belief in one Supreme Being, and the love for our fellow-men." Accordingly, his religion is a theism not greatly different from Unitarianism. On page 11 religion is defined as "that more or less distinct feeling of dependence upon a Supreme being." Again: "Religion and science are not opposed to each other. They are the founders of the welfare of mankind and fellow-workers. Both pursue the same task,—to enlighten men, to make them better and happier" (p. 13).

Mr. Gerhard seriously endeavors to reject Supernaturalism. He says, (p. 13): "There is no other revelation than that which God has given us in nature, in the whole universe, and in our own conscience." (Page 12): "There are no miracles, there never have been miracles, and there never can be miracles. Everything that occurs in the universe is produced according to eternal, unchangeable laws. The belief in miracles is the origin of superstition." Mr. Gerhard endeavors, we say, for though perhaps unconsciously he is not successful in his efforts. His theistic views dim his eyes so that he retains all the old conceptions about man's duality as being a composition of two substances, the immortal supersensual and the mortal body. He says, (p. 404): "Man consists of spirit, soul, and body. The spirit, as the principle of the supersensual, is distinct from the bodily, sensual nature—that is to say, from the body, and the soul which we imagine gives life to the body."

Mr. Gerhard's belief in individual immortality and the substantiality of the spirit rests on facts similar to Swedenborg's well-known vision of the Stockholm fire, and the death of Frederick the Wise of Saxony who saw a monk's pen pierce the lion's ears in Rome. The fact "that the spirit is in full activity whilst the body is sleeping" and "the conditions of clairvoyance" are supposed to be sufficient proof of the existence of "a power in man which can be active and alive without the use of the senses." "All these phenomena, and each one in itself, furnish the proof that our belief in immortality and our hope for it are based upon a firm foundation." We also believe in immortality; but our view of immortality is that of a continuance of our ideas, which are the real constituents of the soul and of our works done during life, which is a manifestation of our ideas. The continuance of ourselves in our children in whom our ideas will be best preserved and may be even higher developed, is no mere sentimentality, but a truth of great importance, and it is this fact which is the true meaning of all beliefs in immortality, however mixed they may be with superstitious notions.

Mr. Gerhard's work is written in an earnest, sincere, and thoughtful spirit. The pleasant and sustained character of its style engages the reader's attention, and a high ethical tone and a strong common sense pervade and beautify its pages.

NOTES.

We are in receipt of a number of letters bearing upon the discussion of the single-tax and other economical problems, that, by reason of the pressure upon our columns and the fact that the points presented have already been fully ventilated, we are unable to publish. Correspondents who desire their manuscripts remailed, may communicate with us to that effect; otherwise letters not accompanied by a request to return will be retained.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE APPROACHING NEW RELIGION.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

It is a significant proof of the widespread and far-reaching effects of freethinking and liberal culture in both England, Europe, and America, to find a new religious cult growing in favor among a people where false faiths and preternatural theological beliefs have found many enthusiastic apologists. It may be taken as a startling announcement of the timeliness, if not feasibility, of the adoption of either a new Christianity or a rational generic religion by a people among whose institutions and in whose very civilization supernaturalism and the Christian mythology has nestled, when we find as is actually the case by statistics compiled by the New York *Independent*, * that nearly three fourths or 55,000,000 of the entire population of the United States is unchurched and in the strict use of the word unchristian, and but 19,790,323 of the possible 75,000,000 are members of or attendants upon the regular services of the church. It is not, therefore, an encouraging sign of the success of the church if her strength is to be estimated by numbers, to find after twenty centuries of experimental Christianity that so large a proportion of the people in the United States alone should seem and be so indifferent to the organized and working Christian church. And when it is remembered that there are less than 200,000,000 of alleged Christians in the world and 826,000,000 of believers in other and apparently equally supernatural religions, such as Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Brahmanism, Sintoism, and Judaism, we are on the one hand more than alarmed over the future of the present church, and on the other hand, more convinced of the steady growth and practicability of natural religion. When so large a number of our population, fully three fourths, are unchurched, where we naturally expect to find but one fourth, and where the latest year-books of all denominations show a gain in membership by no means commensurate with the local and general increase in domestic, emigrant, and foreign population we have fears that something in the church is wrong, and ought to be remedied. And when the fact is added to this that not only idiocy, insanity, † drunkenness, mendacity, and pauperism, but also crime and prostitution * are on the increase, and that the more intelligent classes produce the most cunning criminals, a terrible blow to our present system of education, and also that the carnival of sin now rampant in our great cities is receiving fresh recruits daily from the smaller towns and villages, it may well be asked, what will the ministry say and what will the church do. Further, when it is known that the masses of our people are sinking deeper and deeper into the social sty by the curse of industrial slavery, and into conditions and tendencies of living from which there seems to be little hope of escape, and by which generations unborn will carry in their lives the evil of these dark days, we ought to be sufficiently alarmed over the grim evils that breed like vermin in our midst.

I admit that the church is not altogether to blame for this discouraging condition of things. Yet I believe that crime could be checked, drunkenness abolished, insanity decreased, mendacity destroyed, and all other wrongs and sins modified and averted if not obliterated by the help of the church. It is not that the church is incapable of doing this very thing, but unwilling—not that she lacks resources and backbone but refuses to be guided by the right method of procedure. The present church seeking to save man by saving his soul for the next world has killed her influence in modern society. As an institution whose chief concern is the salvation of man through Christ, it is a failure, and as long as she continues to bolt against the natural method of living by trying to re-make society after the plan of Calvin or some equally hot-headed theologian, she will accelerate her doom.

Heaven and hell are no longer motives for right living among intelligent humanity. This means that the idea of the atonement, the very vertebræ of the Evangelical church, is disjointed and is falling to the ground. When this idea loses its hold upon human nature then the superstructure of theology, which is built upon this idea, falls, and with it the church that endorsed it.

Hence the Evangelical church has reached the crisis in her history. All effort to keep her intact—with heart gone and the whole nervous system paralyzed—will prove to be as useless a labor as trying to revive a corpse by applying an electrical battery.

* July 1888.
† New York *Sun*, March 1889.

* New York *Press*, March 1889.

The church in order to justify herself before the world must prove her *usefulness*. To do this she has the benefit of two alternatives.

1. She can unite in emphasizing the *moral* side to religion; or,

2. Formulate a new religious cult.

Concerning the former let it be said that the church is or should be organized to benefit man, to elevate society, to purify the state, to adorn a civilization. She was not founded to be a constructive civil power, organized to build a kingdom within a kingdom or to become a great and powerful autocracy as she undoubtedly became in the Middle Ages, nor to become what might easily be termed a separate institution, whose sole object of existence might be parasitic; but she was founded to persuade man to do God's will. It should have been regarded as a matter of little concern whether year after year she counted her spoils as a pious nun counts her beads, or as a merchant figures up his profits, and it should have been considered a sure indication of her usefulness, if year after year not by statistics alone but by the reign of liberty man was proven to be no longer a slave to his baser nature. Were the church to cease wrangling about creeds and unite by working along the line of the moral uplifting of mankind, it could no longer be said by C. M. Morse as was said in the February *Forum*,—"we have a moneyed aristocracy, a political dictatorship, landed proprietors, a rapidly increasing tenant population, the 'workingman,' and the 'tramp.'"

It is one of the most deplorable facts of modern history that the church should have fallen so far from its purpose that a prominent clergyman could say without fear of contradiction that Christianity bears no particular relation to the religion of Jesus, that doctrinally it is of Paul and the other theologians and that socially it is of the earth, earthly. It is true that the fashionable church is a natural product of the present social system as is the mission chapel, the pawnshop, the palace, and the tenement.

The reason why in our city churches we often find the rich absent when the poor predominate, and the poor absent when the rich predominate, is because social caste tyrannizes over American society. Christianity ought to be "a furnace to fuse all elements into a homogenous mass," to make a reality the fact that we are all children of the same God, to certify by law as well as in character that we are free men and sovereigns of the earth. This opportunity awaits, this alternative is in the hands of, the church. Apropos of the discussion of the adoption of a common moral platform of work, it would not be impertinent to quote what a few very prominent thinkers have said. Says M. J. Savage, "If all the time and money and enthusiasm and effort had been spent in co-working with the real God in delivering the real man from his real evils, long before this the world might have been the Eden that never was and that never will be, until men intelligently combine to save man here and now from the ills that all can see and feel." And Rev. Doctor Gladden declares that the church is beginning to see, "as it never saw before, that Christianity is not exclusively a scheme for the transportation of a portion of the human race away from this world to a more congenial home beyond the skies, but a plan for the reorganization of life upon this planet; a plan that includes every department of human action—business, politics, society, art, education, amusement, all the interests of life."

Were the church to unite in emphasizing the moral side to religion, polemical theology and Christian doctrine, in fact, the whole superstructure of supernatural Christianity would be jeopardized if not destroyed as the chief intellectual force in the modern religious world. A new impetus would be given to freethinking, and the fires kindled by Voltaire and Thomas Paine would blaze with a new light throughout the world.

This *modus operandi*, although possible and practical, will never be popular. It would precipitate the present church, absorbed as she is in the victories of nominal Christianity, denominationalism, and sectarianism, into irrevocable bankruptcy. The world in consequence would lose a power of repression as valuable in the reorganization of society as liberty itself. Hence this alternative as a method of procedure will be considered by the church as a dangerous expedient.

The demand, therefore, is imperative for the other and only alternative—a new religious cult. What will it be?

I have long since abandoned the idea that the present church will ever accommodate herself as an organization to the spirit of the rising generation, because already in the western world the young life is becoming estranged from the church and is attaching itself to the wild but very fascinating doctrines of Agnosticism, Materialism, and Utilitarianism. The same irreconcilable differences which drove M. Renan from the church of Rome, lead many others to repudiate all forms of organized Christianity and setting up cults of their own to indulge in all manner of speculation. True to reason man has at last learned to seek God not in any single event of past history, as Mrs. H. Ward says, but in one's soul, in the constant verification of experience, in the life of love.

All things change, creeds, philosophies, and outward systems. Inconsistencies of creed, unscientific views of religion, supersentient or supernatural aspects of Christianity have long since proven to be inefficient in saving the world. Man seems to believe that much

of the teaching of the church is contrary to nature, experience, and to all rational ideas of religion. He has seen how through an evolution of hardly 2000 years the church has so multiplied her cults, so diversified her forms of organization, so complicated her methods of work, and so deviated from primitive Christianity, that Jesus in the first and Christ in the nineteenth century stand for different ideas.

Unwilling to become a doctrinarian without first investigating the grounds for belief in this or that form of the Christian religion, man has pondered Christian evidences and Christian polemics to find that the text itself was so incomprehensible, the evidence so untrustworthy, and polemical discussion so tempered by bias that a positive definition of Christianity could hardly be constructed. He must either accept the miracles and declare Jesus God, the supernatural and declare Christianity the revealed religion, or repudiating the evidence of the supernatural as the data of the imagination or the incoherent testimony of tradition, and excluding it from the forum of legitimate evidence he must construct a new religion upon the basis of natural law, or, accepting the human side to Christianity, he must be content with its morals as its characteristic feature. "In matters of intellect," says Professor Huxley, "man should ever follow his reason as far as it will take him without regard to any other consideration, and further, that he should never declare conclusions certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable." A religion which cannot stand this test or that must be studied by a set of mental faculties, wholly different from those employed in all other provinces of intellect, is a religion that is intangible to human nature, impracticable in experience, and an imposition upon society.

The *odium theologicum* and the general protest which accompanied the rise and progress of natural religion, even while all forms of supernaturalism swayed and enslaved human nature, was but the consequence of independent research, the declaration of the sovereignty of natural law, and a fearless effort on the part of a few men not to make Jesus anything less than what he was, or Christianity anything less than his work or the work of man, but to emphasize all truth as scriptural, all knowledge as revelation, all morality as authoritative. Through and by human nature comes the infallible code of moral laws as obligatory as any Sinaitic revelation or Christian beatitude. This is a code of morality which we can use, a revelation which we need, to the exclusion and abandonment of what are the mere trappings of theology, or the inarticulate utterances of a fetich past. We look upon all bibles as books of human experience whose testimony is only valuable to us as it voices the laws of our being and whose literature is no more sacred than the writings of Plato or the essays of Emerson. There will always be men, idolatrous or ignorant enough to believe in mythology or in miracles, in spite of the evidence of nature of the uniformity of her own laws of causation. To such all reasoning is in vain. Our duty is not to distort history, nor disbelieve the past because past, it is not to put new wine into old bottles, or reconstruct and revivify the *dramatis personæ* of bibles in accordance to the *Sartor Resartus* of society, but to call a spade a spade and to show that the infallible bible of the universe is God's immutable laws. No longer will man become a slave to a metaphysical word as Saint Augustine did—such as trinity, personality, intelligence, and what not—but he will read the law of the universe in his experience whatever it may be, and find authority for duty in reason and in conscience.

The new religious cult will be properly called natural religion. Christianity stripped of "credulous love, Jewish tradition, and Greek subtlety," is a contribution to its unfoldment. To live in obedience to natural law or to God's will, as expressed in natural law, is its chief commandment. In natural religion all truth is glorified. We have had enough of the God that the books have killed. We need and will have a God that theology cannot caricature, a moral law which cannot be relaxed, a church that will be humanitarian.

The old faith has long ago decayed and like some weather-beaten and dead tree it stands as a monument of a great religious past. At the base of this tree are the feeble yet promising sprouts of a more glorious faith. The very elements and conditions which killed the old are the elements and conditions which feed the new, and by and by, in its own season, will this new faith mark man's triumphant unity with his God and his complete mastery of himself. Religion has been made natural. It has been placed upon the "rock" and not upon the ever shifting "sand," upon the moral law and not upon what is and will yet come to be preposterous and stupendous imagery. The church will do well if she accepts as her alternative this new religious cult and not seek the living among the dead. So the torch of God will pass on its way, hand lovingly reaching out to hand.

RETROGRESSION IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE LIFE.*

BY AUGUST WEISMANN.

When we speak of the development of the animal and vegetable kingdom we are apt to think, in the main, of an unbroken and continuous development which proceeds from lower to higher types. But this is not the case. On the contrary, *retrogression* plays a very important part in this matter, and if we accurately note the phenomena of retrograde growth we shall find that they enable us, almost more than the

* Translated from the German by μκοκ.

phenomena of progression, to penetrate to the causes which occasion the transformations of the organic world. And hence their transcendent importance.

Let us start with a particular instance. There are, as we are all aware of, birds that cannot fly and among them some that do not even possess wings. To this class belongs the so-called wood-ostrich of New Zealand, the Kiwi-Kiwi, as the natives call it. A superficial examination of the animal makes one feel as if something essential were lacking; the impression is that of a man without arms, for its wings are wanting. Where they should lie, there is no trace of them to be seen: hair-like feathers droop sleekly and smoothly down its body; one observes no trace of an anterior member. Why, the question arises, has this bird no wings?

Not many years ago, a reference to the bird's manner of life would have been deemed a sufficient answer to this question. The Kiwi lives in the woods, but on the ground and not in the trees. During the day it hides itself in holes in the earth, while at night it emerges timidly and circumspectly, in search of insects and worms, of which its food consists. It is thus not obliged to fly to find sustenance, and it need not fear enemies among the native animals living on the ground, for, with the exception of two species of the bat, there are no mammiferous animals to be found in New Zealand. Formerly we would have received this answer in explanation: the Kiwi was created without wings because it is not obliged to fly. At the present day, when we can no longer accept a creation in the old childish sense of the term, when we know that the animals and plants of every epoch of our earth's history have not suddenly arisen from nothing, but have evolved themselves from more primitive forms—such an answer is no longer satisfactory. The conception of an instantaneous creation of things can no longer be made to harmonize with modern scientific knowledge: the first cause of all being can not possibly have created the present existing state of things by a "let there be and there was," much less the forces conjoined to matter, which through their interaction have brought into being this great universe of unceasing transformation — the growing and dying solar systems as well as growing and dying forms of terrestial animals and plants.

From our point of view the Kiwi has not been created from nothing but on the contrary has developed from other animal-species that lived before it, and that from other species of birds. Birds, however, have developed from reptiles of the lizard class and as these posessed not only hind feet but also forefeet, birds also must originally have had them. The forefeet developed into wings. *Accordingly the progenitors of the Kiwi must have possessed wings, and the question at hand is, Why has the Kiwi lost them.*

We know for certain that it has lost them, and we know for certain that its progenitors posessed them, for even now short stumps of wings are found hidden beneath its coat of feathers. And although it can no longer use them in any way, nevertheless they exhibit to us in perfect distinctness all the essential characteristics of a bird's wings. Nay, they even have a few short and crooked feathers, whose tough stems clearly call to mind real pinion-feathers.

The actual cause of the wings of the Kiwi-Kiwi having become so rudimentary, must now, it is clear, be looked for in the circumstance that they would be of no use to it with its present build and in its present mode of life. Thus far the first explanation is correct in saying the bird has no wings because it is not obliged to fly. In reality, its build is perfectly adapted to a life on the ground. Its short but powerful limbs and feet serve to dig up the soil and to tunnel holes beneath the roots of great trees; and when pursued by the natives or one of the few birds of prey that live upon the island, they enable it to dart away with the swiftness and noiselesness of a rat. In addition, its long, sensitive bill directs it almost exclusively to the food which it can find in the earth, which is principally worms. It penetrates the soft, damp soil of the woods with its bill after the manner of a woodcock, and extracts the worms from beneath with great accuracy and skill.

At the time therefore, when this species was being formed, it was already confined to the ground and had no reason to leave it; the body conformed, in course, to these conditions of its existence and the wings were stunted in growth. Were this process taking place today, it would probably be interrupted. For the immigration of the Europeans with their muskets and their animal companions, the cat and the dog, has changed materially the Kiwi's conditions of life. Wings would now be of great service to the defenseless bird. But they have been lost once for all, and the probability is, that within a short time they too will be exterminated, as have been the giant-ostriches, the Moas, that within the memory of man still inhabited New-Zealand, and whose skeletons, over twelve feet in height, are now the object of wonder in our museums.

The winged ancestors of the Kiwi, by having adapted themselves more and more to this life on the ground of the woods, gradually outgrew the need of using their wings, and, in accepting the explanation that this uninterrupted non-use of the wings is in some way connected with their present stunted form, we shall not fall wide of the mark. For the non-exercise of the powers of flight, continued through generations, has worked a retrogression in the growth of the organ of flight, has in some way gradually shortened the wing and finally reduced it to that insignificant appendage which is discovered upon the Kiwi to-day.

We are furthermore able to understand why the retrograde growth in the case of the Kiwi has been more complete than in the case of the ostrich. The latter still uses his wings to accelerate his course over the steppes and deserts of Africa, whereas the thick underbrush of the forests in which the Kiwi lives, would hinder from the start such speedy flight. The short wings of the ostrich with their covering of great and beautiful feathers, would encumber the Kiwi in its creeping course through the undergrowth and bushes, in any event would be useless to it. Hence, its wings are almost completely stunted and have disappeared entirely from the surface of the bird's body.

The ostriches are, further, not the only birds whose wings have, to some extent, suffered this retrogression of growth. Among water-fowl individual species are to be found that have become too heavy and stout to be still able to lift themselves into the air : and in these cases as for instance in the Pinguin, the wings as instruments of flight have fallen into total disuse. Yet, though not for flying, they are used as a means of propulsion in water and are consequently not so completely stunted as in the case of the Kiwi ; in fact they only differ in size from the wings of birds of flight, being much smaller, and, by their thick coat of short, scaly feathers resembling the fin of a fish.

From these few illustrations it is evident that the principle of adaptation in the organic world asserts itself in two directions. For not only are organs in process of formation, fashioned with reference to their ultimate fitness, that is, so as best to accomplish what they have to accomplish ; but also everything superfluous is withdrawn and every part again removed so soon as the animal ceases to exist. This removal, it is plain, does not take place abruptly and arbitrarily, but by degrees and in conformity to a law, so that we are very frequently enabled to observe the intermediate stages between the fully-developed organ and its total disappearance.

Retrogression in the growth of members at one time essential, is, however, not an occasional phenomenon of nature. It is extremely common : in fact instances of it are not wanting in any of the higher forms of life and in some can be established by a multitude of cases. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, if the higher forms of the present age are sprung from the lower types of a former ; for the latter lived in totally different circumstances and surroundings, and consequently possessed various other limbs and organs which in the course of ages were either transformed or have completely disappeared. Were it not in the power of nature to effect this disappearance of superfluous organs, most of the transformations of species could not have taken place at all ; for the presence of organs which had become superfluous, would have interfered with the action of the others which the animal still used—and have impeded their development ; in fact if all organs possessed by progenitors had to be retained, a monstrosity of animal life would have resulted, a form incapable of existence. *The retrogression of organs which have become superfluous, is thus a condition of progression in the organic world.*

Having discovered the principal cause of the disappearance of an organ during the course of its evolution in its superfluity, we shall next proceed to inquire how it comes that an organ hitherto indispensable to life, is no longer needed. Manifestly, this can only occur through a change in the conditions of the animal's existence. If a bird, that hitherto sought its food on trees and bushes, discovers such abundance of sustenance on the ground of the forest that it can live better than formerly upon the latter alone, it will accustom itself more and more to living on the ground and will, in time, fly less to the bushes and the trees. By this very circumstance it is transplaced into conditions of life wholly different from those in which it formerly existed ; it will no longer need to fly ; will at first, therefore, fly less than before and in later generations not at all. At the same time, the forest in which it lives, the climate, the animal world that environs it, need not have changed ; it suffices that it has itself acquired a new habit.

The same thing is true of animals that have abandoned their original habitations. They may, perchance, stray into an essentially different environment which, as the circumstances determine, renders some organ unnecessary that before had been indispensable. For example, a species that has hitherto lived in the light, emigrates into dark and unilluminated localities ; they can no longer use their eyes and we therefore find it to be universally the case that such species have more or less completely lost their organs of sight.

This is the case, for example, with the so-called *cave animals*. In the stalactite caves of Carniola, the blind salamander, Proteus, is found in great numbers ; also blind assels, blind Cyclopida, blind insects and snails. In the Mamouth Cave, of Kentucky, we find in addition to other blind species, also a blind fish, a blind craw-fish. It really requires no proof, that these species are descended from progenitors that could see ; for we know that the caves in question have not been in existence for all time, and that the species inhabiting them, therefore, must have emigrated from the regions of light ; and in many of these instances we are able to furnish a direct demonstration, for they still possess indications of the former presence of organs of sight. Thus the salamander and the blind fish of the Mamouth Cave have beneath their skin a small imperfect eye which is inadequate however for

purposes of vision; and, although in the case of the crawfish the eyes have completely disappeared, the movable structures whereon they formerly rested, still remain.

Caves, furthermore, are not the only unilluminated habitations of animals. In deep springs and above all, at the bottom of the ocean and at the bottom of lakes, total darkness reigns. We are indebted to Professor Forel, in Morges, for the first data with regard to the depth to which light penetrates water. Photographic plates were sunk at night to certain depths and having been made fast to a float were there exposed for one or more days to the effects of the impingent light. Forel found, in this way, that even in the crystal-clear waters of the lake of Geneva light did not penetrate to a depth of one hundred metres; and that in winter when the water is purest, while in summer the depth of penetration was not even fifty metres. More recent experimentations by Fol and Sarasin, where perfected apparatus and more sensitive photographic plates were employed, advanced the limit of the penetration of light in the lake of Geneva to the depth of one hundred and seventy metres. At this depth, the illumination on clear days was about that which we are accustomed to have on clear, starry nights when no moon is shining. Not until we go below one hundred and seventy metres does total obscurity prevail; and from this point down to the greatest depths our lakes attain (300 metres) we find blind animals of some kind or other; as the blind assel and a species of Cyclops. In the ocean the limit of penetration, by reason of the absence of murkiness, lies much deeper, *viz.*, at 400 metres. Now, since the sea, as at present known, is inhabited by living creatures to a depth of 4000 metres, there consequently exists an immense inhabited region of darkness, whence innumerable sightless animals have sprung, blind fishes, blind crabs of all descriptions, blind snails and worms, all of them forms whose near relatives of the illuminated regions of the sea above them, possess eyes.

Likewise animals that have themselves dug the tunnels they live in, possess imperfect eyes or none at all. Thus the rain-worm is without eyes, whereas its kindred in the surface regions of the ocean as a rule possess eyes; in many cases, indeed, eyes of a wonderfully superior and complicated structure. It is true the common mole still possesses eyes although diminutive, and quite hidden beneath a thick coat of hair; yet in Africa there are moles that are without eyes altogether, and thus completely blind.

We could cite many more instances to prove that animals which have no opportunity to see, have lost their eyes. What is true of the eyes, moreover, is true of all organs: experience teaches us that every organ that is no longer used, suffers a retrogression of growth and finally passes away.

We are in possession of interesting proofs of this also, in the other organs of sense, although the instances are less frequent where they have been entirely put out of use. Thus the Cœcilia or blind-grubs, tropical amphibians of the shape of a worm or snake and living in the earth, have not only lost their eyes but their sense of hearing also! They possess neither an ear-drum nor a cavity for the drum and although the membranous sac is still present hidden in the interior of the skull, yet the auditory nerve whose functions are to connect with the sac and supply it with sensitive substances, is stunted. Thus these creatures do not hear at all! There must probably have been no necessity for them to hear, living as they did in the interior of the earth, since otherwise the organ would not have fallen away. Their powerful organ of smell, of quite unusual development, makes amends for hearing and sight; of all vertebrate animals they have the finest sense of smell.

We know of instances, too, where the organs of the sense of smell have become stunted from not being used. Thus the whale and the dolphin have, more or less, completely lost these organs, which, in other mammals have attained such a high development. In water they are indeed useless.

Not always does this process of retrograde growth continue up to the total disappearance of the organ. In the case of organs of sense this will assuredly, always be so, for these can hardly be converted to any other use. But, with this exception, it is not rarely the case that the disappearing organ can be utilized by the animal in some other than the original way, and then it stops at a certain stage of the retrogression (as, for example, the wing of the ostrich), or it is changed and transformed in a certain way, that is, made more fit for its new functions, as where the wing of the Pinguin is converted into an oar.

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

. . . . . .

"Impeaching self conceit in men
Who put their confidence alone
In what they call the Seen and Known."
The Oracle of the Goldfishes: JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

IS THEIRS or ours the greater "self-conceit"?
They look within and worship what they find;
They look within and every master-mind
Evolves himself a universe complete.

We kneel and beg the truth at nature's feet;
And what she gives is truth for all mankind.
You say she cheats us, but the words that bind
What creeds have put asunder cannot cheat.

Ah, we have visions, too. Our eyes have seen
The world made one in hope and will and act
To purge the house of life from things unclean.

No rival dreams of ours can break the pact
That joins our hearts and thrust a doubt between,
For all are shaped along the lines of fact.

CORRESPONDENCE.

METHODS OF ASSESSMENT.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

WHAT I would like from Wheelbarrow is a simple statement of "fairer methods of assessment," that would not, like Mr. George's plan, "sweep into the gulf of confiscation" the value of the unoccupied lot, that we are now creating and presenting to the English Land Co.

As to confiscating my lot, I don't intend to allow it; but I am not simple enough to place my faith, as a preventive therefore, in a Chicago lawyer, Kent's Commentaries, the Constitution of the United States, or even "the combined legal and judicial talent of the civilized world."

Under any system, I intend to pay my taxes; and notwithstanding the above list of eminent authorities; "in this neck of woods" and the fifteen states and territories of the United States that I have been in, State and County officers will, and do now, confiscate land for non-payment of taxes; as effectively, and in the same way, proposed by Mr. George. The difference, at this point in the system, is in the disposition of the property after confiscation.

Last year, after paying my just share of taxes, I prevented confiscation of my "allodial" lot by paying about seven dollars taxes that should have been charged to the lot by mine.

JEROME LYNCH.

FREDERICK POLLOCK ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IT may be of interest to those who have noted the controversy between "Wheelbarrow" and Mr. William C. Wood, whether "absolute private property in land has no legal existence and is an impossibility, being incompatible with civil government," to read the following remarks of Frederick Pollock on the English view of the case.

"It is commonly supposed that land belongs to its owner in the same sense as money or a watch. This has not been the theory of English land since the Norman conquest, nor has it been so, in its full significance, at any time. No absolute ownership of land is recognized by our law-books except in the crown."—The Land-Laws, p. 12.

This also is interesting:

"The people who exercise rights of common exercise them by a title which, if we could only trace it all the way back, is far more ancient than the lord's. Their rights are those which belonged to the members of the village community long before manors and lords of the manor were heard of."—The same, p. 6.

And this:

"I am not aware that the public at large have a strict right to be anywhere except on highways (including estuaries and navigable rivers) and public paths, in places expressly dedicated to public use and enjoyment by their former owners or by Act of Parliament, and on the foreshore of the sea between high and low water mark. And strictly speaking the right to be even on a highway is limited to the purpose of passing and repassing. * * * Even the air is not free." Pages 13, 15.

MORRISON I. SWIFT.

ASHTABULA, O.

A NEW HAMPSHIRE VIEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

HAVING become interested in the discussion of Eminent Domain in THE OPEN COURT, I wish to add a word to the ideas there advanced. It is true that Dr. Wood states the current *theory* of text-book writers upon this matter. This is the theory of delegated sovereignty. It is based upon feudal traditions and regards the right of Eminent Domain as an *incident* of sovereignty. This theory is borrowed from the civil law and is unquestioned in countries where "divine right" of kings prevails. But my object in writing THE OPEN COURT is to call the attention of its readers to a decision upon this matter in my own state. The case is that of Orr vs. Quimby, 54 N. H., 590, 603, (1874), the dissenting opinion of Doe, J. Judge Doe is now Chief Justice of New Hampshire, and if the case were to be decided again, his view of it would undoubtedly prevail. Following is a quotation from Doe's opinion:

"In a form of government constitutional in the American sense, public authority is exercised under a power of attorney; the powers of government are created and conveyed to the public by an instrument in writing duly executed by the voting class or their elected and authorized agents; the power of Eminent Domain does not exist unless it is so created and conveyed. Coupled with a reservation of the right of property, eminent domain is limited every way by the law of necessity; but it can no more be judicially extracted from a non-constitutional public necessity, *inherent sovereignty*, or *feudal resumption*, than from the divine right of kings. Established in error by early American authorities, it was held in check by a duty of compensation drawn from the civil law, the natural law, the universal law, and any law higher or lower than the constitution."

I will not quote more of the opinion. This is enough to show that there is more than one opinion upon the subject in the Courts. In view of this disagreement among the judges, I wish to submit the following as the true view of eminent domain.

1. *Constitutional necessity*, which in our government is equivalent to *true* public necessity, is an incident, not to delegated sovereignty, but to the societary contract for the purpose of its more perfect and complete execution.

2. All taking of private property for public purposes depends upon that necessity; and upon that necessity alone.

3. Private rights, when taken for public purposes, must be given full and certain compensation. This by force of the *constitutional guaranties* of private rights.

The principle is this: That private property must yield to the public good or benefit, is true only to this extent, namely, that the rights necessary to secure the enjoyment of property to every man to the fullest possible extent are superior to the rights necessary to secure an *opposed* enjoyment to an individual here and there. Nevertheless it is not sufficient that the multitude be protected. All must be. Therefore, when property is taken from a person for a public use, that person, beside being admitted in common with all to the public benefit, enjoyment, and profit attendant upon that public use, is also entitled to a full compensation for the special, individual loss which befalls him, and which is not shared by citizens in general.

ARTHUR R. KIMBALL.

State Library, CONCORD, N. H.

THE INJUSTICE OF THE SINGLE-TAX.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

AS MY share of the discussion now going on as to Georgeism or the single-tax theory, I should like to contribute some personal experiences—happily long past. In my younger days I had a desire to have a home of my own, a foothold as it were on earth, and accordingly bought a lot at a very low price, as lots were selling in an unimproved part of the city, and built a house thereon. The general taxes then, as they are now, were about 2½ per cent. on the valuation, but acting upon the theory I suppose, that the "owner of rent-bearing land should pay to the general public for the benefit of those, who had no land, a tax such as would equalize this injustice," the city authorities compelled me to pay the whole cost of street improvements, including paving of street, sidewalk,

alley, and also construction of sewer adjoining my property, and then added the cost of these improvements to the general valuation.

Of course, I was compelled to sell out my home getting but little more than half of what my adventure in that line cost me, and since then I have had no more desire to own land under such a system. To be deprived of the ownership of land may be a badge of serfdom, but I have no wish to indulge in such expensive freedom. I prefer rather to live in a rented home and see my landlord undergo the sweating process.

In the summer of 1854 I belonged to a party of surveyors in California. We were employed by the State to run the section lines of five townships of land in Kern county, near Baker's Ferry. It was then a desolate country—covered mostly with alkali shoe deep, in some places a little sago brush, and stunted cactus with some willows by the alkaline pools. I would not have accepted the track surveyed for my summer's work. The "God-given right" to the whole 115,000 acres of land would not have supported a thousand jack rabbits.

Within the last few years, a company seeing the possibility of the situation, have flumed Kern River, constructed irrigating ditches, and made this desert productive. Baker's Ferry, a single cabin and a rope ferry, has become a city of 2000 inhabitants, and the land, absolutely valueless at one time, is now worth say fifty dollars per acre.

Now is there any justice in taxing the brains and pluck of these corporators or of those who are occupying these lands now to equalize my lack of brains thirty-five years ago?

This theory of God-given right or inalienable right to land for all men is all fudge. Land, like merchandise or a situation, is only a means of obtaining an income, either in *esse* or *posse*, and the man who holds land is no more depriving another of his rights than he who holds merchandise or a place for a salary. And this theory of "equalization" is most unjust and iniquitous of all, even when disguised under the name of the public good. In my case the land was not taxed at all but my salary as a bookkeeper was sliced up for the use of the public. Now I don't object to bearing my share of the general burden, but I think it should be apportioned justly. I have seen as yet no arguments produced by the single-taxers that meet the equities of the case. I have no scheme of taxation to propose, but justice to all seems to require that according to a man's income in *esse* or *posse*, whether derived from lands, merchandises, salaries, or wages, should lie the responsibility for his proportion of the general expenses, and the nearer we get to a system based upon these principles the nearer will we meet the requirements of equity to all.

J. G. CONANT.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

LAND VALUES AND PAPER TITLES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IN THE OPEN COURT for August 15th, I am assailed by three more soldiers of the "new crusade." They spring out of the ground like the clansmen of Roderick Dhu. These are more formidable than some of the others; they are stronger, and better armed. For answer to these new antagonists I will take a few texts from the law and the prophets of the new revolution.

"Private property in land has no warrant in justice."

"We should meet all economic requirements by at one stroke abolishing all private titles declaring all land private property, and letting it out to the highest bidders."—Henry George, "Progress and Poverty," Book VIII, Ch. 2.

"Now it is evident that, in order to take for the use of the government the *whole income* arising from land, *just as effectually as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land*, it is only necessary to abolish, one after another, all other taxes now levied, and to increase the taxes on land-values till it reaches as near as may be *the full annual value of the land*."—Henry George, "Protection or Free Trade." P. 302.

"Georgeism does invoke the practical confiscation of land by the government. In *form* it leaves the present owner of land an owner still; but in *fact*, the government becomes the owner."—Hugh O. Pentecost, THE OPEN COURT, No. 94.

"We mean to destroy the private ownersbip of land by confiscating *ground rent*."—Hugh O. Pentecost, THE OPEN COURT, No. 94.

I present those texts in order to show that Mr. Albro's very instructive and intelligent article has little application to "Georgeism," but is explanatory of an entirely different scheme of change. Mr. Albro's plan would not destroy the private ownership of land. It would strengthen private ownership by relieving the land-owner from some of the burdens of taxation. It must have been thus presented to the farmers at the meeting to which Mr. Albro refers, or they never would have approved the plan.

I am strengthened in that opinion by the estimate those farmers made of the taxes which under Mr. Albro's plan would fall upon a New York farm worth $15,000. I say Mr. Albro's plan, because it has no resemblance to the plan of Mr. Henry George, except in this, that all other taxation is to cease. The estimate made by Mr. Albro, and agreed upon by the meeting as "about right," was $150, or one per cent on the value of the farm. This in lieu of all other taxes, would be a light and easy burden. It would not be "the *whole income*, and the *full annual value* of the land." It would not make the government owner "in *fact*" of the farm. It would not give the "*kernel*" of the farm to the public, and leave the "*shell*" to the owner. It would secure to the farmer the ownership of his farm not only in form but in fact. This is not what Mr. George desires. He insists that *all* private titles shall be abolished "at one stroke."

There is much guess work and fanciful speculation concerning the "relation between land-values and population." The variations are so many that nothing positive or even reliable is to be had upon that subject. It cannot be true that the farmers and land-owners of this country owe $600 to each and every other person. I cannot believe that each person's "existence" adds $600 to the value of land in the United States. I think that whatever value my "existence" gives to the farmer's land, is fully compensated by the value of the farmer's "existence" to me. I think it very likely that the "existence" of some people adds value to land, but I am sure that the "existence" of some other people diminishes that value. How much does the "existence" of criminals, idlers, and sports add to the value of land? Nothing, and yet they count equally with worthy citizens in the population. It is not a man's existence but his work that benefits the community. Not for being, but for doing, is man entitled to anything. I wish that Mr. Albro would explain himself a little further.

"Tricycle" is bright, witty, illogical, and incautious. When I advised Mr. Pentecost to read Don Quixote, I wondered whether anybody would snap at the bait, compare me to the Don, and laugh at me for fighting windmills. Sure enough, Tricycle took the fly like a hungry salmon. He compares my controversy to "that doughty hero's celebrated battle with the windmills, which he mistook for giants." Well, I did not mistake my critics for giants, and if I thought them "windmills," I preferred that somebody else should call them so.

Let me assure Tricycle that I never was "haunted by the idea" that under the single-tax Tom Clark's farm would be taken away from him. I knew how wildly irrational and unjust was the scheme of Henry George to take it away from him either by the "single-tax" deception, or by the bolder plan of confiscation. I have never been "haunted" by any fear of Mr. George's impossible revolution. It will never come.

Tricycle thinks it strange that I cannot see "that the single-tax would leave Tom Clark in absolute possession of his farm." I think it strange that Tricycle cannot see the contrary after reading in the text what Mr. George means by the expression "single-tax." In addition to what I have quoted at the beginning of this reply, I will now give Mr. George's latest utterance on the subject, printed in a recent number of *The Standard*.

"Although the right of private property in land is not the present practical question in connection with the single tax, it is involved and should be understood by all who undertake to promote or antagonize the movement."

Here Mr. George confesses that the very right of Tom Clark to his farm is involved in the single-tax question, and yet Tricycle thinks it strange that I cannot see that the single-tax "would leave Tom in the absolute possession of his farm."

It is a pity that a writer so keen as Tricycle should be so deficient in the logical faculty as to see no difference between the man who recognizes private property in land and the man who does not; between a wish to increase the number of land-owners and a scheme to deprive every man of his land. I desire to increase the number of the landed, and diminish the number of the landless, while Mr. George declares that every man must be landless. By a most illogical contradiction Tricycle asserts that this would make *all* men *landowners*. As well say that the confiscation of all the cattle in the country would give every man milk for his coffee. It is false reasoning that leads a man to say the destruction of land-ownership would make all men land-owners.

Mr. Theodore P. Perkins, suspicious that the doctrine of Henry George is indefensible, drops him altogether and says: "It is not so important to know what Mr. George or any one else meant by certain phrases, as it is to know what is a just land-system, and how we are to get it." This is a new departure, and a very sensible one too, but it reflects not on me. For months my critics have been pounding me with Henry George: they have been explaining what they call "Georgeism"; they have been advising me to read his works that I might correctly understand him. They have been dogmatizing like sectarians, and with a good deal of self-righteousness have described themselves as "Georgeites." Now I am gravely told by Mr. Perkins that it is not important to know what Mr. George meant by what he said. Mr. Perkins cannot switch the George doctrine on to the side track, because he thinks it has been damaged in the collision. "Georgeism" so-called, not by me, but by the sect of Henry George, is the theme of this debate. It cannot be hustled out of the way by Mr. Perkins, because he has had enough of it. I most heartily agree with Mr. Perkins that it is not important what Mr. George or any one else means. The subject itself is a grander theme than the opinions of any man. When I see the obsequious deference which my critics pay to Henry George and "Georgeism," I offer them the advice which Jefferson gave to his nephew, Peter Carr. "Never believe nor reject anything because any other person rejected or believed it."

Mr. Perkins is a robust antagonist. A man of ability, who thinks for himself, who knows that he is honest and believes that he is right in his opinions, is not to be easily disposed of. He is very much stronger than the man who confesses himself the disciple of another, and is therefore embarrassed by the eccentricities and the inconsistencies of his master and apostle. It is Mr. Theodore Perkins who must be answered now, and not Mr. Henry George.

Mr. Perkins emphatically says, that it is not just that land should have an "owner," but he claims that man should have "the privilege of peaceably occupying land for use." This peaceable occupation, he says, "is a right." If so, this "right" ought to be made secure, and its highest security is ownership. On that security depends the whole theory and practice of agriculture, the strength and foundation of all the other arts and sciences. When this security is denied and the land is made common property, agriculture ceases, and hunting takes its place. Mr. Perkins insists that the privilege of peaceably occupying land for use is a "right," but the red savages of America, who anticipated Mr. George by many centuries, deny this right entirely. They say that no man has a right to appropriate the land or any portion of it for his own peaceable occupation, because the Great Spirit gave it as the common property of all.

There is a good quality of moralizing in the reflections of Mr. Perkins on the abuses of land-ownership, and the wickedness of private property in land, but he converts it all into pure sentiment when he says: "It is true that every man has a right to as much control over land as is needful for his use and enjoyment of it, and for the security of the fruits of his labor." Very well, what is this right to control but ownership? If a man has the right to control a piece of land, every other man's infringement upon it is a trespass. Mr. Perkins qualifies his concession by denying that this right exists after death. I think his position here is weak, both in morals and in politics. What sort of civilization is it wherein a man has no inducement to work for his children? What sort of savagery would result should every man's property be scrambled for at the moment of his death? Where would be "the security of the fruits of his labor," if a farmer could not share those fruits with his family, and leave them to his family at his death?

The privilege of controlling land which the owner is not using, is a wrong, says Mr. Perkins; so that the right or wrong of land-owning shrinks to the narrow measure of use. "The question is," remarks Mr. Perkins, "how shall we get rid of the unjust privileges without letting go the rights?" Why, we must reach them by the serpentine road that winds around Robin Hood's barn. Here is the scheme of Mr. Perkins: First, "In the case of unimproved land, to refuse governmental assistance to the holders of paper titles against would-be settlers, meanwhile protecting such settlers from the interference of the owner or his agents."

Let us examine that anomaly for a moment. Government gives a man a patent to a piece of land, and when a trespasser invades it, the government dishonors its own deed and protects the trespasser against the "interference" of the owner. But, suppose there are eight or ten "would-be settlers," all jumping the claim at the same time; shall their disputes be settled by bloodshed or by the courts? If by the courts, the decision in favor of one or the other of them becomes enrolled on the records of the courts, and that record becomes another "paper title," which the courts, according to the land-scheme of Mr. Perkins, are bound to dishonor in behalf of some new would-be settler, who has made another trespass upon the land, and so on for ever. A "paper title," whether it be a deed, a patent, or a judicial decree is only evidence of title, and under any civilized land-system that evidence must exist on paper somewhere, before any man can be safe in the enjoyment of "the right of occupying land for use." This is Mr. Perkins's first step to chaos.

And the second is like unto it. "In the case of improved lands, to refuse government assistance to the holders of paper titles against the owners of the improvements on the land." But, what if the owner of the paper title is also the owner of the improvements on the land? And a trespasser comes and pitches him into the road? His "paper title" being of no value in the courts he can only obtain redress by proving that he made the improvements on the land. This might be a difficult thing to do, and suppose he did not make the improvements himself, but bought them of the man who did make them, his proof of this must be the paper title called a deed, which, according to Mr. Perkins, the government must not recognize, for his third step to chaos is this: "To refuse to record warranty deeds, or to enforce the provisions peculiar to them;" and the fourth is this: "To refuse to enforce any conditions in deeds old or new."

And to make confusion worse confounded: "In general, to assume that occupancy and use give the best title, and to refuse to consider any suits at law for the purchase money or rent of land, apart from, or over and above, the value of the improvements on it." This would be to make all men "infants" by declaring them incapable of making contracts. The seller and the buyer of a farm would not be allowed to agree upon its value if any part of the

purchase money remained unpaid. The debt could not be secured by mortgage, because that would be a "paper title" which the courts must not recognize. It could not be evidenced by a note for the same reason. The parties to the sale would not be bound by their own agreement, and the whole neighborhood must be called in to decide upon the value of the improvements on the land, every man making a different estimate, and holding an opinion different from the others This reaction towards the ancient barbarism out of which society has been evolved through the travail of many centuries, is innocently called by Mr. Perkins a "reform." It would be a return to the land-system of the savages.

WHEELBARROW.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

CHAPTER XLII.

TOBIAS BACHHUBER.

ILSE gently touched the head of her husband. Felix opened his eyes, threw his arms round his wife, and for a moment looked in confusion at the wild scene about him. The mist hovered like a white curtain before the opening of the cave; the first dawn of morning cast a glow on the jagged projections of the dark vault; the redbreast sang, and the blackbird piped; the pure light of day was approaching.

"Do you not hear something?" whispered Ilse.

"The birds singing, and the water rushing."

"But under us, within the rock, some strange power is at work. It stirs and groans."

"It is some animal from the wood," said the Professor; "a fox or a rabbit."

The noise about their seat became louder; something was pushing against the stone bench; it was working and sighing like a man who carries a heavy burden.

"Look," whispered Ilse, "it is coming out; it is slipping round our feet. There sits the strange thing; it has shining eyes and a glittering cloak."

The Professor supported himself on his hand and looked at the dark spot, where a small figure sat with hairy face, its body covered with a stiff, glittering garment.

They both looked motionless at the figure.

"Now do you believe in the spirits of this place?" asked her husband, in a low tone.

"I am afraid, Felix; I distinctly see the gold of the dress, and I see a small beard and a horrible face."

She raised herself.

"Are you the Dwarf-King, Alberich," asked the Professor, "and is the Nibelungen treasure concealed here?"

"It is the red dog," cried Ilse, "he has a coat on."

The Professor jumped up; the dog crouched whining before his feet. The Scholar bent down, felt a strange material round the body of the dog, and took off the covering; he stepped to the entrance and held it up in the dawning light. It was old rotten stuff, woven with golden thread. The dog, freed from his burden, rushed out of the cave with a growl. The Professor gazed long on the torn tissue, let the rag fall, and said gravely:

"Ilse, I am at the goal of my long search. These are the remains of a priestly vestment. The dog has drawn this out of some hole into which he has crept; the treasure of the monk lies in this grotto. But I have done with my hopes. A few days ago this discovery would have intoxicated me, now so dark a remembrance is attached to it that the pleasure that I might have had in what is concealed in these depths has almost all vanished."

There were loud voices on the opposite bank. Hans hallooed again through the mist; he greeted his sister and Felix who now came out from the cave on the broad rock, with the joyful news—"The water has fallen." The other brothers and sisters rushed after him and came close to the water shouting and screaming. Franz brought a sandwich in a paper, and declared his intention of throwing this breakfast over to them, that they might not starve. The children contended against this decision, and eagerly devised a plan of throwing over a piece of twine on a ball and attaching the sandwich to it. Life on the estate had again resumed its ordinary routine.

"Has Fritz come?" asked the Professor, across the stream.

"They are still at Rossau," called out Hans. "The bridge has been repaired; Mr. Hummel is up, and has gone down there."

The father also came, followed by a troop of laborers, who brought beams and planks. The men went into the water and drove a support into the soft ground, upon which they laid several slender tree-trunks across the water; the Professor caught the rope which was thrown to him. After a few hours' work a small bridge was erected. The Proprietor was the first who passed over to his children, and the men exchanged a grave greeting.

"If the men have an hour's time to spare during the day," said the Professor, "they may do one last work for me here. The hiding-place of the monks was in this cave."

In the meantime Mr. Hummel was descending with rapid steps towards Rossau. The carpenters were still working at the bridge. He cast a searching look on the spot where he had caught hold of the young Prince in the water and murmured:

"He went down like a cannon-ball. This nation has no capacity for the sea either in its upper or lower classes,—in this whole neighborhood they have not so much as a boat. Twenty years ago there was one here, it is said, but it has been cut up to boil coffee. The best thanks that one can give to this Bielstein man for the disturbance that we have occasioned him,

*Translation copyrighted.

will be to send him a boat to keep among his bundles of straw."

With these thoughts he entered the door of the Dragon; there he went up to the sleepy landlord and asked:

"Where is the young couple that arrived yesterday evening?"

"They are up stairs, I suppose," returned the latter, indifferently; "their bill is to be paid yet, if you will know."

As he was about to ascend to the upper floor, he heard a cry of joy.

"Father, my father!" exclaimed Laura, rushing down the stairs; she threw her arms round his neck, and gave vent to such warm expressions of tenderness and sorrow that Mr. Hummel at once became gracious.

"Vagrants!" he exclaimed; "have I caught you? Wait! you shall pay dearly for this escapade."

The Doctor also rushed headlong down stairs, and greeted Mr. Hummel with outbursts of joy.

"Your carriage will bring the things after us; we will go on ahead," ordered Mr. Hummel. "How did your Don Juan behave?" he asked, in a low tone, of his daughter.

"Father, he took care of me like an angel, and sat on a chair the whole night before my door. It was terrible, father."

"And how does the affair please you? So romantic! It calls forth superb feelings, and one thereby escapes the almond-cake and the unseasoned jokes of the comic actor."

But Laura pressed up to her father, and looked imploringly at him, till Mr. Hummel said:

"So it has been a cure? Then I will joyfully pay the bill of the Dragon."

They walked out of the door together.

"How did she behave on the way?" he asked the Doctor, confidentially.

"She was charming," he exclaimed, pressing the arm of the father, "but in an anxious state of mind; I was sent up on the coach-box four times that repentance overcame her."

"What, and did you climb up?" asked Mr. Hummel, indignantly.

"It gave me pleasure to see that she was so deeply affected by the unusual nature of the journey."

"'It gives me pleasure that my poodle should go into the water,' said the flea, and was drowned," returned Mr. Hummel, mockingly. "Why did you not look calmly on the anxiety of my child? It would have saved you many a bond if you had been firm with her the first day."

"But she was not yet my wife," said the Doctor.

"O, it was tolerant mischievousness, was it?" replied the father, "may you bide your time."

When they approached the courtyard, the daughter hanging on the arm of her father—which she would not let go—he began:

"Not a word to-day, now, about this abominable elopement. I have hushed up your thoughtless folly before the people here, and thrown a mantle over it, that you may be able to open your eyes; you are announced and expected as quiet travelers. We shall remain here together to day; to-morrow I shall speak to you, in my office of father, a last word concerning your romance.

At the door the wanderers were joyfully welcomed by their friends. The Professor and the Doctor embraced each other.

"You come just in time, Fritz; the adventure which we began here years ago will conclude to-day. The treasure of Brother Tobias is discovered."

After some hours the whole party started for the cave; the laborers followed with iron crows and levers.

The Proprietor examined the block of stone at the back of the cave. At the bottom on one side he saw a hole, the same through which the dog had crawled.

"This opening is new," he exclaimed; "it was closed by a stone which has fallen in."

The large stone bench was with some exertion rolled away, and an opening wide enough for a man to creep in without difficulty became perceptible. The lights were lowered into it, and showed a continuation of the cave sloping downwards, which went many yards further into the mountain. It was a desolate space. In the time of the monks it had undoubtedly been dry, but was no longer so. Roots of trees had driven the crevices of the rock asunder, or the strata had sunk, owing to the penetration of the damp. Thus an entrance had been given to water and animals, and there was a confused mass of litter from the wood and bones. The workmen cleared it with their tools, and the spectators sat and stood by, full of curiosity. The Professor, in spite of his composure, kept as close to the spot as he could. But the Doctor could not long bear to look on. He took off his coat and descended into the opening. Mouldy pieces of thick cloth were brought up; probably the treasure had been conveyed in a large bag to its place of concealment. Then came altar covers and ecclesiastical robes.

There was a cry of joy, and the Doctor handed out a book. The face of the Professor was suffused with color as he took it. It was a missal on parchment. He gave it to the Proprietor, who now looked on with great interest. The Doctor handed out a second book; all pressed near. The Professor sat on the ground and read. It was a manuscript of St. Augustine in a deplorable condition.

"Two!" he said, and his voice sounded hoarse from inward emotion.

"The Doctor handed a third book, again spiritual Latin hymns with notes. The fourth, a Latin Psalter. The Professor held out his hand, and it trembled.

"Is there more?" he exclaimed.

The Doctor's voice sounded hollow from the cave.

"There is nothing more."

"Look carefully," said the Professor, with faltering voice.

"Here is the last," cried the Doctor, handing out a small square board, "and here another."

They were two book-covers of solid wood, the outside ornamented with carved ivory. The Professor perceived at once from the style of the figures that it was Byzantine work of the latest Roman period—the figure of an Emperor on a throne, and over him an angel with a halo.

"A large quarto of the fifth or sixth century. It is the cover of the manuscript, Fritz; where is the text?"

"There is no text to be found," again replied the sepulchral voice of the Doctor.

"Take the lantern and throw the light everywhere."

The Doctor took the second lantern in. He felt with his hand and pickaxe all round in every corner of the rock. He threw the last blade of straw out, and the last remnant of the bag. There was nothing of the manuscript to be seen—not a page, not a letter.

The Professor looked at the cover.

"They have torn it out," he said, in a faint voice; "probably the monks took the Roman Emperor in ivory for a saint."

He held the cover to the light. On the inner side of one of the pieces, amidst dust and decay, might be red, in old monkish writing, the words:

"THE TRAVELS OF THE SILENT MAN."

The silent man was now drawn from his hiding-place. But he spoke not: his mouth remained mute for ever.

"Our dream is at an end," said the Professor, composedly. "The monks have torn out the text from the cover, and left it behind; there was no more room for the manuscript in the crowded bag. The treasure is lost to science. Our hand touches what was once the cover of the manuscript, and we cannot help having the bitter feeling of sorrow for what is irreparable, the same as if it had passed away in our sight. But we return to the light in possession of our faculties, and must do our duty in making available to our generation, and those who come after us, what remains."

"Was this genius called Bachhuber?" exclaimed Mr. Hummel; "judging from appearances, he was an ass."

The Proprietor laid his hand on the shoulder of his son-in-law.

"After all, you learned men have been in the right," he said. "Close the opening by the stone bench again," he said, addressing the laborers; "the cave shall remain as it was."

The party returned silently to the old house. The boys carried the books, the girls the bundles of torn monks' dresses, and made plans for drawing out the gold threads for themselves. The Professor kept the cover of the lost manuscript.

As they entered the house there was a sound of horse's feet on the other side. The Proprietor went to the door. The old Chief Forester drew in his black horse.

"I have ridden in haste through the farm to bring you news. Everything with us is topsy-turvy. We have Court Officials and Ministers, and doctors are fetched from every quarter. My people have all been sent out, and I myself have come to Rossau to order a courier. I fear his Serene Highness is very low; he knows no one. The Hereditary Prince is now awaiting the arrival of the Court physician; as soon as he gives permission the party will start for the capital. All these terrible things are owing to the unfortunate additions to my quiet dwelling. One thing more, while it occurs to me—your son-in-law is searching for old papers and books. There are some chests at our place containing such lumber of ancient times, when the ranger's lodge was still a royal shooting-box. Over the door, from under the plaster, one can discover a foreign word, *solitudini*, which means, they say, 'in solitude.' The chests are rotten: in the course of the building they have been moved from their place. When things become quieter with us the Professor will, perhaps, look over them."

"Then here is the Castle Solitude, with the genuine chests of the official," exclaimed the Professor. "I shall never go to that house."

The Doctor seized his hat, and spoke in a low tone to Laura and the Proprietor.

"I beg leave of absence for to-day," he said, going out.

He did not return till evening.

"In the chest there are accounts for repairs to the monastic buildings and for the estate at the end of the seventeenth century; there are, besides, some volumes of Corneille. The vicar who went to America is related to the Chief Forester."

"We have been led astray," said the Professor, calmly. "It is well that every doubt has disappeared."

"But," replied the Doctor, "there is still no proof that the old manuscript is destroyed. It is yet possible that it may come to light somewhere in fragments. Who knows but there may be strips on the back of some books?"

"On the books which the Swede has written in characters of fire at Rossau," replied the Professor, with a sad smile. "It is well, Fritz, that the tormenting spirits are forever banished."

(*To be concluded.*)

BOOK REVIEWS.

ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE. *Horace P. Biddle.* Cincinnati: 1881. Robert Clark & Co.

"The Elements of Knowledge" is divided into ten chapters, treating respectively of 'Knowledge,' 'God,' 'Creation,' 'Philosophy,' 'Science,' 'Art,' 'Literature,' 'Government,' 'Morals,' and 'Religion.' Each chapter is subdivided, code-like, into sections which postulate truths, didactically uttered, and intended either for purposes of instruction, or as a formulation of a system of philosophy. The nature and spirit of Mr. Biddle's work may be best shown by illustrative quotations from the several chapters:

"The foundation of knowledge is consciousness; the beginning and ending of knowledge is consciousness; knowledge is consciousness, nothing more, nothing less, nothing else."

"Concerning the origin of matter, and the cause of its forces, the philosopher knows no more than the fool."

"Philosophy is the study of the absolute through the relative, the unconditioned through the conditioned, the infinite through the finite, the eternal through time, God through the universe."

"Science is what we know; and all that science can know is, 1. Consciousness; 2. Phenomena; 3. Law."

"Art is the adaptation of the things in nature by man to his use or pleasure."

"Religion is the tie which binds man to God, and is coeval with man and as eternal as God. It is the harmony of the soul with universal and eternal truth."

STUDIES IN THE OUTLYING FIELDS OF PSYCHIC SCIENCE. *Hudson Tuttle.* New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co.

Says Mr. Tuttle in the analysis prefaced to his work: "There is a Psychic Ether, related to thought, as the luminiferous ether is to light. This may be regarded as the thought-atmosphere of the universe. A thinking being in this atmosphere is a pulsating centre of thought-waves, as a luminous body is of light." Plainly the hypothesis of the 'psychic ether' is an extension into spiritual philosophy, by analogy, of a theory of physical science. The idea is not novel, yet it is strange that Mr. Tuttle, possessed, as he seems to be, of an acquaintance with physical science, and the history of its development, should predicate the existence of a psychic ether, as resting upon evidence as strong as the existence of a physical ether. True, we have no more *direct* evidence of the one than the other, yet the criteria of universality and necessity are satisfied in the application of the latter to explain physical phenomena, while Mr. Tuttle does not even postulate definite properties of the former within the bounds of which spiritual phenomena can be brought for explanation. "The facts of clairvoyance, trance, somnambulism, and psychometry, prove the existence of this ether," says Mr. Tuttle; and in another place, that this is demonstrated "by the certainty and harmony of the answers it gives." But the facts of clairvoyance, etc., can be hardly designated as universal phenomena; the complexity and shadiness of the conditions under which they are observed, do not admit them to the rank of universality. Furthermore, the psychic ether must be adapted to the necessities of each case it solves, and hence "the certainty and harmony of its answers." In effect this amounts to postulating an independent and separate ether for all the multitudinous spiritual phenomena that daily occur; a system of polyethereal capacities that the genius of the spiritual universe could never tolerate. As a matter of professional opinion, we believe that an emission-theory of thought is structurally much better adapted to explain spiritual phenomena than an undulatory theory; the limits of applicability of the corpuscular, Newtonian doctrine are immeasurable, and its acceptance would open Elysian Fields to the speculations of spiritual physicists.

Mr. Tuttle's book contains many eloquent and well-written passages. Its chapters treat of "Sensitive States," "Psychometry," "Dreams," "Thought Transference," and kindred subjects. The following is Mr. Tuttle's view of immortality:

"The problem of an immortal future, beginning in time, is solved by the resolution of forces at first acting in straight lines, through spirals reaching circles which, returning within themselves, become individualized and self-sustaining." *μκρκ.*

The *Journal of Pedagogy*, an educational magazine of high standing, published at Athens, Ohio, enters upon its third volume with the September issue.

An article that will be read with interest in the September *Wide Awake*, relates to "Maria Mitchell at Vassar," written by one of her old pupils, Frances M. Abbott. A good portrait of the woman-astronomer accompanies the sketch.

The illustrated feature of the September *Magazine of American History* is the third chapter in Mrs. Lamb's "Historic Homes and Landmarks"; the scene being the site of the Damen farm, between Wall street and Maiden lane, which for nearly half a century was outside the walled city of New York.

The Freethinker's Magazine for September will be a Bruno number, containing: a page illustration of the Bruno monument; an article on "The Murder of a Philosopher," by George Jacob Holyoake; an essay entitled "Giordano Bruno in the Past, Present, and Future," by T. B. Wakeman; a poem on Bruno by Lydia R. Chase; a sketch of the life of Bruno by Prof. Thomas Davidson; and also an article on Bruno by Karl Blind, from the *Nineteenth Century*.

NOTES.

Mr. L. J. Vance will shortly contribute to the columns of THE OPEN COURT an essay upon "Superstition in American Life." Many practices from the days when supernatural agencies were rife, still obtain in our country.

Gustav Freytag's novel, "The Lost Manuscript," which, beginning with No. 22 of THE OPEN COURT, has been continued without interruption to the present date, will conclude with our following issue. The novel will be published in the course of the following year in book-form, and its publication duly announced.

"In turning over M. Renan's *Histoire du Peuple d'Israël*," says Mr. Andrew Lang (*The New Review*, August), the "mythologist is impressed by the vagueness of M. Renan's remarks. "Myths are vague affairs, at best, and can best be treated without "too much definiteness. But they have certain fixed characteristics, and one of these is a habit of being much the same all the "world over. If a tale be a genuine myth, you are likely to find "it, in a rude or in an accomplished form, wherever you look. "Here it may be a mere barbarous *conte populaire*; there it may "have been shaped by Homer, and re-shaped by Plato. But the "fundamental ideas are commonly much the same, and the poet "handles matter which some medicine-man may have first brought "into the general treasure of human fancy. * * * One has a kind "of traditional objection to talking about the 'mythical' parts of "the Old Testament. It is a way of speaking which must offend "many people, perhaps needlessly, and again, it does not convey "quite a correct impression. Whatever else the stories in Genesis or Exodus may be, they have moral and intellectual qualities, "seriousness, orderliness, sobriety, and it may even be said, a "poetic value, which are lacking in the mass of wild queries and "fancies usually called myths. Whence this orderliness, sobriety, "and poetry arise, why they are so solitary, so much confined to "the ancient Hebrew literature. is exactly what we wish to know, "and what M. Renan, perhaps, does not tell us."

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion from a psychological point of view is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

CARLYLE'S RELIGION. WITH REMINISCENCES OF HIS T.. THEREON.

[In this article MR. MONCURE D. CONWAY has presented a number of important and hitherto unpublished facts bearing upon the religious belief of the great Scotchman. (No. 98.)]

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THE LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCIENCE.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE LAYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH, LA SALLE, AUGUST 25th, 1889.

BY EDWARD C. HEGELER.*

Members of the Congregation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of La Salle:

When the invitation was extended me, through your pastor and board of trustees, to lay the corner-stone of this your new church, my first thought was, "Can I with good conscience comply with such a request?" Though, indeed, I was baptized, brought up, and confirmed in the Lutheran Church, yet I have become a stranger to many of your teachings and practices—have become, indeed, their open opponent.

The Christian religion teaches humility. In that I cannot follow her. The words of Schünemann-Pott, "Be Proud Yet Unassuming," ("Seid stolz, aber bescheiden,") have become with me a moral command.

Though I highly prize the value of prayer, in so far as it is a self-examination, or the moulding of *right willing* for the affairs of life, or in so far as, in times of adversity, it lends us consolation and gives us strength by awakening in our memory the loftier views of life that at some former time have been imprinted into us;—yet I *can not* pray with you if your prayer be a supplication. It must be the expression of *earnest will*—and that alone.

And in Baptism, too, I see but a beautiful custom—the reception of the child into a circle of fellow-aspirers towards a higher humanity. And in the Holy Communion I see but a festival of brotherhood in commemoration of the founder of the Christian church and of the painful death he went to, representing the highest ideals of the human race. If I am present when you practice these old customs and in honest belief attach a further mysterious meaning thereto, such tokens of respect, as I then show, do not refer to such mysterious meaning.

In the most essential teachings the Religions and Science are not in opposition.

The Christian and other religions teach: That is right which is the will of God, and that is wrong which is contrary to His will; and God compels obedience.

And Science teaches: The great All, or Nature (if *all that is* be included in this word) works in the living world here on earth, and has worked since *millions* of years, to produce ever higher individuals.

In this manner it has produced *man* as he is to day; in this manner it now continues to work, and thus, we can foresee, it will continue to work for just as long a future, developing ever higher beings out of the man of to-day.

The men who take this conduct of Nature for their guide will survive; those who do not, will perish.

The separate ethical teachings that follow from this, are, for the most part, the same as those of the Old and the New Testaments.

A fundamental principle that is common to Religion and Science is this: *Strive to find the truth, be it welcome or unwelcome.* And I accordingly had to tell you through your representatives that your church did not, in its articles of organization, distinctly permit the free investigation of religious truth. Of my friendly feelings towards this church, I could now, as I have formerly done, give warm assurance; for—and I thankfully confess it—much that I am I have become through the Lutheran Church. But further I could not identify myself with her.

I furthermore told your representatives, that if the teachings of the Lutheran Church were such as a man of Luther's character, equipped with the science of *to-day*, would make them—then I too was still a Lutheran.

Your pastor then assured me that the synod of your branch of the Lutheran church *did* permit independent research, and by his advice you have, without dissent, embodied in the constitution of your church resolutions that not only *permit* your pastors to study articles of creed in the light of science, but *make it their duty.* And you have further made it a part of your constitution THAT AN ARTICLE OF CREED, IN SO FAR AS IT BE IN CONFLICT WITH SCIENCE, MUST FALL.

Therein, my friends, the true Protestant spirit has again taken possession of you and you have taken up the continuance of the reformation.

If that article remain forevermore its spiritual corner-stone, *your church stands upon rock.*

* Translated by him from the German, with the assistance of Thomas J. McCormack, Esq.

And so I now meet with pleasure the invitation with which you have honored me, to lay the corner-stone of your new temple, which shall be the place of highest human aspirations, where in the youthful generation now arising, you will form again the soul of those who now live, and of those who lived before us, and give it continuance beyond the individual life. Let the walls of this edifice—dedicated to humanity's highest ideals—proudly rise; to the honor of the high founder of the Christian church and to the honor of our Martin Luther and of all who worked before, with, and after them, in their way, to elevate humanity!

And particularly may this remain a seat of tolerance, as to-day it is; of tolerance from those who cling to the olden teachings towards me who think progressively; of tolerance, too, from such as think like me towards those who only with hesitation change the creed of their childhood.

* * *

In behalf of the Evangelical Lutheran Congregation of La Salle, and by virtue of the tolerance accorded me, I herewith lay the corner-stone of this church—by *one* stroke of this hammer, symbolizing the oneness of the All, and bearing in mind the Bible words: "In Him we live and move and have our being."

SEXUAL CHARACTERISTICS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

THERE is a story of an English lackey who accompanied his master to Paris and was greatly scandalized at the unmilitary appearance of the French army. "Them is no soldiers, whatever they call 'em," was his comment, "blue uniforms is perfectly absurd for regular troops, except for the light artillery."

That anecdote well characterizes the very prevalent disposition to mistake the results of arbitrary arrangement for facts founded on the "eternal fitness of things." If such arrangements have the sanction of a time-honored institution, the proof of their fitness is supposed to be complete. "Time is the test of truth," argued the defender of the Holy Inquisition, "and the experience of many successive generations has proved that witchcraft laws are as necessary as laws against murder, and that leniency to sorcerers is treason to heaven. If witchcraft were a chimera, the defendants would somehow and somewhere have succeeded in establishing that fact; but it is well known that their trials have invariably resulted in conviction and cremation. Whatever is, is right."

"Whatever is, is explicable," would be a little nearer the truth, but the concise form of the axiom is too convenient to be readily abolished, and the fact that women have for ages been kept in subjection to their masculine relatives is considered sufficient evidence in support of the theory that women are naturally inferior to the males of their species. The most plausible specification of that tenet is the argument that prestige is founded on physical strength and that in the species *homo* and all its near relatives the males are physically the more powerful animals. Family-cares certainly tended to temporarily exclude the child-bearing sex from participation in the martial pursuits of our rude ancestors and thus to make the males of our species, *par excellence*, the battle-fighters and arm-bearers. But physical prowess, even in the most primitive sense of the word, implies something more than physical bulk. The birth of a helpless offspring inclines the female of nearly all mammals to seek safety in seclusion, for a day or two, but the subsequent duty of defending her half-grown young has made the mother-animals of quite a number of our next relatives the most pugnacious members of their tribe. At the approach of an enemy the females of the Chacma baboon will fly to the front, shrieking and bristling, while their husbands content themselves with slamming the ground, very much like a fierce bull pawing the dust of the arena,—but still perfectly willing to let their wives stand the brunt of the fight. "The domestic pets of my host," says the naturalist Rueppell, "included three interesting specimens of the Gelada baboon: an old male, a full-grown female, and a waddling youngster, hardly a year old, but as full of mischief as a crowd of schoolboys in recess. Without the constant vigilance of his mother he would have been rarely out of trouble, but his first cry of terror brought her flying to the rescue, and strange to say she was quite as ready to take the part of her husband, and, indeed, seemed to act as the protector general of her little family. Her husband, though fully prepared to resent all personal affronts, never troubled himself about the safety of his relatives. He was a splendid specimen, glossy-haired and sleek, while constant vigilance and constant fighting had made his partner as lean as a hound." Sir Samuel Baker gives a similar account of the Wanderoo ape that haunts the coast-jungles of Ceylon. "We made repeated attempts to catch a young one alive," says he, "but the watchfulness of the old *matriarchs* could not be circumvented. At the first rustling of a bush their alarm-whoops put the whole troop on the alert and during the headlong flight through the treetops the old females invariably brought up the rear."

The tradition of the Amazons repeats itself at three different periods of ancient history, the last time as late as B. C. 327, when Alexander the Great is said to have received a visit (according to others an embassy) from Thalestris, the queen of a Circassian race of fe-

* Copyrighted under "Body and Mind; or, The Data of Moral Physiology." Part XXV.

male warriors. The legend has never been clearly proven or explained; but history abounds with the records of martial females who retrieved a cause which their male countrymen had given up for lost.

The biographies of at least nine different female sovereigns prove that women are capable of conducting the public affairs of large states with skill and prudence, and even acquitting themselves creditably under the crucial test of absolute power. With all her faults, the Empress Catherine passed that ordeal in several essential respects with a cleaner record than any man whose absolutism was limited only by his principles of equity. Without any constitutional checks, without any religious scruples in the conventional sense of the word, she repeatedly gave considerations of public interest an unhesitating preference above motives of private favor or private resentment. How rare a similar consistence of policy has always been among the best sovereigns of the arbitrary sex is shown by the esoteric history of Frederick the Great. How far the very idea of legitimate king-craft had been confused by the despotic outrages of the Middle Ages is proved by the sobriquet of Haroun the *Just*—of the tyrant who murdered his tutor, his faithful minister and the companion of his boyhood-years, for no other reason but the fear that their merit might eclipse a few reflex-lights of his own glory. Even the great Augustus banished a favorite of the Muses for the sole purpose of removing a witness of his own indiscretions; and the spotless fame of Marcus Aurelius only proves how completely the influence of true ethics can counteract the temptation of unlimited power.

"Women," says Schopenhauer, "can boast the virtues of an impulsive and sympathetic nature; they surpass us in emotional philanthropy and compassion, but in justice, honesty, and strictness of principle the average woman is inferior to the average man." Charles Reade, whose latter works convey under the form of a novel the most subtle ethical reflections, repeatedly characterizes the female as the "foxy" sex and seems to doubt the existence of a woman without a taste—or at least a talent—for artistic duplicity.

But is it not quite possible that verdicts of that sort are founded chiefly on the study of life under abnormal conditions—of character warped by ages of oppression and injustice? Cunning and duplicity are the defenses of the weak and the wronged, and is there a doubt that our sisters could have justly urged that plea since the earliest dawn of authentic history? Is it not disgracefully true that "man's inhumanity to man" is far surpassed by man's inhumanity to woman?

The custom of the earliest Aryans seems to have classed women with the domestic animals of their male relatives, and the law of Menu reduced those customs to a fixed system. Women, it says, during childhood must be the slaves of their fathers; in married life the slaves of their husbands, and in widowhood of their eldest sons, or next male kinsmen.

In an account of Sonnerat's "Travels in India," we read of a similar degradation of married women among the mediæval Hindoos: "The husband habitually spoke of his wife as a 'servant' or 'slave,' and she was always bound to call him her lord, and sometimes her 'god'; but she was never allowed to call him by his name,"—evidently to emphasize the unspeakable degree of his precedence, just as the name of the Deity was by certain nations held so ineffably holy as to make it a blasphemy to pronounce it at all. Lycurgus distinctly authorizes husbands to lend their wives to their friends, but Plato, in his ideal "Republic," goes even further and maintains that females ought to be considered the common property of the sovereign citizens. Among the Samnites custom or an unknown lawgiver had established a method of matrimonial selection hardly calculated to develop the moral or mental faculties of the female citizens, whatever might have been its effect on the ambition of the males. Once a year the unmarried young men of the community were assembled to be classed by the degrees of their merit, and beginning with the successful competitor for the honor of the first rank, were successively permitted to choose a spouse, from a number of unmarried females, who for their part had no vote at all in the matter. Roman husbands had the right to beat or imprison their wives, and women could under various circumstances be sold and bought like cattle.

Among the ancient Gauls, Scandinavians, and Slaves, marriage was little more than a contract for slavery, and even courtship by capture outlasted the introduction of Christianity in many parts of eastern Europe. The right of divorce long remained optional with a married freeman. He could send his wife away upon almost any pretext, or without stating his motive at all.

In Araby parents openly sold their daughters to the highest bidder. Her own predilections were consulted only in the case of several equally wealthy suitors being unable to settle their rivalry in any other way, but the parent still reserved a casting vote, which might thwart the inclination of his daughter as well as of her favored lover.

Lower down in the depths of barbarism woman's rights are generally limited to the right of suicide. "In western Africa," says Dr. Letourneau, "a woman is rarely allowed to share the repast of her husband; her children show their contempt for her and do not listen to her; the head of the family will knock her down upon the most frivolous pretext. And everywhere the poor creature will submit most humbly to her lot. Even in countries where Moorish influences

are predominant, the lot of women is not much better than among the negroes. In Senegambia they cultivate the soil, bear the burdens, and watch the cattle; they are excluded from the feasts of the villages. They are beaten and cast off at pleasure. In Darfur they are treated in the same way; one may often see them laden with luggage and provisions, following on foot their lord and master who is comfortably seated on an ass."

Where barbarous nations have to fight the struggle for existence under specially hard conditions of soil and climate, the larger share of the burden is almost invariably shifted upon the shoulders of the patient sex, but even in Polynesia, where Nature more than half supplied the primitive wants of the natives, men monopolized an unfair portion of the ample leisure for recreation. While their husbands feasted and sang women were obliged to search the thickets for pandanus berries, or climb along the sharp ledge of a coral reef, in quest of shell-fish.

Would a similar treatment have failed to react on the character of any tribe or class of men? Nobody wonders that slavery perverts the moral instincts of its victims to the degree where they would deem it a folly to miss a chance for avenging their wrongs by fair or foul means, or to "pilfer pennies from those who have robbed them of pounds"—in other words, we admit that the experience of brutal injustice begets a disposition to oppose cunning to force.

Is it not possible that similar agencies have developed the alleged instinctive female penchant for duplicity?

But, it may be asked, have women not largely deserved their degradation by enduring it? Why have they not made their theoretical equality a fact by rising to their proper level?

The answer is that the female is naturally the *conservative* sex. Their proper constitution qualifies them to receive and to preserve, rather than to originate. Women would fill with credit many of the positions in social, literary, and official life from which custom now debars them, but they cannot well be expected to initiate the work of removing those barriers. Innovation is foreign to their natural sphere of function.

Edmond About mentions an Emir of Yemen who claimed the homage of a tribe of date-tree cultivators. Being urged to adopt a system of representative government, the magnanimous Oriental agreed to grant his subjects a vote on certain questions of tillage and irrigation, but reserved himself the privilege of confiscating the harvest. With a similar generosity certain male specimens of the genus *homo* permit their sisters to participate in elections, but oblige them to vote for a male candidate. A more thorough-going reform, indeed, depends on the recognition of the truth that the difference between the characteristics of the male and female intellect is a difference of kind, rather than of degree.

WORDS AND WORK.

BY WHEELBARROW.

I had a dream which was not all a dream.—BYRON.

I HAVE not been able to study many books this summer, and I find once more that loafing in camp weakens discipline. I now see the value of daily drill although I could not see it when a soldier. I have been dreaming away the summer, and so great is the luxury that I have some charity for the opium eater who yields to the fascination, and dreams himself to idiocy and to death. The temptation is great.

What little reading I have done has been chiefly devoted to the dreams of others, notably the communistic dream of Edward Bellamy, and the anarchistic dream of Elisée Reclus. These have a brotherly likeness to each other, and a family resemblance to the dreams of seers and saints and soothsayers, from the trance of Balaam to Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones which he conjured into men; from Belshazzar's nightmare to the Apocalypse of John; from the Utopian visions of Sir Thomas More to John Bunyan's dream, told in that immortal classic which sprung full-armed out of a tinker's brain; from Walhalla and Paradise to the ideal Boston of Bellamy; and from him to the swarthy gipsies who prophesy for sixpence. All these dreams and dreamers weave spells around emotional natures. In the old slavery days before the flood I have seen Virginia negroes, dazzled by the gold and pearl and sapphire of the Apocalypse, lift up their voices in camp-meeting and sing:

> "John saw the angel Gaberel
> Sitting on a golden altar."

Considering that it was felony by the law to teach those people to read, they may be excused for misunderstanding the text, and beholding the splendors of liberty in the Heaven of John. Wild, weird, and impossible, as we regard it, nevertheless John had a dream which was not all a dream.

Dreamers move the world only as they stimulate action. Work is the way, the truth, and the life; and work for others is the most religious prayer that man can pray. Wholesale philanthropy is well, but retail philanthropy is better. Each can pave his way to heaven by simple deeds. We may neglect the individual sinner to preach comprehensive plans of salvation until our own salvation is lost. In our zeal to reform systems, we may neglect little bits of charity until the gates of mercy close against ourselves. The preacher who stands at the altar and invites the people to come to the eucharist of bread and wine, the holy communion of equal brotherhood, does well; but God's preacher is the man who bravely carries the

sacrament out of the sanctuary to the hovels of the poor. It is well to call upon the people to come to the temples and hear the word of life, but it is better to carry the word of life to their houses, and a bit of the bread with it.

Those doctrines were revealed unto me in a vision. Most of us who have had a theological and religious education have had visions of St. Peter at the gate. Many of us are ashamed to acknowledge it, but it is true for all that, especially of men like me, who are in the sunset, wondering what our Heaven or otherwise is to be. In all my visionary interviews with the apostolic turnkey I have managed to squeeze through on doctrine, although I passed a very poor examination when it came to works. In my last effort it was a close debate whether I should get in or stay out. I pleaded the many good things I had advocated, and the bad things I had rebuked. "Yes!" replied the venerable saint, "you have said some good things, but what good things have you done? What griefs have you lifted from the hearts of your fellows? Whose tears have you dried up? You have forgiven the enemies of other people, but which of your own enemies have you pardoned?" I was silent. "I shall let you in," he said, "but I cannot promise you a very good position, because, my son, you must remember that the man who has given a cup of cold water to a thirsty soul takes higher rank in the celestial monarchy than he who spent a lifetime in denouncing the mismanagement of the water-works." I had a dream which was not all a dream.

The hopeful schemes of "Scientific" socialism and "Philosophic" anarchy are only dreams of an ideal state, for which an ideal people must be made. This will require the slow gestation of ten thousand years. I am not sure that figs will not grow on thistles after proper grafting; but the grafting must be done; and even after that must come the education of the thistle. It is only the poets who can "hear the feet of angels coming down to men." They do not come, unless reincarnated as a punishment, and then they are no longer angels. Angels have their own affairs to attend to, for there is work to do in heaven, and aspiration for a higher heaven still. Some day there may be a people on this earth fitted to live in the anticipated Boston of Mr. Bellamy, although I am not sure that I should care to dwell among them any more than I should like to live in a planet where the oceans have no tides, and the air no storms. For all that, we may by individual effort, by retail philanthropy, lift ourselves and others out of many social evils up towards the improved condition pictured in the vision. Behind all my doubts and fears comes up a hope that Mr. Bellamy has had a dream which is not all a dream.

There is something fascinating in the scheme of "Philosophic" anarchy, "life without government and without law." That is the life that suits me, and I find that I have been an anarchist from a boy. If a slight amendment would be in order I would move the following addition, "and without work." For those principles I am ready to turn out and carry a torch. I never had much schooling, and what little there was of it was made unprofitable by precocious anarchy. I wanted to live "without law and without authority," and so I ran away at every temptation to go a-swimming, and a-skating, and a-fishing, while a band of music would troll me away into the deepest cavern in the mountain like the foolish children who followed the pied piper of Hamelin; and it can do so yet. There is too much restraint upon me. I am altogether too much bound down by authority and law. It would be much better if this were otherwise; better for me I mean. As for my neighbors, I must frankly say that it is better for them that my savage inclinations be restrained.

I fear that the virtuous "Anarchism" advocated by Reclus is an impossible state, to which present humanity can never attain. I fear it is an ideal paradise never to be enjoyed by us who live in this real world. I think that Anarchism, as he desires it, is a revolution that must follow, and cannot precede, a revolution of human character. A state of society where all is justice, kindness, liberty, and love, where law and authority are unnecessary, must be based upon an aggregate humanity virtuous and enlightened, a general and individual character purified from selfishness and greed, from low ambitions and the dross of human pride, from lust and all ignoble passions. I believe that such a state is not possible in our time, nor under the conditions of our present physical, mental, and moral organization. It may come in the future, when through the slow education of centuries mankind shall have reached another stage of development. Meantime, "law and authority" must both remain to protect the good against the bad, the weak against the strong. Before we can reach the healthy table land of the delectable mountain, the peaceable Anarchism of Reclus, we must be relieved of that nature which now enfolds us and weighs us to the ground. Poring one night over Æsop's fables to relax my mind which had been somewhat strained by the speculations of Reclus, I fell asleep and dreamed a fable of my own.

The mud turtles held a convention to take into consideration the degradation and poverty of the mud-turtle classes of society. Delegates attended from all the mud-ponds round about, and the convention was honored by the presence of some eloquent and distinguished mud-turtles from abroad. The base and groveling condition of the mud-turtle classes was con-

trasted with the delightful and superior existence of the birds of the air. One eloquent speaker said, "We aspire not to rival the eagle in the strength of his wing, nor the swallow in the swiftness of his flight; we desire not the plumage of the parrot, nor his power to speak in any language; we ask not the strong toe-nails of the hawk, nor the mocking-bird's gift of song; but is it right, is it just, my fellow-mud-turtles, that even the ignoble buzzard should be allowed to refresh himself with the pure air of the cerulean heavens, while we are limited to the fever-and-ague districts of the most inferior portions of the earth? Let us arise in our might and fly." The committee on resolutions having adopted a platform in accordance with the tenor of the above remarks, the chairman was about to put the question, when a venerable mud-turtle on a back log rose and said:

"Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Convention—Did it ever occur to you that before we can carry out the resolutions of the platform and fly like the birds, we must first discard the cumbersome overcoat which we are now in the habit of wearing, and adopt in place of it a garment of feathers and wings?"

This fable teaches. We must fit ourselves for that condition to which we aspire.

MONISM AND DUALISM.

IN REPLY TO THE CRITICISMS OF MR. E. C. HEGELER IN NO. 104 OF "THE OPEN COURT."

BY THE REV. H. H. HIGGINS.

MR. HEGELER sends his courteous reply through the columns of THE OPEN COURT. May I have another say?

"The words 'our heredity from God' are dualistic still." Well, there is dualism and dualism. Monism does not act as a charm, nor dualism as a scarecrow, on all minds alike. But Mr. Powell's "Heredity" is referred to God as primal source, not as external agent. Indictable dualism I take to be non-proven.

"We are phenomena of God."

Quite true, we are so; but not to such eyes as ours. Our outcome is the resultant of conflicting forces invisible to human eyes. We are not *visibly* phenomena of God. "Inevitably this is to be the course of events." Let not my friend be angry and I will speak. Too much like Haeckel in former days.

"The same quantity of life will be in action here."

Conservation of force is one of those exquisite arcana disclosed, as was Artemis, but rendering the hunter liable to inconvenience through his own hounds. The earth has not always had the same *quantity* of heat; and what we do with the heat that we have, on a frosty night, it would not be safe to say.

LIVERPOOL, August, 1889.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE HYPOTHESES OF M. BINET.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

THE recent articles of M. Binet in THE OPEN COURT have been extremely interesting to students of psychology, but it seems to me doubtful if his conclusions will meet with general acceptance. From the beginning distrust is aroused in us by such phrases as "unconscious perception," "unconscious reasoning," etc.; and this distrust is not lessened when we reach his remarks on the hypothesis of animal automatism, as held by Prof. Huxley. Whatever we may think of that hypothesis, it is quite obvious that M. Binet's experiments cannot affect it at all. The hypothesis that consciousness is an "epi-phenomenon" is based on the doctrine of the conservation of energy, and must stand or fall with that. Consciousness may, indeed, accompany the actions of the anæsthetic arm; but the question still remains whether the consciousness is an epiphenomenon, or is a link in the chain of cause and effect. M. Binet thinks that "Huxley's hypothesis is too simple to explain" such complex and purposive actions as those shown by the anæsthetic arm; yet he would hardly hold that these actions are any more complex and purposive than those of normal bodily activity, which Professor Huxley most assuredly regards as "explained" by the hypothesis of animal automatism. If complexity and purposiveness of action could prove that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon, surely M. Binet could have attempted the proof with more confidence from normal bodily actions. At all events the absurdity would have been no greater.

The entire irrelevancy of M. Binet's argument against animal automatism would alone warn us against a hasty acceptance of his hypothesis of the doubling of consciousness in hysterical individuals, and a careful consideration leads us to reject it as unnecessary.

We must, of course, admit that to uncritical thinking the hypothesis seems quite reasonable; for the more prominent phenomena of bodily life teach us to associate consciousness with actions of much complexity. But the consideration of a class of less prominent phenomena shows us that while consciousness *may* accompany complex actions, it is not a *necessary* accompaniment. Omitting detail, it is enough to state that from the simplest to the most complex muscular co-ordinations there are few that are not at times performed unconsciously by the individual under perfect normal circumstances. Moreover, if we survey the entire past of our conscious experience, we see that there has been a gradual and constant withdrawal of consciousness from the more frequently-repeated bodily actions; and we can set no limit to this process but the end of conscious life. Accordingly, there can be no difficulty in conceiving that under abnormal physical conditions complex and purposive actions are automatically performed; and the hypothesis of the doubling of consciousness is altogether unnecessary.

It may, of course, be said that this line of argument begs the question, since the so-called automatic actions of our bodily life may be accompanied by a consciousness, although not the one that calls itself "I." That is to say, as fast as the principal consciousness withdraws from bodily actions, a second, subsidiary consciousness takes its place; so that the total amount of consciousness accompanying bodily movements is at all times the same, and there are absolutely no automatic acts. The entire fruitlessness and superfluity of such an hypothesis scarcely needs pointing out; while it raises more questions than it disposes of. For the hypothetical second consciousness must be in some sort of relation and communication with the first and principal one; and this relation demands explanation. M. Binet meets this difficulty

by a purely verbal explanation, saying that an idea in one consciousness "provokes" a movement in the other, and a sensation in the second "awakens" an idea in the first. As a matter of fact, no explanation is possible, and an hypothesis that brings us face to face with such a mystery must be, *ipso facto*, unnecessary.

Fortunately the value of M. Binet's experiments is not measured by the value of his hypothesis ; and while rejecting the latter, we can heartily thank him for the former.

SARANAC LAKE, N. Y. RICHARD F. SMITH.

WHEELBARROW'S HERESY. A CRITICISM.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

I WOULD fain reproach Wheelbarrow with having "stolen my thunder" in his article on convict labor, were it not for the pleasure it affords me to see that unconsciously he has imbibed the cardinal principles upon which the "George theory" rests and the certainty that, when he has considered the logical conclusions to be shown from his arguments against maintaining convicts in idleness, he will land in the camp of the single-taxers.

Having concluded that it is under-production and not over-production "means hunger to the poor man's child," having imbibed the "industrial heresy," that in order to his happiness the laws of society should be framed so as to make not more work for him but less ; and as it has occurred to him also "that in order to have more food, more clothing, more wages, and less work, I ought to encourage the multiplication of all the comforts of life, and then seek by proper laws a fairer distribution of them, and in that heresy I expect to die."

Brave words these ; but alas, how many subscribe to creeds they fail to endeavor to forward ! Assuming, however, that Wheelbarrow has the courage of his own convictions, I welcome his article on convict labor as I would the letter of a distant friend informing me that he was on his way to join my company.

For, in order to increase the production of the comforts of life, Wheelbarrow must endeavor to work for the removal of all restrictions, fines, or hindrances in the way of producing wealth, he must strive for laws encouraging production and discouraging non-production.

To secure a fairer distribution, he must oppose the taking by non-producers of any portion of the amount produced. He must give to each his own.

In the course of his inquiries into the nature of production he will discover that all these things which he terms comforts and necessities are drawn from the great storehouse of nature. He will see that it is only by labor, acting upon raw material, wealth is produced, and that without access to the raw materials furnished by the earth, labor must cease to exist. He will be forced to admit that the right to live, the right to labor and produce being granted, it also follows that the right to land upon which to labor and to live is self-evident.

God has made man a land-animal incapable of existing elsewhere, and an all-wise intelligence would never have subjected man to certain conditions without at the same time furnishing him the right and the means of compliance.

Man, therefore, has a right to land for use and for no other purpose, that right being as inherent as the right to breathe, and co-equal with the right of every other man. Just as in the exercise of the equal right to the use of the highway one may drive a team, a single horse, or go afoot, as he chooses, but none have the right to obstruct.

To carry out Wheelbarrow's proposition to further production, it is necessary to prevent any man from holding land unused.

This may best be accomplished by that pocket-book test "the single-tax," which will make it unprofitable to hold land unused and yet not increase the burden of taxation with the using.

Wheelbarrow will probably be able to see that a tax upon the products of labor is a fine upon enterprise, is a discourager of use and will marvel at the absurdity of laws that taxes whiskey to discourage its use, that taxes the owners of dogs to limit their number, and then proceeds to tax the builder of houses, the maintainer of factories, the producers of wealth in exactly the proportion that they add to the stock of comforts that Wheelbarrow wishes to have increased. Therefore, in order to carry out his own proposition of multiplying the comforts of life, he will seek by proper laws to remove the fines and discouragements imposed by the taxation of capital and improvements and through them of labor.

While engaged in this investigation, he will perceive that a tax upon the value of land, exclusive of improvements, will lessen the taxes of users, will increase the taxes of non-users, will fall upon no man in a way to discourage or prevent the use of his land or capital, but will compel its use by that most powerful of all levers—self-interest ; and he can see that levied as a tax, determined and regulated by the values of contiguous lands of the same general advantage ; it will permit of no over-bidding or crowding off ; will, while leaving the holder secure in his possession, enjoyment, and use, take for the uses of society the values produced by society, and leave to the individual the values resulting from the exercise and use of his labor, his skill, and his capital.

In conclusion I would point out to Wheelbarrow the inconsistency of objecting to the convicts living in idleness, supported by the labor of honest men and not at the same time protesting against men outside of the prison walls, living in idleness and luxury, drawing their support from the labor of others, because they possess the power to exact tribute from labor for the privilege of drawing from the storehouse of nature the raw materials from which to multiply all the comforts of life.

GLOVERSVILLE, N. Y.

WM. C. WOOD, M.D.

ALL VALUE THE OUTCOME OF SOCIETY.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IN the discussions of the subject of land-tax, one aspect of the matter presents itself to me as full of contradictions. I hope they are only seeming contradictions, and I hope that some one will sometime take the pains, in a word or two, to explain them away and make them clear to me.

Now it is difficult for me to think of reviving again those feudal distinctions between soil and gold, land and personalty, which even the law, conservative as it is, has wholly abolished or recognizes only as fictions. The reason that these distinctions ever arose is this. The old law gave men the power of eternal ownership over land. Each lord was able to control the land, which fell to him by the chances of conquest, into so long a future as feudalism should exist. The "form of the gift" (*formedon*), the words of the lord concerning the disposition and use of such land must be strictly observed *forever*. Such land could not be sold by the possessor nor taken for debt incurred by him, all because of the words of the lord of the land who at the time might be dead and forgotten, except by the law. Personal property, owing to its insignificance, escaped this law. And when in a later age trade arose and personalty became of primary importance, different laws were applied to it. The reason of this difference it is customary to ascribe to the liberal tendencies of a more enlightened age.

However that may be, later ages completely abolished this peculiar estate, which was known in land alone,—*perpetual* estate, we may call it. Tenure the feudal law named it. Now although the name is often employed as useful to support certain collateral incidents, yet the substance is taken entirely away. There is now only one *true* estate known in property. This is essentially the estate of possession or enjoyment. No man can create a perpetuity in

either land or personalty. But he can now create just as long and lasting an estate in money as he can in lands.

Now in what way, I beg to ask, can any moral distinction be made between gold coin, the representative of personalty, and land, the representation of all realty? I must confess, I see more wisdom in the spirit of modern law which, from something considered quite different, has converted them, or rather our *theory* of them, into things essentially alike.

As to the test of communal advantages to be derived from them respectively, I see no difference, excepting such a difference as is in favor of the independence of the land-owner.

What value has gold independent of society? How much of its value springs inherently from the individual ownership, and how much from the fact of the existence of *civilized* fellow men? And after gold, with even more force, may the same query be raised as to the qualities and sources of that value which attaches to all the vast production of the modern industries and trades.

But it is not my intent, following this question to all its ends, to make it an argument against exclusive land-tax. My purpose is fulfilled in suggesting it merely.

ARTHUR R. KIMBALL.

CONCORD, N. H.

MR. CONANT'S CASE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IT seems to me that Mr. J. G. Conant fails totally to understand the principle underlying the single-tax. As I understand it, Mr. Conant's improvements so increased the value of his property that he was taxed out of it, whereas the owners of the unimproved property not only enjoyed the "unearned increment" resulting from his improvements, but enjoyed the benefit of his increased taxes which were his reward for the improvement of his property. Under the single-tax system the reverse condition would have obtained. I am not yet a believer in the single-tax principle, but the injustice done Mr. Conant seems to me a strong argument in its favor.

JAS. G. KIERNAN, M. D.

CHICAGO.

THE LOST MANUSCRIPT.*

BY GUSTAV FREYTAG.

(Concluded.)

CHAPTER XLII.

Early on the morning of the following day a line of carriages left the ranger's lodge; the first was closely curtained—it was the prostrate Sovereign, guarded by his physicians. Before starting, the Hereditary Prince beckoned the Chief Forester to his carriage:

"Is there any other way to Rossau than that by the manor-house through the Bielstein estate?"

"Over the ridge through the wood," replied the Chief Forester; "but it is a roundabout way."

"We will take the road through the wood," commanded the Hereditary Prince. On the way he said to his attendant: "I expect from you, Weidegg, that, should occasion present itself, you will show considerate attention to the people who dwell in that house. I am the son of the sick Sovereign to whom a voice refused reception there. I shall, therefore, never again cross the threshold of that house; and I wish that you never again mention the name of that woman in my presence."

The sad procession passed close by the spot where once the lightning had struck the pine-tree. The carriages moved at a slow pace along the ridge of hills upon the forest-road.

"Drive on ahead," said the Prince; "I will walk a short distance alone."

He stepped to the edge of the hill; the early dawn tinged the dark bushes of heather with a golden green. From that same height, where once a merry party had rested, the Prince looked down on Bielstein, which stood out in the white morning mist, on the roof and balconies of the old house. Long he stood motionless; the bell sounded from the village church through the mountain air; he bent his head till the last echoes of the melancholy tones passed away; then he stretched his hand greetingly towards the manor, turned quickly back, and went along the forest-road.

* * *

The cocks crowed in the farmyard at Bielstein, the sparrows twittered in the vine arbor, and the people were preparing for the day's work. Then Mr. Hummel knocked three times with his ponderous fist at the door of the room in which his daughter slept.

"Get up, eloper," he shouted, "if you still wish to take leave of your forsaken father."

There was a noise in the room and a pattering of slippers, and Laura's head peeped through the opening in the door.

"Father, you are not going to leave us!" she said pleadingly.

"You have left me," replied Mr. Hummel; "we must have a few final words together. Dress yourself properly, and you shall accompany me down the hill. I will wait for you in the hall."

He had to wait some time for his daughter, and paced impatiently up and down, looking at his watch.

Laura glided down the stairs, clung to her father's arm, and stroked his cheeks with her little hand.

"Come into the garden, my little actress," he said; "I must speak to you alone for a few minutes. You have succeeded in eloping, you have gone through the scandal,—in what state of mind are you now?"

"Uneasy, dear father," said Laura, dejectedly. "I know that it was a folly, and Ilse says so too."

"Then it must be so," replied Mr. Hummel, dryly. "What is now to become of you?"

"Whatever you wish, father," said Laura. "Fritz and I are of opinion that we must follow your wishes unconditionally. I have by my folly lost all right of

* Translation copyrighted.

expressing a wish; if I could still venture to make a request," she said, timidly, "I should like to remain here for a short time."

"Then you wish to get rid of your seducer?"

"He is going back to his parents, and we will wait, my father, until he has an appointment at the University: he has prospects."

"Indeed," said Mr. Hummel, shaking his head. "All that would have been very sensible before the elopement; now it is too late. Your banns have been published in church, now, three times."

"The people would not have it otherwise," continued Mr. Hummel. "When it was known that you had eloped, the clergy could not avoid publishing the banns; you had not been long out of the gate when this calamity took place."

Laura stood terrified, and a burning red suffused her cheeks. The bells of the little church by the wood below sounded. Mr. Hummel took a paper out of his pocket.

"Here are those cursed old godmother's gloves; I wish at last to get rid of the trash. Here you have your dowry, I can give you nothing more; put them on quickly, that people may at least observe by your hands that this is a festive day for you. When it comes to the business of the wedding-ring you can easily take them off."

"Father," cried Laura, wringing her hands.

"You could not bear the idea of a wedding-cake," said Mr. Hummel, "so you must do without a wedding-dress, and many other things. These dramatic attitudes would have been very suitable before the elopement, now you must be married without question either immediately, or not all. Do you think that one goes out into the world for a joke?"

"My mother!" exclaimed Laura, and the tears rolled from her eyes.

"You chose to run away from your mother, and if your father, out of consideration for these strangers, had not come, you would have had to do the business alone. You wished to escape from our homely, simple feelings."

Laura laid hold of a tree with trembling hands, and looked imploringly at her father.

"You are not so bold as I thought. Now the timid hare in you comes to light."

Laura threw herself on her father's breast and sobbed; he stroked her curls.

"Little Hummel," he said, kindly, "there must be punishment, and it is not severe; I am satisfied that you should marry him. He is a worthy man; I have observed that; and if it is for your happiness, I shall easily get on with him, but you must not immediately begin to hum and buzz if I sometimes bristle up in my way. I wish, too, that you should marry him to-day, that is now the best course for all parties. You may exercise your bridal feelings later and go through your emotions as you like. Be brave, now, my child, the others are waiting, and we must not delay them. Are you ready?"

Laura wept, but a soft "Yes" was heard.

"Then we will awake the bridegroom," said Mr. Hummel. "I believe the sacrificial lamb sleeps without any foreboding of his fate."

He left his daughter, hastened to the Doctor's door, and looked into the room. Fritz lay fast asleep. Mr. Hummel seized the boots which were standing before the door and bumped them down beside the bed.

"Good morning, Don Juan," he shouted; "have the kindness to get immediately into this leather. These are your bridal boots. My daughter Laura begs you to make haste, and the clergyman is impatient."

The Doctor sprang out of his bed.

"Are you in earnest?" he asked.

"Terribly in earnest," said Hummel.

He did not have to wait long for the Doctor. He entered the garden where Laura was still sitting alone in the bower, uneasy, like an imprisoned bird that does not venture to leave its cage. Mr. Hummel led the Doctor up to her.

"There, you have her," he said solemnly. "It is a fine morning, just like that when I set out as a boy. To-day I send my child into the world, and that is another kind of feeling. I do not object to it if you live happily together, till first your children run away from you into the world, and then the grandchildren: for man is like a bird, he takes pains and collects the bits of straw together for his home, but the young brood do not care for the nest of the parents. Thus the old raven must now sit alone and find few who will be vexed with his croaking. Take my stubborn girl, dear Fritz, and do not let her have too much of her own will. I have watched you for some time, and I will tell you something in confidence: ever since the affair of the cat's-paws it occurred to me, that in the end you would be no bad husband for this Hummel. That you are called Hahn is, after all, only a misfortune." He kissed them both right heartily. "Now come, runaways, for the others are expecting you."

Mr. Hummel walked before his children to the house; he opened the door of the sitting-room where the whole family were assembled. Laura flew to Ilse, and concealed her hot face on the breast of her friend. The latter took the bridal wreath, which her sisters had brought, and placed it on Laura's head. Gabriel opened the door. Years before the Doctor had drawn his friend from the bramble bush against the wall into the church; now he walked into the little village

church hand in hand with his love, and again the children strewed flowers. When the clergymen joined the hands of the bridal pair, Ilse also clasped the hand of her husband.

"The bridal journey you will make alone," said the Professor; "not with us. Ilse and I have determined, after a short rest, to return to the city. I have some months of the vacation still before me which I shall endeavour to make of use to a select circle of students. Among books we shall again find what we lost among strangers,—peace with ourselves, and peace with those about us."

It was about Easter the following year. Mr. Hummel and Gabriel stood dressed in festive black before the door of No. 1, Park Street.

"I was to see her, Gabriel," began Mr. Hummel, confidentially. "I took the money to her this time myself, because you wished it. I inquired concerning her of the people at the Inn and of the neighbors. She behaves with modesty, and her character is greatly changed. Much water, Gabriel," and he pointed to his eyes.

"You were kind to her?" asked Gabriel, faintly.

"As a lamb," replied Mr. Hummel, "and she the same. The room was poor, one picture only hung there without a frame, Gabriel, as a remembrance of her happy position in that house. It was a cock with golden feathers."

Gabriel turned away.

"At last the place became too moist for my dry constitution, but care has been taken of her. She is to be placed in a respectable business as a saleswoman, and as for the illegitimate Knips, the ladies will take care of him. I have spoken with Madame Hummel, and she with the Hahn woman over the way; they will arrange for the charitable collections. But as far as you are concerned, Gabriel, with all respect,—what is too much is too much."

Mr. Hummel respectfully seized Gabriel's waistcoat button, and twisted the averted face as by a screw round to himself. Then he looked into the sad eyes for some time without saying a word, but they both understood each other.

"It was a hard time, it was a mad time, Gabriel, in every point of view," began Mr. Hummel, at last, shaking his head; "what we went through with Princes was no trifle."

"He was very light," said Gabriel, "and I carried him like a feather."

"That is nothing to the purpose," said Mr. Hummel; "the affair was creditable. Just think what it is to have saved a young Sovereign. That few of us can do. For a moment, ambitious thoughts came into my head—that is to say, the Chamberlain, no ill-disposed man and an old acquaintance of ours, sounded me on a delicate point when he last called."

"He also sent for me," interposed Gabriel, with dignity. "Prince Victor had commissioned him to send his respects, and to say that the Prince was to marry the Princess."

"Even this kind of householder becomes domestic," said Mr. Hummel, "that is at least a beginning. Well, the Chamberlain assured me of his Serene Highness's gratitude, made eloquent speeches, and probed me at last with a 'predicate.'* Do you know what that is?"

"Hum," said Gabriel, "if it is something that is given away at that Court it would be like a colored tobacco pouch without any tobacco in it; it must be a title."

"You have hit it," said Mr. Hummel. "What do you think of Sir Court Hat Maker and Householder, Henry Hummel?"

"A swindle," replied Gabriel.

"Right, it was a weakness; but I overcame it at the right time. Then I asked this Chamberlain, 'what would you expect of me'? 'Nothing at all,' he said, 'except that you should carry on a distinguished business!' 'That is the case now,' I said. 'But what hats will they expect me to keep?' For he, who has had experience like mine, becomes suspicious; and look you, Gabriel, then the fraud came out, for what was his idea and expectation? I was in his eyes a man who dealt in straw hats. Then I thanked him for the honor, and turned my back to him."

"But," said Gabriel, "there should be some concession with regard to this matter; we are on good terms now with the people over there; and if you have given your daughter to the family, why not also an article of business?"

"Do not interfere in my affairs," said Mr. Hummel, irritably. "It is bad enough that I, as father, and in a certain degree as neighbor, have been obliged to give up my old grudge. How can one irritate oneself now, when one is obliged to have one's hand pressed here, and to drink family punch under the cursed Muse there? No, I was a weak father, and as a neighbor, an inexcusably fickle man. But, Gabriel, even the worm which is trod upon keeps its sting. And my sting is my business. There the enmity still remains. Every spring, vindictiveness; and every winter, triumph. I have lost my child and made over my money to a coxcomb, but I am still man enough to hold my own against the fellow across the way."

He looked at the empty place on the door-steps, where his dog Spitehahn formerly used to sit.

"I miss him," continued Mr. Hummel, pointing significantly to the ground.

* A title.

"He is gone," said Gabriel.

"He was a dog after my own heart," continued Mr. Hummel, slowly; "and I have an idea. What do you think, Gabriel, if we were to erect a monument to him in the garden. Here near the street; there would only be a low stone and upon it a single word—'Spitehahn.' When the doors stand open one could read it across the street. It would be a memorial of the poor beast, and especially of the good time when one could pluck the feathers of a Hahn without being indicted for infanticide."

"That will not do," replied Gabriel. "What would the son in-law's people over the way say to it?"

"The devil!" exclaimed Mr. Hummel, and turned away.

Yes, Spitehahn had disappeared from the world. Since that hour, when in the dim grey of the morning he had wound round him the golden dress of the deceased Bachhuber like a ruff, he had disappeared. No inquiries and no offers of reward had enabled Mr. Hummel to obtain a trace of him. In vain were the shepherds and laborers of the neighborhood, and even the magistrates of Rossau, set in movement—he had vanished like a spirit. The place on the steps remained empty; the blank which he had left behind in society was filled by a younger race of dogs in Park Street; the neighborhood in every walk along the street felt a satisfaction which they had long been deprived of; the cigar dealer again placed his stand near Mr. Hummel's garden; and the young ladies in white dresses, who went to the Park, gradually gave up the custom of turning away from Mr. Hummel's house, and going over to the straw side. The memory of Spitehahn passed away without regret from any; only with the old inmates of the street the remembrance of him remained as a dark tradition. Gabriel alone thought of the lost one evenings when he saved the bones for miscellaneous dogs of the neighborhood. But he did not wonder at the disappearance of the animal: he had long known that something mysterious must sometime or other happen to him.

There came a confirmation of this view, which furnished food for thought for the rest of Gabriel's life; for when, in the following autumn, he again went in company with his master and mistress to visit the Manor-house of Bielstein, directly upon his arrival he begged permission to have an afternoon's holiday, and, as he often did now, walked alone with his thoughts. He went in the wood, far past the ranger's lodge, amongst large mossy beech-trees, ferns, and bilberries. It was evening, and a grey twilight overtook the wanderer; he was uncertain of his direction, and, somewhat uneasy, sought the road to the house. Thunder rolled in the distance, and sometimes a bright flash of lightning passed over the heavens, and for a moment lighted up the trunks of the trees and the mossy ground. Amid a bright flash he saw himself suddenly on a cross-road; he started back, for a few steps from him a great dark figure was moving across the path, with a broad-brimmed felt hat on his head and a weapon on his shoulder; it glided by noiselessly and without greeting. Gabriel stood astonished; again a flash, and along the same road ran two dogs, a black and a red cur, with huge heads and bristly hair: suddenly the red one stopped and turned towards Gabriel, who saw at the back of the dog a tuft which it wagged. The next moment there was profound darkness, and Gabriel heard at his feet a slight whimpering, and it appeared to him as if something licked his boot. Another slight noise, and then all was still.

The people on the estate maintain that it was a poacher, or the great deer-stealer from the other side of the frontier; but Gabriel knew who the night-hunter was, and what the dog was. He who had before sent the dog to Hummel's house, without money and without name, had also called him away. The hound now barked again in the night, when the storm blew like a hunting-horn, when the clouds flew under the moon, and the trees bent their heads, groaning, to the earth. Then he ran over the hills from Rossau, through the grounds of Bielstein; he howled, and the moon laughed mockingly down on the place in which Tobias Bachhuber had deposited his treasures, and among them the cover of the lost manuscript.

But if no observer could be in doubt as to the fate of the dog, far more uncertain is the judgment of the present day concerning another figure which hovers about the grotto.

What can thy fate be, unfortunate Brother Tobias Bachhuber? Thy conduct towards the manuscript we have been seeking transcends everything one could have expected of a Tobias. It is much to be feared that thy disregard of the highest interests of mankind may have injured thy social position in the other world. Grievous doubts arise, Bachhuber, as to thy heavenly happiness: for the wrong that thou hast done to us would have drawn tears from an angel. To us mortals it is impossible to think of thee with the confidence which thy true-hearted words would impress upon us: *hæc omnia deposui*,—I have deposited all this. That was an untruth, Bachhuber, and the wounds of deceived confidence will always bleed afresh.

Answer my question, Tobias—what views didst thou hold of the unity of the human race? of the bonds of union binding the souls of men of past ages with the souls of men of the present? or of that stupendous net-work, humanity, in which thou wert a mesh? Thy views were pitiable, indeed. Thou didst stuff the great manuscript, the hope of our century, into a bag and thou didst rip out the text when thou foundest the bag

too full, and didst carefully preserve the covers for later generations! For shame, thrice for shame!

And yet, withal, thou didst ever hover restlessly about the cave of the forest, and since Swedish times didst bustle about unceasingly in the rooms of the old house!

Why didst thou do that, Tobias, silly monk? Is 't possible that thou hadst something in store, that thou wast guarding something, for the happiness of those who came after thee, that thou wert, after all, laboring for the unity of mankind that we said thou hadst no conception of?

Yes, a treasure was found. It did not have the appearance that our scholars thought it would, when their glance first rested on the faded letters of thy record. The treasure that both the scholars found, had clenched fists, and dimpled cheeks, and sweet, bright eyes. Their treasure came to them alive, nor was it of the silent kind. Bachhuber, can it be that thou hast frivolously transcended the rules of thy order? Was it thou that set down this treasure in the 'dry hollow place' commonly called a cradle? in the cradles of two homes?

To-day there is a great christening at the Professor's house—a double one. The Professor's son is called Felix, and the Doctor's young daughter Cornelia. Almost at the same time the children resolved to narrow the space of the over-crowded world by their appearance. The sponsors of the boy are Professor Raschke and Mrs. Struvelius; the sponsors of the girl are Professor Struvelius and Mrs. Raschke; but Mr. Hummel is godfather for both, stands in the middle and swings first one, and then the other godchild.

"I am delighted that yours is a boy," he said, to the Professor; "he will be fair and jolly. For womankind is rapidly getting the upper hand, and will soon become too powerful for us; we must strengthen ourselves by an increase, otherwise a complete revolution will take place. I am delighted that yours is a girl," he said, to his daughter; "the creature is dark and bristly; it will be no Hahn, but a Hummel."

The christening is over, and Professor Raschke raises his glass.

There are two new human souls in the kingdom of books, two more scholars' children in our blustering, curious, pedantic, and whimsical community. You children will take your first riding-lessons on your fathers' folios; you will make your first helmet and your first dress from your fathers' proof-sheets: you will regard, earlier than others, with secret terror the books that surround your rosy youth. But we hope that you too will help preserve for a future generation the proud and lofty spirit with which your fathers have dedicated their lives to science, to thought, and to creative activity. You too, be you man or woman, must become the faithful guardians of the ideals of our people. You will find a national spirit that takes a stronger flight and makes higher demands on its intellectual leaders. As we in the present, so you in the future, will often be accorded a smile. But see to it that it be kindly. And see to it that the office that has come to you from your fathers, remain worthy of the people. And see to it that you too shall acquit yourselves as steadfast and honest workers in the fields of Science—true to your faith in the good genius of this our life."

Raschke spoke: and waved his glass.

"Pray, Professor Raschke!" exclaimed Mrs. Struvelius; "you have my glass. My gloves are in it. Do not drink them, I beseech you!"

"True enough," said Raschke, apologetically; and he poured with measured deliberation the wine from the flask on the gloves, to join with great appreciation in the toast he had offered.

But in the dimly, lighted corner, by the book-case, whereon the tiny record of our loved Brother lay, appeared the humble figure of Bachhuber,—Tobias Bachhuber, observed by no one—in the resemblance of a nurse. He greeted, and graciously bowed his thanks.

When the friends had departed, Ilse sat on the sofa, the child before her in her lap. Felix knelt at her side, and both looked down upon the young life between them.

"It is so small, Felix," said Ilse; "and yet all that was and all that is, does not make the mother so happy as the soft beating of the little heart in its breast."

"Restlessly the thinking mind struggles after the eternal," exclaimed the Scholar; "but he who holds wife and child to his heart, feels forevermore united in holy peace with the high power of life."

The cradle rocked, as if moved by spirit hands. Thus does the treasure look, blessed Bachhuber, that thy active hand has helped bestow upon a future race. Thou hast not acted well by us. Thou hast done us wrong. But when we think how studiously active thou wast, in the old manor-house and elsewhere, to perform, to the glory of coming generations, the kindly offices of a match-maker, we cannot be angry with thee or this solemn, festive occasion. All in all, we must say thou wert an unfortunate, ill-starred fellow, and hast been the cause of much trouble. But thy heart was kind. And after all, Tobias, thou hast been taken up into heaven—with a question-mark it is true: for thou shalt ever wear on the back of thy celestial cowl a tag of Satan's making—a mark for all future time of thy dealings with the lost manuscript of Tacitus.

[THE END.]

COPERNICUS.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

"Impeaching self-conceit in men
Who put their confidence alone
In what they call the Seen and Known."
—J. R. LOWELL.

"Certain men, either from a love of novelty, or to make a display of ingenuity, have concluded that the earth moves."
—MELANCHTHON.

For self-conceit this Kopernik may well
Pass number one. Our modern vanity
Can hardly give its facts a pedigree
Before the Church adopts them all pell-mell.

The Pope proclaimed this man an infidel;
Luther said "upstart fool whose heresy
Reversed the science of astronomy;"
And mild Melanchthon damned his soul to hell.

Let us be friends; bad names will never bring
The peace on earth whose tidings angels bore
When Christ had come to keep the promising.

For His sweet sake forbid the lips that pour
Contempt and calumny on that sad thing
The self-conceit of two and two make four.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A HOPELESS CASE. A Remarkable Experience of an Unromantic Individual with a Romantic Name. *Luther H. Bickford.* Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.

The scheme upon which this tale is founded is not new. It is a Dr.-Jekyll-and-Mr.-Hyde adaptation of an idea now curren among theosophical spiritualists, which proposes to explain psychological phenomena of doubtful genuineness by postulating a dual personality; the part that does the legerdemain is called the 'astral self,' the part that pays admission and stands the strain is called the 'pragmatic counterpart.' Such charlatan hypotheses when made the *motif* of a piece of literary art and when executed with genius and tact, may be made to convey truths of deep psychological import. But genius is necessary, and although the author of "A Hopeless Case" has written a readable story, to that gift of the gods we hardly believe he will pretend.

Kœhler who is the centre of astral disturbance in the story, is rescued by the hero, Leslie Marlton, while taking a day's outing on a steamboat. Kœhler is an uncouth genius; his expressions of gratitude toward his rescuer are so profuse and overwhelming that the latter is tempted almost to do with his own hands the deed that the waves left undone. Returning home, the hero, who is an actor, appears in a difficult rôle. Entering on the stage he finds himself, to his unutterable misery, literally transformed into the part he acts: his success is unprecedented, the applause tremendous; the secret of the thing being that Kœhler whom he sees sitting in the audience has mesmerized him. That night, in bed, he dreams that, irresistibly lured to the scene of action by his friend, he robs a bank; but he awakes to find himself snugly under the covers. On the morrow he is arrested; it turning out that it was his 'astral self' that robbed the bank, while his poor 'pragmatic counterpart,' which was actually his responsible living self, had been all the time a-bed. Nevertheless, the 'pragmatic counterpart' was the part that was indicted and was the part that would have paid the penalty, had not the lawyer for the defence found Kœhler, and mesmerizing in turn this arch-mesmerizer, forced him to confess. Kœhler afterwards writes a letter, in which his methods are explained—rather lamely it must be confessed.

The little volume contains various criticisms upon questions of the day. It is cheap and transportable. *μκρκ.*

Count Tolstoi, it is said, has volunteered to translate Dr. Alice B. Stockham's valuable work, "Tokology, A Book for Every Woman," into Russian, and the Baroness Grippenberg, likewise, to put it into Swedish. (Chicago: A. B. Stockham & Co.)

Mr. Joseph Henry Crooker's new book, "Jesus Brought Back," (A. C. McClurg & Co.), has met with considerable success. "His work will do wonderful good," says *Public Opinion*, "to "those who thoughtlessly neglect the character of Jesus because of "prejudice against theology and would help sweeten many of the "more conservative views of the Redeemer of the world." In the early fall, George H. Ellis, of Boston, will publish another work by Mr. Crooker entitled, "Problems in American Society."

In "The Glory of Infidelity," (Putnam & MacDonald, San Francisco), Mr. Samuel P. Putnam starting from the etymology of the word "infidel" draws, in a sharp and pointed style, a humorous contrast between the man of orthodoxy and the man of infidelity—much to the discomfiture of the former. Mr. Putnam puts the names of Lucretius, Lessing, Shakespeare, Shelley, Whitman, Wagner, in the category of protest, of infidelity; saying: "The true Infidel is he who accepts no finality. He will always "inquire, for he will always believe that there is a new and better "way. Infidelity, therefore, is not a passing phase of humanity, "but a permanent necessity. There must be eternal search and "eternal questioning. We cannot be wound up like a clock and "set a-going right every morning, however nice such an operation "might be. We must guess our way and forever make mistakes "and forever rectify with new and vaster outlooks."

"Evolution and Special Creation," a pamphlet by Mr. Charles Watts (Toronto: *The Secular Pub. Co.*) examines: 1. What is Evolution; 2. The Formation of Worlds; 3. The Beginning of Life on Earth; 4. Origin of Man; 5. Diversity of Living Things; 6. Psychical Powers; 7. Future of Man on Earth. Speaking of the human evolution of the future, Mr. Watts says: "It is no longer "a contest between physical powers, but between physical and "mental. No higher physical development is likely to occur, be-"cause it would not meet the case, since, however perfect it "might be, it could not hold its own in the struggle for existence "against man with his intellect. The development in the future "must be one of mind, not of body. We do not, consequently, "look forward to the time when organized beings, higher and more "perfect physically than man, shall take his place on the earth; "but we do believe that a period will arrive when the intellectual "powers shall be refined, expanded, and exalted beyond anything "of which at present we can have any conception."

NOTES.

Of the death of Horace Seaver, the late editor of the Boston *Investigator*, we learn with sincere regret. Mr. Seaver died at the age of 79. His long life was one of active and enthusiastic labor.

It may be of interest to those of our readers who devote their leisure to the study of popular traditions, to learn that the German periodical *Am Urds-Brunnen*, has begun a new series, with altered name and an extended program. The present title of this little monthly magazine of folk-lore is *Am Ur-Quell*. Originally founded to collect and collate, with a view to scientific solution, the songs, traditions, legends, customs, and sayings of the German people, the attention it evoked and support it received at home and abroad induced its editors to extend the scope of its activity, and it now counts among its contributors the foremost specialists of the fatherland and has become a worthy representative of the modern folk-lore movement. The present title was suggested by the words of Dr. Friedrich Krauss, the eminent scholar, that "popular lore was a nation's perpetual fountain of youth." (Ed., H. Carstens, Dahrenwurth bei Lunden, Ger.)

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Nation The	3.00	4.70
Nature (New York and London)	6.00	7.15
North American Review	5.00	6.00
Popular Science Monthly	5.00	6.00
Science	3.50	4.80
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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

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SUPERSTITION IN AMERICAN LIFE.

BY L. J. VANCE.

It can hardly be said that the Americans are not a superstitious people. Happily, those modes of thought which cherished magic, witchcraft, sorcery, and prodigies of various kinds have more or less passed away. Our people as a rule never, for a moment, think of ascribing occult phenomena and mysterious happenings to supernatural agency. With the exception of a deep-set repugnance to Friday, to sitting thirteen at table, and the like, there are no general superstitions from Maine to California. Thus, we of to-day boast—and boast not without a show of reason—of having a much clearer mental vision than our forefathers had. No doubt, we *are* wise in our generation, nevertheless our *pond* is haunted all the same. For, as it has been well said, it were as easy to pluck the comet out of the sky by the tail, as to eradicate superstition from the mind of man.

The plain truth is, that every one of us is superstitious in a certain way, if you but scratch us deep enough. Indeed, some of our people, some of our folk are still superstitious without scratching. Here we are boasting that the dark superstitions of the Middle Ages have vanished, and yet, while writing I read an extended account of a clear case of witchcraft in Illinois. A young German girl was declared by her neighbors and parish pastor to be bewitched, and sticking pins into her body was the means taken to exorcise the evil spirit, the consequence being that the girl suffered terrible injuries from which she was expected to die. Every now and again the more cultured are thunderstruck at the grotesque fancies and forms which still float in the brains of the unthinking and unprogressive folk. Faith in supernatural cures are believed in, signs and omens are followed, divination is daily practiced, charms have their magical value, houses are haunted, and persons claim the power of bringing up the spirits of the dead at their own sweet will and pleasure.

Now it has become a matter of some scientific importance to understand how, and whence, and why came those superstitious beliefs and usages which are *in* our day, but not *of* it. In other words, what is the antecedent history of those crude notions and irrational practices, survivals of which are found, in one shape or another, in our midst? Broadly speaking, Folk-lore is a study of intellectual survivals. By applying the comparative method, the folk-lorist seeks to ascertain what characteristics any particular superstition and story has in common with similar ones found in a different locality and among different peoples. The student of folk-lore soon finds among the folk many survivals of primitive belief, just as the physician finds in use among his patients the remedies prescribed by Pliny. Indeed, he only need read newspaper reports of fortune-telling and of spirit-painting, to find primitive ideas still flourishing in our midst; to find the Irish or German maid-servant and the keen-witted lawyer alike persisting in the belief that wise women can foretell fortune, that invisible artists can paint fine pictures.

Thus, it is often asked, why are horse-shoes nailed to the mast-head or hung over the door-way? Why do people carry wish-bones, and the like, "for luck"? Why do men and women put potatoes, etc., in their pockets to ward off disease? Why do the country-folk which plant, and sow, and reap, go entirely by the moon's quarterings? Why is a group of stars called the Bear, or the Swan, or named after the fair daughters of Atlas, the Pleiades? This last question was particularly puzzling to the late Artemus Ward. "What beats me about the stars," he used to say in his quaint way, "is how we come to know their names." Of course, the savage who figures the individual stars as animals or human beings, could have settled all Prof. Ward's doubts with more surety than could the modern astronomer who retains the queer names for zodiacal signs.

Admitting, then, that superstition is even now an important element in American life, we will briefly indicate the manifest sources from which the folk-lore of our people has been more or less derived. In this inquiry we leave out of consideration the mass of Indian myths and legends.

Now, in the case of the American people, the superstitious element can be largely traced to their heterogenous composition. The American nation is compounded of the blood of many different races. The settlers and emigrants to this country brought along with them not only their clothes, but what Professor Teufelsdröckh would call their Clothes-Philosophy.

That is to say, they brought over superstitious beliefs and usages, many of which are still retained in rude enough shape by their descendants. Thus, the great Puritan exodus occurred at a time when witchcraft flourished in England, and the result was that the New England settlers brought to this country the seeds of a superstition which later on burst with fearful vigor in Massachusetts. Speaking of the great body of slaves that came to the United States, McMaster says that "they were still as ignorant, as superstitious, as devoted worshippers of stocks and stones, as their most remote ancestors," who ran wild on the river Gambia.* Again, according to a writer in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, the Pennsylvania Germans in the country "adhere to many curious customs and manners with great tenacity. A common response when questioned in regard to this is, "As my fathers did, so I do." (*Wi der fáder gedú hot, so du ich d.*)

In addition to the lore conserved by inheritance and by tradition, superstition in American life can be traced to another source. First of all, we may mention those items of superstition, or traditionary lore, which spring from ignorance, whereby the folk explain natural causes by supernatural agencies. For, as Mr. Buckle has argued, "if we compare the different classes of society, we shall find that they are superstitious in proportion as the phenomena with which they are brought in contact, have or have not been explained by natural laws." Indeed, it does not need much argument to show that superstition thrives best where churches, and railroads, and schoolhouses are few and far between. In this respect there is a line of demarcation between city and country; not that the city people are not superstitious—for they are—but country folk, *i. e.*, folk in secluded or remote regions, are rather prone to ascribe to supernatural agency what is uncanny, mysterious, and bewildering. And, I venture to think that there are few "backwoods"-districts in the United States that can not lay rightful claim to some item of superstition or traditionary lore.

Such, then, are some of the principal sources of superstition as existing to-day in our different states, bearing in mind what has already been said, a few examples more or less known, may be given to show that superstition is still an interesting element in American life.

The first case is curious; we refer to the pretty and touching practice, which prevails in some of the states, of telling the bees of a death in the family. According to De Gubernatis, the practice dates back to antiquity when honey or bees-wax was sprinkled over the tomb as a symbol of death and immortality.† Farrer, in his "Primitive Manners and Customs," has collected and grouped together a number of examples of this same custom, which, as he says, prevails with local modifications, in the English counties, and very widely over the continent.* Thus, in Lithuania when the master or the mistress of the house dies, it is considered necessary to give notice of the fact to the bees. In some parts of Germany this notice is put into this form of rhyme:

> "Bienchen, unser Herr is todt,
> Verlass mich nicht in meiner Noth."

In Normandy and Brittany the bees are not only informed of a death in the family, but the hives are decorated with crape. In some parts of France the informant taps thrice on the hives, repeating this formula: *Petites abeilles, votre maîtresse est morte.* Several very interesting examples of the custom in England are given by correspondents in English *Notes and Queries*. One correspondent says that in Devon, besides telling the bees, the folk usually put some wine and honey before the hives.† Another says that in Suffolk the bees are asked to the funeral, and that, if this compliment is omitted, the bees will die or will take their departure. A third correspondent, the late J. G. Wood, writes that the custom is in full force in Ashborne, Derbyshire, Wilts, and one or two other places. He says: "Three taps are made on the hives with the house-key, while the informant repeats: "Bees, bees, bees, your master is dead, and you must work for—," naming the future owner. A piece of black crape is then fastened to the hive.‡ He adds that "the bees always expect" to be informed also of the weddings in the family.

Where do we find similar superstitions about the bees surviving in the States? In *Scribner's Monthly* for May, 1879, the well-known writer and naturalist, Mr. John Burroughs, tells about finding the superstition in New York. His account does not vary much from those already given above. Mr. Drake in his "New England Legends," notes the same custom.§ Again, several contributors to the *American Notes and Queries* have recently added their testimony to the prevalence of the superstition in the several states. One correspondent thus briefly writes: "In Lewis county, N. Y., a farmer's wife died, and the husband immediately informed the bees of the event in order that they would not also die.‖ Finally, we cannot leave the subject without a few lines from one of Whittier's "Home Ballads," wherein the superstition is thus finely touched:

> "Before them, under the garden-wall
> Forward aod back,
> Went drearily singing the chore-girl small,
> Draping each hive with a shred of black.

* McMaster, "History of the People of the United States," Vol II, p. 18.
† Zoölogical Mythology," Vol. II, p. 218.

* Page 281.
† Vol. V, p. 148.
‡ O. S., Vol. IV, p. 308.
§ Page 314.
‖ Vol. I, p. 312, also Vol. II, pp. 238, 274.

"Trembling, I listened; the summer sun
Had a chill of snow,
For I knew she was telling the bees of one
Gone to the journey we all must go!"

The survival of some superstitions in American life can only be accounted for on Hudibras's theory that, "the pleasure is as great of being cheated as to cheat." As an illustration, we may mention the faith in the divining-rod, which prevails all over the United States. Primitive magicians invested the forked stick with supernatural power, and their credulous followers have, down to the present day, pinned their faith therein. Thus, Mr. Lenormant in his "Chaldean Magic," mentions the divining-rods used by the Magi, and says that divination by wands was "even the most ancient mode of divination used in the time of the Accadians. Among the Hindus and other nations of antiquity magic sticks were in use, and it is from the Greeks that we get our word "rhabdomancy." The practice still survives among the Chinese who use a branch of the peach-tree as a form of *planchette*. It would seem that the use of the divining-rod in historical antiquity was chiefly moral; that is, it was employed to decide future events, to advise courses of action, to detect guilt, etc.* Then came the alchemists and mediæval philosophers who speculated deeply on the use of the divining-rod as a means of discovering hidden treasure or precious ore.† During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the rod was in pretty general use all over the continent. In England the problem of the rod actually came up before the Royal Society of London, in 1666, and it "became the playing ground of the Cartesian and other philosophers." Swift refers to it in his "Virtues of Sid Hamet, the Magician's Rod," while in Sheppard's "Epigrams," we read:

"Some sorcerers do boast they have a rod,
Gathered with vows and sacrifice,
And borne about will strangely nod
To hidden treasure where it lies."

Indeed, the notion still prevails in many parts of England that secret mines and springs of water can be discovered by the craft of old Dick Dousterswivel, described by Sir Walter Scott in the "Antiquary."‡ Mr. Lang says that it is habitually used by the Cornish miners to discover seams of ore.

Tracing the antecedent history of the rod in this country, it would seem that the 'twig' was very early employed to find water by the New England settlers. One of the first recorded accounts of the working of the rod may be found in the *American Journal of Science*,* in a letter to the Editor, dated at Norfolk, Conn., and signed by Ralph Emerson. The writer says that a Rev. Mr. Steele of Bloomfield, N. Y., "worked the twig," so that it "often withed down from an elevation of 45° to a perpendicular over particular spots, and when we passed them it assumed its former elevation." To those who are unfamiliar with the use of the divining-rod we would say, that a forked branch of witch-hazel or peach is selected always in the shape of the letter Y. The branches are grasped at the ends by the hands with the palms turned upwards, the ends of the branches being between the thumb and forefinger, and the stem or shank of the rod being horizontal. In this manner the operator with his elbows bent and the forearm at right angles, walks over the ground, and the forked twig is said to move or turn, according as there is or is not a mineral vein, spring, etc., beneath the surface.

The *rationale* of the whole maneuvre has been set forth by many curious experimenters, but perhaps not more clearly than by a clear-headed writer in an early number of *Silliman's Journal*, to which we would refer the inquiring reader.† A very good account of "the adventures of an old rodsman" may be found in the *Democratic Review* for March 1850. There the writer says that "since the discovery of mines in California, a Spanish gentleman in the city of New York has advertised for sale to the adventurers, a mineral rod, which will direct them to the richest deposits, and by which he has made his own fortune. In proof of their undoubted excellence he also published the certificates of several men of science." Coming down to recent times, Professor Rossiter W. Raymond records how he encountered in Southern Colorado, a few years ago, a party of capitalists, who were accompanied by an expert, whose purpose was to discover a mine by the use of the rod. It is also said that the Central Pacific and Southern Railroad Companies employed the rod successfully in the discovery of water, and located by this means their artesian wells in the desert. Within the past ten years a large number of oil wells in Pennsylvania have been bored at places pointed out by the so-called "oil-smellers." Only last summer I ran across a curious specimen of the Dousterswivel order in Central New York. He had been more or less successful in finding water, but at this time he was engaged in searching out gas-wells. One morning I went out with this expert, and I will not soon forget the antics he went through in trying to satisfy me that he was all that he claimed to be. A short time ago the following item appeared in the Canandaigua *Times*, relating to this same rodsman:

*The "Divining-Rod," by R. W. Raymond in *Journal of Franklin Inst.* for 1885.

† The number of tracts or treatises on the divining-rod is something enormous. The best summary of the subject is given by M. Chevreul in his "*La Bagnette Divinatoire*, Paris, 1853; in English by Baring Gould, in "Curious Myths of the Middle Ages."

‡ See Rev. Thisleton Dyer's "English Folk-Lore," p. 178.

* Vol. III, p. 102.

† See *Silliman's Journal*, Vol. II, p. 201, et seqq.

"Our citizens have had but little faith in J—— C—— and his divining rod, but now that he has been successful in locating two good paying gas-wells in this county, they may be disposed to give him more credit."

But to conclude: The amount of faith in the divining-rod among our people is surprising. Speaking incidentally of the subject, a writer in *Harper's* * recently made the remarkable assertion, that "almost every county in every state of the Union has its professional adept at divination, at best so far as the discovery of hidden well-springs is concerned, and our mining districts of the West are prolific in these modern soothsayers who claim to be in familiar communication with subterranean stores of wealth, and stand ready to betray the confidence for a consideration."

By way of ending this brief sketch of superstition in American life, a few examples of some curious intellectual survival may here be given. As an illustration, we notice the superstitious notions, which, in one form or another, have clustered round the moon. Mr. Farrer argues that the moon's changes are more remarkable than any of the sun's, "and hence are held in popular fancy nearly everywhere, to cause, portend, or accord with changes in the lot of mortals, and all things terrestrial."† If this argument be sound—and it is—then, "the moon's wane makes everything on earth to wane; when it is new or full is everywhere the proper season for new crops to be sown." Such, indeed, we find to be the case, from the Harvey Islanders who plant cocoa-nuts in the full of the moon to the English husbandman who sows his peas and beans in the wane of the moon, in the full belief that with the rise of the planet they, too, will rise and wax strong. According to Rev. Mr. Dyer in his recent book on the "Folk-lore of Plants," the advice given by Tusser in his "Five Hundred Points of Husbandry," is not a forgotten event in England at the present day:—

"Sow peas and beans in the wane of the moon,
Who soweth them sooner, he soweth too soon,
That they with the planet may rest and rise,
And flourish with bearing, most plentiful-wise."

The same writer says that in Devonshire apples "shrump up" if picked during the waning moon.

This belief in the moon's changes is found in many parts of the United States. Dr. Hoffman in the *Journal of American Folk-lore* ‡ has recently pointed out that, among the Pennsylvania Germans, potatoes are planted in the new moon; that peas, beans, and other plants grow as the vines are planted when the 'horns' of the moon are turned up, so that they may grow up vigorously; that wheat must not be cut before full moon as it will not be fully ripe; that hogs should be slaughtered during the waxing of the moon, otherwise the meat would shrink. Dr. Hoffman also refers to another notion in vogue to the effect, that fence-posts should be made when the horns of the moon are up, or else they will sink and soon rot away. I recently came across the same notion in Ulster county, N. Y., where some farmers still hold that posts set in the earth in the old of the moon will not be affected by frosts. In Yates county, N. Y., it is claimed that pork will "shrump in the pot" if killed in the wane of the moon, and in the same locality I found the notion that peas will not pod in 'the old of the moon,' or else will be very small and withered-looking. Again, in the "Lincoln Life," now running through the *Century* magazine, the authors say that, in the early days in Illinois, "the magical influences of the moon were wide in its influences, and extended to the most minute details of life."* Finally, in the last number of the *Journal of American Folk-lore*, a writer mentions the same superstition as in full currency among the mountaineers of North Carolina. He says that "crops of corn must be planted with a growing moon, but shingles must be nailed on the roof when the moon is on the wane, as otherwise they will warp upwards at the edges."

I need only allude to the common notion that considers it unlucky not to have a piece of silver money in one's pocket when one first sees the new moon. In one part of New York state I found that the way to avert this ill-omen was to turn head over heels, the same as is done by the Yorkshire peasant. Mr. Henderson † quotes the case of a maid-servant in the North of England, who was in the habit of closing the shutters so that she would not see the new moon. This is substantially the same superstition that Mr. Mooney noticed in North Carolina, where "it is a bad omen to see the new moon through bushes or the branches of a tree." A correspondent of the New York *Times* records finding several of these old-time superstitions among the Gloucester farmers in Rhode Island.‡ He says that all the planting is done by the signs of the zodiac, and that much of the work is done only during the full of the moon. "Even a tooth must not be pulled unless the moon is right; if it is, it will come out hard and cause great suffering." There are also various love-omens and divinations derived from the moon's phases, but of these space forbids mention. There is a theory that insane persons are influenced by the moon. For example, when

"She comes nearer to earth than she was wont,
And makes men mad."

Dr. Forbes Winslow says that an intelligent lady, who, for many years, was in his establishment, told him, that she observed among feminine patients a

* Vol. LXX, p. 912.
† "Primitive Manners and Customs," p. 74.
‡ For September 1888.

* The *Century* for November 1886.
† Folk-lore of Northern Counties.
‡ April 6th, 1889.

greater violence and agitation when the moon was at its full.*

In folk-medicine the moon has played a more or less important part. Mr. Tyler, in his "Primitive Culture," humorously remarks that the Lithuanian precept to wean boys on a waxing, but girls on a waning moon, is a fair match for the Orkney islanders' objection to marrying except with a growing moon. In some parts of the United States the "yarb doctor" gathers his roots only under certain changes of the moon, after which they possess remarkable curative properties.

Indeed, the magical virtues which are supposed to reside in certain plants would form an interesting article of itself. But just why a stolen potato carried in the pocket should be good for rheumatism is hard to tell. In Scotland it was considered lucky to carry a piece of torch-fir, just as Mr. Conway noticed in the gold mines of California that the miners tipped a cone with the first gold they discovered, "just for luck." The American belief in charms shows how hard it is to rid the human brain of inherited notions.

The truth is, that the mediæval leech or doctor is still with us. A stone with a hole in it, hung at the head of the bed, is still good for nightmare. The application of the dock-leaf with its old familiar formula of

> "Nettle out, dock in—
> Dock remove the nettle sting."

is still a well-known cure among our folk. To eat the first Easter-daisy that can be found, is considered a valuable specific. A piece of the rope by which some criminal had been hanged is cure for aches, especially about the head. A ring made, or piece of wood, from a coffin is still a sure relief for cramps. The common fennel is said to give increased bodily vigor, and as such is alluded to by Longfellow in his "Goblet of Life." To cure whooping-cough administer milk stolen from a neighbor's cow. In Berks County, Penn., the cure for bronchitis is to make a gimlet-hole in the door-frame at the exact height of the patient's head into which insert a small tuft of his hair and close the hole with a peg of wood. As the patient grows in height beyond the peg, so will the disease be outgrown.† The writer remembers being told once, while a child, that a piece of stolen meat rubbed on his warts, and then buried, would cause the warts to disappear. Although an immense mass of superstition has been interwoven with folk-medicine, still there are at times some inherent medicinal properties in the remedies so confidently prescribed.

Granted, then, that the strength of superstition is only equalled by its lasting power, by its persistence from generation to generation, we can only ask with Herr Teufelsdröckh, "What specially is natural supernaturalism?" The wisest of us will admit that the mysteries in nature and in man are as truly miraculous to us, as—to use Teufelsdröckh's simile—the artificial formation of an icicle was to that Dutch king of Siam. But the difference between the old and the new supernaturalism can hardly be mistaken, for it is this: While the old mystics and magicians boasted of having the power of performing the miraculous, we of to-day recognize the absurdity of attempting to use spiritual and material forces of which we know nothing. The scientific spirit of the age, the *Zeitgeist*, has begun its work of weakening men's faith in those superstitions that sin against pure logic. That so many dark places remain in this machine-made world, and in this machine-made man, shows how far we are from perfect illumination. "Meantime," says Emerson, "far be from me the impatience which cannot brook the supernatural; far be from me the best of explaining away all which appears to the imagination. Willingly I too say Hail! to the unknown, the awful powers which transcend the ken of the understanding."

* A keeper on Ward's Island, New York City, says that he has long observed the same phenomenon.

† *Journal Am. Folk-Lore*, Vol. II, p. 29.

RETROGRESSION IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE LIFE.*

BY AUGUST WEISMANN.

II.

How deeply the processes of retrograde growth from non-use enter into the history of the evolution of species, can not be better illustrated than by the case of the parasite.

In very many animal-groups there are single genera or whole families, and whole classes even, that live upon the blood or secretions of other animals, without killing them as beasts of prey do. They are parasites. Some visit their unwilling host only on occasions, as when they suffer hunger, and leave him when satiated; others have their permanent abode upon or within the animal and do not leave it until death. The parasites are especially numerous in the large class of Worms, but they appear almost as frequently in another and still larger class of animals, namely, that of the Crabs or Crustaceans. Most species of crustaceans swim or run at large in the water, especially in the ocean, and nourish themselves partly from plants and partly from living or dead animals. In almost all species of crustaceans parasites are to be found, and they show us with striking clearness the effects of the inactivity attendant upon parasitic life.

One need but visit the fish-market of any sea-port town, and closely examine the larger fishes; there will not infrequently be found, clinging fast to their bodies, articulate animals, about an inch in length and bearing a certain resemblance to the cellar-worm or common

* Translated from the German by μκρκ.

wood-louse.* They are the so-called "fish-lice" (*Cymothoa*) that nourish themselves from the blood of fishes. They do not belong to the class that takes up a permanent abode on the animal, but from time to time they leave their host to search for another.

They show plainly the effects of parasitism. Their legs are short; inasmuch as they are no longer used for swimming, but chiefly for clinging fast. Their organs of sense, too, have suffered to some extent a retrogression of growth, since a parasite has very little use for them. A crab, that lives by preying on other animals, must be able, of course, to discover his prey at a distance, and for this purpose needs good eyes and such fine organs of perception as it has in its feelers; a parasite, however, when once firmly fastened to its host, does not forsake him so easily again, and if he does, soon finds another, for fishes generally live together in schools. Consequently the eyes and feelers of these fish-parasites are small and inconsiderable.

Yet this is only the first stage of retrogression of growth, which, as the parasite becomes more and more settled, proceeds still farther. To the same order of Crustaceans, namely, the Isopods, belong the various species of internal parasites that infest the inner parts of other crustaceans and especially the pungar. They do not change their host; in fact, they do not move from their position within him; on the contrary, where once settled they remain during their whole life-time. Buried in the liver of their entertainer, they absorb the juices of his body, grow to an immense size, produce thousands and thousands of eggs, and at last die. It is evident that such a mode of life brings many organs into disuse, which were necessary to their progenitors in their unconfined life in the ocean, and in such organs a retrogression of growth will have set in. In reality, this retrograde process has been so marked in their case that the whole structure of the animal has thereby been changed to the extent that it is difficult to discover in this internal parasite any kinship at all with the crab. The characteristic division of the body into rings and segments has totally disappeared, and in place of the hard armour of shell a thin, soft tegument is come. The body has also lengthened, becoming worm-shaped; has acquired peculiar pointed appendages for the preservation of deposits of eggs, and has become colorless, as is the case with all animals that live in the dark. All these changes are intelligible. The segmentation of the body in the crustacean produces flexibility, and its frame of hard skin serves as a base of attachment for the muscles. So, too, the eyes and feelers are wholly missing. The animal lives in the dark and therefore has no occasion to see, and there is furthermore nothing to touch or perceive after it has once firmly buried itself. All the parts of the mouth, the jaws, which are so well developed in the other Isopods, have disappeared without leaving a trace of their previous existence; likewise their legs, of which this same animal living in freedom possess 14 anterior and 12 posterior pairs. Not less reduced are the internal organs, with the single exception of the ovaries, which have been enormously enlarged, so that one might almost believe the animal was nothing but an egg depository.

It will perhaps be asked whence we know that this peculiar worm-shaped animal is a Crustacean and further an Isopod. We answer that we know of a number of other parasite Isopods in which the retrogression has not been so complete as in this case and which form an approximately connected line of transition from the fish-parasite to our internal parasite. The descent of the internal parasite from the free-swimming Isopod is still more definitively proven by the fact that its young are *always complete* specimens, having eyes and feelers, articulated bodies, jaws, and many pairs of legs; in short formed in all essential parts like the fish-parasites. These young internal parasites live also at large. They *must* live so unless their species is to become extinct; for how is the female of an internal parasite to get from its original host to another, if it has no means of locomotion? And then the species must always be able to find new subjects to live on, the old ones dying in time. The young internal parasite leave their mother in the perfect form of their species, work their way out of their host, the pungar, and swim at large in the sea until they have found another pungar into which to bore themselves; in quick succession now are all the steps of retrograde growth completed until that peculiar worm-shaped creature is reached that we first observed.

Of course, such a complete degeneration was not attained at once, but only in the course of countless generations and numerous species. The first parasitic forms undoubtedly lived as the fish-parasites of to-day, on the outside of their hosts' skin; then came those that buried themselves in the cavities of the body, in the respiratory or intestinal cavity. Here the retrograde action of physical change must have been greater, and must have continued to increase in proportion as the parasite sank deeper into the internal organs.

This internal parasite is not the most extreme case of retrogression found among crustacean parasites. There are species that have lost not only legs, feelers, eyes, and the segementation of the body, but even their head, the stomach, intestines, and the aperture of the mouth; their sustenance is absorbed through peculiar, root-like conduits, which suck in the blood

* *Oniscus scaber; Oniscus asellus.*

of the host and nourish the parasite directly, without the action of digestion. The instance given, however, suffices to show what radical transmutations the non-exercise of parts of a body can effect in the whole organism.

If these illustrations have convinced us that the non-exercise of an organ is always accompanied by its gradual and, after many generations, complete disappearance, we might be led to assume that this disappearance was *the direct consequence of non-use*, and that the retrogression of growth had been caused immediately by the cessation of its activity. In fact, it has hitherto been understood so, and at first sight the notion seems quite admissible, indeed, probable.

Now it is an universally accepted, although not accurately investigated fact, that organs that are used a great deal, become strong and powerful, that those that have little or no exercise grow small and weak. By constant practice on the horizontal bar we cause the muscles of the arms to become much larger and more powerful than they were before, and *vice versa* they become weakened by never having been vigorously exercised. Circus performers show us what wonderful muscular development and power can be acquired by practice, while the many trades and professions that necessitate sedentary and inactive habits plainly show the enervating effects of lack of exercise. Still more positive is the following experiment, that when the nerves of a muscle are severed, the muscle wastes away, the possibility of regular exercise being then excluded; and that when the nerves of a gland are cut, the gland ceases to perform its functions and it too wastes away. We may state, as a general proposition, that an organ is strengthened by its normal activity and weakened by a continuing inactivity. How this comes to pass, need not be discussed here, in fact, it has not yet been completely explained. It suffices to know that it is so.

If we may now assume as certain that the non-use of an organ during the course of individual life leads to a retrogression of growth, what is more natural than to explain the gradual disappearance of organs no longer in use, proceeding through generations of a species, by the assumption that the retrogressive effects of non-use are transmitted from one generation to another, grow greater in this way and finally lead to a complete removal of the part in question? Although the effects of non-use during the course of an individual life be inconsiderable, yet in the course of generations they would necessarily accumulate, the organ would necessarily recede more and more from its state of perfection and would become smaller and weaker until at last nothing were left of it.

Though this explanation appear plain, it cannot be the correct one, for there are a great many facts which are irreconcilable with it.

In the first place it presupposes what, although often upheld, has never been proved, *viz.*, *the hereditary transmission of acquired properties.*

We well know that all the physical and intellectual attributes of a parent may pass to the child, the color of the eyes, of the hair, the shape and size of the finger-nails, in fact even the slightest and most indefinable physical and intellectual peculiarities, such as determine facial resemblances, the carriage of the body, the walk, the handwriting, and the disposition of a person, whether mild and placable, or impetuous and violent. But their ancestors had possessed all these characteristics *as germinal elements of their constitution;* whether their development came sooner or later, or whether they appeared with varying vigor and in different associations, it matters not. Such attributes, however, as the ancestor during his life actually "acquires" through external influence, he cannot transmit. The loss of a finger is not inherited by his posterity; all the thousand and one capabilities which are acquired through the discipline of a part or the whole of body, are but acquisitions for the person himself; none of these pass to his descendants. It has never yet been found that a child could read of itself although its parents had throughout their whole lives practiced this art. Not even are our children able to talk of their own accord, yet not only have their parents, but, more than that, an infinitely long line of ancestors have never ceased to drill their brains and to perfect their organs of speech. It is now to be regarded as firmly established, that children of civilized peoples, if reared in the wilderness and entirely without communication with their fellow-beings, do not produce anything that resembles language. I need not here refer to that unauthentic account only, which tells of the inhuman experiment of a Persian king who caused twenty new-born babes to be brought up together without ever hearing a human word. It is said that not one of them ever uttered anything like a word, but all imitated to perfection the bleating of a goat with which they lived together. Similar accounts come from all those well authenticated cases in which half and full-grown persons have been discovered in forests in a totally wild state—cases which, as late as the last century, have occurred at different times in Germany, France, England, and Russia. In almost each instance, it is said, those sounds were produced which were most like the cries of the animals with which they lived; not a trace, however, of human utterance.

Let us consider for a moment how thorough and uninterrupted are the efforts we devote to speaking during our lives, whether in actual conversation or in

silent thought, and let us consider that, despite this unceasing discipline of the human mind and the human vocal organs for thousands of years, the faculty of speech has not established its hereditability in the slightest degree; and from this alone we will be prone to doubt that acquired capabilities in the true sense can ever be transmitted. This is in perfect accordance too with theoretical opinions as to the nature of the phenomena of transmission, at least with such as are in my opinion the only admissible ones.

Now then, if the results of discipline upon an organ are not transmitted, the effects of non-discipline and non exercise must be likewise limited to the individual. If this be the case, then the continuance of an organ's retrograde growth in the course of generations is impossible, for, if so, the process would have to start from the beginning in each generation, and would thus never get any farther than it had in the individual cases of the first generation. We are therefore obliged to consider the former exposition incorrect, which explains the retrogression of growth in an organ from its non-use, and must look about us for another and better explanation. If I am not mistaken we shall find this in *the reverse of the principle of natural selection.*

My meaning will at once become evident. Since the time of Chas. Darwin and Alfred Wallace we understand by natural selection that eclectic process, which nature, without the aid of man, conducts, in that there are always being born more individuals than can continue to exist, and that of these only the fittest are able to survive. The fittest in this case, however, are those, which possess the fittest organization, which are, so to say, most perfectly "adapted" to their conditions of existence. Inasmuch, now, as these alone in the course of generations survive, inasmuch as these alone multiply and increase, they likewise alone transmit their properties to posterity, and the more imperfect properties of less perfectly constituted individuals are exterminated. The generation following will, upon the whole then, be composed of more perfectly constituted individuals than the one preceding, and the accumulation of useful qualities will continue along from generation to generation until the greatest attainable state of perfection has been actually reached.

Now, what is true of the animal as a whole, is true of each part of it, for the total efficiency of the animal depends upon the excellence of the individual parts. Every part may thus be raised to the highest possible state of perfection by this continued action of selection. It is in this way, and this way only, that we are able to understand how everything, even the most minute parts of animals and plants, has been disposed with such wonderful fitness; only in this way are we able to derive the development of the organic world from the known forces of nature.

If this view be correct, if the fitness of living things in all their parts rests upon the principle of natural selection, then *this fitness must be maintained by the same process that created it, and it must disappear so soon as this process of natural selection ceases.*

In the above conclusions we have found the explanation, why parts that have become unnecessary and are no longer needed, must necessarily decline from their perfected state and gradually waste away.

A special illustration will best explain the matter. Let us take a lizard, such as is found every spring in our swamps and puddles, and examine its eyes. They are not so large, yet are highly developed and quite like our own. They play an important rôle in the life of the lizard, for the latter depends almost entirely upon his eyes in searching for food. Everything that moves, it sees at once, and snaps at; did it not have its eyes, it would starve to death. Its eyes are complex and delicate in the extreme. Through countless generations and periods of the earth's history these organs must have gradually attained the perfection of organization and power that is shown in the lizard of to-day. We do not know, it is true, their line of ancestry, but we are acquainted with a great many of the stages of development in the eyes of other animal-groups, and from these we are able to ascertain how this gradual improvement of the organs of vision, once so simple and imperfect, might have taken place. The slow but steady advance from one stage of perfection to the next higher has, according to our view, resulted as follows. The individual eyes of the species were not at all times all exactly alike, and furthermore did not possess exactly the same degree of excellence and sharpness; on the contrary, eyes of varying degrees of excellence have always existed together, and of the individuals of each generation only those survived that possessed the most perfect organs of sight. By this process of natural selection not only must the perfection of the eyes have advanced, but *it must also have been maintained by this selective power at the highest point of development reached.*

Suppose now this species of lizard to have wandered into a dark cave, through which subterranean waters flow The immigration will take place slowly, for the animals must first adapt themselves to the new conditions of life; yet, in the course of generations, they will learn to distinguish and to seize, in perfect darkness, without the aid of their eyes, the animals they live upon. This will have been rendered possible by the sharper development of their organs of smell and scent. Thus, after a succession of generations, there will spring up, in the approaches to the cave, a race of lizards, which will be quite able to find its food

by scent, without the help of its eyes at all, and this race will penetrate farther into the cave and will be able to pass its whole existence in total darkness. In this way it must have come to pass that not only the entrances to caves, but likewise whole subterranean cave-districts, their brooks, lakes, and rivers, are inhabited by animals, as we find it in Carst near Trieste.

As soon as these immigrants have become able to procure sufficient sustenance without the help of their eyes, a process of retrograde growth will commence in their organs of sight; for so soon as the latter are no longer necessary to the animal's existence, they are no longer regulated by the selective action of nature, it being no longer a matter of importance whether the organs of sight are good or bad. There will be no necessity now for an exercise of choice between individuals possessing more perfect and individuals possessing less perfect eyes, but both classes will have the same prospect of surviving, and of perpetuating their line. From now on, a crossing will take place between those with more perfect and those with less perfect eyes, and the result of this can only be an impairment of the eyes in general. It may possibly help, that smaller and weaker eyes are here of advantage, for then the other and now more important organs, those of scent and smell, may develop themselves all the more strongly. But apart from this, the eye will be bound to descend from the highly organized state it has reached, so soon as natural selection ceases to maintain it at that point; slowly, it is true, very slowly at first, and yet without interruption.

In this manner all instances of retrogression, be it of an organ, or be it of a species, are explainable. The explanation first cited does not go so far. There are numerous phenomena that it fails utterly to shed light upon, even though we were allowed to assume that *acquired* attributes could be inherited.

(*To be continued.*)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

SPONTANEOUS ATTENTION.

II.

THE physical manifestations of attention are numerous and of very great importance. We shall minutely pass them in review, while forewarning the reader, that we consider them less as effects of this state of mind, than as its necessary conditions—frequently even as its constitutive elements. This study, accordingly, far from being subordinate to our purpose, is really an investigation of capital importance. To obtain an approximately clear idea of the mechanism of attention, we shall not have to look anywhere else. It is, in fact, only an attitude of the mind, a purely formal state; if we divest it of all the physical concomitants that determine and give it substance, we remain in the presence of a pure abstraction, a phantom. And so the psychologists that have only spoken of attention from inward observation, have remained silent concerning its mechanism, and have limited themselves to extolling its power.

It is always necessary to bear in mind the following fundamental principle: Every intellectual state is accompanied by definite physical manifestations. Thought is not,—as many from tradition still admit,—an event taking place in a purely super-sensual, ethereal, inaccessible world. We shall repeat with Setchenoff, "No thought without expression"; that is, thought is a word or an act in a nascent state, that is to say, a commencement of muscular activity. The sensorial forms of attention so clearly testify to this principle that it cannot be questioned. The same applies to that internal, hidden process, called reflection, of which we shall speak later.

The physical concomitants of attention can be referred to three groups: vaso-motor phenomena, respiratory phenomena, and motory phenomena, or phenomena of expression. They all denote a state of convergence of the organism and of concentration of labor.

1. Let us suppose that twenty persons fix their attention for five or ten minutes upon their little finger. In such case something like the following will happen. Some will be unconscious of any sensation whatever; others will experience certain distinct sensations, as suffering, pain, arterial pulsations; the majority will feel a faint impression of heaviness and a crawling sensation. This simple experiment raises the following questions: Do there not always exist in the several parts of the body sensations, due to incessant modifications of the tissues—modifications which pass by unperceived unless attention is fixed upon the same? Can the act of attention increase the vascular activity of the sensorial ganglia, and there produce subjective sensations? Finally, can the sympathetic centres be aroused, can the vaso-motory nerves be so influenced as to produce certain transitory vascular modifications in the finger with which the sensation is connected?

The first supposition seems probable only to a very slight degree. Indeed, it is always possible to experience a sensation in the finger, if we set about attentively to seek for this sensation.

But, we think that the two other suppositions are perfectly well grounded. The sensation experienced is perhaps partially subjective; but in our opinion, the finger, upon which thought is concentrated for a sufficient space of time, is really the seat of a sensation.

* Continued from No. 104. Translation, by γνῶν, copyrighted under the title "The Psychology of Attention."

The vascular modifications that take place, are felt in the form of arterial pulsations, heaviness, etc.*

It is highly probable, and almost universally admitted, that attention, even when not directed toward any region of our body, is accompanied by local hyperhæmia of certain parts of the brain. The vascularization of the parts concerned, increases in consequence of greater functional activity. This local hyperhæmia is caused by a dilatation of the arteries, which itself is caused by the action of the vaso-motor nerves upon the muscular integuments of the arteries. The vaso-motor nerves depend on the great sympathetic nerve, which is independent of the action of the will, but which is subjected to all the influences of the emotional states. The experiments of Mosso, among others, show that the slightest and most transient emotion causes an affux of blood to the brain. "The blood-circulation is more active in the cerebral organ, while it works, than while at rest. We are accordingly justified in saying, that attention, when fixed upon a group of ideas, has the effect of accelerating the circulation in the nervous substratum of these ideas. This is exactly what happens, when an idea takes strong hold of the mind; it maintains in the brain an active circulation, and does not allow it to rest or sleep." † After a spell of protracted attention we may also notice the redness (sometimes the pallor) of the face.

II. The respiratory modifications which accompany attention resemble the motor phenomena proper, and enter partly into the feeling of effort. The rhythm of respiration changes, slackens, and sometimes undergoes a temporary stoppage. "To acquire the power of attention," says Lewes, "is to learn to make our mental adjustments alternate with the rhythmic movements of respiration. It is a felicitous expression, that in the French language, which designates a clever but superficial thinker, as one incapable of any work *de longue haleine*—of long breath." ‡ The yawning which follows a protracted effort of attention is probably the effect of the slackening of respiration. Often, in like instances, we produce a prolonged inhalation, in order to renew abundantly the air within our lungs. The sigh—another respiratory symptom—as several authors have pointed out, is common to attention, to physical, and moral pain: its object is to oxygenize the blood that has been narcotized by the voluntary or involuntary stoppage of respiration.

All these facts are so many proofs in support of what has been said before, that attention is an exceptional, abnormal fact, which cannot last a long time.

* Hack Tuke, "Mind and Body," p. 2.

† Maudsley: "Physiology of Mind." Gley: *Sur l'etat du pouls carotidien pendant le travail intellectuel.*

‡ Consult Lewes, loc. cit., p. 188.

III. The movements of the body, which are said to express attention, are also of paramount importance. In this chapter we can only enter into a partial study of the same; the remainder will be more properly studied under the title of voluntary attention:* but here, for the first time, we shall proceed to investigate the motory mechanism of attention.

In the first place let us examine the facts. They have not been seriously studied before our own time. Formerly only artists and a few physiognomists—both at all times too partial to their own fancies—had concerned themselves about them.

Duchenne, of Boulogne,—a pioneer in this as in various other fields,—conceived the idea of substituting the experimental method for the pure observation practiced by his predecessors, Ch. Bell, Gratiolet, etc. By the aid of electricity he provoked the isolated contraction of a facial muscle of a man affected with anæsthesia, and by means of photography he obtained the results of the experiment. According to the theory which he had set forth in his *Mécanisme de la physionomie humaine* (1862), a slight contraction of a single muscle is often sufficient to express an emotion; every emotional state produces a single local modification. Thus, according to him, the occipito-frontalis is the muscle of attention; the orbicularis superior of the eye-lids, the muscle of reflection; the pyramidal, the muscle of menace; the zygomaticus major, the muscle of laughter; the eye-brow-muscle, the muscle of grief; the triangular of the lips, the muscle of contempt; and so on. Still, Duchenne limited himself to stating merely the facts; in this following the example of J. Müller, who declared that the expression of the emotions is a completely inexplicable fact. Darwin went still further. Making use of the comparative method, and relying upon laborious researches, he investigated the origin of the different mechanisms of expression; he tried hard to establish why the contraction of a certain given muscle of the face, is necessarily associated with a certain given state of mind.

In the absence of these minute investigations all attempts to explain the mechanism of attention would have been premature. How, indeed, is it possible to explain a mechanism, the wheel-work of which is unknown to us? Let us see, in a summary way, what we know concerning attention in its two forms; as applied to external objects (attention proper), or to internal events (reflection).

Attention (in order to mark it more precisely, we shall call it sensorial) contracts the occipitio-frontalis. This muscle, which occupies the whole region of the forehead, has its mobile point of insertion in the under surface of the skin of the eye-brow and its fixed point of insertion at the back part of the skull. In con-

* See Chap. II, *infra*.

tracting, it draws to itself the eyebrow, lifts it, and produces a few transversal wrinkles on the forehead; consequently the eye is wide open and well illuminated. In extreme cases the mouth opens wide. In children and in many adults close attention produces a protrusion of the lips, a kind of pouting. Preyer has attempted to explain this facial play by hereditary influence. "All animals," he says, "first direct their attention to the search for food. The objects that their lips, their feelers, their proboscis, and their tongue can reach, are those with reference to which their first investigations are made. All examination of, and all search for, food, consequently, is accompanied by a preponderative activity of the mouth and of its appendants. In suckling, the mouth of the infant protrudes forward." In this manner an association would be formed between the first movements of the mouth and the activity of attention.

The act of reflection is expressed in another, and almost contrary manner. It acts on the superior orbicular muscle of the eye-lids and lowers the eye brow. As a consequence, small vertical folds are formed in the space between the eye-brows: the eye is veiled or completely closed, or it looks within. This wrinkling of the eye-brows imparts to the face an expression of intellectual energy. The mouth is closed, as if to sustain an effort.

Attention adapts itself to what is without, reflection to what is within. Darwin explains by an analogy the mode in which reflection expresses itself. It is the attitude of difficult vision, transferred from external objects to internal events that are difficult to grasp.* Hitherto we have only spoken of the movements of the face; but there are, besides these, those of the entire body—of the head, trunk, and limbs. It is impossible to describe them in detail, because they vary with each animal species.† In general a state of immobility sets in, adaptation of eyes, ears, and of touch, as the case may happen: in a word, there is a tendency toward unity of action—convergence. Concentration of consciousness, and concentration of movements, diffusion of ideas and diffusion of movements go together. Let us recall the observations and calculations of Galton upon this subject. He observed an audience of fifty persons, listening to a long and tiresome lecture. The number of movements clearly discernible in the audience was very uniform: forty-five a minute, or, say an average of one movement for each person. Several times, the attention of the audience having been aroused, the number of movements decreased by one half; besides they were less extended, less prolonged, shorter and more rapid. I may incidentally anticipate an objection. Everybody knows that attention, at least, in its reflected form, is at times accompanied by movements. Many people seem to find that walking to and fro helps them out of perplexity; others strike their forehead, scratch their head, rub their eyes, move their arms and legs about in an incessant, rhythmical fashion. This, indeed, is an expenditure, not an economy of motion. But it is a profitable expenditure. The movements thus produced are not simple mechanical phenomena, acting upon our external surroundings; they act also through the muscular sense upon the brain, which receives them as it receives all other sensorial impressions, to the increase of the brain's activity. A rapid walk, a race, will also quicken the flow of ideas and words; they produce, as Bain says, a sort of mechanical intoxication. The experimental researches of M. Féré, which we cannot quote here,* furnish numerous instances of the dynamogenetic action of movements. We stretch out our arms and legs to begin work; that is, we arouse the motor centres. Passive movements impressed upon paralyzed members, have in certain cases, been able, by reviving motory images, to restore lost activity. And it is to be observed, that the result of these movements is to increase mental activity, and not to concentrate the attention; they simply provide it with subject-matter. It is a preliminary operation only.

(To be continued.)

*For details see: Darwin, "Expression of the Emotions," Chap. X; Preyer, "The Mind of the Child," p. 250, et seqq.; Montegazza, "*La physionomie*," Chap. XVI.

†An excellent study of the expression of attention in animals will be found in Ricardi, "*Saggio di studi e di osservazioni interno all' attenzione nell' uomo e negli animali*." Modena, 1877, (second part, p. 1-17).

*See his book, "Sensation and Movement."

A TRIBUTE TO MATTHEW ARNOLD.

BY THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND.

[From *The New Review*.]

"Few souls ever passed away with more hope of "acceptance, few lives more unstained have been led "from childhood to old age, few men have ever gone "into 'that silent void where if there are no smiles "there are no tears, and where if hearts do not beat "they cannot be broken,' leaving behind them such "passionate regrets, such daily, hourly desire for "communion which the grave forbids, for friendship "which death has ended. Struck down in the very ful-"ness of his powers, his brain teeming with beautiful "thoughts and noble conceptions, actually engaged "to furnish works which would have enriched the "language, widened our sympathies, and enlarged our "knowledge, without a trace of age upon him, light-"hearted as a boy, serious, faithful, and affectionate "as a man of years, he passed from us in a moment, "never to be forgotten by his friends, to be remem-"bered for many a long year by all that is best and "greatest amongst his countrymen. It is useless, it

"is impossible, to try to cast the balance. No verdict "on such a man can be impartial pronounced by a "friend, no friend would wish it to be. 'If there be "'any place for the spirits of the just, if, as the wise "'declare, great souls are not extinguished with the "'body, then rest in peace; and lift up your friends "'and kinsfolk from weak regret and unmanly lam-"'entation, to gaze upon your virtues, for which "'shedding of tears and beating of the breast are no "'fit mourning. Rather let us honor you by rever-"'ence, by present eulogy, nay, if our poor nature "'will supply the power, by making ourselves your "'copies. This is the real honour, this the religious "'duty of those who are bound to him by the closest "'ties. Let us always bear in mind all deeds, all "'words of his, let us always dwell upon and make "'our own the history and the picture not of his per-"'son but of his mind. Not because I would object "'to busts or statues of marble or of bronze, but in-"'asmuch as men's faces and their portraits are but "'weak and fleeting things, while the image of the "'soul abides for ever, we can ourselves retain and "'reproduce the image of the life he led without the "'aid of any artist, his colours, or his carving. For "'all in him that we follow with wonder and with love "'remains and will remain for ever in the minds of "'men, through the endless flow of ages, as a portion "'of the past.'

"Some such words as these, (frail echoes indeed "of his large utterance,) one of the greatest spoke of "one of the noblest of the Romans. It may be per-"mitted to use them here as suggesting the 'enthus-"iasm which lies in the language of reserve'; and "further to adapt to the occasion the well-known and "lovely lines which Mr. Arnold admired, and which "veil while they express the feelings of his friends:—

"Unà speravi tecum, dilecte Favoni!
"Credulus heu longos, ut quondam, fallere Soles:
"Heu spes nequicquam dulces, atque irrita vota!
"Heu mæstos Soles, sine te quos ducere flendo
"Per desideria, et questus jam cogor inanes!"

OBITUARY.

On the eighteenth of August last, suddenly died, of heart-disease, Dr. Gustav Carus, the Superintendent General of the State Church of Eastern Prussia, and the father of Dr. Paul Carus, the editor of The Open Court. Our readers, who have felt, in Dr. Gustav Carus's criticism of the work of The Open Court (No. 70) the lofty purpose, the sincere tone, and high moral conviction of his life, will share in common our deep regret. We extract the following biographical notes from the *Ostpreussische Zeitung*, of August 21, just received.

* * * 'Wilhelm Friedrich Gustav Carus was born February '24th, 1819, at Dahme, in the province of Brandenburg, Prussia. 'He evinced, in early life, marked aptitudes for a career in the 'church, and, after the completion of his preliminary education 'at the Gymnasium, began the study of theology at the Univer-'sities of Berlin and Halle, where the influence of Julius Müller 'and Tholuck especially affected his development. On entering 'upon the active duties of his profession, his career was one of 'steady preferment, culminating in the promotion to the general 'superintendency, for Eastern Prussia, of the Prussian State 'Church.

* * * * * * * * * * *

'The theological faculty of the University of Greifswald be-'stowed upon him in 1868, in recognition of his scientific and 'theological writings, the high degree of Doctor of Theology.

* * * * * * * * * * *

'A power peculiarly his own, was to inspire, to stimulate. 'Wherever a new undertaking was formed, wherever obstacles were 'to be removed, there he was to be found; withholding no effort, 'avoiding no journey, and sparing no labor. It was a pleasure for 'him to go onward; and hindrance only aroused redoubled en-'ergy. He accomplished much, and our province is indebted to him 'for much. We will mention here but the following memorials that 'he has placed in our midst: the excellent "New Evangelical 'Hymn-Book," which supplied a true need in this field, the re-'formed system of theological examinations, * * * etc., etc. We 'cannot pretend to estimate the wide-reaching effects of the per-'sonal inspiration that he brought to bear upon others. The 'whole province knew their chief-pastor and loved him. He never 'withdrew himself from their midst, but wheresoever the welfare 'of those committed to his charge demanded it, he was present, 'disregardful of personal comfort and health. His coöperation, 'when sought, was never refused. To devote his whole energy, 'body and soul, to the service of his office, was the rule of his life, 'and this he demanded from his clergy.

'Of a cheerful disposition, teeming with humor and wit, he en-'joyed the company of the light-hearted, and many a merry word 'fell from his lips. Yet in his inmost depths he was a serious, 'earnest man, the roots of whose being were firmly fixed, in pen-'itence as in faith, in the Christian Creed; his look ever unswerv-'ingly directed towards Zion.'

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SINGLE-TAX.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

I am much interested in the discussion in The Open Court of the single-tax. It seems to me that Wheelbarrow continually fails to recognize the difference between the two kinds of things—things that are, and things that are not, the product of human labor. Land is the only thing that is not the product of human labor. I shall not enter into a discussion of the difference between those two kinds of things, but will simply ask Wheelbarrow to explain, why it is that to tax anything else but land makes it higher priced, and the higher it is taxed the higher the price. But to tax land makes it cheaper, and the higher it is taxed the cheaper it becomes. I do not think Wheelbarrow will deny this, and I believe if he will endeavor to explain this, that he will find out the reason why the single-tax on land values is a just tax, and no other tax is just. By removing all taxes from everything but land we will make them cheaper, and by putting all taxes on land we will make it cheaper. Cheap things are what poor people need, and the single-tax will give it to them. J. G. Malcolm.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Logik. *Christoph Sigwart.* Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tübingen. Vol. I. Freiburg: 1889. J. C. B. Mohr.

An important part of thought pursues the end of arriving at *propositions* that are *certain* and *universal*, and from the fact that this aim is frequently missed, arises the necessity to consider the conditions through which it may be attained. To solve this prob-

lem is to come into the possession of an art of thought that would guide us to certain and universal truths. It is the business of psychology, says Prof. Sigwart, to determine what thought is; but for the purposes of logic we may derive from the usage of language a sufficient clue to its essential nature. Thinking, in its widest sense, is a *presentative* activity; subjective excitation is not produced when we think, nor does the result express itself in an effect upon ourselves or others, as the result in volition and action does: its essence consists in this, that an object is present to the mind. Perception has to do with an outer object, while thinking is a purely inward act; it involuntarily springs forth, it is a complicated and, in conscious moments, uncontrollable process, ramifying throughout every province of psychical life. But upon and beyond this involuntary thought arises a voluntary activity, *willed thought*, which guided by definite interests and objects, seeks to control the originally involuntary course of mental process, and direct it towards a given goal: selecting, rejecting, retaining, and developing that which arose uncalled for; searching and pursuing that which is not present, yet needed. The interest attempted to be satisfied in 'willed thought,' is determined, in the first place, by the law that we seek the pleasant and shun the unpleasant; we seek entertainment, and avoid *ennui*; we build castles in the air, and endeavor to evade the evil pictures of our fancy. Such emotions, in short, are always of an individual turn, they depend on constitution and character, and determine the varying type of individual thought that no one can hope to efface. Yet this motive is subordinate. The *needs* and *exigencies* of *life* lay greater claim to the exercise of our mental activity. Our welfare, our very existence, depends on conscious action upon, and directed effort against, the things about us. This is accompanied by the careful observation of things and their relations, by thoughtful adaptation of means to ends; it is reached when human thought, on the basis of a *knowledge of reality*, correctly forecasts what is to come, when the 'presentative act' extending in the future coincides with the actual course of events. Added to this practical motive comes the instinctive thirst for knowledge planted in us, which in effect includes the other: we seek to produce in our subjective sphere a faithful and complete picture of the objective world: knowledge of that which is and is becoming, is the immediate object that sets our thought in motion and determines its direction. Yet this is not all. We are governed by *laws*, the rules of state, propriety, ethics, etc., by which we judge the worth of our actions. Our conduct must accord with these, yet whether it does or not is not a matter of visible coincidence, but a matter of pure thought determined by the opinion of ourselves and others. We have nothing to tell us that our conduct is correct but the consciousness of the *necessity of our thought*, the *certainty* that the given act conclusively follows from a general rule, nor have we any outer confirmation of the same than the assent of others who from the same premises arrive at the same results. The same criteria of the *necessity* and *universality* of our thought, also, are all that we have to tell us whether we have knowledge of the outer world. If there is a knowable reality, our knowledge of it depends on a relation between us and this reality whereby that which we *necessarily* think corresponds to what actually is; yet the very certainty of such a relation rests precisely upon our understanding of the necessity of our mental processes. And if there is a knowable reality outside of us, again, it is the same for all thinking subjects: their thought with reference to the same things must be the same, and so every mental process that will cognize reality must be a *universal* one. If this possibility be denied, of knowing a thing as it is of itself, all we have to do is to predicate objectivity of the things we produce *necessarily* in thought under the consciousness of necessity, and then all others that are thus produced will have by hypothesis the same character. And so the knowledge of reality, of 'things of themselves,' is included in the condition that we think nothing that is not *necessary* and *universal*. This idea exhausts the notion of Truth. The common character of mathematical, moral, and material truth is, that it be necessarily and universally thought. Thus Prof. Sigwart avoids the difficulties of metaphysical logics, and escapes the one-sidedness of systems that deal with the cognizance of the purely theoretical and neglect the practical.

All thought, thus considered, results in judgments, and judgments in propositions. But the existence of *error* and *dispute* shows, that thought, in the judgments it reaches, often misses its purpose. From this arises the need of a system, a method, that will teach us to avoid error and disagreement, and so to think that our judgments are necessary and certain, and hence universal. In attaining this the view that logic takes of thought, and the view that psychology takes, differ. Psychology seeks the laws in accordance with which a certain thought under certain conditions is produced in one way and not in another; it investigates every mental act from the standpoint of the general laws of psychical activity and from the given facts of the individual case—investigates, thus, the untrue and the non-accepted as well as the true and the universal: the opposition of the true and the false has no place in psychology. But logic premises *truth* of thought, and is concerned with this alone. In proceeding with this object in view, and in seeking the conditions under which the same can be reached, it first sets forth the *criteria* of correct thought and then gives directions how to shape the action of the mind to attain it. In the former instance, it is a *critique*, and in the latter an art. But the value of criticism is determined by its fitness as a means to accomplish an end, and thus the chief purpose of Logic must be, as it essentially is, an *art*.

Such, in brief, is Prof. Sigwart's position with regard to the object of Logic. The present volume, of the second edition of Prof. Sigwart's work, treats of the judgment, the concept, and the inference. It has been Prof. Sigwart's endeavor to bring Logic into an organic relation with the scientific needs of the day. This constitutes the distinctive feature of the work.

In a little brochure, entitled "The Problem of Personality," received some time ago, Eliza Ritchie discusses the notion of personality from the standpoint of psychology and metaphysics. The treatise was presented as a "thesis for the degree of Doctor Philosophy at Cornell University, June 1889," and might be termed a critical review. The treatment is marked by a timidity that we think original research should avoid. It is clearly written. (Andrus and Church, Ithaca, New York.)

NOTES.

Mr. Moncure D. Conway will contribute, within a short time, to our columns, an interesting essay upon the religion of George Washington; an original study suggested by various unpublished private letters of our first president.

The extract from Lord Coleridge's "Matthew Arnold," an essay in the August *New Review*, we have published (p. 1833) partly for the value of the fervent tribute to the English poet and critic, and partly to make known to our readers the apt and eloquent passage from the Agricola of Tacitus, which the Lord Chief Justice has quoted. "Rather let us honor you * * * by making "ourselves your copies. This is the real honor, this the religious "duty. * * * Let * * * us dwell upon and make our own the "history and the picture not of his person but of his mind. * * * "We can ourselves retain and reproduce the image of the life he "led. * * * For all in him that we follow with wonder and love "remains and will remain forever in the minds of men, through "the endless flow of ages, as a portion of the past." This is the true conception of immortality, and this the *soul* that, in the words of Tacitus, "abides for ever."

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

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HYPNOTISM AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.*

BY DR. J. LUYS.

In my recent researches upon the subject of hypnotism, the results of which have been presented in the form of clinical lectures lately delivered at the Hospital of Charity, Paris, I have propounded two principal points as the object of inquiry:

1. To bring together in synthetic shape the main phenomena of hypnotism; giving them a more precise classificatory form, and studying them in pursuance of the methods regularly employed by the pathology of to-day, with a view to establishing their proper classification within the boundaries of neurological science.

2. To point out the close relations that unite the phenomena of hypnotism with the phenomena of mental pathology properly so-called; by showing that in hypnotized patients the principal morbid indications of psychical diseases can be experimentally induced, and illusions, sensorial and emotional hallucinations, delirious notions, and even irresistible impulses in the experimental form of suggestions, created at will.

These are the new facts, to the existence of which only I wish to point in this place, and which I intend to develop, in my work "*Lecons Cliniques, etc.*," with the greater particularity their nature merits.

With regard to the first object of inquiry propounded, it must be stated that I have confirmed the majority of phenomena, both physical and psychical, hitherto recorded by scientists who have studied the subject of hypnotism, and I find that there are in this department of research a certain number of acquired truths that may be justly regarded as the foundations proper of a science of modern hypnotism.

To the researches already recorded I can add the results of numerous experiments of my own, that have enabled me to throw quite a new light upon certain obscure points of the physiology of the nervous centres.

I have employed particular pains to demonstrate the fact that the phenomena of hypnotism, however suspicious and wonderful they may appear to persons who are brought face to face with them for the first time, are for the most part reducible to simple laws derived from the principles of ordinary physiology and that, more particularly, they are in the main the generalized and amplified expression of those phenomena of inhibition and dynamogeny with which the labors of Brown-Séquard have enriched contemporary science.

I have thus, in the order of things purely physiological, demonstrated the serial relation of the various hypnotic states to be merely the successive phases of a single evolutionary process. I have shown that the state of hypnotism is essentially characterized by the obscuration of certain faculties and the compensatory exaltation of other faculties, and that thus the abolition of the consciousness of the exterior world—for example, the abolition of cutaneous sensibility inducing hyperæsthesia of muscular and optical sensibility—incites a hyper-physiological exaltation of the faculties of memory and imagination; etc.

In the province of things that relate to psychic activity, accordingly, I have been able to adduce in evidence a series of new phenomena, towards which our experimentalists have hitherto not directed their investigations. I have thus been able to show that the emotive regions of the brain, at the wish of the hypnotizer, and by means of certain technical methods, can be separately aroused and made to exhibit their most varied modes of manifestation; and that the psychological unity of the living individual can be divided in two, thus being able to bring about a veritable doubling of sensations and psychical acts so as to produce, right and left, antagonistic emotions. The right side of the individual, for instance, yielding to an emotion of joy and the left side reacting in the opposite sense.*

I have been able, in this way, to adduce the fact, that there is a whole class of phenomena which are ordinarily attributed to psychical activity and which, in reality, are nothing but operations automatically and unconsciously arising. And in the order of events that relate to the innermost, basic acts of will, I have, in connection with the theory of suggestion, made plain, that the part of conscious activity is very small, and that, inversely, the part of automatic activities is great.

* Translated from advance sheets, furnished by the kindness of the publisbers, of Dr. J. Luys's new work "*Lecons Cliniques sur les principaux phénomènes de l'Hypnotisme*" (George Carré: Paris), with the permission of the author.

* See my *Recherches sur le dédoublement des opérations cérébrales*: contributions to the *Académie de Médecine*, 1879.

The facts I have above adduced are precise and incontrovertible phenomena, as firmly established for science, as any recorded by contemporaneous physiology, whether in the study of the circulatory system, or the digestive or locomotory system. And it is not without surprise that we see the present generation of physiologists (kept back by questions of technical and mechanical bearing) remain inactive and immobile at the threshold of this new field of inquiry, which they regard with mysterious mistrust and of which they do not even seek to pass the outer boundaries.

With regard to the second object of inquiry, namely, the relations of hypnotic states with those of mental pathology, I have striven, as occasion has presented itself, to show the characteristic connections that unite the one with the other.

It is chiefly in the somnambulistic state that the points of contact are the most expressive and the most manifold. I find, in fact, nothing that more resembles the tranquil, general paralytic than a hypnotic subject at the stage of lucid somnambulism. It is the same unconsciousness of situation and environment—the same "*credivity*," or proneness to believe.

Both somnambulist and paralytic know not where they are. Ask them what the day of the week, or what the hour of the day—they have no idea of the one or the other. The paralytic readily believes everything that is told him. In the asylum to which he is brought, or wherein he is sequestered, you may tell him with impunity that he is at home, that he has bought the property. He assents, and a few hours afterwards will explain to you the schemes of embellishment that he intends to carry out. Tell him that he is general, secretary of state, or minister-plenipotentiary, and he will passively accept these new marks of distinction. The faculty, moreover, of changing one's personality, which may be so easily developed in hypnotized subjects, can, in the paralytic also, be developed with extreme facility. Thus suggestions of every sort may be put into his mind, and, however absurd they are, they will germinate there because all consciousness is absent, over-clouded, and set out of place by the fact of the ruin of the organic substratum that supports it. The tranquil paralytic and the lucid somnambulist, when they speak and reply to questions put them, are but illusory appearances of that which, from a psychical point of view, they in reality are. They have both lost their spontaneity, their conception of surrounding things; they are both unconscious of what is going on, are credulous, have lost their memory, and they live at the mercy of the automatic activities of their brain, which lead them to the most unexpected decisions, *without the slightest conscious participation* on the part of their psychic personality which has disappeared.

In certain depressive forms of general paralysis in atomic patients, slow of motion, a special condition of the muscular fibre is furthermore observed, which represents, to a certain extent, the origin of certain phenomena of the state of catalepsis. If the subjects' limbs be seized and raised, we will find that they retain their attitudes like genuine cataleptic patients, that they are flexible and that they rest for a greater or shorter length of time in the positions they have been placed.

Beyond these psychical states, which are so strange and which form a common ground upon which the tranquil paralytic and the lucid somnambulist meet, there is still a whole series of psychopathical manifestations which may be called forth at will in all hypnotic subjects. Thus it will be seen that illusions, sensorial and emotional hallucinations, which constitute the essential characteristics of insanity, may be provoked, at the will of the experimenter, in all hypnotic subjects. We may produce in them fixed ideas, delirious conceptions, which we can cause to continue after their awakening, and with which, in the form of suggestions grafted in their inner self, they can live, without knowing whence the notions came.

Without further enumerating all the varied marks of factitious and transitory alienation that can be produced in hypnotized subjects, we shall yet recall the fact that the entire class of impulsive acts which are met with among persons suffering from hallucination, can be artificially reproduced in persons hypnotized, accompanied, too, by those typical marks of violence in movement and of swiftness in execution that are the characteristic signs of all acts performed by lunatics.

We have here facts that were unknown—an unexpected collocation of data, that despite the expressions of skepticism that they will call forth in contemporary circles, are none the less destined to throw a new light upon the various questions, still so obscure, of mental pathology. It is indeed natural to believe that by giving these inquiries, which at present rest upon data so uncertain and conventional, an actual foundation, wider and more firmly established; by uniting them by more rigid bonds with the life of the organic substratum that supports them—that we shall thus connect them more rigorously with the normal operations of the life of the brain. We shall thus be in a fair way to fill that great gap that at present separates psychopathical symptoms from the cerebral mechanisms that serve as their support.

The future of mental pathology is, in that direction, logical; and I cannot too often repeat it to the rising generation of alienist physicians, that aside from these natural and truly physiological roads there is, and will be, nothing but confusion and idle discussion.

In the domain of medical jurisprudence, too, new

problems thus result, with which the judicial authorities and medical experts will have to reckon; and I have considered, in its main aspects, the moral responsibility of hypnotized individuals.

Of not less importance is the therapeutic application that can be made in the treatment of certain chronic diseases of the nervous system, either by fascination or suggestion, which prove to be agents of great therapeutic power.

We are thus led to say, that modern hypnotism, as created by the labors of Braid and our contemporaries, as well in France as in other countries, now represents a series of researches of a scientific character sufficiently certain to justify it in claiming a legitimate place in the domain of neurological science.

Hypnotism, at the present day, is in a period of transition. It is emerging, now, from the nebulous phases which have veiled its remote origin. And just as modern astronomy long lived in the minds of men in the guise of astrology, captivating their imaginations by the false assumption of an occult power, seeking the mysterious relations between the acts of their destiny and certain conjunctions of the stars; just as modern chemistry, that triumphant conquest of the human intellect, long ruled the minds of men by its pretended power of transmutation of metals and its search for the philosopher's stone; so too, it is not illogical to assume, that the recent studies of hypnotism—which, in like manner, plunges its roots into the depths of that peculiar property of humanity, the belief in the mysterious—may also have, in the measure that they are better comprehended and better inquired into, a destiny similar to that of their predecessors.

These researches have passed from their period of agglomeration, where their results were a mass of incoherent materials. They constitute a synthesis of acquired facts; they have become solidified; and, having as capital a definite number of given data, verified by incontrovertible therapeutic applications, they present themselves, in their turn, to the world of science and demand the rights of citizenship.

Miracle-workers, sorcerers, magnetizers, etc., who throughout the ages were their first incarnation—are not they to these studies what the alchemists and the astrologers were to modern chemistry and modern astronomy; that is to say, their true unconscious precursors?

I love to think that they will fulfill the same destinies as their predecessors, and that despite the suppressed or loudly-uttered suspicions of circles closed and opposed to new ideas they also will come to pass through, by virtue of their own force, their natural evolution.

In France, and in other countries, the onward movement is being made. We cannot, indeed, regard without wonder the recent practices that, by mastering the dynamics of the central regions of the nervous system, are able to produce in the living individual psychical states which disconcert, by their strangeness, the uninitiated, who prefer to regard them rather as impositions than as phenomena experimentally provoked. We feel that there are, here, new forces come into play and that these mysterious forces are destined to awaken a deep echo not only in the domain of common psychology but also in that of mental pathology upon which entirely new lights are being brought to bear.

The therapeutical deductions derivable from these studies further engage the mind, by showing the new applications of those transferences of unknown nervous forces, the effects of which are in certain cases destined to produce really miraculous cures.

There is here, I repeat, a whole world of new facts to be recorded, to be interpreted, and to be weighed in estimation of their value. These will be the secrets of the physiology of the twentieth century. At present a mere laborer of the dawning day, I shall be content to contribute my work to the common acquisitions that a number of chosen contemporary minds have gathered, and to follow in the same path as they. And I wish for these brilliant and engaging studies the success that they merit, hoping to see them attain an honorable career for the human mind and a useful one for suffering humanity.

PARIS, 1889.

THE RECANTATION OF COUNCILLOR CARTER OF VIRGINIA.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

IN his History of St. Mark's Parish, Dr. Slaughter, historiographer of the diocese of Virginia, says of the first Carter of that state, "A chart of his descendants would fill this book." From 1669, when that patriarch (John) died, to 1889, when one of his descendants fills the presidential chair, the Carter family-tree has borne famous fruits. Robert Carter, son of John, was the great "King Carter," administrator of the Fairfax estates. This Robert's grandson, Councillor Carter of Nomony, was a man of genius, a scholar, a philanthropist. He was perhaps the first Virginian who carried his antislavery sentiments to the extent of manumitting his slaves,—an event which, considering the grandeur of his estate on the Potomac, was of tremendous importance. I have read in the records of Westmoreland County (1792–1793) his manumissions of 49 negroes; the remainder were bequeathed liberty, as certain legal conditions prevented the liberation of all. He dwelt in the neighborhood of the Washingtons and Lees, was respected for his character

and admired for his humor, but his religious experience was attributed to eccentricity.

At what period the freethinking spirit began to pervade the Old Virginia gentry, it is difficult to say. They seem to have brought it from William and Mary College. This institution which was a grand one while Harvard was yet small, developed a rationalism similar to that in later generations associated with Harvard. Edmund Randolph, our first Attorney-General, says that his early deism was partly due to two clerical instructors at William and Mary. Among those so influenced were Jefferson, Chancellor Wythe, John Randolph, also Bishop Madison, whose rationalism was not resented so harshly as that of Bishop Colenso in our own time. Robert, or "Councillor" Carter, was a fine scholar, and a very influential man; and for every phase of his faith he became a zealous apostle, in his way. For some years now I have been coming across letters written by gentlemen in the Northern Neck of that period, anxiously discussing the teachings of Swedenborg, and could never explain them until recently. In looking over a mass of Carter papers (now in possession of Mr. W. R. Benjamin of New York), I came across the following document, which represents the earliest adoption of Swedenborg's teachings which I have been able to find in America. The paper is throughout in Robert Carter's own bold and clear writing, although he appears as if reporting another person. This arises, no doubt, from his habit of writing legal documents in which he had to speak of himself as a "party."

The endorsement, also in Councillor Carter's writing, is given, like the subjoined paper, literally. It is as follows:—"Some circumstances occurring from ye 31st day of May 1777 to the 6th of September 1778. relative to Robt Carter of Nomony Hall."

"In the 49th year of Robert Carter's age, he relyed on a negative Righteousness—to justify Mankind to Jehovah; he supposing that the Bible was a human Work for temporary advantages—; that R. C. on the 12th day of June, A. D. 1777, at the House of Henrietta Maria Ford, Widow, in S. Mary's County in the Province of Maryland, renounced the heresy mentioned above, and he then declared that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.—It is expected that the two opinions mentioned above will appear to Persons, who have not experienced Divine Chastisment for the Sin of Unbelief or transgression, to be delusion or fickleness—Reader you then stand as Nicodemus stood, when he denied the possibility of a second birth, that is a birth into Righteousness—or faith in the Lord Jesus Christ and Love to his Neighbour. Let it be remembered that the same Nichodemus a Ruler of the Jews, and master of Israel, a private Disciple of the Lord's, brought a Mixture to embalm his Body, according to the manner of the Jews. Nichodemus, after the Passion, was baptized by a Disciple of Christ's, for which he, Nichodemus, was deposed from the dignity of a Senator, excommunicated and driven out of Jerusalem: Gamaliel conveyed him to his County house and supported him during life—and buried him honourably by St Stephen's Tomb.

"Saturday, the 31st day of May 1777—Doctor Gustavus Brown* attended at Mrs. Ford's House mentioned above who inoculated R. Carter, John Tasker Carter, his Son, Priscilla Carter and Nancy Carter, two daughters of R. C.—and Negro Sam, his Servant. Sunday, the 8th of June, Mrs. Frances Carter wife of R. Carter, came to Mrs. Ford's house—R. C. the same day had a Fever Heat—indicating that the inoculation was effectual—Saturday the 28th June Mrs. F. Carter and John Tasker Carter left Mrs. Ford's house to return to Virga — two Doctors, G. Brown, Reader, Mrs. Ford, and Miss Peggy, ye daughter of Mrs. Ford, each and every one diligently attending the strangers mentioned before, the time they remained in Maryland, who embarked on board a Boat on Thursday the 3 day of July 1777—they to return to Nomony-Hall in Westmoreland County in Virginia.

Nomony-Hall the 4th of July after 7 o Clock Noon† 1777—R. Carter informed his family, that formerly he had not called them together to hear read, parts of the Holy Bible, and to talk about fundamental Christian Doctrines: so that Hearers, each and every one, may examin whether they had experienced similar Exercises—and R. C. notified that the like order should be continued daily, til it should be forbidden.‡

Lord's Day the 6th of September 1778—R. Carter attended divine worship at the house of ——Brown, widow, on Totuskey Creek,§ in Richmond County, Virginia—; that Lewis Lunsford and John Sutton two baptist ministers then present, that according to their Church order, R. Carter informed the Congregation that he desired to become a Disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ, who is ye Son of God—because he, R. C., believeth that Jesus Christ in his State of Humiliation possessed a full and perfect Righteousness—; that if the Lord had not assumed human nature that a total Damnation was, at that time, at hand and threatened every Creature, but now it is not so—for the Lord came into the World, to subdue the Hells that are in US, and to glorify his Manhood—so that Man may re-pent—that is, he may have Faith in God, may forsake his evil habits, measurably, and he may live a good Life:—No Person

* This physician was an eminent instructor of medical pupils at his house, Rose Hill, Port Tobacco, Md. He attended Washington (long his personal friend) at death.

† Meaning probably "forenoon."

‡ The statute of religious liberty was not yet passed in Virginia, and in remote regions heresy might still be interfered with.

§ On the northern side of the Rappahannock, about 20 miles S. E. from Nomony Hall.

did forbid baptism, and Elder Lewis Lunsford plunged R. C., into the water of Totuskey, R. C. doth declare that the baptism was no Cross to him, that he returned Home rejoicing on his way."

The Baptists were above all other religionists unchurched and persecuted in Virginia, and perhaps the Councillor could in no other way have so nearly followed his newly found Lord, who went down to be baptized by the half-clad Forerunner. The Baptists appear to have embraced his new views, and he built a chapel for them near Nomony Hall. Bishop Meade intimates that he became a "papist" before his death, but it is probable that this arose from the Catholicity of his new faith. In the absence of any church representing his own convictions he, no doubt, sought for points of sympathy with his Catholic friends in Maryland as with the Baptists.

The memory of the Councillor's love of liberty has passed away. I recently read aloud his acts of manumission to a group of astonished Westmorelanders in their Court House. At Nomony I found that the little chapel he built had disappeared; it is remembered by a few as a commonplace Baptist meeting-house, under the name of "Little Bethel." Probably only the readers of the old paper here reprinted will understand what "Bethel" signified to its noble builder. It is sufficiently pathetic to think of that scholar trying, by whatever round of the ladder at hand—Baptist or Catholic—to ascend to the vision shining above his lonely pillow.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

SPONTANEOUS ATTENTION.

II.—CONTINUED.

We must now determine the real part sustained by the movements in attention. Up to this point we have limited ourselves to describing them—at least the principal ones; we are now prepared to put the question in its clearest and simplest terms:

Are the movements of the face, the body, and the limbs, and the respiratory modifications that accompany attention, simply effects, outward marks, as is usually supposed? Or, are they, on the contrary, *the necessary conditions, the constituent elements, the indispensable factors of attention?* Without hesitation we accept the second thesis. Totally suppress movements, and you totally suppress attention.

Although for the time being we are in a position only partially to establish the point maintained (the study of voluntary attention, reserved for an other chapter, will show it to us in a new aspect), still since we are now touching upon the essential feature of the mechanism of attention, it seems proper to dwell awhile upon the subject.

The fundamental rôle of the movements in attention is, to *maintain* the appropriate state of consciousness and to *reinforce* it. But as this is a question of mechanism, it will be preferable to approach the problem from its physiological side, by an inquiry into what takes place in the brain, in its double capacity of an intellectual and a motory organ.

1. As an intellectual organ the brain serves as substratum to perceptions (in sensorial attention), images, and ideas (in reflection). By hypothesis, the nervous elements that act will furnish, on an average, a superior work.

Attention certainly causes an intense innervation, as proved by the numerous experiments of psychometry, in which it plays a part. "An active idea," says Maudsley, "is accompanied by a molecular change in the nervous elements, which is propagated either along the sensory nerve to its periphery, or, if not so far, at any rate to the sensory ganglion, the sensibility of which is thereby increased. The result of this propagation of molecular action to the ganglion is that the different muscles in connection with the affected sense are put into a certain tension by reflex action, and thereby increase the feeling of attention, in accordance with the law that associated feelings strengthen one another."* Attention, according to Hartmann, "consists in material vibrations of the nerves," in a nerve-current, which, traversing the sensible nerves, proceeds from centre to periphery.† But there is another element of equal importance.

2. As a motor organ the brain plays a complex rôle. In the first place, it inaugurates the movements that accompany perceptions, images, or ideas; afterwards, these movements, which frequently are intense, return to the brain by way of the muscular sense as sensations of movements; the latter increase the quantity of available energy, which on the one hand serves to maintain or to reinforce consciousness, and, on the other, returns to its original starting-point in the form of a fresh movement.

In this manner there is a constant going and coming from centre to periphery, from periphery to centre, and from the strengthened centre again to periphery, etc. The intensity of consciousness is but the subjective expression of this complicated work. But to suppose that this state could last without these organic conditions, is an untenable hypothesis, completely in disaccord with all that experience teaches us. The naïve spectator at the Opera, who is bored at the unintelligibility of the music, is all atten-

* Translation, by γνῶν, copyrighted under the title "The Psychology of Attention."

* Loc. cit., p. 313.

† *Philosophie de l'inconscient, trad. Nolen*, Vol I, p. 145; Vol. II, p. 65.

tion when a sudden change of scenery occurs; that is, when the visual impression has produced an instantaneous adaptation of the eyes and the whole body. Without this organic convergence the impression would rapidly vanish. "The difference between attention and voluntary movement," says Wundt, "consists essentially in the preponderant reaction upon the sensitive parts (the original source of the performance). In voluntary movement, the main direction of the central excitation is toward the muscles; in attention, the muscles only act in conjunction with subordinate, sympathetic movements"; * or, in other terms, a reflection of movements is produced. Finally, in the words of Maudsley, we may declare the mechanism of attention to be: "first, the excitation of the proper ideational track either by external presentation or internal representation; secondly, the intensification of its energy by the increment of stimulus resulting from the proper motor innervation; thirdly, a further intensification of energy by the subsequent reaction of the more active perceptive centre upon the motor factor—the interplay of sensory and motor factors augmenting the activity up to a certain limit."†

If, accordingly, we compare the ordinary state with the state of attention, we find in the former weak representations, and but few movements; but in the latter, a vivid representation, energetic, and convergent movements, and moreover repercussion of the movements produced. It matters little, whether this last addition be conscious or not: consciousness does not perform the operation; it simply profits by it.

It may perhaps be interposed that, admitting this reaction of the movements upon the brain, still there is nothing to prove that the movements are originally the simple effect of attention. There are three hypotheses possible, namely: either, attention (the state of consciousness) is the cause of the movements, or it is the effect of the same, or it is first the cause and afterwards the effect of the movements.

* * *

Still, I do not wish to choose between these three hypotheses which have a purely logical and dialectic import, but rather to put the question otherwise. In the above-stated form the problem is thoroughly impregnated—without appearing to be so—with that traditional dualism, of which psychology finds it so difficult to rid itself; and the problem is reduced, in effect, to the question, whether in attention the soul first acts upon the body or the body upon the soul. This enigma is not for me to solve. To the eye of physiological psychology there exist only internal states, differing among each other as well by their peculiar qualities as by their physical concomitants. If the intellectual state produced is weak, brief, without perceptible expression, then it is not attention. If it is strong, stable, well-defined, and marked by the before-mentioned physical modifications, then it is attention. The point here maintained is, that attention does not exist *in abstracto*, as a purely inward event: it is a concrete state, a psycho physiological complex. Take our spectator at the opera. Abstract from him the adaptation of eyes, head, body, limbs, changes of respiration and cerebral circulation, etc., and the conscious or unconscious reaction of all these phenomena upon the brain; and that which is left of the original whole, thus despoiled and emptied, is no longer attention. If anything remain, it is an ephemeral state of consciousness, the shadow of that which has been. We hope that this example, however far-fetched it may seem, will better contribute to an understanding of this point than long disquisitions. The motory manifestations are neither effects nor causes, but elements; together with the state of consciousness, which constitutes their subjective side, *they are* attention.

The reader, however, is not to regard this as anything more than a rough outline, or provisional view, that will be completed later on. Thus, we have not spoken of the feeling of effort, because it is very rare in spontaneous attention, if met with at all. But the part sustained by the movements is sufficiently important to justify repeated investigations of the subject.

(To be continued.)

* *Physiologische Psychologie*, pp. 723-724 of the first edition. This passage is not found in the following editions.

† Loc. cit., p. 316.

RETROGRESSION IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE LIFE.*

BY AUGUST WEISMANN.

III.

We have seen that phenomena of retrogression find their explanation in a sort of negative natural selection. But it is further manifest that an organ can degenerate only in those conditions where its use depends upon an actual activity of the organs, where it is influenced, so to speak. In vision, chemical changes take place in the retina of the eye, perhaps, too, in the optic nerves—changes that cease when the eye is no longer exposed to the light. In flying, an energetic metamorphosis of tissue takes place in the muscles that work the wings, and this metamorphosis also ceases when the bird ceases to use its wings. Accordingly, certain parts of the eye and the muscles here, must be retrogressively affected so soon as non-use sets in.

But why should it affect the anther of *one* flower that its pollen does or does not get into the stigma of *another, different* flower? No interactive influence here is brought to bear. And yet we find cases where androgynous flowers have returned to the original sep-

* Translated from the German by *μκρκ*.

aration of the sexes; the anthers in the one flower, and the styles in the other, having wasted away. Whether this case is to be explained simply by a remission of selective action, whether or not natural selection plays an active part, is another question. But let us follow it further. When the anthers, in the course of the development of the species, have wasted away and disappeared entirely, their filaments still remain and, as is not infrequently the case, are of considerable length and strength. Gradually, yet very gradually, these, in their turn, waste away, and they are found in some classes comparatively long, in others short, in others not at all, only appearing occasionally in an individual flower as a reminder of its former, complete presence. The filament of the stamen is no longer used; but why should it be thereby affected and suffer a retrograde growth! Its structure has remained the same, the sap circulates within it just as before, and flows to it just as much as it does to the flowers next to it, or to the style. From our point of view the matter is easily explained. The stalk of the stamen is not now a determining condition of the permanence of the species in question; natural selection is no longer concerned with it, and it gradually degenerates.

Still plainer and still more elucidative are certain cases in the animal kingdom. Why have most of our domestic animals lost their original color? Plainly because, under the protection of man, their color is of little or no importance to them; whereas in the open life of the wilderness it formed a material protection against pursuit by their enemies.

Quite similar is the case of the *disappearance of the hair*—a phenomenon common among those mammals for whom hair is no longer of importance. Whales and dolphins have a bare, hairless hide, although they are undoubtedly descended from hairy ancestors, and an examination by the microscope still shows, on some parts of the body, rudimentary hairs in the skin. It is clear that the removal of the coat is not in any way the direct result of non-use, for it does not affect the growth of the hair whether the warmth it affords is necessary and useful to the animal or not. In an indirect way, however, the case is easily explainable. As soon as the development of an enormous blubber beneath the hide of the whale, afforded a perfect protection against the cold, the coat of hair became superfluous; natural selection is no longer concerned with it, and a retrogression of growth sets in. Should it be thought, perhaps, that the direct effects of the water had caused the hair to disappear, we have only to call to mind the seals, the smaller kinds of which have a thick fur, while the larger, as for example the walrus, have only a few spare bristles on their skins; they, like the whale, having developed a blubber, which alone is sufficient to keep their huge bodies warm.

An example of quite a different kind is furnished by animals that conceal parts of their bodies in cases and shells. Thus the hermit-crab thrusts the hind part of its body into empty univalve shells, the larvæ of quiver-flies (Phryganidæ) construct in the water cases for themselves, in which they conceal the long, many-limbed hind-parts of their bodies, and the same is true of the larvæ of certain small butterflies of the spinner-group, the so-called Psychidæ.

In all these cases we find that the skin of the protected parts of the body is soft and whitish, that is, without any particular coloring, while the parts that project from the shell possess the usual, hard protective mail of articulate animals and various, though chiefly brilliant, colors. One might, indeed, say, in a certain, and yet incorrect, sense, that the protective armor of crustaceans and insects had the "*function*" of protecting the soft internal parts from external injury, but in the true sense this is no function, for there is no activity involved. The rôle of the protective covering depends simply upon its passive presence. Whether the animal is protected by it against thrusts and bites, or whether such attacks never reach it, is entirely immaterial to it and its permanence; it loses and gains nothing thereby, and its good condition is not in the least dependent upon its being frequently struck and bitten. The fact of its having withdrawn into the shell from such possible attacks, can, in no way, directly cause a retrogression of growth. If therefore, in each of the three instances cited, the protective armor has suffered a retrogression of growth exactly to the point to which the shell reaches, this in its turn can only be explained by the fact of its having become unnecessary and unimportant to the parts covered, and consequently natural selection could not concern itself longer with its preservation.

The most striking illustrations, however, are furnished us by colonizing insects and particularly by *ants*. The male and female ants have wings and use them at certain periods of the year to rise high into the air in great swarms. Yet these male and female ants form but a small portion of the population of an ant community; the principal part is composed of the working-ants, the common wingless specimens. They have lost their wings, in the course of the development of their species, through non-use; for they have no occasion to fly, and in fact they would be exposed to greater dangers in the air than on the ground, and that without having obtained any advantage therefor. Their business is to procure sustenance, wood for building, and everything to be found on the ground; they have to feed the larvæ and care for the young; to them alone belongs the responsibility of protecting

the colony against the attacks of an enemy. All these duties confine them to the ground. In earlier periods, when they gradually developed from actual females, they must have used their wings less and less, according as they devoted themselves more and more to the exclusive performance of the above named duties. Here too, it seems, we could assume that the constant disuse of the wings had caused a slight retrogression of growth in each individual and that this retrogression had been transmitted to the following generation and had there, by further disuse, reached a higher stage than before; and so on. But in this we are confronted by a circumstance that admits of no evasion or compromise: *the working-ants are barren, they do not propagate!*

It is therefore impossible that the stage of retrogression reached in an individual case could be transmitted to the following generation. The disappearance of the wings admits only of the other explanation; namely, the remission of the process of natural selection from the moment the wings become unnecessary and useless. It might be asserted, perhaps, that the wings had disappeared before the power to propagate was lost; but such an assumption must be rejected upon very definite grounds, which I must here omit to mention. It might be brought forward that the barrenness of the working-ants is a stumbling-block to our way of explanation; but it must not be forgotten that all processes of natural selection here take their course not directly in the working-ants but in their parents, the sexually-potent individuals of the colony. In other words, the working-ants are not a subject of natural selection themselves; but their *parents* are, in proportion as they bring forth less perfect or more perfect workers.

We might very appropriately term this phenomenon, which brings about the retrogression of an unnecessary organ, *universal crossing* (*panmixy*), for the principle of it is this: that not only those individuals come to be propagated that possess the organ in question at its point of greatest perfection, but that all do, quite irrespective of the fact whether in their case the organ is at a high or low stage of development.

This process of panmixy must have been of great significance in the development of the organic world, and must be still; for innumerable transformations were and are going on, and they have by no means always been progressive in their action, but very frequently (as we have seen in the case of the parasites) retrogressive, and perhaps most frequently of all, they were both at the same time, progressive in one organ and regressive in another. We ourselves could hardly have arrived at so high a stage of intellectual development, if we had not sacrificed a considerable share of the *physical* powers of our primitive ancestors. Even to-day the nations that live from the chase exhibit a far greater keenness of perception, hearing, seeing, and smelling, than we possess; now this certainly does not depend alone upon the uninterrupted use which in the individual life is exacted of these organs; on the contrary it is innate. Owing to our civilization, we have degenerated in this respect, and this degeneration is due to panmixy; for a highly perfected development of the *senses* no longer determines the individual welfare. We can earn our bread to-day just the same, whether we have acute ears and delicate organs of smell, or not. Even keenness of sight is no longer a determining factor in the struggle for existence. Since the invention of spectacles keen-sighted individuals have scarcely any advantage, with regard to productive power, over near-sighted ones; at any rate not in the higher classes of society. This is why we find so many near-sighted people among us. In ancient times a near-sighted soldier or a near-sighted general for that matter, would have been out of the question, likewise a near-sighted hunter; in fact, in almost every pursuit in human society near-sightedness would have been a great hindrance, and would have rendered advancement and comfortable existence difficult, or have made it impossible. To-day this is no longer the case; the person of poor eyesight can make his way as well as another and his near-sightedness, in so far as it is due to constitutional inheritance, will be handed down to his descendants and will contribute towards making inheritable near-sightedness a wide-spread symptom in certain classes of society. Near-sightedness, it is true, can also be acquired but it is then not inheritable. In my opinion, we are not to attribute the wide prevalence of near-sightedness to the excessive straining of the eyes and their continual use at short distances alone, but rather to *panmixy*, to the remission of natural selection in this quarter, for we are as much subjected to its effect as other organisms are.

Much could be said of the different ways in which the physical constitution of civilized man has, owing to civilization itself, become impaired and will undoubtedly continue to become more so. Let us take the teeth; the art of dentistry has reached such a high stage of perfection that one might almost prefer artificial to natural ones. At any rate no one need die to day for lack of nourishment in consequence of bad teeth, and the poorest teeth may be uninterruptedly inherited by descendants without end.

Notwithstanding these facts, we need have no ground to fear that the human race will, because of its civilization, degenerate altogether. The corrective principle here lies in the same process that brings about the decline of an organ from its original state; for plainly this decline can only continue so long as it

does not impair the individual's capacity to exist; when this point is reached, the selective power of nature interferes and prevents a further degeneration. But, following the instance given, it is quite conceivable that the percentage of those who are constitutionally near-sighted will increase; not, however, that the visual powers of the human race in general, or of any people, or of any class in society, will sink from the present standard. For then individual existence would be at stake, and the possessor of weak eyes could no longer compete in the struggle for existence. We have no need, therefore, to fear that our eyes will ever completely degenerate like those of animals living in the dark and the parasites before mentioned; and the same thing is true of the enfeeblement of our muscular powers and of our powers of endurance in general.

I have hitherto spoken only of those functions of the body which through non-use and the resultant panmixy have suffered retrogression of growth; the same thing is true of our mental qualities. Nor is this surprising, for every mental process is conditioned by a physical one. The relative size and complexity of the brain is not all that determines the degree of intelligence; every instinctive action of an animal presupposes a corresponding disposition of the nervous system, which brings it about that a certain irritation is followed by a certain action. When therefore certain instincts of an animal pass away in consequence of non-use, the nerve-fibres that effect instinctive action, must have previously wasted away. There exists really no material contrariety between the fact of the degeneration of physical organs and that of instincts and mental powers; the one goes hand in hand with the other.

A complete and universal physical degeneration is, likewise, followed by a mental degeneration. The internal parasites which have lost their eyes, feelers, legs, and masticatory organs, are mentally degenerate —quite natural of animals that can do nothing but lie still and absorb sustenance. Their entire nervous system is greatly degenerated.

There are instances, too, which show in a most interesting manner that retrogression may affect only a *single* instinct, and, at the same time, the animal will remain, both in form and power, wholly unaffected thereby.

Here belongs the loss, in domestic animals, of the instinctive impulse to flee. Most all wild animals, mammals as well as birds, flee instinctively; they are not only extremely suspicious of every rustle, of every smell, of every moving object within their field of vision, but are all unceasingly on the alert for their safety, beasts of prey not excepted. They are not so consciously, however, through reflection; but unconsciously and in a high degree instinctively. A wild bird takes to flight at the softest rustling, the hedge-hog which has been taken unawares and rolled himself into a ball, waits a long time before unrolling, and at the slightest suspicious sound rolls himself up again. The animal does not reason in this matter; the act is purely instinctive with him. The rolling together is the immediate result of his hearing the sound and takes place before the animal has had time to reflect upon the meaning of the noise—instantaneously, just as we close an eye when some object drives against it. In higher animals consciousness of course controls these instinctive movements, that is, they may be suppressed, and this explains why animals in confinement get rid of their habits of timidity and flight. But the instinct is deeply rooted in them and it takes generations and generations of confinement for this inborn timidity to disappear. My opinion is that this depends for the most part upon a remission of the selective power of nature and upon the resulting, gradual degeneration of the instinct. In this case it is indeed hard to say in how far the habits of the individual influence the degeneration, but it is quite safe to assume that the young of tame chickens, geese, and ducks, having lost much of the instinct of flight possessed by their wild ancestors, would never again fully acquire their original timidity, even if placed under the guidance and protection of a wild parent from the beginning of their lives on.

How slowly this latent wildness, as we may call the instinct to flee, disappears by domestication, is seen in the case of the guinea-pig. Only since the discovery of South America, almost four hundred years ago, have these animals been introduced into the household of man, and this period of time has not been sufficient to rid them of their natural timidity. They start violently at every noise, and attempt to flee, even when they have never had a bad experience before in their lives; and this is true of them immediately after birth. In this instance, just as with the different species of pheasants that have been domesticated, the young are the wildest. The instinct of flight is quite fully inherited, and taming must commence anew with each individual. The tameness of the full-grown animal is in this instance an "acquired" attribute, that is, one acquired during the life of the individual; it has not yet passed into the germinal constitution of the animal, or better: it does not come from a change in the germinal constitution, such as must gradually occur through *panmixy*, but it comes just as it does in the case of a wild animal captured young, a fox, a wolf, a finch, or a rat, all of which may, to a certain extent, be tamed, *i. e.*, made accustomed to the absence of enemies.

(To be concluded.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

SELFISM = PAN-ONTISM.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

"Men and their Gods pass away, but still
I [Ego] am Maker and End, I am God, I am Will."

FOR a number of years past in separate publications, and in the pages chiefly of the *Journal of Science*, *Natural Reformer*, and *Agnostic Journal*, I have been laboring to expound a new theorem of Nature and human nature, based entirely on our present unexampled standpoint of Science and Philosophy, under the term of Hylo-Idealism or the Brain system of Mind and Matter. Any thoughtful reader of these expositions must notice that this solipsismal Monism arraigns the course of Nature herself as practically capricious, changeful, and in very many respects, so malignantly hostile to human, and indeed all sentient, welfare and meliorism, as to be impossibly the design and "handiwork" of an omnipotent, unconditioned, or absolute, and all-beneficent personal Demiurge or Creator.* All Science and abstract synthesis, *for ages past*, indeed, negative animistic Dualism, and demonstrate unmistakably the truth of Monistic Materialism, *i. e.*, the universality of Matter and its function, to the exclusion altogether, of a second substance or *pseudo*-Spirit. For the latter, indeed, there is no linguistic expression whatsoever. All nomenclature invented to convey and embody animistic or "spiritual" notions is derived from material ones. Saint, Sanctity, Salvation, Saviour, etc., for instance, refer only to organic soundness, health, or "well-faring." The terms "Soul" (Life) and "Spirit" (Breath) are the same and even God (Khoda or Lord) is as distinctly human and hylic as is *Deus*, or the Lustrous (Epiphanes). It must be noticed, parenthetically, how much more stress is laid in the Revised Version of the Bible on the material theory of vitality than in the hitherto authorized Canon. The word Psyche is, in the latter, on all important occasions at least, rendered Life not "Soul"—though at bottom identical, as in Christ's *dictum* that "all a man has he will give for his *life*." Even though, as above stated, "Soul" is no true differentiation, being merely the Anglo-Saxon synonym of life and therefore a fictitious verbal distinction only, not any real one. *Anima*, *Pneuma* is the same. Psyche and Pneuma, I repeat, mean primarily and veridically merely *Vita*, or Life, or Breath, and only by a secondary and vicious gloss and misinterpretation comes to signify a *donum divinum* superadded to, and dominating somatic organization. The term *Geist* is etymologically one with Gas. All primordial scientific syntaxes, from the attraction of Gravitation up to dynamic anatomy or somatology predicate the same immutable fact that Matter has *within itself* active, dædal, or creative energy and thus requires no supplementing of its own working-power by the intrusion of any other substance or entity whatsoever. The very *con*ception is not only logically inconceivable, but in its very *in*ception contrary to the very elements of reason. It is an heirloom from primitive Medicine-men in the agriological stage of our race. Animals develop from plants and mineral earth, as Modern Chemistry abundantly proves, since Wöhler's artificial manufacture of *Urea* sixty years ago. No separate vital principle differentiates the organic from the inorganic and the Chemistry of the former is now recognized merely as that of carbon compounds. Thus Science compels us to regard man and ultimately the Self-unit as only sentient (innervated) inorganic substance—as indeed stated already speculatively in Genesis, without "soul" or God or future life or need for such—all Pan-ontism, as stated in the title to this paper, being contained in Selfism. The imaginary has no definite limits and in that sphere, if unrestrained by the Phenomenalism of inductive and exact Science, we may gyrate, without real progress in a vicious circle, to all eternity. But if confined to sober, realizable fact, proverbially grander than all fiction, we discard the absolutism of first causes or Eschatology and find ourselves at home only in Relativism and Phenomenalism. *En revanche*, however, for this limitation, or delimitation, in that sphere we are supreme as the fabulous classic Pantheon, only like it exposed to the fatalities of Chance, Fortune, or Destiny, fatalities diminished by all advances in rational or scientific experience of Nature, resolvable ultimately into *Self*-experience or knowledge.

Science cuts both ways. It raises giants and *cruces* of all kinds, undreamt of in earlier epochs of the world and thought, of which the present epoch is the father, but if rightly handled and guided, it brings also the solution of the painful riddle it has framed, as James Watt held that Nature has her weak side if we can only hit it. And no solution of the *crux* can be more simple and convincing than this Autocosm extorted from the "charnel-house" of Physics and Physiology. It lands us, as I state in *Life and Mind*, in the certainty, quite devoid of all conjecture, that all we need aim at, as our *summum bonum*, our chief end on earth is not to "glorify God and enjoy him forever," which is the Utopian dream of oriental visionaries, but simply to retain, or recover, perfect physical health, *which includes mental and moral sanity*—the seat of which, as of all other sensation and thought is in the supreme hemispheres of the Brain. In seeking after God we really are only fathoming the Self. That end attained all and everything is well. Happiness and Life, zest which alone renders Existence worth having, is the equivalent of the normal Hedonism of healthy, bodily function, and more than which Existence has not to impart.* The abnormal rapture and consolations of all Religions betoken, and are the symptoms of physiological conditions corresponding to such pathological states as Calenture, Mirage, and other forms of neurotic deliration and Narcosis.† Even the Alcoholism known to British soldiers as "the Horrors" or "Delirium Tremendous," when uncomplicated by pronounced hepatic derangement, is not unfrequently, at least paroxysmally, attended by pleasurable and grandiose symptoms. Just as the raptures of saints and martyrs have their paroxysms and reactions of despondency, doubt, despair, horror, and other visions of Inferno.

ROBERT LEWINS, M. D.

LONDON, ENG.

* President Carnot, at the recent opening of the Parisian Exhibition, takes this Hygienic view of the real character of our century. He sums up the present standpoint of civilization in the formula: "*Human Life lengthened, mortality diminished*," thus elevating Hygiene, or State Medicine, into the throne, now vacant, once occupied by Religion.

† It will be remembered that the apostolic frenzy at the Pentecostal Descent of the "Holy Ghost" was confounded, by indifferent outsiders, with that of vinous inebriation.

* Bishop Butler's "Analogy," the most profound defense of Revelation in any language, is quite nullified by this arrangement of "Nature," which is itself only a mental concept like all else—a "think," not a "thing." Hylo-Idealism is only an expansion of the later Nominalism (Conceptualism).

PRODUCTION AND LAND-OWNERSHIP.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

DR. WOOD returns to the charge in No. 106 of THE OPEN COURT with a criticism entitled "Wheelbarrow's Heresy"; and reasoning inversely, as his habit seems to be, pretends to see some "George Theory" in my article on "Convict Labor" printed in No. 103 of THE OPEN COURT. By the orthodox tone of Dr. Wood, I recognize a controversial friend who used to say: "I differ with you in this matter and that puts you *prima facie* in the wrong."

Because I claim that every man should work in order that our comforts may be multiplied, Dr. Wood concludes that by that claim I testify to the wisdom of his way of reaching the result. This begs the question, for the dispute between us is about the means to accomplish the desired end. Dr. Wood assumes that because I wish to see a sufferer cured of typhoid fever, I must

therefore favor the remedies prescribed by Dr. Wood, when, in fact, I may believe that his treatment of the case will make the patient worse instead of better.

Dr. Wood appears to think it "no trouble to show goods," and he spreads upon the counter a lot of remnants which have been in stock for ages, such as "comforts and necessities are drawn from the great storehouse of nature"; "by labor acting upon raw material wealth is produced"; "without access to the raw materials furnished by the earth, labor must cease to exist"; and much Bunsbeyism of the same sort. I am ponderously told that after inspecting those remnants I shall be "forced to admit that the right to live, the right to labor and produce being granted, it also follows that the right to land upon which to labor and to live is self-evident."

I am not sure that I have "the right to live," any more than the sheep which I slay for food; but I am certain that I have "the right to labor," and I must do my fellow-men the justice to say they have never abridged that right. In fact, they have never been jealous when I have enjoyed the right of working twelve, fourteen, or sixteen hours a day. "The right to labor," in my case, has been too generously given.

Was it by inadvertence or design that Dr. Wood, while insisting upon my right "to live, to labor, and to produce," omitted to mention my right to *own?*. If he answers that the "right to land upon which to labor and to live," includes the rest, I reply that it does not. The negro slaves had the right to land on which to live and labor. It was a worthless right. What I contend for is the right to land upon which to labor and to live, to *own* and to enjoy. The "George Theory" denies me the right to own.

"God has made man a land-animal," says Dr. Wood, "incapable of existing elsewhere, and an all-wise intelligence would never have subjected man to certain conditions without at the same time furnishing him with the right and means of compliance." How does Dr. Wood know all that? Is he a Doctor of Divinity too? I do not venture upon the theology of the question for I do not understand it, but admitting that Dr. Wood knows all about it, he proves too much. If God has made man a land-animal, has he not made the deer a land-animal also? And what right has one land-animal to deprive another land-animal of land? Every other land-animal asserts the same inheritance from God. The water-animals all make the same claim to the sea. One claim is as good as the other. God made the sea, says the whale, for me. Who shall contradict him? Are not all the "conditions" of his argument there?

The buffalo claims that the land-animal man has tortured and disfigured the land with plows, and harrows, and spades, instead of leaving it undefiled and beautiful as it came from the hand of God. He says, the "all-wise intelligence made these plains and covered them with grass for me. He has adapted me to grazing conditions and supplied the grass. He would not do that without furnishing me the right of enjoyment. The red Indian land-animal denies that, and asserts that God made the plains as hunting-grounds for him, and furnished the game in the shape of buffalo. The Caucasian land-animal denies the rights of both, and says that the fertility of the soil proves that God made the land for the man who has sense enough to plow it and plant it with cabbages and corn. We are on perilous ground when we declare the purposes of God.

In the early settlement of Iowa there lived on the Boone river in what is now called Webster county, a frontiersman named Allen. I knew him well, Horatio, a fellow of infinite jest, of most exquisite fancy. He was a brave, kind, hospitable, honest man, and like Nimrod, "a mighty hunter before the Lord." He had a wife to correspond, a mother in Israel blessed in the memory of all travelers who have stopped at her house on their way forward and backward across that part of Iowa. We had to stop there, for it was the only place to stop between the Iowa river and the Des-Moines. Mrs. Allen carried a sensitive religious conscience into everything, even into cookery. In that virtue she excelled all other women. I do not think that any other woman ever knew how to cook a venison steak, and cook it right; while the recollection of her crab-apple sauce is a perpetual feast to me.

My work in those days caused me to travel a good deal across that country, and I often stopped at Allen's, where I was always welcomed with three cheers; no flip-flap shake of the hand, and a formal "glad to see you," but three actual cheers that shook the leaves off the trees in "Allen's Grove." And then the best of everything, fish, venison, and such butter and cream as the city millionaire cannot buy for money. I dare not mention the size and flavor of the vegetables because if I should mention them, I should not be believed. Allen was a devout man, and gave thanks to God in a frank, sincere, and manly way. Always before retiring for the night the household united with him in prayer, and this is what he prayed: "Oh Lord, we thank thee that thou hast cast our lot in this howling wilderness; we thank thee that although the buffalo is getting scarce, the elk is abundant on the prairie, and the deer tollable plenty in the timber; we thank thee for the Boone river meandering through the grove; we thank thee for stocking it with fish of good quality, and that we have no trouble in getting a mess of pickerel or black bass, and occasionally a trout." Here was a land-animal who religiously believed that all other land-animals, and water-animals for that matter, were created merely to be his prey; but the elk, the deer, the pickerel, and the trout were of a different opinion, and might reasonably claim the benefit of the argument from adaptation.

It is a melancholy delusion that by abolishing the private ownership of land production will be increased and the comforts of life multiplied. The opposite result must follow, and for that reason I oppose the fantastic speculation called the "George Theory." It is merely a claim refuted by the history of centuries and by all the facts of civilization. Without the right or hope of ownership there is no stimulus to production. Where individual reward is denied, individual exertion ceases. Men will not cultivate land without security of tenure, and the best security is ownership. This is the supreme inspiration of agriculture. To increase production I desire to increase the number of land-owners instead of abolishing land-owners altogether. Mr. George's design is a reaction toward the primitive state of man.

It is not new. It was the law for thousands of years, and it is yet the law among the barbarous tribes in Africa, America, and Australia. It yielded slowly to the law of evolution, but it yielded, and its resurrection is impossible. By this law the hunter gives way to the shepherd, and the shepherd yields to the ploughman. Man developed from the savage state where all the lands and animals were owned in common, to the pastoral state, where flocks and herds were private property, and from the pastoral state to the higher civilization of agriculture, wherein the title to the very land itself was given to the farmer as an inducement for him to cultivate the soil.

From game to sheep was a great advance, from a forest of doubtful food to a land flowing with milk and honey, was a beneficent emigration. The phrase poetically pictures a land rich in grass for cattle and flowers for bees. Only a pastoral people could appreciate its value. From a land of milk and honey to a land of corn, and wine, and oil, was a more beneficent emigration still. It was an advance to agriculture and the private ownership of land. This law of evolution is visible in the allegory of Cain and Abel. Abel was a "keeper of sheep," but Cain was "a tiller of the ground." Pasturage is overcome by tillage. It is the law. The man who can earn his dinner from a yard of land must have the land in preference to him who requires for his dinner a territory long and wide as a sheep's ramble, or a stretch of land equal to the reach of an arrow from his bow. The scheme of confis-

cation as advanced by Henry George and his disciples, if seriously attempted, would countermarch humanity and turn mankind from progress backwards towards poverty.

WHEELBARROW.

MR. CONANT'S CASE AGAIN.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IF Mr. J. G. Conant will send me his address, I will be pleased to send him a copy of "Progress and Poverty," if he will read it; for he will see all through it the same indignation against taxing brains and pluck that burns in Mr. Conant's letter in THE OPEN COURT for August 29th. Had the land speculators who are holding land for a rise near Mr. Conant's home, been compelled to pay exactly the same taxes as he paid on *land of the same value, whether improved or not*, he would be still resting under his own vine and roof-tree. Most of us hold, that the man who corners wheat and thereby increases the cost of bread, injures us. But even the man who corners wheat benefits the wheat producer and stimulates production by raising prices But speculation for a rise in land leads to less food and less production of all kinds. The man who "corners" a piece of unimproved land, to the extent of his corner, prevents all production. He injures us without any compensating advantage.

What we single-tax men seek is merely to see that this land speculator should no longer escape his fair share of taxation. In both city and country he has shouldered it off on citizens and farmers. Let him try paying his own score for a while. In the cities this vacant lot speculator prevents the production of houses and thereby crowds people like cattle; in the country he prevents the production of food. For these "bounties" we have been rewarding him by exempting his wild country land from all taxation and taxing the city lots lightly as "agricultural land," while he holds them idle. What we ask, in brief, is that two men owning land of *equal value* pay the *same taxes*, whether the one is used and the other is idle or not.

We do not ask that the men who injure the community by land speculation shall be punished for it, but we do ask in the name of justice that our legislative Solons shall stop rewarding them at our expense. In most counties of this state and adjoining states a man's taxes are raised if he paints his barn. Whom does he injure in painting it? If, two farmers owning land of equal area, fertility, and value, one is idle, neglects his fences, allows thistles and weeds to grow in the fence-corners, his houses and barns to decay, and his stock run wild, and the other is industrious, thrifty, keeps things in apple-pie order, and improves his stock and surroundings, we all know that the last-named pays the most taxes.

But why? Are criminals so rare that industry must be made a crime? Is it wise to fine a man for thrift? When injurious dogs increase too much, we tax them to reduce their number. Unless we have too many houses, let us stop taxing men for making them, or stop calling them improvements. In every growing community the value of the land (as distinct from all improvements) increases with the growth of the population, with the arrival of every immigrant, with the birth of every child. Every improvement, public or private, adds to it. It is a value, due, not to the efforts of any one individual, but is drawn equally from all. It is from this value, created by the community, that we hold the community should draw when funds are needed for public purposes before we take from any one any portion of his earnings as an individual.

Hence, we ask you to exempt entirely from taxation all improvements, all products of industry, and abolish poverty by adopting the single-tax on land values.

Yours respectfully,

PHILADELPHIA, PA. W. J. ATKINSON.

RETROGRESSION A CONDITION OF EVOLUTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

MAY I say a word in regard to the article which appears in your issue of August 29th, on "Retrogression in Animal and Vegetable Life." It seems to me that our German friend and his translator are wrong in their use of the word *Retrogression*

Retrogression, if I understand it in evolution, is going back to original or lower forms of life—it is the antithesis or negation of evolution. When a tadpole loses its tail and becomes a frog, it is not a case of retrogression but of evolution. So with the Kiwi or wood-ostrich; it was evolved from a reptile or a lower form of animal life which had claws or wings. In the process of *evolution* these, being no longer necessary, were dropped. Now if a Kiwi could be found *with* wings, or something like the wings of its ancestors, *this* would be retrogression. In the case of the eyeless fish it is not retrogression but evolution when it becomes blind, because by this means it becomes better adapted to its environment. If now in the Mamouth cave a fish should be found *with* eyes, this would be retrogression, that is if the ancestors of these blind fish ever did have eyes, as that would be going back to original forms. Losing a member of the body, when that member is not necessary, is not retrogression but evolution. To *retain* a member after it has served its purpose, *that* is retrogression.

TOLEDO, OHIO. A. G. JENNINGS.

[On the very page from which Mr. Jennings has taken his illustrations, Prof. Weismann states, explicitly, that "the *retrogression of organs* which have become superfluous is a condition of *progression* in the organic world"; in other words, that the retrogression of *parts*, in adaptation to environment, is a condition of the evolution of the *organism entire*. There may be a retrogression of a part and an evolution of the whole; as well as an evolution of a part and a retrogression of the whole. The tadpole, losing his tail, becomes a frog. This *is* an evolution [*sic!*] of the *tadpole*, but a retrogression, indubitably, of the *tail*. So with the Kiwi. His evolution to his present form is indeed dependent upon the loss of his wings. Nor does Prof. Weismann say that this is a retrogression of the *Kiwi*; he says, and with perfect correctness, that it is a retrogression of the *wings*. Mr. Jennings may choose to call the loss of an eye, in eyeless fish, an evolution; it may be with reference to the *fish*. But Prof. Weismann, a man "of a large discourse, looking before and after," skillfully evades this possibility of a controversy that has no scientific significance, and calls it what with reference to the *eye* it really is; namely, a *retrogression* of the eye. There is nothing fixed or immobile in the word retrogression, that will make it apply to an organism entire and not to an organ. Retrogression expresses, naturally, anything that retrogrades, and Prof. Weismann uses it in this sense in the essays that follow; be it a retrogression that conditions the highest evolutionary form of existence, or be it a retrogression that involves the complete structural transformation of an animal, leading it, as in the internal parasite, from a high form of crustacean life to an almost unrecognizable egg-sack. Apply Mr. Jenning's definitions to the crustacean parasites. All loss that makes an animal "better adapted to its environment" is evolution. The crustacean parasite loses everything, almost, that it has; it loses its protective covering, its legs, feelers, eyes; the segmentation of the body, the characteristic mark of Crustacea, disappears; head, stomach, intestines, the buccal cavity, all vanish: until it would seem that the very boundary of individuality separating host and parasite were undiscoverable. Here is a perfect instance of adaptation to the conditions of existence, or evolution; and undoubtedly, in Mr. Jennings's words, a "going back to lower forms," or retrogression. Consequently, evolution is retrogression. This may seem specious reasoning; but in a distinction of words specious reasoning is always possible.—*μκρκ.*]

BOOK REVIEWS.

SONST, HEUTE UND EINST, IN RELIGION UND GESELLSCHAFT. By *Dr. F. Staudinger*. Leipzig: H. G. Findel.

This little pamphlet entitled "Formerly, Now, and To Come in Religion and Society" is a popular exposition of the thoughts that form the content general of the author's larger work, "Die Gesetze der Freiheit," of which one volume only has appeared and of which three are to follow. "People must be educated to Socialism," reads the motto, "and their education must begin upon the basis of existing conditions" First Dr. Staudinger attacks belief dependent on authority and opposes to it the belief that comes of reason He will not hear that the masses are unprepared for the reception of the latter, but points to the lives of those who are, and says that others are not less capable. Then he examines Religion, Christianity in particular, and finds that the latter creed has left us one heritage: that true perfection lies within and not without. Morality is a bringing of the life-interests of the individual into ever more perfect agreement with the interests of all the world; human perfection in human community is the ideal. The conditions are personal and material: first, truthfulness, love and deeds; second, knowledge, education, and organization. In the union of the interest of of self with the interest of all, lies the corner-stone of the New Ideal. Then follows the "Critique of the Present," a review of social misery and the weakness, practical and theoretical, of the fabric that makes it possible; whereof the conclusion is that private ownership of land must be abolished and a social organization substituted in its stead. But Dr. Staudinger differs from the popular reformers of the day as to the methods by which the social idea is to be realized. "The Social Organization," and "The Way to the End," concluding chapters in which the outlines of his scheme are sketched, form the most interesting and instructive parts of the work.

THE *Art Amateur* for September has some remarks on the coming of Millet's Angelus to America, which place in a strong light the absurdity of our restrictions on the importation of works of art. In answer to the question "Will it be admitted Free of Duty?" we feel inclined to answer in the spirit of Socrates, "Free of Duty! No. It is our duty to send a guard of honor to meet this great teacher of Holiness at the wharf and to pay public thanks to the munificent purchaser who will give us the chance to see the original of those many copies in which, in however poor guise, it has carried a spirit of love and piety into the households of our land."

Let us at least demand that this master-piece be made an exception to the petty rules of the Custom House and placed on the Free List by right of the blessing it brings to us, instead of its owner being obliged to resort to trickery to ensure its admission.

Theodore Child concludes his interesting accounts of the Paris Exposition with a particular description of the Jewellry in which he says that Tiffany of New York excels all others in originality and variety of design. The French, he says, in order to rival them have "aimed simply at perfection." This would not be an unworthy aim for our artists to unite with their efforts after originality and beauty. Some interesting notes on the Ceramics of the exhibition conclude the article.

Ernest Knauff's instructive remarks on Pen Drawing for Photogravure are well illustrated by reproductions from various artists, a drawing by D. Requier from Hebert's Rabelais is particularly good. We are glad to see that Edith Scannell's drawings have more freedom and variety of expression than usual.

The colored print "A Rustic Scene after Veyressat," is unusually pretty in design and harmonious in color. E. D. C.

The contents of the *Revue Philosophique* for September are as follows: "L'esthétique contemporaine—la Mimique dans le système des Beaux-Arts," Ch. Bénard; "Philosophes espagnols—Gomez Pereira," J. M. Guardia; "Catégories logiques et institutions sociales," (Concluded), G. Tarde. Analyses et comptes rendus. Notices bibliographiques. (Félix Alcan, publisher, 108, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris.)

"In this essay (*God and the Universe*, by James W. Stillman; Boston: J. S. Atkins, 30 Broomfield St.) says the author, "we propose to consider the alleged existence of a Supreme Being and the theistic hypothesis of creation." Mr Stillman's argument is popularly presented, and although purely formal, does not fall into metaphysical abstruseness. But in refuting the hypothesis of creation Mr. Stillman confines himself to the overthrow of theological dogmas respecting the same, and does not consider the idea of creation from the universal, and scientific standpoint. Mr. Stillman's conclusion is, "that the whole problem of the existence of God and the origin of the Universe is entirely above and beyond the scope of the human intellect."

We have received from the Purdy Publishing Co., of Chicago, an attractive little pamphlet called "Selections from the Writings of George MacDonald, or, Helps for Weary Souls," compiled by Mr. J. Dewey. It is a book eminently adapted as a companion to persons of unshaken Christian faith, and contains many beautiful passages. "The soul," it is said in one place, "is not capable of generating its own requirements, it needs to be supplied from a well whose springs lie deeper than its own soil, in the Infinite All, namely, upon which that soul rests. Happy they who have found that those springs have an outlet in their hearts—on the hill of prayer." If "prayer" be taken here as defined on p. 1811 of THE OPEN COURT, this passage contains an ethical truth.

"The Spirit of Truth," by Thomas Herttell (Boston: *Investigator* Office), a pamphlet of 86 pages, is "an exposition of infidelity or religious unbelief." Mr. Herttell will reject religion in whatever form or guise it appears To him, it is the antithesis of Reason, it is Superstition, it cannot be Science. Mr. Herttell's "exposition" is mainly directed against Christianity—the mere representation of an historical idea, the accident of a period; but of religion in its comprehensive sense, a dwelling upon the relations of things, an outcome, "a weapon," as Prof Bender calls it, "in the struggle for existence," we have not a word. Yet this criticism cannot be advanced without restriction, for we believe that Mr. Herttell intentionally limits his discussion to the immediate dangers of serving hypocrisy and blind belief that face us.

NOTES.

M. Alfred Binet will soon present to the readers of THE OPEN COURT another series of articles on the phenomena of double consciousness.

The researches of Dr. Luys, summarized in the opening essay of this number, well illustrate the tendency of modern science: the resolution of the mysterious. It is to be hoped that the prediction of Dr. Luys with reference to the science of hypnotism, when realized, will bear out the comparison drawn from alchemy and chemistry, astrology and astronomy.

Dr. Robert Lewins, whose communication regarding his system of philosophy we publish in our present issue, is the propounder of the so-called theory of Hylo-Idealism or Auto-Centrism. Our readers will find the fuller exposition of Dr Lewins's doctrine in his interesting little work "Life and Mind: On the Basis of Modern Science" (Watts & Co., London)—a work which we shall review later in our columns.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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MAN AS A MICROCOSM.*

BY CARUS STERNE.

The sages of ancient India, the priests of Egypt, and the astrologers of Chaldea long ago pondered upon the interdependence of all existing things. They held that the harmony of the universe was so complete that nothing in it could be thought of that did not depend upon the rest; and in the more particular application of this principle they believed, that living creatures at their birth received the impress of the attendant constellation of the heavenly bodies, and that they ever afterwards remained subject to its influence.

On a *bas-relief* found by the noted French Ægyptologist Champollion, in 1827, upon the ceiling of the tomb of Ramses IV, there is represented the figure of a man, upon the different parts and members of whose body were drawn the stars and planets by which the parts were supposed to be influenced. Thus, upon the heart, the eyes, the ears, and the arms, were marked the stars that during the second half of the month of Tobi slowly rise at night from beneath the horizon, and under whose ascendency those members were believed to stand.

These ideas of antiquity met with a cordial reception among Saracenic scholars, who for a long time were the intermedium for the transmission of ancient philosophy to the peoples of modern times. In the tenth century of our era, the somewhat fantastically finished cosmic conception of this Oriental people was reduced to a system by the so-called Brothers of Purity or Sincerity. This system exhibits an evolutionary tendency. For according to its principles the creative power manifested itself by radiation into higher forms: thus it first produced minerals; then mineral-plants; then plants proper; later on, animal-plants and plant-animals, the lower and higher species, until, passing through man and angel, it reverted to divinity. Accordingly, said they, the forces of nature are all gathered together in man; all the elements of the mineral kingdom are represented in his body; to the nine spheres of the universe correspond the nine successive layers of his body, namely, marrow, bones, sinews, veins, blood, flesh, skin, nails, and hair; all the physical and psychical attributes of plants and animals unite in him; the heavenly bodies, particularly the planets, influenced his creation and continued to dominate the members of the body: the sun, the heart; the moon, the lungs; Mercury, the brain; Jupiter, the liver; Mars, the gall; and Venus, the abdomen.

Then, again, each member was redivided into separate regions, and they in their turn were supposed to be subject to the influence of the various heavenly bodies. In the art of chiromancy, or palmistry, which two hundred years ago was taught at almost all the universities, the masters, proceeding from the analogous principles of astrology, divided the palm of the hand into different sections, which were supposed to be subject to the sun, the moon, and the planets then known; and from the disposition of the lines of the moon and sun, from the configuration of the mountains of Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Mercury, and from the cestus of Venus, they read the future fate of the individuals in question; just as the astrologists in casting the horoscope of a man's life consulted the constellations of the stars and planets that were in the ascendant at the moment of his birth. Of the interaction and intercurrence of all parts of the universe upon and with each other, they were thoroughly convinced.

They fancied, accordingly, that they could, without any difficulty whatever, liken the conditions of man, the microcosm, or little world, to those of the macrocosm, or the great universe; and wonderful things, of course, resulted from this notion. The absurdities that this parallelism of human and cosmic life led them into, is perhaps best seen in a book published towards the close of the sixteenth century by Dr. Oswald Croll, court-physician to the Prince of Anhalt. In his "Treatise upon the Symbols of the Great and Little Universe," he attempted to prove the coincidence of the microcosm and macrocosm by the following oppositions:

MICROCOSM.	MACROCOSM.
Physiognomy, or face.	Aspect of heaven.
Chiromancy, or hand.	Minerals.
Pulse.	Movement of the heavens.
Chill.	Earthquake.
Flux.	Rain.
Stomach-aches.	Peals of thunder and hurricanes.
Kidney-troubles, etc.	Lightning in summer-time.
Leanness of the body.	Drought.
Dropsy.	Floods.
Epilepsy.	Tempest.

Of course, among men of greater intelligence these

*Translated from the German by μκρκ.

notions of the coincidence of human and cosmic life assumed a less superficial shape. The intellects of Greece and Rome, in their day, had also reflected upon this relation: how that man, as the being in which the universe first came to individual consciousness, must himself be the content of the All—a microcosm, in which every force and every element were represented, in which all chords vibrated and all the ends of creation must necessarily be realized. This notion is in reality nothing but the ultimate conclusion of an anthropocentric conception of the world which regarded man as the central point of the universe, as the actual, original reason of all creation, and the consummation of creation's work. Among the early teachers of the Christian Church we find the same idea developed. John of Damascus calls the first man, as he came from the hands of God, a "second little world within the great one," a being intermediate between earth and heaven, lowly and exalted, of the flesh and of the spirit, of earth and of heaven, temporal and eternal—in which the gifts of God had united with the attributes of earth." As servitor of heaven, he reigned supreme in the world that was created for him. For him alone did the stars shine, the earth bear fruit, the beasts give flesh, the flowers fill the air with fragrance and array themselves in glorious colors; and on the day of judgment, when all mankind were to meet their doom, all these wonders would share the common fate.

It is not our purpose here to take exception to the assertions of those abstruse philosophers who believe that this idea is the acme of human wisdom; who say that without the observing eye of a rational creature the genesis of the world could not be conceived of, and that thus the animals of primeval periods did not really exist until man had discovered their remains and shaped them anew, and that with the last of rational beings the world will sink again into the nothingness from which with man it originally arose. All this is but an apotheosis of the representative faculty wherein the latter instead of recognizing its true function here to be merely that of reproduction, would fain awaken and exorcise a world from nothingness—idle trickeries and self-delusions, to avoid the sorely felt limitations set to the faculty of direct cognition, and to hide the helplessness of philosophy as a constructive science.

Yet, withal, man could with justice regard himself the *heart* of that world which Plato has represented in his Philebos as a great organism, a sort of living animal, and whose throat and respiratory cavity the Middle Ages sought in the abyss of the Maelstrom. None could dispute that he was the highest expression, the culminating point of animal life; and with this fact was early associated the idea that in him the germinal elements of all existence must have been united to form a final and highest expression. "All forms of creation, organic as well as inorganic, are repeated in the organization of man," teaches the Talmud* in various passages; and adds that the dust of his body is come from all the quarters of the world, to the end that he may accomodate himself to the climates of all regions. In latter days it is Paracelsus particularly who has never wearied of giving reiterated expression in his books to these ideas.† "As the world was created from out of Limbus (primitive chaos) and as of all creatures man was created the last, so there is nothing in the world that is not comprised in him. Man has therefore the knowledge of the angels and the spirits, and comes by every art that other creatures possess, *for he has inherited it from them.*"

In his book upon the Plague he particularly emphasizes the theory that man bears in his body the likeness and attributes of all creatures created before him; and our author incidentally estimates the number of these creatures to be in round numbers MMCC. In his treatise upon the "Origin of Human Knowledge and the Human Arts," he remarks that the reason of man is also nothing but the collective reason of all animals, and that therefore man was the highest animal, for the animals individually did not possess the entire animal nature. Although every species of animal was contained in man, yet in the individual case only one of these attained pre-eminence of development; thus one man exhibited the temper of a dog; another, the voracity of a wolf; a third, the cunning of a fox; and so on. The magnitude of the influence that these ideas exerted, is hardly definable in a short essay. It was not alone that, in a book upon physiognomics,‡ the Neapolitan Baptista Porta taught a method of determining human character from the prominence of resemblances to certain animals;—an idea which the Danish painter Schack § a few years ago again made the subject of an extensive work. Here commence, moreover, the speculations concerning the gradation of created things that was supposed to begin with minerals and proceeding through plant, animal, and man, to extend to the highest Being—speculations which were especially favored by Leibnitz and his school and closely associated with his theory of monads.

This idea of the repetition of all creation in man had a still more immediate and important result in the school of so-called Naturalistic Philosophers—now so vehemently persecuted and abused by the very ones who are most akin to them in the unintelligibility and

* Dr. Placzek, *Darwinismus und Talmud*, in the *Jüdisches Literaturblatt*, 1878, No. 1, et seqq.

† Compare Huser's edition of Paracelsus (Strassburg, 1616–18), especially Vol. I, pp. 327 and 581, and Vol. II, p. 326.

‡ Baptista Porta, *De Humana Physiognomia*, Hanoviae, 1593.

§ Sophus Schack, *Physiognomische Studien*. Jena, 1881.

grotesqueness of their view of the world. This school of philosophy moved entirely within the circle of microcosmic ideas defined by Paracelsus (and secretly cherished, even to-day, by many closet-philosophers). Their chief representative, Lorenz Oken, whose transcendent merit it is, to have first led into successful paths the long neglected study of animal evolution, writes, in 1806, in almost the very words of Paracelsus: "Man is the synthesis of all the animal principles. Animals therefore are only individual developments of these separate principles, and consequently are nothing else than the corporate impersonations of the various human organs. The organ, which is crystallized in them as it were, is their form and essence; this *single* organ constitutes the *whole* animal, while in man it constitutes but a minor part."* The various animals took various parts in the development of the different systems of organs from which later on man was supposed to issue in full perfection. Thus, some busied themselves more with perfecting the digestive system, others more with perfecting the organs of respiration, the circulatory system, the organs of locomotion; etc.

The careful observation of the preliminary and transient phases of development through which higher animals pass, and in which *one* system of organs is seen to form before another and to exhibit, throughout these phases, an unmistakable resemblance to the permanent structure of certain animals of lower classes—had prepared the way for the views of the school of Oken. As early as the year 1793, in fact, it was formulated as a universal principle by Heinrich Kielmayer, a Tübingen professor, that the embryos of higher animals had to pass, in their development, through the various structural forms of lower classes; a principle which became more and more firmly established, the more carefully the development of the young bird in the egg and the mammal in its mother's body was studied. So too, towards the close of the third decade of this century, the scientist Rathke discovered that not only frogs and other amphibia pass as tad-poles through a fish-like stage of development, but that also the higher vertebrate orders which never breathe with gills at all, show in the course of their formation *rudimentary* gills. And this last discovery seemed to confirm the correctness and truth of Oken's theory of "the embryo of man illumed throughout the animal kingdom." Whereupon the microcosmic doctrine celebrated a further deceptive triumph.

It has ever been the prerogative of philosophical systems immediately to appropriate the acquisitions of empirical research as the ripe products of their own origination; and, with Schelling in the van, their exponents now proclaimed aloud that the entire evolution of the world and its forms of life was only human genesis and a reflective act on the part of nature; that animals and all lower forms of life were nothing but stages in the onward movement of the genesis of man. Thus, Schelling could make the resultant product say of the original matrix of all:

> "I am the God within her bosom cherished,
> The Spirit that in all doth glow
> From hidden forces' primal struggle
> Till life's first streams in fulness flow."

But if man were really recognizable as the ultimate purpose of the development of life, in whose creation nature had expended every effort, and for whose presence she had long prepared; then surely man were the embodiment of nature's first and not her final thought. The animals that had to go before him, in order, agreeably to Oken's theory, to embody and develop the various systems of organs, were consequently only *means to an end;* and if, after the process of development had ceased, they still survived, they were then to be regarded as mere reproductions of primitive designs and transitional stages, as waste products of the genesis of man, the plan of whose construction lay at the foundation of all organic growth as a guiding and motive principle. In accordance with these ideas the fishes that figured in the world's history so many thousands of years before the era of man, possessed two pectoral and two ventral fins for the sole reason that they first had to show the world a rough sketch of the general form of the human body with its two arms and two legs.

In the first part of the present century, an accurate study of human miscarriages and monstrosities, made by the French naturalist Etienne Geoffroy de Saint Hilaire, led this scientist to the conviction that the animal resemblances so frequently marked in these subjects and generally characterized as harelips, ape's heads, etc., were caused by a cessation of embryonic development in some given direction, and that these subjects, accordingly, were to be looked upon as incomplete human formations. The same animal-like formations always occur, moreover, in the regular course of human development; they must be passed through by every human being coming into life; but in the normal course of development they stand for transitional stages which are generally passed over without leaving a trace of their prior existence. In the instances mentioned, accordingly, the normal course of development, having prematurely ceased at an unfinished stage, must have been arrested through some cause or other, and this fact seemed to offer a sufficient reason for giving such monstrosities the name of *arrested formations.*

*Lorenz Oken, Ueber die Entwickelung der wissenschaftlichen Systematik der Thiere in *Oken and Kiese*, Beiträge zur vergleichenden Zoologie, Anatomie und Physiologie. Bamberg und Würzburg, Heft I. (1806.)

This theory of arrested development was further elaborated by Carl Vogt in his well-known theory of microcephalous forms. The latter's conclusions were as illogical and superfluous even, as those of Geoffroy; and yet the theory was immediately adopted by many naturalists of evolutionary tendencies and extended as an explanation of the origin of the entire animal kingdom. Just as the microcephalous subject had been described as a human being whose cerebral development was arrested at a stage just anterior to that of cerebral maturity in man, corresponding, namely, to the point of development attained by the brain of the ape—so, too, apparently, the ape could be regarded as a *human* being that had failed in attaining total perfection and maturity; and so, too, the animals ranking below the ape in the order of life, could be regarded as beings who at earlier periods of development had been checked in their aspirations to human dignity and "arrested" in their too ambitious and vaulting career. Nor could the very lowest types of animal life be excluded; they must also be regarded as the primitive movements of animated nature towards the genesis of man. The main idea in this application of the theory, to explain the origin of the whole animal kingdom, was essentially contained in Oken's earliest doctrines; the name alone was new.

In this way a theory of arrested development in a broader sense originated and for a long time continued to be the guiding principle in the domain of evolutionary research. The transitory stages passed through in the evolution of the human fœtus, could be shown to agree perfectly with the permanent forms of the lower vertebrate animals that successively approximate to man, as the fishes, amphibia, and mammalia; these resemblances were shown to exist in the skeleton, the nervous and circulatory systems, the structure of the heart, the organs of generation and excretion, in fact in almost every system of the human body. The conclusion from these facts was, that the genesis of the human species had proceeded perforce through all these lower stages; and the theory that made the entire animal kingdom a collection of living models for the grandest work of art in organic creation, became more and more perfected, until many zoölogists, like B. Serres, did not hesitate to defend it with all its manifold consequences. The gradation of organic creation and the unity of its plan appeared thus to be established; for, according to this scheme, all animals were but variations of one and the same primitive type (Oken's "individual animal"), of which the lower incorporations, kept back in their development at particular stages, exhibit in each case the characteristics of a different genus, family, and class.

It is indeed a captivating dream for man, penetrating the secrets of creation, to trace to himself the whole of animated nature, to find his own reflection in everything that lives, and to figure not alone as the culmination but also as the purpose, the origin, and primal cause of all life! Agassiz spoke, in this spirit, of "embryonic" and "prophetic" types in the primeval world. Not only in the past have eminent zoölogists sported and reveled in these enchanting phantasies, but even nowadays pamphlets and books appear which trumpet forth this long since antiquated philosophy as a brand-new discovery: while people have become bolder and more assertive in their extension of the theory, and would fain lay claim to the entire universe as the dross and waste-material of this grand work of human genesis. The entire universe, so cry these ingenious souls, once glowed with life, even to the last atom; but in the measure that this life energized, and converged with thousand-fold intensity upon definite points (living creatures), correspondingly large masses of matter were deprived of the breath of life that originally pervaded them all alike, and were cast out from the mighty genesis!

(To be concluded.)

RICHARD WAGNER.

BY DR. PAUL CARUS.

GERMANY in the last twenty years has become dramatic. The nation of poets and thinkers has been aroused from its dreams and has taken,—what was before considered impossible,—an active and prominent part in the political affairs of the world.

At the same time the music of Germany has developed in a similar way; it has struggled for dramatic expression. After Mozart and Haydn, Beethoven had attained the highest possible summit of musical grandeur. Beethoven is a philosopher like Kant; his sonatas and symphonies are essays full of deep thought. He propounds a theme with a certain motive and then argues about the proposition from every possible standpoint, in variations connected with each other in strict logical order.

Yet Beethoven is also a lyric poet like Gœthe. His music is the expression of a deep emotion, and as he broods over some fretting pain of his heart, he reveals to his listeners his disappointment, his sorrow, and his grief; and he leads them through the labyrinth of his breast from emotion to emotion, as one psychical state of mind naturally follows another, till he finds comfort and peace in the temple of his goddess, where music restores harmony to the dissonant and jarring chords of his afflicted soul.

Music has ever been considered as the representation of human emotions. Beethoven's genius appeared to soar above the sphere of emotions, raising his art to the ethereal atmosphere of philosophical loftiness. In our time, however, music has gone a

step further and ventured upon a field which was supposed to be unattainable. Music has become dramatic; and the one who dared to lead her upon this disputed ground, who bravely fought for her right in this province and aspired after this new musical ideal, was *Richard Wagner*. Whether he has attained what he has striven for, is another question; still he was its champion in spite of malice and personal abuse.

Richard Wagner, the seventh child and the third son of the *Polizei-Actuarius* Wagner, was born in Leipsic, the 22d of May, in 1813,—the same year in which another famous poet of the Nibelungs was ushered into the world; I refer to *Friederich Hebbel* whose dramatization of *Siegfried's Tod* may be mentioned. It was at the beginning of the sanguinary war of German independence which gave birth to a free country, and was at the same time a death-knell to a usurper's tyranny, when the battle of Leipsic took place, and the roar of cannon resounded almost three days without intermission around Wagner's cradle. The many corpses of the battlefield round Leipsic produced a dangerous fever and Richard Wagner's father was one among the victims of this epidemic.

Two years afterwards, his mother, who was still young and could scarcely bring up her many children on the small pension allowed her, married Mr. Geyer, an actor of the Royal Theatre at Dresden. Mr. Geyer took good care of his step-children and did his best to give them the advantages of an excellent education. But the young Wagner lost his second father in his seventh year and reports that a day before his step-father's death he played some tunes of Weber in the adjacent room, and Mr. Geyer said in reference to his playing, "Can the boy have a talent for music?"

As a boy Wagner visited the *Kreuz-Gymnasium* at Dresden. He was enthusiastic about Weber's "*Der Freischütz*," and an acquaintance with Shakespeare's works inspired him to compose similar dramas, which of course were utter failures.

In his fifteenth year he was so deeply impressed with Beethoven's music that he decided to become a musician. The young artist composed an overture for the grand orchestra and through his acquaintance with the musical director at the Leipsic theatre, Mr. Dorn, his composition was accepted and (in spite of the remonstrance of the members of the orchestra) executed. Its success was equal to zero. The public received it with utter indifference; Mr. Dorn said in reference to this fact: "Wagner was then of a shy nature and not at all arrogant or assuming, so that he bore the failure of his virgin work with silence, laughed with the others at its fate, and seemed to believe in its justice."

Nevertheless Wagner did not lose confidence, but felt comforted by the hope of future success, and remarkable was the judgment of Dorn concerning him, who said: "I doubt, whether there was ever a young musician who was more familiar with Beethoven than Wagner was in his eighteenth year. He possessed the scores of Beethoven's overtures from the Master's own hand. He went to bed with the sonatas and arose with the quartets: the songs he sang; the quartets he whistled, for he did not get along well when he tried to play them. In short, he was a real *Furor Teutonicus*, who combined a peculiar intellectual spontaneity (*Regsamkeit*) with a higher scientific education, and he promised much."

As a youth of 17 years Wagner attended the University of Leipzig as a student of music, and at the same time he took lessons from Mr. Th. Weinling, the distinguished chanter of the Thomas School, who was famous for his thoroughness.

In 1833 Wagner went to Würzburg where one of his older brothers was theatrical manager. There he composed two operas, one *The Fairies*, and another, *Das Liebesverbot:* the latter resembles Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*. Wagner conducted for some time the theatre orchestra in Magdeburg, Königsberg, and Riga. In the first place (although circumstances were unpropitious to him) he succeeded in having (in 1836) his *Liebesverbot* presented, and it proved, as all previous works of his, a failure.

He married the talented and beautiful actress Minna Planer whose acquaintance he had made in Magdeburg, and he accepted gladly a position in Riga. From the latter place he went in 1839 to Paris, where in 1841 he completed *Rienzi* and the *Flying Dutchman*. The latter was suggested by a storm that occurred when Wagner was on his way to Paris on a sailing vessel, voyaging from Riga to Boulogne *sur mer*.

Rienzi was first produced at Dresden in 1842 and, being a great success, led to Wagner's appointment as orchestral leader in that city, where he gave his *Tannhäuser* in 1845.

In 1849 Wagner had to leave Germany as an exile for political reasons, and went to Switzerland where *Lohengrin* was finished and the Tetralogy of the *Nibelung* begun. Wagner then lived in Italy, Vienna, and in Paris, where in 1861 *Tannhäuser* met with a disastrous presentation.

In 1863 he was permitted to return to Germany. In the following year Wagner became intimate with Louis II, the young King of Bavaria, under whose zealous patronage he brought out in Munich his *Tristan* in 1865, the *Meistersinger* in 1868, *Rhinegold* in 1869, and *Walkyria* in 1870.

A special Wagner theatre was begun in 1872 at Bayreuth, where he lived the rest of his life, and his works were presented in 1876 in entire harmony with

his vast requirements. Wagner's last work, *Parsifal*, was published in 1878.

Invaluable was the favor of his royal patron, Louis II. Yet the friendship of Liszt, the father of his second wife, was of greater importance. For Liszt, the renowned musician, fully recognized his genius, became deeply interested in the ideals of Wagner, and seconded him in his aspirations with the full weight of his authority.

Wagner wrote the texts of his operas himself and also published numerous pamphlets, most of which led to acrimonious discussions.

Wagner met with many failures before he succeeded; he endured many misfortunes and was the most abused musician that ever lived. He died at the height of a dearly won renown, in 1884 at the advanced age of 71 years.

Wagner is no mere musician, he is also a dramatic poet. He figures not only in the history of music but in that of art at large. And from this standpoint we must consider his works when we attempt to explain the development of his genius.

Wagner endeavored to express in music more than emotions; he tried to express ideas and thus to make ideas the basis of musical composition; he became a musician-poet and a composer of thoughts in musical sounds. His works are not operas in the old sense of the word; they are dramas in music.

Our greatest composers, such as Mozart, could easily be induced to compose the veriest nonsense. With extraordinary good-naturedness they accommodated their genius to the poorest librettos. That era is past since Wagner gave birth to a new ideal of music. The word is no longer merely accessory and almost meaningless as in the operas of old; it has become an integral part and the chief part of their musical expression. This new kind of musical drama may justly be called *word-opera*. There may be a doubt whether Wagner's method of realizing the ideal was the right and proper way. But whatever his faults, he bravely dared to create, and succeeded in creating a new department in music.

Wagner aspired to be the national composer of Germany. He dramatized those subjects which stirred the German nation for ages: the old sagas of the Flying Dutchman, Parsifal, Tristan, the Meistersinger, and above all the saga of the Nibelungs, the national epic of the Teutonic nations. The subjects of Parsifal, and Tristan and Isolt had been introduced into Germany from Brittany through France, yet the German genius had moulded them in such a way that they became entirely Germanized, the one through Gottfried von Strassburg, the other through Wolfram von Eschenbach, the profoundest of epic poets, both of whom lived in the twelfth century. Rienzi is a subject from Italian history and even that was taken from the narrative of an English novelist, Bulwer Lytton.

In the *Ring of the Nibelung*, Wagner attempted to reflect the Teutonic conception of the world in a grand drama representing the development of humanity, thus explaining the problems of man, his errors and guilt and chastisement, until through punishment and sacrifice justice is restored and atonement made. The German *Nibelungen saga* had been artistically represented and dramatized by many poets before Wagner, as many *Fausts* were written before Gœthe began the chief work of his life. And like Gœthe's *Faust* also the *Ring of the Nibelung* is a work that grapples with the profoundest problems of life and attempts to unravel the labyrinthian knots of the human soul.

Accordingly, Wagner's chief work may be classed among philosophical poetry—with Lucretius's *De rerum natura*, Dante's *Divina Comedia*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Klopstock's *Messiah*, and Gœthe's *Faust*.

The *Nibelungen saga* and the *Götterdämmerung* are not Wagner's inventions; like Gœthe's Faust they are old literary treasures of the German nation, although Wagner moulded them in his own way, as Gœthe did the Faust legend.

The Germans were the only nation who in their mythology presaged the end of the world and of its gods. This doctrine of a doomsday to come proves not only the depth of their religious and philosophical conceptions, but, what is more, also their veracity. It shows a moral prowess. They were accustomed to face death unflinchingly and had learned from it to countenance a sad truth.

The Teutonic tribes did not live under an azure sky, in a bright climate like that of Greece. Under unfavorable conditions, in a foggy, damp country, they never indulged in optimistic views of an enjoyable and peaceful existence of happiness. Life was earnest to them and was a constant battling, against hostile powers. The affinity of this view of life with pessimism engendered by bitter personal experiences, led Wagner to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, which was destined to exercise a decided influence on his development. Schopenhauer's philosophy may briefly be characterized by two words: *Idealism* and *Pessimism*. His Idealism is based on Kantian Critique and is akin to the nihilistic idealism of the Vedas of old India. It declares the world of real existences to be merely phenomenal. Our life is like a dream, and death is the awakening from it. Schopenhauer's *Pessimism* teaches that life is not worth its own troubles and we have to be ransomed and redeemed from the evils thereof. The source ot life is *will*, through which all that is exists. The negation of our will is the highest ethical deed man is capable of. The Nirvana of the

Hindoo (a non-existence, or as others say an incomprehensible all-being), a life of peace and quietude, an existence of absolute rest, must be our hope and comfort.

We need not enter here into a controversy with Schopenhauer about his philosophy of negation and unwholesome ethics. We reject pessimism and propose in its place the doctrine of meliorism to lead humanity onward through constant struggles and efforts to ever higher ideals. But as Schopenhauer has greatly influenced Wagner and the development of Wagner's operas, we must here briefly review his conception of art.

Schopenhauer declares art to be the representation of Platonic ideas, which are the types of the different stages of the evolution of the will. He calls them objectifications of the will. He says:

"Music stands alone, quite cut off from all the other arts; in it we do not recognize the copy or repetition of any idea of existence in the world. *Yet* it is such a great and exceedingly noble art, its effect on the inmost nature of man is so powerful, and it is so entirely and deeply understood by him in his inmost consciousness as a perfectly universal language, the distinctness of which surpasses even that of the perceptible world itself, that we certainly have more to look for in it than 'a disguised arithmetical exercise of a mind that is unconsciously counting or calculating,' as Leibnitz called it. Still, Leibnitz was perfectly right, in so far as he considered only its immediate external significance—its form. But if it were nothing more, the satisfaction which it affords would be like that which we feel when a sum in arithmetic comes out right, and could not be that intense pleasure with which we see the deepest recesses of our nature find utterance. From our standpoint, therefore, at which the æsthetic effect is the criterion, we must attribute to music a far more serious and deeper significance connected with the inmost nature of the world and our own self, and in reference to which the arithmetical proportions to which it may be reduced, are related not as the thing signified, but as the sign. That in some sense music must be related to the world as the representation to the thing represented, as the copy to the original, we may conclude from the analogy of the other arts, all of which possess this character and effect us on the whole in the same way as it does, only that the effect of music is stronger, quicker, more direct, and infallible. Further its representative relation to the world must be very deep, absolutely true, and strikingly accurate, because it is instinctively understood by every one and has the appearance of a certain infallibility, because its form may be reduced to perfectly definite rules, expressed in numbers, from which it cannot free itself without entirely ceasing to be music.

"All the arts objectify the will indirectly only, by means of the ideas; and since our world is nothing but the manifestation of the ideas in multiplicity, music, being no direct representation of the ideas proper, is entirely independent of the phenomenal world and ignores it altogether. It could to a certain extent exist if there was no world at all, which cannot be said of the other arts. Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself, nay, even as the ideas whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of individual things. Music is by no means like the other arts the copy of the ideas, but the *copy of the will itself*, whose objectivity the ideas are. Since, however, it is the same will which objectifies itself both in the ideas and in music, though in quite different ways, there must be, not indeed a direct likeness, but yet a parallel, an analogy between music and the ideas whose manifestation is the visible world.

"I recognize in the deepest tones of harmony, in the bass, the lowest grades of the objectification of will, unorganized nature, the mass of the planet. Further, in the whole of the complemental parts which make up the harmony between the bass and the leading voice singing the melody, I recognize the whole gradation of the ideas in which the will objectifies itself. Those nearer to the base are the lower of these grades. . . . the higher represent to me the world of plants and beasts . . . lastly in the melody, in the high-singing principal voice leading the whole and progressing with unrestrained freeedom, in the unbroken significant connection of one thought from beginning to end representing a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the objectification of will, the intellectual life and effort of man."

So far Wagner is in accordance with the pessimistic philosopher, but in another passage Schopenhauer says: "Music is not in need of the words or action of a drama; and the *vox humana* is to music nothing but some modified sound as is that of another instrument. That, in our case, this instrument is at the same time used as the organ of speech and communication of ideas, is incidental and may be employed as an accessory, an additional yet secondary help, but it must never become its chief purpose."

Although Wagner, in the attempt at deepening the import and significance of music, followed his guide, Schopenhauer, in some respects perhaps too closely, he certainly rejected the doctrine of the indifference of the words and therewith the impossibility of dramatic music, which Schopenhauer proclaimed in the above quoted passages. But if *music* expresses *will*, and if *melody* symbolizes human aspirations, why should music not be dramatic? Indeed, from the

premises of Schopenhauer's explanation of music, it is the unavoidable consequence.

Schopenhauer would have been more consistent in saying, "If my theory is right and music signifies will in its different stages of objectification, if melody represents the aspirations and struggles of mankind, the notes of music ought to express the deeds of man; they must be dramatic."

Wagner was bold enough to realize it. He was a faithful believer in Schopenhauer and speaks in a passage of his essays about the exorbitant difficulties which a proper conception of Schopenhauer's philosophy has to face; he recommends it as the basis of all culture, both intellectual and ethical, and adds: "All our labor should be devoted to its realization in every province of life. If we succeeded in that, the beneficent and regenerative result would be immeasurable."

Wagner, indeed, has acted accordingly: all his works of art bear the stamp of Schopenhauer's influence.

One instance, where the effect of Schopenhauer's pessimism is most decided, will suffice.

According to the old Teutonic mythology as it is preserved in the Edda, the gods die fighting, and the tenacity of their strong will even in meeting their destiny is remarkable. It reminds us of the fearlessness of the Ostro-Goths, who when fighting against odds, stood in battle unflinching and sold their lives dearly.

The gods in the Edda, presaging their fate, courageously fight, until Odhin, the last of them, sinks to the ground; and the sons of Muspil, the flames, flicker round Ygdrasill, that great tree, which means the world, and devour the meaningless wrecks of the universe, that remain after doomsday, the *Götterdämmerung*, the last struggle of the gods. Such death is no renunciation, no negation of life. Wagner transforms this version of the doomsday of the gods into a pessimistic resignation. Wodan renounces life, and sick of existence, waits for the moment when the injustice done through the love of gold in the beginning of the whole drama of life, has been atoned, and then dies by suicide in the flames he has himself kindled. How feeble appears Wagner's Wodan in comparison with the heroic God of the Edda!

Wagner often compared poetry and music to man and woman, and the relation of words and melody to love. If love is more than an emotional or romantic revery, both husband and wife have to yield and give way to each other, in order to find their individualities restored in a higher and more perfect unity.

Wagner was strongly opposed to what he called absolute music, "which," he said, "uses the words as foil for a jewel. The foil has no value, the musical jewel is all." According to Wagner, words and music are to be wedded on equal rights. Such was his intent, but it may be that their marriage, as realized in Wagner's operas, is more like the whimsical eccentricity of a couple who, in spite of apparently unsurmountable hindrances, link their fates together. Wagner's music is full of abnormal combinations and accords that defy all rules of harmony; ingenious whims abound and imitators of this system would be apt to lead composition to utter ruin. But then he has exaggerated his style in such a way that none will ever be able to out-Herod him. Wagner succeeded in spite of his negligence of fundamental rules, in spite of the dangerous lack of regularity and musical law. He succeeded; the earnestness of his aspirations and the high and noble aim of his soul, compelling him to go on in his path, in spite of all opposition. His confidence is like the divine faith of a prophet, and the perseverance with which he pursues his visions, impresses his auditors with the sincerity of his ideals. If we blame the form of Wagner's works of art, we must acknowledge his genius, who conjured the phantom of a dramatic opera from the realm of the ideal, and we cannot send it away. It will haunt us until it is fully realized.

Wagner is not the end and consumation of all musical development, beyond which it is impossible to go. He is the starting-point for a new development, and the faults of which he is accused, and, may be, in many cases certainly is guilty of—his very faults indicate that there is scope for improvement and further development.

The merit of Wagner is his ideal of dramatic music; his fault is his romanticism * sicklied over with pessimistic world-renunciation. The object of art is by no means a vague phantasy of impossible fairy visions in a transcental ghost-land of miracles; its object is the representation of human ideals here on earth, in this real world of ours. Accordingly art should not lead us to a total renunciation of ourselves and of our aspirations, it should teach the resignation of egotistic desires only in order to purify our hopes and longings. The hero of a tragedy must not be the victim of his own despair but rather a sacrifice for progress on the altar of the ideal. Thus art will not be a guide to suicide but to higher existence and to a nobler life. It will not destroy but preserve.

The poet-composer of the future should unite Wagner's dramatic vigor with classic beauty. Instead of confounding the public with mystic phrases (as does Wagner in his Parsifal) he should show us the grandeur of the simplicity of truth. The dramatic action of word-operas should be a faithful image of real life, not for the sake of world-renunciation, but for elevating the hearts of the auditors, and strengthening the faith in their ideals.

* The libretto of the *Meistersinger* is perhaps the only composition which is free from the romantic and pessimistic tendencies that pervade almost all other operas of Wagner.

RETROGRESSION IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE LIFE.*

BY AUGUST WEISMANN.

IV.—CONCLUSION.

We spoke, in our last paper, of the loss of the instinct of wildness in animals. It is furthermore interesting to note the loss of the instinct to seek for food, occurring in many instances. The reception of food and consequently the acquisition of the same, is indispensable to life. We might regard this instinct to be the first and most primitive of all, and yet it may be entirely or partially lost. Numerous young birds no longer possess this instinct to search for their food. They stretch open their bills and cry; they swallow the food, too, that is put in their mouths; but it never occurs to them to *pick up* food that lies on the bottom of their cage. The sight of the food does not awaken in them a desire to eat. They have, at this period of their lives, actually forgotten how to eat. Nor is it strange; for birds come out of the egg in an imperfectly developed state, and are fed by their parents, who shove the food into their opened bills. It was thus not necessary for them to be incited to eat by the sight of food, but simply by feeling it in their bills. Part of the instinct thus became superfluous, and was lost. It cannot be objected here that the little creatures are as yet too undeveloped to search for their food. That they are; and for this very reason their parents were obliged to feed them, and the instinct of seeking for food became unnecessary. Many other birds, as chickens for instance, run about immediately after creeping out of the egg, hunt their food and pick it up. Here the instinct is preserved intact.

One of the most remarkable instances of the loss of this instinct is that of certain *ants*. It has been well known, ever since the beginning of the present century, that a great many species of ants hold slaves; as, for instance, the reddish ant of Alsace and Switzerland, the *Polyergus rufescens*. The ants of this species are not large but are very powerful, and are wont to take the field, from time to time, in great hordes, to fall upon and plunder the habitations of a weaker species, as the gray ant, the *Formica fusca*, for instance. Their purpose, however, is not to kill and devour their surprised victims. It is quite different. They deprive them of their young, and carry the latter to their homes, where they care for them tenderly, employing those that turn out to be working-ants, as servants, or, as they are commonly called, as slaves. These "slaves" attend to all those domestic duties which the reddish working-ants had formerly to attend to; they feed the young, build the passages and dwellings, bring food and even feed their lazy masters. This is no fiction, as formerly supposed, but a confirmed fact, which was first observed in the early part of this century by that celebrated observer of ants, Huber of Geneva, and which has been firmly established since his time by his successor and pupil, August Forel. I have convinced myself personally of its truth.

The astonishing fact, though, is this: the reddish ants in consequence of being thus fed by their slaves, have totally forgotten how to search for food. If we shut them up and give them their favorite food, honey, they will not touch it, but will starve, and die of exhaustion—if we do not take pity on them and procure them one of their gray slaves. Being put in the same compartment the slave goes to work, first partakes of the honey himself to his heart's content, and then feeds his masters, who joyfully accept this rescue from an ignominious death.

As with young birds, so in this case, the instinct of searching for food and the ability to recognize it by sight, has degenerated, and, plainly, because it is no longer needed. From the fact that in these ant-communities there always were great numbers of slaves and that the latter always fed their masters, the instinct to search for food became unnecessary, was neglected by the selective power of nature, and gradually passed away.

Other instincts, too, in these reddish ants, have wholly or partially disappeared; and for the very same reason. The reddish ants seem to have forgotten how to build their dwellings, and, in a great measure, to care for their young. Other ants bestow upon their young the greatest possible care, carry them from time to time to better parts of their houses, take them out into the open air and out into the sun, and feed their larvæ with unremitting assiduity. But we find none of these duties performed by the reddish slave holders. They would be incapable of raising their young, and the species would become extinct, if they were suddenly deprived of their gray slaves. Not only among men does there rest a curse upon slave-holding; even animals grow debased and degenerate under its influences.

There are still other species of slave-holding ants, whose habits have been carefully studied, where the degeneration of the masters is even more complete, having affected their physical strength. But there is yet much light to be shed upon this subject and I would therefore prefer not to consider it fully here, however remarkable the phenomena so far observed appear. All the instances cited are an additional confirmation of the correctness of our theory explaining processes of retrogression from non-use; for all these cases of degenerated instincts are found among the working-ants, that is among those *that have no offspring*. The disappearance of these instincts, therefore, cannot have been effected in the way before suggested, namely, that the individual became accustomed, for

* Translated from the German by μκρκ.

example, to no longer seeking his food himself, and that this habit was transmitted to his descendants.

In the instances given, the degeneration of the instinct to eat has been partial and not complete. Thus, only the instinct to search for food and the faculty to recognize it, have been lost. There is no lack of cases, however, where the instinct of nourishment, generally, has degenerated, where hunger is not felt and where no sort of food is taken. This sounds strange, but is explained by the fact that enough food was deposited in the bodies of these animals from the earlier periods of their existence, to last them throughout their lives. Many night-butterflies, and dayflies (ephemera), possess more or less degenerated mouths, and none of them take food. The male wheel-animals do not possess a vestige of an alimentary canal; they have neither mouth, stomach, nor intestines; their life has only to last as long as the food which they brought with them from the egg, holds out. Nature is never extravagant. No instinct, no organ of the body has permanency unless absolutely requisite to the preservation of the species. *Panmixy*, or, if you will, the remission of natural selection, brings it about that the superfluous is reduced to the absolutely necessary.

It is true that these retrogressions, if our explanation be accepted as the correct one, can only be effected very gradually. Generation after generation must elapse before that which is unnecessary vanishes; and we must expect still to find at times vestiges of organs and mechanisms which were once important but which are now fast approaching total elimination. We have seen this in the examples cited. The so-called "rudimentary" organs are found in myriads of cases and among the most different species of animals; and they are evidence to us of the radical transmutations the different species have undergone. Here belong the hidden eyes of the eel-salamander (*Proteus anguinus*), of the golden mole, of the blind-grub, and the latter's degenerated mechanism of hearing; here belong the remnants of the Kiwi's wings, the wing-stumps of many female night-butterflies whose male companions possess fully developed wings; here belong the slight projections about the mouth-aperture of dayflies, which are nothing else than jaw-bones that have not yet completely disappeared; and thousands of other instances.

In this category belong, above all, those many cases of retrogression, in which an organ possessed by the progenitor is wanting entirely in the adult descendants and yet is present in a rudimentary form in the young. The working-ants, as above explained, possess no wings, but in the larva the rudiment of a wing is found in the shape of a small disc beneath the skin; later on this disappears.

The larvæ of bees, too, have lost their feet; they do not need them to creep about, for they live in an enclosed wax-cell directly in contact with their food. Although having from non-use of their feet become footless larvæ, yet they acquire a pair during their development in the egg such as their sawfly-like ancestors must have had.

We see from such cases that an organ that has retrograded from non-use, first disappears in the fully developed condition, and not until long after, in the embryonic, rudimentary form. The latter may be preserved for generations, even though in the fully developed condition the organ has long since disappeared from the organization of the animal.

Such rudimentary remnants, not advancing in development, have been discovered in great multitudes by evolutionists. They plainly point to the previous history of the species, and would form in themselves a competent proof of how numerous and various the ancestors of the now existing species must have been, and of how intricate and crooked the path is, that the development of the organic world has followed. At times it was forwards, at times backwards; at times it affected only a part, at times the whole organism. All that nature in the course of countless generations has constructed,—for example, the highly organized organs of locomotion, limbs of definite strength, of complicated articulation and great elasticity, of accurately balanced muscular-power, adapted to movement upon the earth, or wings so wonderfully designed for overcoming weight and for rising into the air, or those organs that give animals knowledge of the outer world, those eyes of incredibly delicate construction, those mechanisms of hearing and smelling, into the intricacies of whose fitness only the continued and united labor of our keenest investigators has been able to penetrate—they are all at once relinquished and given over to a slow process of disorganization from the very moment they become unnecessary to the persistence of the species.

It certainly seems as if development in this direction could not possibly be termed a progression. As regards the particular organ, it is certainly a retrogression; but as regards the whole animal, the matter is quite different. When we speak of "purpose" and "aim" in relation to living creatures, the "aim" can only mean existence. The form and complexity of structure, the *absolute* potentiality of an organism are not determining factors. The question solely is how may the species continue fit for existence; it cannot remain *below* the standard of fitness, for, then it would perish; it cannot go *above* it, for it has no means of rising higher than the point at which its fitness for existence is fixed. The ultra-pessimistic doctrine of Schopenhauer, that the world is as bad as it possibly

could be, and that, were it a little worse, it would perish, is as true, and just about as significant, as the opposite optimistic theory, that the world is as perfect as it was possible to make it from the forces given, that it is not conceivable how it could have been turned out one jot more perfect than it is.

The world of organisms proves to us that this is so. We see every living species shaping itself in conformity to its purpose in every detail, and adapting itself to the particular conditions of existence in which it is placed. But it adapts itself only in so far as is unavoidably necessary to ensure its existence, and not one iota more. The eye of the frog is a highly imperfect mechanism compared with the eye of the hawk or that of man, but it is perfect enough to see a crawling fly or a wriggling worm, and thus ensures the species sufficient nourishment. From a strictly optical standpoint, even the eye of the hawk is not an absolutely perfect visual organ, but it is perfect enough to discover its prey with accuracy from high altitudes ; this is all that is required for the existence of the species, and the attainment of further visual excellence, through natural selection, is precluded.

The object of all transformations—the species's fitness for existence—is not always attained by the progressive improvement of the whole or of a part ; new organic additions are not being continually made. On the contrary old organic parts become in time unnecessary and must be removed. This does not take place with ideal completeness, nor suddenly as if by magic, but slowly and in conformity with the forces involved, and for many generations, therefore, imperfectly. But in the end the organ which is no longer indispensable to life, is entirely removed, and a complete equilibrium is again established between the structure of the body and the work it has to perform. In this aspect, retrogression is a part of progression.

A SWISS SCENE.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

How sweet it is to linger all alone
  Beside the shore, while summer skies are bright,
  And watch the little boats with steady flight
Follow the wind toward the setting sun.

Their pointed sails the last ray falls upon
  Spread wing-and-wing, and, wonderfully white,
  Seem really wings of birds about to light
Upon the water when their day is done.

They come to me out of the distant haze
  A scattered fleet before a gentle wind,
Laden with precious thoughts of other days ;

  And just as when I watched them from behind
At starting, when they took their different ways
  New-painted on my nursery window-blind.

NEAR GENEVA, 1877.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CHEAPEN LAND BY TAXING IT.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IN THE OPEN COURT, No. 107, Mr. J. G. Malcolm wraps up a conundrum in a very comical paradox, and then hurls it at me. Presuming that Mr. Malcolm is not jesting with me but inquiring in good faith, I will answer him. He calls upon me to "explain why it is that to tax anything else but land makes it higher-priced ; but to tax land makes it cheaper, and the higher it is taxed the cheaper it becomes ?" The fallacy here is concealed in the assumption that the tax is a burthen in one case, and a benefit in the other. The truth is that the tax is a burthen in both cases, the manner of its mischief being differently shown.

A tax upon land operates as a blight in proportion to the severity of the tax. It cheapens land as Canada thistles cheapen it, by making it less valuable, and harder to enjoy. Ten years ago a plague of locusts fell upon Northwestern Iowa. In despair the farmers of that region sold their farms for a trifle and fled from the plague. The locusts were a blessing because they cheapened land. The single-tax plague would cheapen land just as the grasshoppers did. It is a mistake that we can benefit the general community by tormenting land with any form of barrenness, tax, or blight.

Another fallacy concealed in the conundrum is that land and personal effects, as merchandise, have the same character, as for instance, cloth and land, when the true comparison is between the product of the loom and the product of the land. We may make land less desirable or "cheaper" by taxing it, but the man who cultivates it must add his extra taxes to the price of wheat and pork, or he must perish. Unless he can get his taxes back by the sale of his produce, he must abandon the land, and if we make the single-tax high enough, we can make the land so cheap as to be worth nothing. We may levy the single-tax on sheep, and the effect will be to make sheep-raising so precarious as to cheapen sheep, but the sheep-raiser must lay his tax-burthen on to the wool he sells, and the weaver who pays it in the higher price of wool must lay it on to cloth ; and so on until it falls at last upon the man who buys a coat, the final product of the sheep and of the loom. Either that, or it will tax all sheep-owning out of existence, as Mr. George and his disciples propose to tax land-owning out of the world.

What matters it, whether land is cheap or dear if men are not permitted to own it ? In Mr. George's Utopia men are forbidden to own land, and consequently can have no object in buying it. The single-tax artifice is used by Mr. Malcolm, although he ought to know by this time that it has no place in Mr. George's theory, except as a means by which to confiscate all the lands in the country. Mr. George says the end he seeks is the abolition of private property in land ; the single-tax contrivance he declares is only the means to that end. The substance of the plan is confiscation, the single-tax the form. WHEELBARROW.

THE MORE OWNERS THE BETTER.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

"*To increase production I desire to increase the number of land-owners altogether.*"—Wheelbarrow in THE OPEN COURT, No 108.

To increase production I desire to increase the number of land-users. Wheelbarrow and I are getting together very rapidly. In fact, since his letter on convict labor, the only difference I can see, is largely a theoretical one. He desires greater facilities for the performance of productive labor, so do I. He desires that the laborer shall receive the full value of the amount produced. So do I. He proposes as a remedy a wider distribution of land. So do I.

Perceiving that the concentration of land in the hands of the few is destructive of the opportunity to use, he would have many owners instead. In place of ten men owning all the land of a state he would have ten thousand owners. So would I. But I would go further. I would have *all* share in this beneficent thing, ownership of land, that Wheelbarrow considers such a necessity to civilization. If it is better that a hundred should own instead of one, surely a thousand owners would be better and to have *all* share in the ownership would be the best of all.

But how? Wheelbarrow does not tell us. He has as yet advanced no remedy except objections to other people's remedies, or, if the quotation at the head of this article is to be considered a remedy, he has given us no pharmaceutical directions as to its preparation, nor has he advised us how it is to be administered.

Surely, if in prescribing for my typhoid-fever patient, I neither gave name of medicine, dose, nor time of taking, my patient could justly distrust my abilities. If, in fact, I simply contented myself with telling him he had typhoid-fever, he would be justified in discharging me and calling on some one who had a remedy and was prepared to administer it.

We have agreed, then, that the concentration of land in the hands of the few *is* an evil.

How Wheelbarrow proposes to remedy matters he never tells us

I would do it by making it unprofitable to *hold land and not use it*. I would not divide up the land. I would not prescribe state-ownership. I would not have the land worked in common. But I would, by a tax levied upon the value of land exclusive of improvements, take for the benefit of the whole people the rental value of the bare land and leave to the holder the entire value of the labor and improvements he placed upon that farm. Thus making, in effect, all share in the benefits to be derived from this good thing ownership, that Wheelbarrow praises.

In so doing I would leave the holder secure in his possession and use, and the better the use the better it would be for him. It would only be non users that would get hurt. Wheelbarrow would like to get rid of these latter by increasing the number of owners on the principle that the smaller the holding the more likely the holder is to be a user.

I would appeal to the pocketbook by a tax that would make it unprofitable to own any amount of land, large or small, without making the best use of it possible. WM. C. WOOD.

LAND-OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL FOR USE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I do not think that the arguments of Wheelbarrow, in your issue of August 29th, were "robust" enough to give much weight to his direct compliment. They seem to me to be characterized, as usual, by a certain "smart" way of putting things, and by inability, or unwillingness to see distinctions between things which are somewhat similar but not alike.

The red savages, he says, denied the right of appropriating land for peaceable occupation, saying that the Great Spirit gave it as the common property of all. But we must not accept as authoritative even what the savages say about the Great Spirit. The prejudice of the red man against peace in general, and his ignorance of the ways of other races of men, probably kept him from seeing that in denying the right of peaceable occupation, he denied also a man's right to a wide range of choice in employing himself. There is plenty of room in this country, both for nomads and town-dwellers.

Wheelbarrow, however, does not agree with the savages, but says: "The highest security for the right of peaceable occupation for use is ownership." Plainly, my analysis of the existing custom of ownership was lost on him. I tried to show (and he did not deny it) that our custom of ownership, because it includes more privilege than any mortal can rightfully claim, stands condemned of injustice. It certainly gives a very high form of security—for the "owner."

Similarly, if a sufficient fleet of gunboats should patrol George's banks and prevent all but American crews from fishing there, that would give a very "high" security of occupation for the Americans. But, in both cases, special privilege for some would necessarily mean slavery for the rest—that is, denial of equal rights. To say that in order to secure the privilege of using land, one must be privileged to control land which he is not using at all, is like saying that in order to secure a man's right to self-control, he must needs be privileged to control some one else, for the privilege of controlling idle land is worthless, unless some one else wants to use it. And yet, Wheelbarrow wants us to take his word for it, that the whole theory and practice of agriculture depends on protecting the land-owners in their control of land which they are not using, as well as that which they are using, thereby enabling them to trade in the necessities of the rest. 'Tis a startling statement—I should like to see him try to prove it. It seems to me that if Scully's Illinois tenants did not have to pay him two-thirds of their crops as rent, and if the Dakota wheat growers did not have to pay speculators for the privilege of using virgin soil, they might be more successful farmers than they are now.

Again, I am rightly quoted, thus:—"It is true that every man has a right to as much control over land as is needful for his use and enjoyment of it, and for the security of the fruits of his labor," and then Wheelbarrow innocently says:—"Very well;— what is this right of control but ownership?"

Methinks a man who can't distinguish between these two privileges should think more and publish less. For the distinction is perfectly plain. Ownership of land includes, of course, all that I have approved in the above quotation; if it stopped there, it would be just. But it don't stop there. It gives the protection of the State's clubs and threats as completely to the man who never even saw the vacant land he "owns," as to the man who lives on his land and uses it constantly.

Wheelbarrow seems to think that there can be only one kind of control over land, namely, the cast-iron, trespassers-will-be-prosecuted kind, which the warranty deed conveys.

But there may be many degrees of control. Where the use is but a simple robbery of nature, like gravel-digging, surface-quarrying, felling trees, grazing cattle, hunting or fishing, the control needs to be only slight and temporary, because, as a rule, the user is not storing anything in or upon the soil for future use. On the other hand, the farmer, the store-keeper, the manufacturer, and others like them, need to enjoy much more complete control; but even then it needs not always to be wholly exclusive of others, for a common footpath, or cart-road, or drain may run across it without injury to it.

The uses for land are numberless; control should be sufficient for the use, and no more, and where there is no use, there should be no control.

Wheelbarrow says that in denying that a man's rights exist after his death, I occupy a weak position, both in morals and in politics. He does not venture to discuss the moral side of the question, however, but contents himself with misrepresenting my statement, and asking me questions which derive all their force from the misrepresentation. I said nothing about a man's right to property. My right to use land exists because I exist. My right to property exists either because I have produced the property from the soil, or have gotten it fairly from some one who did. The two are essentially different. Land is opportunity; property is the reward of exertion. If Wheelbarrow had known the difference between the two, he would not have asked his three irrelevant questions.

A man's right to use land springs from the necessary relation

between him and land. Death destroys this necessary relation, and with it the right. The right is a condition of life, and is unlimited, save by the equal rights of others. Necessarily, therefore, it is not transferable.

Now, as to the withdrawal of goverment protection. Government has done, and is doing, many things which it ought to "dishonor," and the sooner the better. Wheelbarrow thinks that evidence of land-title must exist on paper somewhere, before any man can safely enjoy the right of occupying land for use.

This indicates, I think, a superstitious faith in officialism. How about other natural rights—the right to live, for instance? Can a man safely enjoy that, if he has no official certificate of birth? And if a man's presence is proof enough that he has a right to live, should not the fact that he is using land be proof enough of his right to use it?

Perhaps he thinks it impracticable to hold land without paper-titles. But it is done, all about us. In the older states, at least, if the holder of a title-deed neglects to assert his legal privileges, twenty years' possession of the land gives any other man a perfect title, despite the deed. Title to some of the best land in Boston was gained thus by a "squatter" within the present century. At Nahant, close by here, many titles have been gained thus, within fifty years, and there are men there now who, when they buy land, omit to record the deed, preferring to get a title by simple occupation. Wheelbarrow doubtless knows well that in the West, the first improvement made,—a well dug, or a shanty built, for example,—has often settled the question of title. And in Dakota, within ten years, even in the stress of land-hunger which our laws produce, a frame made of three pieces of timber nailed together and set up has often sufficed to hold title for thirty days, while the settler was getting his lumber.

Such customs have sprung from the good sense of the people. If it had not been for the usurpations of legal authority, the same good sense would, doubtless, long ago have made occupation and use the sole and necessary condition of land-tenure. As to settling disputes by violence, no law or custom can wholly prevent that, but if all the vacant land in the country were free, as it should be, such disputes would probably be rare, and confined mostly to people with a taste for violence. For the stake in such a quarrel would not be what it is under present conditions—the loaded die of a land-gambler, or a private-taxing privilege. It would be simply a chance to work in a community where such chances would be so plenty that the population could not use one-tenth of them.

I note briefly the other points. Title to improvements could be conveyed by bill of sale, as well as by deed. But I did not propose to abolish the record of all deeds, but only of the *warranty* deed, because it assumes to convey privileges which no man ever had or can have. Very likely Wheelbarrow never heard of quit-claim deeds, but lack of space compels me to assume that my readers know some things

My proposition would not declare men incapable of making contracts; it would only decline to enforce one kind of contract—a very different thing.

Again, a mortgage on improvements, or a note, might be recognized by law although a land-mortgage should be ignored.

* * *

To conclude—I think that our primary monopolies—land, money, tariff, and patent monopolies, from which spring a whole brood of lesser ones—have sprung from government restriction, and are supported directly by it. Therefore I believe that the natural way to destroy monopolies is to lessen the power of the ruling class, by leaving a larger number of acts outside the control of the legislator, the judge, and the sheriff.

THEODORE P. PERKINS.

LYNN, MASS.

BOOK NOTICES.

Brentano's will publish in the latter part of September a story called "Puritan and Priest," expected to have a large circulation in church-circles—evidently antidotal in tendencies.

The *Revue de Belgique*, for August, contains an instructive essay, *Les Sources du Pentateuque*, by M. J. Küntziger, written in review of Alexandre Westphal's work, *Les Sources du Pentateuque : Etude de critique et d'histoire* (Paris, Fischbacher).

The author of "The Reveries of a Bachelor," Mr. Donald D. Mitchell, who has so seldom written of late, will contribute to the October *Scribner's* the end-paper, entitled, "A Scattering Shot at Some Ruralities," upon the decay of "New England Farm and Village Life."

It is announced that Prof George P. Fisher, of Yale, will contribute during the coming year, to *the Century*, a series of papers on the Nature and Method of Revelation. Prof. Fisher will touch upon various interesting points in Christianity. We are curious to know its purpose and tendency.

To the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, Mr. Joseph Henry Thayer contributes a paper on "President Woolsey." Although taking "little interest in ecclesiastical peculiarities or denominational proselytism," says Mr. Thayer, yet to President Woolsey "Christianity was consummate rationality."

Publishers, Newsdealers, and Journalists will find *Caspar's Directory of the American Book, News, and Stationary Trade* a most valuable working adjunct. It is a painstaking and careful compilation, numbering some 1434 pages. The arrangement of indices and classification of topics are excellent.

The opening article of the *Popular Science Monthly* for October is "Pensions for All," by Gen. M. M Trumbull. Apart from its political and financial significance, there is a moral element involved in the question; and Gen. Trumbull broaches an ethical lesson, bearing forcibly upon our national character, that all will do well to heed.

With regard to the long-announced appearance of Mr. M C. O'Byrne's novel, "Upon this Rock," we learn, upon inquiry, that the author is unable definitely to speak The book has long since been ready for the press, and it is to be regretted that a work promising to deal with so many current vital questions should make such an inauspicious beginning.

"Swedenborg's Lehren und die Metaphysische oder Geistige Heilungsphilosophie," is the title of a little pamphlet of twenty pages, written in German, by Adolph J Bartels, "Preacher of the New Church and Doctor of the Metaphysical Science of Healing." The title in English would probably read: Swedenborg's Teachings and the Metaphysical or Spiritual Philosophy of Healing. We are unable to give an impartial criticism of Preacher Bartels's upholdings. *Ab initio* we are prejudiced, and mentally incompetent to receive them; the very words of the preface, *viz.*, "the healing of diseases by *supernatural* means," precludes us. Preacher Bartels's "Spiritual Metaphysic," which includes all such inferior forms as the Faith Cure, the Prayer-Cure, the Thought-Cure, and Christian Science, may contain latent germs of truth; but can we use them in their unclassified shape, and their supernatural guise?

NOTES.

Dr. Paul Carus arrived, from Europe, on Friday of last week.

Dr. Gould, of Philadelphia, will contribute to our next number a paper, called "A Dream of Alchemy," relative to the Brown-Séquard 'Elixir of Life.'

The Open Court Clubbing Rates.

The following rates are offered to all who wish to subscribe for THE OPEN COURT and any one of the magazines in the list subjoined. If more than one he desired, they may be obtained through our office at the price stated in the first column, allowing a discount of 10 per cent on all orders amounting to $10.00 and over. Each periodical sent with THE OPEN COURT for the price stated in the second column. Money must accompany all orders.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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A DREAM OF ALCHEMY.

BY GEORGE M. GOULD, M. D.

I.

Whoever knows the long strange history of the evolution of medicine,—the blunderings of the primitive healing-art in mazes of illusion and superstition, and the wondrous credulity of mankind in other ages, never weary of new charlatans nor tired of old miracles—has just reason to marvel at the splendor of the modern science. In no field of progress had advance been so slow;—that which had really the most direct importance for man,—the science of bodily health,—was the very last of all to be extricated from the hands of fools or knaves. But within one century, suddenly catching that splendid zeal of reason and research that began to thrill through the whole civilized world, Medicine also magnificently vindicated its right at last to a seat in the highest circle of positive science. Perhaps the dear old Æsculapian snake has not been yet able to slough off the very last patch of its empirical skin; but that is only near the tail, and the tail is kept as much as possible out of sight. Some shreds of the dead integument make little difference now that the living symbol has been able to wreathe itself about that lofty column of Truth whose polished solidity defies the gnawing of all follies, bigotries, or greeds.

And yet when the news of Dr. Brown-Séquard's amazing proposal to prolong and renew human life and health by the hypodermatic injection of a certain animal extract was first flashed through the civilized world, it must have seemed to most serious thinkers that modern scientific medicine had received its worst blow from the hand of a long-trusted defender. But, singularly enough, no incident of our times could have served so well to show what high things may be expected of that science in the future. Amid the storm of prurient curiosity aroused by the announcement, and the voluntary or involuntary exhibitions of weakness by medical tyros and notoriety-seekers, pandering to such curiosity by experiment, the disciplined self-control of the profession as a body remained unaffected. It simply closed up ranks,—like a square-front in battle when the first man falls; while the delusion that had stricken down one of the great soldiers of science, passed on to fire popular imagination.

Outside of the professional corps, the widespread effects of this almost incomprehensible error are giving curious proof how vast the possible evil results of one blunder made by a man with a great scientific reputation. It also shows, to an appalling degree, the popular ignorance of the simplest facts of biology,—and reveals everywhere a latent smoldering of mediæval superstition,—old fires of alchemy and witchcraft so long and deeply covered with the accumulated strata of our new civilization, that we had almost believed them burned out. For this pretended discovery is not new;—the idea of it only represents a startling case of scientific atavism,— a retrogression or devolution to the notions of the savage and the philosophy of the alchemist. In almost any good history of chemistry or mediæval medicine,—in almost any scientific work treating of the history and practices of uncivilized superstition, not written *virginibus puerisque*,—the same fantastic belief may be found. The *Diasatirion* of Mesue, cited in the "Cordic Dispensatory," of 1546,* was a very popular elixir in olden times; and the chief ingredient of its polypharmic nonsense was *testiculi vulpis*. To this "rejuvenating principle" was also added *caudarum scinccium renibus et semine*. Some two hundred years ago the physician-in-ordinary of an English King recommended to his royal master, and to all Englishmen who could obtain it, a certain "mummial quintessence,"—being "the flesh of a sound young man dying a natural death about the middle of August." Certain superstitions connected with savage cannibalism, and the habits of tribes who believe that by eating the hearts or drinking the blood of fierce animals, bravery and ferocity may be obtained,—offer familiar parallels to the delusion resurrected by the French savant. But the barbarism of that delusion is even more directly evidenced by the fact that our own North-American Indians have long believed in, and used, the very same "elixir" recommended to us from Paris as a novelty. They sometimes prepare a powder from dessicated glands, but more commonly eat raw the organs of freshly killed buffalo and antelope.† A friend informs me that, to his own knowledge, a similar custom prevailed among otherwise sensible white people in Missouri and elsewhere

* See Peters's "Ancient Pharmacy and Medicine," p. 153.
† See *Medical News*, of Sept 7th, 1889.

some twenty years ago;—the meat sliced, and prepared with condiments, being eaten uncooked.

No doubt, such beliefs and practices date back to the earliest stages of human superstition. So much for the novelty of the idea! But now be it observed that in the matter of practice, the children of barbarism and the votaries of mediæval superstition have proved themselves far more rational than the once great French physiologist;—for if the result desired were possible to obtain by any use of the material employed, their own primitive method would certainly have larger chances of success. If we admit a surplus of life-force and implied recuperative power to exist in the secretion chosen, every fact of surgical experience and advanced physiological knowledge would oppose the policy of any method of direct transmission of it into the circulation, and demand, on the contrary, its consignment to the natural organs of digestion and assimilation. Even the surgical transfusion of blood, milk, etc., from one organism to another, is now admitted to have no other purpose or effect than the simple gaining of time for the organism to rally in cases of great hemorrhage or extreme exhaustion. It supplies an increased volume of fluid to the cardiac mechanism, as a stimulus to reaction;—or, it supplies red-corpuscles simply as oxygen-carriers, etc.; but the whole effect is merely mechanical, temporary, unnatural. The introduced blood, for example, does not become an integral part of the organism,—as some persons seem to suppose: it remains for the time being a foreign body;—and within a day or two every foreign corpuscle is sorted out, broken up, and excreted,—the hæmatin reappearing in the renal secretion. Even your brother's blood will not be accepted by your own circulation, and domesticated in your veins;—the hæmatopoietic organs of another can never fashion blood accurately enough to suit the exquisite discrimination of the mystic *Unbewussten*. Then, what egregious sciolism to dream of hypodermatically injecting a mass of alien serum and bruised glandular and sperm cells!

Yet another absurdity remains to be considered. Is it not the A, B, C of physiology that a cell or a secretion perfected for any special and definite end, can have no other function? So long as it acts at all, it may act only in fulfillment of that purpose for which it was set aside. Could a Malpighian corpuscle be replaced by a gastric follicle? Could a sperm-cell act as a blood-corpuscle? Above all, what use could a cerebral ganglion have for a sperm-cell? To claim that the physical agents of the procreative function are capable of modifying utterly-different tissue-metamorphosis and far-removed tissue-nutrition, is simply arrant nonsense,—a *non-sequitur* that disgraces any brain capable of thinking it. Furthermore, the absolutely savage mind could certainly teach to the deluded scientist a lesson in logic;—for while the latter thought to obtain by his imaginary hygieno-therapeutic treatment a generalized increase of vitality for the whole economy, the Cheyenne Indian more rationally sought only the stimulation of a special function. "*Valet ad erectionem virgæ, multiplicat spermæ, et desiderium cœundi,*" says Mesue,—in which belief the alchemist and the savage stand precisely upon the same level of error,—a level, nevertheless, higher comparatively than that to which M. Brown-Séquard has fallen.

But it is not even here, when we attempt to fathom the depth of the absurdity under consideration, that the plummet-line of science touches bottom. Astounding forgetfulness, or astounding ignorance, concerning the limitations of usage of specialized cells and tissues, is again displayed by the proposal to employ products taken from the lower animals. Whatever may be implied by the recognition of cross-fertilization as a biological necessity,—the law of Sterility clearly marks those everlasting barriers Nature has raised between different orders and species in the course of their evolution; and in any event the life-properties of sperm cells, such as those whereof the use, or rather abuse, has been thus insanely advocated, could only communicate,—if any vitalizing results were possible,—a stimulus bearing relation to those laws fixing the durability and character of animal existence. On the other hand, if the hypodermatist had not ignored Nature's omnipotent barrier, he would necessarily have found his theory lead him into the frank advocacy of cannibalism—like our Physician-in-ordinary of two hundred years ago, with his "mummial quintessence." (There is indeed a revolting alternative suggested—but thought shudders and words fail. . . . .) And carrying the question a step further, why should germ-cells be excluded?—Would it not be rational to suppose them, rather than sperm-cells, the lodgers and carriers of high potentialities? Or why not both? Even as a *false* theory the scheme has not the apology of the simplest outlined development, of any plausible shape;—it cannot rise above the level of folly as a hideous loathsome suggestion. But there are follies of which the results are crimes,—crimes such as must be excluded from the pages of even the amplest histories, like certain maniacal vices of Roman Emperors, and the monstrosities of Gilles de Retz.

Finally, in regard to certain results claimed to have been obtained by dangerous and foolish experimentation, it only remains to say that any not discovered by a too-vivid imagination, are probably due to some leucomaine in the serous fluid—which simply means that the circulation has been stimulated by the introduction of a poison which must be got rid of as soon as possible. That septicæmia is the most prob-

able result has been already well-proved by those poor dupes whose credulity disgraces their degree.

II.

From these few plain statements of fact, it can readily be perceived in what manner the true scientific world received the announcement of the physiologist. The unavoidable inference was that M. Brown-Séquard's mental faculties had become impaired; but the respect due to his name for past services to medical science, and the respect also which venerable years command, inculcated a policy of polite silence. Unfortunately, however, the result of this senile folly was not to be confined to the shameful discredit cast upon the profession. What is in itself false according to natural principle, is also in itself immoral; but this folly in especial was smitten with the germs of a two-fold immorality whereof the contagious effects could scarcely be over-estimated. Passing over the sin against the animal race, which might have ended heaven knows where, had the incident occurred a few generations ago,—we remain appalled by the faintest hint of the putrescent infamy the theory authorizes. There are possible far-reaching consequences of such lamentable follies that can only be guessed by those conversant with the history of sexual superstition, and those who know how insanity catches at suggestions and justifies the most execrable fantasy. Few know the depth of the stagnant vice, the nameless, indescribable, moral rottenness, lying just out of public sight in all great cities,—few, at least, beside physicians. And yet to a physician,—to Brown-Séquard in the fulness of years,—belongs the degradation of stirring it up. Already things have been put upon record, in a certain class of periodicals, which startle the coolest blood; and imagination shrinks from answering the query:—"How far *can* this go?" Not of this vile falsehood can it be said,—as was aptly said of a once fashionable medical delusion,—that "what is new in it is not true, and what is true in it is not new." For it contains nothing whatever that is either new or true. It is old as stupidity, wicked as superstition, cruel as savagery;—it is false in its premises, false in its logic, false in its conclusions;—and there is no saying to what extremes of shame and crime it may yet lead many a brutal blundering mind. And, however consolatory the spectacle of its silent condemnation by science, it is not enough that a hundred thousand independent judges should ignore the sophistry with quiet scorn,—it is not enough that the medical profession should turn away its eyes from the error of one of its old division-generals, and calmly pursue its duty. The error must be now crushed by outspoken medical opinion without pity,—before further evil consequences make themselves manifest.

And yet the victim and first enunciator of this miserable delusion must himself remain an object of sincere pity. There is a cruel pathos in this visible crumbling-down of a wondrously-gifted brain,—this spectacle of a mind so skilled in physiological methods and ripe in scientific research, thus damning its long reputation by the utterance of one irredeemable weakness. Through all time to come the name of Brown-Séquard will be coupled with that fatal folly; and the remembrance of it will doubtless outlive the fame of all his many contributions to that science momentarily spattered with ridicule by his fall. Of him, more than of any other great figure of the scientific century, perhaps, may it yet be truly said:—"He that troubleth his own house, shall inherit the wind."

But cerebral degradation alone cannot fully explain this singular incident of moral feebleness. It is not easy to believe that, even at the verge of dotage, such a mind as that of the Franco-American could so far forget its training, as to commit so gross a blunder from mere exhaustion. No: the primal cause must be sought in the falsity of some principle followed, or some method pursued, during the best years of his career. And here we are obliged to consider the fact that both scientific medicine and its parent, physical science, have been yielding too long to the guidance of materialistic philosophy. To read of the atrocities of vivisection, the stupidities of endless statistical countings, the numberless *post-hocs* mistaken for *propter-hocs*, the stolid indifference to living principles and living facts,—to read of all this and more, characterizing much of our modern medical literature, is disheartening enough from the moral point of view. But it seems to throw some light upon the horrible blunder of the French physiologist. He largely represented the willful blindness of medicine to the existence of Life as a force *per se*,—to the existence of the soul as a mysterious power using flesh only as an engineer machinery. Such materialism had its origin, no doubt, as a scientific self-assertion of independence, in the once necessary reaction against old dogmatisms; but the reaction itself has latterly developed into an extreme of such hardness, that the necessity for a second and more natural reaction grows more apparent each year. All in vain have we rudely broken our way, Vandal-wise, into sacred silences,—into those secret temple-chambers where Life, the awful goddess that is the ghost of us, sits, weaving about her the Isis-veil of Materiality. All in vain have we sought to lift it,—another fold beneath ever appears to wrap the mystery from sight;—a million upliftings, a million curtains to conceal. And yet human pride refuses still to reverence the Infinite Weaver that works within! The smallest knowledge of embryology should have revealed to clear-sight the certain ultimate con-

fusion of all theories of mechanicalism; and yet we have to deplore the too-general medical acceptance of a fatalistic creed, that folly and crime are due to cranial asymmetry or inherited cerebral abnormalism. What wonder if some individual egotism, hardened by the consequence of such beliefs, should blunder at last into some monstrous delusion,—when the mind weakens before the approach of death: the delusion that infinite store of vitality could be found in a few sperm-cells, and that these, by slaughter and theft, could be made to yield our veins new divine force! There is, indeed, a terrible pathos in that strangest error,—that insanest fancy that life might be renewed by some cheating of Nature without the knowledge of Nature's God! There is a broken-hearted confession in it, that materialism cannot satisfy man;—there is a sobbing yearning in it for knowledge of that Spirit so long denied: the Spirit and Giver of Life. Physiology at last makes avowal that the bodily machine cannot run itself!

Naturally, the moral wrong of that yearning for days beyond man's allotted time,—an immorality long recognized by loftier thinkers,—has remained totally unperceived by this poor old groper in darkness. The practice of vivisection had long petrified the heart that made the wish; and whatever selfishness habitual cruelty nourishes, must have grown with age. And so, to him, life still seemed sweet for its own sake,—even at that time of years, when those who have ever loved Nature's divinity too deeply to inflict needless pain upon the least of her dumb children, feel death's approach only as the coming of some grateful sleep, and welcome it with uttermost trust in that Soul of all cosmic being, ever working for us all,—the foolish and the wise alike,—but always behind two veils that none may draw,—the Veil that shadows all beginning, and the Veil that shadows the secret of the end, after the weariness is forever done and the light is past.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

BY C. STANILAND WAKE.

THE *System of Ethics for Society and Schools* which Mr. Austin Bierbower, the author of "The Morals of Christ," has given to the world, under the title of "The Virtues and their Reasons,"* commences with the following observation: "There are some general conditions of thought and feeling which lie at the foundation of all morals, and constitute what may be called moral states, as kindness, love, and sympathy—terms nearly synonymous, which express the feeling with which we should regard our fellow-men." We are told further that kindness or love is "the sum of all the virtues," and that "underlying virtue generally, and itself the chief special virtue, it tends, in its wide results, towards all moral ends." These statements appear at first sight to be perfectly just, and yet a little consideration will show that they are far from satisfactory. Kindness or love is defined as "the feeling of benevolence which the good man has toward all men, desiring their welfare and sorrowing for their misfortune." This feeling of benevolence is perhaps essential to the well-being of society, but does it provide an actual basis of morals? Mr. Bierbower states in his Introduction that the virtues are universally recognized as duties; and, therefore, as duties are such only because they are obligatory, that which in his system of Ethics is the sum of all virtues and underlies virtue generally, ought to possess the element of obligation. No doubt, dominated by love, "one can do no wrong, since every wrong can be resolved into some unkindness, and will tend to all good, since every good is kind." This may furnish a sufficient reason why a man *should* exercise the virtue of benevolence, but it does not show why it is *necessary* for him to do so. The statement that the virtues "have a sufficient reason in some advantage to the parties concerned," weakens the case, as it supplies ground for the objection that a system of morals which professes to be based on love is in reality founded on selfishness. The utilitarian principle of doing good to others, because in the long run it will be the best for one's self, may furnish a criterion of morality, embodied in a system of *expediency*, but without something more, it can never, even with the aid of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "organized experience," form the basis of a system of moral *obligation*.

The fact is, as stated by the eccentric Jean Jacques Rousseau,* the first sentiment of duty comes to us, not from what we owe to others, but from what is due to ourselves. Hence, the French writer teaches that a child should be told first of his rights and not of his duties. This doctrine, although opposed to the ideas generally prevalent on the subject of education, is founded on nature and is therefore strictly correct. What is more, Rousseau shows that the idea of right in connection with moral conduct is originally associated with *property*. This he illustrates by reference to an incident intended to show that the idea of property goes back naturally to the right of the first occupant of the soil by labor. The justness or not of this illustration does not affect the argument; because whether the first property acquired was in the product of the soil or of the chase, the principle is the same. It is on the personal right that the idea of moral obligation or duty is really based, as shown by the use of the term *property*. This is not only some*thing* proper to one's self, but also the quality of an object or of an

* Published by George Sherwood & Co., Chicago, 1888.

* Emile, Vol. I, p. 157.

action, which may be thus described as right or *proper*, and moral conduct itself as moral *propriety*.

When once the notion of "property" was acquired, it would necessarily lead to the formation of the idea of *right*. In man's primitive condition, his property would be necessary to his self-preservation, and any interference with it would give rise to the feeling of not-right or wrong. There is not here, however, any ethical element. A man may form the idea that it is wrong to interfere with *his* rights, and yet have no compunction about thus dealing with those of his neighbor. The idea of right in relation to others can be formed only after experience has taught that interference with the "property" of others will meet with resistance and punishment. We may judge that the notion of morality in relation to such actions is really founded on that of property rights, from the fact that among peoples of even a comparatively high degree of culture, nearly all crimes have a material price, the payment of the fine fixed for the offense being considered a sufficient satisfaction and atonement. But can the fear of retribution give rise to the idea of duty? It is very probable that originally this idea was formed in relation, not to the rights of the living, but to those of the dead. The superstitious fear of disembodied spirits is one of the most influential factors in the life of the savage. These spirits are regarded as having certain rights, inattention to which will be revenged. The savage who fears the anger of a spirit, on whom he cannot retaliate, if he performs, or does not perform, a certain act, may ultimately come to feel it right to do what the spirit is thought to require. This feeling of obligation has reference to the supposed rights of the spirit. In like manner, if infringement of the rights of other men were forbidden by a competent authority, especially if this were clothed with a superstitious character, it might under the influence of the fear of retribution come to be regarded as wrong.

We cannot doubt that a feeling of impropriety in relation to actions, such as robbery and murder, and, in fact, with respect to any actions which affect the general welfare at first of the family or clan, and afterwards of the tribe, were developed at an early date. The law of retaliation would be an influential agent in such development, but it would not be sufficient by itself. Probably here comes into play the sentiment of sympathy, which originates in the sexual instinct, but shows its activity as a social force first in the family. All the members of a family-group, represented (say) by a woman and her descendants, would be bound together by the ties of sympathy, and they would show special regard for each other's rights. As the family-group increased, so would the range of sympathy, and as the feeling grew in strength there would be a gradual improvement in the general conduct towards society at large. We see the growth of that sentiment in the development of the custom of "brotherhood," which exists in every part of the world, and among peoples of all degrees of culture. This artificial fraternal tie is regarded as equally binding with that of nature which it imitates. Usually, however, the engagement is placed under the sanction of an oath; and we can understand, therefore, that before actions, which are the expression of sympathy, can become clothed with a feeling of duty, they must be placed under some similar sanction. Such a sanction is found among primitive peoples in the will of the spirit ancestors of the family or clan, who are in fact the guardians of the oath of brotherhood, and who have already certain rights of their own which they jealously guard. The idea of retribution by spirit agency thus becomes influential in the development of the social instincts, which ultimately show their activity in the active virtues of life, as distinguished from its passive duties.

The distinction here drawn between virtues and duties is real and important, although Mr. Bierbower in common with ethical writers of the utilitarian school necessarily confound them. I cannot do better than repeat the words I have written elsewhere on the subject.* "There is a great difference between the performance of certain actions because they are right, and the abstaining from others because they are wrong. Both may indeed arise from the existence of the same condition of mind—the love of one's neighbor and regard for his happiness. It is true, moreover, that in one sense the abstaining from injuring others may be said to denote a certain state of action; for it implies the exercise of a restraining power over the selfish instincts. But in the ordinary sense, it is none the less certain that obedience to the commands of (for example) the Hebrew Decalogue, which forbids interference with the rights of others, must be a state of passivity. These negative actions may therefore, as being the first to acquire a moral obligation, be distinguished by the name of *duties;* positive actions, those which are really performed for the benefit of others, or rather the mental qualities from which they spring, being called *virtues*. No doubt, the performance of the former class of actions is usually accompanied by a virtuous condition of mind, but this is not necessarily so; while on the other hand, it is only in a relative sense that the latter can be said to possess moral obligation," and therefore to be duties. The "virtues" are active, and are exactly covered by the term *benevolence*, which is a duty only because, being traceable to an attribute of man's nature, it is indirectly affected by the element of "propriety," which belongs essentially to the passive duties. The latter are founded on the right which all men have to the possession of what be-

* Evolution of Morality, Vol. I, p. 411.

longs to them; while benevolence, although not actually founded on any such right, tends to confirm it, by aiding men to retain their possessions, or regain them when lost, using that term in its widest sense as referring to anything pertaining to body or mind.

Under the influence of the *lex talionis*, and the fear of retribution by the ancestral spirits under whose sanction conduct has been placed, a feeling of obligation in relation to actions affecting the common clan or tribe would be developed. This may be described as internal or tribal morality, as distinguished from internal or non-tribal. This is a distinction recognized by all primitive peoples. Actions which, as among members of the same tribe would be accounted wrong, as infringements of recognized private rights, are usually regarded as harmless, if not praiseworthy, when directed against persons belonging to another tribe. It is evident that men who consider (if they think at all on the matter) that they are justified in robbing or killing members of a neighboring tribe, and yet may not treat members of their own tribe in the same way, cannot have a very clear idea of morality. They have, however, made a certain advance in moral culture; which is none the less valuable because their conduct is governed chiefly by the principle of expediency. How then are the feelings which have been thus gradually developed in relation to conduct to acquire the force of moral obligation? If every man had an innate faculty which approved or disapproved of particular actions as good or bad, there would be no difficulty in accounting for the genesis of the idea of obligation in relation to such actions generally. As a fact, however, conscience, to which that function belongs, is the product of man's intellectual development as much as any other faculty. Conscience is defined by Mr. Bierbower as the "common sense of ethics." Like common sense, however, conscience is the product of a long series of experiences, in the sense that it could not exist without them. The origin of the conscienee may be explained as follows: In infancy a child undergoes a process of gradual mental development, showing itself at first as an awakening consciousness to the experiences of life, followed by certain differentiations, the nature of which depend on that of the phenomena which have been influential in originating them. The laws of moral evolution are perfectly analogous to those which govern the development of the intellectual faculties. The beginning of both is the simple consciousness, which becomes resolved into conscience in response to external stimuli, the conscience differing morally and intellectually only in the ideas about which it is concerned. In either case, the teachings of experience are appropriated by thought or reflection, the resulting ideas being attended by a feeling of fitness or unfitness, which through its habitual activity becomes instinctive. In relation to moral conduct, agreement with the instinct thus formed becomes the test of propriety. The "conscience" is thus gradually formed as the result of the activity of consciousness in relation to certain phenomena, and it may be described as an *instinct of moral propriety*, or, by virtue of its function, the moral sense.

It may be objected that if this view of the origin of conscience is correct, it may give different responses on the same subject, if presented at different times, and therefore that it does not supply a perfect test of right conduct. This is, no doubt, true, and yet it is equally true that when the conscience acts under similar conditions, it will always give the same response. What its teaching may be in a particular case will depend entirely on the state of the mind in relation to the subject. The formation of a right judgment by the intellect cannot be expected if the conditions necessary for its formation are wanting, and it is exactly the same in regard to the judgment of conscience in relation to moral questions. This consideration will explain why the dictates of conscience vary among peoples of a different degree of culture and in different ages. There is the same differentiation of consciousness, but it has taken place under varying conditions, and, therefore, the ideas of moral propriety formed in different minds also vary. An analogous state of things is observable in questions of taste, showing that the æsthetic conscience is capable of education, in like manner as that which deals with questions of morals. It is owing to the intellectual element at work in conscience that its teachings are liable to change, and that it is able to attain from time to time to more perfect action. The education of the conscience depends, therefore, in great measure on that of the judgment, and the development of the reflective faculty will under proper conditions lead to the recognition of truth in its moral relations no less than in its intellectual bearings.

There is another view of moral conduct which must not be lost sight of, as it shows the ultimate source of moral obligation. Morality has two phases, the objective and the subjective, according to whether our conduct effects others or ourselves. Thus, actions may be wrong (criminal) in relation to their consequences to others, and wrong (sinful *) in their effect on the individuals performing them. They may have the former quality without partaking of the latter. Criminality has reference to society, while sinfulness relates to the moral nature of the individual. Thus the criminality of murder and theft consists in the interference by those actions with the rights of others; their sinfulness depends on their tendency to injuriously affect the moral nature of the criminal. It is

* I use this term for convenience and not with any theological significance.

only when this tendency becomes the predominant motive for the prohibition of such actions, that they are thought to be sinful. At this stage the social injury assumes from the moral standpoint a secondary place, as an accident of a depraved moral condition. This has especial reference to sexual conduct; for, except where actual injury to another is occasioned by it, such conduct cannot strictly be treated as wrong, except so far as it intends to injuriously affect the moral condition of the individual acting. The moral wrong of such conduct is thus subjective rather than objective, and the fact that it may be "sinful" without being criminal shows that the ultimate foundation of all morality may be, as in fact it is, duty, not towards others, but towards self. The very duty to self requires, however, that man should strive after a perfect life in all its relations. This can be attained only by the observance of the *true* law of love, which embraces all morality, that which concerns man as such, and as standing in a certain relation to God. The true source of morality is indeed to be found in the being of man as part of the universal whole of nature, although his relationship to mankind at large, as well as to the members of the animal kingdom, gives rise to special obligations. The distinction pointed out between the two classes of virtues, the active and the passive, is purely objective. Subjectively they have a common basis in the nature of man, and therefore they must be both traced to the Universal existence of which every man forms part. The soul, that which displays its activity in consciousness, is derived from God himself, not as having been made in his image, but as the evolutional product of his essence. The development of the soul's faculties, therefore, is the unfolding of the divine nature in man. Viewed in this light, the conscience may be described as the expression in the human soul of the divine consciousness, which becomes revealed as an instinct of moral propriety, as the soul's experiences on the earthly plane are enlarged, and the intellectual faculties become perfected in their operation.

MAN AS A MICROCOSM.*

BY CARUS STERNE.

II.

It was chiefly the merit and outcome of Carl Ernst Baer's incomparable researches in the field of evolutionary science that demonstrated the untenableness of the microcosmic phantasies discussed. Baer's investigations went to prove that the hypothesis of a single gradation of living creatures ascending from the lowest animal classes to the highest human types, was an utterly erroneous idea; that, on the contrary, there were many great classes of animals, the structural forms of which the highest types in their development did not even approximately touch; and that the higher vertebrates, although showing in the first genetic stages indubitable similarities to the ultimate forms assumed by lower vertebrates, merely presented points of general agreement and did not exhibit the characteristic marks of the separate species: they simply recapitulated the general forms of the divisions ranking below them; and when they finally arrived at the highest point of organization attainable in their proper class, the class, order, family, genus, and species to which they belonged, would be successively revealed, inasmuch as the development naturally proceeded from the more general to the more particular form. According to this theory, man, in development, does not pass through the forms of *all* the animal classes, but only through those of one single branch of the entire animal kingdom that, early separating from the numerous other branches of the tree of life, had risen to an especially lofty height, called by us the vertebrate branch.

With the recognition of these investigations the theory had to fall that made the entire animal kingdom a product of a general plan of development having man for its original prototype. Other series of types, showing in structure no marked resemblance whatever to the vertebrates, as the articulates, the mollusks and the echinoderms, have also attained a luxuriant development and in part even more multiform than that of the vertebrate kindred of man; and yet they never saw a similar hyperzoöic form issue from out their midst. The highest forms in all of these spheres of life repeat, in their development, the history of their race just as man in his development repeats the history of his. The principle, recently formulated by Hæckel, which underlies the development of all life, that the descendants of every race must briefly recapitulate in development the history of their race, has shown itself to prevail universally. But it is self-evident that each descendant can only reveal what in its own ancestors it has itself experienced; and in the early development of the human type neither does the shell-fish, nor the beetle, nor the star-fish, nor even the kindred tortoise, nor the bird, play any part; no more than the forms of vertebrate development appear in the larval stages of the other divisions of the animal kingdom. The advocates of the theory before set forth, may still choose to support their favorite doctrine by further endeavoring to establish a universal interdependence of all the branches of the tree of life, they may still insist upon the growth of all from a common root, and may appeal to the fact that the early stages of animal evolution, even in the most heterogeneous types, all resemble each other. Nevertheless, the comprehensive investigations of comparative embryology necessitate abandoning this anthropocen-

* Translated from the German by *μκρκ*.

tric idea which makes man the central point and original cause of animated creation—and thus the true microcosm.

But we have made another and no less valuable scientific acquisition in the teachings of Darwin. We have again approached that old-time circle of ideas, in having gradually become convinced that man, the crown of creation, is in reality a blood relation of animals, that he proceeded from among them and raised himself far above them by virtue of his own superior powers. It cost many a hard struggle with prejudice in every phase, before this doctrine found general recognition; but nowadays it scarcely meets with serious objection from well-informed people. Even Virchow no longer hesitates to admit that the link connecting man with other vertebrate animals must be sought somewhere; and he has recently become so certain of the location of this link as to think it right and proper to speak of anthropoid marks in apes and of pithecoid marks in men.

It matters not whether we choose to regard man as the primitive aim of creation, ever kept in sight, or as an unexpected lucky hit of the evolutionary process. From the day we became conscious of our connection with the rest of animated nature, ever since we perceived that one bond of unity enveloped the entire organic world, and that the same life pulsed in all its forms, at times so strangely different; the study of nature has acquired an infinitely augmented interest for us. And with the same sympathy with which we trace the fortunes of our national ancestors to the remotest periods of the past, with the same interest do we now cast our glance into the epochs of the prehistoric world in which, indeed, no being in our own likeness appeared, but where our own ancestral stock, our own flesh and blood, struggled onward to a higher destiny. To be sure, in the confused swarm of life that rises before the mind's eye, we can no more determine with certainty the true line of our descent, than can the Habsburger or the Hohenzoller trace amid the confusion of migrating nations the line of his ancestry. But it is a source of satisfaction to feel and to know that *then* and *there* we struggled in the very vortex of the everlasting strife. At the period when no form of vertebrate life existed except the fish, our cold-blooded ancestors were swimming the ocean; in the age of carboniferous forests, or shortly before, our forefathers first gained their feet; they valiantly contended for existence, perhaps, in the days of the salamander; or suffered, in the shape of small and timorous creatures, under the tyranny of their great, ungentle cousins, the giant reptiles of the secondary period—finally to master and outlive them.

When we glance, to-day, over the great course of development through which, from the dawn of time, we may trace the history of vertebrate creation, when we consider that, even in the remotest periods known to us, admitting the possibilities of egoistic illusion, it far surpassed all other orders in point of organization; the conviction becomes inevitable, that our race must belong to those which extend farthest back in the history of life. Marvelous perspective, that, which carries back our own individual life to the beginning of all life! For it is the mark preëminent of life that it knows no break in continuity: one living form reaches the lamp to another and where the light goes out, the chain is broken, and no power on earth can again unite it. In this conviction, that every single line of life must have its roots in the lowest depths, lies our warranty that this same life, to-day pulsing in our veins, is a wave that swells from the sea of eternity, and has never ceased in its onward march since the rise of our ancestors who probably belonged to the first births of the world in general.

The very primitive forms of life, among which we too must seek our actual ancestors, never knew a natural death. They divided into two individuals, as some of their kind do even to-day, and these latter again divided into two, and so on. Their life was an unceasing rejuvenescence and multiplication, wherein no participant could pretend to a greater age than another, where forefather and descendant could in no way be distinguished. For them immortality was and is an incontestible fact. Death came into the world as a necessary evil, the necessary accompaniment of complex physical structure and waste of bodily tissue; yet, given Death, the thread of life among their more highly organized descendants in our ancestral line could nowhere have suffered the slightest break in continuity, for otherwise we ourselves would not exist. Despite the never-ceasing struggles in every region, high and low of the globe, the spark that was ignited æons ago still glimmers in us. Yes, we have lived through all and suffered all that has been decreed the earth since the Beginning. We have participated in the whole elevation of the human race from primitive and insignificant beginnings to the height now attained; we were parties to every struggle by land and sea, and the fact of our existence alone testifies to the antiquity of our patent of nobility. How might the remaining classes of animals been able to compete with such antecedents; the zoöphytes (plant-animals), for instance, who never forsook the water, or the echinoderms, who never left the sea, or the mollusks, of which a small division came upon the land, and not then until in the tertiary period! If we may infer the distance traversed from the height attained, the race from which human beings are sprung has traveled the longest road of all; it has been subjected more than any other to participation in the uncounted transfor-

mations that have taken place upon the surface of the earth, in fact, it is very likely a product of these varied changes, and in a higher sense, therefore, a creation of universality,—a true microcosm.

There are important consequences that immediately come to mind the moment we thus regard the eternity of life. How often may this unending life have, as we say, hung by a thread, and yet been spun on despite all dearth and pain; hunger and love, those dark and mighty instincts, ever winning the victory anew. It daily comes to pass that Fate prematurely severs a thread of life that has been spun from eternity, or that a man lays violent hands upon himself, or obstinately refuses to reach the lamp onward, thereby nullifying the work of thousands of years. The disappearance, without issue, of a renowned dynasty, or a line of nobility, whose name perhaps can be traced back through scarcely a dozen generations, is lamented with many expressions of grief, but it occurs to no one that with every childless man a line of life terminates which in like manner may unquestionably be traced to the beginning of time. Consider for a moment that every person has two ancestors in the first preceding generation, in the second four, in the third eight; so that if we say there are three generations to a century, and count from the beginning of our era only, we will find that a man living to-day may have had more than one hundred and ninety billion ancestors, all of whom have been frustrated should this descendant of theirs, whether male or female, remain unmarried or meet an early death. It follows that the state of celibacy is attended with serious considerations, and everybody that has not grave reasons for so doing, should well consider whether it be not unjust to interrupt intentionally the work of æons. Not through any regard for his ancestors, whom ingratitude, if this *be* ingratitude, could not affect, but for his own sake and to the end that his own race, which has undergone so much, may take part in the future, that he may continue to exist in it and continue to contribute to the work of nature.

It is true, nature herself in her limitless prolificacy may not demand this; hundreds perish in one year, and in the next, perhaps, the loss is a thousand-fold replaced. But withal, how often in the course of terrestrial existence have great and proud races become extinct to the very last member, never to be replaced! How many kindred animal races has not man himself outlived, of which not a few have been exterminated by his own hand or soon will be exterminated! Let us ask how many beasts of the chase and the jungle will yet live some thousands of years hence, if the work of extermination continues at the same pace as heretofore! Thus does man, who not only has outlived the greatest periods, but in whom the future of all higher development rests, gradually draw to himself the exclusive dominance and the total heritage of his line; the animal that will not serve him, that will not submit to his dominion, must give way to him. May he ever remain mindful of the teachings and the obligations which this uninterrupted and ever progressive line of development has imposed upon him, may he not refuse to listen to the warning therein contained, to strive after perfection in soul and character, and to regard himself in every aspect as a stage of transition to something higher! Nor shall he forget his origin, for it is calculated to infuse in him modesty and self-respect, and to animate him with hopes for the future.

In closing let us glance at the connecting links by which the separate parts of the chain, ever separated of course, were bound together.

The wonderful perfection of the forms of life, so infinitely slow in process, and therefore hardly noticeable in each particular period, would be scarcely conceivable, if a rejuvenescence of life did not take place at every stage of development. By the sexual process it is reconducted to its simplest form, brought back to the state with which it appears all life began—a diminutive particle of protoplasm. Thus in this particle are ultimately incorporated all the attributes and perfections of the stage of life attained; in it are latent all the secrets of life. When a race becomes totally extinct, a definite kind of protoplasm has ceased to rejuvenate itself. In this protoplasm lies, too, the great mystery of evolution, and the old physiologists accordingly attributed to it a distinct germinal soul which was far superior to the ordinary human soul, and whose function was to guide and inspire the entire development with untiring foresight. The later physiologists seek this guiding principle in a sort of memory of living matter,* which is supposed to enable the germ to pass through essentially the same development, in a short space of time, that its ancestors underwent during uncounted generations. The germinal soul, according to this theory, consisted simply of the power to recapitulate, in a short space of time, the old development extending over great periods; and this faculty manifested its activity unconsciously, just as we quite unconsciously perform all those acts which have become easy to us through repeated practice, for example, the different movements made in speaking, singing, writing, dancing, and so on. Indeed, upon close examination, it is possible that consciousness results merely as a syn-phenomenon of psychic activities, so that the idea of a germinal soul without consciousness does not involve any *contradictio in adjecto.* Yet in the measure that this development, *ab ovo,* was repeated in each individual from the beginning, the

*Ewald Hering: "Upon Memory as a General Function of Organized Matter," in THE OPEN COURT, Nos. 6 and 7.

general course of the same could impress itself with the less difficulty and the more permanency; for at each further stage there was only a little bit more to be learned. Thus the memory of the diminutive germ needed not to be overburdened, for a thousand fold repetition aided in assimilating the prodigious acquisitions of to-day, and an infinite space of time was devoted to it.

By this graphic method of viewing the matter we at least enabled to *presage* the solution of that problem which, to the philosophers of former ages, appeared the most important of all; namely, how the young life-germ can re-develop to that height of organization attained by the parents, while losing nothing of the wealth acquired. And as this wealth in man is greater than in any other living creature, so, too, is the abundance of transformation in his life, from the first movement of life in the germ to the last breath drawn, greater than anywhere else. The lower instincts of the animals, from among whom he has issued, meet in him with the presage of a higher existence, and the fancy of the ancients was right in calling him a microcosm.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

SPONTANEOUS ATTENTION.

III.

THE state of surprise or astonishment is spontaneous attention augmented; a few words with reference to it are now in order. Although of frequent occurence in every-day life, it has been forgotten by psychology. I find, however, in the *Traité des passions* of Descartes (Part II, Art. 70) the following definition: "Admiration is a sudden surprise of the soul, which causes it to consider with attention those objects that to it appear unfrequent and extraordinary. Thus, in the first place, it is caused by the impression in our brain representing the object as rare, and consequently as worthy of exceptional consideration; and in the second place by the movement of our thoughts, which by virtue of that impression are disposed to tend with great force toward the locality of the brain in which the impression rests, in order to strengthen and preserve it there; as they are also disposed, through that impression, to pass from thence into the muscles that serve to maintain the sensory organs in the same position in which they are, in order that, if originally formed by the organs of sense, the impression may be further prolonged by their support." It will repay us, well to ponder this passage. If we carefully peruse it, we shall find that due allowance being made for slight differences of language, nearly all the elements which we have endeavored to point out in the mechanism of spontaneous attention, are therein clearly enumerated; namely:—the augmentation of nervous influx in consequence of the impression; its partial conduction toward the muscles; the action of these muscles in order "to support" and "to strengthen." Incidentally we may remark, that Descartes's method of treatment is that of physiological psychology and not that of spiritualistic psychology, which quite improperly lays claim to him.

Surprise, and in a higher degree astonishment, is a shock produced by that which is new and unexpected; as if, for example, a person who travels little and whom I believe to be at home, some five or six hundred miles away, suddenly enters my room.

From the mental standpoint, there is little to be said of it. It belongs to the group of Emotions, and in its strong form, it is a commotion. Properly speaking, it is not so much a state, as an intermediate condition between two states, an abrupt rupture, a gap, an hiatus. At the moment of the shock the previous polyideism abruptly ends, because the new state rushes in, like a giant, into the struggle for life going on among the states of consciousness. By degrees the new state finds its place, is put into connection with others, and equilibrium tends to be re-established; but surprise having passed away, the state that follows it is attention, that is, an adjusted monoideism—adaptation having had time to take place. The intellectual element regains the upper hand over the emotional element. It is highly probable, that in the state of surprise we have imperfect knowledge because we have too much sensation.

From the physical side the symptoms are an exaggeration of spontaneous attention. "Attention," as we have seen, "is shown by the eyebrows being slightly raised; and as this state increases into surprise, they are raised to a much greater extent, with the eyes and mouth widely open. . . . . The degree to which the eyes and mouth are opened corresponds with the degree of surprise felt."* This raising of the eye-brows is an instinctive act; because it is also met with in individuals born blind: it allows the eyes to be opened very rapidly. As to the opening of the mouth, it permits a vigorous and deep inspiration, which we are always wont to make before any great effort.

We have said, that surprise is spontaneous attention augmented. I believe that this assertion is perfectly allowable. This state best exemplifies the emotional causes of spontaneous attention; for, from the latter there is an insensible gradation to surprise, to astonishment, to stupefaction, and finally to fright and to terror, which are emotional states of a very high degree of intensity.

* Translation, by γνῶν, copyrighted under the title "The Psychology of Attention."

* Darwin "The Expression of the Emotion" (Chap. XII). The probable origin of these diverse movements is discussed there.

Brought back now to the point from which we started, we are thus able to see, that the origin of attention is very humble, and that its primitive forms have actually been bound up with the most exacting conditions of animal life. Attention, from the first, had but a biological value. The habit of psychologists to restrict themselves to voluntary attention and even then to its higher manifestations, concealed its origin.

We may assert "a priori" that if attention is caused by emotional states, which in their turn are caused by tendencies, needs, and appetites, it is in its last analysis inseparably bound up with that which lies deepest in the individual—the instinct of self-preservation.

A rapid examination of the facts will enable us better to see that the power of being attentive in the struggle for life has been an advantage of the foremost order; but we must leave man and descend lower still—indeed, very low—in the scale of animal life. I leave aside completely the rudimentary forms of psychic life, which only too easily afford a pretext for conjectures and aberrations. In order that attention can be evoked, a few developed senses at least will be requisite, a few clear perceptions, and a competent motor apparatus. Riccardi, in his previously mentioned work, finds the first clear expression of attention in *Arthropoda*.

Any animal so organized that the impressions of the external world were all of equal significance to it, in whose consciousness all impressions stood upon the same level, without any single one predominating or inducing an appropriate motory adaptation—were exceedingly ill-equipped for its own preservation. I shall overlook the extreme case, in which predominance and adaptation would favor detrimental impressions; for an animal thus constituted must perish, being an illogical organism—a kind of incorporate contradiction. The usual case remains, *viz.:* the predominance of useful sensations, that is, of those connected with nutrition, self-defence, and the propagation of the species. The impressions of prey to be caught, of an enemy to be avoided, and from time to time, of a female to be fecundated, become settled in the consciousness of the animal with their adapted movements. Attention, thus, is at the service of and dependent upon necessities; always connected with the sense most perfectly developed, the sense of touch, of sight, of hearing, of smelling, according to the species. Here attention is seen in all its simplicity, and here it affords the most instruction. It was necessary to descend to these rudimentary forms, in order to grasp the reason of its power:—attention is a condition of life; and it will preserve this identical character in its higher forms, where, ceasing to be a factor of adaptation in a purely physical environment it becomes, as we shall see, a factor of adaptation in the social environment. In all the forms of attention, from the lowest to the highest, there is *unity of composition*.

And besides, among the highest-class animals even, attention loses its limited and material character. The great majority of animal species are enclosed within the narrow circle of feeding, propagating, sleeping; in this their entire activity is expended. The most intelligent have a superfluous activity, which is expended in the form of play—a manifestation which is so important, that several authors have made play the original source of art. To this need of luxury there also corresponds an attention for luxury. Dogs, that their masters amuse in a certain manner, become attentive when they see the latter making preparations for the same game; and a close observer of children, Sikorski, has shown that their activity and attention are mainly developed through play.*

CORRESPONDENCE.

TAXATION AND PRODUCTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

WITH your permission I would like to ask "Wheelbarrow" a few questions. He writes, "Without the right or hope of ownership there is no stimulus to production." This is perfectly true, but, ownership in what? *In the instrument of production, or in the article produced?* That it is the latter, the fact that a large part of the production of the country comes from leased lands, amply proves. And thus is true, not of one form of production, but of all; in agriculture, mining, manufacture, and exchange, experience shows that security in the ownership of the product is the only stimulus needed for production.

He further says, "Where individual reward is denied, individual exertion ceases." We cannot frame a more adequate or more eloquent indictment of the present state of affairs. To-day when the tax-gatherer calls and says, "Mr. Wheelbarrow, because you have been industrious and Mr Bicycle idle, your taxes are heavy and his light," does he not deny you a portion of your individual reward and thereby lessen your incentive to exertion? But the tax-gatherer of to-day goes further, he says, "Because you, Mr. Wheelbarrow have been thrifty, prudent, and saving, and Mr. Bicycle wasteful and extravagant, because you have married and given 'hostages to fortune,' and he has lightly shunned such cares, because you have employed carpenter, bricklayer, and mason, and builded yourself a house, while he has made no use of his lot of equal value, but kept it idle and open, an eye-sore and gathering-place for garbage and cats, for all these reasons you shall be mulcted and he exempt."

Would it be no better to say, henceforth, if a man desires to erect a building, we will not fine him for it? To say, since the taxation of personal property has at all times and in all places produced more perjury than revenue, we will no longer attempt taxing men for thrift, energy, industry, or enterprise, but will abolish all taxes save one on the rental value of the bare land? For this is the only tax which can be collected without denying to the individual some portion of his due reward. It is the only tax that can be collected without confiscating from the individual something that is justly his. It is the one tax that conforms to all the canons of taxation, for it does not prevent production. All taxes upon the products of labor do. It can be more easily and cheaply

* *Revue Philosophique*, April, 1885.

collected than any other form of taxation, while tariff taxes, for instance, take from consumers many times over the sum they yield the government. It bears equally on all, for under it each man would pay to the community in taxes the market value of the natural opportunity he uses, nothing less, nothing more.

I am grievously mistaken in "Wheelbarrow," if in all this there is anything he will object to, and I count confidently on his assistance in bringing about the reign of common sense in taxation,—the single-tax. Yours respectfully,

W. J. ATKINSON.

NO JUSTICE IN THE SINGLE-TAX.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

I MUST beg the indulgence of your readers again in presenting some more illustrations drawn from actual life, and which seem to me to be representative cases. They are from the experiences of my neighbors who also bought land about the time of my disastrous adventure

One of them, possibly with a foresight as to the character of the population that gradually occupied the vicinity, established a corner-grocery and has to-day a large stock and a business worth at least five thousand a year.

My other neighbor, who held the third corner, bought it as a safe investment for a rise. Both my neighbors as well as myself paid the usual taxes besides the *whole* cost of expensive street improvements that were required for the use of the public—but neighbor No. 2, being a fortunate physician as well as the owner of a valuable copyright, had an income of about twenty thousand a year and could stand it. After holding his property over twenty years he was glad to sell out this summer at a loss of taxes and interest for the whole term. The increase in population was of such a character that it deteriorated *his* property, although—it built up the grocer's trade. Neither of those corner-lots are worth as much to-day as they were twenty years ago. And by the way there is a good deal of buncombe about this "unearned increment."

The average annual advance in value of unimproved real estate in the whole country will not equal two per cent. net on the investment. Now if I understand the single-tax theory rightly, the doctor, the grocer, and myself should pay equal taxes, as the land aside from improvements is of equal value. Moreover, according to the theory of some of the disciples of Mr. George, as we are in possession of this land thereby preventing all the rest of the world from occupying it, we should pay the whole cost of improvements for the common use of the public as a sort of equalization for the injustice we are doing them.

Of course, the grocer is pleased with the single-tax, for it relieves him of all taxes on his stock, and his stock is more to him than his land. The doctor is indifferent, for his income is ample and does not depend on his possession of a single foot of ground—but the occupant of the land, whether he be rich or poor, day-laborer or professional, mine owner, or small farmer, grubbing his living out of the soil, is to be saddled with the whole burden of taxation as a sort of penalty for his offenses against society. If this be Mr. George's theory it makes ownership of land a pretext for robbery.

Now to me it seems an intolerable injustice that the individual who takes five or fifty thousand dollars a year from the community, should be exempt from bearing a fair proportion of the burdens of the state—on account of arbitrary conditions imposed by the state. It is an intolerable injustice to discriminate between incomes from *land* and those from other sources, to bind heavy burdens on the tillers of the soil, who are glad enough to make both ends meet at the end of the year, and exempt the trader, the speculator, the patentee, or the manufacturer. Justice whether practicable or not demands that he who takes from the public should return in proportion to his gains, and the moral sense of the community will in the end tolerate no other system.

ST. LOUIS. T. G. CONANT.

RETROGRESSION AND NATURAL SELECTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

IN the article entitled "Retrogression in Animal and Vegetable Life," in a recent number of THE OPEN COURT, the author expresses the opinion that acquired traits are not inheritable. As an illustration he suggests that a child does not inherit the power to produce articulate language.

It seems to me that the author does not take a correct view of the question. The child inherits the ability to produce articulate language with the aid of example and instruction. His father had this power and his children will possess it also, *viz.:* the ability to do a certain thing having given certain conditions.

Suppose for a moment that the child could speak without instruction, and let us compare the cases. The father could speak with the aid of instruction. The child can speak without the aid of instruction. Plainly the child has a power the father did not have.

Then it seems to me that if a child could speak under such conditions, it would clearly be a case of non-inheritance.

A new-born infant makes an audible cry without having heard a similar one, but the cases are not analogous. The infant has the ability to cry, and hunger or pain is the condition under which that ability was developed. Hence the ability plus the condition result in the cry.

Again the author speaks of the reverse of the principle of natural selection as the means of accounting for retrogression.

Let me use his own illustration to prove the contrary. The ancestry of the Isopods had hard shells developed in accordance with the principle of natural selection. But when the Isopod becomes a parasite a hard shell is no longer to his advantage: It would prevent his assimilating the necessary nourishment from the internal tissues of his host: Possibly it might produce discomfort, disease, or death of the host. That being the case the *soft* bodied crustacean parasites will be most likely to exist, and transmit their characteristics to their offspring.

Again for an internal parasite to produce legs or maintain those already produced is clearly a misappropriation of energy. The Isopod does not need legs after it becomes fixed in his host. For an animal to devote nourishment upon the maintaining of needless organs is to place him at a disadvantage in the struggle for existence. Nature, in the long run, will permit no such uneconomical methods. The legged parasite must go and the legless must take its place.

But both the development of a soft integument and the retrogression of the legs are strictly in accordance with the principle of natural selection. G. A. OSINGA.

OTSEGO, Mich.

[It is difficult to grasp the exact application of Mr. Osinga's first illustration with regard to the inheritability of acquired traits; but a word may be said with reference to the question of retrogression and natural selection, last introduced. Prof. Weismann nowhere lays it down, that the "development of a soft integument and the retrogression of the legs" are *not* "strictly in accordance with the principle of natural selection." If natural selection is the means whereby a certain animal retrogrades to a lower plane in the kingdom of life, the activity of the selective action involved is limited to parts and organs necessary to the animal's existence in that plane; but, negatively considered, this is obviously a "*remission* of the selective action" with regard to organs *not* necessary, and viewing it from the positive, higher standpoint, which is the more comprehensive, it is eminently correct to say, as Prof.

Weismann says, that we are to find our explanation of the phenomenon in the "reverse of the principle of natural selection." Prof. Weismann views the phenomenon, as in treating of *retro*gression one must do, from the point *from* which the animal retrogrades; Mr. Osinga views it from the point *to* which the animal ultimately arrives. In the one case, it is a remission of natural selection as to a state formerly occupied; in the other, it is a continuation of natural selection as to a state not yet attained:—a distinction which, in the subsequent essays, evidently not seen by Mr. Osinga at the time of writing, Prof. Weismann impliedly presents.—*μκρκ.*]

BOOK REVIEWS.

PRINCIPIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By *Clinton Roosevelt*. 52 Exchange Place, New York City.

The brochure above noted contains a synopsis of the views of Social Science held by Mr. Clinton Roosevelt, a New York gentleman, whose activity in matters of public interest now extends through fully half a century. The tenets of Mr. Roosevelt are expressed, without prolixity, in some forty-six propositions. Beginning with the nature of Science, the Laws of Universal Action, and the derivation of Good and Evil, we are led consecutively to Ethics and Government. Though assenting to much that Mr. Roosevelt sets forth, both in method of argument and in conclusion, we believe that the form in which both are sometimes couched is not the best adapted to an accurate and clear development of the truths here expressed in epitome; we refer for instance, to the application to social and psychological phenomena of analogies from the world of physics, chemistry, and even theology; though true in every phase in which there may be a point of contact, yet we are led by the hypothesis of their identity to apply them in their completeness, to employ them in aspects wherein, in reality, they diverge; the danger here is not in misunderstanding their form of presentment, but in the further philosophical development of the same. "The science of Government," reads Prop. 25, "is the science of motive powers, to produce happiness as the chief good of existence. * * * The rights of man (conseq. his Ethics) depend on his benevolence or *will* to do right, and on his *intelligence*." (Herein we have the utilitarian idea of Government, as formulated by Austin, and the Kantian principle of Ethics.) "Administrators of government should so order and conduct society for the supply of every reasonable *want*, as that it shall be to the direct self-interest of each to act consistently for the great good of all as in an army in action, every blow the soldier strikes is for the victory of all the army of which he is a part." (Herein we have the principle of intelligent and consistent coöperation.) The wants Mr. Roosevelt classifies as: those for the means of subsistence, those for the means of defence, and those for the means of refinement to perfection. With regard to the administration of the Government, the following (Prop. 38) is suggested: "The candidates for officers of government should be selected by Professors of a Social Science University, and be voted for by all the people of a proper age to vote, and who shall have read the 'Principia of Social Science,' and accepted just conclusions. But no man should be held up as a candidate for any office of trust, honor, or emolument, whose head is less than eighteen inches in circumference, or which terminates in a point above his ears, such being uniformly idiotic. Nor should any man be nominated for the office of a Judge, whose facial angle is less than that of an ourang-outang, such being advocates of precedents in law in preference to honest principles." It is proposed by Mr. Roosevelt to found a University of Social Science on the principles posited, and ultimately, by education and the diffusion of knowledge through the medium of this great Political University, to establish government upon a scientific basis. The principles set forth in the "Principia" deserve careful consideration. Persons interested in the "University" may address the author at 52 Exchange Pl., New York City.—*μκρκ.*

The Giordano Bruno articles that appeared in a recent number of *The Freethinkers' Magazine*, are now published in separate pamphlet form. (Office of Freethinkers' Magazine, Buffalo, N. Y. Price, 15 cents.)

We have received from the Deutschen Gesellig-Wissenschaftlichen Verein, of New York, their latest publication in the series "Popular Lectures," entitled *Die Neueste Literatur*, by Hermann Rosenthal, an entertaining and illuminative review of the tendencies of recent literature.

"Der Staat und seine Widersacher," and "Die Demokratische Republik," are the titles of two little pamphlets published by the *Freidenker Publishing Co.*, of Milwaukee, Wis., wherein Mr. Hermann Boppe sets forth his ideas upon social and political reform. Mr. Boppe writes with fervor and, withal, with great control of the fundamental principles of his subject. "It is *man*," he says, with telling force, "and not property that must become the central notion in political structures. * * * The problem before us is not to abolish the State, but to perfect and idealize it," and with Littré Mr. Boppe justly recognizes that social reform through *direct* methods is impossible; it must begin in the intellectual and moral domain of human activity.

About the first of November, it is proposed by Messrs. Mac Ewen and M. C. O'Byrne, the former publisher and the latter editor, to begin the issue of a series of monthly pamphlet publications entitled *Tracts for the Times*. Their character will be popular and they will be designed, the prospectus states, "to prepare the mind of the reader to confront manfully the grave social issues that are before us." The idea of the new project is to restore the pamphlet, as an instructor, educator, and engine of social and political reform, to the position it once occupied and to which, historically regarded, it is proper it should now retain. (Subscription for one year, post-free, $1.00. Price, per single copy, 10 cents. Office, "Tracts for the Times," Room 38, 152 Dearborn Street, Chicago.)

NOTES.

The Society for Political Education, of New York, was organized in 1880, by members of the various political parties; its purpose is the dissemination of knowledge concerning the State and its functions: the political education of the people. To this end the so-called "Economic Tracts" are published, dealing with various subjects of national interest; courses of reading are submitted and methods of study suggested. Conditions and terms of membership, etc., are contained in circulars which may be had upon application to the Secretary, Mr. George Iles, (330 Pearl st., New York). We have received the last tract, "The Liquor Question in Politics," by George Iles, constituting a careful review of this important question.

The National Woman's Christian Temperance Union meets in Chicago, Nov. 8, continuing its sessions through to the 12th of that month. "Current Journalism," says its President, Frances E. Willard, "has given the impression that we are nothing if not "Third Party Prohibitionists and Women's Rights agitators. On "these two subjects we have nothing whatever to conceal, and "beg you to come and find out for yourself our position; but we "wish you to know how much wider is the scope of this heaven-"ordained movement of the home-makers, than the general public "has been led to suppose. Its motto is, No sectarianism in re-"ligion, no sectionalism in politics, no sex in citizenship; but each "and all of us for God, and Home, and Native Land."

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REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

RECENT CONTENTS OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

PROOF OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONSCIOUSNESSES OF HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE HYSTERICAL EYE.

[A series of original investigations, with new and unpublished experiments, by the French psychologist, M. ALFRED BINET, upon the psychology of hysteria; including an examination of double consciousness, "automatic writing," and the various forms of anæsthesia. (Nos. 100, 101, and 102.)]

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BEETHOVENIANA.*

BY PHILIPP SPITTA.

To DERIVE enjoyment and edification from a master-piece of art, does not require a knowledge of how it came into being. It stands by itself—a product apart from its author; and all that is requisite to an appreciative understanding, is contained in the simple phenomenon of its existence. To want to know more about a production than it itself imparts to us, can efface the impression made, and our inquisitiveness may lead to disappointment—robbing us of the very capability of undisturbed enjoyment.

For Science, however, the problem of the genesis of a work of art has quite a different significance. It becomes important here, to ascertain the outward circumstances that led the artist to direct his fancy toward a given ideal; in order thus to observe how the accidental blends with the essential and the transitory with the permanent. Of the essence of the Beautiful we would thus discover a constituent part. Could we pry into inner creative processes, we might promise psychology and æsthetics valuable results.

Of course, if we are to arrive at results of universal validity, at a knowledge of laws that condition the special case, we must be in a position to make an unlimited number of observations. Until that has been done the employment of results obtained is unsafe, and we would have to seek other criteria, in order, in each individual case, to determine what resulted from universal principles and what emanated from the personality of the artist.

Music offers greater obstacles to scientific apprehension, both as to subject-matter and intellectual content, than any other of the fine arts. The process of artistic conception in general, is veiled in profound secrecy, as is the gradual perfection in the fancy of the thing conceived; and we may easily estimate thence, how hidden from view are the operations of creative musical thought.

Habits of introspection are not entirely lacking among artists. They possess, it is true, a certain value, but are very apt to lead astray. The more powerful the excitation of the fancy, the duller do our powers of observation become; some of the greatest artists have told us that the basal ideas of their creations have been formed in states of mind almost approaching to unconsciousness. Whatever they could state as having taken place, would refer chiefly to unimportant matters. Or perhaps they subsequently attempted to transplace themselves into the condition they had been in, and thus fall into self-illusions. We know instances where artists have afterwards imputed associations to their works, which in their conception they could never possibly have had.

The way in which the great musicians have given their productions form and expression varies with their genius and habits. In many instances the process was conducted in hidden silence. Mozart allowed his ideas to assume perfect shape before writing down a note. The written notation became to him, accordingly, a mechanical exercise during which he could chat and joke at random. It would not disturb him if people played in his presence, so deeply and ineffaceably was his composition fixed in his mind. It was extremely rare for him to be undecided about a single particular, when writing. The overture to "*Le Mariage de Figaro*" furnishes an instance: it was to have originally had a middle movement which Mozart struck out before the overture was completely finished. Sketches that have come down to us, show as a rule the piece complete in all its outlines. If during the execution of details something in particular came up at the moment, it was subordinate in importance. To lighten the darkness of Mozart's creative activity is therefore impossible.

The method of Franz Schubert was very similar to this. Although the degree of inner maturation was manifestly less, and the greater part was improvised at the time of writing.

We know of Sebastian Bach, that sometimes he would make occasional notes beforehand, for compositions that he had in mind. Upon the whole though, the creative process was in his case an internal one; but it seems to have advanced more slowly than with Mozart, though always with equal continuity. Despite the intricacies of his compositions, we know of few cases where he has rejected the outlines once hit upon. Even in the execution of details there is hardly ever any uncertainty. He more frequently undertook changes when returning to a composition some time afterwards. But by reference to these alterations noth-

* Translated from the *Deutsche Rundschau by* μκρκ.

ing is gained as regards our knowledge of how the composition was originally formed.

Händel was perhaps the most rapid of all the great composers. Composition and notation were almost simultaneous with him, and the very first copy completely determined the form of the piece in all its principle outlines. When filling out the outlines sketched, he undertook another examination of the composition. Händel's sketches offer, least of all, a picture of the inner workings of the musical mind; exhibiting not even points of interpretation whence we may reason back to the processes that gave them being. In his revisions of his own and others' compositions, however, we have an excellent means of learning on what general conditions the creative power of his imagination rested, although it gives us no insight into the origination of any single work.

With Beethoven the case is quite different still. He was in the habit of always aiding the inner creative work by giving his thoughts objective expression. He would procure, for this purpose, books and stitched sheets of blank paper, which he filled with musical jottings, essays, sketches, and plans of all sizes; he would do this not only while engaged in his work at home, but even while roaming about, as was his custom, in the open country. Of these manuscripts a vast number has been preserved. No one who knew of their existence, could fail to perceive their importance for the criticism of Beethoven's creative activity. Yet it is not until very recently that critics have set about a thorough and systematic examination of these sources.

It is the merit of Gustav Nottebohm (died, 1882), to have taken the initiative in this movement. He presented the results of his investigations in several publications—"A Note-Book of Beethoven's," 1865; "Beethoveniana," 1872; and "A Note-Book of Beethoven's from the year 1803," 1880. To these belong also Nottebohm's posthumous essays, which were published a short time ago by C. Mandyczewski, of Vienna, under the title of "Second Beethoveniana" (Leipsic, J. Rieter-Biedermann). There are, all together, sixty-five essays, and they cover Beethoven's whole Vienna period from 1792 to the year of his death, 1827.

Whosoever listens to a rendering of a Beethoven composition, whether he abandon himself to the enjoyment of it alone, or whether he test it critically—cannot fail to be impressed with the inimitable perfection of form and the graceful freedom of individual movement. Everything is in its place. Everything is indissolubly joined together. In perfect unity of organic growth his most gigantic compositions move along so gracefully and so unerringly, that one would think they could never have been other than what they are, and that the Genius of Art, obedient to some hidden law of natural necessity, had unconsciously and unlaboriously called them into being.

But it is the first and most incontestable inference from Beethoven's notes that this was in no wise the case. Beethoven's work proceeded not only slowly and laboriously, but piece-wise and unconnectedly. It seems inexplicable how compositions, so perfectly organic, could have been produced in this manner. In sharp contrast to Händel's method, we notice an unsettled and capricious disposition; the subject is approached only by fits and starts; now this is taken up and now that, until written notation must be resorted to, if the results of this confused activity are not to be lost. When we compare the original sketches of compositions known to us as the highest perfection of musical art, with the forms they ultimately assumed, we find that these embryonic themes frequently appear commonplace and valueless and that frequently they scarcely possess any resemblance whatever with the resultant forms of their development. At other times they are heavy and inelegant.

But in Beethoven's matured works we have a safe criterion of his sense of beauty, and we must therefore exclude the supposition that they could, at any time, have met his approval in that shape. He must have found in them something indiscernible to the eye of others—the glimpse of an ideal that at first hovered before him in outlines dark and indistinct. Then, in his later notes, we may trace how the first sketch begins to assume more individual marks. Yet even after the process of elaboration is begun, the object in view is not so definitely aimed at; he tests, changes, and often, after having stubbornly worked in a given direction, he suddenly rejects the whole and attempts the solution in another way.

His method of composition is always the same, whether the subjects be great or small. Simple pieces like the well-known funeral-march from the A-flat major sonata (Op. 26), the variation-theme from the C-sharp minor quartette, which in its fervid simplicity, seems to have sprung like an inspiration direct from the heart—were all the product of repeated adaptations and labored efforts.

We find more than a dozen different versions to the melody, "*Freude, schöner Götterfunken*" (Joy, O beauteous spark of heaven!) which is the pith of the *finale* of the ninth symphony and is certainly of most exquisite simplicity. The ode, "*Die stille Nacht umdunkelt erquickend Thal und Höh'*" (The silent night enshrouds, refreshing, dale and height), is found in sixteen, more or less diverging, commencements. In Goethe's little poem, "*Trocknet nicht, trocknet nicht Thränen der ewigen Liebe*" (Dry not, dry not the tears of eternal love), which only after many attempts assumed its final musical form, Beethoven seems

to have begun in the middle; at any rate the notes first set down belong to the words "*unglücklicher Liebe!*", and "*Ach, nur dem halbgetrockneten Auge, Wie öde, wie todt die Welt ihm erscheint!*"

This being the case with smaller poems, it is not surprising that he composed, for example, the separate odes in the collection "*An die ferne Geliebte*" (To my far-off Love), not in their regular succession, but undertook them all at once, and, without completing what had been begun, would turn from one to the other at random.

We learn from Beethoven's own words that he liked to work at different compositions at the same time. "As I now write, I often compose three or four pieces simultaneously," he says in a letter of June 29th, 1800, to his acquaintance, Dr. Wegeler. Of this, his note-books furnish proofs, plainer and fuller, than could ever be found in Beethoven's words. It is found, too, that he did not first adopt this method so late as the year given. In 1794 he was working at two pianotrios and a vocal piece at the same time. We find in the so called Rassumoffsky string-quartettes (1806) that he busied himself simultaneously with the different movements of the first and second, and of the second and third quartettes. He did the same thing in his great string-quartettes of 1825 and 1826: he was busy with all the principal parts of his B sharp minor quartette, without any system whatever. In this connection it not unfrequently happens that single thoughts or for that matter whole movements had originally different constructions from those that were finally given them.

On the other hand it often happened that Beethoven's conception of an air was, at the very start, the same as it ultimately became. At the first glance, his ideal came to him in all its distinctness. But indecision takes possession of him; he throws aside his first conception, and wanders searchingly about only to return after many aberrations to the original form. This was the case with Gœthe's poem "*Kleine Blumen, kleine Blätter*" (Little Flowers, little Leaves). Oftentimes too, the composition of a multi-movement piece is quite regular and normal: step by step, and movement by movement. And then at times, as in the A major symphony, the ideas in the beginning are entirely different from what they become in the finished composition. Again, the ideas employed for any purpose sought to be attained, are not always conceived on the spur of the movement. Old and unused material is again brought to light. The beautiful theme of the slow movement in the A major symphony was conceived six years before being introduced into this piece. The theme of the scherzo in the ninth symphony was in existence two years before Beethoven even set about composing the symphony.

Beethoven's genius did not manifest itself as a broadly beaming stream of light, but as an intense glow, an unceasing scintillation. The fruitful germs sprang from his imagination in rapid succession. He, certainly, only entered the most important ones in his note-books, and even these were not all developed.

It is marvelous, the number of ideas and sketches we find, of which he made no use. Many there are, of which we cannot discover their latent power. Others of mature and perfect beauty. Prospective plans in such quantities, that Nottebohm was warranted in stating, that, had Beethoven completed the symphonies he began, we would have possessed fifty of them at the least.

This scintillation of genius never ceased—even during the direct composition of his works. While writing the third of the Rassumoffsky quartettes (the C-major) the theme of the second movement of the A-major symphony suddenly flashed up, and, happily, it was not doomed to die, as hundreds of others were. One notices that just at the completion of a work an especially large number of new suggestions and ideas take origin. And it is these chiefly that remain undeveloped.

The explanation of this lies in the nature of the process. The artist, when near the triumphant completion of a work, is filled with a sense of pride, happiness, and elevation. This sense, in Beethoven's case, expressed itself in a more powerful excitation of his peculiar imaginative powers. The mighty swell whereon he triumphantly rose to the completion of a work—and of him more than of others may we speak of triumph—broke into a sparkling spray of after-thoughts. They were but the part of a work that had been executed once for all, and further elaboration was denied them.

This intricacy of method, this arduous drudgery and inconstancy in the treatment of subjects, and those mighty works of art, perfect and built as it were for eternity—what a contrast they form! How was it possible that the same man whom we see waging a life-long war with matter, could have reared the royal structures that place him among the greatest artists of all nations and all times? We ask. But the fact remains, and we must set aright the seeming anomaly.

(To be concluded.)

VOLUNTARY ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

VOLUNTARY or artificial attention is a product of art, of education, of direction, and of training. It is grafted, as it were, upon spontaneous or natural attention, and finds in the latter its conditions of ex-

* From "The Psychology of Attention," translated by γνῶν, copyrighted.

istence, as the graft does in the stock, into which it has been inserted. In spontaneous attention the object acts by its intrinsic power; in voluntary attention the subject acts through extrinsic, that is, through superadded powers. In voluntary attention the aim is no longer set by hazard or circumstances; it is willed, chosen, accepted or, at least, submitted to; it is mainly a question of adapting ourselves to it, and of finding the proper means for maintaining the state; and hence voluntary attention is always accompanied by a certain feeling of effort. The maximum of spontaneous attention and the maximum of voluntary attention are totally antithetic; the one running in the direction of the strongest attraction, the other in the direction of the greatest resistance. They constitute the two polar limits between which all possible degrees are found, with a definite point at which, in theory at least, the two forms meet.

Although voluntary attention is almost the only form that psychologists have studied, and though to the majority it constitutes all of attention, its mechanism, nevertheless, has not been any better understood. In attempting to arrive at some comprehension of it, we first propose to investigate how voluntary attention is formed, to inquire into its genesis; then we shall study the feeling of effort by which it is accompanied, and finally the phenomena of arrested motion or inhibition, which, in our opinion, play a principal part in the mechanism of attention.

I.

The process through which voluntary attention is formed, may be reduced to the following single formula: To render attractive, by artifice, what is not so by nature; to give an artificial interest to things that have not a natural interest. I use the word "interest" in the ordinary sense, as equivalent to the periphrase: anything that keeps the mind on the alert. But the mind is only kept alert by the agreeable, disagreeable, or mixed, action of objects upon it, that is, by emotional states. With this difference however, that here the feelings that sustain attention, are acquired, superadded, not spontaneous, as in its primitive manifestations. The whole question, accordingly, is reduced to the finding of effective motives; if the latter be wanting, voluntary attention does not appear.

Such is the process in general; in practice, however, it becomes infinitely diversified.

In order properly to understand the genesis of voluntary attention, the best way will be to study children and the higher animals. The simplest examples will prove the most instructive.

During the earliest period of its life the child is only capable of spontaneous attention. It fixes its gaze only upon shining objects, and upon the faces of its mother or nurse. Toward the end of the third month it explores its field of vision, by degrees allowing its eyes to rest upon objects less and less interesting (Preyer). The same takes place in regard to the other senses; there is a slow transition from that which is of greatest concern to that which is of least concern. The fixing of the gaze, which later becomes intense attention, is outwardly expressed by the more marked contraction of various muscles. Attention in the infant is accompanied by a certain emotional state, which Preyer calls 'the emotion of astonishment.' At its highest point, this state produces a temporary immobility of the muscles. According to Dr. Sikorski, "astonishment, or rather the emotion that accompanies the psychic process of attention, is chiefly characterized by the momentary suspension of respiration—a striking phenomenon indeed, after being accustomed to the rapid respiration of children."* It is almost impossible to tell, at what period the first appearance of will takes place. Preyer claims to have noticed indications of will toward the fifth month, but in its impulsive form; as a power of inhibition it appears much later.

So long as the psychic life thus remains in the tentative epoch, attention, that is, the transfer of the mind from one object to another, is determined only by the objects' power of attraction. The birth of voluntary attention, the power of fastening the mind upon non-attractive objects, can only be accomplished by force, under the influence of education, whether derived from men or things external. Education, derived from men, is, of course, the most easily demonstrable, but it is not the only kind.

A child refuses to learn how to read; it is incapable of keeping its mind fixed upon letters that have no attraction for it; but it will gaze with eagerness upon pictures in a book. "What do those pictures mean?" Its father answers: "When you know how to read, the book will tell you." After a few talks of this kind the child finally gives up; at first it sets about the task lazily, but afterwards it becomes accustomed to its work, and finally evinces an eagerness that needs to be checked. In this we have an instance of the genesis of voluntary attention. It was necessary to graft upon a desire, natural and direct, a desire artificial and indirect. Reading is an operation that does not possess an immediate attraction, but as a means to an end it has an attraction—a kind of borrowed attraction—and that is sufficient: the child has been caught in a wheel-work, as it were, and the first step has been accomplished. The following is another example from B. Perez.† "A child six years old, habitually very *inattentive*, went to the piano one day, of its own ac-

*Sikorski: "*Le Développement psychique de l'Enfant.* (*Revue Philosophique*, April, 1885.)

†B. Perez: *L'Enfant de trois à sept ans*, p. 108.

cord, to repeat an air that pleased its mother; and it remained there for over an hour. The same child, at the age of seven, seeing its brother engaged about some of his holiday-duties, entered and seated itself in its father's study. 'What are you doing?' asked the nurse, astonished at finding the child there. 'I am doing a page of German; it is not very amusing; but I wish to give Mamma a pleasant surprise.'" Here we have another case of the genesis of voluntary attention, this time grafted upon a sympathetic, and not upon a purely selfish feeling as in the former example. The piano and the German lesson did not spontaneously evoke attention; they awaken and maintain it through the medium of a borrowed force.

In every instance of the origination of voluntary attention this mechanism is invariably found to be the same,—but in endless variations, resulting in success, half-success, or failure: ever grasping natural motives, diverting them from their direct purpose, using them, if possible, as means for another end. Art bends nature to its purposes, and for this reason I call this form of attention, artificial.

Without assuming to enumerate all the different motives that artifice puts into play, in order to call forth and to consolidate voluntary attention, that is,—to repeat once more my former statement,—in order to impart to the purpose in view a power of action that it naturally does not possess, I shall now indicate three periods in point of time into which voluntary attention falls.

In the first period, the educator acts only upon simple feelings. He employs fear in all its forms, egotistic tendencies, the attraction of rewards, tender and sympathetic emotions, as well as our innate curiosity, which seems to be the appetite of intelligence, and which to a certain degree—no matter how weak—is found in everybody.

During the second period, artificial attention is aroused and maintained by means of feelings of secondary formation, such as love of self, emulation, ambition, interest in a practical line, duty, etc.

The third period is that of organization; attention is aroused and sustained by habit. The pupil in the class-room, the workman in his shop, the clerk at his office, the tradesman behind his counter, all would, as a rule, prefer to be somewhere else; but egotism, ambition, and interest have created by repetition a fixed and lasting habit. Acquired attention has thus become a second nature, and the artificial process is complete. The mere fact of being placed in a certain attitude, amidst certain surroundings, brings with it all the rest; attention is produced and sustained less through present causes than through an accumulation of prior causes; habitual motives having acquired the force of natural motives. Individuals refractory to education and discipline, never attain to this third period; in such people voluntary attention is seldom produced, or only intermittently, and cannot become a habit.

It is unnecessary to show in detail that also in animals the transition from spontaneous attention to voluntary attention is similarly effected under the influence of education, and of training; but here the educator only has at his disposal limited means of action, very simple in character. He acts upon the animal through fear, privation of food, violence, kindness, caresses, and in this manner he succeeds in making the animal contract certain habits, and through artifice become attentive. Among animals, as among men, there are teachable and refractory individuals. "A man," says Darwin,* "who trains monkeys to act in plays, used to purchase common kinds from the Zoölogical Society, at the price of £5 for each; but he offered to give double the price, if he might keep three or four of them for a few days in order to select one. When asked how he could possibly learn so soon whether a particular monkey would turn out a good actor, he answered that it all depended on their power of attention. If, when he was talking and explaining anything to a monkey its attention was easily distracted, as by a fly on the wall, or other trifling object, the case was hopeless. If he tried by punishment to make an inattentive monkey act, it turned sulky. On the other hand, a monkey which carefully attended to him could always be trained."

Accordingly, at the root of attention we find only emotional states, attractive or repulsive tendencies. In the spontaneous form these are the only causes. In the voluntary form, it is the same; yet with this difference, that here the feelings are of a nature more complex and of slow formation, derived through experience from primitive tendencies. If, while voluntary attention is still in its period of genesis, before it has been organized and fixed by habit, you take away from the school-boy all love of self, all emulation, all fear of punishment, leave a fortune to the tradesman or the workman, grant a competence to the clerk from the very outset of his career, all their attention to their distasteful employments will at once be scattered to the wind, for there is nothing left to evoke and sustain it. I confess that this genesis of attention is very intricate; but it is conformable to facts. According to most psychologists it would seem, that voluntary attention—which, although only a derivative and acquired form, is yet the only one that they regard—enters without an antecedent foundation. "Voluntary attention is subject to the superior authority of the Ego. I give or withdraw it, as I please; by alternate turns I direct it toward different points. I concentrate it upon each point, as long as

* "Descent of Man," Vol. I.

my will can sustain its effort."* If this be not a purely conventional and fanciful description, if the author derives it from his own personal experience, I should not withhold my genuine admiration. But in truth, we should be destitute of all genius of observation, or blinded by prejudice, if we did not perceive that voluntary attention, in its durable form, is really a difficult state to sustain, and that actually many do not attain to it.

But if, as we have attempted to show, the higher form of attention is the work of the education that we have received from our parents, teachers, and surroundings, as well as the education which later we have ourselves acquired in imitating that which we earlier experienced, this explanation, nevertheless, only forces the difficulty further back; for our teachers have only acted upon us, as others had previously acted upon them, and so on back through the generations. This, accordingly, does not explain the primordial genesis of voluntary attention.

How then does voluntary attention originate? It originates of necessity, under the pressure of need, and with the progress of intelligence. *It is an instrument that has been perfected—a product of civilization.* The same progressive movement that in the order of moral events has caused the individual to pass from the control of instincts to that of interest and duty; in the social order, from primitive savagery to the state of organization; in the political order, from almost absolute individualism to the constitution of a government: this same onward movement, in the intellectual world, has also effected the transition from spontaneous attention to the dominance of voluntary attention. The latter is both effect and cause of civilization.

In the preceding chapter† it was pointed out that, in the state of nature the power of spontaneous attention, both for animals and men, is a factor of the foremost order in the struggle for life. In the course of man's development from the savage state, so soon as (through whatever actual causes, such as lack of game, density of population, sterility of soil, or more warlike neighboring tribes) there was only left the alternative of perishing or of accommodating oneself to more complex conditions of life,—in other words, to go to work,—voluntary attention also became a foremost factor in this new form of the struggle for existence. So soon as man had become capable of devoting himself to any task that possessed no immediate attraction, but accepted as only means of livelihood, voluntary attention put in an appearance in the world. It originated, accordingly, under the pressure of necessity, and of the education imparted by things external.

It is easily shown that before civilization voluntary attention did not exist, or appeared only by flashes and then of short duration. The laziness of savages is well-known; travelers and ethnologists are all agreed on this point, and the proofs and instances are so numerous that it would be idle to quote authorities. The savage has a passion for hunting, war, and gambling; for the unforeseen, the unknown, and the hazardous in all its forms; but sustained effort he ignores or contemns. Love of work is a sentiment of purely secondary formation, that goes hand in hand with civilization. And we may note, now, that work is the concrete, the most manifest form of attention.

Continuous work is repugnant even to half-civilized tribes. Darwin asked certain Gauchos who were addicted to drink, gambling, and theft, why they did not work. One of them answered: "The days are too long."* "The life of the primitive man," says Herbert Spencer,† "is passed mainly in the pursuit of beasts, birds, and fish, which yields him a gratifying excitement; but though to the civilized man the chase gives gratification, this is neither so persistent nor so general. . . . . Conversely, the power of continued application, which in the primitive man is very small, has among ourselves become considerable. It is true that most are coerced into industry by necessity, but there are sprinkled throughout society men to whom active occupation is a need—men who are restless when away from business and miserable when they eventually give it up; men to whom this or that line of investigation is so attractive that they devote themselves to it day after day, year after year, hardly giving themselves the rest necessary for health."

But, as in order to live at all, even as savages, it is necessary from time to time to perform some kind of drudgery, such labor, as is well known, usually devolves upon women, who, while their husbands sleep, work from fear of being beaten. It is accordingly possible—although at first it may seem a paradox—that voluntary attention first originated in woman.

Even among nations enjoying the advantages of long centuries of civilization, there exists a complete class of beings that are incapable of protracted work, —vagabonds, professional thieves, and prostitutes. The Italian criminologists of the new school, whether rightly or wrongly, look upon these as cases of atavism. The majority of civilized nations, however, have sufficiently adapted themselves to the exigencies of social life; and they all are to a certain degree capable of voluntary attention. But the number of those, of whom Spencer speaks, to whom voluntary attention is an urgent necessity—is very small indeed; and few and far between are those who profess and practice the *stantem oportet mori.* Voluntary attention is a

Dict. scient. phil., 2e édit., Art. "Attention."
THE OPEN COURT, No. 110, p. 1869.

* *Voyage d'un Naturaliste au Tour du Globe*, p. 167.
† "Data of Ethics," Chap. X.

sociological phenomenon. When we consider it as such, we shall better understand both its genesis and its infirmity.

The fact, we may say, has now been established, that voluntary attention is an adaptation to the conditions of a higher social life; that it is a discipline and a habit, an imitation of natural attention, which latter serves, at the same time, as its point of departure and point of support.

(*To be continued.*)

ROADSIDE REVERIES.

BY A RECLUSE.

One cannot help thinking among trees and green leaves. In vacation I am a recluse; and I come annually to this far away Dreamthorp, where I now find myself, to ruminate and dream. A smooth country road winds by the cottage I occupy; and thick trees and dense shrubbery embower it. What a lulling sound there is under green leaves, which scarcely ever lack some vagrant zephyr to stir them. Some one has aptly said, "It was a beautiful thought when God thought of making a tree." Perhaps for that reason the meditative mood is so overpowering where trees surround you. Not less interesting where I am is the clear stream which curves around the house, and makes an audible ripple over its shingly bed. This has its passengers, too, like those of the road; and, if one could only read their thoughts and knew their errands on both highways, what human dramas might there not be evolved here.

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It seems to me that nature and society are rather complements to each other than hostile antipodes. Delightful as it is to meet nature alone, few do it long. Robinson Crusoe had his man Friday. Thoreau had Emerson's company often, with many fine callers, and Rousseau,—well—he had, if anybody has had, a most complicated and overwhelming social experience.

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I often wonder how it is that so many people find time to devote their lives so wholly to the reformation of their neighbors, and to exploit infallible panaceas. I do not condemn them,—for the world needs workers in every helpful line; but I often think of Carlyle's aphorism when I meet some of the more fussy and pretentious sort. "Reform thyself, Man; and then you may be sure there will be one less rascal in the world," or words to that effect. If every one did this, how many misdirected energies might be spared and what a moral waste would be avoided. There are actually not a few bright spirits whom I know, whose attention to the wants of others cramps their own proper development. I do not forget what compensation may come from such bereavements; but, I lament their loss just the same. When I look out into my yard, I see that no tree leaves its place to tutor or watch over another, and no flower in the garden gives any beauty but its own example to a neighboring blossom. Would that it were so among the human kind.

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"Do the duty that lies nearest to you," was another of Carlyle's almost biblical aphorisms, which I write down here without verifying the exactness of the quotation. I think Gœthe, however, said something like it before him. What a solvent that maxim is when one is troubled about many things, and when the stream of life seems to run with cross purposes. Do the nearest duty, the maxim says, and—as a result—already the next one will have become more clear.

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We are all of us, whether working or idle, doing with our lives as the chemist does in his laboratory. Here we put in an acid and there an alkali. Each new ingredient changes the substance and color. If we make a mistake, we can only partly, not wholly, correct it. It would have been better, perhaps, to have used the metaphor of the loom, and then try to show how the texture goes on like the strands or figures in a roll of cloth or carpet. If time is the shuttle, we are indeed the weavers. Our tapestry may be of rags, or silk, or it may be of Gobelin's manufacture. What a fabric went to make Epaminondas, and Franklin, and Lincoln? Very different from the stuff used by Nero and Napoleon. I never think in this direction long, however, without recalling somebody's expressive couplet which I cannot place, but which often bombards my memory:

> "Our former deeds pursue us from afar,
> And what we have been makes us what we are."

I have a friend, Horatio, who often drops in upon me. He is full of vigorous strength and life, and not a student, though a very robust thinker. If he interrupts my thoughts for the moment, he always leaves me something new to think about. He said yesterday: "I have never been troubled much about sin, in the singular number. Sin only touches my conscience when it has a definite or an indefinite article before it—when conscience says: "Thou art the man." It is not abstract evil, but the concrete article which disturbs me. I may not be exactly orthodox, but I never could repent of what is called original sin. It seems to me that to do so, would be something like the shedding of tears by Mark Twain at the supposititious tomb of Adam. It is sin which originates with me, that gives me a pang; not that which Adam committed. So far as he has left me helpless and weak, so far he has, it seems to me, lessened my responsibility. The story of Eden has its uses, however, if it only commends us to be watchful. When I read it

as a child and supposed it literally true, it staggered me with a certain deep sense of injustice. As a moral fable, nothing equals it in force and significance!

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Emerson said at the beginning of his essay on Compensation, that he had long wanted to write upon that subject. If I were only a theologian, I should say that I have long wanted to write an essay on the Orientalism of the New Testament. I do not know what is taught in the Divinity schools, as I have never been in one, but I should think a professorship of Persian, Arabic, and other Oriental Poetry would be a matter of prime importance in them. An understanding of these literatures would certainly prevent any one's reading the New Testament as one would read our Revised Statutes. When you read it so, you cannot possibly escape the doctrine of Transsubstantiation. In fact, you cannot escape a good many other absurdities. How true it is that the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.

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Gœthe said he saw no sin that he might not himself have committed. And Bunyan uttered in a different form a quite similar confession. Bunyan died sixty-one years before Gœthe was born; but there is scarcely a possibility that Gœthe borrowed his thought from the author of the "Pilgrim's Progress." Doubtless he never heard of the author of that book. That two such diverse minds, who looked at life from such different angles, could utter this pregnant confession, suggests a good deal of deep reflection.

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It is curious what differences of criticism there are on Gœthe's life and work. Wordsworth abominated the "Wilhelm Meister." Emerson who exalted Gœthe, not without reservations, in a way that would have shocked the mind

"Of him who uttered nothing base,"

saw nothing very admirable in Faust. But I find that the great admirers of Gœthe make both of these works as significant and moral in their purpose as anything in all literature. Faust deals with the problem of evil, and Wilhelm with the practical problems of life. The mind which so profoundly affected Byron and Carlyle, not to name others equally great and equally different, must have penned a larger scroll than some critics can give credit for. The deeper sense lies and must be read between the lines.

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It is acknowledged that Gœthe paved the way for Darwin. He saw physiological analogies that were unthought of before his own time. Though making some mistakes, he still, in a measure, gave new eyes to science. He showed that the leaf was the real germ of a plant. Pistil, stamen, petal, caylix, and cotyledon, he discovered were simply a leaf otherwise disposed—arranged, so to speak, under new fashions. It was before Darwin wrote his "Origin of Species," too, that Emerson said in one of his poems:

"And striving to be Man, the Worm
Mounts through all the spires of form."

All this leads one to think that the *Zeitgeist* is, in a large sense, the author of authors; or, as Emerson puts it in a better way, the Over-Soul. Perhaps, then, that is a true story told lately of Mrs. Stowe. When some one congratulated her upon the genius in "Uncle Tom's Cabin," she said: "I am not its author. God wrote it. I was merely the amanuensis."

DARWINIAN OR CHRISTIAN.*

BY LUDWIG NOIRÉ.

FAITH, to our spirit, to our consciousness, to our true self, is what knowledge is to the intellect. Our faith is our future, for our spirit lives even now in the future. Fools they are, who would force our faith into physical limitations, for it is the most immediate, the most spontaneous force of the human spirit. Still greater fools they, who would like to make empirical knowledge of ever changing and fleeting matter, the substance of faith. It is the same foolishness which presents the form of religion as its essential, and tries to make it the subject of faith. We to-day believe and have faith in love, in truthfulness, in our nation, in man, and in humanity, even if we do not worship them as personal deities, as the Greeks did, or refuse to see in them the commands or the creations of the personal God. They are doing the greatest injury to faith, who attempt to hinder its evolution, who would like to eternalize the crumbling form, and thus place themselves and their dogmas into strong conflict with the consciousness of the time.

But no less foolish are they, who dream, that faith, that belief will ever be superseded by knowledge. There is one thing, we can never know, however stupendous may become the advances made by science, and that is the future. For the world is evolution of the spirit, and it is the essential nature of evolution, that the next step must always be an improvement upon the last one. Therefore the reflection of all the past, which fills our knowledge, can never give us information of even the nearest future of our spirit. That can alone be furnished by the active, creative force of

*Translated by Theo. Gestefeld.

(Both sides to the recent controversy between agnosticism, so-called, and orthodox Christianity may find some valuable suggestions in the confession of faith, made by the late Ludwig Noiré, one of the foremost evolutionists of Germany, in his work: "Die Welt als Entwicklung des Geistes," (The world as evolution of spirit,) which appeared in 1874, long before Mr. Huxley thought it necessary, to coin the word agnostic. Mr. Noiré, being neither an agnostic nor an orthodox Christian, calls his book also "building-stones for a monistic system of philosophy," and therefore his confession should possess a special interest for the readers of THE OPEN COURT, and all who sympathize with its objects.—TR.)

faith, which co-operates in the great work of the evolution of the universe. The ideals are the polar star, which guides the skiff of humanity upon this boundless, silent ocean of evolution. And ideals we can never know, we can only believe them, have faith in them.

If the question was put to us in the following form: Are we Darwinians, or Christians? then I would exclaim out of the fullness of my heart: Christians!

We do not call ourselves Copernicans, nor Newtonians, nor Keplerians; we do not take our name from those who have advanced our knowledge. Science is a gigantic structure to which every age, every century, every great intellect, before disappearing, add a stone. When you have told me all you know, you have become through that very fact quite dispensable to me, and if I sought of you nothing but knowledge, I would never call on you again. But if it is your own being, if it is your belief, your purpose, the aims and objects of your aspirations, which you pour into my soul, O then my heart will be lit up by a similar flame, and inseparably united, in absolute atonement with you—then would I confess and profess you loudly, and everywhere.

Thus we also confess. We confess our faith, our belief, in the highest ideal, towards which for more than two thousand years the longings and the aspirations of the most exalted of our race have been directed, for which millions have given their lives, no less in the noiseless, unnoticed sacrifice of active love for humanity, than in the night of the dungeon, in the secrecy of the torture-chamber, or in the lurid glare of the stake. This highest ideal is humanity, the brotherhood of man, the union of mankind into one great nation, into one great family. The time will come, when all joys and pains will be born and felt by all in common, when all evil will be prevented and shorn of its power, when all sufferers will find shelter. Nobody has felt this ideal in more beauty and purity, nobody has proclaimed it with more glory and with more enthusiasm, than that divine master, whose great, flaming heart felt and experienced itself all the sorrow and all the anguish, then and now still resting upon humanity, blind and wearily sighing for a saviour, and who first raised the command of neighborly love into the sympathetic feeling of the oneness of all humanity in those imperishable words of comfort: "Come to me all ye who are weary and heavily laden, and I will give you rest!" As long as this highest ideal has not been realized, so long will we rejoice in being named after Him who revealed this ideal to us, and who has been the purest and noblest example of absolute humanity upon this earth. In the fullness of time this now most beautiful flower of ideality may ripen into full fruitage, and then the name will disappear, because its essence will have become universally accepted, and a name only signifies a distinction. But His picture will be raised up in the temple of humanity as that of its greatest benefactor, and gratitude and reverence will be offered up to His memory by coming generations, who will have forgotten all the dark clouds of superstition and unbelief, which for so long have endeavored to obscure its beauty. In this sense our greatest poet accepted this ideal in all its purity for the humanity of the present day, when, with the charm of his poetry, he expressed the true essence of Christianity with soul-stirring simplicity in these lines:

From corruption's womb,
Christ is risen for you!
Tear off now your fetters,
With joyous sound!
Praise Him by doing,
Prove Him by loving,
Preach Him, while wand'ring,
By promising joy!
Now is the Master near,
For you is He here.

TO ———.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

THOU oft hast told me how, when night
Had blent the garden's wealth of green,
And high o'er Leman's wave serene
The moonbeam tipped the mountain height,

From yonder window, robed in white,
Thou'dst gaze as on a "fairy scene,"
While gentle music bade thee glean
Thy sweet heart's fill of calm delight:—

The full moon shines across the lake;
I hear a soft Italian air;
The little ripples hardly break;

And all as then is passing fair—
But thou art gone! and these but wake
The dreamy echoes of despair.

1877.

CORRESPONDENCE.

USERS OF LAND, AND OWNERS OF LAND.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

DR. WOOD comes back again and says that he and "Wheelbarrow" are getting together very rapidly. I am glad to hear it. He is not the first of my critics to see the error of his doctrine. Mr. Pentecost, who censured me for doubting the efficacy of the single-tax expedient, now denounces it himself. In a recent number of the *Twentieth Century* he proclaimed the single-tax to be a "humbug and a farce." I never said anything about it so severe as that. I have called it a "deception," but without implying that its advocates have any intention to deceive, for I do not think they have. They and their disciples are all innocent victims of the same philanthropic delusion. Persons who compare Dr. Wood's last criticism with his first one, will see what a great advance he has made in the knowledge and understanding of land, and man's relation to it. He will soon discover the impossibility of making all men land-owners by the inverse process of abolishing land-ownership. National ownership of all the post-offices does not make me a postmaster, neither will government land-ownership make me a land-owner. I think it would be very unjust if every man should own the land that one man tills. I think that he alone should own it. More than that, I think his land should bear its fair proportion of the public taxes according to its value, and no more.

Dr. Wood reproaches me that I have as yet "advanced no remedy except objections to other people's remedies." I am not quite certain, but I think that statement is correct. I have not yet received my diploma as a Doctor of Politics, and I am afraid that if I should go to mixing "remedies," I should not succeed any better than Dr. Wood. I fear that like him I should provide another bane instead of an antidote. Besides, a man may criticise the plans of others without thereby assuming any obligation to furnish better plans. Last month I attended a Scotch picnic, and had great sport in watching the athletic games. The prize for the longest running jump brought out many competitors. The best jump was made by a sinewy fellow who cleared 19 feet 11 inches. I happened to say to a friend that it wasn't a great jump, when a bystander, a friend of the jumper, turned sharply upon me and said: "Well, go and beat it or shut up." I thought him very rude, because I was not bound to beat it before criticising the achievement. And in like manner, all sorts of botch-work claims immunity by demanding that its critic shall do better or say nothing.

Can anything be more useless than a scheme to deprive the farmer of his land, and then "leave him secure in his possession and use of it"? I want to give him that security by making him the owner of the land. I desire to see men owners and not renters of the soil. We perpetrate a solecism grotesque and palpable when we confiscate a farm in order to make the farmer "secure in his possession and use of it."

Dr. Wood says: "In order to increase production I desire to increase the number of land users." Very well! But no man can or will use land to its greatest capacity of production unless he is the actual owner of the soil. No man with a title below the rank of ownership can afford to cultivate his land to the best advantage. He cannot afford to plant orchards, and vineyards, dig wells, build houses, barns, windmills, buy reapers, mowers, threshing machines, or even make his fences permanent and strong. He cannot even afford to manure the land. In proportion to the strength of his title will he develop the resources of his farm.

Mr. Theodore Perkins rather ungraciously rejects the compliments I paid him a couple of weeks ago, and therefore I must take them back. He sneers at my "smart way of putting things," but I will not repine; nor will I return evil for evil. I will not retort upon him, nor charge him with saying anything smart. I will cheerfully testify to his innocence in that regard. He kindly advises me to "think more and publish less." No doubt, Mr. Perkins thinks ten times more than I do, which perhaps will explain the diluted character of his thought. Quality, not quantity, is the test of thought. Better think right for a minute, than wrong for an hour.

Mr. Perkins is apparently anxious to abandon his own premises for some other ground of controversy more favorable for him. I decline to go with him, nor can I permit him to coax me or provoke me into a false position. I cannot accept his challenge to defend the abuses of land-ownership and the extortions of the landlord system. I would make things better instead of worse, and therefore I oppose the scheme of Mr. George and his disciples to deprive the American farmer of independence, and reduce him to the condition of a vassal and a tenant. I wish to make every tiller of the soil a free man, the *owner* of the land he plows. The "single-tax" apostles desire to make him a serf, the dependent villein of the state.

Mr. Perkins thinks that Scully's Illinois tenants would be more successful farmers if they did not have to pay two-thirds of their crops as rent. I doubt that Scully's tenants pay two-thirds of their crops as rent; but if they do, they are better off than they would be under the landlord that Mr. George desires to put over them. Hear him again:

"Now it is evident that in order to take for the use of the community the *whole income* arising from land, *just as effectually as it could be taken by formally appropriating and letting out the land*, it is only necessary to abolish, one after the other, all other taxes now levied, and increase the tax on land-values until it reaches, as near as may be, the *full annual value of the land.*"

The mythical "Scully," even by the exaggerated statement of Mr. Perkins, would only take two-thirds of the products of the land, while the beneficent "single-tax" landlord will take the *whole income* of it, and levy rent amounting to the *full annual value of the land.* I present again this project of despotism because my critics tenderly step around it on tip-toe, as if afraid of waking it. They try to conjure it out of sight by the "single-tax" device, which is elastic enough to stretch from a mild and gentle method of taxation to a sinister plan for confiscating every farm within the dominion of the American Republic.

Mr. Perkins says that I misrepresented his statement concerning the *post mortem* rights of a man in land and its products. If so, I am sorry for it. I would not willingly misrepresent the position of an adversary. In this case I must have failed to understand the statement made by Mr. Perkins, but he will admit that it might easily be misunderstood. I ask him to read it again. Here it is. "It is true that every man has a right to as much control over land as is needful for his use and enjoyment of it, and for the security of the fruits of his labor. It is not true that this right exists after his death." If that is not what Mr. Perkins meant, he is misrepresented by himself and not by me. His own language led me astray. What makes a farmer feel secure in the right to "the fruits of his labor"? He is stimulated in his work and comforted by the knowledge that his right will be continued in his widow and his children. This law is of the highest social value; it is the moral strength of life; it makes man and his work immortal, so far as anything can be immortal on this earth. When Mr. Perkins declared that a man's right to his home and the "fruits of his labor" ceased at his death, I was justified in asking those questions about the widow and the children. Every man who plants corn in the spring knows that he may die before harvest, but he is animated by the thought that in case of his death his folks may gather the crop. The Third Reader used to have a story like this, "An old man was planting an apple-tree. A fool came along and said, "What foolishness is this! You will never live to eat apples from that tree." "I know it," said the old man, "but my children may."

I would confirm the right which Mr. Perkins grants by making the user of the land the owner of the land. In what other way can the "right to control" be made so effective as by ownership? The very best lease is an inferior security. It gives the lessee a limited "control over land," but a control qualified by time, and hampered by tributes and terms.

Mr. Perkins condescendingly assumes that his readers "know some things." He could hardly have assumed that when he wrote his curious reflections on "paper titles." It is not necessary to repeat my answer to that part of his former article, but I think it has had some influence in modifying the opinions of Mr. Perkins. He now appears to be willing to recognize a "paper" bill of sale, a "paper" note, a "paper" mortgage on improvements, and a "paper" quit-claim deed. He thinks it very likely that I never heard of quit-claim deeds. Yes, I have heard of them; I saw one a few years ago, and I was told that it would pass the interest of the grantor just as effectually as a warranty deed made on parchment of the finest quality. "Title to improvements," says Mr. Perkins, "could be conveyed by bill of sale as well as by deed." If so, it is a "paper title" just as good as a deed, and ought to come under the same condemnation. Say, for instance, a bill of sale to an orchard, a vine-yard, a mill-dam, or a well.

Did Mr. Perkins assume that his readers "knew some things," when he was telling them about the queer inhabitants of the King-

dom of Nahant, "who, when they buy land, omit to record the deed, preferring to get a title by simple occupation"? What do those strange people take deeds for, except as evidence of title? And why should a native of Nahant risk his title for twenty years, when he can establish it in twenty minutes by simply recording his deed?

Mr. Perkins can hardly expect that his readers will assume that he "knows some things," when he tells them that "in the older states, if the holder of a title deed neglects to assert his legal privileges, twenty years possession of the land gives any other man a perfect title, despite the deed." That must be in the State of Nahant. If Mr. Perkins will look a little deeper into that matter, he will find that the "twenty years' possession" must be of a certain legal character, having certain qualities outside the mere possession; and he will find that a twenty years' trespass gives no title at all. His readers will be still more doubtful about his knowledge of "some things," when he tells them that title to some of the best land in Boston was gained thus by a 'squatter' within the present century." Such chimney-corner legends are hardly within the scope of serious debate. WHEELBARROW.

"ET VERSA VICE."

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

AT the risk of adding, somewhat unnecessarily perhaps, to an already protracted discussion, permit me to point out one curious result of land nationalization as illustrated by a recent act of the legislature of New South Wales. The author of this measure is Mr. Brunker, who holds public office as Minister of Lands. The large landed "proprietors," or squatters, as they are termed, have waged a stubborn fight in Parliament to secure compensation for improvements, that is to say, those who would in other countries be called the landed aristocracy are in New South Wales merely tenants of the people. This system of reversal is thus summarized by an English newspaper:

"In New South Wales the landed gentleman is the tenant, and the people are landlords. The aristocrat who 'squats' on several square miles of land has never been allowed, as with us, to own it and keep it as a sheep run or a pleasure park. Any man who is prepared to come and till the soil can oust the squatter and his sheep. But the game of the squatter is to prevent the soil getting into the hands of the people. So he makes what he calls 'improvements' on his run, and then hopes, by demanding exorbitant compensation for them, to keep the small cultivator from acquiring it."

By Mr. Brunker's measure the State, as lessor, instead of awarding the squatter pecuniary compensation for improvements, somewhat ignobly avails itself of what a lawyer would probably designate an "enabling statute"; so that when, as often happens, a third party intrudes on a portion of the land as a cultivator, the subsequent proceedings take the following order. First the squatter warns the intruder against trespassing; then, finding that the newcomer means honestly to till the soil, he puts in a claim for unexhausted improvements. Here it is that the peculiar beauty of the "enabling statute" is apparent, for the State, as Grand Panjandrum or universal landlord, instead of a pecuniary compensation concedes a five years' lease of the improved land in question to the squatter author of the improvements. Much of this land was doubtless acquired under a government guarantee, in which case it seems to me that the subsequent confiscation deserves to be called by a harsher name. Where shall the line be drawn against property nationalization, confiscation, or robbery? To-day it is one class of property that is threatened; who shall say what class may to morrow be imperilled by the state *Numquamposteaeripides* (the *Nevergetbackagainides*), from whose clutches stolen property is not likely ever to be wrested?

Now that theories hitherto regarded as Utopian are coming into the range of practical politics, we may anticipate that every industry will be more or less affected by a general feeling of insecurity. Perhaps one of the worst signs of the times is that even the truth-loving, ingenuous Anglo-Saxons are taking kindly to Jesuitical casuistry. For example, in a speech delivered on Tower Hill, London, on Thursday, Sept. 5, Mr. John Burns, the Socialist, said: "The end justified the means. Everything that assisted the dockers' strike was moral; everything that retarded their cause was immoral." On the previous Sunday Mr. Burns had an interview with Cardinal Manning, the celebrated engineer of the dogma of Papal Infallibility, and it may be that the laxity of his Tower Hill ethics was encouraged hy the sanction of an ecclesiastical authority whose moral standards are foreign alike to the teachings of Jesus and his apostles, and to the promptings and determinations of the enlightened intellect. I remember to have read in my theological days, in the *Homo Apostolicus*, and the *Theologia Moralis*, of Alphonso de Liguori, that in a case of absolute necessity goods are common, and that he who steals under pressure of such necessity is justified in his stealing: Gibbon, ("Hist. Decl. and Fall," Chap. xxxviii,) also speaks of the "cruel necessity of seizure and confiscation imposed on the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire. Where is the casuist who can differentiate between the *right to take* of Clovis the Merovingian and that of the confiscating majority in a modern Parliament? Is not necessity always the tyrant's plea. M. C. O'BYRNE.

INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

"Men will not cultivate land without security of tenure, and the best security is ownership." "Without the right or hope of ownership there is no stimulus to production."—Wheelbarrow.

It is strange how men came to erect such fine buildings on the school-lands of Chicago without any "stimulus." Without the "hope of ownership," and therefore with "no stimulus to production" men pay the City of Chicago hundreds of thousands of dollars ground rent for the mere privilege of producing.

To things which are the product of labor there is no denial of the right of individual ownership, but to the resources of nature the right of individual ownership is being, of late, very energetically denied. Here we see the necessity of understanding clearly what is meant by "ownership," and the confusion that must result from the error of treating ownership and possession as synomymous. Individual *possession* of land everywhere marks the advance of civilization. Common, or communal *possession* of land everywhere marks the savage. This is universally recognized. And it is the recognition of this fact that causes men to defend individual *ownership* of land. And the habit of using these two words interchangeably causes these men to assert that individual *ownership* of land is necessary to civilization. This is what led to the Indian Severalty Act, compelling some of the Indians to accept our land-system.

But in nearly all ages there have been men who saw that although individual possession was necessary to social development, individual ownership of land was wrong in principle. Such men, as Herbert Spencer, have written with a clearness of perception, a precision of language, and a force of logic which is overwhelming, against the *right* of individual ownership of the resources of nature. Why have their unanswerable arguments had so little effect? Simply because they saw no way to harmonize the *right* of individual possession with the *wrong* of individual ownership; how to secure individual possession without individual ownership. They saw clearly that by allowing some men to *own* land there had been brought about a condition in which *some* men were not allowed to *possess any* land. The right to individual *ownership* in land admitted and it requires but a moment's reflection to see that a few men might "own" the whole earth, and all the rest would have no *right* to exist on the earth at all. And such is not only the theory but the fact of the situation to-day. A very few men, comparatively, "own" the earth, the rest exist by sufferance—slaves. This,

we all know, is contrary to the equal *right* of all men to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Therefore all men have the right to *possess* land, none to *own* it. As deep an analyst as Spencer was, he failed to solve the problem—which he plainly saw *must* be solved—how to reconcile individual possession with the denial of individual ownership.

That a man may possess and yet not own a piece of land is every day illustrated by the omnipresent tenant. What is a tenant? Webster says: "One who has the occupation or temporary possession of lands, whose title is in another." So men jump to the conclusion that although the tenant may possess without owning, it is necessary that some one else own the land. The most of the wealth of the world is produced by men who "possess" land which is "owned" by others. For this possession these tenants (often tenants in fact though not in form) pay rent to the "owners." By so doing the security of their posession is guaranteed by the "owners."

All honest men admit that the welfare of all is promoted by the largest possible use of the land; that our prosperity is endangered by allowing large tracts of land to be held out of us. A nation of *homes*—small independent holdings—is generally believed to be the best. Security of *possession* of the land, and security to the possessor, of ownership of the products of labor, are necessary to make such a nation. An individual owner cannot make such possession of land more secure to the possessor than can a corporate owner: a corporate no more than a government. In fact, the "owner" looks to the government for the security of his title. The tenant might as well pay his rent to the government as to an individual, thereby receiving his assurance of security directly from the government.

This result can be obtained by the single-tax without the government assuming possession of the titles, and all the benefits claimed for individual ownership of land secured to the individuals, at the same time destroying the evils which result from individual ownership.

BRISTOL, S. D. W. E. BROCKAW.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LES SCIENCES ET LA RELIGION. By *J. Barthélemy-Saint Hilaire*, Membre de l'Institut, Sénateur. Paris: Félix Alcan.

M. Barthélemy-Saint Hilaire's book is a defence, a justification, a criticism. The first part of the work, which throughout is written in a plain and easy style, is called "Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century." The author summarily reviews the state of philosophic thought in the nations, civilized and barbaric, of the world, and having disposed of Asia and the remaining nations of Europe, reverts to France, where he finds the impersonation of the philosophic work of our century in M. Victor Cousin; or at least so, by inference—for in the introductory chapter he mentions in the French philosophy of the nineteenth century M. Victor Cousin alone, and in the paragraph following remarks: "It is not, accordingly, a submission to patriotic vanity to state, that, in the nineteenth century, the philosophy of France has still rendered the greatest services to the human mind." M. Cousin's activity was regulative rather than creative: what he did, as our author claims, was to place "spiritualism upon an unshakable foundation," to organize the history of philosophy, and to introduce the teaching of philosophical truths into schools; his method was that of eclecticism, the method of the historian and the critic. Would France, even in patriotic admiration, accept that as the sum total of her philosophical activity for the last ninety years? We believe not, and on the part of the rest of the world, we also file a protest. "The United States of America," we read, "have as yet hardly anybody in the domain of metaphysics." The fact is we have too many; we need an inquisition for the suppression of professors of 'mental philosophy.' Like the rank, luxuriant undergrowth that hinders the true and perfect development of our native forests, so the myriad exuberance of the lower forms of philosophical life impedes, in our land, the growth to individual distinction, of the little metaphysical genius we possess.

The remaining divisions of M. Barthélemy-Saint Hilaire's book are, respectively, "Philosophy and the Sciences," "Philosophy and Religion," "Philosophy and Religion in France." They contain many apt and just criticisms; especially the chapter upon "Philosophy and the Sciences," which is a powerful refutation of the self-conceived omnipotence that experimental research has of late years taken unto itself. μκρκ.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE ALLIES. By *James Thompson Bixby*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. Price 30 cents.

Mr. Bixby has written a creditable and intelligible little book, which it will well repay the many timid orthodox opponents of the reconciliation of religion and science, to peruse. Mr. Bixby's book might be termed a treatise of transition; it is progressively written, and admirably adapted to quell the militant scruples of a conscientious faith; but, with all becoming modesty, we do not think the position maintained is throughout as high and untrammeled as the ground upon which THE OPEN COURT has taken its stand. Mr. Bixby recognizes that "there is no rightful and necessary antagonism between Science and Religion; Religion should encourage and urge the study of science rather than forbid it"; "religion is capable of being made a genuine Science, and it will never, I believe, maintain the purity, attain the stability and accuracy, reach unto the depth and breadth of truth which is within the demands of its grand mission unto mankind, until it thus weds Science to itself." But the principle of unity, the monistic idea upon which all is based, and which both science and religion seek to come at, takes, in more than one of Mr. Bixby's expositions, a dualistic vesture. The following we cannot accept: "Does it become Science to exert itself so diligently merely to pass from effect to anterior effect, from one law to another law, only a little more simple, but never ask what is the prime power on which all depend—the Lawgiver *behind* all the laws? Shall it trace with such painstaking assiduity every thread of the Kosmos, each hairbreadth of those exquisite webs of interacting laws, so harmoniously blended, so pervaded with the tokens of profoundest intelligence, and then, when we ask for the Weaver of this infinite marvel, the Reality behind this veil—tell us there is none—the *veil* is *all?* No! The true man of science must work, etc." Mr. Bixby's dualism may not be intentional; and we believe that his position in general will not bear it out. μκρκ.

The *Art Amateur* for October contains an unusual amount of matter interesting to the general reader. If Sir Edwin Arnold is right, in predicting that a great advance in æsthetic and intellectual development may be gained from the study of Oriental literature and Art, the Union League Club of New York has done wisely to offer to the public a continuation of the series of admirable exhibitions of Oriental art begun last winter. It is also good to hear that another fine Rembrandt, "Dr. Tulp," may be seen there next winter.

A short paragraph well shows up the absurd and injurious action of the so-called protection of art. The production of artistic stained-glass windows has become an important business in America of late years. "Now, because a window is for a church, it passes the customs free; because the materials for a stained-glass window are not imported for a church, they are crushed by a tariff which demands about forty-five per cent. duty for the glass and sixty per cent. for the colors." "The tariff is cruel, the exception is unfair and at bottom absurd."

A pleasant account is given of some of Thackeray's early criticisms of artists who were his contemporaries. He was sometimes right and sometimes wrong, as when he compares the great names in modern art of Rousseau, Ziem, and Troyon, to those who are now wholly forgotten.

A word in regard to the popular discussion of a national flower is good, because it considers the various candidates from an artistic point of view which has been so much neglected by the various newspaper writers. An interesting account of the Chicago exposition must not be forgotten, and we would call special attention to a thoughtful article on the subject of values which is more often talked about than understood.

The technical articles and illustrations are as good as we have learned to expect from this popular magazine. E. D. C.

Mr. Andrew Lang has edited a collection of some forty of the best fairy-stories of Greece, Germany, France, and England, under the title of "The Blue Fairy Book." The book will be illustrated, and will shortly appear at Longmans, Green, & Co.

"Our Pariahs Among the Tramps," (Belford, Clark, & Co.,) by *Uncle Tim*, is a collection of monologues and comments on social conditions, nominally uttered by a professional wanderer. It is written in a popular style and contains many excellent and trenchant criticisms.

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, for the present quarter, contains a continuation of Mr. Alfred G. Langley's translation of Leibnitz's Critique of Locke, and "The Spiritual Sense of Dante's Divina Comedia," by Prof. W. T. Harris. (D. Appleton & Co., New York. $3.00 a year.)

The lectures delivered by Mrs. Hedwig Henrich-Wilhelmi, during her sojourn of two years in the United States, have appeared in the form of a small book of 192 pages, (Freidenker Publishing Co., Milwaukee,) under the title of "*Vorträge von Hedwig Henrich-Wilhelmi*." The lectures were carefully revised for their publication in the present form; their worth as coming from the pen of the gifted woman whom even her opponents intellectually fear, is incontestable; they touch upon the chief points of interest to man as a member of society and the universe, and are imbued with the spirit of the modern view of the world. A portrait of the authoress is prefixed to the little volume.

NOTES.

M. Alfred Binet will contribute to our next issue a rejoinder to the reply of Mr. Romanes, relative to "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms."

We acknowledge the receipt, from Mr. Geo. Julian Harney, of an article in *The Newcastle Weekly Chronicle*, entitled "The Revolt of the East End." It is a stirring review of the recent labor-troubles in London, and we hope to see it reprinted, if only in part, on this side of the Atlantic.

An interesting sketch of the habits and mode of life of the Kiwi-Kiwi, the wingless bird, which formed the main subject of Prof. Weismann's first article on "Retrogression," in No. 105 of THE OPEN COURT, will be found in the October *Life-Lore*. It is accompanied by illustrations, and written for the "young naturalist."

The American Secular Union offers a premium of One Thousand Dollars "for the best essay, treatise, or manual of not less than 60,000 words and of not more than 100,000, adapted to aid and assist teachers in our *free public schools* and in the *Girard College* for orphans, and other public and charitable institutions professing to be unsectarian, to thoroughly instruct children and youth in the *purest principles of morality* without inculcating *religious doctrines*." * * * Circulars, fully setting forth the requirements and conditions of the competition, may be obtained from the President, Mr. R. B. Westbrook, 1707 Oxford Street, Philadelphia. Essays are to be submitted by April 1, 1890.

Among a number of excerpts from the press-reviews of "Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought," formerly appended to our announcement of Max Müller's work, on the cover-page of THE OPEN COURT, appeared the following laconic criticism from *Science*, viz: "The absurdity of the theory is manifest." Mr. John Chappelsmith, our venerable friend, as well as esteemed contributor, informs us in a private letter, that he immediately communicated this fact to Prof. Max Müller, stating that THE OPEN COURT openly indorsed the opinion of the reviewer in *Science* and openly took its stand in the ranks arrayed against the "Science of Thought." The position of THE OPEN COURT on the identity of thought and speech has been too often and too emphatically asserted to require us to respond to this charge of equivocation. Nor is it necessary. Favorable criticisms and adverse criticisms we accept with equal equanimity--and *some* we print. Adverse criticisms, as in the case of Prof. Max Müller's book—the merit of which fortunately does not rest upon the opinion quoted—often constitute a recommendation; they show that prejudice in certain narrow-minded circles, prevails against the author's views, and that the book is a real necessity of the age. A book goes out to do battle in the world, and woe worth the publication that does not encounter hostile criticisms! A book without enemies is like a warrior without foes.

From Calford, Kent, in England, Mr. W. B. McTaggart writes: "Monism, without doubt, is the only consistent or intelligible form of philosophy, nevertheless there is a dual point of view from which Monism may be regarded, namely, the 'Material,' and the 'Spiritual.' It is true, no doubt, that in ultimate analysis these two are also one. Nevertheless, although recognizing and knowing this fact, still they must be separated in thought—otherwise cognition is an impossibility. And different temperaments doubtless lay greater stress on the side to which they are mentally most disposed. Personally I lean greatly to the spiritual side of Monism and regard matter as the outcome of mind (Idealism). Your editor, I think, lays the greater stress on the materialistic side and conceives of mind as the outcome of matter, or at least has a permanent tendency toward that conception. Herein therefore we must agree to differ, although we are in accord as to Monism in the ultimate. Nevertheless, the "*great crux*, which so far as the ages have discovered, remains inscrutable, is 'The Unfolding of the Absolute,' or how the one became the many. Even in appearance or illusion,—for illusion or appearance in itself *is* otherness, and constitutes dualism." [The work, in which Mr. McTaggart has expounded the idea hinted at in the preceding remarks, was reviewed in an early number of THE OPEN COURT: the title, "Absolute Relativism; or the Absolute in Relation" (W. Stewart & Co, London) Mr. McTaggart's philosophy is pre-eminently monistic, though as stated, it views things from the adverse standpoint taken by THE OPEN COURT. Mr. McTaggart, in his chapter on Idealism, says: "Materialism finds nothing but the MANY; Idealism finds nothing but the ONE; Materialism affirming that unity, or the ego, is but the synthesis or outcome of the Many, while Idealism asserts that the Many, or the Non-Ego, is, on analysis, but the amplification of the One" But the Monism of THE OPEN COURT may be substituted here for both "Materialism" and "Idealism." It regards the ONE from one standpoint only; it accepts neither entire; it sees in the Many One, and affirms the former a *form* of the latter; in *form* it finds the explanation of the "Unfolding of the Absolute," and what Mr. McTaggart calls "the Absolute in Relation," Monism would call Form.]

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TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

RECENT CONTENTS OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

[MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES replies, in this contribution, to the criticisms advanced by M. Alfred Binet in the preface of his work "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," recently published by THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY. The discussion from a psychological point of view, is extremely interesting and instructive. (No. 98.)]

PROOF OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO CONSCIOUSNESSES OF HYSTERICAL INDIVIDUALS.

THE HYSTERICAL EYE.

[A series of original investigations, with new and unpublished experiments, by the French psychologist, M. ALFREO BINET, upon the psychology of hysteria; including an examination of double consciousness, "automatic writing," and the various forms of anæsthesia. (Nos. 100, 101, and 102.)]

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RELIGION, OLD AND NEW.

A POSTHUMOUS ADDRESS, WRITTEN MAY 1887.

BY PROF. W. D. GUNNING.

It would seem that as soon as man stood over an open grave and spoke the word "Death," he would have spoken the other word, "Religion." But it was not so. This word was not learned at a grave. It was not learned at all in the infancy or childhood of the race. Many churches of the race never learned it. Ancient Israel never learned it. The equivalent of the word religion was not in the Hebrew language. The word religion nowhere occurs in the Old Testament. It occurs only three times in the New Testament. It was used twice by Paul and once by James. It was never spoken by Jesus. The Hebrew language had been dead nearly a hundred years when Jesus was born, and the Aramaic, which was the language he spoke, had no more religion in it than the Hebrew. No word meaning religion occurs in the Aramaic.

To some men it would seem strange heresy, if I were to say that certain very good things have got into the world through some other door than a Bible.

Very early in the history of the Latin language the Latin mind framed the word *religio*. Cicero tried to find the origin of the word by dissection, and so to trace its meaning. He failed. Modern scholars, like Max Müller, have made the same attempt and failed. This need not disturb us. The presumption is that the first meaning attached to the word was not good. Very royal things and names have had lowly birth. When you call Shakespeare's Hamlet a tragedy, it need not disturb you that the name of this sublimest mould in which human thought is cast, when it was a fresh coinage of the Greek mind, meant a "Goat-Song."

I do not care what religion meant. I do not care how hideous it was in the germ. If long ago, when the butterfly was not, but only potential in the worm, you had seen a little scale-like expansion on the breathing surface of the worm, you would not have dreamed of the gorgeous wing, bepainted in heaven's own dyes, that one day would bear a butterfly like a flash of living sapphire through a heaven of flowers. And if your mind had been full of the large patience of nature you would have said, "No matter about the years which lie between that membranous scale and the wing."

A little scale-like expansion from the respiratory lung of the spirit appeared on the human pupa. Though men named it not, still they had it. Though Israel knew it not by name still he had it, and well advanced. One day it will wing the spirit over fields of asphodel. It will then be named *religion*. But its name will be religion long before it becomes a wing.

At first that prophetic scale had no relation at all to morals. The spiritual philosophy of early men was very simple. There are the gods, for the most part malignant, meaning to hurt us if they can. Here are we, helpless in the hand of the gods. By what machinery can we avert their wrath or win their favor? That machinery was religion, in the sense in which Paul used the word in his speech to Agrippa. In its earliest stages it involved crime. We must infer from outcrops in Hebrew literature that the pre-historic Hebrews killed their first-born in sacrifice to their god. Abraham came very near doing the same thing. Japhtha killed his daughter, and David killed the murderers of the son of Saul, and kept them hanging in the air all summer long, to remind Jahveh that Ishbosheth was avenged. This was David's religion.

The Greeks on the eve of a certain battle made a bargain with Apollo, that if he would give them victory, as many men as he would help them to slay on the field of battle, so many kids would they kill for him. The Greeks conquered with prodigeous slaughter. More enemies were slain on the field of battle than there were kids in all Greece, and the debt was bonded. That was the religion of early Greece. When the temple, called Solomon's, was finished in Jerusalem, the Jews killed as sacrifice to Jahveh 22,000 oxen and 120,000 sheep. The soil was a reek of blood and mud, the air was poisoned with the stench of burning flesh. That was the religion of ancient Israel.

If you catch a Yezzidee in the act of stealing, he will tell you that theft is a part of his religion. If you catch a Thug in the act of assassination, he will tell you that murder is to him a religious rite. If you reprove the Judas of the Nilghery Hills for living in polyandry (many husbands to one wife), they will tell you that this is the very ground-work of their religion. If you reprove the Mormons for living in polygamy,

they will remind you that this is the biblical chart of their religion.

It is not pleasant to hear or to speak these things, but if we are to understand the butterfly, we must not ignore the pupa. Such diabolical religion implies diabolical gods. When you find a tribe of Negroes who worship a white cow as a god, you see them knocking out their front teeth so as to resemble as much as possible their god. So in these early conceptions of the gods as delighting in blood and theft, it was inevitable that the devotee should try to assimilate himself to his god. Immoral religions are survivals from pre-ethical ages of humanity.

You have seen the pottery of that old race called Mound Builders, whose towns of adobe and communal huts were here and there on the shores of western lakes and banks of rivers. You have seen how these ancient peoples wrought on their pottery certain conceptions they had of invisible beings, exaggerated toads, impossible birds, preposterous monkeys. I suppose they were gods. They used clay and silica. How long do you suppose this silica had been lying under feet of men who had no thought that it had higher function than to be moulded into hideous god-forms? Passing from the Museum at Washington to the Observatory, and looking from the toad-gods and ape-gods on Mexican pottery to the great lens in that great telescope, "here," I said, "here the silica which dabbling hands of savagery had profaned, here it has attained its highest function, in gathering up such sheaves of light as to resolve the beaded mist of the Milky Way into abysmal stars! A grinning god there on a drinking-mug, such revelation of the Infinite God there in the telescope, through the worlded deeps of space that imagination folds her wing and the wrapped soul is hushed in wonder!

Now I have no controversy with the man of pottery. I do not like the preposterous gods he has moulded of mud and silica on his mug. I do not expect him to like my thoughts of God prompted by that revelation through the telescope, I have no controversy with the man of pottery, but I do not wish him to make his mud-gods obstructive. He thinks he has found the highest function of silica to be fingered into a god-form. I think we have found it as a lens to reveal the Infinite through the infinitude of space. That is his *silicious* religion; this is mine. The difference between us is radical. I will not submit it to vote, for he carries the majority. I will not submit it to that white-bearded arbiter called time, for in his left hand he has always carried the ripe sheaves of error, and in his right only the seeds of truth.

I have given religion a wing, her own growth; I have given her a lens, not her own, but the work of science. Without the lens she is blind; without the wing she is lame. How long was the lens only potential in the silica of the old mud gods? How long was the wing only a rudiment in that scale-like expansion on the pupa? With neither lens nor wing, that which was to be religion was a mere heart sickness of the race. So Heraclitus, one of the great thinkers of Greece, called religion a disease of the heart. The disease, he said, could be cured if man could be restored to happiness. But the sick heart had addled the brain and stained the hand in crime. The Greek thinker did not see the height and depth of his great theme. Heart-*hunger*, heart-*yearning* religion is, but not heart-palsy. The ancestors of Heraclitus called man "*Anthropos*," the upward-looker. The race that coined that name saw already that man sustains relations to the Infinite. The Fijee Islander called man "Long Pig." *He* felt that man sustains relations to the sty. No wing will ever grow from the spirit that thinks itself only a different kind of pig in a larger sty. I cannot think that the germ of religion was in the Fijee. The wing was already well formed in the man whose very name of man implies relations with the Infinite. For religion is that sentiment born of a sense of the infinite and dependence on 'a power not ourselves.' But there was no moral character in the sentiment until in the mind of man began to sound the solemn word "Ought." Then religion became ethics warmed with sentiment. In this highest sense religion is the noblest attribute of man. It tones down his asperities. It curbs his passions. It mellows his character. It sustains him in *his* hours of Gethsemane. It lifts him to citizenship in an invisible world. It is his bond of communion with the good and the great who have gone before.

But if heaven's light shall flash from its wing, it must breathe the free air of heaven. Formalism stifles it, creed-stuff chokes it. I wish to note this law: Whatever is highest in nature or spirit depends most on conditions and demands most careful nurture. A most gorgeously maculated wing of butterfly is found in the eastern States, and Ohio, and Michigan. Trace that butterfly westward; the bloom on which it feeds is changing, and the beauty of color is fading out. Trace it to the alkaline plains of Colorado, and all the maculation is gone; the wing is of dingy ash, and the butterfly is now a thing of naught.

In Oxford, England, there stands a hotel whose sign and name are, "The Goat and Compasses." In the time of Cromwell there stood on that same place a hotel whose sign bore the inscription, "The Lord Encompasseth." 'Twas the high-tide line of Puritan religious faith. What a bleached, ashen desert of faith does it imply that men, caught only by the sound

"The Lord Encompasseth," should translate it into their vernacular thought, "The Goat and Compasses!" How the maculation of the wing has faded out!

The bane of what is higher has always been the ancestral lower which slumbers in it, ready at any time to wake. No high-blooded animal tends more strongly to revert to the wild stock than formulated religion. Above any other sentiment it delights to robe itself in archaic forms. Crosier, mitre, stole, robe—things of the ancient man—are its fashionable trappings. It delights to think that its nutriment is drawn from the far-away and the long-ago. If I were to read to you to-day as prop and stimulus to religion the noblest utterance of the noblest of living men, there are those, even in this presence, whose tender religious nature would feel a slight shock. If I were to read a page utterly infractuous, written anonymously long ago and far away in the Orient, such tender souls would be comforted.

No; Heraclitus was wrong; religion is not a disease, but it is fearfully *diseased*. Where is the healing?

* * *

I believe with Arnold that the world cannot get on much longer with religion as formulated, and I believe with him that it will not and cannot get on without religion. My words are addressed to those who have grown their wing and who hold from science her gift of lens, who think no more of the mud-gods on pipes and mugs, and no longer care for the tribe-gods on pages of ancient writ. We believe that we are in line with the religious thought of the age. We would cut away all devitalized roots. We would have a deeper communion with God through that in which he is manifest *here* and *now*. No man ever sat under a green tree and watched the shaping and drifting of clouds in the azure, and heard the orchestra of life in the song of birds, and looked into the pure heart of the anemone or the violet, without exaltation of the spirit into something like the glow of religion. Think you not that these are better oracles than the text which has fed religion, and dipped her hand in the blood of 50,000 men and women: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live"? Is it not better for morning devotion to hear the trill of a lark than to read a psalm of cursing? Noble, God-ward aspirations of holy men, breathed out in any age, on any land, I would hold as fallible helps to spirit growth; but the scripture men will read and feel to the end of time is the theophany we call creation. The song bird is more to the heart of man than the ancient prophet. The lilies of the field are more than the tinsel trappings of an ancient temple. The rose of Sharon is a better text of purity than any seer or psalmist. Mont Blanc is a higher Cathedral spire than Strassburg. The domes of Yosemite are crowns of a mightier temple than St. Peter's. The spangled night-heaven—what a solemn preacher to all the sons of men!

I have always been impressed with a scene which Humboldt paints between himself and an Indian on the banks of the Orinoco. They sat on a log, he, the great savant, and he, the hungry child of the pampas. The great man felt the mind of the nature man on religion. He talked about God—no, the Indian had never thought about a God. He talked about impalpable Indians on other and happier pampas. No, the Indian had never thought about a spirit-land. He pointed to the mighty river, coming out of a mystery and flowing on forever into another mystery. The man of nature grew pensive. He pointed to mountain domes throned above the clouds and crowned with eternal snow. The pensive savage looked, and his soul seemed to dilate with the vision. He talked about the vast camp fires ablaze in the night-heaven—and the man who had neither wing on the spirit nor lens for the eye, after one glow of exaltation, turned with clouded brow to the great man and said: "If we were not all the while hungry!"

What a revelation was that! What a sermon to you and to me! Whatever is riper in you was germinal in that man by the Orinoco. Bodily need had well nigh stifled in him the spirit whose nutrient scriptures of growing grass, and opening bloom, and flowing river, and drifting clouds, and shimmering stars should have made him a man. Real need in him, factitious need in you, hunger in him, care in you, may choke the spirit, but the same convex earth is under your feet; the same concave heaven bends over your head, and the same voice of duty speaks within. It speaks in poor, stammering, half articulate accents on the Orinoco. If it is more clear and articulate on the Mississippi, our religion owes the hand of help to groping hands of the other hemisphere. Helping we are helped. Teaching we are taught. The world is so far unified politically and financially that no dusky son of Adam on the Columbia or the Orinoco, in Senegambia or Borneo, can smite his neighbor, but the nerves of this vast net-work will carry a thrill to the antipodes. Let the bond of the spirit be closer than the bond of interest. One God, one voice of God in the mind, "Thou shalt, thou shalt not"; myriad voices of God speaking to the mind throughout all his scriptures, and blending in symphony to the ETERNAL ONE, who orbs in heaven the morning star and by the same law globes on earth the drop of dew, who holds the ancient heaven from going wrong, and holds man to the law of right, these are the scriptures, this the symphony of the religion which one day will hold the allegiance of all upward-looking and rational souls.

MECHANISM OR SUB-CONSCIOUSNESS?

BY ALFRED BINET.

In all the experiments that I have hitherto presented, I have supposed in hysterical persons the existence of a double consciousness. This hypothesis possessed the advantage of explaining how it happens that we are able to provoke in the limbs of such individuals various complex movements of adaptation, which are performed without their knowledge; and we, accordingly, proceeded upon the assumption that these movements were regulated by a secondary consciousness, which does not amalgamate with the principal personality.

But the objection has recently been made, that the hypothesis of double consciousness is not necessary, and that we might explain all the experiments in question by presuming that the movements of the insensible members are parcel of that mechanical activity which is constantly seen at work in habit and instinct, and which seems to perform its functions without the aid of consciousness.

This second explanation, at first blush, is so natural, that when I began my researches I did not hesitate to accept it, even contrary to the opinion of my friend M. Pierre Janet, who adopted the hypothesis of subconscious phenomena. But later, according as my observations and experiments became more numerous, I was compelled to abandon the explanation founded upon mechanical acts. This, I admit, cost me a great deal; for it is singular to observe, how, despite ourselves, and the desire of being impartial, we ever reluctantly surrender a first idea. I shall, therefore, essay to recapitulate the facts that have brought about my conviction. Some of these facts are new; but the greater part have already been published by me in the *Revue philosophique* of February, 1889; and M. Pierre Janet in his recent book on psychological automatism (*l'Automatisme psychologique*) has added other facts that are highly interesting.

Let us begin with the simplest cases.

We have before us a lady patient, observed in the waking state, whose anæsthetic hand, hidden behind a screen, repeats the movements that it is made to perform; the patient feels nothing, suspects nothing, and believes that her hand is motionless. This repetition of the movement may be regarded as a physiological act devoid of consciousness. Let us complicate slightly the experiment in question. Let us cause the hand to trace the patient's own name, and, in so doing, commit an orthographical error; it frequently happens that the hand, in re-writing the name, hesitates when it reaches the error, or will even correct it. We may still, perhaps, maintain that this is a physiological act devoid of consciousness. But let us continue. There are patients, St. Am—— for example, whose hand spontaneously finishes the word they are made to trace; thus, I cause the letter *d* to be written; the hand continues, and writes *don;* I write *pa*, and the hand continues and writes *pavillon*; I write *Sal*, and the hand writes: *Salpêtrière*. Is it possible that this is an act destitute of consciousness? The question, manifestly, is become more doubtful. But there is a more convincing instance still, for the following case is the most curious that has come under my notice. M. Taine was speaking to me one day, in detail, of an observation that he has inserted in the preface to his beautiful book on Intelligence (*l'Intelligence*). The observation in question relates to a young girl who, at times, would unconsciously seize a pen, and write a whole page, the sense of which she did not understand; this page, always signed by the same name, (M. Taine told me that it was the name of the girl's governess,) was the expression of mournful ideas and sorrowful reflections upon life. What particularly interested me in the matter of this observation was the fact, that I myself, in an observation of my own, have obtained an entirely analogous result, and M. Pierre Janet, likewise, has gotten five or six more. The lady patient, whom I observed, was an hysterical subject, whose right arm was totally insensible. On certain days, when a pen was put into her right hand behind a screen, the hand in question, without further solicitation, would begin to write connected phrases, to which the mind of the patient remained wholly foreign, for while her hand was writing, the patient would be chatting with us about something entirely different. Concerning the explanation of these last facts, the slightest doubt no longer seems permissible; and it is likewise certain that authors who have gathered equally complicated observations, have not hesitated in regard to the manner in which they are to be explained.

In fine, we behold, in this instance, the writing of the anæsthetic hand become the secretary of a complete personality, endowed with its own exclusive ideas, and its own emotions. M. Taine, without the thought of an objection, admits that these facts are explained by the existence of two personalities in juxtaposition.

I well know that a skeptic could always maintain that the second personality, revealed in our experiments, is a personality destitute of consciousness. I am, indeed, unable to furnish the material proof to convince such a skeptic that he is mistaken. The question of consciousness, as in a future article I shall have occasion fully to demonstrate, is one of the most delicate problems that a psychologist could undertake to solve. Upon the whole, however, it seems to me that there is a great probability in favor of the acceptance of the element of consciousness in such

complex psychic manifestations as those I have just cited.

M. Pierre Janet has added to the subject in question a further argument, that ought to be regarded as convincing. How are we led to recognize, he asks, the existence of consciousness in another individual? When we find, for example, that the individual utters connected words, conveying sense. But, if the word is one mode of expression of conscious thought, writing must be regarded as another, equally complex, or even more so; and we are unable to understand why writing should not prove as much as the spoken word.

Moreover, in order to render this demonstration perfectly convincing, we will say, that there are patients in whom this second personality speaks, even in the state of wake. Here, at least if I consult my own experience, we have to do with entirely exceptional cases. Thus, I have seen three patients who, when we slightly pricked their insensible member, suddenly would complain in a loud voice, crying: "You hurt me!" It was the second personality that spoke, for if we addressed the patient directly and called her by her own name, she would invariably declare that she had said nothing. I did not follow out the study of these curious phenomena, because at the beginning of my researches I did not know whether they were real or simulated. But M. Pierre Janet has observed similar ones under circumstances so precise, that now I no longer doubt their exactitude.

Here, accordingly, the second personality of the hysterical patient not only writes of its own accord, but speaks even. Shall we still maintain that this is an unconscious personality?

But this is not all. We know of even more convincing facts. We know of observations, in which this second personality, ever awake, is seen gradually to develop more and more, and to assume the initiative in conduct, instead of the first personality, which is temporarily annihilated. Such is the case of Felida, the interesting patient whose history M. Azam reported twenty years ago, which people at that epoch could not have been expected to understand, but at the present time is perfectly elucidated by all the data which in an abridged form we are placing before the reader. With Felida there occurred certain critical periods, as the effect of which her character would completely change and a part of her recollections would disappear; she passed into a new state—into her second condition, as M. Azam called it; this second condition, which would last weeks and even months, was connected by memory with her previous "second" conditions. Thus she would remember persons, whom she had seen in former "second" conditions, but she did not remember those whom she had seen in the intervals. Thus there was developed within the patient a real double personality, not co-existent, but successive.

The facts above set forth have led me to the assumption that there may exist in hysterical patients two rational faculties, that are mutually ignorant of each other. I do not regard this as a simple hypothesis; it is an induction, in my opinion perfectly legitimate.

To me it seems difficult, upon the occasion of every case examined and every movement produced in the anæsthetic member, to declare whether the movement in question is accompanied by consciousness; the criterion which we employ is too uncertain to be everywhere applied with infallibility. But I believe it satisfactorily established in a general way, that two states of consciousness, not known to each other, can co-exist in the mind of an hysterical patient.*

We discover at once the psychological conclusion to be drawn from the preceding experiments; namely, that the limits of introspection are not those of consciousness; and that where we have not consciousness, there is not necessarily unconsciousness. Such are the very important and very curious facts that to me seem destined to reconstruct the theory of the unconscious.

SIGNING THE DOCUMENT.

BY WHEELBARROW.

Few men of this generation understand the meaning of those words, and yet the time was when they menaced the liberty of all the workingmen of England, and the time has now come when they threaten the independence of all the laborers of America.

About fifty-five years ago the workingmen of England combined for their own welfare and protection into a trades-union organization, something like the Trades Assembly and the Knights of Labor here. So formidable did this organization become that the government resolved to stamp it out, and conspiracy laws were passed against it. It's too long a story to tell now, but after a great deal of fining and imprisoning and transporting, the contest ended in something like a drawn battle—the trades-unions were not entirely conquered, nor were they entirely successful. Other societies came into existence, having other methods of assisting labor, and the trades-unions melted into them. What remained of them ceased to be very dangerous, and was "let alone."

As a protection to themselves against the trades-unions, the employers of labor, or the "masters," as they were termed in England—and we might as well adopt that name here, now that we have "signed the document"—the masters formed themselves into a

* I cannot adduce here all the arguments upon which my position is based. I shall only refer, in this note, to the interesting researches of M. Pierre Janet upon "systematic anæsthesia."

counter organization, and the first thing they did was to prepare an agreement for all workingmen to sign. This was a pledge not to join the trades-unions, or any similar society. The masters, on their part, pledged themselves not to employ any mechanic, artisan, clerk, or laborer who refused to sign this document, and they agreed to discharge all workingmen now in their service who should also decline to do so. This paper was something like the one submitted by the telegraph companies to the striking operators four or five years ago.

The "document" meant servitude and subjection. It was so translated by the workingmen. They refused to sign it, and were discharged by thousands from their various employments. Popular sympathy at once rallied to the side of labor, and so menacing became the discontent, that the government was alarmed. Songs containing the watchwords of the Unions were sung in the streets, and the agitation became dangerous. A remarkable evidence of the stubborn freedom of the English was that the men most resolute in refusing to sign the document were not the trades-unionists, but men who had never joined the unions, but had always bitterly opposed them. They said they could not sign away their own liberties, nor the liberties of their children, and they declined to give the "masters" any other reason for declining to sign.

Of course, some "signed the document," and retained their situations, but those unfortunate men were always held as tainted by a moral leprosy. Twenty years afterward, and so long as that generation remained, it blasted a man like a crime to say of him, "He signed the document"; indeed, men took more pains to deny this accusation than to deny a charge of burglary. Sometimes a man would work in a shop among a hundred men, maybe for a year or more, when some craftsman would come along who knew him long ago, and would tell that he had "signed the document." From that time his life would be uncomfortable in that shop. Although no harm would be done him, he felt that his shopmates all regarded him as unsound in moral fiber, and no true Englishman. Boys at school could not insult one another more effectually than to say, "His father signed the document." At our school more fights grew out of this insult than out of all other causes put together.

And this was the end of the telegraph strike. The operators all "signed the document," and went back to their work. Their offer to surrender would not be accepted unless accompanied by a written abdication of their independence. This abdication involved important consequences not only to themselves, but also to all wage workers of every degree. Not only did they sign away their own birthright but that of the whole great brotherhood of labor. That other masters would exact the same pledge was certain, and quietly but unrelentingly this encroachment upon liberty has been advancing. Labor was deprived of its dignity and subjugated, while monopoly and privilege were correspondingly strengthened and exalted when the telegraph operators "signed the document."

A few months ago a young man of my acquaintance, in the employ of a very powerful and wealthy corporation of Chicago, said to me in a tone of sadness and humiliation, "Well! I have signed the document. The firm required it and we all did it." I asked him if there were no rebels who refused. "No," he said, "not one. What could we do? Its easy to talk and moralize about these things, but its not so easy to get into a job as it is to get out of it. My work is hard, but the wages is fair, and if my job were advertised in the papers to-night as vacant, there would be fifty men after it before nine o'clock to-morrow morning; fifty men just as good as I am. Who of the million men in Chicago would care a cent about me, or sympathize with me for quitting my job 'on principle'? Not one! They would all call me a fool. Knowing this, I signed the document."

I had no reproaches to make; the philosophy of his reasoning was too plain. This indifference to the welfare of others is driving both humanity and divinity out of our social state. Justice beating up against it has to tack like a ship striving against a head wind. This indifference is a dangerous thing, as we shall find out some day. September 2nd was "Labor-day" in Chicago, and thousands of workingmen celebrated it by a procession and some festivities. I walked through the city, but I could not see the slightest interest in the occasion outside the workingmen themselves and their own families. This was not well, and the influence of this neglect is evil. There ought to have been some show of kindly feeling on the part of those who do not have to toil so hard as those artisans and laborers. Do the capitalists imagine that these men will not return them scorn for scorn. Labor-day is a national holiday in England, and it ought to be so here. Nay, capital has very skillfully obtained credit for the festival; it is called "Bank Holiday." It was made national by Act of Parliament through the efforts of Sir John Lubbock, a banker; and in the vernacular of the common people, the holiday is called Saint Lubbock's day. In the calendar of the canonized I find a patron saint for almost everything and everybody except labor and laborers. Sir John Lubbock has been chosen to fill that vacancy, and his canonization is more valid than that of many saints I know of. Few rich men realize how much easier the "Labor Problem" has been made in England by Saint Lubbock's day.

On the second of September, I watched the workingmen's procession with some sadness because it did

not appear to be the march of light-hearted men with springy feet, except when the band played the Marseillaise. Then I saw good marching and a flashing in the eyes, while some of the marchers broke into song. A fiery stimulant is that Marseillaise.

While waiting for the procession, and watching the busy crowds moving rapidly to and fro, I saw a policeman with a prisoner in his charge. The criminal was a young man with a good face enough, save that it wore a somewhat hard expression. His slouch of a hat was drawn down over his eyes showing a feeling of pride in him yet. He walked doggedly and almost defiantly along like a prisoner of war. Nobody paid the least attention to him, nor showed any concern for his fate, and he returned the indifference as I could see by his manner and his walk. He evidently felt that in the battle between the classes and the masses, he had been captured by the classes and was simply not a criminal but a prisoner of war. His fellow men were too busy to bother about him, and why should he care about them. Between him and them there existed a state of social war.

I borrow the phrase "too busy" from the Governor of Illinois, with whom I had an interview in August. I was pleading with him to perform an act of justice and humanity, which I knew would bring upon him a storm of hostile criticism. Without conceding or denying the justice of my prayer, he said, "How can I affront popular opinion by doing what you ask? The public mind is made up." I answered, "The justice of it will be seen when the matter is investigated." "But," he replied, "it will not be investigated. Men are too busy to explore for justice. They will only read the headlines of the articles denouncing me for doing it. They are too busy." "Moral cowardice," I quote his very words, "moral cowardice is the failing of our people. Some of the men who join with you in asking this of me, would join my enemies in denouncing me for doing it."

The man who told me this was a student of politics and of men. He had found out that indifference to the rights of others was a trait of our social character. It was a hard lesson to learn and I did not like to learn it. I am glad to know that it is not universally true, for I can point out hundreds of men whose generous lives give it splendid contradiction, but what I saw on Monday convinced me that much of it was true. How then can we expect an ambitious man, honorably ambitious too, with a possible great future before him to imperil his prospects by offending public sentiment? And how can we expect a man of humble station who must labor with his hands for bread, in a social atmosphere of absolute indifference to him or his affairs, how can we expect him to risk his job of work by refusing to sign the document?

IS REINCARNATION TRUE?

BY JOHN RANSOM BRIDGE.

In an essay entitled "Death—and Afterwards," printed in the *Fortnightly Review*, by Sir Edwin Arnold, he argues against the great mistake of refusing to believe in the continuity of the individual life because of the incomprehensibility of it, saying, "Existence around us, illuminated by modern science, is full of antecedently incredible occurrences; one more or less makes no logical difference. There is positively not a single prodigy in the ancient religions, but has its every-day illustration in Nature. The transformation of classic gods and goddesses are grossly commonplace to the magic of the Medusa, which is now filling our summer seas with floating bells of crystal and amethyst. Born from the glassy goblet of their mother, the young hydrozoön becomes first a free germ resembling a rice grain; next a fixed cup with four lips; then those lips turn to tentacles, and it is a hyaline flower, which presently splits across the calyx into segments, and the protean thing has grown into a pine-cone crowned with a tuft of transparent filaments. The cone changes into a series of sea-daisies, threaded on a pearly stock; and these, one by one, break off and float away, each a perfect little Medusa, with purple bell and trailing tentacles. What did Zeus or Hermes ever affect like that? Does anybody find the doctrine of the Incarnation so incredible? The nearest rose-bush may rebuke him, since he will see there the aphides, which in their wingless state produce without union creatures like themselves; and these again, though uncoupled, bring forth fresh broods, down to the tenth or eleventh generation; when, on a sudden, winged males and females suddenly result, and pair. Or is the Buddhist dogma of immortality in the past for every existent individual too tremendous a demand? The lowest living thing, the Protamœba, has obviously never died. It is a formless film of protoplasm, which multiplies by simple division; and the specimen under any modern microscope derives, and must derive, in unbroken existence from the amœba which moved and fed forty æons ago. The slime of our nearest puddle lived before the Alps were made."

Emerson writes: "We must infer our destiny from the preparation. We are driven by instinct to hive innumerable experiences which are of no visible value, and we may revolve through many lives before we shall assimilate or exhaust them. Now there is nothing in nature capricious, or whimsical, or accidental, or unsupported. Nature never moves by jumps, but always in steady and supported advances. . . . . If there is a desire to live, and in a large sphere, with more knowledge and power, it is because life and knowledge are good for us, and we are the natural de-

positaries of these gifts. The love of life is out of all proportion to the value set on a single day, and seems to indicate a conviction of immense resources and possibilities proper to us, on which we have never drawn."

Take this passage with the following from "Through the Gates of Gold," and you have, from the standpoint of Esoteric Budhism, the reason for the presence of each of us upon this planet:

"Nature is the kindest of mothers to those who need her; she never wearies of her children or desires them to lessen in multitude. Her friendly arms open wide to the vast throng who desire birth and to dwell in forms; and while they continue to desire it, she continues to smile a welcome. Why then should she shut her doors on any? When one life in her heart has not worn out a hundredth part of the soul's longing for sensation, such as it finds there, what reason can there be for its departure to any other place? Surely the seeds of desire spring up where the sower has sown them. This seems but reasonable; and on this apparently self-evident fact the Indian mind has based its theory of reincarnation, of birth and re-birth in matter, which is so familiar a part of Eastern thought as no longer to need demonstration. The Indian knows it, as the Western knows that the day he is living through is but one of many days which make up the span of man's life. This certainty which is possessed by the Eastern with regard to natural laws that control the great sweep of the soul's existence, is simply acquired by habits of thought. The mind of many is fixed on subjects which in the West are considered unthinkable."

As this passage says, it is only in the Western world that the doctrine of reincarnation has to many the flavor of a new "ism." The followers of Buddha outnumber the followers of Jesus, and the former are reincarnationists. But their faith, like that of the Christians, has been marred and distorted almost beyond recognition. In either case one has much rubbish of an ecclesiastical nature to clear away, before the pure waters of life may be reached. This is so, because the generations of priests, in their endeavor to keep the people within orthodox boundaries, have of necessity declared faith in their statements, faith in their dogmatic ideas of God, salvation, and sin, to be the passport to heaven, rather than the conduct of man in his relations with his fellow men. This is the rock upon which the Christian church has builded: "Believe, and thou shalt be saved." Yet it is a curious fact in history that the advance of civilization has been in the degree that the hands of the church have been forced away from the affairs of the state. Liberty of speech and action has not come from or with the blessings of the priest, but in spite of him and followed by his curses and anathemas. Who among the many warring sects of Christians would be willing that the liberty and future prosperity of this country be placed absolutely in the hands of any sect,—except perhaps their own!

Outside of Christendom, the acceptance of a belief in reincarnation under some of the cruder forms of metempsychosis, implying pre-existence upon this earth, is, and has been, well-nigh universal. It appears in the earliest forms of Brahmanism as displayed in the oldest sacred hymns of India. It is found in the writings of Zoroaster. It is symbolically expressed in the hieroglyphic rituals of ancient Egypt. Pythagoras taught it, as also did Plato. And in what has later become the Christian section of the world, some reflection from this truth has been shadowed in the writings and teachings of the greatest minds which the succeeding centuries have occasionally produced.

Mr. E. D. Walker, author of the recently published "Reincarnation, a Study of Forgotten Truth," quotes the following passage from a "Disquisition on a Præexistent State," by Soame Jenyns: "That mankind had existed in some state previous to the present was the opinion of the wisest sages of the most remote antiquity. It was held by the Gymnosophists of Egypt, the Brachmans of India, the Magi of Persia, and the greatest philosophers of Greece and Rome; it was likewise adopted by the fathers of the Christian church, and frequently enforced by her primitive writers. Why it has been so little noticed, so much overlooked rather than rejected, by the divines and metaphysicians of later ages, I am at a loss to account for, as it is undoubtedly confirmed by reason, by all the appearances of nature, and by the doctrines of revelation."

The Council of Constantinople denounced these teachings of the earlier writers and forcibly suppressed them, substituting those dogmatic assertions in regard to a future life, which have since become the bane of Christendom and the mask from behind which the Roman Church pretends to speak as a messenger from God.

Although from prehistoric times the idea of transmigration of souls is as a continuous thread running through the fabric of nearly all the great religions; it is within the past few years that the doctrine in all its fullness has been presented as a plain truth rather than cloaked under symbols and glyphs which disclose their deepest signification only to the initiated. If this and other wisdom has been treasured among a few advanced students, as there certainly seems to be strong evidence, a little study of the action of natural laws, which govern the transmission of such knowledge, will convince the skeptical that it is never a question of giving, but of receiving. Man's cup of knowledge is always full to the brim, and if he persists in retaining his own petty conceits and cherished fancies, nature

can give him but little true wisdom. When, in the known history of the world, have the masses, as at present among the Aryan races, been educated to that degree that they could intelligently grasp the subject of reincarnation and the train of metaphysical reasoning which it introduces? In fact, we are just emerging from that condition where the priest represents the brain of the people, the balance of humanity the trunk and limbs which obey the head. The orthodox priest has been a stumbling-block in the path of progress.

The new views of life, of which reincarnation is one phrase, and which so alter the relationship of "God's footstool" and of man to the universe, as commonly considered, come naturally at a time when radical changes are predicted in our social life. Close observers declare that both church and state are approaching a crisis which may mark the beginning of a new epoch in our history, though such as do not feel the shadow of coming events, or do not consider that new wine is fermenting in old bottles and new vessels may soon be needed, will not be likely to connect the new presentation of reincarnation with the need of the times. Yet only those who refuse to hear and to see can deny that the old creeds and conflicting dogmas, the fetters of the priestcraft, are slowly bursting asunder under the dynamic power of advanced thought. Through the process of natural growth the spiritual in man is beginning to assert its being. New conceptions of life are everywhere rudely intruding upon what was supposed to be the established order of things.

A good illustration of the effect of an honest consideration of the doctrine of reincarnation may be found in the chapter on modern Prose Writers in Mr. Walker's book. He says: "The noblest work of modern times, and probably of all time, upon immortality, is a large volume by the Rev. William R. Alger, entitled, 'A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life.' It was published in 1860, and still remains the standard authority upon the topic throughout Christendom. The author is a Unitarian minister, who devoted half his lifetime to the work, undermining his health thereby. In the first edition (1860) the writer characterizes reincarnation as a plausible delusion, unworthy of credence. For fifteen years he continued studying the subject, and the last edition (1878) gives the final result of his ripest investigations in heartily endorsing and advocating reincarnation. No more striking argument for the doctrine could be advanced than this fact. That a Christian clergyman, making the problem of the soul's destiny his life study, should become so overpowered by the force of this pagan idea, as to adopt it for the climax of his scholarship, is extremely significant."

Mr. Alger puts forward the doctrine as a theory, saying: "It is advanced solely as an illustration of what may possibly be true, as suggested by the general evidence of the phenomena of history and the facts of experience. The thoughts embodied in it are so wonderful, the method of it is so rational, the region of contemplation into which it lifts the mind is so grand, the prospects it opens are of such universal reach and import, that the study of it brings us into full sympathy with the sublime scope of the idea of immortality, and of a cosmopolitan vindication of Providence uncovered to every eye. It takes us out of the littleness of petty themes and selfish affairs, and makes it easier for us to believe in the vastest hopes mankind have ever known. It causes the most magnificent conceptions of human destiny to seem simply proportional to the native magnitude and beauty of the powers of the mind which can conceive such things."

Mr. Alger's arguments called down upon him a storm of ponderous orthodox invectives from those who insist that we must believe the immortal soul of man is at birth created out of nothing by a divine fiat, whisked through a few miserable years of earth life, and then flashes off to an unlocated heaven, or falls with the majority into a sea of eternal torment. If the soul is immortal now, we must agree with the Greek philosophers who held that nothing which has being, could have originated from nothingness or can be resolved into nothingness. They asserted preexistence to prove immortality. As Emerson says: "We wake and find ourselves on a stair. There are other stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight." Judged by our limited conceptions of time and space, each of these steps of which Emerson speaks must be very broad indeed, and our passage upward is only by the slow progress of natural development. The notion that the spiritual part of the man is dragged up these stairs, willing or unwilling and with more than lightening rapidity, catching hardly a glimpse of the spheres through which it is drawn, is certainly not in accordance with the workings of nature. As Mabel Collins writes: "Man comes into this world, surely, on the same principle that he lives in one city of the earth or another; at all events, if it is too much to say this is so, one may safely ask, why is it not so? There is neither for nor against which will appeal to the materialist, or which would weigh in a court of justice, but I aver this in favor of the argument, ... that no man having once seriously considered it, can go back to the formal theories of the skeptics. It is like putting on swaddling clothes again." This must be so, if man is not a puppet, and if he is not, how else may we regard him than as a "powerful consciousness who is his own creator, his

own judge, and within whom lies all life in potentiality, even the ultimate goal."

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL ETHICS.

BY ALLEN PRINGLE.

THAT the ethical attitude of different nations towards each other is materially affected by their trade relations is a fact not generally recognized. That individual conduct is so affected, as well as international and national morality, is still less recognized.

The public man or private citizen who has come to look with moral complacency upon a crooked transaction with, or commercial advantage taken of, a foreign nation or one of its citizens, will, in due course, be led to condone with himself a wrong perpetrated against his own country or his own fellow-citizen.

The remnants of the tribal cults of primitive man, in which the moral bond or obligation was circumscribed by the area and interests of the tribe, still survive—of course in an attenuated form. What would be a moral outrage against a member of the same clan would be quite justifiable—if, indeed, not a virtue—when perpetrated against the member of another tribe. And in modern civilized life, by means of a sort of moral strabismus, which is perfectly natural, the average citizen is not so much troubled in his conscience about taking advantage of a stranger as he ought to be.

But humanity is growing better in this regard, as the monistic principle of its unity of origin and solidarity of obligation takes root. Hence whatever tends to fertilize this grand principle, and thus promote community of interests among men and nations, becomes the proper object of the true reformer—moral, social, religious, or political. I look upon international trade as one of these objects—one of the potent mediums and promoters of the amity and comity of nations. As individuals are dependent on each other so are peoples.

From these premises it follows that the freest possible commercial trade, and resultant social intercourse, between nations, in all useful products, is conducive not only to international morality and good will but to national and individual well-being and well-doing.

Per contra. Artificial and arbitrary commercial barriers between nations or their component parts, directly tend to foster the spirit of ill-will, injustice, and the selfishness and exclusiveness of a still dominant *egoism.* That the dual principle in which such egoistic exclusiveness has its root, is perpetrated by tariffs and other unneighborly and arbitrary barriers, erected by selfishness and a mistaken economy, between the nations and peoples of the earth, is as obvious to the moral philosopher as that such barriers are opposed to economic law is palpable to the political economist. Indeed, if our economic science, as applied to international trade relations, were found to clash with the very first and fundamental principal of ethical philosophy, viz.: the moral unity (and, as a corollary, the confraternity) of the whole human race, then we might fairly suspect the soundness and integrity of our political philosophy. If the universe of matter and force, including all phenomena, all truth—is one "stupendous whole," inseparably connected, then every truth must be consistent with every other truth—every science, whether of religion, or morals, or sociology, or political economy, must be not only consistent with every other but coherently connected therewith and considered as a part of the grand whole.

The greatest evil that still afflicts humanity on this planet (and let us hope it nowhere else exists in the universe) the worst vestige of man's animal nature, and evidence of his lowly origin, and at the same time the most stupendous anomaly of his present enlightened civilization, is *modern war*— the barbarous, cruel slaughter of man by man, brother by brother. This is at once the most terrible evil on the earth and the bitterest reflection on man's moral nature.

But humanity in general is slowly and surely rising above this barbarism, while not a few are already on the high table-land of peace. The great English Quaker and reformer, John Bright, and his scattering, tho' worthy, compeers throughout the world, may take courage. Although the animal in man is still strong and considerably in the ascendant a better day is evidently dawning.

Unmistakable signs there are that as the head of man grows harder in sense his heart grows softer in sentiment. One of these pleasing signs has been presented to us a few months ago in the Peace Commission, which came over to the United States from Great Britain—the Monarchy to hold a friendly conference with the Great Republic, to the end that war between those two foremost nations of the world, of one flesh and blood, may, in future, never be tolerated, but that any differences that may arise may be settled in a friendly and neighborly way. To the philanthropist this is one of the auspicious events of the century.

So long as war, the sanguinary method of deciding political questions, remains to deface nature and abase man, how can we expect national or international morality to prevail? And how can the generous instincts of individual humanity thrive so long as armies of men continue to slaughter each other for little reason or none at all? If it is right to kill a fellow-man on the battlefield for slight cause, or no cause at all, how can it be wrong to kill a fellow-citizen against whom he may have a real or fancied grievance?

Most of the old systems of Ethics as well as Religion—supernatural and arbitrary—must go; and the new must be placed upon a sure and firm natural base before there can be any genuine and lasting elevation of Mankind. But how is morality to be placed upon a natural base, and a religion of humanity evolved from man's own higher nature? *Hic labor, hoc opus est.* How are the ethics and religion of science to take the place of existing systems, the inadequacy of which to meet the moral and social requirements of man is becoming more and more apparent.

The first practical step, then, in the new and better road—assuming that science is faithfully doing her work in the premises in discovering and establishing basic principles—is for man to put his foot firmly down upon this accursed war and crush the monster out of existence. And I venture to affirm that the first and most important practical step towards the doing away with war (and this brings us face to face with the gist of the subject) is to remove the commercial barriers which now, unfortunately, separate and estrange most of the nations of the earth. These removed, many of the direct and indirect causes of national disputes must go with them.

Although the moral and material advantages which would flow from unrestricted international trade, are apparently recognized to some extent by a few leaders in the world of thought and progress, the mass of legislators and those in authority are practically, if not theoretically, hostile to such a desirable consummation. However, the reaction or retrograde movement against the liberal commercial policy which manifested itself throughout Europe and America for a period of about thirty years, commencing with the repeal of the "Corn Laws" by Great Britain in 1846, is now happily showing signs of breaking up.

Not long ago it was announced that several of the European States, including Germany, Austria and Italy, being tired of the excessive restrictions on their international trade, and smarting under the injurious effects, had opened negotiations towards a more liberal commercial policy. Prof. Kaufmann, of the University of Tübingen, proposed a Zollverein of Central Europe, by means of which their markets may be expanded through treaties, "so that (as the *Kölnische Zeitung* says) the surpluses at any one

place within their dominions may serve to make up for the deficiencies in another." This principle is well expressed by Cowper in the following lines, the economics of which are in no wise behind the poetry.

"Each climate needs what other climes produce
And offers something to the general use."

The report of the British Commission (1886) "On the Depression of Trade and Industry" affords further evidence of the liberal trend of the commercial economy of the day.

On this continent the auspicious workings of the same wholesome leaven may be observed. The Butterworth and other Bills in the last two American Congresses proposing not only unrestricted trade between the United States and the Dominion of Canada, but a commercial Zollverein of the whole Continent; President Cleveland's messages to Congress nearly a year ago; the deliverances of the New England merchants a few months ago, in session in Boston; the resolutions of the National Board of Trade at Washington; the attitude of the City Boards of Trade and the more influential of the independent press throughout the country; an economic and industrial analysis of the vote at the recent presidential election: all point unmistakably to a broader economic policy and more extended and intimate international trade relations.

IN REPLY TO CRITICISMS OF "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS."

I.

AGNOSTICISM AND MONISM.

In a review of "Fundamental Problems," published in *Watt's Literary Guide*, Miss Mirabeau Brown, while upon the most important points in general agreement with the author, takes issue in favor of agnosticism. She says:

"The situation we think may be summed up thus: While some minds, after contemplating the Universe, will satisfy themselves with the thought that all things *are one* (Monism), there are other minds which prefer to believe that all things *are from one source*, that source being unknowable (Agnosticism)."

Miss Brown in this passage furnishes a most concise statement as to the nature of and main difference between Agnosticism and Monism. Monism says: "All things are one." Agnosticism says: "All are from one source."

Some agnostics deny that Agnosticism is dualism, metaphysicism, or mysticism. Whoever accepts Miss Brown's definition must agree to its being:

1. *Dualistic*—the knowable world being the one form of existence, and its unknowable source the other;

2. *Metaphysical*—the world consisting of the phenomenal world which is nature in all its cognizable realities, and of a metaphysical entity behind nature;

3. *Mystical*—the transcendent source of nature being unknowable. Things cognizable and the source of things are supposed to be so heterogeneous, so radically different, that between them there is a great gulf fixed, so that they who would pass from hence to the unknowable source of things cannot. Neither can the source of things pass to us if it would come from thence in any shape of a revelation. Thus the source of all things necessarily transcends all comprehension.

In like manner an esteemed contributor expresses himself in a private letter, from which I quote:

"The words; 'All cosmic being always working behind two "'veils that none may draw—the veil that shadows all beginning "'and the veil that shadows the secret of the end'—refer to the "emergence of life out of the All and its return, we know not "when—but both mysteries surely."

This is agnosticism no less than that of the unknowable source. Agnosticism says: "All things come out of the All and will return to the All." Monism says: "All things in their totality are the All."

Suppose the agnostic view were correct? Would we not be obliged to accept the idea of a creation? This world of things must have once, in the beginning of time, emanated from the source of all things; and most likely will return to it. However, this conception stands in contradiction to the law of the conservation of energy and matter. According to this law, matter and energy are eternal. Neither matter nor energy can be either created or destroyed—although their forms may change.

So long as the law of the conservation of energy and matter remains unrefuted, the monistic conception of the world will stand unshaken. The indestructibility of energy and matter, and their eternity are irreconcilable with the idea of a source from which they are supposed to come.

It may be conceded by some agnostics that "the source" lies within, not without; but being within, behind a veil, as it were, it is unknowable; matter and energy, they say, are the source from which, as their manifestations, natural phenomena emanate; while the manifestations are knowable, the source (matter and energy) is unknowable.

This cuts nature in twain. But, in fact, there is no line of division between the two halves: Natural phenomena are forms of real matter and of actual energy, they are no mere appearances, no mere emanations from energy and matter! Things (ourselves not excluded) *are* certain forms of matter and energy. The source of these things are other things; which means that the present forms have evolved from other forms by a transformation of their shape, according to certain laws. But reality itself, the world, the All, the totality of matter and energy, has no source. It is eternal.

The idea of an extramundane source would imply an extranatural origin of nature—and this view, after all, is not greatly different from supernaturalism. It is the essence of dualism extracted from a volatilized supernaturalism, which by and by must give way to a positive conception of nature.

Necessarily any act of creation must remain a mystery. Like can come from like only. It is not understandable how the phenomenal can emanate from the noumenal, the physical from the metaphysical, or the natural from the supernatural. And yet the orthodox explanation, that the world came into existence through a divine *fiat*, is, in spite of its *naiveté*, simple and intelligible in comparison with the agnostic idea of an "unknowable source." To me it seems preferable to Agnosticism. And according to the principle of Agnosticism, the old view is after all quite possible.

By the bye, the Mosaic account in Genesis does not speak of a creation out of nothing, as do our orthodox theologians nowadays. The Hebrew word *barah* signifies "to make, to shape, to form." Moses says: "In the beginning God shaped the heavens and the earth." There is not a word about matter or energy having emanated from him as their source. There are Rabbis who look upon God as the principle of order that shapes all the world. And there are also Christian theologians who discard the idea of a creation out of nothing and look upon God as the Eternal power in which we live and move and have our being. Similarly Monism considers God as the All in All. We call the All God in so far as the omnipotent power of All-existence is a well-arranged Cosmos, the laws of which are immutable, and of which the more we know the more wonderful they appear in their beauty and harmony. We do not call the All God in order to bow down into the dust and to adore it. We regard adoration as a pagan custom which, it is a pity, survived in Christianity. The idea of God always had, and still retains, a moral significance. Therefore it is right to name the All in its cosmic order "God," in so far as we find in it the basis of the moral order of society. It is the grand authority upon which the ethical law rests, the authority which enforces it, for it is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto

the third and unto the fourth generation and showing mercy upon thousands of them that keep the commandments.

As a rule, we can, in this physical world of ours, know the source by the water that it pours forth. Why can not the Agnostic know what the source is like, from which all things are? Should they not rather, from their own standpoint, say, that things are a revelation of that source? Suppose we knew all things in their totality, should we not know all about their source? So the old religions teach that we know God (the source) by his works, and I see no flaw in this logic. (Only let the believers in the old religions beware that they do not take the formulas of their sectarian creeds, or writings in which they are embodied, as the word of God.) We certainly should know all about the Universe, the All, the Cosmos, if we knew all the so-called manifestations of nature—all natural phenomena in their totality, as well as in their minutest details!

Such an exhaustive knowledge being practically impossible, we can know nature only in parts. Even though we may know much, the region of the unknown remains immeasurably large; and as nature is constantly changing, evolving, and re-evolving, not even a God could exhaust the wealth of her rich possibilities. Therefore it is true, as the Apostle says, that now we "know in part." And further, since relativity is the character of knowledge, even an exhaustive knowledge depends upon the cognizing subject. Therefore it is true, also, "when that which is perfect is come," as Paul continues, "we shall know even as also we are known." If agnosticism means that the range of enquiry will always remain unlimited, and that all knowledge is relative, I also am an agnostic; but so long as it limits enquiry by the unknowable, I can not accept it.

'The All is eternal,' means it exists; uncreated and undestroyable, it has always existed and will always exist. The laws of the All which we have all reason to admire in their grandeur, are ultimately based upon form and the intrinsic regularity of form. The laws of form are no less eternal than are matter and energy and "Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one title shall in no wise pass from the law!"

The laws of form and their origin have been a puzzle to all philosophers. "Ay, there's the rub!" The difficulties of Hume's problem of causation, of Kant's *apriori*, of Plato's ideas, of Mill's method of deduction, etc., etc., all arise from a one-sided view of form and the laws of form and formal thought. The author of "Fundamental Problems" has tried, and hopes to have succeeded in formulating the problem in its simplest way. Let us recapitulate the solution thus:

If it can be proved that twice two could not always so regularly be four, unless some extramundane mathematician had imposed this as a law upon things, let us then accept theological supernaturalism. Let us then believe in a demiurge and accept the anthropomorphic conceptions of God.

If it can be proved that twice two need not always be four, but only happens to be four in those comparatively few cases we know of here on this little planet, let us accept the materialistic view that the world is a chaotic jungle without rhyme or reason, and that its order is at best a chance effect, a chimera of our prejudiced brain.

If it can be proved that every single case in which twice two is four must remain an unsolvable mystery and that it is beyond our ken to know why it is so, let us accept agnosticism.

The solution proposed in "Fundamental Problems" recognizes the intrinsic necessity of this as well as of all purely formal propositions. Necessity means that it is so and that we know it will be so in all other cases. Twice two will always be four, whether I try it with apples, or planets, with suns, or atoms.

The intrinsic necessity of formal laws excludes on the one hand the supposition that they have been decreed and shaped by a law-giver with intentional foresight or purpose, who might have, if it had pleased him, arranged matters differently than they are. The intrinsic necessity of formal laws excludes on the other hand that they can in any wise be considered fortuitous.

Furthermore, since cognition is only an act of systematizing and of unifying facts, with the help of the formal laws of thought, the intrinsic necessity of formal laws, implying their universality, makes all facts systematizable, *i. e.* knowable. Indeed cognition means nothing more or less than a tracing of the red thread of necessity which winds through all the changeable forms in this world of facts. Thus the intrinsic necessity of formal laws, when recognized, makes agnosticism impossible.

In this actual world of reality there is no room for any thing so chimerical as is the unknowable. Reality is identical with knowability. The German word *Wirklichkeit*, derived from *wirken*, to take effect, is an excellent and most expressive term. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, forever hidden from our eyes, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. A thing that has no effect at all,—that does not *work** somehow,—does not exist. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but its work, so to say,—the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

Schiller makes Wallenstein say:

> "*Wenn ich nicht wirke mehr, bin ich vernichtet.*"
> [If I'm no longer active—I'm undone;

or literally translated:

> "If I no longer work, I am annihilated."]

This is literally true, if *working* means all the effects of a man's activity, the work done by every cell of his body. The work of a man is not only the effect of his life. His work *is* his life.

A transcendent existence that exists by itself without exhibiting any effects, is impossible. As soon as it exhibits an effect the effect can be perceived, can be classified with other effects, and is thus knowable. Existence exists in so far only as it has effects, (as it works) and existence without effects is a mere phrase without meaning, not realizable in thought.

The effectiveness of things, their work, their interaction being positively knowable, the idea of something absolutely Unknowable is untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested, *i. e.* existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility. P. C.

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In spite of the first sentence above quoted much of the land of the world, which is put to the greatest productive use, is not owned by the users. In all civilized lands there may be found both city and farming land whose "capacity of production" is as fully used by renters as is that of any other similar land by its owners. London has been built largely by tenants, the buildings becoming the property of the land-owners at the expiration of the leases. The same thing occurs in the cities of this country. It is a fact, which cannot be gainsaid, that more land is used—and more put to better use—by those who pay others for the privilege of using it (either in rent or as interest) than by those who do not. In other words, owners do not use, and use well, as much land as those who do not own land.

* *To work* and German *wirken*, are derived from the same root.

The reason is plain. Ownership produces nothing. The profits of land-ownership come from land-values. The profits of land-using come from use. The land-owners who use well all their land pay more indirect taxes than the value of their land amounts to. And so long as taxes are placed upon production land-using is discouraged. It may be true that no man with a title below the rank of ownership *can*—under our present system—"cultivate his land *to the best advantage*," no matter what he can "afford." But that is because his landlord has the "advantage" of him.

If, by "the strength of his title," his approach to ownership in fee simple is meant, the statement is refuted by every day facts. The most of the land that is held idle, is so held by "actual owners." That is because simple ownership is so profitable that there is nothing to induce those owners to use it. On the other hand, leased land is put to the best use because the user's profits depend upon efficient use.

"I doubt that Scully's tenants pay two-thirds of their crops as rent; but if they do, they are better off than they would be under the landlord that Mr. George desires to put over them. . . . . The mythical "Scully," even by the exaggerated statement of Mr. Perkins, would only take two-thirds of the products of the land, while the beneficent "single-tax" landlord will take the *whole income* of it, and levy rent amounting to the *full annual value of the land*."—WHEELBARROW.

There are two things he keeps out of sight in the above. One is, that when Scully receives the rent the tenants get nothing in return, except "the right to use" the land—a right which is theirs without Scully's permission—whereas, under the single-tax, the tenants would get the rent back in public improvements and exemption from taxation. The second is, that the tenants not only pay Scully the rent, but they pay all the taxes upon the land, and all the various other taxes that fall upon consumers and producers in Illinois; whereas, under the single-tax, all these taxes—except the one upon land—would be abolished, and the "full annual value of the land" would not *then* be as much as their present land tax, plus their rent to Scully, amounts to.

The single-tax, by making "the holding of land out of use" unprofitable, would increase the available supply of land and thus reduce the actual rental value of land, and completely destroy its speculative value. Therefore it is very probable that those who are now increasing "the balance of trade in our favor," by exporting wealth to Scully, would pay no more "land value" to the government, under the single-tax, than they now pay to Scully.

The single-tax would *not* take the *whole income* of the land, but the whole "*unearned* increment," leaving the balance of the "income" for the user, as wages and interest. "Full annual value," and "whole income," of the land, are not synonymous.

BRISTOL, S. D. W. E. BROCKAW.

BOOK REVIEWS.

L'ACTIVITE MENTALE ET LES ELEMENTS DE L'ESPRIT. By *Fr. Paulhan*. Paris: Félix Alcan. *Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine*. Price, 10 francs.

This latest work of M. Fr. Paulhan, well-known in the philosophical circles of France, and the author of "The Physiology of Mind," and "Emotional Phenomena," published in the same series, constitutes a portly volume of some 585 pages. M. Paulhan begins with a short, clear introduction upon the nature of mental and psychic acts; stating, that mental life, like organic life, is the component result of innumerable elements, subject to general laws, abstract expressions of concrete phenomena. The investigation of these laws, of the action of the underlying elements upon which they are based, and the investigation of the mind as a unified and coördinated whole, form the objects incorporate in his work.

First, we are called upon to study the life of the elements that go to make up mind. The simplicity of elements of mind is relative. A thought, a perception, a disposition, as regards the possibility of further analysis, may be a complex of elements, and yet with regard to a higher synthetized product, constitutes, itself, an elemental unit. Gifted with the power of independent activity, they are dominated primarily by the laws of association and inhibition: they form vast complexes, appear and disappear in the struggle for psychic existence, absorb and are absorbed in accordance with the two laws mentioned, which are the abstract expressions of their conditions of life. The law of *association* is, that every psychic or mental fact tends to associate itself with, and to create, other psychic or mental facts that harmonize with it and aim at the same purpose or harmonious purposes, which, with it, can form a system. The law of *inhibition* is, that every psychical or mental phenomenon tends to prevent the rise, the development, or causes the disappearance, of all mental phenomena that cannot unite with it in agreement with the law of association, to attain a common end. Of the forms of manifestation of the law of association, M. Paulhan considers the "law of association by contrast" the most important—more important than that by "contiguity and resemblance" which, despite Bain, are here regarded as simply secondary forms, only practically available. The law of association by contrast is, that a psychical state tends to be accompanied (simultaneous contrast) or followed (successive contrast) by a state that is opposed to it, or at least, in certain respects, is its contrary. M. Paulhan's exposition of the law of association by contrast, simultaneous and successive, forms one of the most interesting divisions of his work. In the activity of mind, the *raison d'être* of all formation is the fundamental law of systematic association; the law of inhibition is its counter-part; the law of contrast is a combination of both, and the laws of resemblance and contiguity particular forms of association. The mind is thus a sort of living machine, highly complex, unceasingly assimilating new impressions, decomposing them, rejecting the unfit, rebuilding new systems with the results, and unceasingly destroying that which it had just formed, in turn to form others. Everything that happens in society and in nature, affecting it, is taken into and involved in its activity. The ideas that come of the effort of self-preservation, ideas of individual life; the ideas that come of our contact with society, ideas of love, of procreation, of the species as an organic whole; ideas that come of abstraction and generalization, ideas of the good, the beautiful—such are the principal forms of the "systematization" of our mental activity, and to these principal forms, with their numerous subdivisions, M. Paulhan devotes the remainder, the practical part, of his work; discussing with lucidity and accuracy the concrete manifestations of those laws of mind which first he theoretically develops. *μκρκ.*

NOTES.

The Single-Tax Debate, so long continued in THE OPEN COURT, will close with the present number. We believe that the main points in issue have been fully discussed by both sides.

The rejoinder of M. Alfred Binet to Mr. G. J. Romanes, on the question of the psychological faculties of Micro-Organisms, announced to appear in the issue of this week, will be delayed for some time;—a delay unexpectedly incident to the return of the proof-sheets.

Mr. John Ransom Bridge, in the endeavor to demonstrate the doctrine of reincarnation, seems inclined rather to look for germs of truth in religions "outside of Christendom" than in Christianity. Stripping Christianity of the formalism of creed, much is to be found that contains the notion of reincarnation; as, for example, Paul's idea of the first and second Adam, and the resurrection of Christ in us. Is not the notion of future life—spiritualized reincarnation—an advance upon the Buddhistic notion of reincarnation; in that it is more practical, looking to the future, and not to that which is past?

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE RELIGION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

In editing a volume of Washington's private and personal letters for the Long Island Historical Society, I have been much impressed by indications that this great historic personality represented the liberal religious tendency of his time. That tendency was to respect religious organizations as part of the social order, which required some minister to visit the sick, bury the dead, and perform marriages. It was considered in nowise inconsistent with disbelief of the clergyman's doctrines to contribute to his support, or even to be a vestryman in his church. This unbelieving loyalty is a natural development under an established church. It prevailed in Virginia throughout the latter half of the last century, if not before; it mastered William and Mary College, where Edmund Randolph says he was taught deism by two clergymen; and it culminated in the election of a bishop—Madison, the first Bishop—who was well known as a rationalist. In the early part of this century Bishop Meade encountered Parson Weens, Washington's friend and first biographer, on a court day selling, along with his "Washington," Paine's "Age of Reason." The Bishop asked if it were possible he would sell such a book. Weens took out the Bishop of Llandaff's answer to Paine and said, "The bane and antidote are both before you." Bishop Meade adds: "In my own pulpit, in my absence, he extolled Tom Paine and one or more noted infidels in America, and said if their ghosts could return to the earth they would be shocked to hear the falsehoods which were told of them." But Washington had in his library the writings of Paine, Priestley, Voltaire, Frederick the Great, and other heretical works. He was indeed a vestryman; he attended church, pretty regularly; and he paid his subscriptions, though without forming any intimacies with clergymen. With one, indeed, he seems to have had a friendship in early life—the Rev. Charles Green, who had been an intimate friend of his father. This clergyman was a physician, and helped young Col. Washington when he was dangerously ill. But to subsequent pastors in his neighborhood he preserved a notable reserve. In his many letters to his adopted nephews, and other young relatives, he admonishes them about their manners and morals, but in no case have I been able to discover any suggestion that they should read the Bible, keep the Sabbath, go to church, or any warning against infidelity. In no instance have I been able to find any allusion to Christian doctrines, and not a single mention of Jesus Christ. That this reserve on religious dogmas was keenly felt by Washington's orthodox contemporaries is certain. In a letter of Jan. 11, 1800, Major Tallmadge writes to Rev. Manasseh Cutter, concerning Washington: "Altho' from a long and tolerably intimate acquaintance with him, I have been abundantly convinced of his attachment to the *Christian System*; yet had he been explicit in his profession of *faith in* and *dependence on* the finished *Atonement* of our glorious Redeemer for acceptance and pardon, what a conspicuous trait would it have formed in his illustrious character." Jefferson declares that efforts were made by addresses of religious bodies to get some confession of faith from Washington. I have before me a letter (16 Nov., 1782,) in reply to a congratulation from the Reformed Church at Kingston, N. Y., on the close of the war:

"Gentlemen: I am happy in receiving this public mark of the esteem of the Ministers, Elders, and Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church in Kingston.

"Convinced that our religious liberties were as essential as our civil, my endeavors have never been wanting to encourage and promote the one while I have been contending for the other—and I am highly flattered by finding that my efforts have met the approbation of so respectable a body.

"In return for your kind concern for my temporal and eternal happiness, permit me to assure you that my wishes are reciprocal; and that you may be enabled to hand down your Religion pure and undefiled to a posterity worthy of their ancestors, is the prayer of

Gent'n,

Yr most obed servt,

Go. Washington."

This is a type of Washington's answers to all addresses of the kind. Many clergymen visited him, but they were never invited to hold family prayers, and no grace was ever said at table, and something in Washington forbade introduction of the subject.

Jefferson says Washington was a deist. In our own days there has been developed a distinction—

somewhat arbitrary perhaps—between deism and theism. English deism was the belief that the deity had created the universe and set it in motion to work out its necessary results; but in America there was developed a sort of unitarian theism which believed in the immanent, though not supernatural, providence of the deity over human affairs. Thomas Paine was a fair type of the English deist, but Jefferson was more of the theistic type which I have indicated. I lately found, in a lady's album, a few sentences written by Jefferson, which, better than any published passage, states as I think his creed and the creed of his particular friends:

"Th. Jefferson to Th. Jefferson Crotjan:—

"Your affectionate mother requests that I would address to you, as a namesake, something which might have a favorable influence on the course of life you have to run, few words are necessary, with good disposition on your part. Adore God; reverence and cherish your parents; love your neighbor as yourself; and your country more than life; be just, be true; murmur not at the ways of Providence, and the life into which you have entered will be a passage to one of eternal and ineffable bliss, and if to the dead it is permitted to care for the things of this world, every action of your life will be under my regard, farewell.

"Monticello, Jan. 10, '24."

I have no doubt that this remarkable manuscript would express the faith of Washington also. His God is a ruler of nations; especially, a President of Presidents. I suppose there never was written a more solemn appeal than that which Washington wrote to Gen. Gage, whom he was besieging in Boston.

Gen. Gage, (13 Aug., 1775,) wrote: "Should those under whose usurped authority you act control such a disposition, and dare to call severity retaliation, to God, who knows all hearts, be the appeal for the dreadful consequences." Washington in his answer, (20 Aug.,) says: "May that God, to whom you then appealed, judge between America and you. Under his providence those who influence the councils of America, and all the other inhabitants of the United Colonies, at the hazard of their lives, are determined to hand down to posterity those just and invaluable privileges which they received from their ancestors."

The British Ministry, by the way, never ventured to publish Washington's answer. The English heart might have been too much moved by its solemnity.

Here is the fragment of a letter, written at Morristown, 19 May, 1780,—to whom does not appear—and owned by a friend of mine, residing there: "[Prov]-idence—to whom we are infinitely more indebted than we are to our wisdom—or our own exertions,—has always displayed its power and goodness when clouds and thick darkness seemed ready to overwhelm us. The hour is now come when we stand much in need of another manifestation of its bounty, however little we deserve it."

I have unpublished notes of Washington indicating belief in immortality. To a friend who had named a child after him he expresses the hope that "he will live long to enjoy it, long after I have taken my departure for the world of Spirits." To the same friend, on his child's death, he writes: "He that gave, you know, has a right to take away. His ways are wise—they are indisputable—and irrestible." I have found only one instance in which Washington expressed his approval of any doctrine preached by any minister. This is in a letter written in the first year of his presidency acknowledging a printed discourse on the death of Sir William Pepperell, of Maine, in which he expresses his "approbation of the doctrine therein inculcated." This note (MS.) appeared to me so unusual that I hunted up the sermon, which was preached by Benjamin Stevens, A. M., Pastor of the First Church in Kittery, and printed in 1759. The text selected for the only native American baronet was from Ps. 82. "But ye shall die like men." Referring to the previous part of the verse (7) "I have said ye are Gods," the preachers said that magistrates were representatives of God, and carrying out the plans of the supreme moral governor. The doctrine was an affirmation of the divine duty of rulers, and this, as the American modification of their "divine right," was what Washington approved. But it is remarkable that in all this funeral discourse, so approved, there is no allusion to any distinctive Christian dogma, nor to the office of Christ. It is a sermon that Theodore Parker might have preached so far as any religious orthodoxy is concerned.

A note now in possession of George Washington Ball of Alexandria (author of a valuable monograph on the maternal ancestry of Washington), is very impressive in this connection. It was written less than three months before his death, on hearing of the death of his brother Charles. "I was the first," he says, "and am now the last of my father's children by the second marriage, who remain. When I shall be *called upon to follow them*, is known only to the Giver of Life. When the summons comes I shall endeavor to obey it with a good grace." The italics here are Washington's. With what grace he obeyed the summons is known to the world. When the end was near, Washington said to a physician present—an ancestor of the writer of these notes—"I am not afraid to go." With his right fingers on his left wrist he counted his own pulses, which beat his funeral march to the grave. "He bore his distress," so next day wrote one present, "with astonishing fortitude, and conscious, as he declared, several hours before his death, of his ap-

proaching dissolution, he resigned his breath with the greatest composure, having the full possession of his reason to the last moment." "Mrs. Washington," says the same letter, "bore the afflicting stroke with a pious resignation and fortitude, which show that her hopes were placed beyond this life." She knelt beside his bed, but no word passed on religious matters. With the sublime taciturnity which had marked his life he passed out of existence, leaving no act or word which can be turned to the service of superstition, cant, or bigotry.

To this statement, in the interest of historic truth, of what I find to be Washington's religion, let me add that, so far from being biased, I feel a certain sadness in the record. It does not impress me as a true or happy or beautiful faith, but as a phase of revolution. I feel about Washington somewhat as I recently wrote concerning Carlyle, in THE OPEN COURT, that his character might have been more sympathetic and his life happier, had he felt some of the enthusiasm of humanity now represented by Jesus in the Broad Church. But this was not in the air which Washington breathed. The human Jesus was unknown, and Washington could have no love for High Priests, whether in heaven or earth. This old Theocracy of our colonial or revolutionary fathers was unlovely and hard. It had to include faith in the providential agency of all evil. Beside human grief it could only say, with Washington: "His ways are wise—they are inscrutable—and irresistible." It appears to me that to this hard and mechanical Theism orthodox Theology is now steadily tending, and that it is likely to reach it just as Liberalism will be leaving it for a more human and humane religion. The King of Kings became a Governor after the Revolution, and has become a Father in our own time, but he must come yet closer before the human heart can say once more, "We love him because he first loved us."

BEETHOVENIANA.*

BY PHILIPP SPITTA.

II.

MOZART has said, in a letter, the original text of which we do not possess, but of whose genuineness there can be no doubt, that when he had mentally composed a piece, he did not hear it in his imagination part for part, in the proper order of sequence, but simultaneously and as a whole; and that to him this was the most beautiful.

In that remark the true kernel of artistic creative thought is faithfully characterized. That sense of unity that even in the conception of remotest details is constantly preserved, from which all emanates, to which all returns, and in which, as in a focus, all is gathered! Only thus can a true work of art come into being.

Certainly, Beethoven must have possessed this sense of unity, and the fact, that at times he did not give a higher and more perfect form to many of the thoughts that came to him, is quite consistent therewith. This could happen to any composer. It is possible, too, that while occupied with details in the first stages of composition, he easily lost this sense of unity, and was obliged later on to arouse it within him to renewed activity.

The contents of his note-books prove this beyond a doubt. It appears that separate movements of his quartettes were originally sonatas and that, even after they were very far advanced in form, they were employed for another arrangement and in some cases for another combination of instruments. The rondo of the *sonate pathétique*, Op. 13, was at the start a piece for the violin (with piano). The last movement of the great A-minor quartette, Op. 132, originated from rejected schemes intended for the *finale* of the ninth symphony. In this same quartette, according to the original plan, a movement was to have been introduced which ultimately found a place in the great B-major quartette. Such procedure is only possible through a complete alteration of plan, or, what is nearly the same thing, by a disintegration, on the part of the artist, of the whole conception into its component parts.

The indiscriminate treatment of three or four subjects, at the same time, so without method and so strikingly chaotic, is conceivable upon no other hypothesis. And when Beethoven attempts, at four different times and always with the same principal conception, the composition of an overture, (C-major, Op. 115,) we must regard it merely as a recurrence of the same phenomenon.

With such a bent of constitution it required unusual power of will and a deep sense of obligation to art, to attain the end sought. Beethoven possessed both. He never wearied of moulding the most minor part until it harmonized completely with his conception. He never grew disheartened in his ever-recurring struggle with the powers of unrest within. Again and again he scaled to the height of absolute mastery, till his position could at last be maintained.

We know of the sudden revulsions of feeling that visited him during life; how the impressions of his fancy would become clouded and darkened, or would suddenly relapse into their opposites.

A conclusive instance of this is found in the notes to the great E-flat-major quartette, Op. 127. The *adagio* with the succeeding variations is one of the most beautiful of those sacred chants that none other than Beethoven could compose,—when the soul, freed

* Translated from the *Deutsche Rundschau by* μκρκ.

from all earthly sorrow and pain, soars in solemn adoration towards eternity beyond. It seems hardly possible that even the faintest intonation of material existence could penetrate to this realm of purity. And yet what happens? After Beethoven had worked a time at the *adagio*, his demon suddenly came upon him. He changes key and time, and works the theme into a light *allegro* movement, where his humor plays its most sportive pranks. And to judge from its subsequent lengthy elaboration, he must have seriously entertained a notion of introducing it as a separate part into the quartette.

Although this is the only known instance of so violent a revulsion, yet an unceasing vacillation between seriousness and pleasantry ever marks the character of Beethoven's humor—that humor which he was the first to give comprehensive musical expression. To do this, and at the same time preserve the composure that dominates art, demands an unusual store of energy and power of exertion.

All the great masters before Beethoven—Händel and Bach, Haydn and Mozart,—even Beethoven's contemporaries, Spohr, Weber, and Schubert—could compose to a certain extent at their own pleasure. Gœthe's happy saying, *Gebt ihr euch einmal für Poeten, so commandirt die Poesie*, ("Pronounce yourselves forsooth for poets, and poetry wields supreme command,") was true of them in their domain. Were their attempts not successful at first, they nevertheless had accustomed their genius to obedience, and it never completely failed them.

Beethoven did not possess this power of voluntary composition. At every new work he battled with his demon. At times he easily mastered his evil genius, and it may have been after such an experience, that he writes, in 1810: "To accustom oneself to keep in the mind the whole, as it appears, and all the parts." This seems as if he had wished to hazard an attempt to break away from his note-books. If he did, he failed.

In later life, when the power of intuition had perhaps become enfeebled, the struggle with the evil genius within grows more violent. He himself said that he dreaded to undertake any new work of magnitude. He had never been a rapid composer, and yet it had never come to pass that he had to spend so much time on a work as he did upon the ninth symphony. The latter, indeed, took six years, and his great mass, four.

As he advances in years, instances where the resultant form of a composition does not accord with the original conception, grow more and more numerous. His mass assumed such tremendous proportions, as no longer to be available for its purpose. He was long undecided as to the form of the closing movement in the ninth symphony, and when it had been perfected as it now stands, he felt dissatisfied with the result.

In his last quartettes he frequently lost all sight of instrumental combinations. He is said to have once remarked, when Schuppanzig remonstrated with him: "Do you imagine that I think of a miserable fiddle when the Spirit speaks to me and I record his dictations?"

But the fact that this Spirit could so overpower him, was the serious feature. The form of musical thought is in great part conditioned by the instruments through which it is given expression; and in most of Beethoven's earlier instrumental pieces, indeed, nothing is less noticed than disregard of instrumental effect.

It is impossible to deny that even in his earlier periods instances occur, in which—let it be said with all due modesty—the final result does not appear to have been the best conceivable; instances, where Beethoven instituted a great number of attempts, and at last hit upon a choice that to us is incomprehensible. But how infinitesimally small is their number in comparison with the innumerable instances, where with instinctive infallibility his sense of fitness chose the best,—indeed, the only possible! How, step by step, and after untiring application, the dross is separated, and the inner core glows with ever increasing beauty! How it is often but a seemingly trivial touch which, added or taken away, so completely alters the contour of a musical creation! Indeed, in his compositions of the highest order, everything that lends them character and personality is wanting in the original drafts. Point by point, and step by step, were they introduced.

The notes to the Eroica symphony exhibit a wonderful instance of this. They most forcibly confirm the truth of the view suggested above, that the items in Beethoven's note-books had a deeper and more manifold significance for him than for other mortals. It is impossible that the determining characteristics of a work of art should not have been inherent in the original idea, but should have been later on wrought into it from without. They subsisted, therefore, as invisible potentialities in those formal sketches, perceptible only to the eye of the artist.

It is certainly an important acquisition for an insight into the workshop of Beethoven's mind, that we come to understand more clearly what we might term the *Ethos* * of his compositions. Their purifying and ennobling power, that effect which makes us leave with the feeling that we had become better men, all has its origin in the character of the process whereby they were created. Deep within and not upon the surface do they bear witness to the story of their birth.

* For a criticism upon the significance of this word see Editorial in No. 24 of THE OPEN COURT.

Not a sound is intended to reveal it, but we read it in every touch. Only through unceasing, vehement strife, through conquest step by step, was that won which now stands forth, as free from every material impurity as the power of man could make it. This incessant struggle and effort sought no material end; it aimed at the ideal. A Deity impelled the artist to the attainment of this ideal, forced him to summon every effort to accomplish the result.

It has been attempted to derive the *Ethos* of Beethoven's compositions from his personal character. Undoubtedly it is affected by it; but little or nothing is thereby disclosed. Händel, too, possessed grandeur and purity of sentiment in surely no less a degree than Beethoven; yet the effect of his creations is entirely different. This, too, is intelligible from his method of composing. He was a powerful ruler whom all obeyed at will. But Beethoven was a victorious warrior.

It is well known how Beethoven introduced the last movement of the ninth symphony. He was led to this by his intention to prepare the way for the introduction of a vocal part which was to form the crown of this instrumental composition. Short movements by the orchestra alternate with phrases in recitative by the bass-instruments. The first of these movements is but a wild, tempestuous raging: everything is violently dislocated, it seems. In the next, the introductory themes of the first three movements of the symphony follow in their proper order. At this point the *contra-bassos* and violincello, in recitative, break in. Then comes the melody of the ode, "Freude, schöner Götterfunken," ("Joy, O beauteous spark of heaven,") first rendered only by the orchestra. The melody ceases; a renewed tempest by the instruments foreshadows the plan of development, and this in its turn is interrupted by a human voice: "O Freunde, nicht diese Töne! sondern lasst uns angenehmere anstimmen und freudenvollere." ("O Friends, not sounds like these! but sounds more pleasant, joyous, let us strike.") With that, the chasm is bridged and Schiller's hymn begins.

It appears from the note-book that the final form adopted, harmonizes in the main with the plan that Beethoven originally conceived, and yet this latter contains very many ideas that aid us greatly in the interpretation of the creative process. We find phrases which were afterwards never used, but which were originally intended as the text of the bass-recitative, to be used as an introduction to the *finale*. The words are not always legible, but the sense is intelligible.

The following are the most important. First, we read: "Nein, diese [Töne] erinnern an unsre Verzweiflung," [not that, such tones remind us of our despair,"]—evidently in connection with that tempestuous orchestral movement which opens the *finale*. Then again: "Heute ist ein feierlicher Tag, dieser sei gefeiert durch Gesang und Spiel" [to-day is a festal day, to celebrate with song and dance]. (The orchestra plays the beginning of the first movement.) "O nein, dieses nicht, etwas anderes, gefälligeres ist es was ich fordere" [O no, not that, 'tis something else, more pleasing that I want]. (The opening of the *scherzo* is heard.) "Auch dieses nicht, ist nicht besser, sondern nur etwas heiterer" [nor that, 'tis no better, something more gladsome]. (The adagio commences.) "Auch dieses, es ist zu zärtlich, etwas aufgewecktes muss man suchen; ich werde helfen, dass ich selbst euch etwas vorsinge" [this likewise, it is too tender, something enlivened must be found; I shall try, I myself shall sing for you,] (the orchestra plays the beginning of the air: "Freude, schöner Götterfunken,"); "dieses ist es, ha! es ist nun gefunden!" [That it is; ha, now 'tis found!] (The bass-voice itself now commences: "Freude, schöner Götterfunken.")

Observe the plan thus typified in the light of our previous remarks. Note that it was precisely the *finale* of the ninth symphony that gave Beethoven unusual trouble; that originally he had no idea of employing a human voice; that his work upon this symphony was crossed and interrupted by a plan he had in mind for another, in which, it appears, a vocal part was to form the main feature; that furthermore he had now entertained for thirty years the idea of putting Schiller's hymn to music on a grand scale, and that ten years previously he had actually set about it with a will, though without success.

We can well understand that here the idea came upon him of incorporating into the work in hand the course of artistic creation that he had so often passed through and that had ever finally guided him from the darkness of doubt to the light of victorious success,—to incorporate it at this point, where an appropriate method of transition had justly, from an æsthetical point of view, involved him in doubt. True, therewith he had transcended another law—the law demanding that from a work of art all traces of its genesis should be wiped away; a law which, formerly, he himself was wont most strictly to observe. And of this, too, he was fully conscious, and in the ultimate form which the introduction to the *finale* assumed, he sought to cover up the revelation of the process by allowing the instruments, as much as possible, to speak in preference to the human voice.

Beethoven's contemporaries were full of admiration for the irresistible power of his improvisation. The rich variety of ideas at his command, when he gave himself up, at the piano, to the inspiration of the moment, is said to have been inexhaustible, and their character bewitchingly beautiful. This seems in con-

tradiction to the laborious efforts with which it is proved he shaped his thoughts to express his meaning. A painstaking searcher, who cannot find form for his thoughts, and who yet understands to ravish his hearers in brilliant oration! But a quickly passing and never re-appearing effusion of fancy can dispense with the perfection of form that is required of a work of art intended to be permanent. It is not imperative to accept the conclusion, that Beethoven's impromptu fantasies were of the same matured structure as his written compositions, and if the suggestion might possibly prove correct that the familiar Piano-Fantasy, Op. 77, represents his favorite method of improvisation, the proof of the inferior worth of such improvised productions were very evident. Their effect, nevertheless, can well have been what we are told it was. The personality of the composer, the fervent execution, the impression made by grand invention thus directly welling forth—all this must have essentially influenced the effect.

Yet another element must be admitted. There is no doubt that the trial of unbounded technical skill and mastery, awakened a feeling of felicity in the artist, which favorably disposed his imagination for a certain creative display, and that Beethoven, accordingly, by this very means was led, while playing, to a great many thoughts that in silent meditation with difficulty, or not all, appeared. And moreover the very contact with the warm and pulsing body of art—and that the production of tone and sound *is*—arouses in an artist the impulse to creation.

We know that Joseph Haydn, when he wanted to compose, first seated himself at the piano and improvised at random; and that he afterwards noted down and elaborated the best ideas that thus came to him. But that is something quite different from dilettanti impromptu composing at the piano, wherein really all that is ultimately accomplished is what one's fingers want to, and are able to, execute. If Haydn's practice is not sufficient evidence, reference may be made to Sebastian Bach. Bach also was one of the greatest masters of improvisation, but invention with him came slower than with men like Händel and Mozart. When he wished to play off-hand before an audience, it was his custom to warm himself up to his task, by performing old compositions, and—strange to say of a man of his wonderful originality—especially the compositions of other composers. Only after he had come into a state of artistic excitement, did his own fount pour forth its whole wealth.

Since, thus, in musical improvisation many other elements are involved than act in silent, unexpressed creation, it is highly probable that Beethoven's inventive genius expressed itself in a different way from that which is known to us from written notes of his permanent compositions. It is possible that beauties flashed forth in improvisation, the essential condition of whose being was the impossibility to put them in the form of notation.

Of the contents of the note-books which Nottebohm's industry has opened to the world, I have desired to emphasize and to examine but one, particularly important, phenomenon. The information that may further be obtained from this collection regarding the chronology of Beethoven's compositions, the revision of works already completed, his life and personality, is very considerable, and cannot easily be exhausted. We may prophesy that the source here opened, will be the most important for the coming epoch of Beethoven-research.

MEMORY AND ORGANIZED SUBSTANCE.

Through the monistic conception the yawning chasm that seems to separate living nature from dead nature, is bridged over. Dead nature only appears to be dead in comparison with the higher manifestations of organized life. Nevertheless, the latter springs from, and is constantly drawing upon the resources of, the former. It is true, it has not hitherto been possible to create organized substance from non-organized substance. So far as we can judge this cannot be done otherwise than by the natural process, with the help of previously extant organisms. All attempts to the end of making the organic elements (O, C, H, N) organize, have utterly failed. This, however, does not disprove, that under certain definite circumstances (which, perhaps, are no longer realizable on this planet of ours) the organic elements do actually organize with the same necessity as under certain given circumstances electric tensions spontaneously arise, which afterwards discharge in thunder-storms.

The spontaneous rise of organized life from the "all life" of nature cannot be contested, unless indeed we wish to lose ourselves in interminable contradictions or in incomprehensible wonder-theories concerning supernatural powers.

In view of the fact that we must grant even to inorganic nature a certain kind of life, manifested in spontaneous self-motion, the question has been mooted, whether a piece of coal that burns away, and a stone that falls to the earth, are not endowed with a kind of feeling, that is, whether in such substances actually there does not take place something that, on a miniature scale, might correspond to that which in ourselves we perceive as feeling.

The question is perfectly legitimate, and, perhaps, ought to be answered in the affirmative. The non-organized substances must, in fact, possess all the conditions of organized life, and consequently those of feeling also. Still, in admitting this, we ought to

bear in mind that the mere conditions of feeling are not as yet feeling itself, even as mere friction does not as yet constitute electricity.

The processes of inorganic nature, as compared with those of organized life, are isolated and instantaneous proceedings. They are not organically linked to previous processes by a chain of memories. An atom of oxygen goes through a thousand different conditions which leave, so far as we are able to judge, no mark, no impression upon it. With equal indifference it will now sustain life and now cause iron to rust. That it did pass through the former process has no influence upon its action in the latter, and although all processes of nature, even those of inorganic nature, are interconnected, the connection is meaningless in such cases. Every process of inorganic nature is an isolated act, limited to the instant at which it takes place. This is one and perhaps the most important reason why inorganic processes can not exhibit feeling—certainly not that which in the life of animal existences we are wont to designate as feeling.

Coal and stones and atoms of oxygen in the air are not sentient beings in the same sense as animals, and not even in the sense in which mimosas are sentient, simply because they are not organized, and according to all appearances are destitute of memory. Only memory can create feeling—that which we commonly understand by feeling, which is a discriminative faculty. The retentive power of memory preserves former impressions, and thus renders a comparison of the present state of things with past experiences possible.

Professor Hering most ably demonstrates in his famous monograph on Memory, that *memory is a universal property of organized substance.* Memory, indeed, is the result of organization and all the superiority of organized substance over inorganic matter, is first of all due to its memory.

Every organized substance that we know, is but the summation of its history from the beginning. Every impression, and every mode in which the organism ever reacted against impressions, are faithfully preserved, in the most delicate and recondite features of the living substance. By the aid of its memories an organism creates a unity with its own past as well as future, which enables it to turn the fruits of former experiences to advantage for experiences to come, and in this manner renders possible a progression to ever higher stages of development, to more varied forms, and to more powerful and nobler types of being.

The rise of organized substance from non-organized elements constitutes the triumph of nature over the blindness of a purely material reality. The elements previously isolated combine and their very union builds up in their forms a higher kind of life. Substance, in becoming organized, peculiarly connects the existence of materiality from molecule to molecule. It produces above or among the molecules a new kind of existence, manifested in ceaselessly interacting structures which, not unlike living fountains, preserve their forms in the constant flux of matter. Material existence has the advantage of being indestructible and eternal, but the life of forms has the greater advantage of being plastic, and while preserving the treasures of its former days, it can, in every moment of its activity, gain new ones. This higher life of nature, deriving its superiority and grandeur not from its material resources, but from its form, may very well be characterized as spiritual.

It is said that the human body every seven years completely renews all its constitutive elements. But the connection with the work done by the lost and disintegrated parts is therefore not broken, after their having performed their respective functions. We still very well remember what we did and thought seven or fourteen years ago, nay even twenty-one, twenty-eight years, and more. The reason of this wonderful fact is, that the forms of organized substance as created under the influences of events and actions amidst all the elementary changes of growth, still remain faithfully preserved.

The preservation of form in living substance is the principle that explains memory. Indeed, both are equivalent terms. By memory we understand nothing more or less than the psychical aspect of the preservation of form in living substance. The skin of my hand, which once, some twenty years ago, was slightly wounded, has been renovated again and again, through the expulsion of all disintegrated parts, but the form of the wound has nevertheless been preserved in the white line of a scar. The brain similarly preserves certain impressions, the forms of which remain, though the nervous substance may change. And if these forms happen to be stimulated or irritated, we experience the same feelings over again, as when we received the impression—only much weaker in its resuscitation than in the moment when they were first experienced. And yet not a single particle is preserved of the matter that, at the time of the impression, performed the function of feeling.

The higher life of nature begins with memory through the preservation of living forms, and in the course of the ever-ascending higher development of the organizing substances, it will reach the consciousness of animal life and ultimately rise to the stage of human intelligence.

This same higher nature, that created spiritual existence, still continues active, and in the depths of human hearts incessantly creates new ideals, which in organic growth sprout forth from past experiences. The memories of both successes and failures live

in our brain, and shape themselves into new images of better conditions, under which disappointments can be avoided. Thus they lead humanity onward on the highway of an endless and boundless progress.

The spiritual life of higher existence, which to organized substance imparts its superiority and proper character, we commonly call *soul.* Accordingly, we define soul as *the form of an organism.* This definition may seem exceedingly simple, but like all simple truths it possesses a far-reaching significance.

The development of our soul is the highest task of humanity; to attend to this task constitutes our most sacred religious duty. But the indispensable condition for this is self-knowledge.

The pursuit of self-knowledge being the basis of religion, the words *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν,* "know thyself," were inscribed above the portals of the most venerable sanctuary of ancient Greece. Self-knowledge is demanded from those who wish to cross the threshold of the sanctuary of Apollo, of the divinity of light, and spirit.

To investigate the nature of the soul, to study the laws in accordance with which the soul is developed, and preserved in a condition of health, is of greatest importance to every human creature; for even in our own day, to the most advanced and radical adept of free thought, as to all, the grand words of the Gospel apply: "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" (MARK VIII. 36.) P. C.

AUGUSTE COMTE AND PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA.

A LETTER TO A YOUTH PROPOSING TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

MY DEAR FRIEND:—You ask for frank replies to three questions:

1. Is it worth while for any American to go to Germany to study Philosophy?

2. Has the Positive Philosophy and Religion of AUGUSTE COMTE lost value or become obsolete by reason of later speculations?

3. Is the study of Philosophy of any practical value any way, or any where?

Fortunately the answers to your first two questions will dispose of the last, and the answer to the German question has been given by Evolution and America. Our Federal Republic is the flower of all history, all progress, all time.

"Time's noblest offspring is the last."

To crawl back to Europe to study philosophy, which is, if anything, the fundamental thought of your age, is too much like groping about in the Catacombs to find new life. To every one abreast with *Republicanism,* that is to every true American, Europe is outgrown. Its grandeur in thought or action is of the past. Philosophy is the thought of the living world, as Poetry is its emotion, and Politics its action. The American Republic is a new environment which must create its own feelings, thoughts, and activities.

Why then should young America put himself, or be put, into the intellectual armour of the Knights of the Middle Ages? The true answer is given by GOETHE, the European Positive Poet of the Modern Era, in lines never quoted too often, on

"THE UNITED STATES."

Amerika, du hast es besser, Als unser Continent, das alte. Hast keine verfallenen Schlösser Und keine Basalte.	America, thou hast it better Than our Continent, the old! Hast no ruined Castles Nor basalt pillars.
Dich stört nicht im Innern Zu lebendiger Zeit Unnützes Erinnern Und vergeblicher Streit.	Thee troubles not inwardly In the living time, Useless memories And fruitless strifes.
Benutz' die Gegenwart mit Glück! Und wenn nur eure Kinder dichten, Bewahre sie ein gut Geschick Vor Ritter-, Räuber- und Gespenster-Geschichten.	Thy present use with joy! And when your children are to Poetry given, May some good genius preserve them From Knights', and Robbers', and Ghostly tales.

These words of purest wisdom apply to Philosophy and Politics with greater force and meaning even than to Poetry. European Philosophy and Politics are wholly out of place in our "United States." This does not mean, of course, that the past has not an historical value of great moment. Only the uppermost of the strata of geology can be cultivated, but that is understood only by its relation to each of the preceding strata upon which it rests. So each of the preceding stages of philosophic thought have their historic value, since through them the present has evolved and become possible and intelligible. To Europe the student might well go, if he is to be a Professor of Philosophy, for this historical purpose. But this should be only after his character, habits, and practical living have had a solid foundation in the present age and in America. For, if there is any truth in the law of environments, to be put to school in early youth in Europe is at a fearful sacrifice—the loss of our real world. The seed-time of life determines character, and that is formed but once and forever. The life and character of Europe is impractical in America, and always *alien.* As well might the American farmer spend his youth among the flora and fauna of the past ages of Geology. The Modern Era is now coming to its majority, its blossom-time, in America, and those who wish to live it, must learn to think, feel, and act according to its requirements *here.* American parents who send their children to Europe to be educated in Philosophy, or anything else, send them out of the real world into one of ghost-stories and traditions with their useless issues, memories, and strifes. It is time enough to learn of them as parts of the evolution which has raised us to the surface of the present in our new world.

Your next inquiry as to the value of Comte's Positive Philosophy and Religion is prompted, as you say, by the fact that a firm of well know Publishers in New York have thought it worth while to put out a new edition of Harriet Martineau's celebrated condensed translation of his Positive Philosophy—a work so well done that Comte, for general use, recommends it instead of the original.*

Again you may be sure that if there is any truth in the laws of Evolution, this "Positive Philosophy" has not lost and is in no danger of losing its value. It remains the fundamental work of its kind. The later speculations of Herbert Spencer, John Fiske, Lester F. Ward, and indeed the grand progress of science since its appearance, instead of depreciating, have added to its value and necessity. Indeed, these later speculations have themselves no complete or philosophic meaning without that epoch-making work as their foundation. It is the indispensable corner-stone of every *modern* library, and so must remain, for the same reason that the book of Copernicus is the corner-stone of modern Astronomy. This Positive Philosophy was the first work to present a Scientific Philosophy composed of the special sciences in the actual order of the world's evolution—from the star-mists down to the mind of

* "The Positive Philosophy of AUGUSTE COMTE," translated by Harriet Martineau. Vol. I, p. 838. 8vo. Belford, Clarke, & Co., Chicago—New York—San Francisco.

man. All that Spencer and other Philosophers and Scientists have done is to confirm, deepen, and extend this scientific outline-picture and philosophy of the Cosmos. Without it, there is no evolutional or scientific understanding of the new world and new era in which we are living, and which was really introduced by the Copernican Astronomy. To grasp this idea of the new era, not yet 300 years old, ask yourself who are the three fundamental, fruitful representative men of that era, in feeling, thought and action? Are they not GOETHE, the modern Poet, who reconciled the human heart to its new conditions?

COMTE, the modern Philosopher, who made the knowledge of those conditions a positive Scientific Philosophy, and the basis of human activity? And then the American, WASHINGTON, the modern Statesman, who instituted and constituted the Federal Republic as the necessary logical polity of those conditions in America, where alone it was at first possible, and from whence it must in time extend over the civilized world.

After you have had your smile at the juxtaposition of the names of these men, so utterly diverse and incomparable in every respect—think how in the general grand divisions of human feeling, thought, and action, these men founded and lead, and thus cooperate in the modern era, which is represented by America rather than by Europe.

Carlyle used to sneer at "Our George," because he lacked the religion of Oliver, the ambition of Napoleon, and the genius of both; but he had far more than either in the "stupid," honest, evolutional, reliable, fruitful *patriotism* which founded the Federal Republic for mankind as the ultimate polity of the world. As to Gœthe, the estimate of the last Encyclopedia Britannica will stand, —that as Homer represented Greece, Virgil Rome, Dante the Middle Ages, Shakespeare the Renaissance, so Gœthe has felt, lived, and sung the emotions and motives of the new Copernican world, the new era of civilized mankind.

Lastly comes COMTE, the scientific surveyor, and for that purpose properly sprung from the disciplined French or Latin people, to lay out the new world, and to discover its order and the true method of its mental occupation and improvement. Comte had in early life designed to emigrate to America to pursue there his philosophic career. It is greatly to be regretted that he did not make his escape from Europe before it arrested his growth. There was and is no room for him or his Philosophy in Europe, although he thought of America only as "colonial." The Positive Philosophy is that of the new era and has no logical political outcome except a Federal Republic, which was and is impossible in Europe, until its whole religious, social, and political system is modernized. The Papacy, the Empire, and the Monarchy have no place for a common, verifiable Philosophy, which displaces authority not derived from the people. Comte's papal polity was the accident of his Latin origin, and was felt at once to be an inconsistency which set evolution at defiance, and which would have been impossible in America—even as a political hypothesis. His Philosophy and Religion of Humanity were largely approved, but both have been practically frustrated by the reactionary tone and spirit which his Papal Utopia threw over his whole work. He crushed the new and good under the polity and spirit which had grown out of the old theological era, and which belonged to that alone. His philosophy and religion, the children of his head and heart, were indeed of the new era and heirs of the future, but he left them imprisoned under the skeleton ribs of the old. M. Littré, afterwards Senator of France, and many others, sought to effect their liberation in France, while John Stuart Mill, Harriet Martineau, G. H. Lewes, George Eliot, and others sought to do the same in England. But they all achieved only a partial success, because a Federal Republic of Europe was impossible. It is only play-work to think a philosophy; to make it a success, it must also be felt as a religion and a poesy, and be acted out as a polity in political and practical life. So the new philosophy was condemned in Europe to a quiet subterranean growth, and to a retractation by Herbert Spencer in England under the name of The Synthetic Philosophy, by John Fiske in America as the Cosmic Philosophy, by Lester F. Ward under the name of Dynamic Sociology, and by Strauss in Germany under the title of The Old and the New Faith. The name matters not; the object was to express in intellectual form the new general conclusions of science about the world and man as a new philosophy. They have all done well, and have had a great effect upon the world intellectually, and are destined to have more. But Comte led the way for them all. He outlined the first Scientific Philosophy, without which their works are largely unintelligible, but if read as continuations of, and as commentaries upon, his work, they are invaluable. All together they form but one Scientific Philosophy, to which each has contributed a new aspect from a different point of view. But as Copernicus made modern astronomy possible, so Comte discovered and founded irrevocably the base of the new philosophy and the centre of the new religion. The discovery could be made but once, and the fact cannot be denied. There can be but one Columbus in Geography, one Copernicus in Astronomy, and one Comte in Philosophy. All done after them can only confirm their fortunate priority. For example, the base and backbone of the new intellectual world is the line of world-changes, or force-correlations, from the distant stars to the solar system, to the earth, to organic life on its surface, then to social human life or history, then to the individual man and his feelings, thoughts, and actions. Comte made this evolutional order of the world the base of the scientific philosophy by ordering the special sciences in that line, and proving their dependence upon each other, from the more distant and general down to the more near, complex, and special. Thus he drew the base line of the intellectual cosmos from the star-mists down to the sun system, thence to the earth and its life and man, and so to the mind that in wonder gazed upon them—through Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Siciology, Ethics, Psychology. This was the order in which matter and its changes or forces have brought the actual world and earth into their present forms, and made them the home for man. But as this evolutional order of the sciences is the back-bone of modern science, (and it is only necessary to look into the Proceedings of the American Association for the Advance of Science to see how wisely they adopt it, and how useful it is,) equally true is it that the "law of the three states," or of the changes of the human mind in explanation of the world, from Theology to Metaphysics and thence to Science, is the breast-bone of Science. By this law the philosophy of history is created and rests upon an actual and natural order. It rises pyramid-like from the primeval, but still prevalent, savage Fetichism to the Astrolatry or Sabeanism of Egypt and the eastern Hierarchies, then to the Polytheism of Greece and Rome, then to the Monotheism of Roman Catholicism and Islam, then to the Metaphysics of Modern Europe, and finally to the outflowering of the scientific method and its results in a Scientific Philosophy. This process of "deanthropomorphisation," as John Fiske calls it "for short," marks the progress by which man's intellect has taken the place of his fear and imagination in explaining the world. Now, just as sure as "there is nothing great in the world but man, and nothing great in man but mind," so sure is the growth and power of science the line and law of human progress and the true "meaning of history" to us.

Then, again, after discovering the foundation of a Philosophy of Science and of History as above stated, he added the solidarity, continuity, and evolution of MAN, or humanity, as the grand social, organizing, moral Being of Earth. The result was, of course, a *Religion of Humanity*, by which the relations and duties of the individual were solved by means of what he does and can know, instead of what he does not. In a word life was

based upon intelligence instead of ignorance, imposition, and superstition.

To Comte belongs the glory of these great philosophic and religious discoveries, and their invaluable applications, objective and subjective. Others scented them and might have made them, but to him they, in fact, belong, as to Columbus and Copernicus belongs the glory of their world-changing work—discovered and made known once and forever!

Now, what is needed is not the importation of more obsolete mystifying theology or metaphysics from Europe, but the placing of this solid, scientific, practical philosophy under our Republic, which is really the only logical and evolutional outcome of its earlier and empirical application. For the spirit of this philosophy is practical orderly and progressive. It is best illustrated in the evolutional, conservative, anti-metaphysical statesmanship of Washington, Webster, Seward, and Lincoln. The extension of this spirit and its philosophy is the one thing needful to banish the shallow frivolity, the material, selfish, hedonic greed, the metaphysical pessimism and indifference, which threaten to dry-rot and destroy the grand political structure we have inherited.

Let that be your work here, instead of going abroad to bury your young life in the fog bank of German metaphysics, the philosophy of the inane.

This brings up and disposes of your last question: Is the study of any philosophy of value? That depends upon the philosophy you choose. Those of the past have always an historical value, as above stated, and which you see illustrated in Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy." But the philosophy of our era must be its own thought, practical, human, positive, and scientific—no others are now of our life; to try to make them so, is to be guilty of an evolutional anachronism.

Are you a metaphysical pessimist to ask: Is any philosophy of any value? If you are, it makes little difference whether you go to Germany or anywhere; but it would be a benefit to your country if you should. "Natural selection" declares against *pessimism*. It ratifies the hope, endeavor, and joy of a wise, devoted, human *meliorism*. If we can find no value in that heroic, altruistic view of life, it were better had we never been born to tax our kind and kin with the expense and trouble of living. Happily, "the struggle for individual existence" in civilized communities can generally be successful only by adding something to the common welfare. Instead of becoming an exile, does not the Republic need you, and many more, with your exceptional talents and leisure, to diffuse the light and life of the new Philosophy of Science at home?

With the hope that you will answer this question as an American should, I remain sincerely your friend.

New York, August 20th, Era of Man 289 (A. D. 1889).

IN REPLY TO CRITICISMS OF "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS."

II.

THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST.

A reviewer of "Fundamental Problems" in the *Christian Standard*, which is an orthodox Baptist paper, quotes the motto from the title page:

"No Agnosicism but Positive Science,
No Mysticism but Clear Thought,
Neither Supernaturalism nor Materialism,
But a Unitary Conception of the World,
No Dogma but Religion,
No Creed but Faith,"

and calls it a "specimen tangle." My reviewer takes special offense at the idea that "God is immanent." He says: "This tangles things, but so learned a man does not mind tangles," and then adds with a good dose of irony: "He has found bottom, too, where others have been adrift."

The Reverend Gentleman, for such I take my critic to be, involuntarily calls to my mind the remembrance of a good and dear old schoolmate of mine, who, regarding mathematics as a *non plus ultra* of human vanity and a useless display of mental summersaults, ever quietly slept during the mathematical recitations of our Professor, who was no less a man than Hermann Grassmann.

Sometimes I tried to stir my friend up, when matters of importance were discussed, and once when I told him that he should pay attention at least for a quarter of an hour, he awoke to life and listened for a while to the recitation. I thought Prof. Grassmann's explanation was wonderfully lucid, but my neighbor quietly said, "What bosh! It's a mere tangle of words," and continued his nap. I tried to convince him that Grassmann was marvelous, and clear as daylight. But in vain, and in a long discussion on the subject he got the best of me, finally convincing me that all mathematics were and would ever remain a tangle to him—a mere tangle of words.

This schoolmate of mine became a clergyman, and I am told he is a good one, whom the members of his parish like to hear preach. In the pulpit he is not at all asleep and makes the sleepers of his congregation wake up.

In later life I called on him, and on Sunday we went to church. He spoke of the Holy Ghost and the sin against the Holy Ghost, which shall not be forgiven either in this world or in the next. He made himself very clear on the subject, so that every one of his hearers felt that he was, or at least might have been, the one who had committed the sin against the Holy Ghost; at least I did. He said, among other most forcible things, we were rational beings endowed with the power of thought and of faith by the Holy Ghost. If the Holy Ghost conducts our thinking, we shall wander in the right path, but woe worth him who trusts in human reason. Reason, he said, is like the mercenary woman of Babylon,—here he quoted a well known passage from Luther—of whom the prophets speak with disgust. The Holy Ghost represents Divine Reason, but human reason is sham wisdom. Like Sheol, it is a flame that burns, but gives no light and leads astray like an *ignus fatuus*. He who follows human reason, and were it ever so neatly expressed in mathematical formulas, is the man that commits the sin against the Holy Ghost and he is on the road to perdition.

After the sermon I tried to persuade my friend that there was but one Reason. There cannot be two different reasons. And this reason is a very simple thing, and if there seem to be two different reasons, there is a very simple method of testing which is the right one. I simply try which is in accord with reality. That which agrees with reality is the only right reason. This one Reason I shall call the Divine Reason, because its laws are really divine; they are imperishable and eternal. They are plain and yet grand, obvious and yet of far-reaching importance; they are clear and demonstrable, and will be applicable to the most desperate cases. Should any one oppose them, he will in the end be the loser, for he would stubbornly knock his head against the iron facts of reality. And be his head ever so hard, facts are harder. If he should persevere in his perversity, he is the man who commits the sin against the Holy Ghost, for it is a sin that none can forgive, because he makes it a principle to oppose the Holy Ghost—the spirit of truth, of charity, and of light.

Human reason is true only in so far as it is, in man's brain, an embodiment of the only one, the only possible Divine reason, that reason which lives as well in the correct formulas of a mathematician, as in good deeds founded upon the logic of faith—of that faith which trusts in an ever-increasing realization of truth and good will here on earth. This is the *logos* of which Philo spoke, and which, as St. John tell us, became flesh upon earth in man.

If there is any human reason in opposition to Divine reason, it is that of the Scribes and Pharisees whom he, who calls himself the son of man, reproached for keeping the key to heaven away from people. It is that sham reason of the orthodox, which pre-

tends to be the light of the world, and yet it denounces all that is truly light, it shuns the plain, the clear, the demonstrable, and retires into the dark, the mysterious, the unintelligible.

If any one thinks that I convinced my friend, he is mistaken. He made a long and clever speech about the arrogance of philosophy, which tried to comprehend things that are in themselves incomprehensible, and was thus led to the assumption of identifying the Divine and the Human. "Every monism is atheism," he said, "and God being the source of all good, atheism necessarily is the root of all evil, and if the simplest formula—for instance, $(a+b)^2$ equals $a^2 + 2ab + b^2$ —were in contradiction to Divine Reason, it must be abandoned, no matter whether it agrees with or dissents from reality. He who would not abandon it, is not worthy the glory of the Holy Ghost, and the superior light of a spiritual life."

When I humbly asked how I could know the difference between the two kinds of reason, he informed me that the revelation of the Divine Reason is to be found in the Bible, but observing that the Devil might quote scripture as well as a Baptist, he added that it is the Bible as interpreted by the Symbolical Books of his church. He had publicly promised on the altar of God to teach these doctrines only, *i. e.*, the doctrines of the Bible as interpreted by the Symbolic Books, and he considered any attempt of doubt in the divinity of the corner-stone of his faith as felony. He looked upon himself as a soldier who had sworn allegiance to the Lord, and it was not his matter to criticize his Liege.

I was silenced, but I could not help thinking that to bind men by such an oath of allegiance to the narrow views of a few men—to the views of the authors of the Symbolical Books—is exactly what Christ means, when he says: "They bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders." To keep men in such fetters, that is the sin against the Holy Ghost, because it extinguishes the divine spark of independent thought in men. It quenches the fire of faith of the living and ever-growing spirit upon the altar of truth, and replaces it by a creed embodied in the letter that killeth.

The lesson I learned from that experience was, that that which is clear to one man can after all be a tangle to another. Yet before any critic has a right to call any essay or explanation a tangle of words, he should prove that it contains self-contradictions. So long as he cannot do so, his assertion must be taken as a personal statement as to the state of his own mind, but not of the book he reviews.

I cannot conclude without thanking my critic that he continued to read the book after he had received the impression of its author, that "much learning hath made him muddled." When he had worked his way through the tangles, he declared that "the author says some capital things in a forcible and original way." He makes a few quotations, that have his full approval, *e. g.*, that Christ was the Copernicus of Ethics, p. 227.

I am sorry that the quotations are spoiled by a misprint—"age" is printed for "ego"—which makes the whole quotation unintelligible. I should not wonder at all, if the readers of the *Christian Standard* think: If this empty verbiage is declared to be good, what incomparable nonsense must be contained in other passages denounced as tangles! P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE CUT-WORM AND THE WEEVIL.

In The Open Court for Oct. 3rd, Mr. W. J. Atkinson asks me a few questions. Quoting my assertion that "without the right or hope of ownership there is no stimulus to production," he enquires, "Ownership in what? *In the instrument of production or in the article produced?*" To that I answer, In both; if possible, in order to make more certain the future enjoyment of the product. If a producer does not own the instrument of production, he must pay rent for the use of it, or he must become the hired man of the owner. As a hired laborer, I discovered long ago that the man who works for wages at any instrument of production, will, as a rule, get less product out of it than he would get if he owned the instrument. The man who pays rent for an instrument of production, will get all he can out of it, but he has no interest in its welfare, nor does he care to preserve or increase its productive power beyond the time for which he has hired it.

This rule attaches more closely to land than to many other things, because land refuses to do business except on long credit. It will not pay its laborers for months, and sometimes it makes them wait long years for their wages. He who breaks the virgin soil must wait until the second year for a crop of wheat; he must wait ten years for a crop of apples. No tenant with a short lease will ever plant an orchard, repair the fences, or manure the land. It may be true that God made the land, but man makes the farm; and the most productive farm is made by the man who owns the land he ploughs. I want the farmer to own this instrument of production, that he may be sure of the "article produced." It is true, as Mr. Atkinson says, that a large part of the production of the country comes from leased lands, but it is also true that a larger product would be had if the tenants who hire those lands, were owners of the soil.

Mr. Atkinson thinks that my maxim in reference to individual exertion and individual reward is broken, when the tax-gatherer calls and says, "Mr. Wheelbarrow, because you have been industrious, and Mr. Bicycle idle, your taxes are heavy and his light." Mr. Atkinson means to show by this that the taxation of labor's product lessens the incentive to exertion, and encourages idleness. The moral of the parable fails, because all taxes must come out of the products of industry. All the product of the nation's idleness will not yield ten dollars' worth of taxes in a year. The whole statesmanship of the question lies in fair and equitable assessment, so that one industry shall not pay taxes and another escape taxation. If idleness could yield revenue, it would be wise to levy all taxation upon idleness, and exempt industry all together; but unfortunately, idleness is not a tax-payer. No matter how we may contrive or disguise taxation, whatever cash revenue is obtained by it, must come out of the "product of industry." We can as easily get revenue out of moonbeams as out of abstract "values," separate from the substance which industry has made.

Continuing the catechism, Mr. Atkinson asks this question, "Would it not be better to say, henceforth, if a man desires to erect a building, we will not fine him for it?" I answer, Yes! I think it would be very foolish and unjust to fine a man for building a house, and I have never yet heard of such a practice in any civilized community. What Mr. Atkinson means is that the taxation of a house is a fine for building it, and he further insinuates that the taxation of personal property is a fine imposed upon "thrift, energy, industry, and enterprise." Mr. Atkinson would not fine a man for being rich; I would not fine a man for being poor. If taxes are fines, they must be paid by one or the other, and I prefer that the rich man pay them. I do not think that money, stocks, bonds, ships, railroads, factories, merchandise, street-cars, jewelry, plate, carriages, and horses, ought to be exempt from taxation, because they happen to be the visible signs of thrift. They should all bear a fair proportion of the public expenses, because without the public protection they could not exist at all.

I offer in evidence here a couple of hard facts in the form of houses. Just round the corner are two lots of the same size, one exactly opposite the other. They are of precisely the same value. The owner of one of them is Mr. North, a bookkeeper, who has managed by thrift and industry to build a frame-house worth twenty-

five hundred dollars, and his furniture is worth about five hundred dollars. The owner of the other lot, Mr. South, has built a house upon it worth forty thousand dollars, and his furniture, stable, horses, and carriages, are worth eight thousand dollars more. Besides all this, he is worth a million dollars in bank-stock, money, and merchandise. Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Henry George require that Mr. North and Mr. South shall be taxed alike, and contribute equal sums to the public treasury. I think such an apportionment would be unjust, and if attempted by the law, intolerable. In order to avoid fining the rich man for being rich, Mr. Atkinson proposes to fine the poor man for being poor. This impossible scheme of injustice he innocently thinks would bring about "the reign of common sense in taxation." He also thinks that the tribute levied on Mr. North would not be a tax on "the product of labor." How is the man to pay it, except by the product of his labor?

Close on the trail of Mr. Atkinson comes Mr. W. E. Brockaw in No. 111 of THE OPEN COURT. He takes for a text this quotation from an article of mine, "Men will not cultivate land without security of tenure, and the best security is ownership. Without the right or hope of ownership, there is no stimulus to production." Then he says:

> "It is strange how men came to erect such fine buildings on the school-lands of Chicago without any 'stimulus.' Without the 'hope of ownership,' and therefore with no 'stimulus to production.' Men pay the City of Chicago hundreds of thousands of dollars ground-rent for the mere privilege of producing."

I answered that argument three months ago, when it was offered in THE OPEN COURT by Mr. Pentecost. I will only repeat this part of what I said then. The owners of those "fine buildings" took very good care to obtain "security of tenure" before they laid a brick. They took a seventy-years' lease of the lots. In other words, they became owners of the lots for a term of seventy years. The long lease was the "stimulus" to build. Last spring a citizen of Chicago contracted to build a magnificent hotel on a lot for which he had a three-years lease. He had hardly begun to lay the foundation, when, as might have been expected, he was taken to the lunatic asylum, and there he is yet. Did Mr. Brockaw ever see a man fit to be at large, erecting "fine buildings" without ample security of tenure?

I congratulate myself that Mr. Brockaw almost recognizes the contrast which I pointed out between the civilizing influence of personal land-ownership, and the Red Indian system of land communism. He now says, "Individual *possession* of land everywhere marks the advance of civilization. Common or communal *possession* of land everywhere marks the savage." This attempt to make a distinction between *possession* and *ownership* scarcely affects the principle for which I contend. When it is conceded that individual title to the *possession* of land is an essential element of civilization, the rest of my claim will soon be conceded also; because in that case the strongest and most durable right of possession must be the best; and that is possession by right of ownership.

The attempt to make the right of possession and the right of ownership antagonistic and hostile principles in a civilization where one of them is absolutely necessary, is an impossible task, because the right of possession is itself a qualified right of ownership. There is no difference between a right of possession and a right of ownership, except in duration and degree. If a man has the exclusive individual right to the use and possession of a farm for ten years, he is the owner against all the world until the expiration of that time. We invert the rules of reason when we say that "although individual possession is necessary to social development, individual ownership of land is wrong in principle."

Mr. Brockaw tells us that Herbert Spencer and others have written "with a force of logic which is overwhelming against the right of individual ownership of the resources of nature," and then in great astonishment he enquires, "Why have their unanswerable arguments had so little effect?" My guess at the conundrum is this, because they were not unanswerable; and for a like reason the overwhelming logic did not overwhelm. Mr. Brockaw answers thus, "Because they saw no way to harmonize the *right* of individual possession with the *wrong* of individual ownership." A very sensible reason, when we consider the opposite qualities of right and wrong, and how hard it is to bring them into harmony. I advise Mr. Brockaw not to try where Herbert Spencer failed; if he did fail, of which I am not sure, because I hardly think that he has ever tried to harmonize the *right* of one thing with the *wrong* of something else. To harmonize the right of possession and the right of ownership is easy enough; and if it is conceded that either is right in principle, the other cannot in principle be wrong. If it is wrong in principle to own land for a hundred years, it is wrong to own it for ten years or for one year.

Mr. Brockaw's premises come to an untimely and inconsequent end in the curious admission that "A nation of *homes*—small independent holdings—is generally believed to be the best." Have I not been contending for *independent* homes? and have I not been criticized and rebuked for doing so by Mr. Brockaw and other defenders of the single-tax philosophy? Is it not the declared purpose of Mr. George and his followers to abolish all "independent holdings" by the scheme of the "single-tax," so that there shall not be any such thing as an independent home in the United States? Mr. Brockaw insists that no man shall have an "independent holding," but that every holder of land shall be a tenant; and he reasons as if rent were a natural incident attaching to land like grass, when in fact it is an unnatural infliction resulting from an artificial social state.

Mr. Brockaw, still believing that rent is "native to the manor born," and racy of the soil, says, "The tenant might as well pay his rent to the government as to an individual." Certainly, but it is better for him to be free from rent entirely; better for him to have a "home," an "independent" holding than a dependent holding, for which he must do homage and pay rent to his neighbor or to the government. If the farmer every year must lose a portion of his crop, it may make no difference to him whether the weevil or the cut-worm gets it, but it is not necessary that either of the pests should have it; and in the matter of rent, so far as the farmer is concerned, the private landlord and the public landlord are to him as the cut-worm and the weevil. WHEELBARROW.

BOOK NOTICES.

Mind, for the present quarter, (October) opens with an article, "Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies," by Prof. H. Sidgwick. Prof. Sidgwick apologizes for the triteness of the topic introduced, and commences by a reaffirmation of the position he had assumed in his "Methods of Ethics" upon Free Will and Determinism, and which he claims has not been confuted—the position namely, which predicates freedom of will in the *moment* of *deliberate* action and admits determinism in the rational forecast of *future* conduct. The discussion of distinctions centering about this point complete the essay. Dr. Edmund Montgomery, in the closely-reasoned contribution following, "makes the attempt to discover "the proximate source of what usually goes by the name of "mental activity"; Dr. Montgomery concludes, "that the term 'mental activity,' if it all retained, has to be construed as signifying, "not anything happening within the conscious content itself, but "the functional play of all that part of our extra-conscious being, "from which such conscious content is the supreme emanation." "The Classification of Pleasure and Pain" is the subject of the third, Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall's, contribution; Mr. Marshall endeavors to render more distinct our psychological conceptions, and more definite our psychological terminology; and the effort, in this instance, is made in the more logical classification of the con-

ceptions of pleasure and pain. The "Discussion"—a section devoted to criticism and and comment—contains: "Relation of Feeling to Pleasure and Pain," by Hiram M. Stanley; "Dr. Maudsley on the Double Brain," by J. M. Baldwin; and "'The Senses' in a Course of Psychology," by G. L. Turner. Of the interesting recensions in "Critical Notices," attention may be called to the exhaustive review by Carveth Read, of John Venn's "Principles of Empirical and Inductive Logic," and to Mr. W. R. Sorley's review of the second volume of Prof. Friedrich Jodl's "*Geschichte der Ethik in der Neueren Philosophie*" (History of Ethics in Modern Philosophy); "every chapter of the book," says Mr. Read of Venn's Logic, "is both entertaining and instructive," while Jodl's work is characterized as a lucid, logical, and masterly production. We shall have occasion, in a later number of THE OPEN COURT, carefully to examine Prof. Jodl's two volumes. (Williams and Norgate, London.)

An attractive number is the October issue of the *Revue philosophique*—descriptive and historical rather than of the usual experimental-investigative character. M. Paul Janet continues his "Introduction a la Science Philosophique"; the present contribution constitutes the fifth in the series, and bears the title "La Geographie de la Philosophie." "Philosophy is controlled," says M. Paul Janet, "by the laws of space as well as those of time; it originates somewhere, passes from country to country and follows certain highways; by 'the geography of philosophy,' accordingly, I comprehend the study of these various places, of these migrations —the study of the philosophical guide-book, as it were." Having *completed* the outlines of his philosophical chart, M. Paul Janet remarks:-"The future has in store for us, perhaps, other centres of "thought—in the great nations that hitherto have only been tributary to the work of civilization, namely, Russia, and the United "States; if in Russia we except Nihilism and in America the name "of Emerson, these two great countries have not contributed a "single important addidition to the philosophy of our century." M. Ch. Henry writes upon "Contrast, Rhythm, and Measure"—"psychological researches." M. Henry writes much upon these subjects; his little volume "Cercle Chromatique" will find future notice in THE OPEN COURT. J. M. Guardia furnishes another article upon Gomez Pereira in the series 'Spanish Philosophers.' Interesting is M. Th. Ribot's review of Mr. Romanes's work, "Mental Evolution in Man," as are also the reviews of MM. Binet and Arréat, the former upon Ottolenghi and Lombroso's new studies in hypnotism, and the latter upon P. Souriau's L'Esthétique du Movement." (Paris, Félix Alcan.)

"Manuals of Faith and Duty" is the title of a series of neatly bound volumes now being issued by the Universalist Publishing House of Boston, which aims to set forth the prominent teachings of the Universalist Church. Number V. of this series is called "Salvation," by the Rev. Orello Cone, President of Buchtel College, Akron, Ohio. *A propos* of the preference given by Mr. Huxley for justification by verification over justification by faith, Mr. Cone says: "The justification by faith, which modern science regards as unreal and sentimental, will be found, when stripped of the magic which has so long disguised it, to proceed quite in the manner of verification, and to be in fact a sort of righteousness according to science. For to live conformably to verified principles, whether in the sphere of the physical life or of the soul, is to live scientifically. Whoever, then, pursues righteousness, trusting in a great moral and spiritual order, which experience has verified as the true order for human beings, and conformity to which has been found for many ages to render the lives of men strong, sweet, and noble, is, though not far from the kingdom of Heaven, still within the realm and method of science."

We have received Volume V, Part I, of the *Proceedings of the Davenport Academy of Natural Sciences*, Davenport, Iowa, containing among various communications the following: "On Certain Recent, Quaternary, and New Fresh-Water Mollusca," by R. Ellsworth Call; "A Defense of our Local Geology," by W. H. Barris; "Volcanoes of the Sandwich Islands," by C. S. Watkins; "A New Genus of Eriogoneæ from Lower California," by C. C. Parry; "An Ancient Mine in Arkansas," by Wm. A. Chapman; "Lastarriæa, Remy—Confirmation of the Genus, with Character Extended," by C. C. Parry; "Contributions to the Mollusca of Florida," by Chas T. Simpson; "A Description of the Rockford Shales of Iowa," by Clement L. Webster; "Preliminary Annotated Catalogue of the Birds of Iowa," by Charles R. Keyes and H. S. Williams. A memorial of Professor David S. Sheldon (with portrait) by Dr. C. C. Parry, concludes the volume.

The Rev. Chas. W. Wendte's "Discourses in Defence of the American Public School System," recently reprinted from the *Oakland Enquirer*, were called forth by the attacks of Roman Catholic Clergymen in California. They constitute a fair summary of the question and an exposition of the principles involved. From Mr. Wendte, who is the pastor of the first Unitarian Church of Oakland, Cal., we have also received in his Sermon Series a pamphlet entitled "A Unitarian Estimate of Robert Ingersoll."

The address of Prof. Samuel G. Williams, of Cornell University, before the National Educational Association at Nashville, July 18th, 1889, has been issued in pamphlet form. The subject is "The History of Education, Its Value to Teachers"; the little pamphlet is a comprehensive, though rapid, sketch of educational history.

Colonel Garrick Mallery's address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, on "Israelite and Indian," will be published in *The Popular Science Monthly* for November. Colonel Mallery draws a conclusion unfavorable to the suggested descent of the Indians from the "lost tribes."

The Humboldt Publishing Co. of 28 Lafayette Place, N. Y., have recently issued an authorized translation, by Baron Nils Possee, of Frederick Björnström's work, "Hypnotism, Its History and Present Development." The book is an exhaustive review of historical hypnotism; an appendix contains a "bibliography" of the subject.

Longmans, Green, & Co. will presently issue an outline history of the development of modern music, showing the growth of opera, oratorio, and symphony. The author is Mr. W. J. Henderson, of the New York *Times*; the title, "The Story of Music."

NOTES.

Dr. Carus will discuss, during the course of the next few months, various psychological problems, among them the questions of hypnotism and double consciousness.

After our announcement of the discontinuation of the Single-Tax-Debate, the privilege of a closing reply was asked by Wheelbarrow; the reply appears in this number.

Under the direction of the Secular Union, the following lectures will be held at the Princess Opera House, 558 W. Madison st., Chicago, Sundays, 8 P. M:—Sunday, Oct. 27th, "The Future of Religion," by L. H. Sawyer; Sunday, Nov. 3rd, "Our Public School System Under the Constitution of Illinois," by R. H. Vickers; Sunday, Nov. 10th, "Orthodoxy," by W. F. Farey; Sunday, Nov. 17th, "The Labor Movement," by Henry D. Loyd. All are invited to attend.

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THE OPEN COURT is not exclusive or sectarian, but liberal. It desires to further the efforts of all scientific and progressive people in the Churches and out of them, towards greater knowledge of the world in which we live, and the moral and practical duties it requires. To this end it asks for circulation in the Churches, and also in all Ethical, Secular, and other Liberal societies. It hopes for a well-wishing co-operation in what all must admit to be true, good, and practical in the conduct of life, individual and collective.

DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

BY JOSEPH JASTROW, PH. D.

INTRODUCTORY.

The study of mental phenomena has been pursued with varying interests and from various points of view throughout almost the entire historical period of the development of man. The various roots from which diverge the departments of learning so sharply specialized and accurately defined with us, are at bottom very closely bound together by a community in the general welfare of knowledge. An early distinction is that between the wise man, the initiated, the adept, and the common every-day man, the one uninitiated into the mysteries of knowing, the arts of doing. It is in this search after the wisdom of experience, this cultivation of the contemplative habit, that mind-lore has its origin. The first branch of the general growth to bear fruit is Philosophy,—not specialized as yet, but combining an appreciation of facts, a sympathy with human trials and successes, with a love of lofty ideals and of the processes by which they are developed and attained. Just as we find Poetry reaching a high development, while Science is still in its infancy, so the side of mind-lore that arises from the experience of thoughts and emotions finds a successful expression long before the apparently simpler results of observation and generalization are obtained. It is only after many systems have been elaborated and the merits of rival theories discussed, that attention is directed to the basal facts upon which systems are built, and to the methods by which reasoning is conducted. These, as almost all the typical stages in the development of thought, are admirably illustrated in the history of Greek philosophy.

Looking through modern spectacles at the checkered career of the philosophical sciences in the past, one would ascribe the first distinct appreciation of the scientific study of mental phenomena to Aristotle, in whom were combined to an extraordinary degree the observing habits of the naturalist with the speculative powers of the thinker. The spirit of his activity can be traced in the writings of later *savants*, but it is in the main overshadowed by a dominant interest in speculation for its own sake, doomed in succeeding centuries to be displaced by a barren mixture of theological disputation, of hair-splitting logomachy, in which the method of authority was exalted and that of tangible proof ignored, and of an unmethodical propagation of narrowing systems. In the general revival of learning following these "dark ages," mind-lore matures into a fruitage replete with careful reasonings, methodical researches, and suggestive, though in great part premature, generalizations. The study of psychology as a distinct department of knowledge is cultivated, though with little uniformity of design or results. Scientific psychology can hardly be said to exist before the psychological importance of the results obtained by the physiologists and cognate scientists, had been recognized. This had been done, though in ways different amongst themselves and decidedly so from our way, by Descartes and Bacon, by Kant and Locke.

Turning more especially to this second, the observational root of mind-lore, we find in scattered observations of physicians and physiologists, from Hippocrates and Galen on, a more or less appreciative insight into that ever mysterious interdependence of body and mind. From the theory of the savage* who explains the phenomena of dreaming as the temporary separation of body and soul,—the latter in its liberated state wandering about and gathering strange experiences which it imparts to the possessor of the body upon reëntering it,—to the attempt of Democritus, to give a closely similar conception a more scientific formulation; from these to the mediæval notion of the ousting of the soul from the body and the invasion of a foreign spirit, thus explaining the varied forms of insanity and heresy, and thence by an apparently short and yet so painfully long advance to the attitude of the modern scientist who unconcernedly dismisses the dream as the natural effect of an overburdened digestion, and, with the all increased care and humanity that the change of conception brings with it, treats the insanity as the evidence of a disordered brain; in all these stages we recognize so many attempts at a working explanation of the bond that keeps soul and body together. Omitting any more detailed reference to that gradual advance and spread of scientific notions, especially in the fields of biology and medicine, that has so profoundly influenced every-

* See Tylor, "Early History of Mankind." p. 7, et sqq.

thing that is modern, I will pass to the more immediate ancestry of Modern Scientific Psychology.

A word often used as synonymous with this,—Physiological Psychology,—indicates one most important groundwork of the science. Amongst the factors contributing to the formative period of modern physiology, the writings and spirit of Johannes Müller are typically important. He drew distinct attention to the fact that a vast portion of the phenomena of sensation and of the higher faculties, in part, forms the common property of Physiology and Psychology; that many of the problems concerning which philosophers had allowed themselves more or less arbitrary opinions could be definitely decided by the crucial test of physiological experiment. With this came the demonstration of the posterior and anterior roots of the spinal cord as the agents of the sensory and motor, the impressible and the expressive, functions; thus furnishing two rubrics fundamental to psychology. Again the establishment of reflex action as the physiological element by the complication of which many higher, more intellectual, forms of action and reaction could be explained; the measuring of the time that a nervous impulse requires for traveling along the nerve; and more recently the association of definite regions of the brain with definite sensory and motor groups of functions, the irritation of which areas excites these functions and the extirpation of which removes them; all these, like the dark lines in the solar spectrum, are but convenient points for marking off the important stages of what is really a slow and continuous development. They have all profoundly influenced, and will for all time be important factors in the dominant conceptions of the nature of the psycho-physic organism. With this doctrine of the constant interdependence of bodily and mental states once fairly under way and its significance constantly accentuated by new discoveries; with, too, the increased solidarity of the entire range of mental phenomena opened up by the conceptions of evolution, the progress was many-sided and rapid. For the most part, however, the contributions were isolated and uncoördinated; the physiologist touched the problems from one special side; the physicist saw that he too must consider certain psychological aspects of his work; the physician appreciated the tie that affiliates the abnormal processes with which he deals to the operations of the normal mind; the philosopher, the educator, and the anthropologist must all in part be psychologists. Meanwhile, too, certain special psychological investigations, revealing essentially new problems and results, were undertaken. The work of Fechner* upon the psycho-physic law, that of Helmholtz † upon the relation of hearing and sight to their physical stimuli, belong to this category. It is not until 1874 that a comprehensive treatise * appeared aiming to present at least the more important aspects and results of the new science that had grown up between the gaps left by the rugged outlines of the other sciences at their points of contact.

I have dwelt thus broadly, and necessarily sketchily, upon the historical antecedents of modern psychology, to show that it is bound to the past by real and intimate ties, and that, however bold and striking is the contrast between the psychology of to-day, and still more so of to-morrow, to that of yesterday, the inherent importance of the historical sense will ever prevent a too radical rupture with the past and should also allay the fears of those who look gloomily upon the materialism of the present. It remains to portray, as best I can, the several fields of study and the various points of view that together form the content and the spirit of the new psychology.

We have then first this great department in which Physiology and Psychology go hand in hand. The general problem is the orderly correlation of the physical analogues of all those functions, small and great, that in one way or another enter into the mental life. The general plans and arrangements of nervous systems; the detailed properties of nerve-fibre, of nerve-cell, and of muscle as the elementary substrata of purposive action; the control and subordination of the various functions in the hierarchy of nervous centres in man, and in the lower animals; the special relation of that highest product of evolution, the cortex of the human brain, to the specially or prominently human functions, as seen in the light of anatomy, of pathology, and of experimentation upon animals; the gradual and orderly growth in size and complexity of the nervous system as paralleled by the increase of psychic faculty;—these are but a few of the many vital problems that have called out the ingenuity and the labor of eminent scientists, but are still far from a complete solution.

A borderland between this field and the science of Psycho Physics proper is formed by the study of Sensation. The constant stream of impressions flowing in upon us from birth till death,—a stream converted into a rushing torrent by the environment of our modern civilization, is primarily conditioned upon the nature and limitations of our sense organs. The senses of sight and hearing, as the more especially intellectual senses, naturally demand the greatest attention. The one is preëminently the organ of space-perception as the other is of time perception; the one gives us the understanding of written, the other of spoken language; the one is keenly sensitive to minute distinctions of form and color, and thus furnishes the basis of the fine

* "Elemente der Psychophysik," 11. Vol., Leipzig, 1860.

† "Physiologische Optik," 1867. "Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen."

* Wundt, "Elemente der Physiologischen Psychologie."

arts, while the other is gifted with a truly mysterious power of analyzing the mathematical relations of tone intervals, thus making possible the music 'that hath charms'; each illustrates how intricately inference is intermingled with crude sensation, and how dominant traits of mind are connected with superiorly sensitive senses. Touch and the motor sensations are hardly less important; the one yielding the most immediate and, perhaps, most primitive sensation-group, while the other introduces the active, the imitating faculty, so fundamental in education.

I can only mention by name the vast sciences of physiological optics and acoustics, that have done more than almost any others to perfect our knowledge of the adaptation of means to end in nature, in order to gain space for a few words regarding Psycho-Physics in its restricted sense. This includes the experimental treatment of the psychological aspects of sensation, chief amongst which is the group of problems centering about the psycho-physic law. This law, concerning which so large a literature has accumulated, emphasizes the fact that we are sensitive to ratios rather than to absolute differences of sensation, that relations and relative distinctions are more important to us than absolute ones. The every-day experiences that the rich man needs a greater increase of wealth to ensure a pleasurable sensation than the poor man, or that the system impregnated with a drug needs larger and larger doses to produce the same effect, find in the sphere of sensation an exact formulation in the law of Weber, that the distinguishability of two stimuli differing slightly in intensity depends simply upon their ratio, (we tell ten ounces from eleven as readily as twenty from twenty-two,) which in turn leads to the formulation of Fechner, that as the sensations increase in an arithmetical series of equally marked sensation-differences, the stimuli increase in a geometric series with a constant ratio. The wide range of facts covered by this law, (influencing, as we can to-day show, the sorting of the stars into magnitudes by the ancient astronomers,) still awaits a clear exposition and an interpretation capable of harmonizing the apparently contradictory results of different observers.

Another equally recent branch of Experimental Psychology deals with the Time-relations of mental phenomena. A vast share of all conduct may be use fully regarded as the more or less complicated elaborations of that very natural and simple performance of the brainless frog which, when a bit of paper soaked in acid is placed upon its thigh, mechanically sets up movements resulting in the removal of the irritant. The diplomat's decision upon learning the complicated situation of political affairs, to pursue a certain line of conduct, like the frog's reflex action, is simply the response to an external stimulus; and we can measure the mental complexity of such responses, or reactions, by the time needed for their performance. When I measure the time required for pressing a key in immediate response to a flash of light, I measure the time for the nervous impulse to proceed from eye to brain and from brain to hand, and other physiological factors; but I am also enabled to measure the time of purely mental phenomena. For if I agree to react only when I see a *red* light, then the additional time measures how long it takes to perceive that an object is red. Furthermore, if I agree to react with my right hand if a red light, but with the left hand if a blue light is shown, the additional time tells me how long I need to perform a simple act of choice, and so on. By much toil and by the aid of ingenious and accurate apparatus the times of all the simpler processes that lie at the basis of mental life,—discrimination, choice, associations of all kinds,—have been measured and an unexpected insight has been gained into the influence of attention, of familiarity, of expectation, of fatigue, and the action of drugs, upon the rate and nature of mental operations. The field is a new one and undoubtedly has a most promising future; we may perhaps even learn how to make our lives longer by learning how to go through mental operations more quickly and with a minimum of friction.

The unfoldment of mental faculty in the human infant has been elevated to the dignity of a special study under the title of Psycho-Genesis, or more simply Infant Psychology. The order of appearance of various powers, both receptive and expressive, can only be ascertained by the exact observation of a large number of normal infants. The earliest reflex actions and the general helplessness of the infant show the poverty of our original endowment compared with that of an animal lower in the scale. The latter, for example a chicken, emerges from the shell ready to enter upon the trials of life, and pecks quite accurately at a grain of corn when first it sees it,—a feat impossible to the human infant for many months. It is just because the child knows so little at the outset that it has the opportunity of knowing so much more at the end; it is less freighted with inborn habits, freer to develop habits of its own; and again it is from the long duration of this developmental period in the human child that the word education derives its supreme importance. For concrete instances of the manifold interests and great value of such observations, I must refer to the studies of Preyer and Kussmaul, of Perez and Taine, of Darwin and Pollock.

What the department of Animal Psychology would include can readily be inferred. Its aim is to show the continuous steps in the evolution of faculty in the animal series, showing where and how certain faculties reach a maximum of development, and wherein

these differ from the peculiarly human faculties. Quite recently Mr. Romanes * has drawn up a table indicating certain general levels of intelligence as tested by the appearance of certain emotions and actions, according to which the performances of different groups of animals may be rated. The widespread sympathy that the evolutionary hypothesis gives to the study of animals is sufficient to ensure for it a rapid growth. The great difficulty is the keeping apart of observation and inference, and the great danger is the interpretation of animal conduct too closely by the feelings and reflections accompanying our own actions.

Anthropological Psychology finds its material in such of the records, past and present, of primitive man as deal with the processes and products of mental action. The notions of the uncivilized regarding nature and the universe; the universal tendency to personification, the projecting into the external world the feelings and reflections of the inner-self; the formation of myths to satisfy that primitive curiosity that is the ancestor of scientific inquiry; the crystallization of thought-habits into curious customs, and the strange survival and perversion of such customs long after their original meaning has been forgotton. In these it is that the psychologist finds interesting and valuable information regarding the earliest stages of that long development that makes for knowledge and civilization.

The last three departments of psychology may be appropriately included under the general name of Comparative Psychology, for in each we are comparing stages of development with one another and with the mature, civilized human intellect; and the interest of all three is much enhanced by the light which each sheds upon the others. The generalization that the individual repeats *in parvo* the history of the race connects the study of the child with that of primitive man, while the equally suggestive analogy between the stages of child-growth and the evolution of mental faculty, especially as strengthened by an extension of the comparison to embryological peculiarities, serves as the bridge between the psychology of the infant and of the lower animals. The methods employed in all three are similar, and they serve to verify one another's results and to supplement one another's facts.

There is finally the very comprehensive department of Morbid Psychology. This includes, primarily, the varied phenomena of diseased mental action, the many forms of emotional disturbance, the curious and fantastic delusions of paranoia, the arrest of mental development in idiocy. Not only do we recognize in disease an experiment prepared by nature and enabling us to detect the functions of delicate and minute parts of the organism, but the study of the abnormal sheds direct light upon the nature of the normal and gives us knowledge not easily obtainable from other sources. Thus the "law of regression" showing the decay of mental faculty to follow an order the reverse of the order of acquisition, analyzes the stages of such acquisition more perfectly than can be done from the rapid and complex growth of faculty; and so reliable is this law that we can predict by it the successive loss of the different parts of speech in the gradual decay of language. Ribot's interesting monographs upon "The Diseases of Memory," "The Diseases of the Will," and "The Diseases of Personality," aptly illustrate the point of view here described. But the department of morbid psychology really includes much more; it covers all those intermediate forms of mental divergence that bridge over the gap between the sane and the insane, "the genius to madness near allied"; it includes the natural history of error, the subtile processes by which sense-deceptions pass into illusions, and illusions give place to hallucinations, as well as an analysis of that powerful mental contagion that reveals itself so terribly in the history of psychic epidemics; it includes, too, those minor forms of defect, blindness and deafness, the study of which admirably illustrates the rôle of sensation in the higher intellectual development. And if we are disinclined to regard that very heterogeneous group of problems now summed up under the term "Psychic Research," as a separate department of psychology, we may treat of it as an appendix to the topic now under consideration. Of paramount importance here is the study of hypnotism, that has received so remarkable an impetus during the last five years. Though the true nature of hypnotism is still a matter of dispute, it has been rescued from the hands of charlatans with whom it dwelt long enough to acquire an unenviable reputation, it has been enriched with an embarrassing number of novel facts and suggestive distinctions, it has been utilized as an unexpectedly fertile mode of analysis of complicated psychological traits, and it has received promising practical application to the treatment of disease. In this study and that of allied fields we are being overwhelmed with facts and theories from every source, good and bad, sound and unsound; difficult as it often is to understand what is reported upon the basis of existing knowledge, and strong as is the temptation to interpret this difficulty as the proof of hitherto undiscovered if not supernatural agencies, we have reason to think that the best results—and surely no one can doubt their supreme importance—will be secured by the use of that caution and firm reserve, that have always characterized the ways of science.

I need hardly add that the divisions of psychology

* "Mental Evolution in Animals," 1884, and "Mental Evolution in Man," 1889.

here suggested are not the sharp boundaries between neighboring territories, but rather conveniently placed centres from which groups of facts radiate, and towards which dominant interests converge. Not only do the divisions shade into one another, but by forming parts of *one* science, they necessarily show evidences of that organic unity which rationalizes our fragments of knowledge and makes "all the world akin."

CELIBACY AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL.

BY MRS. SUSAN CHANNING.

MONCURE D. CONWAY, in his recently published article, entitled "Books That Have Helped Me," wrote: "On the most momentous of all subjects, sex and the moral problem relating thereto, no adequate English work exists; there is no chart of the passionate current of wind and wave sweeping this dangerous sea which every youth must voyage."

As the genius of a whole people is greater than that of any individual, let us see, as Matthew Arnold would say, what humanity has to say on this subject. By humanity we mean the wisest and greatest men and women of antiquity and of our own generation; they only can lead us into wider sight and purer conceptions and enable us, to find a chart for the youthful Ulysses starting on his perilous voyage.

There is no use stuffing his ears with the wax of good advice, and believing it will keep him from hearing the voices of the Sirens as he passes the Scylla and Charybdis of this "passionate current."

The force of this current is too strong; like the flood-tides of the Bay of Fundy, it carries everything before it, since by every test made to estimate the force of a state of feeling, sex-affection in early manhood ranks supreme. To give a man abstract principles as a chart and check will no more keep him from yielding to his sex-impulses than will a bridle check a horse without a rider. At the outset let us state that there is not one instinct, appetite, or passion in man, more essential to his higher life, than the sex-affection.

The saying, "there is a soul of goodness in things evil," is eminently true of sex-affection. Nature has sacrificed everything to the preservation of the species. The two strongest functions in man are the nutritive and sexual; they are the centrifugal and centripetal forces that keep the race in its orbit. Shakespeare says by the mouth of Cressida:

> "But the strong base and budding of my love
> Is as the very centre of the earth,
> Drawing all things to it."

It is the heart that furnishes the centre and fulcrum of life. The instinct of all the higher animals is towards a closer affinity with a single mate, and nature by making the number of males and females nearly equal, indicates it as natural.

Experience and observation have shown that moral and intellectual progress, and the whole social fabric, depend upon the extinction of the impulse in man towards promiscuity. The force of sex-affection in man is far greater than his well-being requires, and its excess has probably contributed more than any other single cause to the misery and degradation of the race. Lecky, in his "European Morals," states that "the victims of seduction are often led aside quite as much by the ardor of their affections and by the vivacity of their intelligence, as by any vicious propensity," and he quotes from "A Woman's Thoughts about Woman," by Miss Mulock, to the effect, that it was the experience of Sunday school-mistresses that, of those of their pupils who had been led astray, an extremely large proportion were of the very best, refined, intelligent, and affectionate. Nothing is more fallacious than the belief that any body is competent to take care of clever boys and girls.

A teacher finds it quite as difficult to induce a youth to whom five talents have been given to bring five others, as to lead him to whom but two have been given to bring other two. The more original a child the less receptive he is; such children prefer to fix of their own accord on certain subjects. So too, the affectionate, high-spirited nature is more difficult to keep in the path of purity than the dull and unimaginative. As Schiller said, "you can make an honest man out of windled straw, but you must have grist to make a villain." Poets and imaginative persons are apt to be erratic and sensuous; the violence of their passions often puts their conduct upon a footing with that of ignorant, low men; desire comes to them suddenly like a wave, drowning reason and resistance; the tempestuous passion of love usually develops their talents. Dante was but eleven when he first saw and loved Beatrice. Gœthe, to his lasting disgrace, was ever in quest of or meeting a new affinity. As Bebel said, "Again and again Gœthe wasted the warmth of his heart and the enthusiasm of his great soul on one woman after another." Byron, Burns, Heine, were all in love at the very dawn of puberty.

And yet, nothing is more blighting to genius than impurity of life or a too early yielding to sex-affection; those who have not studied the problem cannot conceive the intellectual collapse caused by sensuous excesses. The brain is a family of nerve-centres that has gained an ascendency over other nerve-centres and performs executive functions; yet, it is the servant of the ruled, and any injury done to the other nerve-centres tells at once on it. The high water-mark of a man's mind and morals can be estimated by his notions on the sex-relation. If they are carnal there is more hope for a fool than for such as he. The great intellects of the world since the days of Plato have sought

to idealize the sex-relation, and throw the grace of intellectual enjoyment over animal necessity. The lower the mind, the greater its dependence upon objects. The youth that "can be happy with either dear charmer, with the other dear charmer away," is incapable of an exalted attachment. Such a man, in the language of Ruskin, is nothing better than "a little floppy, soppy tadpole, with a stomach and a tail." He who leads an irregular life is incapable of high thinking or action.

Gœthe, notwithstanding his own excesses, recognized this in his "Wilhelm Meister." It was the sight of his son that first aroused in Wilhelm Meister the virtues of a good citizen, and made him exclaim, "Woe to every sort of culture which destroys the most effectual means of all true culture." Much as Wilhelm Meister had already seen, it seemed to him as if the observation of the child offered him his first clear view of human nature. The theatre, the world, had appeared to him before only as a multitude of thrown dice, every one of which upon its upper surface indicated a greater or smaller value, and which when reckoned up together made a sum, but here, in the person of his boy, a single dice was laid before him on the many sides of which the worth and worthliness of man's nature were legibly engraved. Is it not clear, then, that our intellectual as well as our moral nature is enlarged by married life and the relation of parent and child? Celibacy palsies the mind as well as the heart and has a far more depressing effect than toil or suffering.

John Fiske, in his "Cosmic Philosophy," maintains that, had it not been for the long period of infancy, man, in all probability, would have remained an animal; of course a superior animal. This deduction seems justified by the facts. The utter helplessness of the infant made it necessary for the mother to watch it carefully and tend it long, and the presence of the male was necessary, as the child's cries at its birth might attract beasts of prey. These conditions helped to develop those mental qualities essential to man's civilization; and the same humanizing effects are still seen in those who rear families. Only a God or a Devil can live alone, were the words of Montaigne.

This was a mere re-statement of a scriptural truth. "And the Lord God said it is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him an helpmeet for him." (Genesis II. 18.)

The expenditure of nervous force in maintaining tender emotions is small. Bain, in "Emotions and the Will," says, "It may be questioned whether the human constitution can yield the same amount of pleasure at so little cost by any other means." It is this tender emotion which makes children and home a refuge and solace after toil. The physical side of this emotion is in no small degree complicated, but the full and outspoken manifestation of the feeling, the goal to which it always tends, is the loving embrace. Sex-affection is the most altruistic instinct in man, even if we deny, as did Adam Smith, Hume, and Darwin, the natural existence of disinterested affection and explain altruistic feeling as a resultant of self-love.

The study of animal life has revealed the fact that in the love-season the male is the more courageous; after the birth of her offspring the female shows the more courage. This is equally true of human beings. Galton, in his work on Heredity, maintains that the long period of the dark ages was due in very considerable degree to the celibacy enjoined by the religious orders on their votaries. The church having first captured all the gentle spirits, and condemned them to an unmarried existence, then brought to the scaffold all those who were most independent, truth-seeking in their habits of thought and action, and hence the most suitable parents of a high civilization.

Beyond doubt the present inferior position of Spain in the political and literary world is greatly due to the loss annually for more than three centuries, *i. e.*, between 1411 and 1781, of over 1000 of her independent thinkers.

If our gifted men and women do not marry and leave descendants, our intellectual progress as a nation will be retarded. The prudential delay advocated by Malthus, has produced more evil than good, as the delay is only practical by the prudent and self-denying, and disregarded by the impulsive and self-indulgent, and it is the children of the former class that the world especially needs, while it is the offspring of the selfish and sensuous that cumber the earth and crowd its vacant places. The practical application of deferred marriage leads to the most mischevious results, and people who advocate the doctrine will find as a result of its adaption race-deterioration. The gifted of every community should be encouraged to marry; the celibacy of the intellectual *élite* is a public calamity. Galton, in his "English Men of Science," has shown that scientific men at least have always had able mothers. Bacon, Buffon, Condorcet, Cuvier, Forbes, Watt, all had remarkable mothers. The grandmother of Brodie was a woman of ability, and the eminent relatives of Newton were those connected with him by female links.

In the "Descent of Man," Darwin says: "It is fortunate that the law of equal transmission of character prevails with Mammals, otherwise it is probable that man would become as superior in mental endowment to woman as the pea-cock is in plumage to the pea hen." Yet, notwithstanding this law, the tendency to repeat herself in her descendant is more powerful in the female than in the male. In the animal world,

when the male of one species and the female of another are crossed, the type of the female usually predominates. In the case of man, the woman transmits, at least to her sons, her mental qualities and tastes.

There are many notable examples in history of this transmission.

Cæsar had all the characteristics of his worthy mother, Aurelia. Mommsen says, "Cæsar was a man of passion, for without passion there is no genius; but his passion was never stronger than he could control. He had his season of youth and song; love and wine had taken joyous possession of his mind, but did not penetrate to the inmost core of his nature. Literature occupied him long and earnestly, and amused his leisure hours. The dominant qualities of Alexander the Great were those of his mother—hatred of restraint, great personal bravery, and sensuous tastes. To the end of his life Alexander found in wine the destroyer of care."

The Gracchi, were they not worthy descendants of the high-minded, cultivated Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio, the conqueror of Zama? It was from her, and not from their aged father, they inherited their public spirit and hatred of oppression.

Nero was but the male embodiment of the selfish, unscrupulous soul of Agrippina. A painting by Sylvestre gives us a vivid idea of the cruelty of Nero. In the picture we see the Emperor in the subterranean halls of the palace of the Cæsars, seated by the side of the horrible witch Locusta, watching the death struggles of the victim upon whom they are experimenting with the poison intended for Nero's rival, Britannicus. This is the hand of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob. It is Agrippina hastening the death of her consort, Claudius, by tickling his gluttonous throat with a feather dipped in poison, that her son may sooner reach the throne. How that son repaid her for her crimes in his behalf is best told in her own words. When Nero's hired assassins came to dispatch her, her last words, as the sword was about to fall on her, were: "Strike me on the womb; for it bore Nero."

In the equation of life the female is the known and the male the unknown quantity. The female produces herself; if there is a new increment of brain power, it comes from the male. As Mrs. Poyser remarks in Adam Bede: "I allays said, I'd never marry a man as had got no brains; for what's the use of a woman having brains of her own, if she's tackled to a geck as everybody's laughing at; she might as well dress herself fine and sit backwards on a donkey."

It is woman who has always exercised sexual selection. Had it not been for her the race would have degenerated. Her sex-affection is not as quickly nor as directly stirred as that of the male; if it were, she would mate with the first who approached her.

Macaulay, writing to his sister on the subject, said: "I am sure much of the love of woman for man depends upon the eminence of the man."

We have not gathered any well authenticated data on the subject, but, on a superficial survey, it would seem that the women who have attained the highest rank in literature and science have been married. Sappho, after she became a widow, wrote her 'Ode to Venus,' which Longinus pronounced one of the finest emanations of the Grecian Lyric Muse. Mrs. Browing, Madame de Staël, Mrs. Hemans, George Eliot, Mrs. Somerville, George Sands, Mrs. Stowe, Mrs. Mary Putnam Jacobi, and many other distinguished women, found their intellectual strength and brilliancy increased by marriage. It is joy, grief, love, and enthusiasm which inspire, and contain the fruitful seeds of whatever is most perfect in music and poetry; and all these emotions are incident to married life.

When we come to examine the beneficial effects of marriage on man, the evidence in its favor is overwhelming. Whatever may be said as to marriage being a failure, does not militate against the fact that it is thus far the highest conception of the human mind as a means of regulating the sex-relation. There is not a single fact in history or in individual experience to show that where this conception of the fidelity of one man to one woman united for life is faithfully carried out, good and happiness does not result to the individual and nation.

J. S. Mill, Disraeli, Benjamin Franklin, maintained that it was impossible for a man to succeed in a public career without the aid of a woman. Ruskin, in proof of this theory, cites Shakespeare and Scott who, he declares, have no heroes, only heroines, and in his 'Sesames and Lilies,' he gives abundant proofs in support of his claim. He says there is hardly a play of Shakespeare which does not contain a perfect woman, while the men have all flawed strength, and fail at the critical moment; that the catastrophe of every play is always caused by the folly or fault of a man; the redemption, if there be any, is by the wisdom and virtue of a woman, and failing that, there is none.

But we need not rely on fiction and the drama for the evidence that woman is a helpmate to man. Lord Nelson and the whole British navy declared that, had it not been for the skill and strategy of Lady Hamilton at the Court of Naples, they would not have been able to have followed Napoleon up the Nile and defeated him.

Wherever the habits of a people are dissolute, and marriage is held in contempt, the race degenerates.

Mommsen says: "The fashion of Grisettes did more to cause the decline in the population of Rome than all the wars of Hamilcar or Hannibal.

Galton in his work on 'Heredity' writes in a sim-

ilar strain. The decline of that marvelously gifted race, the Greeks, began the moment social morality grew lax and marriage became unfashionable and was avoided. "Only in the family," says Frœbel, "can man attain to his full dignity." Emerson truly said:

> "He that is in love inhales an odorous and celestial air.
> Is not he only unhappy who is not in love?
> His fancied freedom and self-rule, is it not so much death?
> He who is in love is wise, and is becoming wiser."

As Count Tolstoi in his *Anna Karénina* says, "He who knows only his wife, and loves her, understands all women better than if he had known a thousand. And this is my idea—women are the principal stumbling-block in the way of men's activity. It is hard to love a woman and anything else. There is only one way to love with comfort and without hindrance, and that is to marry. And now to explain to you what I mean. Suppose you had to carry a burden, your hands are of no good until you fasten your burden on your back. And so it is with marriage. I found this, when I got married, my hands suddenly became free. But to carry this burden without marriage, your hands will be so full that you cannot do anything."

SOUL-LIFE OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS.

THE soul of man is the result of the total development of organized substance from its first beginning and through all its phases of transformation. Man is the sum of all the memories of his ancestors. In the man of to-day all the memories of the past continue to live, as naturally as the child continues to live in the youth and the youth in the developed man.

Death vanishes, when we thus conceive mankind as one grand totality, as a huge wave sweeping onward across the ocean of life. The wave in its progress incessantly lifts other particles of water and leaves the old ones behind; yet it remains the same, and ever must remain the same in its onward career. The wave is not the water, although it consists of water; it is a special form of motion in water. Humanity is not the matter of which men's bones and muscles consist. Humanity is a certain form of life—a form of motion that sweeps over the ocean of matter. The material particles of which humanity now consists, are left behind, they sink back into the ocean, but humanity continues to progress; it continues to live, and remains the same through all the changes which the material parts of living substance have to undergo. By humanity we do not understand the clay of which man is made, nor even the life which moves the clay, but the form of life in the clay—his soul; and the soul lives even though the body may die.

From this point of view the life of the individual man is enlarged beyond the narrow limits of the ego. He feels himself a part of a great whole, for which, even in the most modest sphere, he can work and exert himself. And in so far as he represents the soul of humanity, he breathes the atmosphere of immortality. The tidal wave of life, that now bears him along, even after his earthly part has returned to the dust whence it originated, will sweep resistlessly onward toward grand and glorious goals, that now in our ideal aspirations we dimly can presage.

Let us throw a glance upon the beginning of organized life where it separates into two distinctively different kingdoms, *viz.*, into plants and animals.

Living substance, animal as well as vegetable, which has not as yet assumed a perceptibly specialized form, is called protoplasm. Minute lumps of animal protoplasm can frequently be found in stagnant water. They are called change-animals, or amœbas. Amœbas do not yet possess a distinct mouth; they take nourishment by absorbing and assimilating all kinds of animal and vegetable particles, which they draw into their interior through any point of their surface. They have no distinct members; they move by sending out protuberances and dragging the rest of their mass behind. They multiply by division. Their constant changes of form gave them their name.



AN AMŒBA.

Amœbas cannot as yet be characterized as organisms. The simplest organism into which living substance develops, is the cell.

Simple as the cell really is in comparison with any higher organism, it still appears extremely complex, when submitted to a careful investigation. Under ordinary conditions it consists:



A CELL.

The granulated appearance, according to Fleming, is caused by coagulation due to chemical reaction. In the living cells which be examined, minute particles of fat vibrated in the interfibral matter.

1. Of a membrane or skin, *a*, formed under the influence of its environment.
2. Of the kernel or nucleus, *c*, and
3. The plasma or cell-substance, *b*.

According to Prof. Walther Flemming,* the cell-substance, as well as the nucleus, is made up of special fibral structures and an interfibral matter, which in living cells, we have good reason to infer, is of the nature of a fluid.

* *Zellsubstanz, Kern, und Zelltheilung.* By Walther Flemming, Professor of Anatomy at Kiel. Leipzig, 1882. F. C. W. Vogel.

The kernel contains a smaller kernel, *d*, called the nucleolus.

In the activity of the cell there subsists a division of labor: the skin acts as the agency of communication with the outside world, the cell-substance assimilates and disassimilates food, the kernel serves for propagation. When the kernel has split, the cell begins to branch off into several filial cells.

The principle of division of labor is carried farther still, when, as in the Hydra or Gastrula, several cells form one greater whole. Each cell retains its individuality, but it is differentiated through its service upon the organism, to which it belongs.



GASTRULA (OLYNTHUS.)



SAGITTA. URASTER. NAUPLIUS. LINNÆUS.

FOUR DIAGRAMS OF DIFFERENT HYDRAS, ACCORDING TO HÆCKEL:

i, Inner skin, or entoderm.
e, Outer (exterior) skin or entoderm.
o, Orifice or mouth.
d, Stomach.
s, Reservoir of assimilated food.

The law of specialization which makes the parts of an organism work with and for each other, is the fundamental condition of all higher evolution of life. Organized life, therefore, with all the varied spiritual treasures that it has created, ultimately depends upon a moral condition; it depends upon the condition that the individual earnestly devotes all its life and efforts to the service of the greater whole to which it belongs. Or shall we not rather state the fact in its inverted and more natural order? Because the devotion of the work of every part to the life of the whole is the condition of all evolution and of all progress, therefore it is ethical. Ethics is no creation of our mind. Being the code of rules for our conduct, it must stand on facts. The facts that have produced man, are the data from which the rules of our conduct must be derived. If ethics were a human invention, it would be a mere fancy of our imagination. It might then be called poetry, or romance, or subjective opinion, but it would never be a science. Ethics, as we conceive it, can be derived from and applied to facts. It is a science and among the sciences it is the science of sciences. It is applied philosophy.

* * *

The Hydra, or fresh water polyp, being the next step in the progressive development, has the shape of a double-skinned bag.



NEURO-MUSCULAR CELLS.

The outer skin, or ectoderm, *e*, performs the functions of sensation and motion; if irritated, its cells contract. The inner skin, or entoderm, *i*, performs the function of food-assimilation. The cells of the ectoderm being connected among themselves by long fibres, are called neuro-muscular cells, because they perform in the simplest manner possible at the same time both the functions of nerves as well as those of the muscles in more highly organized animals.

Man, considered from the standpoint of the theory of evolution, must be regarded as a most highly developed Hydra. In man the inner skin, or entoderm, through constant specialization of work, through the perfectionment and increase of the functions, has been developed into lungs, stomach, intestines, heart, liver, and kidneys. The ectoderm, or outer skin, has been transformed into the epithelium, muscles, nerves, bones, and brain. The activity of the soul proper—*i. e.*, of that part of the soul, or the whole form of the organism, which discharges the most important functions,—has been concentrated in the brain.

Professor Hæckel, in one of his lectures, beautifully explains, how each cell, even the plant-cell, is endowed with a peculiar soul of its own; but in higher animals there are formed through a division of work special soul-cells in the shape of nerve-substance.

The vegetable world could not raise its humble and modest existence to such a height, as to differentiate its soul-life in special soul-cells or nerves. And the reason why plants remain on a much lower level than animals, is mainly due to the fact, that the plant chiefly lives upon inorganic elements, deriving nourishment from its immediate environment, from the earth, the

air, and the water. Under the influence of the sun, the plant decomposes water and carbonic acid, setting free their oxygen. It retains the carbon of the carbonic acid, and the hydrogen of the water. At the same time it absorbs nitrogen compounds from its surroundings. The products of these decompositions are then united into those combinations of carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen, which serve animals as food. The plant, accordingly, (or more correctly expressed, the solar-heat in the plant,) performs the work of decomposing the surrounding elements and building up out of the simple products of decomposition higher combinations that are more complicated and contain potential energy. The functions of the animal body are performed exactly in an inverse order. The plant-cell decomposes in order to build up, the animal-cell builds up in order to decompose.

The higher a combination is, the less stable it is. Like a house of cards, it easily breaks down and sets free the energy stored up in its structure. Animal bodies decompose vegetable combinations in order to transform them into much higher combinations which are extremely unstable, and thus they gather a store of potential energy that, whenever wanted, can be converted into the kinetic energy of living movements.

Animal life is conditioned by plant-life; plant-life must perform the preparatory work; it collects by the aid of sun-beams a treasure of potential energy, whence animal life can derive the strength of its existence.

Since plant-life disengages comparatively little energy and that which it disengages, seems solely devoted to decomposition, plants naturally lack voluntary motion, and therewith all the higher soul-life of the animal world. Exceptions to this rule are mostly illusions. Such motions as those of the sun-flower, turning its head toward the light, and the closing of the morning-glory after sunrise, cannot be considered as voluntary. And such instances as the movements of the Mimosæ and the Venus fly-trap are at best slight indications only of the higher possibilities which are realized in animal life.

Darwin's interesting and well-known researches upon this subject seem to confirm, that the movements which take place in these plants in consequence of an irritation, can partly, at least, be referred to the contraction of certain cells. As soon as the hair-like fibres on the upper edge of the fly-trap are irritated, they transmit the irritation to the cells of the middle-ribs of the side-leaves, whereby such a change is effected in the cells that both halves of the leaf approach each other. The nature of this change in the fly-trap has not as yet been sufficiently established. But, it is highly probable, that the movement in question is caused by some kind of purely mechanical pressure, and not through any disengagement of energy in the plasma of the cell. Yet, even if this were the case, it still differs immensely from the voluntary movement of animal substance, even in so low an organism as is the amœba; and we can look upon the motions of the Venus fly-traps as upon a faint analogy only to the activity of the animal world, and very rare, indeed, are instances of such motions in the world of plants.

The work of the nerves or soul-cells consists in the transmission of an irritation, caused through an outward impression. The irritation provokes a movement which is called the reflex-motion of the irritation. It is considered as a reaction, and physiologists speak of "a change of irritation into reflex-motion."

Nerves, accordingly, perform two functions:

1. An irritation is received at the periphery (the outer skin) of an organism; and

2. A reaction takes place in the interior of the nervous substance. It is conducted on another path back to the periphery, causing the contraction of certain fibres beneath the skin, thus resulting in motion.

In this manner two kinds of nerve-fibers are formed, in-going and out-going lines, centripetal or afferent, and centrifugal or efferent nerves, which meet in a knot, the so-called ganglion. The centripetal nerves are called sensory, the centrifugal motory.



TURBELLARIA, ACCORDING TO HÆCKEL.

a, Ganglion. *o*, Ear.
s, Sensory fibres. *h*, Skin.
m, Motory fibres. *f*, A layer of muscles.
t, Tentacles (feelers). *w*, Cilias covering the skin.
a, Eye.

As an instance of an extremely simple nervous system consisting solely of a ganglion with afferent and efferent nerves, we mention the whirl-worm or *Turbellaria*. The skin of this worm is differentiated in two places on each side, in the one as eye in adaptation to the rays of light, and in the other as ear, under the influence of the waves of sound.

What an enormous distance from a worm like this unto man, who in his complicated nervous system contains hundreds and thousands of such minute gang-

lion-systems, partly coördinated and partly subordinated in a rich and systematic arrangement!



THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF MAN.

a, Brain.
b, Cerebellum.
c, Spinal cord.
d, Facial nerve.
e, Brachial plexus.
f, Internal cutaneous nerve of the arm.
g, Mesial nerve of the arm.
h, Cubital or ulnar nerve.
i, Sciatic plexus, giving rise to the principle nerves of the lower extremities.
j, Intercostal nerves.
k, Femural plexus.
l, Radial nerve of the arm.
m, *o*, External peroneal nerve.
n, Tibial nerve.
o, External sapheneous nerve.

If comparative physiology has not as yet succeeded in discovering all the many millions of links from the amœba up to man, what does it matter? The evolution of man from a lowly origin can no longer be rejected if we consider that continuity is throughout the characteristic feature of life. Man represents life from the very beginning of life and what he is he is through the history of his race.

That man has risen from a low beginning to that height, is not humiliating to him but elevating; it proves that he may continue to develop his soul even to a greater and nobler future. P. C.

IN REPLY TO CRITICISMS OF "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS."

III.

ODD VIEWS OF MONISM.

AMONG the different reviews of "Fundamental Problems," I find two which really deserve no answer, first, because the reviewers have apparently not read the book, and secondly, because there is no way of coming to an understanding with men who, with a contempt for logic, speak infallible oracles from a critic's tripod. There is no court of appeal from their absolute decisions. Nor do I desire any to exist.

One of these gentlemen is an anonymous reviewer in *Science*,—perhaps the same sage who exposed himself previously in a criticism of Max Müller's "Science of Thought," in which was stated "that the absurdity (!) of Max Müller's theory was manifest." About "Fundamental Problems" he says:

"The author's philosophy is crude and crass materialism. Indeed, we have never seen a work in which the materialistic view was presented in so extreme a form as in this of Dr. Carus. Thus, in discussing the origin of feeling, he says, 'We must expect the solution of this problem from biological investigations.' . . ."

Biology is the science of life. Feeling, being one of the most important features of life, it is almost a tautology to state that the problem of the origin of feeling must be expected from biological investigations.

Without much ado he continues: "The doctor's ethical theory is confused and inconsistent. He rejects utilitarianism and at first adopts Kant's view that the moral law is purely formal, without any reference to ends."

My critic should say: "He rejects hedonism"—the word "utilitarianism" does not occur in the whole book It was purposely avoided, because it is not a good and expressive word, and people are liable to mistake its meaning in the one or in the other way.

Kant's ethics are called in the criticism "formal ethics without reference to ends." Kant's view would better be characterized by "the ethics of a good will, which is a will in conformity with reason without regard to personal advantages" There is a great difference between 'without reference to ends" and "without reference to personal advantages."

Mr. Spencer said that Kant speaks of "a will without reference to ends," but Kant never uttered such a contradiction. The error appears to arise from bad translations, and I suspect my critic that if he ever read Kant, he never took the trouble to look up the original. If he had done so, most likely he would not have characterized Kant's ethics as being without reference to ends. He will find matters fully explained in the editorials of Nos. 51 and 52 of THE OPEN COURT: "Herbert Spencer on the Ethics of Kant."

Now it is true, as my critic says, that the formal ethics of Kant are adopted in "Fundamental Problems"; but (on page 200) they are adopted as the basis only for applied ethics. Formal ethics are insufficient, if they are not applied to the facts of experience.

My critic continues: "These views are supplemented by the theory that morality consists in living for the ideal, though what the ideal is, we are nowhere informed." The definition of ideal is found on page 235: "An Ideal is a conception or idea of such a state of things, as does not yet exist, but the realization of which is fostered in our aspiration." And in other words on page 204 "The next higher stage to which natural development ever tends is its ideal."

Reviewing means first of all to look into a book and read its most important passages. My critic dispenses with that part of the business. He criticises without reviewing; he judges of a book and makes statements about it without knowing its contents.

* * *

An other reviewer of a similar kind is Mr. John Bascom, who says in the *Dial*: "One sees, in glancing over the table of contents, the greatest variety of the most abstruse and difficult topics "arranged in no formal nor inherent order. . . . . Any discussion "of them must necessarily be of the most hasty character."

If Mr. Bascom had read the book, he would have perceived that there is a progress in the discussion of topics in "Fundamental Problems" The book starts with Sensation as the basis of Cognition, whence it proceeds to the method of abstaction. The most important abstract being Form, the philosophy of formal thought, especially of mathematics, is treated, pp. 26–74. The importance of form, in comprehending natural phenomena, is shown in a disquisition on causation. The concept Cause is distinguished from Reason, and thus the errors of a "First Cause" plainly set forth. Cause in its proper sense being a motion, the idea of *vis viva*, of life or self-motion, is treated. The discovery of their causes makes phenomena intelligible. This leads to the topics of Unknowabilities and of Agnosticism. These discussions being in the main the theoretical foundation, the practical application of this philosophy is discussed in the concluding chapters.

Mr. Bascom adds: "The doctrine of monism plays a some-"what important part in the work, yet the author seems to confuse "it with unity—a thing quite distinct. Monism should mean one "form of being, as opposed to two or more forms of being. The "unity of monism is ultimate identity,—oneness, not the coales-

"cence of adverse things in one constructive relation. Unity is "utterly distinct from oneness."

In fact, "unity" is the Latin word for "oneness," although unity is sometimes used in the sense of "union," signifying a "coalescence."

Mr. Bascom knows what monism *should* mean. It would have been better if he had known what it means, or if he had taken the trouble to read the chapter "Foundation of Monism," on page 21. Mr. Bascom says: "Real monism has no way out of itself. Di-"versity is lost, and so is unity. All is swallowed up in a one "which we know not how to convert into two, four, a thousand."

The monism of Mr. Bascom is an absurdity. It is a wagon in the mud, it "has no way out of itself." And it must be a deep quagmire in which it sticks, for together with its driver "all is swallowed up in a one, which we know not how to convert into two, four, a thousand." Why, Mr. Bascom desires such a feat of legerdemain, we are not told.

If Mr. Bascom had read the book, he should have known, that Monism cannot mean any "form of being," nor can it mean either "oneness," or "unity," or "coalescence." Monism is the method of arranging our knowledge of facts in a systematic way, so that one fact agrees with all the other facts. Accordingly, Monism is no dogma but a principle.

Every science is Monism in a certain class of natural phenomena. The scientist arranges all facts in a methodical way, so that all together form one system. Philosophy, when doing the same with all the sciences, is called Monism.

Monism, so far as it has succeeded now in its task, teaches that the world is a unity,* not a union. The Universe is no Ohio river which comes from two different sources, from the Monongahela of Matter and the Alleghany of Spirit. Both the concepts, spirit and matter, are abstract ideas which denote certain properties of reality, certain sides or parts of reality. These as well as other abstract concepts do not exist of themselves. Absolute spirit, or absolute matter, cannot be produced in reality. Spirit which is nothing but spirit cannot be found as a tangible and real thing. Matter which is nothing but matter, having no form at all, does not exist. Thus form is an abstract. Form by itself exists only in the minds of thinking beings. Pure forms and the sciences of pure forms, for instance mathematics, as ideal concepts, are of highest and of a most practical significance for human life, but pure forms considered by themselves as realities (like Platonic ideas) belong to the same category as spirits of themselves,—they are ghosts or hobgoblins, woven of the "stuff that dreams are made on."

Some believe that in the beginning Zeus took from three different boxes, matter, and energy, and form, in order to combine them into one cosmos. According to Monism, the world did not coalesce out of our abstract conceptions (matter, energy, and form,) but the reverse, the world is one whole, it is a unity, and our abstract conceptions are derived—are abstracted—from it.

* * *

Reviewers who treat a book unkindly because they start from different principles, must be in my opinion very welcome to an author, because he can as a rule learn most from his enemies. A hostile criticism which points out the weakness of a book, a fallacy in the author's logic, an error in his statements is most valuable and I should thank publicly any critic who would do so. From these two reviewers, however, I could learn nothing.

A wise American says: "If you would lift me, you must be on higher ground. If you would liberate me, you must be free. If you would correct my false view of facts,—hold up to me the same facts in the true order of thought." P. C.

* According to Mr. Bascom the word oneness is perhaps the proper term.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE KEY TO THEOSOPHY. By *M. P. Blavatsky*. New York: W. G. Judge, 21 Park Row.

This is a large book, well printed, and well written. It is eloquent in many places and interesting in all. The genius of it is pure and elevating, its aspiration sublime. There are many people wondering about Theosophy just now, and enquiring whether it is a religion or a science, a speculation or a fact, a new ethics, or an old Theurgy; and whether it brings with it "airs from Heaven or blasts from Hell." Some think it the art of magic and the way to work miracles. The enquiring and the curious will explore this book for the secrets of the grave and the methods of the gods, while others will search among its leaves for the magician's wand, the philosopher's stone, and Aladdin's lamp. All will be disappointed.

This "key" to Theosophy, which Madame Blavatsky gives us, is the same key that Bluebeard gave to his wife; a key, not for opening a door but for locking it. The word, as a figure of speech, is not well chosen. Madame Blavatsky opens nothing, reveals nothing. If there is within the inner temple of Theosophy a solution of the great "mystery" we shall not find it, for the lock on the door is contrived with such cunning, that this "key" is useless to us without a knowledge of the combination. Madame Blavatsky does not give us the combination; perhaps she does not know it herself. Back to the remotest ages, in India, China, Egypt, Persia, Judea, Greece, Rome, certain Initiates, Adepts, and Masters have pretended to keep the "Divine Wisdom" locked up in some tabernacle or inner sanctuary, of which they alone possessed the key. These were the professors of the esoteric systems which have prevailed, from the Esoteric Buddhism of India through the Esoteric Judaism of Palestine down to the Esoteric Christianity of Rome, Canterbury, and Chicago. Many of those professors were self-deceived. They honestly believed that they possessed the key.

This book is more correctly a key to the Theosophical Society, whose objects are these, "1. To form the nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity without distinction of race, color, or creed. 2. To promote the study of Aryan and other Scriptures, of the world's religion and sciences, and to vindicate the importance of old Asiatic literature. 3. To investigate the hidden mysteries of nature under every aspect possible, and the psychic and spiritual powers latent in man especially." These are praiseworthy objects, and the honest pursuit of them will result in good, even though all their promises be not realized. Millions of men and women are now working for these ends in many different ways. Has theosophy a better way? Has the Theosophical Society any valueable knowledge, divine or otherwise, which the rest of the world has not? If so, what is it, and where is it? Will they give us the key to it, and the combination of the lock?

Madame Blavatsky says that the chief aim of Theosophy is "the relief of human suffering under any and every form, moral as well as physical," and "Theosophy has to cultivate ethics; it has to purify the soul if it would relieve the physical body." These are admirable purposes; and if Theosophy has any knowledge of the rule by which its plans may be achieved, its help to the world will be as the coming of a new redeemer. Does it possess the secret law whereby the soul can cure the body? That such a law exists is in itself a thought sublime, but we are liable to lose it among the mists and fogs of occultism, astrology, alchemy, and magic which obscure the scientific ethics advocated in this book.

Where is the evidence that we possess an "Astral" body? Where is the proof of "Reincarnation"? Where is there any support in reason, probability, or necessity, for the theory of "Reincarnation" or the "Astral body"? And so of the other "mys-

teries" which are supposed to be hidden in theosophy? The book is written for those who love the marvelous. It contributes more to "Mysticism" than to Knowledge. So far as it stimulates men and women to investigate the hidden mysteries of Nature, and the "psychic and spiritual powers latent in man" it is a useful book, but the fault of it is that it creates "mysteries," and asserts without evidence that there actually exist certain psychic and spiritual powers latent in man. It pretends that what were formerly magic and miracle, are spiritual phenomena obedient to a natural law which we may learn, and by a knowledge of this law perform the feats attributed in past ages to spiritual sorcery or divine endowment. It promises power which it cannot give. M. M. T.

LES SENSATIONS INTERNES. By *H. Beaunis*, Professor of Physiology at Nancy. Paris: Félix Alcan. *Bibliothèque Scientifique Internationale.*

By "internal sensations" are understood all sensations that come to consciousness through any other channel than the specialized sensory organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; they are sometimes designated, in their totality, by the terms 'general sensibility,' 'general sensations,' 'organic sensations,' etc. They proceed from the internal organs, in contradistinction to external sensations, which have their origin in exterior objects; they are part of the feeling ego, and usually their character is vague and indeterminate. Nevertheless the line of demarcation in many cases is difficult to fix between sensations that belong to the outer and those that belong to the inner sphere.

M. Beaunis, in the present investigation, adopts a classification embracing eight groups. First, we have *organic sensibility*, the sensations from the tissues and organs, the cartilages and ligaments, etc.; secondly, the *necessities*, need of action and inaction; thirdly, *functional sensations*, those that come from the exercise of the various functions, as the muscles; fourthly, *cœnesthesia*, or the feeling of existence in general; fifthly, *emotional sensations*, those accompanying emotion; sixthly, a class as yet not fully determined, comprising the *sense of direction;* seventhly, sensations of *pain;* and eighthly, sensations of *pleasure*. Of these groups there are various and numerous divisions, comprehensively arranged, and inclusive of the most manifold forms of our organic activity. M. Beaunis, himself an investigator and experimentalist of high attainments, has made use of the latest and best material that modern science has gathered; he has put in a compendious form the gist of the conclusions of science upon a subject that presents very great difficulties to accurate investigation. Especial reference may be made to the chapters on the sensation of central innervation, the notions of space, direction, resistance, and upon muscular sensibility in general.

JANE AUSTEN. By *Mrs. Charles Malden.* Boston: 1889. Roberts Bros.

The biography of Jane Austen forms the twentieth volume of the Famous Women Series. "Rarely," says Mrs. Malden, "has a great writer's life been so completely hidden from the public throughout its entire course, and, indeed, for many years afterwards, as Jane Austen's; for no memoir of her was attempted until quite sixty years after she had passed away. Yet few authors could better have borne the fierce light of publicity upon their lives than the simple-minded, sweet-tempered woman, who never dreamed that anyone outside her own family would care to know anything about her, and who courted personal notoriety so little. She would never have realized the charm that her sweet, peaceful, womanly life would one day have for those who, having long worshipped her genius in her writings, would be delighted to learn how completely free she was from all the whims and caprices that sometimes disfigure genius, and how entirely she carried out the saying of her great sister writer, *D'abord je suis femme, puis je suis artiste.*" The life of the authoress of "Mansfield Park," and "Emma," extending over but forty-two years, furnishes little wealth of material. Mrs. Malden's biographical review is therefore, as its writer confesses it to be, a criticism. It may be remarked, for the benefit of those who, having read with pleasure Miss Austen's writings, wish further to learn of the personality of the authoress, that the task has been performed with sympathy and love. *μκρκ.*

In "The Liberal Christian Ministry," a little volume of ninety-six pages, recently published, Mr. J. F. Sunderland proposes to the "earnest, able, noble-minded young men" of our time the adoption of the calling of the liberal Christian ministry. This denomination marks a new type—neither Unitarian, Universalist, Episcopalian, nor Congregationalist; "its credentials are different, its gospel is largely different; the motives to which it appeals are different; its theory of life is different." Its work is "theological, ethical, philanthropic, spiritual, and personal." Perhaps in these lines, the creed of Mr. Sunderland may best be defined; "Liberal Christianity, too, looks backward for suggestions, for lessons of wisdom, to gather the fruit of the experience of the ages, but not for authorities or fixed models. Its *ideals*, ever rising with humanity's progress, are its *models*; the *truth* as it appears in the light of every new to-day is its *authority.*" (Geo. H. Ellis, Publisher, Boston.)

The Ethical Record, for the October quarter, contains a contribution by Mr. W. M. Salter upon "George Eliot's Views of Religion," followed by a series of essays on the ethical courses at Harvard, Cornell, and Ann Arbor, by Messrs. Josiah Royce, J. G. Schurman, and John Dewey respectively. Mr. Felix Adler writes upon "The Aims of the Ethical Society"; Mr. Stanton Coit "defines" The Ethical Movement, and Mr. W. L. Sheldon replies to the query "What is an Ethical Society." Says Mr. Salter, "A Meliorist she [George Eliot] was; she herself invented "the word, believing that life may always be made better, that "the world is becoming better, that some grand future awaits the "race that now struggles with its littleness, its suffering, and its "sin."

Another and welcome addition to the numerous serial publications upon politico-economical topics, now before the public, is the new *Leader Tract Series*—the purpose of which is to furnish for a veritable pittance (two cents) the best articles, by the best writers, from the best magazines, upon important and engrossing governmental problems. Number One is "The Decline of the Farmer," by J. F. H., from *Belford's Magazine.* (*The Leader*, 151 Monroe st, Chicago.)

It is announced, that *The Teacher's Outlook*, a monthly magazine the laudable purpose and proposed activity of which has before been characterized in our columns, will henceforth appear as a weekly, with the title *The Opinion-Outlook.* (Des Moines, Iowa.)

Contemporaneously with the London edition of Trübner & Co., Nims & Knight, of Troy, N. Y., will publish "Aryan Sun-Myths the Origin of Religions"

NOTES.

Our issue of next week will contain the first part of the continuation of the series "Double Consciousness," by M. Alfred Binet.

Gœthe's house at Weimar, from which the public have been rigidly excluded until within a year, will be fully described in the November *Scribner*, by Oscar Browning.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word Gon by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE GRAPHIC METHOD AND THE DOUBLING OF CONSCIOUSNESS.*

BY ALFRED BINET.

Psychologists, in the last few years, have come by many different ways to establish the fact that in hysterical patients a plurality of persons exists. The curious observation, for example, of Doctor Azam, of Bordeaux, may be recalled, where a young woman, by the name of Félida, manifestly hysterical, presented two successive lives in which she possessed neither the same character nor had the same recollections.† Azam's observation does not stand alone. There are others recorded, very many in fact, of the same kind; as for instance that of Doctor Dufay. In his "Diseases of Personality," M. Ribot has given a complete history of this interesting question.

The experiments that we presented in a former series of articles on this subject, and the similar experiments of M. Pierre Janet, accordingly, set forth nothing new. We have simply found a method of revealing in the majority of persons afflicted with hysteria those remarkable phenomena of duplication which hitherto seemed somewhat exceptional. We have established, almost with certainty in fact, that in such subjects there exists side by side with the principal personality a secondary personality, which is unknown by the first, which sees, hears, reflects, reasons, and acts.

In following out our study of the methods that enable us to reveal this hidden personality, we are now to have recourse to the so-called graphic method, the employment of which, at first restricted to the workrooms of physiology, seems, at the present time, destined to find its way into the current practice of medicine.

The principle upon which this method works, consists, as we know, in the transmission of the movement we desire to study, to a lever the pointed extremity of which writes upon a revolving cylinder. The transmission of the movement to the lever may be effected by various means, the simplest of which is a rubber-tube having communication with an expansible chamber, which moves the lever. Every pressure exerted upon the rubber will be transmitted to the lever by the column of air enclosed within the tube, and thus trace a line upon the cylinder. This line presents various characteristics to be noted. When the lever is at rest, and no movement is transmitted to it, the line that it traces is perfectly rectilinear; if, on the contrary, it receives a pressure, it will trace a curve more or less uneven, which will rise above the line traced when at rest, designated the line of abscissas. This curve, by the height to which it rises above the line of abscissas, will indicate the amplitude of the movement; by its length upon the cylinder, of which we know the velocity of rotation, it will indicate, and that with absolute precision, the rapidity of the movement; and finally, its form will indicate the form of the movement. This, in few words, is the principle of the wonderful method that has given a new status to the physiology of movement.

How may this method be applied to the study of the doubling of consciousness? How are we to get a line that will exhibit a relation to this disorder of the mind? The question was put to me by several psychologists to whom I had discovered the present subject of my investigations. But the difficulty is at once removed when we reflect that each separate personality can be brought to execute movements, and that these movements can be registered.

For example, we have an hysterical patient, hemianæsthetical on the left side; her name is P. S——, and she will be the subject of the experiments the description of which is to follow. She is a young girl, twenty years of age, tall, well-developed, intelligent, and of a serious disposition, yet who is subject to dreadful convulsive attacks and in the intervals of these attacks, to delirious crises. We shall study her during one of these intervals of repose. With her, the movements of the second personality which are commonly called "automatic writing," are highly developed in the insensible portion of her body; thus, if we tell her to think of a number, her anæsthetic hand will be seen to execute movements in connection with the number thought of; if we tell her to count the beats of a metronome, her hand, while she is counting, will be seen gently to keep time. These different movements are performed without the participation of will, or even of consciousness on her part; they may be called, if we choose, automatic movements, but it is

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† Azam, *Double Conscience, etc.*: J. B. Baillière, Paris

not to be forgotten that they are extremely complex, and that it would be improper to liken them to simple reflex motions. We return, here, to an important question that we have touched upon in our first article. Repetition, perhaps, is necessary. We said there that the movements performed by the anæsthetic member under the influence of an idea, sometimes exhibit all the marks of a movement that is intellectual, the result of a reflective act and of volition. One of the proofs that may be given of this, is, that with our patient P. S—— the application of a recording instrument to the anæsthetic member greatly increases the intensity of the movements; and that when the instrument is taken away they slacken, without, however, completely disappearing. Furthermore, the form of the movement varies with the form of the apparatus applied. If we simply place a pencil in the insensible hand while the subject is thinking of the number 5, she will write 5; if we place a dynamograph in her hand, she will press five times; if a myographic drum be used, which is an arrangement to measure muscular dilatation, and if that apparatus be applied to the forearm, the forearm performs a movement. In short, there is in all these cases an intelligent adaptation to the form of the apparatus used. If still other facts be required to demonstrate the complex nature of the movements in question, we may say that they are not produced at the outset in all patients; but it is necessary to wait for a time—for example, to strike the metronome with regularity some several minutes in succession, in order that the second personality which has control of these movements may comprehend what is wanted of it, and execute the same. Thus, for example, if during an experiment a key be let fall upon the table, the subject will not at once perform an automatic movement; but if the key be let fall at equal intervals, or if we regularly strike a metronome, a moment will arrive when the movements will be produced and when they will regulate their rhythm to keep time with the sound heard. Sometimes, even, it happens that when the metronome is suddenly stopped, the subject, not being warned of our intention, continues to produce an automatic movement or semi-contraction.



Fig. 1.—Experiment with P. S——, hemianæsthetical, on the right side. The first line traced, beginning at the top, represents the voluntary contractions of the right, insensible arm. The second line traced represents the voluntary contractions of the left, sensible arm. Both were taken at the same time. The third line represents the automatic movements of the right, insensible arm during the beats of a metronome; the fourth line corresponds to the left, sensible arm during the same experiment. The fifth tracing represents the automatic movements of the right, insensible arm while the subject is thinking of the number 5; the sixth line corresponds to the left, sensible arm during the same experiment. The lines are to be read from left to right. Minimum velocity of cylinder.

These few facts suffice to show us, that the involuntary and unconscious movements an hysterical subject performs when under the influence of a predominant idea or upon hearing the beats of a metronome, reveal a directive process of reasoning and a directive volition. They are voluntary movements on the part of the second personality of the patient.

These movements are, as we have already remarked, greatly stimulated by the application of an instrument to receive them, and I have witnessed them produced in almost every instance in which I have applied such an instrument. The respiratory movements in particular, when the subject thinks of a number, or hears the beats of the metronome, can change rhythm; further, according as the experiment is prolonged, the movements increase progressively in intensity.

After these few preliminary remarks, I have now only to bring before the eyes of my readers the tracings that I have taken with the patient P. S——, and explain beneath them their meaning.

These tracings were all taken, without interruption, in the course of a single experiment, and without any alteration having been made in the apparatus, which remained in its place. A myographic drum was applied to each forearm. It will be remembered that the right side of P. S—— is insensible; the comparison of the reactions produced in both sides of the body can accordingly serve for showing the influence of anæsthesia upon the so-called automatic movements.

We begin by asking the subject to press both hands

energetically, then to open them, his eyes all the while being closed ; we thus obtain the two first lines of the first figure ; the first line belongs to the right, anæsthetic arm, and the second to the left, sensible arm ; we may collect therefrom the following differences : the movement of the anæsthetic hand is behind that of the other hand ; the height of the curve is less ; the line of ascension is more inclined.*

Now, let us ask the subject to make no movement whatever, to remain completely immobile, and to listen attentively to the beats of a metronome : the third line traced, of the figure, corresponds to the right, anæsthetic arm, which, without the knowledge of the subject, executes clearly-defined movements, in rhythmic adaption to the beats of the metronome ; in the fourth line, on the contrary, which corresponds to the left, sensible member, scarcely anything is produced.

Let us stop the metronome, and ask the subject to remain very quiet and, with both eyes closed, to think of the number 5. The right hand then begins, without the knowledge of the subject, to perform movements very clearly indicated in the fifth tracing of our first figure, while the left, sensible hand remains almost immobile, as shown by the sixth and last line marked.

Accordingly, the first figure shows us, with perfect evidence, that if the two, sensible and insensible, arms, of P. S—— be explored at the same time, the voluntary contractions will be stronger in the sensible member, and the automatic contractions, or those of the second personality, stronger in the anæsthetic member. This result, which we have similarly obtained with another subject, appears to uphold the conclusion that the second personality has chosen, as the seat of its operation, the insensible regions of the body.

This result, we once more remark, is obtained only when we make simultaneously a bilateral exploration. Other tracings, which we have deemed unnecessary to publish, clearly show that the automatic contractions of the sensible member are very much stronger when no apparatus is during the same time applied to the other arm. In this case, as a matter of fact, the second personality brings its attention especially to bear upon the region of the body where the experiment is being made ; whereas, if it is obliged in some way, to concern itself with both arms at the same time, it prefers to take charge of the movements of the anæsthetic arm. This common comparison is employed in order to render a highly delicate fact clearly intelligible. It is certain that what we designate by a convenient term the second personality, is a complex synthesis of psychological elements, and that this synthesis, according to circumstances, is now constructed, now destroyed, now enlarged, and now diminished. It is understandable, how attention, practice, and repetition can aid the development of this synthesis ; which is the case, when, in proportion as the experiment is protracted, the movements become more and more extended. This fact, moreover, can be observed with the majority of the lines traced, by running over them from left to right, in the directions in which they have been recorded.

Such are the many important facts bearing upon the psychological history of the double personality ; and these facts are to be accurately ascertained only by the regular application of the graphic method.



Fig. 2.—Experiment upon P. S——, hemianæsthetic, on the right side. Lines 1 and 2 are a repetition of the experiment recorded by lines 1 and 2 of the first figure. Line 3 corresponds to voluntary contractions of the right, anæsthetic arm after paralysis of the left, at first sensible, arm. Line 4 corresponds to the left, paralyzed arm. Line 5 represents the automatic movements of the right arm, and line 6, taken at the same time, represents the automatic movements of the paralyzed left arm, while the patient is listening to the beats of the metronome. The lines are to be read from left to right. Minimum velocity of cylinder.

This method contains still another lesson for us. Glance at the figures 2 and 3. The lines traced were taken, during the same experiment of course, after having effected by suggestion a paralysis of movement and of sensibility in the left half of the body, which was previously sensible and capable of movement. The changes produced at once strike the eye.

Beginning at the top, the two first lines of figure 2 are taken before the experiment of suggestion. The first line is produced by the voluntary contractions of the right, anæsthetic hand, and the second line by the

*On this point, I may refer to my last publication : *Les Movements volontaires dans l'Anesthésie hysterique. Revue Philosophique*, 1889.

simultaneous voluntary contractions of the left, sensible hand. It is the repetition, pure and simple, of the two first lines of the first figure. Then intervenes the suggestion producing paralysis. When the paralysis of the left member is complete, the subject is again asked to squeeze strongly his two fists; the voluntary contractions of the right arm have increased in energy; those of the left, anæsthetic arm are scarcely perceptible, and, furthermore, they are behind, as will be seen from a comparison of lines 3 and 4 of fig. 2.

Now we set our metronome a-going. The automatic movements of the right member remain almost what they were before the experiment of paralysis (line



FIG. 3.—Experiment with P. S——, hemianæsthetic, on the right side. Lines 1 aud 2 are a repetition of the experiment recorded by the tracings 5 and 6 of the second figure. Line 3 corresponds to the automatic movements of the right arm while the subject is thinking of the number 3. Line 4, taken simultaneously, corresponds to the automatic movements of the left, paralyzed arm. Lines 5 and 6 were taken after the suppression of the paralysis and while the subject was listening to the beats of the metronome; line 5 corresponds to the right, anæsthetic arm, and line 6 to the left arm, again become sensible. The lines are to be read from left to right. Minimum velocity of cylinder.

5 of fig. 2, and line 1 of fig. 3); by way of compensation, however, those of the left member which were imperceptible before the experiment when the member was sensible and capable of movement, become very distinct (line 6 of fig. 2, and line 2 of fig. 3). Similarly, when the subject thinks of the number 3, the movements are at the same time considerable in the right, anæsthetic member (line 3, fig. 3) and in the left, anæsthetic member (line 4, fig. 3).

If we seek to collect the signification of these tracings, we shall see, in effect, that when suggestion has stricken the left member with paralysis, which previously continued sensible, two simultaneous facts are produced: its voluntary activity has diminished in intensity, to the extent that the voluntary contractions are hardly perceptible, and at the same time its automatic activity has increased correspondingly, as though there were a sort of antagonism between the two functions. In other words, by creating anæsthesia through suggestion in a region of the body, the province of the second personality has been extended.

But it is curious to remark that the field of action of this second personality is always limited; it cannot simultaneously produce movements equally precise in the right and left members. For instance, when the subject thinks of the number 3, one arm will better express by its movements the figure thought of, than the other (cf. line 3 and 4 of fig. 3); as if the attention of the second personality could not be brought to bear at the same time upon both arms. This is another circumstance that the graphic method alone could reveal.

We shall confine ourselves to these few summary observations. It is not our intention to linger over the detailed description of experimental facts, but only to point out the principle of a new method adapted to the scientific study of automatic writing and analogous phenomena. It is much to be desired that those who have occasion to study automatic writing in normal persons, or in those who pretend to be such, will subject the movements performed by these individuals to the control of the graphic method.

SEXUAL CHARACTERISTICS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

II.

As we have seen in the foregoing chapter, the distinctive mental characteristics of the sexes represent a difference of kind, rather than of degree; and only prejudice can deny the superior qualification of women for manifold administrative functions and certain branches of such sciences as medicine and education.

But a still greater mistake is the theory of the extremists who attribute the universal and immemorial supremacy of the male sex to a mere superiority of physical strength. Brutal force alone has never permanently decided the question of prestige even among brutes. Biology records numerous instances of survival by superior mental fitness and of the extinction of physically superior varieties of primeval species of beasts and birds. The black bear, the polar bear, and the Malayan sun-bear still survive with a large number

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of their smaller relatives—the raccoon and the South American Kinkayou, while the gigantic cave-bear of the antediluvian fauna has entirely disappeared, together with the giant-stag and the primeval hyena. Our three surviving species of elephants are mere dwarfs compared with the monster pachyderms of the earlier geological periods. The giant sloth of prehistoric South America, the Moa and the Dodo, proved less fit to survive than their smaller congeners, and the small, active sea-lizard of New Guinea is the only surviving representative of the once numerous tribe of marine saurians, some of which (like the ichthyosaurus,) could boast the physical potency of the fabled dragons.

The history of international wars teaches a similar lesson. The god of battle did not always declare in favor of the physically strong. Even in the age of hand-to-hand contests intelligent tactics enabled the soldiers of imperial Rome for nearly three centuries to hold their own against the giant warriors of the northern forests. After more than one disastrous defeat of her best armies Rome was saved by the stupidity of the barbarians; as in B. C. 284, when the Senonian Gauls gave their enemies time to recover from the disaster of Arretium and had to pay their blunder by the complete extirpation of their race, or B. C. 105, when the Cimbri slew 82,000 Roman soldiers in the valley of Arausio, on the upper Rhone, but instead of clinching their success by the conquest of Italy, rushed blindly towards Spain and were themselves annihilated in the passes of the Pyrenees. The genius of Belisarius and Narses triumphed over host after host of barbarian invaders; the science of China held in check the rude strength of the Tartar nomads, and for more than half a thousand years the shrewdness of the Spanish Moors prevailed against the united power of the iron-fisted Visigoths with all their northern allies.

Barbarous tribes have more than once acknowledged the rule of physically decrepit, but mentally vigorous, chieftains. Stupid male savages would have been ruled by the shrewd females of their species, as they were for centuries ruled by physically degenerate, but mentally superior, neighbors; yet the physical strength of the male human biped turned the scales by its combination with the monopoly of creative thought and a superior faculty of mental concentration. The mental ability of the ablest woman differs from that of a gifted man, as talent differs from genius, and as the faculty of imitation and adaption differs from the faculty of origination. Social prejudice has not prevented thousands of women from attaining eminence in the accumulation of (pre-existent) stores of all sorts of knowledge, and it would be impossible to explain their almost total lack of originative faculty by the educational disadvantages of their position. For centuries the women of semi-civilized nations were admitted to the service of the temples, entrusted with the management of oracles or even invested with the authority of inspired prophets (as among the ancient Germans and Celts); yet the history of creeds records no instance of a woman's origination of any important religious dogma or religious reform. An analysis of the mystic fancies of female seers and ecstatic nuns would easily reduce them to a revamp of current doctrines. The *femmes savantes* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries included many first-class mathematicians, and Leibnitz confesses that in the rapid assimilation of mathematical instruction some of his female pupils surpassed the brightest boys. The geometrician Euler had more than one learned lady-correspondent, and Voltaire's "Divine Emilia" (Mme. de Châtelet) preferred Newton's Principia to the brightest novel; yet no woman has as yet enriched our stock of knowledge by the discovery of any important mathematical axiom. There have been female amateur-chemists and amateur-physiologists, but the progress of the physical sciences has never been promoted by their studies. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the course of the last hundred years girls have enjoyed three times the opportunities of their brothers for the acquisition of a musical education; yet the galaxy of brilliant female performers has as yet not been supplemented by the appearance of any first-class, or even second-class, female composer.

Nevertheless, the reaction against the unquestionable injustice of female serfdom has misled such writers as Courier and Stuart Mill to the absolute denial of an innate difference in the mental constitution of the sexes. The opposite extreme has found its ablest expression in the writings of Chamfort and Juan Huarte, but especially in the *Parerga* of Arthur Schopenhauer. "The noblest organisms," he says, "ripen slowly: the males of our species rarely attain the full maturity of their reason and mental faculties before their twenty-eighth year; females in their eighteenth. As a consequence women always remain grown children, having eyes only for the nearest objects, for the interests of the immediate present, taking semblance for reality and prefering trifles to the most important affairs of existence. Reason enables man, alone of his fellow-creatures, to review the past and anticipate the future; whence his providence, his regrets, and distressful apprehensions, in which advantages, as well as disadvantages, woman, thanks to her feebler share of reason, participates only in a diminished degree. Every woman is, as it were, a mental Myops, clearly seeing objects near at hand, but limited to a narrow scope of vision and consequently less strongly affected by distant or absent things—whence her frequent, often almost insane, penchant for dissipation. Women, at heart,

consider it the destiny of man to earn money; their own to spend it. . . . The female might be properly defined as the unæsthetic sex. Neither for music nor for poetry or the fine arts do women evince any genuine interest, but merely a simulated sympathy suggested by their coquettish approbativeness: witness Rousseau's famous dictum: 'Les femmes, en general, n'aiment aucune art, ni se connoissent à aucun, et n'ont point de génie.' Only watch their conduct in concert halls and theatres, and their childlike unconcernedness in continuing their small-talk cackle during the brightest passages of an operatic masterpiece. . . . As the weaker sex, women deserve indulgence and forbearance, but the gynolatry—the absurd lady-worship of our age—has only served to encourage them in an arrogance which frequently suggests the conduct of the sacred apes of Benares, which, in the consciousness of their sanctity and inviolable prestige, take liberties apt to surprise even their worshipers."

"Quedando la hembra es en su disposicion natural," says Juan Huarte, "todo genero de sciencia es repugnante a su ingenio, solo la vemos hablar con alguna aparencia de habilidad en materias levianas y faciles." Yet the birthland of that ultra-misogynist was the first to admit women to a more equitable social position; and the example of the South European nations has, in that respect, anticipated many results of our Woman's Right's movement. The humanitarian tendencies of modern civilization mitigated the rigors of "female serfdom," as they abolished a still more oppressive form of involuntary servitude; but there is no doubt that the social position of the female sex has also been greatly improved by the progressive reaction against the gloomy asceticism of the Middle Ages. During the ascendency of a pessimistic creed the joyous instincts of the female soul were unavoidably antagonized by the prevailing system of ethics, and even the ungallant doctrine of Schopenhauer was infinitely surpassed by the diatribes of monkish fanatics who denounced female frivolity as the root of all evil, and recognized marriage only as a concession to the innate depravity and frailty of human nature. The enthusiasm of the *Minnesingers* was, indeed, less a woman-worship than an apotheosis of love—the only surviving deity of devastated Olympus—and the practical lot of woman was never less enviable than in the midnight period of the thousand-years worship of sorrow.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there is a good deal of truth in Edmond About's remark that "the equality of the sexes has been promoted by the rapid effemination of the bearded biped." In a nation of comedians and man-milliners women cannot help asserting their ability to compete with their former oppressors in the contests of their own chosen arena, and the true social equilibrium will only be attained, after centuries of experiments, in an equitable division of labor, founded on the natural, mental, and physical distinctions of sexual characteristics.

In the branches requiring the faculty of invention, discovery, origination, in short of creative thought, male cultivators of science will probably continue to enjoy a monopoly. Female functionaries, on the other hand, will administer a larger and larger share of the educational (*i. e.*, communicative) branches. The education of the young, in all known species of mammals and birds, is almost an exclusive prerogative of the female sex, and in a state of nature the phrenological organ of "philoprogenitiveness," or child-love, is, indeed, chiefly a female attribute. Patience and superior skill in what a modern educator calls the "intuitive art of character-reading," constitute an additional qualification of female instructors, and the prejudice in favor of male school-teachers can only be explained by the traditions of a time when every school comprised a gymnasium—a word still used in many parts of Europe as a synonym of a college. The natural depravity dogma of the Middle Ages, too, may have had its share in excluding female teachers with their predilection for gentle methods of reform, though the pedagogue Taubmann already defined a student as an "animal rationale, bipes, quod non vult cogi sed persuaderi"—"a rational biped preferring persuasion to coercion."

In nine out of ten species of our nature-guided fellow-creatures the male is the food-winner, the female the house-keeper and home-defender. Political economy is, after all, only the art of house-keeping applied to the management of national resources, and will yet be recognized as a science apt to be cultivated with special advantage by the administrative talent of the sex that has already earned a reputation for business acumen in the successful supervision of large mercantile establishments.

Want of educational facilities alone can explain the exclusion of the "sick-nursing sex" from the higher branches of the healing art. Since medical colleges have been opened to both sexes, women have, by incontestable proofs, established their ability to compete with male students on the ground so long monopolized by the male disciples of the mediæval medicine man, and the staple arguments of the exclusionists have one by one been refuted by the evidence of practical experience.

"To settle the question of capacity," says Charles Reade, "we could give a long list of women who have been famous in medical science, such as Dorothea Bocchi, who was professor both of philosophy and medicine; Anna Manzolini, who was appointed demonstrator of anatomy in 1761; Maria Della Donne, doctor of medicine in 1800; Maria Sega, doctor of

medicine and anatomy in 1801. At Montpelier Mademoiselle Doumergue gained the highest certificates of proficiency in three different branches of medicine, as Miss Garrett and Miss Mary Putnam did at Paris, and Miss Josephine Ellert at Zurich. These public examinations are all conducted by males, and women are passing them triumphantly all over Europe. As to the study and practice of medicine degrading women, it may be asked if it degrades men. No, it elevates them; they will not contradict me on that point, and we must decline to believe that any science can elevate the higher sex and degrade the lower. Nurses are not, as a class, unfeminine, yet all that is most appalling and horrible in the art of healing is delegated to them. Women nurse all the patients of both sexes often under horrible and sickening conditions and lay out all the corpses. No doctor objects to this on sentimental grounds, and why? Because nurses get only a guinea a week and not a guinea a flying visit; to women the loathsome part of medicine, to man the lucrative. The noble nurses of the Crimea went to attend males only, yet were not charged with indelicacy. They worked *gratis*. The would-be doctresses look mainly to attending women; but then they want to be paid for it, and there is the rub. It is a mere money question and all the attempts of the union to hide this and play the sentimental shop-man is transparent humbug and hypocrisy. . . . To open the study and practice of medicine to women would import into medical science a new and less theoretical, but cautious, teachable, and observant kind of intellect; it will give the larger half of the nation an honorable ambition and an honorable pursuit, towards which their hearts and instincts are bent by Nature herself."

Female animals, in a state of nature, show a superior courage in the defense of their young, though the males of many species lead their foraging expeditions, and there is no reason why the aggressive and defensive functions of warfare should not be divided between the corresponding sexes of the human race: Men in the field, as leaders of an invasive campaign; women as home-guards, in charge of forts and arsenals. The females of our species who have achieved supreme distinction in the military service of their nation, appeared, indeed, almost without an exception, in the rôle of *home-defenders*, as Deborah, the Maid of Orleans, and the heroine of Saragossa. The wisest of female sovereigns have rarely engaged in aggressive wars, and Captain Burton informs us that the much discussed modern Amazons, the female spear-brigade of Dahomey, proved mostly unfit for the fatigues of a protracted campaign, but excelled their male relatives in the defense of fortified camps.

ONLY ONE WORLD AFTER ALL!—BUT THAT INFINITE.*

BY T. B. WAKEMAN, ESQ.

THE unitary conception of the world brings a great relief to mankind, and that relief consists in getting us free from the incubus of "another world." There is no end to the trouble the supposed "other world" has caused, and nothing is a greater advantage to mankind than the discovery which first broke in upon the mind of poor Giordano Bruno, and which threw him into an ecstasy of delight, *viz.*, that there is and can be only one infinite world, of which "the circumference is nowhere and the centre everywhere." Thus Bruno laid the foundation of modern Pantheism and Monism, which is only saying, that God *and* the World are one Infinite Being or Existence, and that its proper mathematical notation is not 0, or 1, or 2, but ∞. The world does not end in a vacuum 0, or a limit 1, or a duality 2, but is every way boundless.

The issue between Bruno and the Pope was just this question, whether the world was finite and created, or infinite and uncreatable, and on that question Bruno was burned. The Pope and all theology rests upon the notion of a God extra-mundane, *outside* of the world, who created it and *therefore* made it finite. If, as Bruno said, the world is infinite, no space or time is conceivable when and where it did not exist, and no God is conceivable outside of it in any time, place, or manner. God and the *Infinite* World are therefore necessarily one. There can be no Theism, but Pantheism. So Spinoza taught and Gœthe sung, and all the great men in thought of the world are following their lead; as Hæckel implies, *Monism* is the word of Science which separates the new, true world from the old and false idea about it.

This idea sheds a world of light over every question of human life, and to realize it is to get a new heaven, a new earth, and a new life. There can be no world and no life that is not a continuance of the present. There can be no other world than ours—for that is, was, and will be infinite. Our intellect may make a duism, and our art a trinism, but at bottom *all is infinite*.

How fruitful is this infinite-world conception! It readjusts all our ideas of the world and our motives in it, and, *as a part* of it, upon a scientific basis, *viz.*, our relations to the world as All, and to Humanity as a part of that world. What we *ought to do* is determined by the scientific knowledge of these relations. The result is a Scientific Religion, Philosophy, and Morality, leading to positive and knowable duties. It is a new view of the world, and of life and duty which reconciles science and religion freed from superstition,

* From the *Freethinker's Magazine*, with a few slight alterations.

and makes them ONE with a saving power,—the idea of duty and devotion to MAN as the flower of an Infinite World.

What is needed in this and every civilized country is this motive which will compel a higher life. This new monistic human faith signified its power in the sublime enthusiasm which made its first martyr, Bruno, face the most cruel of deaths as a triumph rather than to pretend to recant. What a splendid Republic we should have if a touch of that sublime heroism of duty and patriotism should reach the masses of our people? Dr. Carus, in his "Fundamental Problems," describes, under a great variety of topics, the issues and the solutions presented by this new view of Philosophy and gives the practical outcome in the Preface to his book, thus:

"We know of no decline of any nation on earth, unless it was preceded by an intellectual and moral rottenness, which took the shape of some negative creed or scepticism, teaching the maxim that man lives *for the pleasure* of living, and that the purpose of our life is MERELY *to enjoy ourselves.*"

All philosophic, moral, and practical questions are parts of the infinite world and its *infinite duty*, "equally remote from asceticism or hedonism." Monism, as presented by THE OPEN COURT, is a new and a beneficent revelation and power in our land, with which it becomes every person of free thought and a good heart to become personally acquainted as soon as possible. It is an improvement upon the forms of Positivism heretofore presented in America, for it is *real* instead of *phenomenal*, *infinite* instead of *dual* and finite; and teaches the duty whereunto the World and Manhood is calling us, instead of leaving us to wallow in the sensual or æsthetic hedonism of individual indulgence, without regard to the World or Society of which we are parts.

This seems to be an advanced scientific view of the Positive Philosophy, Religion, and Duty. Monism as a philosophy cannot but be enduring, for it is founded on the *Infinite* and ends by flowing out into the health, good, and glory of *Man*, individual and collective. These are the tests of our age of Liberty, Science, and Humanity. The philosophies and religions which, in their present forms, cannot stand these tests, must gradually submit to modifications, so as to become reconciled to the scientific or monistic view of the world, and the sooner that is done the better will it be for all.

THE NATURE OF SOUL-LIFE.

INTO psychological discussions, of late, have been introduced the terms 'double personality,' 'double soul,' and 'double ego.' They serve for explanations of certain problems, but give rise, in their turn, to other problems; and to many minds the difficulties seem rather increased than diminished by the introduction of these strange combinations of words that tend rather to mystify than to clear our ideas. Indeed, authors are not lacking who deal with psychological topics as if there were a psychic fluid floating about us, or as if beside the conscious, subconscious, and unconscious activity of the soul, there existed a superconscious sphere of psychical manifestation. On the basis of these hypotheses of course everything becomes possible, and the human body may easily be considered as the haunting-place of two or several ghosts.

We shall abstain here from controversial discussions and limit our explanation to a statement of the most important facts of soul-life.

In a certain sense each one of us—every higher organized creature—possesses a double soul. Organization produces a union of many organs, the interaction of which constitutes the unity of the organism. But the parts that constitute the organism are not at all annihilated by their coalition. Every single cell continues to exist as an individual in itself. All together form a community and the work of every cell is divided between caring for its own growth and health, and contributing to the common weal of the whole organism. In return for its work, it is benefited by advantages that it would not possess if it lived a solitary life.

Thus in every organism there exist two spheres of soul-life. The one consists of the activity of the constituent parts; the other is that produced by their cooperation. We call the former the sphere of the peripheral, the latter that of the central soul-life; and in this sense adopt the term 'double soul.'

The peripheral soul is the separate psychical activities of the constituents of an organism; the central soul is the product of their common activity. The peripheral soul is the foundation upon which the central soul stands, or rather it is the ground from which it grows. The central soul did not come from fairyland, a stranger, to inhabit for a time the human body in company with the peripheral soul. The central soul was born in its present abode; the body in which it lives is its home, and the duality of soul-life, thus, is not that of a composition, but that of a disintegration. It does not designate a descent of some unknown power that comes from above; it is the rising of aspirations that are lifted from below to higher spheres.

Some time before the terms double ego and double soul were employed by modern psychologists, Professor Hæckel had spoken of the double soul of the Siphonophore, a Medusa of the Mediterranean sea. The Siphonophore, consisting of many single individuals and yet exhibiting unitary perception and will, is popularly called a colonial sea-nettle.



Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.

Fig. 5.



Figs. 7 and 8.

Fig. 6.

Fig. 9.

Fig. 10.

Professor Hæckel says:

"The Siphonophores or colonial sea-nettles are found floating on the smooth surface of the tropical seas, yet only at certain seasons and not in great numbers. They belong to the most gorgeous formations of nature's inexhaustible wealth, and whoever has been fortunate enough to witness the sight of living siphonophores, will never forget the glorious spectacle of their wonderful forms and motions. These siphonophores are best compared to a floating flower-bush, the leaves, blossoms, and fruits of which look like polished crystal-glass of the most graceful forms and delicate colors.

"Each single appendage of the floating bush is a separate Medusa, an individual in itself. But all the different Medusæ of the community through division of labor have assumed different specialized forms. One part of the Medusa-community controls simply the natatory function (*m*), another the reception of food and digestion (*n*), a third sense-perception (*t*), a fourth defense and aggression, a fifth the production of eggs, etc. All the different functions which a single Medusa performs, are in the present case thus distributed among the different citizens of the sea-nettle colony; and all the individuals have transformed their bodies to accord with their respective duties.

"As in a community of ants, so in the Siphonophore-republic, a number of differently formed animals have combined into a kind of higher social organization. But, while in the republic of ants, which is of a much higher order, the ideal bond of social interests and that of a political sense of duty unites all the individuals as free and independent citizens, in the Siphonophore-republic the members of the community are by bodily connection riveted like slaves directly to the yoke of their communal unity. Still, even in this close coherence each person is endowed with an individual soul of its own. If severed from the common stem, it can move about and live and have an independent being. The entire sea-nettle, as a whole, also possesses a will of its own—a central will, on which the single individual depends. It possesses a common sensation which at once communicates the perceptions of the single individuals to all the others. Thus, each of the Medusa-citizens might well exclaim with Faust:

'Two souls, alas! do dwell within my breast.'

"The egoistic soul of the individual lives in compromise with the social soul of the community.

"Woe to any Medusa, that in the infatuation of egotism would break away from the communal stock, in order to lead an independent life! Unable to perform all the particular functions that are indispensable to its self-preservation, most of which were per-

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A COLONIAL SEA-NETTLE OR SIPHONOPHORE CONSISTS OF:

A STEM (fig. 1 *a*). It is an elongated hollow polyp, closed at the lower end and having an air-bladder (fig. 1 *a'* and fig. 2) at its upper end.

THE AIR-BLADDER (fig. 2) consists of an outer skin *e*, and an air-bag *f*, with a villous appendix (*f* 2).

LOCOMOTORS OR PROPELLORS. Fig. 1 *m*, (fig. 7 seen from below, fig. 8 from the side.) Motion is caused when from the orifice (fig. 7 *a*) the water is expelled, fig. 7 and fig. 8 *b* the web, *c* and *d* contracting fibres.

FEEDERS OR NUTRITIVE POLYPS (fig. 1 *n*, fig. 3 *a* to *f*). Connection with the stem *a*; skin of the feeder *b*; intestines *c*; liver glands *d*; throat *e*; mouth *f*. The assimilated food flows through *a* into the cavity of the stem, whence it is distributed through the different orifices (fig. 2 *a*, 3 *a*, 4 *a*, 5 *a*, 9 *a*, 10 *a*) to the other polyps.

PREHENSILE FILAMENTS (fig. 1 *t*, fig. 3 *g* to *m*, and fig. 4). Skin *g*; hollow interior *h*; arms *i*; bell-shaped envelope of the arm *k*; nettle-battery *l*; nettle-filament *m*.

SHIELD, OR PROTECTING POLYP (fig. 1 *o*, fig. 5 *k*). It covers the feeders *b*, and the feelers *h*.

FEELERS OR SENTIENT POLYPS (fig. 1 *t*, and fig. 6).

MALE AND FEMALE POLYPS (fi. 1 *g*, fig. 9 and fig. 10). Their bells *b*, their stomach *d*, sperma *c* is formed in the walls of the polyp The stomach of the female is filled with eggs.

formed by its several fellow-citizens, it needs must soon perish, if it be detached from its old companions. For one Medusa of the Siphonophore can only float, another only feel, a third only feed, a fourth only catch prey and repel enemies, etc. Only the harmonious coöperation and the reciprocal support of all its members, only the communal consciousness, only the *central soul*, linking all together in bonds of faithful love, can impart a lasting stability to the existence of both the individuals and their totality. In the same manner also in human affairs, only the faithful fulfillment of political and social duties by the citizens of a country ensures the permanent existence of civilized states."

Man no less than the colonial sea-nettle possesses a double soul. The peripheral soul of man consists of the many different activities of such cells as do not stand in a direct relation to the central soul-life of his organism. And by central soul we understand that part of our mind, which makes up the sphere of consciousness.

The spheres of the peripheral and the central soul are not distinctly separated by a definite boundary. The transition from the one to the other is almost imperceptible, and although there is an enormous amount of peripheral soul-activity that is never illuminated by, and apparently can never be accompanied with, consciousness (let me only mention the nervous activity of all the details of digestion, the work done by the kidneys, the liver, etc.,), there is also a vast neutral territory which is now conscious, now unconscious. The main tracts of this neutral territory, which, according to our wants, may not be or may be connected with consciousness, might fairly be included in the term central soul.

There are innumerable nerve-ganglions in our body, whose work is steadily performed without our being conscious of it. Indeed, it is the smallest part of the psychical processes going on within us, of which we become conscious. This fact by no means proves that unconscious activity proceeds without any feeling. It proves only that the feeling of these peripheral ganglions stands in no direct connection with the conscious life of our central soul. The feeling of peripheral ganglions must be of a lower kind, it is extremely vague and dim in comparison with that of central soul-life, where, by a specialization, it has become extraordinarily strong. Sometimes, however, in abnormal conditions of things, caused by disease, the feeling of the peripheral ganglions may be so intensified that we do become conscious of it in the form of pains and the various kinds of aches.

The peripheral and central soul-life continually intertwine. The labors of conscious activity that may have been performed with the intensest attention, will sink down into the night of unconsciousness, and *vice versa*, unconscious memories of the past, that seem irredeemably lost to our recollection, continue to live ; they sometimes combine with other, kindred or antagonistic, ideas, and then their logical results only, the product of their combination, unexpectedly and suddenly flash up on the surface of our conscious being. And we—*i. e.*, in this case, our central soul—do not know whence they come. They haunt us like voices of spirits from a distant beyond.

Our conscious ego covers a very narrow space. Only one or two and certainly no more than a few ideas can at one and the same time be accompanied with consciousness. How poor would we be, if our mental existence were limited to that. Happily, we can constantly derive new vigor and recreation from the spheres of our unconscious soul-life.

Could we look into the interior of a human brain, and did we understand all the many vibrations and motions of the nerve-substance, we would undoubtedly be struck with the quantity of unconscious work that is being carried on there all the time. We should observe how many millions of memories (every one of them having a special structure of its own) are constantly nourished by the oxygen-freighted corpuscles of the blood which surround them in the delicate capillaries.

LOCALIZATION OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS ACCORDING TO EXNER, IN ORDER TO SHOW THEIR DISTRIBUTION.

The places where the different kinds of memories are located do not form, as has been supposed, distinct provinces separated by definite boundaries. They are promiscuously distributed, yet there are corners where memories of the same kind are thickly crowded. In the parietal circumvolutions of the cortex, round about the fissure Rolando,* we see the movements of our limbs in their most complicated combinations. Below the fissure of Silvius are images of sound. There are all the old nursery rhymes, college songs, sonatas, and operas, that have delighted us. Near by are the words of our mother tongue. They

* *Gyrus centralis, lobulus præcentralis*, and the regions about the *præcuneus*, according to Fritsch-Hitzig and Ferrier.

live deep in the folds of the fissure Silvius, in the third frontal circumvolution and are largely dispersed over the sphenoidal lobe. All the verses of our childhood, of which we have not thought for years and years, are there still preserved. The front corner of the sphenoidal lobe is the seat of smell,* perfumes, and odors—disagreeable and pleasant. The hind part of the cortex in the occipital lobe† is full of images, it glows with colored pictures of all kinds. There are the dear old faces of our friends, there are landscapes and all manner of instantaneous photographs of former sights and experiences. In the three frontal circumvolutions those thoughts are throbbing that are of a more abstract order. There are philosophical reflections and mathematical problems. Now and then one or the other idea looms out like a memorial of a national victory more powerfully than the rest. They are the memories of successful thoughts, of happy solutions of difficult problems. What an astounding throng of different structures, and all alive and consisting of feeling nerve-substance!

This is the physiological aspect of the brain. Psychologically considered our mind is an immense empire of innumerable spirits that here live together in the narrow space of about a quarter of a cubic foot. Spirits they are, because they are psychical existences, they are framed by the memories of organized substance. Yet at the same time they are material realities; they are living forms of bodily presence, sustained by the nourishing currents of the blood.

This vast spiritual empire in the human brain is excellently provided for with highways and by-ways for intercommunication. The communications are called by physiologists commissural fibers, by psychologists associations. If it so happens that in the state of unconscious activity a certain number of ideas associate, and then if they have formed a new unity (the solution of a problem, a discovery, an invention or a poem), their life becomes more excited so that they make themselves felt. They are ushered into our consciousness like an inspiration from heaven. Is it to be wondered at that the poet, the artist, the prophet are under the impression that they are instruments merely in the hands of a Greater One than themselves; they feel influenced by a foreign and a supernatural power, over which they have no control? And this is true in a certain sense. As the limbs and the whole body of a child grow without the assistance of his consciousness, or as plants germinate and blow and bring seed, so the thoughts of a man in the shape of delicate brain-structures which are the organs of his feeling and thinking, grow and develop even in spite of him, even if he should attempt to oppose their development. It is not *we* who make our thoughts think, but our thoughts are thinking, and their thinking is sometimes accompanied with consciousness. Therefore, we should say, as Lichtenberg proposes, "it thinks," just as we say: "it lightens," or "it rains."

Experimental psychology has furnished us with many new data of abnormal soul-life through pathological observations and hypnotic experiments. How odd and incredible, indeed, at first sight, almost impossible, do these recent acquisitions of psychological research appear. And yet they find their parallels in well known and common facts of mental activity—in facts that every one can verify by his own experience. If the facts are but clearly stated in their parallelism, what a flood of light do they shed upon all the problems of abnormal soul-life! P. C.

* *Cyrus hypocampi*, according to Munk; *gyrus uncinatus*, according to Ferrier.

† According to Munk and Ferrier.

THE AMERICAN SECULAR UNION.

REPORT OF ITS ANNUAL CONGRESS AND REORGANIZATION.

THE remarkable organization which commenced its career at Philadelphia in the Centennial year, 1876, for the purpose of promoting Secular Government and the complete divorce of Church and State, has just closed its Thirteenth Annual Congress in the same city. To be sure, its name has been changed to that of the American Secular Union, but after trying various additions to its platform, it has returned not only to the city of its first love, but to the original "Nine Demands of Liberalism," formulated by its chief-founder, Mr. F. E. Abbot, of Massachusetts.

About four years ago it claimed to have at least 275 auxiliary leagues scattered through the Northern and Western States principally, but during the last three years little effort was made to sustain them, and a large part of them have suspended action. During the last year many of those interested in state secularization have determined to revive and extend this organization. Therefore, the life-members, officers, and delegates from a large number of auxiliaries met at *Industrial Hall*, Philadelphia, on the 25th of October, pursuant to the call for the congress.

The annual report and address of the president, Dr. R. B. Westbrook, was looked forward to with great interest, as likely to determine what should be done. He met the occasion to the satisfaction of all by a most practical, able, and business-like address, which at once put the whole movement upon solid ground.

Dr. Westbrook is a venerable gentleman verging upon his three score years and ten, but his vigor promises ten years of good work yet. His career as teacher, clergyman, lawyer, and author has given him learning, experience, and knowledge of men and things that singularly qualify him for the duties of president. This was made evident by his review of the difficulties of the union, and his way out of them. The trouble he pointed out was that the union had been without any active concentration of its efforts. Its constitution was too large; its officers were scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and could not meet or coöperate; its auxiliaries had no bond of union or certain objects: its purposes had been originally the "Nine Demands," but they had been added to or overlaid, or confounded with educational, suffrage, political, or other suggestions, so that the main objects of the Union had been confused in the public mind. He had published due notice of amendments to the constitution which would make it concise and practical. By it a Board of Managers were to have a majority residing near the same city, who could attend, and have an office with a stenog-

rapher and typewriter as secretary, etc. The auxiliary societies were to be visited by suitable lecturers and organizers, the political objects of the union relating to the separation of Church and State were to be prosecuted actively, and to these objects *only*, as set forth in the "Nine Demands," were members of the union in any wise to be committed by joining it, or its auxiliaries. All other topics, the discussion of which might interest the auxiliaries, should be left to their own discretion—whether concerning science, religion, politics, morals, socialism, anarchy, or anything else. The matter of the religious exercises, etc., in *Girard College* was referred to as an instance of perversion of the will and purpose of that great philanthropist, which the Union should take measures to have discontinued. The pretense that such exercises are part of "moral" instruction was thoroughly exploded. But in this connection the President submitted a proposal to have the work of furnishing moral instruction, independent of "religious," thoroughly entered upon. At his suggestion the sum of $1000 had been raised as a prize for the best manual of ethical instruction which should be presented during the present year.

These were the more important topics of the address.

The next day the Congress took them up in detail and after full discussion they were all adopted and the constitution amended in substance as had been proposed. The officers were then elected for the ensuing year as follows:

President: R. B. Westbrook, No. 1707 Oxford St., Philad'a.

Active Vice-Presidents: T. B. Wakeman, New York; Dr. E. B. Foote, Jr., New York; Dr. Juliet H. Severance, Milwaukee; John E. Remsburg, Kansas.

Secretary: Miss Ida M. Craddock, Philadelphia.

Treasurer: F. C. Mendie, Philadelphia.

The above officers constitute the Board of Managers, of which four are a quorum. The honorary Vice-Presidents, headed by Col. *R. J. Ingersoll*, make a long list of the distinguished liberals of the United States, including one active member at least from each state, who is expected to look after its liberal affairs and interests. The business affairs of the Congress were thus closed in harmony and to the very great satisfaction of all.

The committee of seven on resolutions reported on Sunday afternoon before an audience that filled the hall and which adopted the report unanimously.

The first resolution congratulated the Liberals and Secularists of the country upon the reorganization of the union, and requested all of the old leagues, unions, and secular societies, and all those in favor of the separation of Church and State, whether organized or not, to report to the president of the Union. The resolutions then denounced the infractions of secular government as set forth in the nine demands, *viz.:*

1. The robbery of the people by the exemption of church and ecclesiastical property from taxation, amounting to millions of dollars annually.
2. The robbery by voting public money to sectarian charities and institutions, also amounting to millions.
3. The imposition of chaplains and prayers upon legislative and public bodies, public institutions, or the army and navy.
4. The imposition of Bibles, prayers, and religious exercises upon the public schools, thereby endangering by sectarianism our whole system of common education.
5. The imposition of religious Fasts and Thanksgivings by the president and governors.
6. The imposition of religious oaths in courts.
7. The imposition of Sabbath laws; closing of libraries, museums, etc.
8. The enforcement of "Christian Morality," instead of secular, natural, social morals, by United States prosecutors, as in the case of Harman & Walker, in Kansas, and the Spiritualist Reed, in Michigan.
9. The attempt to force "The principles of the Christian Religion" upon the rising generation under the pretense of education, as is projected in the "Blair Bill," now pending before the United States Senate. On the contrary, they demand that all changes necessary to place our National and State Governments upon a purely secular, non-religious basis shall be consistently, unflinchingly, and promptly made.

The above are the nine demands stated and applied; and in order that there should be no mistake the removal of Postmaster-General Wannamaker was called for, for his suppression of Sunday mail-service, his prosecution of Reed, and his sectarian partiality.

The services and worth of *Horace Seaver*, the late deceased editor of the Boston *Investigator*, were then gracefully remembered, and sympathy was expressed for the great English Liberal, Charles Bradlaugh, in his illness, and hope for his recovery and continued usefulness.

* * *

On Saturday evening, the 26th, the Rev. Dr. McGlynn, the recalcitrant Roman Catholic Priest, addressed the Congress and an overflowing audience upon "Our Public Schools and Their Enemies." Dr. McGlynn also expressed his concurrence in the main object of the Union, the complete divorce of Religion and State, for the good of both. He spoke for an hour and a half, and left to catch the train, leaving the audience in a great state of enthusiasm. It was in every respect a noble and a noteworthy address. This reverend gentleman is himself a son of the New York common school, and though he may still believe that he is a Roman Catholic in doctrine and feeling, he evidently can never again be an automaton of the Roman ecclesiastical machine.

On Sunday afternoon, the 27th, an enthusiastic audience filled Industrial Hall, on Broad Street, above Vine, to hear the Rev. Minot J. Savage, the celebrated Liberal Unitarian clergyman, of Boston, who delivered an address on "Religion in Our Public Schools," in the series of addresses to the American Secular Union. The audience was in perfect sympathy with the sentiments expressed by Mr. Savage, and applauded him frequently. He said in substance:—

"There is always some special incident which starts a public "movement; Lexington precipitated but did not cause the Revo-"lution; the firing on Fort Sumter occasioned but did not cause "the Rebellion. Each of these wars was the result of a century's "growth, and when a Boston Catholic criticized the public-school "system it brought this question before the people; it too, had de "veloped on years. If you review the history of the Puritans, can "you wonder that they, looking upon life as they did, made church-"membership and citizenship identical? I claim that it is the "most cruel of conceivable tyrannies to compel any man to edu-"cate his children in a way that he believes shall mean eternal "misery for them. If I were a Catholic I would not for a moment "endure the New England system of education. The tyranny "that caused the Revolution was slight in comparison with this, "that a Jew, a Buddhist, a Hindoo, shall be compelled to educate "his children in the principles of Evangelical Christianity.

"By what right does the State educate the child at all? Many "claim that it has no right and that the privilege belongs exclu-"sively to the family. But the State has a right to compel this, "the same right that it has to lay taxes and to compel citizens to "enter the army—the right of public safety, and it has no other. "It has this right only because the stability of our Government "depends on the intelligence of the men who hold the ballot. The "public safety demands that everyone shall be educated sufficiently "to earn a livelihood. Whether this shall mean industrial schools "or a general training of the intellect depends on opinion. But "the principal things they should be taught, should be to under-

"stand the drift of the tides on the great sea of life. The public "safety also demands that enough education be given that citizens "may cast an intelligent ballot. Our greatest trouble is that our "legislators do not know the history of nations, and we are com-"pelled to try over old experiments that have failed ages ago, and "the third demand is that all have enough moral training to com-"prehend and appreciate the duties of citizenship.

"It is a prevalent idea that theology and morals can not be "separated; but they had different origins and are entirely sepa-"rate, though they tend to the same end. The early gods them-"selves were not noted for their morality and I think the gods of "some modern faiths are not up to the level of modern life. Mo-"rality arises entirely from social relations. Socrates was put to "death for his irreligion, but he was faithful to the highest ethical "principles. Theodore Parker, if judged by some modern churches, "was irreligious because he was compelled by his allegiance to "loftier moral things. Let the Catholic teach his child what he "chooses in regard to the origin of right and wrong, let the Evan-"gelical Christian teach what he will in regard to the result of this "life's action. There is the limit of the state's power and juris-"diction.

"It is utterly hopeless for any of the theories of settlement to "be efficiently carried out There are so many shades of opinion, "not to speak of religions, that the only remedy is the complete "secularization of our schools, the entire separation of Church "and State where each may develop healthfully. Parochial "schools? Yes, if they want them; but there is no school so good "as the public school where the child may be learning the great "lesson of life. But we want to reach the point where the evan-"gelical influences shall cease entirely in these public schools and "where they shall be taught the duties of self-respect and self-"support, whence they shall come chaste and intelligent citizens, "ready and able to support a government where there is no union "of Church and State."

In the evening another overflowing audience attended to close the Congress and to hear T. B. Wakeman, of New York, who spoke upon "Our Nine Demands of Liberalism, a Plea for Simple Justice, Nothing More." The principles which the other speakers applied to the common schools, Mr. Wakeman applied to the whole system of Government. He gave history, philosophy, and illustrations for over an hour, to the great delight of the audience, who applauded to the echo. It is impossible to give any outline even of that speech here. It was a necessary part of the Liberal movement in its present emergency and should be obtained for THE OPEN COURT if possible.

After Mr. Wakeman's address, *Mrs. Lucy N. Colman*, of Syracuse, the well-known Heroine of Abolition days, told how the clergy had practically captured the Woman Suffrage Movement in the United States, and also the Prohibition party, and how both woman's rights and temperance had been checked in consequence.

To close the Congress *Miss Susan Nixon*, of Fall River, Mass., read an admirable address on the "Influence of Liberalism on the Home and Family." The hearty applause which came from every one at its close, as the President said, had put all under a charm not to be broken by further speech, and he put the motion and declared the Congress of 1889 adjourned.

BOOK NOTICES.

POEMS. By *Lee Fairchild*. Chicago: A. F. Moore.

POEMS. By *James Arthur Edgerton*. Marietta, Ohio: E. R. Alderman & Sons.

From the little volume of Mr. Fairchild we may quote the following lines on "Immortality" as illustrative of the author's poetical skill:

"The skies may drink the ocean dry,
And hush its liquid psalm of thunder
Forever on the orphaned shore;
The centuries may wear the hills away
With muffled tread of airy feet;
The stars grow weary of their march sublime,
And, falling from their paths of beauty, quench
Their silvery flames in darkness infinite;
And yet shall God remain, and with a smile
Illuminate the trembling worlds of dark,
As with the blush of dawn;
And then shall man be happy in the bloom
Of his eternal youth!"

Mr. Edgerton's verses do not so easily admit of a complete citation, the majority of his poems being several stanzas in length. But the subjoined lines from "The Thunderstorm" are selected, after some discrimination, and in these we believe the poet is at his best:

"The storm now reaches to its height;
Now blacker lowers the murky night;
The blue-tinged lightnings flash more bright,
And cleave the dark in twain,
That still within the rayless black
Are swallowed up again.
With broken jags a fiery gleam
And pouring down a livid stream
There comes—the very marrows thrill,
While all again is deathly still,—
The very walls of heaven crack,
And fling their yells of ruin back
And pealing forth, as on the earth
They'd bring a chaos into birth,
But that the wrath within them pent,
Though laboring still, can find no vent;
But labors bursting till 'tis spent."

The first of the series *Tracts for the Times*, edited by Mr. M. C. O'Byrne, and published by Mr. W. S. MacEwen, has appeared. The title is "The Road to Ruin, or the New Age of Brass," the author Mr. M. C. O'Byrne. The following citation will express the spirit of the new publication: "That which is now termed civilisation we have long protested against as a system which dehumanises those who come within its influence. The culture of modern society is, as it were, a hot-house culture of a few plants, while the other and major portion of the human garden is left wholly to itself. Oppression and cruelty, sickness and poverty, have ever been the attendants of artificial, abnormal, high-pressure civilization which are not founded upon the civilizing—that is, the making more virtuous, humane, and happy—of the whole of the community in every nation; and that these evils prevail to-day is a sad and serious truth upon which every social reformer would do well to meditate."

NOTES.

It has long been our desire periodically to present to our readers items of correspondence from prominent European authors, discussing the scientific tendencies and philosophical spirit of the times of the respective countries in which they live. We announce, therefore, with pleasure, that M. Lucien Arréat, the author of "*Journal d'un Philosophe*," "*La Morale dans le Drame, l'Epopé et le Roman*," *etc.*, and a constant contributor to the *Revue Philosophique*, will furnish us from time to time with critical notes upon the philosophical publications of France.

We have received the first advance copy to the American press of Miss Zula Maud Woodhull's most recent publication, "The Proposal," a dialogue between a gentleman and a lady anent that momentous venture in which "a woman stakes her soul." The aim is to purify our ideas, especially those of men, upon the subject of marriage. The lady, through an acute dialectical process, extorts from the gentleman this confession: "I have always thought the aim was *to get as much pleasure and happiness out of life as possible*. You have changed my ideas with regard to this. I commence to think there is another code of honor besides the world's code. You inspire in me a feeling that there is a haven I have never dreamt of—that the bliss or hell is of my own making."

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

A REJOINDER TO MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES

BY ALFRED BINET.

I HAVE read with great interest the article (No. 98 of THE OPEN COURT) in which Mr. Romanes discusses the criticisms that in my recent study of Micro-organisms I addressed to him. I wish to offer a few words in reply; endeavoring to limit within as narrow bounds as possible the discussion that has arisen between us.

First, let us rid ourselves of a slight difference, quite subordinate. Mr. Romanes contends, that in his various works he has assigned a much greater place to the psychic life of micro-organisms than I have allowed. I maintain, on the contrary, that he has almost totally neglected that department of investigation, and that it is an omission greatly to be regretted. In his work "Mental Evolution in Animals," he only refers, in following Engelmann, to the two facts, that certain Protozoa seek the light and give chase.* This is indeed little. But let us turn to the volume that contains the main recorded facts of observation—I have reference to the work bearing the title of "Animal Intelligence." We will find there, in the first chapter, four pages devoted to the Protozoa. Strange to say, the first creature treated of in those pages is a Rotifer; an animal that belongs to a branch much higher in organization than that of the Protozoans. The second example given is not a whit more fortunate, for the Myxomycetæ that are there discussed are likewise not Protozoa, but vegetal organisms. The remainder of the section is filled with observations by Carter upon Rhizopoda and Amœbæ. The latter author has made some surprising observations, which are all the more in need of confirmation by reason of the fact that Carter does not, as Mr. Romanes supposes, possess a competence in such matters that is incontestable; on the contrary, his authority is of a very mediocre order among men of his department, and he has committed numerous errors that Stein has pointed out. I have not the space here to give in full the observation of Carter, which is particularly remarkable from the singular language he employs; he speaks of the "*ovarian* aperture" of the Acineta, of the "*fatal lap*" of the Amœba, etc.: surely not the language of a man of science. The following, in few words, is the most curious of the observations he reports. Carter saw an amœba wind itself about the body of a parent-acineta that was just ready to give birth to a filial organism; when the latter was brought forth with the vibratile cilia that enable it to make a rapid flight, immediately upon its exit from the ovary (?) the amœba seized and incepted it. I find it impossible to draw any conclusion from this fact, because I do not know whether it is to be explained by the chance of an encounter or by an act of prevision on the part of the amœba. For this reason, and many others, I am constrained to pass by this observation.

And that is all. Mr. Romanes speaks no further of Micro-organisms. Although, despite this dearth of data gathered, he does not hesitate to assign them a place in his diagram of psychical functions. Moreover, as psychical functions, he accredits them with *excitability, discrimination, conductibility.* Why are these qualities thus attributed? As the result of the observations we have cited? This, indeed, is beyond my understanding. It appears to me, that there is no relation whatever between the chart and the observations contained in the text.

I shall no longer tarry by like minor points of detail, and now immediately come to a question of much greater importance, upon which Mr. Romanes and I are divided.

I refer to the matter of consciousness. When we come to deal with comparative psychology, and study an animal organism from the point of view of its motory activity, we are naturally led to ask whether the animal in question is conscious of the stimulations received from the outer world and of the movements it performs as the consequence of those stimulations. This is a question of such high importance that Mr. Romanes begins with it his study of Mental Evolution in Animals. The first chapter of that work bears the title "The Criterion of Mind" and it is occupied with the investigation of the physical indices that best enable us to determine whether a living creature is endowed with conscious activity. The author has not concealed the difficulties of his undertaking, and he has explicitly recognized that the question propounded is incapable of receiving a direct experimental solution. In the matter of consciousness, the individual is immediately cognizant of only his own consciousness; he

* Pages 80 and 81.

knows that he has certain thoughts, that he experiences certain pleasures, pains, feelings, etc. To establish the existence of consciousness in other organisms than ourselves, we are obliged to resort to inferential reason, to inductions more or less perfectly founded, and our inductions, moreover, can never be directly confirmed by experience.

These peculiar conditions plainly render the study of consciousness very difficult, and the question arises, whether, indeed, it be prudent to take this problem as the basis of comparative psychology, and to subordinate, in a way, all others to it. But Mr. Romanes has not hesitated. He has produced a criterion of mind that answered his purpose of classifying the different animals from the point of view of their psychical faculties. The fact taken as criterion, is the ability to learn by individual experience. "The criterion of mind, ejectively considered, consists in the exhibition of Choice, and the evidence of Choice we found to consist in the performance of adaptive action suited to meet circumstances which have not been of such frequent or invariable occurrence in the life-history of the race, as to have been specially and antecedently provided for in the individual by the inherited structure of its nervous system."*

Accordingly, then, all motory activity apparently fixed in the individual and in the species by heredity, can furnish no competent evidence of its being a conscious activity.

We shall return, in due time, to this criterion, of which this commendation at least may be made, that it is the most carefully elaborated of all hitherto proposed. Mr. Romanes has taken much pains to institute exhaustive researches in relation to the psychological problems that he regards the indispensable preliminaries to a study of the mental evolution of animals. It remains, however, to be seen, whether the results he has obtained can be accepted.

I shall now explain the point of view from which I have proceeded, in writing my treatise upon the psychic life of micro-organisms. This point of view has nothing in common with that of Mr. Romanes. I did not set out, as he has, with laying down a criterion of mind or of consciousness; and if I did not do so, it was not because I forgot it, but because I deemed it imprudent. The problem of consciousness, so soon as I had closely examined it, seemed to me absolutely insolvable; and now again, in spite of all the pains I have taken to re-read the work of my adversary, I still consider that investigation fruitless—at least for me. I accordingly put it out of my way: I do not entirely reject it as the positivists do, for questions of origin and purpose,—I reserve it. I, in this way undertook to write a psychology of micro-organisms without concerning myself to ascertain whether these low-class creatures were or were not conscious of the stimulations they receive from their environment, and of the movements of adaptation they perform in consequence of these stimulations. I, moreover, expressly emphasized this reservation on page 61 of the American edition of my work.

I ought, perhaps, to have insisted more strongly upon that reservation, which Mr. Romanes does not seem have noticed; I should have pointed out what the inherent difficulties were, in a discussion of any criterion whatsoever of mind. My excuse for not having done so, is, that I modestly proposed, in that work, to present new observations, little known to psychologists; and if I added to those facts a few lines of comment, it was done simply to emphasize their importance.

Possibly, the reader will ask, What can a comparative psychology lead to, the chief problem of which is summarily suppressed? What interest, it will be said, does the psychological study of micro organisms possess, if we resolve not to investigate the degree of consciousness enjoyed? Suppressing that question, what remains?

In answer to the objection, I will reply with Mr. Romanes, who in this regard must wholly share my opinion, that what we call a conscious phenomenon, such as a perception for example, a ratiocination, an act of memory, is in reality a complex and deceptive operation; simultaneously with the state of consciousness revealed to each one of us, an especial work is performed in the ganglionary cells connected with the function set in activity, and although very little is known of the inner nature of this work, its existence at least may be definitely known by the various muscular, thermal, and secretory effects that it induces in the organism. The acts of life of relation, therefore, may be studied from two points of view: from the subjective, mental point of view, and from the objective, material point of view.

Now this is precisely what I have done. In my work on Micro-Organisms, I particulary endeavored to bring this side of the question to the light. In examining, for instance, the observation of Verworn upon *Difflugia urceolata*, I sought to analyze the complicated acts of preadaptation which that animal executes, without putting to myself the question whether *Difflugia* was conscious of the end sought after. The objective, the palpable fact was, that the animal performed an act of preadaptation.

It will suffice, in fine, to say, that, having come to the conviction that the question of consciousness is one of the most difficult and complex that can be propounded, I had systematically excluded that question from my study of Micro-organisms; I treated it in no

*Page 59.

aspect, I even deemed it necessary, the only time I alluded to it, to state that it appeared to me almost insolvable.

No one, in my opinion, has a right to reproach an author for proceeding with too great prudence; and the position I have taken, moreover, it is my intention absolutely to maintain. I shall maintain it, until new facts been brought to my knowledge competent to clear up the psychology of consciousness and unconsciousness.

However, I must now occupy myself more especially with Mr. Romanes's opinions on comparative psychology; I criticized his opinions in the preface to my treatise and to those criticisms he has replied.

Mr. Romanes reproaches me with having contested various interpretations of his, that were the regular application of his criterion of mind, and with not having spoken of that criterion, which I appear to be ignorant of. I am pleased to own, upon that point, that my honored adversary is right. It was positively wrong of me, not to have entered upon the question as a whole, and it would have been better not to have summarily treated the matter in a few lines. I propose, then, to correct, to the best of my ability, the omission I have made, and carefully to examine the criterion of mind that Mr. Romanes has propounded, and to which I have referred in the first part of this article.

To escape the possibility of future errors, I shall examine Mr. Romanes's theory by reference to the data contained in the first six chapters of "Mental Evolution in Animals." We will return once more to the "criterion"; pointing out the method the author pursues to present it and at the same time to prove it. "The distinctive element of mind," says he, "is consciousness; the test of consciousness is the presence of choice; the evidence of choice is the antecedent uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more alternatives . . . . if there be no alternative of adjustment, it is impossible, in an animal at least, to distinguish reflex action from mental adaptation. Accordingly, adjustive actions that are always the same in the same circumstances of adjustment, in short such as depend upon inherited structures in the nervous system may be regarded as devoid of consciousness. In a word the power of learning by individual experience is the criterion of mind."

It is to be observed, that the employment of this criterion has availed Mr. Romanes to distribute the different animal species in a psychological classification summarized in the form of a diagrammatic chart, to which we have already alluded.

Before proceeding further, we are to note, that the criterion proposed by Mr. Romanes must necessarily rest upon the study of his own consciousness, that is to say, of his own subjective impressions. From observing himself live and feel, he has been able to say that such an act is conscious and such an act not conscious. He cites, as illustrative, the reflex actions, which have, he says, a quasi-intellectual activity and which, nevertheless, are devoid of consciousness. We might add thereto that complete class of automatic movements, so many in number, that we perform several hundred times in the course of a day, not only without volition on our part, but without any appreciable element of consciousness whatever involved. If it were required, accordingly, to rely exclusively upon introspection, it would be comparatively easy to mark in every circumstance the limit of consciousness; and the limit once marked, we might say: on this side, there is consciousness, on that unconsciousness. But recent facts, a multitude in number, and observed by so many different investigators that they cannot be questioned, show that the introspective method cannot elucidate the question we have just presented. I am obliged, at this point, to take Mr. Romanes into a province that is not his own, and to speak with him of researches that have been made of late years in France upon the various disorders of consciousness in hysterical individuals. These researches, which are well-known to the readers of THE OPEN COURT, have shown that there exists in individuals affected with hysteria a plurality of consciousnesses; when, for example, we provoke a movement in a member that apparently is totally insensible, that movement is not perceived by what we call the principal consciousness of the subject; but it is taken up by a secondary consciousness which is able to retain the recollection of that perception. There are, accordingly, in such subjects, phenomena that seem to fall without consciousness and which yet are not unconscious; they are, if the expression be allowed, *sub-conscious*. The presence of a plurality of consciousnesses is not, moreover, peculiar to the mental organism of hysterical patients. Analogous disturbances are found in all individuals who present what is called "automatic writing," and we know, at this day, that such subjects are extremely plentiful. These experiments contain a teaching that it is proper to emphasize: namely, that introspection has limits which are not those of consciousness but those of *one* consciousness. There is nothing to prove that in the normal individual many a perception, many a ratiocination are not produced, which never get to the principal consciousness, but which go to form a minor rudimentary consciousness beneath the former. This opinion has been upheld, and not refuted.

Following out these ideas, we are come so far, as to give the word unconsciousness an entirely new meaning; having brought forth that character of systematization found at the basis of every well-organized

consciousness. Our assumed unconsciousness would be nothing more than elements of consciousness that are not coördinated among each other and that do not form a compact synthesis. Thus, to take a typical instance borrowed from my own personal experience, I present a highly complicated automatic movement, consisting of taking a key from my pocket and inserting it in the lock of the door, every time I return to my home. Now, it very frequently happens that when I am about to pay a visit to some friend, I pull the key from my pocket the moment I approach his door. That movement, it is plain, is not voluntary; and it does not become a conscious movement until the key is half inserted in the lock; at this moment, my will intervenes to suppress the act. If we were to trust solely to the evidence of consciousness, we could plainly maintain that this act is unconscious; but the observations I have just advanced forbid asserting anything certain in that regard; it is possible that a phenomenon of consciousness is produced which remains isolated, which does not connect itself with my principal consciousness, and which, consequently, for me is as if it did not exist at all. I do not insist upon this hypothesis, but unquestionably it must be taken into account.

We cannot take Mr. Romanes to task for not having regarded these recent facts, which are of later date than his works. Nevertheless, we must observe that the hypnotic experiments to which I have just alluded, tend considerably to widen the domain of phenomena of consciousness, and materially to weaken the criterion of mind that Mr. Romanes has invented. I had, accordingly, just reason for saying, at the beginning of this article, that when we deal with a question so delicate as that of consciousness, it is necessary to be very cautious.

Mr. Romanes will not reproach me, I hope, with having far-fetched my arguments; for he has himself expounded, in excellent terms, the nature of the operation termed "*ejection*," which avails us to come at knowledge of other consciousnesses than our own. Mr. Romanes has shown that this operation is accomplished by projecting into the minds of others what has transpired in our own; and every investigation, accordingly, that we make concerning the nature and extent of consciousness in man is of immediate consequence to the so-called ejective method.

But let us leave general considerations aside and examine the thesis of Mr. Romanes more closely. Suppose it were absolutely proven, that to the functional activity of the nervous system there are two parts: a conscious part and an unconscious part; what will follow therefrom? and what is the conclusion that induction will draw from that fact when we come to interpret the psychic life of any animal whatsoever?

The conclusion that to me appears the only just one, is, to translate the inference thus arrived at, into the life of relation of every living organism, and to say that every animal is endowed with a conscious activity and an unconscious activity. We shall thus assign to every animal, by an effort of induction, the complete result of the introspection that each individual can bring to bear upon himself; and in order to distinguish in every animal the part of consciousness, we will make use of the distinction established with reference to ourselves,—namely, that conscious acts are those which are adapted to new circumstances.

But the supposition cannot be entertained, that a living organism may only present acts of adaptation transmitted by heredity. An author who recognizes, and upholds with the ability of Mr. Romanes, that animal intelligence passes through an evolution comparable to organic evolution,* would contradict himself if he were to allow that certain animal species, not confined to unusual conditions, (as those of parasitism, for instance,) could not possess the power of learning by individual experience. But, as that power is regarded by Mr. Romanes himself as the criterion of mind, it follows, it seems to me, that he was wrong, in making out his diagram, to fix the lower limit of consciousness at the level of the Cœlenterata.

Furthermore, it may be said, that, in treating of theoretical questions of this class, Mr. Romanes is not sufficiently concerned about the origin of those "inherited mechanisms of the nervous system which are so constructed as always to produce the same acts in the same circumstances of stimulation." These mechanisms were not always hereditary; heredity which is nothing but a preservative force, a memory of the species, supposes an anterior power of acquisition. The sucking of the teat, which is one of the earliest hereditary acts of the human race, may be explained by heredity among the mammifers; but in order that that power may have been transmitted, it must have been acquired; and the acquisition must have taken place at the time of the formation of the mammiferous type.† If we apply the criterion of Mr. Romanes to cases of this class, we are forced to the conclusion, that consciousness is present at the beginning of all acts and movements of adaptation.

I embrace neither side, upon this question, which, it seems to me, at the present time is not ripe for solution. I confine myself to pointing out my reasons for not having accepted the criterion proposed by Mr. Romanes.

Will he himself always remain true to it? I doubt it.

* Read, for example, his chapter on the Plasticity of Instinct, p. 200, Mental Evolution in Animals.

† On this point, read Mr. Romanes's passage upon the Secondary Instincts, page 189.

Upon again carefully reading his work on "Mental Evolution in Animals," I believe I have come upon a point, in his definition of instinct, very difficult of comprehension. On the one hand, Mr. Romanes says, that "the only distinction between adjustive movements due to reflex action and adjustive movements accompanied by mental perception consists in the former depending on inherited mechanisms within the nervous system being so constructed as to effect particular adjustive movements in response to particular stimulations, while the latter are independent of any such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to the exigencies of special circumstances." Further on, he insists on "the variable and incalculable character of conscious adjustments as distinguished from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjustments." After carefully reading the passage quoted, one is astounded to find instinct defined as "reflex action in which there is an element of consciousness" . . . . notwithstanding "the instinctive action be similarly performed under similar circumstances by all the individuals of the same species."* The contradiction is very apparent.

* * *

But I must stop. I believe I have said sufficient to convince my readers that the question of consciousness is extremely difficult, both to put and to solve; and that rather than to lose one's time in examining that problem, it is much better to make observations and to institute experiments.

The merit of the scientific labors of Mr. Romanes lies quite in another direction: it consists in the considerable number of observations he has made and the experiments he has instituted in relation to the psychic life of animals; and no one can admire more than I the intelligence and sagacity of which he has given such ample evidence in that domain. I trust, that the criticisms I have herein advanced in defense of my opinions, opposed to his upon a particular point of scientific research—that is, as to whether the study of consciousness in lower animals ought at present to be entered upon—will not prevent the recognition of sympathy I feel with an investigator who upon so many other points defends the ideas that are mine.

PARIS, September, 1889.

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ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGY IN GERMANY.

BY JOSEPH JASTROW, PH D.

HAVING reviewed the general departments of modern psychological research, I shall attempt to portray in the light of a recent European tour, the actual condition of the study in the chief educational countries of Europe, and will append to this some notes upon psychological progress at home. The present contribution will deal with Germany and indirectly with the educationally allied countries of Austria and Northern Europe.

The two most prominent German contributions to psychology are in completing our knowledge of the physiological bases of mental action and in posing and partially solving the specifically psycho-physical problems of Experimental Psychology. The former developed naturally from the restoration to recognized kinship of two sciences that had become separated by mutual misunderstandings, and had been led to follow divergent paths with only occasional and half-concealed communications between them. While at first this new relation seemed to take the psychologist into fields far removed from his specialty, the frequent discoveries of psychologically important facts in unexpected quarters of this domain have deepened his interest in the labors of his brother scientists. The modern problem, to the elaboration of which Germany has so largely contributed, is the detailed investigation of the functional nexus between portions of the nervous system and the complex of activities that constitute life. This problem becomes most interesting as well as most difficult in relation to the nervous system of man. At first the methods of gross anatomy and finer dissection revealed all that was known of the nervous system, but with the marvellously increased powers furnished by the microscope and the accompanying technique of section-cutting, hardening, and staining, with, too, the utilization of pathological conditions and of embryological formations, for studying normal relations, our notions of the wonderful complexity of the nervous system has been enlarged beyond all expectation and the range of physiological problems proportionately extended.*

It would carry us too far into details were we to attempt a resumé of the current facts and conceptions

*The chief anatomical methods of to-day are: (1) The methods of coarse dissection and fibering; (2) Section cutting and a variety of stainings to bring out and differentiate the different elements of nervous tissue (the first section was cut by Stilling, in 1842); (3) The method of studyiog the progress of degeneration in nerves when cut at various points, introduced about 1850, aod soon followed by (4) The application of the same principle to the effect of disease in man; (5) Gudden's method of extirpating a peripheral or central portion of the nervous system in a young animal and observing what parts fail to develop, with (6) The application of this to abnormal conditions in man, *e. g.*, when a man is born without arms and the ganglion cells of the cervical enlargement are found shrunken or absent; (7) The study of the embryological appearances, it being found that the several fibre-systems appear and are enclosed in their medullary sheaths (rendering them capable of functioning) at different periods, and thus making possible an analysis extremely difficult in the adult (Flechsig, 1872, on); and (9) The method of comparative anatomy, *i. e.*, noting the relative development of parts in differently endowed types of animals. For a concise statement of results in this field see Edinger, "*Zehn Vorlesungen über den Bau der Nervösen Central-Organe*," 1885. Or more fully and recently Obersteiner, *Anleitung bei Studium des Baues der Nervösen Central-Organe*, 1888. Special works are by Flechsig, Meynert (Translated), Von Gudden. Diagrammatic schemes are given by Flechsig, Aeby, and Rohon

respecting the structure and function of the nerve-cell (the nucleus of which is now believed to be the origin of its growth, shrinking when the cell is over-stimulated, paling away when the function is lost and containing within itself the ultimate elements of the forces of heredity); the growth, functioning, and decay of nerve fibres; the demonstration by a variety of mutually corroborative methods of the columns of fibres in the spinal cord, to which, generally speaking, the various sensory nerves contribute as they ascend posteriorly, and from which the motor nerves emerge anteriorly; the reflex-centres of the gray matter of the cord, the properties of which, though mechanical, are so purposive in their nature as to lead some physiologists to speak of a "spinal-cord soul" and which though in a measure independent of the higher centres serve a most delicate and valued index of the efficiency of the whole organism; the centres of the *medulla oblongata* that regulate for us the functions of mere living and so leave our brains free to make life worth living; the complex system of centres lying near the base of the brain and collectively known as the basal ganglia, that may be regarded as an efficient force of clerks registering and controlling that large class of more or less habitual actions, that no longer need our voluntary and conscious attention and so have been handed over to our automata; the centres of the cerebellum specially related to the process of locomotion; and supreme in the hierarchy of nervous centres, the crowning centralizing power, the cortex of the cerebrum where lie, "half-concealed and half-revealed," the mysterious properties by virtue of which an impression is followed by an expression, the subject comes into relation with the object, and knowledge and development become possible.* It would carry us still further into details to trace the connections between these various centres: the fibres of the corpus callosum that bind the two hemispheres of the brain together and perhaps prevent the dissolution of personality that seems to be a favorite fancy of imaginative writers; the complication of relations introduced by the duplication of parts in the two halves of the body, and furthermore by the decussation of the fibres in their course from end-organ to brain, so that the right brain feels the pinch in the left hand, and the race is largely right-handed because it is left-brained; the fibres of the corona radiata spreading in all directions from the basal ganglia and lower centres to the cortex of the brain; the associative fibres uniting different centres of the same hemisphere as well as neighboring convolutions with one another. All these have passed from the stage in which they were personal or national contributions and have become part of the common knowledge of mankind.

The results just enumerated were elaborated by physiologists and as furthering the progress of their own science; their psychological importance being recognized by the modern school of psychologists. We turn now to the contributions of the latter to the foundation of their own speciality. The leader in this movement is Prof. Wilhelm Wundt, of Leipzig, who in 1879 established there the first exclusively psychological laboratory. He, too, first brought together the scattered results in this domain (*Physiologische Psychologie*, first edition 1874, 2d 1880, 3d 1887) and effected the recognition of the new science by the scientific world at large. For anything like an adequate account of the problems and results of German psychological activity, one must refer to Wundt's treatise (closely followed by Ladd in his "Elements of Physiological Psychology") and for special studies to the numbers of the *Philosophische Studien* published by Wundt since 1882. It must suffice here to indicate the several lines of study and the general direction of advance.

What has been said in general under the head of experimental psychology applies with equal truth to German psychology in particular. The study of the psycho-physic law both theoretically and experimentally, is essentially a German study. Besides the work of Fechner himself and the important contributions of Prof. Müller, of Göttingen, Wundt and his pupils have done much towards establishing to what senses the law applies, within what limits its validity is confined, what factors contribute to, or interfere with, its applicability, what methods and precautions must be used in testing it. It is impossible to express in a few words the present condition of the study, though I may venture the statement that the law seems to hold approximately for sensations within the ordinary range of intensity—and for sensations yielding information sufficiently definite and yet not definite enough to be apperceived as quantitatively composed.

The measurement of the time taken up by mental processes has been the favorite study in Wundt's laboratory for several years. The results have taught us how long it takes to signal that we have perceived a sight, a sound, or a touch; how long to recognize the character of a sensation, say, that a color is blue or a

* These researches lead up to, and centre in, the localization of function in the cortex of the brain upon which so many scholars have concentrated their efforts, and which promises to form a permanent landmark in the history of physiology. The researches take their origin in the discovery of the electrical excitability of the cortex in 1870 by Fritsch and Hitzig, though in part connected with the earlier localization of the motor speech-centre (Broca's convolution) by the French physiologists. The chief methods are the method of irritation, observing the movements, etc., following the stimulation of definite areas of the cortex; the extirpation method, removing such areas and noting the impairment of function that follows; the method of pathology that correlates abnormal symptoms with *post-mortem* appearances besides the physiological applications of the anatomical methods above indicated. Very much of this work has been done and is going on in Germany, and the principal workers who have all published extensively on the question are, Exner (Vienna), Munk (Berlin), Goltz (Strassburg), and others.

tone high; how long to make similar distinctions with letters, with sounds, and how this time increases as there are more and more impressions amongst which a distinction is to be made; how long it takes to will to move our right hand or our left, and how much longer to move a given one of the *ten* fingers; how long for one idea to call up another and how much longer when the nature of the association is limited, *e. g.*, when the relation between the words must be that of whole to part; how long to name a letter, or a picture; how long to translate a word or name an object in a foreign language; how long to form a simple judgment; to perform an easy numerical calculation or recall an item of information. Not the time-measurements merely, but the theories of mental acquisition that the results favor and the influences that vary the results have been carefully studied. The nature and intensity of the impression, the preparedness of the subject, the fore knowledge of the nature of the stimulus, and the direction of the attention, whether upon the sensation or upon the movement,—are all important factors. Mental weariness, sensory fatigue, irregular and unexpected impressions usually lengthen the process, while the action of drugs and semi-morbid conditions show another class of influences. The individual variations or 'personal equation' of the astronomers, with whom indeed this study originated, also affects the result; the general law being that the more complex the operation the greater are the differences in the times that it takes different persons to perform it. Again, the curve of practice has been experimentally derived, and the gradual shortening of the time in school-children, as they advance from class to class, and conversely the extreme lengths of these times in the dull and weak-minded suggest the practical importance of such studies. Nor is the field limited to these more elementary processes; as the results themselves indicate a valid analysis of the processes of cognition, the researches are being pushed further on into the study of the higher faculties. We already have a valuable experimental study of memory by Dr. Ebbinghaus, and an ingenious investigation of complex associations and judgments by Dr. Münsterberg. Here too the study of the time is necessarily combined with a study of the nature of the mental operation in question. It may not be too venturesome to predict that the laws of association for which so many philosophers have earnestly striven, can only be adequately established on the basis of such experimental methods, and that these alone can bring about a correct appreciation of the laws of memory, that will make impossible the recent phenomenal success of a pseudo-psychological adventurer.

There remains the consideration of the study of the senses in other aspects than those treated, not to speak of the variety of miscellaneous problems gradually entering the domain of experimental psychology. The problems are here so many and so various as to make even a bare mention of them exceed the space at my disposal. As problems central in the interests of German psychologists may be mentioned the researches growing out of the discovery of Weber, that there is for each part of the skin a limit at which the points of a pair of compasses will be perceived as two. On the forefinger two points separated by one-twentieth of an inch seem as one point, on the back of the neck they may be separated by over an inch and still seem as one. The theory of "sensory circles" has been devised to explain these facts. But the survey of the field is too incomplete to warrant the acceptance of any theory as final. The study of dermal sensibility has been enriched by the discovery of the 'hot' and 'cold points,' or areas in which a body of neutral temperature gives rise to distinct sensations of heat and cold; the possibility of pressure-points has also been indicated. The nature of the muscular-sense with the discussion of the 'innervation theory' is another closely allied department of research. A second important group of problems deals with the analysis of musical sensations to which Helmholz has contributed so largely; it may be sufficient to mention the work of Prof. Stumpf, the Halle psychologist, (now appearing in several volumes,) as an evidence of the continued interest in this field. As a third central point may be mentioned the psychology of vision. Although much attention has been given to other problems, the main interest has been in those that contribute evidence bearing upon the theory of color vision, Helmholz and Hering being the recognized leaders of the two views, and upon the great controversy between nativists and empiricists upon the perception of space. In connection with these, however, a large number of subsidiary points have been investigated. The sensitiveness of the retina in its different portions to form, color, and motion; the estimation of size and distance; the perception of solidity as illustrated by that truly psychological instrument, the stereoscope; the relations of sight and touch and the coördination of sensory with motor visual factors, are some of the dominant lines of interest in psycho-physiological optics.

While these are the departments of psychology specially cultivated in Germany, it can be fairly said that there is no promising line of investigation to which the Germans have not contributed. Prof. Preyer has written the most comprehensive treatise on child-development; we have many valuable German studies of animal psychology both experimental and theoretical; Prof. Bastian, of Berlin, is an acknowledged leader of the psychological anthropologists; while in morbid psychology we have the most excellent con-

tributions of Krafft-Ebbing, (Vienna,) and Emminghaus, (Freiburg,) of Kussmaul, (Strassburg,) and Wildbrand, (Hamburg). The phenomena of hypnotism are attracting the attention of German psychologists with renewed interest, and they have introduced into this study a valuable critical element. And finally the application of psychology to the German specialty, education, has resulted in the science of pedagogical psychology.

Before leaving the topic of German psychology, it may be worth while to survey the local centres of interest to obtain the basis for an outlook upon the future. The physiological, the anthropological, the comparative and morbid aspects of psychology have a sufficient guarantee of vitality in their growing practical importance, and in the various classes of specialists whose interests they command. It is rather for experimental psychology, as creating new realms and methods of investigation and in part running counter to the traditional psychology, that special provision must be made. The influence of the psychological laboratory at Leipzic is spreading, and the foreign students studying there have, in several cases, succeeded in introducing similar innovations in their own countries. Prof. G. E. Müller, of Göttingen, has established a laboratory at that university, and Dr. Ebbinghaus has done the same at Berlin. Dr. Münsterberg of the University of Freiburg deserves great credit for the laboratory which he privately maintains there. Similar plans are under consideration for the universities of Bonn, of Breslau, of Prague, and doubtless elsewhere. Psychological societies have been formed, though the most prominent of these the *Gesellschaft für Experimental-Psychologie*, of Berlin and of Munich, devote their efforts mainly to the problems of "Psychic Research." The many literary contributions both as special studies and as periodical essays testify to the rapid progress of psychology in all parts of Germany. A serious obstacle to the growth of the department has been the difficulty of obtaining pecuniary aid from the State; this difficulty being increased by the isolation of the several parts of a German university, that prevents an easy affiliation of the psychological laboratory to the kindred departments of physiology or physics. There can be little doubt that as the special needs of experimental psychology are more distinctly appreciated, these hindrances to its free development will be gradually removed.*

* For further information concerning German psychology I can only refer in English to Ribot's "German Psychology of To-day," (by no means as good a compilation as his other works,) and to articles by Prof. Hall and by Dr. Cattell, published in *Mind*. There are very few general articles or treatises on the aims and methods of the new psychology in any language; in German one may consult a few of Wundt's "Essays," and a lecture by Dr. Götz Martius, *Ueber die Ziele und Ergebnisse der Experimentellen Psychologie*, 1888.

CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL SOUL-LIFE.

THE experiments of M. Alfred Binet* prove that in the limbs and sense-organs of hysterical persons we can provoke various complex movements of adaptation which are performed without consciousness. There are certain details of vision that escape consciousness, yet are perceived by the eye. Similarly the anæsthetic hand, a hand that from a nervous disease is deprived of sensibility, jots down in automatic writing impressions which it receives. The hand is called anæsthetic because the patient knows nothing about it; it is not in connection with his consciousness. M. Binet proves that feeling is not extinct in it; for it has a feeling of its own and its psychic acts show a certain intelligence or adaptability.

The experiments of M. Binet are instances of peripheral nerve-activity not entering into the sphere of central soul-life.

Experiments of a similar kind were made by the late Mr. Gurney, one of the founders of the Society for Psychical Research of London. From an account† of his experiments on "Intelligent Automatism," reported, in the main, in Mr. Gurney's own words, we quote the following:

"Mr. G. A. Smith, the 'hypnotiser,' sent off one of the patients into a mesmeric sleep, and in this sleep the patient was told that he was to write some particular word, or to count the number of *e*'s in a particular verse, or to do a particular multiplication sum when he awoke. . . . . Then he was wakened and at once engaged in reading aloud, or counting backwards, or doing something that engrossed his full attention; but his right hand was placed on the planchette (an instrument on wheels containing a pencil), the paper and planchette being always concealed from the subject's eyes, so that he could not know, unless he were able to guess from the blind movements of the instrument under his hand (which guessing was made very difficult by the occupation found for him), what letters or figures (if any) the instrument was tracing. 'As a rule, he was always offered a sovereign to say what the writing was, but the reward was never gained.' On being sent back into the mesmeric sleep, he recalled the whole process, though in the waking state he could never tell what the movements of the planchette under his hand were engaged in producing. Here is Mr. Gurney's account of the results as regards the arithmetical sums worked by what he calls the 'secondary intelligence':—

"The sums given were simple, as most of the 'subjects' were inexpert at mental arithmetic. There were 131 sums in which three figures had to be multiplied by a single one; of these 52 were quite right, 28 had three figures in the answer right, 18 had two figures right, and 14 had one figure right only, whilst 12 were quite wrong, and 7 were either so illegible and muddled as to be undecipherable, or only a small stroke or curve was made at all. . . . . In some cases the sum itself was correctly written, but no attempt was made to put the answer. . . . . A few sums of other kinds were also given: of 14 simple additions (of about the following difficulty: $4 + 7 + 9 + 11 + 13$), six were done correctly, two were

* Published in THE OPEN COURT: No. 100, "Proof of Double Consciousness in Hysterical Individuals"; No. 101, "The Relations Between the Two Consciousnesses of Hysterical Individuals"; No. 102, "The Hysterical Eye"; and No. 112, "Mechanism or Subconsciousness?"

† *Spectator*, June 30, 1888.

quite wrong, and the remaining six were either not done at all, or the answers were illegible scribbles. . . . . Another case illustrates the very distinct memory, on re-hypnotisation, of what had been written. Wells was told to work out the sum, '13 loaves at 5d. each,' and instantly woke as usual. He wrote, '13 loaf at 5d. is 5s. 5d.' When hypnotized again, and asked to say what he had written, he replied, '13 loaf—oh, I've put *loaf* instead of *loaves*—at 5d. is 5s. 5d. I've written the 13 twice—see—but I crossed it out.' He then proceeded, by a long roundabout process, to work the problem out, arriving at the correct answer again.

"Another form of experiment was to tell the 'subject' to count the number of times a certain letter occurred in a given verse. Thus, Wells was told to write down the number of times the letter *e* occurred in the verse—"Mary had a little lamb, etc.," and then, after saying the verse once quickly through to show that he knew it, he was instantly awakened and given *Tit-Bits* to read. Whilst thus engaged he wrote, *The letter E comes 11 times*—which is right. The same experiment was tried with Parsons, who also was kept occupied by being set to read immediately upon waking; but he was not so accurate, and wrote down '12.' He was completely successful, however, when told to write the number of *e*'s in

'God save our gracious Queen,
Long live our noble Queen,
God save the Queen,'

and wrote 11, having read excellently the whole time."

Concerning Mr. Gurney's explanation of these facts, the same account adds:

"His inference is that these trances induced by mesmerism, or whatever we like to call the peculiar influence which special persons seem to possess of rendering others unconscious,—separates the mind of the patient into two separate planes of consciousness, each of which is capable of accomplishing such simple intellectual tasks as the subject's education has fitted him to perform, but nevertheless without the privity of the other, so that the man is apparently subdivided into two men, one of whom is reading aloud, and the other working a sum or counting the number of *e*'s in a stanza, though the man who is doing the sum has little or no knowledge of what his *alter ego* is reading aloud; while the man who is reading aloud has no knowledge at all of the operations of the *alter ego* who is doing the sum."

According to our view these two souls are not two different beings, but they are psychic activities performed in two different spheres—the spheres of central and peripheral soul-life. If the activity of peripheral soul-life is not connected with that of the central soul-life, the central soul can know nothing about the processes that take place in the peripheral regions of our mind. Accordingly we call them *unconscious*. If the peripheral nerve-activity is indirectly, yet not too distantly, connected with the central soul, we may have a dim idea of its proceedings. Thus, we do not know whether the nerves of our intestines are now secreting particles of fat or albuminoids or any other substance, yet we can know upon the whole whether or not they are in a state of health. Such conditions we call *subconscious*.

The experiments of Mr. Gurney as well as those of M. Binet corroborate the fact that every nervous ganglion is a brain in miniature, as *vice versa* the whole brain is but a centralization of many ganglions. All nervous substance exhibits, in the performance of the psychic functions of irritation and reflex motion throughout, a marvelous adaptability to circumstances. Thus, the decapitated frog, when his back is irritated on the right side by a feather saturated in a solution of hydrochloric acid, scratches the spot and removes the irritant.

This might be called a simple reflex motion and can perhaps be explained as purely mechanical. Formerly it was believed to take place without any consciousness. But now it is known, that if the frog's right leg be amputated and his back be again irritated, after several unsuccessful trials to remove the irritant by his right leg, he will use his left leg.

This is plainly a process of adaptation to circumstances. The central soul of the decapitated frog, as can be proven by other experiments, has been removed; but parts of the peripheral soul still continue their activity in the spinal cord so long as the nervous substance remains in a condition of comparative health. And the activity of the peripheral nerve-substance cannot be merely mechanical as are the movements of a machine; judging from the experiment of the frog, they must be psychical at the same time. The mechanism of nervous reflex motions lives and feels. Even the peripheral ganglions possess a kind of consciousness of their own, dim though it may be.

There is no difference of kind between the peripheral and central soul, there is a difference of degree only. And the difference that obtains is undoubtedly produced by a division of labor. This will at the same time explain the fact that the lower a nervous system is, the more independent are its peripherial ganglia. The central soul-life is less differentiated in a frog than in man, and still less in a colonial sea-nettle.

The decapitated-frog experiment is in so far to the same purpose as Mr. Gurney's and M. Binet's experiments, for it proves the independent action of peripheral soul-life without any interference of, or connection with, central soul-life.

The phenomena of peripheral and central soul-life are not a coördinated duality; they form a hierarchical, *i. e.*, a super-ordinated system. The central soul rises from the peripheral soul. The former being taken away, the latter may continue to exist; but we see no possibility for the central soul to exist, if its foundation, the peripheral soul, is withdrawn. We can remove the spire of a church-steeple, and let the base stand, but we can not remove the base and have the spire remain in its place. Thus the central soul of consciousness, being the combined product of a certain part of the activity of the peripheral soul, can not lead an absolute life of abstract existence. It subsists and can subsist only upon condition of the peripheral activity of the nervous system.

How closely the central and the peripheral activities

are interwoven, can be learned from the facts of post-hypnotic suggestions. Mr. Gurney's experiments were purposely so arranged as to make the execution of a post-hypnotic suggestion an act of automatic and unconscious intelligence. This, however, is a special case only and indeed an exception.

Post-hypnotic suggestions, as a rule, rise from the peripheral sphere of unconscious life into the region of consciousness. There they appear as if created out of nothing in no other manner than inspirations may come to a poet. The central soul is in possession of certain data; but it can, out of itself merely, give no account of their origin. A number of conscious ideas are a living presence in the mind, and that is all that from consciousness alone can be learned. Their factors may be, and usually are, hidden in the depth of unconsciousness. The result only of nervous activity becomes conscious, but not the details of its conditions. Consciousness knows least of all about the nervous fibers, the brain-cells, and their distribution.

The subjects who have received post-hypnotic suggestions deal with them very differently. They either execute them without heeding what they do, almost unconsciously; or, especially if the suggestions are absurd, they try to suppress them. Some succeed in doing so, some yield to their impulse after a vain struggle. Some execute them, and if asked why they act thus, they either invent a plausible motive or answer that the idea just struck them to do it.

We quote an example from Forel's latest publication on Hypnotism:

"I said to a hypnotized patient: 'After awaking the idea will occur to you to place a chair upon the table, and then to tap me on the left shoulder with your right hand.' I then ordered him to do several other things, adding: 'Count as far as six, and awake.' The patient counted and when he reached six, opened his eyes drowsily, saw a chair and stared at it.—Often there arises a conflict between reason and the powerful impulse of suggestion. Either the former or the latter will gain the upper hand according as the suggestion is natural or unnatural and as the hynotized subject is suggestible. Our hypnotized subject after having stared at the chair for awhile, suddenly rose, took the chair and placed it on the table I said: 'Why do you do this?' The reply always varies according to the culture, temperament, and quality of the hypnotized subject and of the hypnosis. One will say: 'I followed my impulse.' Another: 'The idea occurred to me.' A third alleges an a posteriori motive saying, the chair had been in his way, it had bothered him. A fourth after the performance of the action, loses every recollection and appears to awaken at that very moment. Particularly in the last instance the subject has the staring glance of a somnambulist; it is more or less rigid, his movements are automatic, and do not cease to be so until after the performance of the act."

Another curious instance mentioned by Dr. Forel is the following:

"To a hypnotized woman I said on a Monday: 'Next Sunday morning precisely at quarter past seven you will call on me. You will see me in a sky-blue coat, with two long horns on my head, and you will then ask me, when I was born.' Next Sunday I was sitting in my study, and had forgotten the whole affair. My patient at thirty-five minutes past seven knocked at my door, entered, and burst into laughter. I at once recollected my suggestion, which now was actually realized, exactly in the manner it was given."

In the waking state the central soul plays a dominant part. This is accomplished positively as well as negatively; positively by concentration and negatively by inhibition. The consciousness of the central soul can be and usually is concentrated upon one object, *viz.*, the object of attention. But all the many sensory impressions that are received in all quarters of the periphery would greatly detract from the clearness of attention, if they were constantly permitted to enter the sphere of the central soul and to interfere with its activity. The central soul, if concentrated upon a subject of interest, sees fit not to heed other things, it suppresses their observation.

For instance, I am writing now and do not notice certain noises about me. I look up from my paper to collect my thoughts, but I do not observe the scenes outside of the window upon which I look. They are indifferent to me, and if afterwards asked what I had heard or what I had seen, most likely I should not be able to tell. I heard the noises—the word "I" here signifies my ears; I heard certain words but I did not listen—the word "I" here signifies my consciousness. I saw certain things, but I did not look; so I cannot tell what I heard or what I saw. My consciousness on the one hand, and my eyes or ears on the other, are two different things.

It may happen, however, that the sound of a word that I did not heed lingers in my memory still. I recall the sound, and now I perceive its meaning too. A certain scene that I glanced at in an absent-minded state, may have impressed itself strongly enough as afterwards to come up in my recollection. Some persons passed by; my eye had seen them, but I had taken no notice of them. Being asked whether a certain acquaintance of mine had been among them, I might then positively know that he was.

If we could ask the eye, it would certainly always be able to tell what it had seen. If we could look into the memories registered in some of the sensory ganglions, we could know what scenes were photographed by the eye; for every scene upon which the eye looked is registered in nerve-substance. We can, however, not expect to recollect a sensation that was prohibited to enter, and thus never entered, our consciousness.

Max Dessoir* gives an account that, if thoroughly reliable, is of great interest.

"Several friends were at my house, and one of them, Mr. W——, sat apart reading, while we others were talking together. Suddenly the conversation turned upon a name X——, which particularly interested Mr. W——. He abruptly turned round, and asked what had happened to Mr. X—— He declared, that

* *Das Doppel-ich*, p. 19.

he knew nothing of our previous conversation ; and that he only had heard the name mentioned. Then, with his consent, I hypnotized him, and in the state of deep hypnosis I asked him again, and to our great astonishment he coherently related the whole trend of the conversation that took place while he was reading."

In another passage Dessoir says :

"The idea of the husband when his wife scolded him for having mislaid the house-key at the inn, was after all not bad. "Wait—said he—until I get drunk again, and I shall certainly find out where I left it."

It is noteworthy, that in dreams as well as in states of intoxication, certain people seem upon the whole to reveal always a similar character which, however, may greatly differ from their normal condition. The conscious life of the central soul being extinguished, and the inhibition that in the waking state is constantly exercised being abolished, the peripheral soul-life oozes out in its originality, and however it may differ from the waking state it shows again and again, under similar circumstances, naturally similar traits of character. There is accordingly a truth in the Latin proverb : "*In vino veritas.*"

The same may be said about dreams. Dreams reveal to us characteristic features of our peripheral soul-life.

P. C.

CONTEMPORANEOUS FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.*

CORRESPONDENCE OF LUCIEN ARREAT.

My Dear Sir :—In assigning to me the task of writing for your review the philosophical correspondence of France, you have rightly inferred that it would be of especial interest to present, upon this occasion, what I am pleased to call, with reference to recent philosophical publications, a *critique de position.* So allow me, therefore, without further preamble to introduce the subject to your readers.

The philosophers of France, it is unnecessary to say, have been concerned at all times with the subject of a general philosophy ; but since the performance of Auguste Comte, now become a thing of the past, there has not been produced among us any conception of a truly general character. The numerous problems of philosophy are being probed and renovated at basal points, and whenever the ambition is evinced to construct some partial synthesis, it usually happens in the domain of psychology and from the point of view of the evolution of the phenomena involved. Even psychology, which has become the centre of philosophical researches, no longer remains strictly physiological ; people, nowadays, have begun to pay greater attention to the data of sociology and history.

In support of the last brief statement I might adduce the entire literary activity of the late M. Guyau. M. Fouillée, with painstaking devotion is now superintending the publication of the manuscripts of the much-lamented young master, and two volumes have recently appeared under the titles of "Education and Heredity, A Sociological Study" and "Art From a Sociological Point of View." Let it suffice, merely to call attention to the latter works. M. Guyau at all times deservedly engages our curiosity, and your readers know too well the fundamental character and content of his ideas to justify the need of a present exposition of the same. Whether as moralist or æsthetician, as psychologist or critical historian, Guyau ever strove ultimately to reach a conception of the world—a theory of cosmic philosophy. This feature of his character must not be overlooked, if we wish correctly to appreciate as well the breadth as the partial prematurity of his mode of thought.

In the same line, we must mention a small volume by M. de Roberty : "The Unknowable, Its Metaphysics and Psychology," (*L'inconnaissable, sa métaphysique, sa psychologie*). A Russian by birth, M. de Roberty passed through the school of Comte, and published his first important works in the review edited by the late M. Littré. According to M. de Roberty, philosophy hitherto has not been a theory of Knowledge, as it has been called, but rather a theory of the Unknowable (in Kant's works for the greater part, in one-half of Spencer, and to a notable extent with Comte himself). In this book,—a mere skirmish by the van-guard, to use the writer's own words,—the author shows us, that the problem of the Unknowable is only a metaphysical aspect of the problem of the limits of knowledge, and that agnosticism is but a transient historical position. M. de Roberty's criticism is new and profound ; it certainly places us in a logical, or methodical, position, that is much more correct. We can only ask, whether, in the face of the problem of the world, and the reduction of the unknowable to the unknown, we shall meanwhile be able to transform ourselves into pure "intellectuals," without still remaining "emotionals,"—I mean to say, poets. At all events, in the opinion of M. de Roberty, a great synthesis does not seem possible before sociology and psychology have been constructed ; and as regards psychology, which in the disguise of a general science is now sallying forth to the conquest of the universe, the author relegates the same to the primary school of facts.

And what, the question at this juncture arises, is the present status of psychology ? In France there has been no attempt to create a complete work after the manner of Wundt or of Spencer ; but there has been the more modest and, doubtless, more useful production of good monographs. The most remarkable of the present year has been "The Psychology of Attention," by M. Ribot, of which I need not speak, since you are offering your readers a translation of the same.

By far more extensive, although even more special, is M. Paulhan's book, "Mental Activity and the Elements of Mind." M. Paulhan explains the entire mechanism of mind by the general law of systematic association (and, as complemental thereto, by that of inhibition) which is a law of finality ; to this law he subordinates the secondary forms, association by contrast, by resemblance, by contiguity—and he thus succeeds in destroying, or rather he reduces to a very modest rôle, the English theory of associationism. The dominant idea of the book is that mind represents a totality of *active* elements, differently arranged, that is, made up of various systems of tendencies, dèsires, etc., systems constituting real sub-personalities, in variable equilibrium with one another, and of which the true personality, which we may call the predominant, the directive one, is merely a kind of resultant. The points of connection of this theory with the researches of M. Luys and of M. Binet are at once manifest, and it is scarcely necessary to point out the line of work of these authors to bring under one identical comprehensive fact all the phenomena presented to us under the normal or pathological forms of dreams, natural or provoked somnambulism, etc.

The voluminous treatise, teeming with facts, by M. Pierre Janet—*Psychological Automatism*, etc.,—comes like a capstone to the book of M. Paulhan. The object of the present investigation, the author says, is human activity in its simplest and most elementary forms ; and he adds : "This study of the elementary forms of activity will be for us at the same time the study of the elementary forms of sensibility and of consciousness." M Janet has gathered his teachings from persistent and patient experiments upon the state of provoked somnambulism. As you well know, he

*All the herein-mentioned works are contained in the *Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine.* Paris : Félix Alcan, Publisher.

is of the number of those, who have successfully devoted themselves to this branch of study, in which the philosophers of France are the foremost leaders.

Consciousness, according to M. Janet, is ever present in the activity of a living being: consciousness is always an organisation, more or less complex, of elements of sensation, and therefore it might be defined as a "synthetical activity." On the other hand, the syntheses constructed are not destroyed, they last, are preserved; they constitute, finally, the consequences of the general law of preservation and of reproduction examined in this work. Automatism thus corresponds to a severance, more or less wide, of the two activities, the creative and the conservative.

There remains to point out a fact of historical significance—the return to Maine de Biran, who, writes M. Janet, seems truly "to have foreseen the experiments that are at present being made." This somewhat forgotten French philosopher further experiences a kind of revival in M. A. Bertrand's book: *La psychologie de l'effort et les doctrines contemporaines*, (The Psychology of Effort and Current Theories Regarding the Same). To Maine de Biran must certainly be referred the earliest French theory of unconsciousness.

In establishing these legitimate returns to the great ones of the past—to Leibnitz or to Maine de Biran, to Descartes or to Spinoza—we cannot avoid acknowledging a certain unity of direction even in the bewildering mazes of philosophy. Particularly, however, in the works of the moderns, divergent though they be, is this progression towards unity of method to be remarked. In this way alone may we hope for harmony and that universal assent which is one of the elements of human certainty.

Paris, October 24th. LUCIEN ARREAT.

SONNET.

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

"The pursuits of the simple nations are still the sports of the artificial ones."—THOREAU.

A TRUCE to work! Behold the star of eve!
Down with the pen and join the merry throng,
The jocund sport; for may it not belong
Also to life? Shall man not know to weave

Into Time's sombre woof one thread of joy?
Abandon, dare he not, the irksome task
A moment in the sunshine's glow to bask?
My soul responded, "Pleasure, too, doth cloy

Excepting as it be with progress found.
Deem not that labor is of joy the foe:
With heart and mind harmonious there is nought
Confers such lasting happiness below.
Unite the chords of life in one glad sound;
Sublimest work of blessedness is wrought!

CORRESPONDENCE.

A DEFENCE OF CELIBACY AND CELIBATES.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

IT is not a little amusing to observe the manner in which Mrs. Susan Channing treated her subject, "Celibacy and its Effects upon the Individual," in THE OPEN COURT for October 31, 1889. Her argument reminds one of the person who accidentally puts salt in his coffee, mistaking it for sugar, but heroically holds his peace until his companion has done likewise. In other words, it would seem from Mrs. Channing's article that human nature is the same—that misery still loves company, however much the philanthropic enthusiast may declare to the contrary.

Everybody will, no doubt, agree with Moncure D. Conway and Mrs. Channing that there is no English word or even a chart of the passionate relations of the sexes. Nor can there be. It is entirely contrary to the laws of nature. The experience of one can by no manner of means serve as a beacon-guide for another, and just as the wind that would anchor one in the peaceful harbor of safety might dash another upon the rocks of Scylla and Charybdis. Hence no rule, or chart, or guide can be adopted, however much, and how greatly, one might be demanded by those who sail upon the uncertain and often tempestuous sea of matrimony. Each must work out his own salvation, the temperament and disposition entailed by heredity having greatly to do with the final result, whether it be good or bad.

While some of the writer's arguments may be good—indeed, she builds up a strong case, and shows great research—the attempt to prove deterioration as one of the universal results of celibacy is certainly considerably attenuated and consequently weak, if not an utter failure. If a man or woman choses to forego the pleasures resultant upon a gratification of the sex-affection, or even those in whom the development of this qualification for manhood and womanhood is not so great, and devotes his time to the cause and investigation of science, art, literature, music, etc., as thousands have done and will continue to do as long as the world stands, do the grand discoveries they have made and may make, the glorious works of art produced, the inspiring epics and elegies written, have the least tendency to degrade or tear down the grand fabric of human intelligence and progress? On the contrary, these discoveries and productions build up and make nobler and better the human race; they serve as an example of what excellence may be achieved by perseverance and labor when the mind is free to act at will, and not hampered by domestic broils and troubles.

Very difficult would be the task of him to whom would be assigned the task or duty of estimating the amount of good done to the world by the works of that world-renowned Italian bachelor, Michael Angelo, whose wonderful creations have been the admiration of all civilized nations since the fifteenth century; who does not dwell with ecstasy upon that sublime old doxology written in the seventeenth century, "Praise God from Whom all Blessings Flow," by the bachelor bishop, Kenbein the author; also the soul inspiring hymns of dear old Isaac Watts, Toplady, Dr. Mühlenberg, author of "I would not live alway," Montgomery, Cowper, etc., among hymn-writers. Other illustrations innumerable of the beneficent effects that bachelors, or their works, have had upon the human race through all ages might be cited, but the names of a limited number must suffice: Grey, Berridge, David Hume, Horn Tooke, John Randolph, Washington Irving, Baron Humboldt, Samuel J. Tilden, Thaddeus Stevens, the late ex-Vice-President Wilson, Alexander Stephens, Allen Thorndike Rice, John G. Whittier, Governor David B. Hill, of New York, Phillips Brookes, and hosts of others almost equally as prominent and illustrious.

Nor should examples of the value of single women to their fellow beings be omitted. Thousands have been made better for having read the impassioned poetical compositions of the Carey sisters, Alice and Phœbe, and no one can witness the wonderful delineations of dramatic art as depicted by that woman of whom every true American should be proud, Mary Anderson, without being moved by tender thoughts and lofty aspirations. Scores of others could be cited, if necessary, but these will suffice at this time.

The divine injunction that "It is not good that THE man should be alone," no doubt had reference to Adam alone, else why does the article *the* precede the word man? Had no one else appeared upon the scene there can be no doubt that Adam would have become lonesome and exclaimed with Alexander Selkirk, "Oh, solitude, where are thy charms?" However this may be, many will seriously doubt whether Mrs. Channing or anybody else would desire to fulfill all the demands and obey all the laws of the Old Testament, where this injunction, that it is not good for

man to live alone, is found, which is always quoted as a clincher by those who incessantly advocate marriage early and often, apparently without regard to fitness or qualification on the part of the interested parties to the important event. What was good and meet for Adam many thousands of years ago, might not hold good in all instances in the light of the intelligence of the closing years of the nineteenth century.

Some over-zealous people declare with more vehemence than logic that it is the divine duty of every man and every woman to take upon himself or herself the responsibilities of a family, regardless of qualifications for the same. Rev. Dr. T. DeWitt Talmage in a recent sermon to women made use of the following terse and sensible language: "Woman was an independent creation, and was intended, if she chose, to live alone, to walk alone, act alone, think alone, and fight her battles alone. The Bible says, it is not good for man to be alone, but never says it is not good for woman to be alone; and the simple fact is, that many women who are harnessed for life in the marriage relation would be a thousand-fold better off if they were alone." And it is safe to say that husbands who do not make their wives happy, are not over-burdened with joys themselves.

In the *Forum* for December, 1888, Junius Henry Browne, in a very able article, entitled, "To Marry or not to Marry!" says, page 438: "To marry is not an obligation, as might be thought from current talk: it is purely optional. He who refrains from wedlock and fatherhood cannot, in the overcrowded state of the globe, be charged with violation of duty to his fellows. To intimate that a man should take a wife, when he has not found a woman who wishes him to take her, is akin to inviting the blind to a spectacle, or a cripple to enter a race, and yet such intimations are incessant."

Again the great criminals of the world were not celibates. Even Agrippina, who plotted to secure the throne of Rome for her son, Nero, was a married woman; Cleopatra, the beautiful but wicked queen of ancient Egypt, was much married; Clytemnestra murdered her husband Agamemnon, and as in ancient so in modern history, nearly all crime was or is committed by youths or married persons.

No great amount of argument is necessary to prove beyond dispute that marriage is at present the most congenial method of dealing with the sex-affection, as now affecting the human family to a great or less degree, but to assert that celibacy deteriorates the human family, is certainly talking at random, as history very plainly demonstrates the contrary to be the true status of affairs. Observation, if not biased, teaches the same. CLINT L. LUCE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE EXCELLENT RELIGION. An Essay on the Relations Existing Between Agnosticism, the Polar Theory of Being, and the Higher Theism. By *G. C. Griffith-Jones* (*Lara*). London: Watts & Co.

This eloquently and clearly written pamphlet of thirty-two pages by Mr. G. C. Griffith-Jones, is an exposition of the doctrine of "The Excellent Religion"—a faith based upon the principles of Agnosticism. The treatment falls into three divisions designated: (1) The Parting of the Ways; (2) Agnosticism and the Polar Theory; (3) The Doctrine of the Excellent Religion. By "the parting of the ways" the author understands the divergent point of the various roads by which humanity seek salvation: the roads of Christianity, Atheism, and Agnosticism. The watchword of Christianity is "Memory," of Atheism "Does it Pay," of Agnosticism "Progress"; but the middle course, Atheism, is definitively discarded and the question thus remains, "Can Christian and Agnostic join hands over their superficial differences and tread the way of future progress with equal steps?" This depends upon definition, and upon the renunciation by the Christian of "the monuments of past credulity and present folly upon which are graven the creeds, the dogmas, and the doctrines which, fixed for all time by the fiat of infallibility, may never be altered." Can the Christian do that, then are Christianity and Agnosticism one; for Agnosticism is defined to be simply this, "*that a man shall not say that he knows or believes that which he has no reasonable grounds for knowing or believing.*"

And now as to the religious position of Agnosticism. "To theology," says the author, "the Agnostic philosophy presents an unbreakable phalanx of arguments . . . . but to religion it stretches out the strong right hand of friendship, and with her bows the head in reverent silence before the majesty and mystery which religion calls God, and philosophy the Absolute." Agnosticism is not destructive, not negative: "On the contrary. With the finger of well-assured certainty and the authority of ages of mental development, it points to the region of the unknown as the treasure-house of infinite possibilities, as the potential realization of man's deepest yearnings, and the possible fulfilment of his loftiest aspirations. . . . . For all the Agnostic may affirm or deny, that 'blank, impenetrable wall' which stands at the end of every pathway of intellectual investigation may be the veil which hides from eyes too weak to bear its glory the supernal splendor of the presence of God." In other words Agnosticism, although appealing to the authority of "ages of *mental development*" and pointing to the unknown as a treasure-house of "*infinite* possibilities," nevertheless erects, or confesses there exists, a "blank, impenetrable wall" at the *end* of "every pathway of intellectual investigation." But if that wall recedes as mental development advances, is it a wall? And how can the watchword of intellectual "Progress" be reconciled with arrival at a place where we must stop—stop "to bow in reverent silence before the mystery which philosophy calls the absolute?"

What that Absolute, that Unknowable is, appears from the following: "On what man knows and yet shall learn, he may reason; and he shall learn enough to reason upon forever if he will. On what he does not know, and, *with his present powers, never can know*, he may still dream to his heart's content, speculating hopefully and trustfully upon the infinite possibilities of the Great Perhaps." But that which cannot be known, cannot exist; the idea of something unknowable 'would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested, *i. e*, existence without reality—which is a contradiction, an impossibility': the idea of the Unknowable deliberately posits a knowledge which is not-knowledge. And, naturally, this leads to dualism, for the author believes "that there will be a faith of the future which, while it will be based on knowledge, will soar far into regions where knowledge is impossible."

The second part of Mr. Griffith-Jones's pamphlet, "Agnosticism and the Polar Theory," is more properly the philosophical part, wherein the conclusions of the Agnostic position above discussed are logically stated and their relations to the "Polar Theory of Being" defined; the third part delineates "the superstructure" of the Excellent Religion. It is to this position alone of Mr. Griffith-Jones's that we object—the position regarding the "delineation of the Knowable from the Unknowable." With the faith and purity of aspiration pervading the whole dissertation we are in perfect accord. *μκρκ.*

NOTES.

We refer the attention of our readers to M. Lucien Arréat's interesting review, in the present number, of contemporaneous French philosophy.

The essays by M. Binet upon "Double Consciousness" are interrupted with this week's issue, to make room for his Rejoinder to Mr. Romanes upon the question of the psychic life of micro-organisms—the delay incident to which has been previously noted.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word God by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

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IS RELIGION DEAD?

BY C. P. GEOFFREY.

One of the greatest historians of morals says: Religion has ceased to be the moving power in our national and in our private life. Interest in theological discussions is nowhere to be found, not even in the churches. What do the people care for the religious issues of former days? They are quite indifferent about the interpretation of Bible passages and the sacraments, which in former centuries caused sanguinary wars among nations. And a great French philosopher announces the advent of an irreligious age, where creeds will disappear, where no church shall exist, and religion shall cease to be.

Contemplating the habits and the life of our age, we are struck by a noticeable change in the general tendencies of men. It seems that everything has become more worldly, more realistic, and more practical. Yes, more practical! and I should say there is no harm in being practical, if the ideal world be not lost in the realistic aims which we pursue, if our hearts be still aglow with the sacred fire of holy aspiration for purity, for honor, and above all, for truth! Let us be practical, and let us more and more become so, in applying the highest ideals to our everyday life and in realizing them!

The God of old Religion said through the mouth of one of his prophets: "Lo, I make all things new." And a psalmist of the western world sings in one of his deepest lays: "There is no death—what seems so, is transition." Nature cannot die, it may undergo changes, but it will live forever. Nature is life, it is the fountain of eternal youth.

Learn to understand the signs of the time. If you see the leaves turn yellow and red and shine in all colors, know that autumn is at hand. The leaves will fall to the ground and snow will soon cover the trees and woodlands and meadows. But when you see buds on the branches, although they may be few and the weather may be cold, still, know that spring is at the door, and will enter soon, filling our homes with flowers, with joyous life, and with love.

The leaves of dogmatic opinion are falling thickly to the ground. How dreary looks the landscape, how bleak the sky! How cold and frosty, how forlorn are the folds of the churches! There is the end of religious life, you think; the future will be empty irreligiosity—without faith in the higher purposes of life, without ideals to warm and fill our hearts, without hope for anything except the material enjoyments of the present life.

And yet, my friends, observe the signs of the time! There are buds on the dry branches of religious life which show that the sap is stirring in the roots of the tree of humanity. There are signs that the death-knell of the old creeds forebodes the rise of a new religion.

Everyone who knows that nature is immortal can see and feel it. A new religion is growing in the hearts of men. The new religion will either develop from the old creeds which now stand leafless and without fruit, which seem useless, as if dead, or it will rise from the very opposition against the old creeds, from that opposition which is made not in the name of frivolous cynicism, but in the name of honesty and truth. The beautiful will not be destroyed together with the fantastic, nor the higher aspirations in life with supernatural errors. Though all the creeds may crumble away, the living faith in ideals will last forever. That which is good and true and pure, will remain—for that is eternal.

The new religion which I see arising and which I know will spring forth as spontaneously and powerfully as the verdure of spring, will be the religion of humanity. It will be the embodiment of all that is sacred and pure and elevating. It will be realistic, for it loves truth. It will promote righteousness, for it demands justice. It will ennoble human life, for it represents harmony and beauty.

The new religion that will replace the old creeds will be an ethical religion. And truly all the vital questions of the day are at bottom religious, all are ethical. They cannot be solved unless we dig down to their roots, which are buried in the deepest depths of our hearts—in the realm of religious aspirations.

Life would not be worth living if it were limited merely to the satisfaction of our physical wants; if it were bare of all higher aspirations, if we could not fill our soul with a divine enthusiasm for objects that are greater than our individual existence. We must be able to look beyond the narrowness of our personal affairs. Our hopes and interests must be broader than

life's short span; they must not be kept within the bounds of egotism, or we shall never feel the thrill of a higher life. For what is religion but the growth into the realm of a higher life? And what would the physical life be without religion?

THE MORBID STATES OF ATTENTION.*

BY TH. RIBOT.

Our daily speech usually contrasts with attention the state called "distraction"; but this state in our language (the French) has an equivocal sense. It designates certain states of the mind, apparently, very similar, yet at bottom totally contrary. We call "distracted" people whose intelligence is unable to fix itself with any degree of persistence, and who pass incessantly from one idea to another, at the mercy of their most transient whims, or of any trifling events in their surroundings. It is a perpetual state of mobility and dispersion, which is the very reverse of attention. It is frequently met with in children and in women. But the term "distraction" is also applied to cases entirely different from this. Thus there are people who, wholly absorbed by some idea, are also really "distracted" in regard to what takes place around them; they afford no hold to external events, and allow the latter to flit by without penetrating their minds. Such people appear incapable of attention for the very reason that they are very attentive. Many scholars have been noted for their "distraction," and so well known are the instances that it is useless to cite them. While those whose distraction amounts to dispersion are characterized by the incessant transition from one idea to another, those whose distraction amounts to absorption are distinguished precisely by the impossibility or the great difficulty of a transfer of this kind. They are riveted to their idea, are willing prisoners without any desire to escape. Their condition, in fact, is a mitigated form of that morbid state which we shall study later on under the name of the "fixed idea."

Yet such manifestations, daily occurring, in fact all the different forms of "distraction," are, upon the whole, but little instructive, and we shall derive greater profit from dwelling upon forms that are clearly pathological. Without pretending to anything like a systematic classification of the latter, we shall endeavor to group them according to some rational order. To accomplish this purpose, normal attention must serve as our starting-point, and it devolves upon us only to note the variations of its nature and its deviations.

If, as we have formerly done, we now define attention as the *temporary* predominance of an intellectual state, or of a group of states, accompanied by natural or artificial adaptation of the individual;—if this be taken as its normal type, we shall be able clearly to note the following deviations:

1. *Absolute* predominance of one state, or one group of states, that becomes stable, fixed, and that cannot be dislodged from our consciousness. It is no longer a simple antagonist of spontaneous association, limiting its activity to direction of the latter; no, it is a destructive, tyrannical power, enslaving everything, not allowing of the prolification of ideas save in one direction, imprisoning the current of consciousness within a narrow bed, from which it cannot escape, and more or less sterilizing all that which is extraneous to its own predominance. Hypochondria, and, better still, fixed ideas and ecstasy, are cases of this class. They form the first morbid group, which I shall designate *hypertrophy of attention.*

2. In the second group I shall comprise cases in which attention cannot be maintained, or in which often, indeed, attention cannot form. This incapacity is produced under two main conditions. At times the current of ideas is so rapid and exuberant, that the mind becomes a prey to an unbridled automatism. In this disorderly flux no particular state either lasts or predominates; no centre of attraction is formed, even for a moment. Here the mechanism of association retaliates; it alone acts with all its power, and without opposition. Such are certain forms of delirium, and above all acute mania. At other times, when the mechanism of association does not pass beyond the average intensity, there is absence or diminution of the power of inhibition. Subjectively, this state manifests itself through the impossibility or extreme difficulty of effort. Convergence is impossible, either spontaneous or artificial; all is unsteady, undecided, and dispersed. Numerous instances of this are met with in hysterical patients, in persons suffering from irritable weakness, in convalescents, in apathetic and insensible individuals, in intoxication, in extreme states of bodily and mental fatigue, etc. This impotency coincides, in short, with all forms of exhaustion. By way of contrast to the former, we shall designate this group *atrophy of attention.*

Incidentally we may remark that the first group of morbid states is allied rather to spontaneous attention, and the second to voluntary attention. The one marks an exaggerated force, the other an exaggerated weakness, of the power of concentration. The one is an evolution, and tends toward *increase*; the other is a dissolution, tending towards *decrease.* Already, pathology verifies what has previously been stated. Voluntary attention, like all artificial products, is precarious, vacillating; disease does not transform it, but causes it to collapse. Spontaneous attention, on the contrary, like all natural forces, may extend and amplify to the very verge of extravagance, but it can

* Translation copyrighted.

only be transformed; at bottom, its nature does not alter: it is like a light breeze at first, that afterwards becomes a tempest.

3. The third group embraces, not the morbid forms of attention, but cases of congenital infirmity. Such are instances in which spontaneous attention, and all the more so, voluntary attention, do not form, or, at least, only appear intermittently. This, in different degrees, is met with in idiots, in imbeciles, in the weak-minded, and in the demented.

After this hasty classification, let us pass to details.

I.

It is well, in the first place, to observe, that there is an almost insensible transition from the normal state to the most extravagant forms of the fixed idea. Everybody must have experienced what it is to be haunted by a musical air, or some insignificant saying, that obstinately keeps coming back without any visible reason. This is the fixed idea in its lightest form. The state of preoccupation so called, takes us one degree higher: anxiety about a sick person, or that attending the preparation for an examination, a long journey to be undertaken, and a hundred other facts of this kind, which without constituting an actual beleaguerment of consciousness, do yet all act by way of repetition. Notwithstanding its intermittence, the idea remains vivid, suddenly starting up from the depths of unconsciousness. It has more stability than any other, and its momentary eclipses do not prevent it from playing the principal part. As a matter of fact, in every sound human being, there is always a dominant idea that regulates his conduct; such as pleasure, money, ambition, or the soul's salvation. This fixed idea, which lasts throughout life—except in cases where another is substituted for it—becomes finally resolved into a fixed passion; which once more proves that attention and all its forms of appearance depend on emotional states. The metamorphosis of attention into a fixed idea is much more clearly seen in great men. "What is a great life?" asks Alfred de Vigny; "A thought of our youth, realized in mature age." In many famous men this "thought" has frequently been so absorbing and tyrannical, that one can hardly dispute its morbid character.

This transformation of spontaneous attention into a fixed idea, a phase decidedly pathological, is very pronounced in hypochondriacs. Here, we are able to follow its evolution, and to note all its degrees; for this disease embraces a great many stages from the slightest preoccupation to the most complete obsession. Although it cannot germinate and grow but in a favorable soil, and although consequently it presupposes certain physical and mental conditions, yet it does not, in its origin, rise beyond the average level of spontaneous attention; the augmentation is effected slowly, by degrees. And it makes no difference, in fact, whether the sufferings of the patient be real or imaginary: from the subjective, psychological point of view this is all one. We know, indeed, that the mere fact of fixing our attention upon any part of our body, the heart, the stomach, the intestines, etc., produces in consciousness strange sensations—an instance of the general law, that every state of vivid consciousness tends to actualize itself. Some people have, in this respect, peculiar gifts. Sir J. Brodie said, that he could feel pain in any region of his body whatever, by strongly fixing upon it his attention. Now, to fix our attention simply means, to allow a certain state to persist and to predominate. This predominance, at first harmless, increases through the very effects it produces. A centre of attraction is established, which little by little obtains supreme control of consciousness. It then grows to be a perpetual preoccupation, an incessant inspection of the state of each organ and the products of each function; in short, the state of complete hypochondria makes its appearance as its picture so often has been portrayed.

* * *

It seems almost universally agreed that fixed ideas may be classed into three great categories:

1. Simple fixed ideas of a purely intellectual nature, which are most frequently pent up in consciousness, or are not manifested outwardly save through certain insignificant acts;

2. Fixed ideas accompanied by emotions, such as terror and agony, agoraphobia, the insanity of doubt, etc.;

3. Fixed ideas of an impulsive form, known by the name of irresistible tendencies, that manifest themselves in violent or criminal acts (theft, homicide, suicide).

Although there is no clear line of demarcation between the three classes, still, we may say, that the specific character of the first is a perturbation of the intelligence, that the second belongs rather to the emotional order, and that the third depends upon an enfeeblement of the will. The latter two will be rigorously excluded from our investigations, because they are parcel of the pathology of feelings and the will. It is by far preferable to keep strictly to cases that are free from all alloy—to cases strictly comparable with that state of relative monoideism which is called attention.

But even in restricting ourselves to this group, examples of fixed ideas will not be lacking. They have received different names according to their predominant character. With some the fixed idea assumes a mathematical form (arithmomania). Why are people of such and such a size? Why are houses of such

and such dimensions? Why are trees of such or such a height? And so on with every possible object. Still more frequently, it consists in an endless necessity to count, to add, and to multiply. "A certain woman, affected with numerous symptoms of hysteria could not see a street without beginning at once, and against her will, to count the number of paving-stones; then would follow an enumeration of all the streets of the town, then of all the towns of Italy, and finally of Italy's streams and rivers. If she beheld a bag of corn, there immediately began in her brain the work of enumerating the number of grains of corn in the city, in the province, and in the whole country. . . . . She confessed, that not only did she feel impelled by an irresistible force to make these odd computations, but that moreover these fixed ideas of hers were so well organized, that if during her laborious task she chanced to be interrupted by the sheer impossibility of proceeding, or by any other cause, she would suffer from a feeling of agony accompanied by indescribable physical tortures." I have myself been told of a certain young man who spends the greater part of his time in calculating the hours of departure and arrival, for each station, of all the railway-trains on the entire surface of the globe. He generously bestows railroads upon countries that have none, and regulates at will this imaginary traffic. He compiles very elaborate time-tables, covering enormous sheets of paper, draws curves, and establishes connections at the various junctions. He is, moreover, a very intelligent young man.

Another form of fixed idea consists in asking endless questions upon some abstract problem, which the patients themselves regard as insoluble. The Germans call it "*Grübelsucht*," the English "metaphysical mania." The interrogatory form peculiar to it has moreover procured it the name of *Fragetrieb*. A certain man, in a case reported by Griesinger, no sooner heard the word "beautiful" uttered, than he began, in spite of every effort, to put to himself an inextricable and indefinite series of questions upon the most abstruse problems of æsthetics. The word "to be" precipitated him into an endless metaphysical investigation. This patient, a highly cultivated man, tells us in his confession: "I am ruining my health by incessantly thinking of problems that reason will never be able to solve, and which despite my most energetic efforts of will, wear out, without a moment's respite, my strength. The procession of these ideas is incessant. . . . . This metaphysical reflection is too continuous to be natural. . . . . Every time that these ideas return I try to drive them away, and I seek to persuade myself to follow the natural course of thought, not to confuse my brain with such very obscure problems, and not to abandon myself to the meditation of things abstract and insoluble. And yet I am unable to escape from the continuous impulsion that keeps hammering at my mind, or from the unchanged, fixed tendency that pursues me, and does not leave me one moment of rest."

I shall give a final instance of the fixed idea, as reported by Tamburni, on account of its purely intellectual character: "A young law-student, the son of neuropathic parents, was completely taken up with the idea of knowing the origin, the why and the how of the forced circulation of bank-notes. . . . . This thought kept his attention continually strained, prevented him from doing anything else, placed a bar between the external world and himself, and whatever efforts he might make to rid himself of it, he was utterly unable to accomplish that purpose. Finally concluding that notwithstanding his long reflections and far-going researches to the end of solving this vexed problem, he was incapable of any other mental work, he fell into such a state of despondency and apathy that he desired to discontinue his course of studies. . . . . His sleep was insufficient and broken; frequently he lay awake whole nights, ever absorbed by his dominant idea. In this case a very singular phenomenon must be noted; namely, that in consequence of the continuous tension of his mind upon the problem of bank-notes and their forced circulation, he at last retained permanently before his eyes the image and picture of the bank-notes themselves, in all their varieties of form, size, and color. The idea, with its incessant repetitions and intensity, came to assume a force of projection that made it equivalent to reality. Yet he himself had ever the full consciousness that the images floating before his eyes were merely a freak of his imagination." A careful medical treatment, and some very clear explanations imparted by a professor, finally helped to improve his condition. "The veil that enveloped his mind, though rent asunder so far as regards bank-notes of large denominations, still persisted in regard to those of smaller value, the images of fifty-centime notes still continuing to appear to him." At last all his troubles disappeared.

It will perhaps be said: "These people and their like are simply insane." They certainly are not of sound mind; but the epithet insane is undeserved. They are debilitated, unbalanced. Their frail, unstable mental coördination yields to the slightest shock; but it is a loss of equilibrium, not a fall. The authors that nave investigated the determining causes of fixed ideas, all reach the same conclusion; they find it, namely, to be a symptom of degeneration. One might even maintain, that not everybody who may wish it can have fixed ideas. A primordial condition—the neuropathic constitution—is requisite. The latter may be inherited, or it may be acquired. Persons of the

one class are the offspring of parents to whom they are indebted for the sad legacy of degenerate organisms. These are by far the most numerous. The others have been exhausted by circumstances and mode of life: physical or intellectual fatigue, emotions, strong passions, sexual or other excesses, anæmia, debilitating diseases, etc. Finally, by both roads the same result is reached. And so the fixed idea, even in its simplest form—that which now concerns us and which appears entirely theoretical and as if confined to the field of purely intellectual operations—is nevertheless not a purely internal phenomenon, without physical concomitants. Quite the contrary. The organic symptoms by which it is accompanied indicate neurasthenia: symptoms such as headaches, neuralgia, feeling of oppression, perturbation of motility, of the vaso-motors, or the sexual functions, insomnia, etc. The psychic phenomenon of the fixed idea is but the effect, among many, of one and the same cause. Our sole purpose, at present, however, is, to examine more closely the mechanism of the fixed idea, to discover in what respect it resembles the mechanism of attention and in what respect it differs from it. This alone concerns us.

And to this proposition we may at once answer, that between the two there is no difference of kind but only a difference of degree. The fixed idea has greater intensity, and, above all, a longer duration. Take a given state of spontaneous attention; suppose that through artificial means we are able to strengthen and, particularly, are able to render it permanent. The metamorphosis into a fixed idea would then be complete; the whole array of irrational conceptions that form its retinue and present a fictitious appearance of insanity being of necessity added to it as the mere result of the logical mechanism of the mind. The term "fixed idea" designates the principal part of the complete psychological state; yet only a part—the centre, namely, whence all departs, and whither everything reverts. The permanence of a single image, a single idea, and nothing more, would conflict with the conditions of the existence of consciousness, which requires change. *Absolute* monoideism, if such there exist, is, at the utmost, met with in the extremest forms of ecstasy, as will be explained further on. The mechanism of the fixed idea consists in associations of states of consciousness in a single direction—associations that at times are loose and of little coherency, yet more frequently held together by a compact, logical bond which expresses itself in incessant interrogations.

Certain authors, Westphal particularly, in noting the differences between fixed ideas and mental disorders designated as insanity, have made the important remark, that "the fixed idea is a formal alteration of the process of ideation, but not of its content"; in other words, there is alteration, not in the nature, the quality of the idea, which is normal, but in its quantity, intensity, degree. To reflect upon the origin of things, or upon the usefulness of bank-notes, in itself is a perfectly rational act, and this state is in no wise comparable to that of a beggar who believes himself a millionaire, or of a man who thinks himself to be a woman. The "formal" perturbation consists in the inexorable necessity that compels the association always to follow one and the same path. Since intermissions and momentary changes of direction occur, these patients, who are gifted with a high degree of intelligence, and more than ordinary culture, possess a full consciousness of the absurdity of their condition: the fixed idea appears to them as a foreign body that has taken up its abode in their system and which they are unable to dislodge; yet, withal, it is not able to take entire possession of them; it remains "a miscarried, delirious idea."

This *formal* character of the fixed idea well shows its close relationship to attention. The latter, as we have often said, is but a mental attitude. Perceptions, images, ideas, and emotions are its content-matter; attention does not create them, it simply isolates, strengthens, and illuminates them; it is a mode merely of their appearance. Even current speech itself establishes a distinction between the ordinary form and the attentive form of the states of the mind.

I am, accordingly, fully inclined to hold, with Buccola, "that the fixed idea is attention at its highest degree—the extreme limit of its power of inhibition." There is no boundary-line, even of fluctuation, between the two; and to recapitulate, if we compare them with each other, the following is what we obtain:

1. In both cases we find predominance and intensity of a state of consciousness, but greatly superior in the case of the fixed idea. The latter, in consequence of organic conditions, is permanent it lasts: it has the disposal of a psychical factor of great importance—time.

2. In both cases the mechanism of association is limited. In attention this exceptional state does not last long; consciousness reverts spontaneously to its normal condition, which is the struggle for existence between heterogenous states. The fixed idea prevents all diffusion.

3. The fixed idea presupposes—and this is one of the ordinary effects of degeneration—a considerable weakening of the will, that is, of the power to react. There is no antagonistic state that is able to overthrow it. Effort is impossible or vain. And hence the state of agony of the patient, who is conscious of his own impotency.

Physiologically regarded, the condition attending the fixed idea may probably be represented in the fol-

lowing manner. In its normal state the entire brain works: diffused activity is the rule. Discharges take place from one group of cells into another, which is the objective equivalent of the perpetual alterations of consciousness. In the morbid state only a few nervous elements are active, or, at least, their state of tension is not transmitted to other groups. It is not necessary, let it be remarked, that the nervous elements in question should occupy a single point or limited region of the brain; they may be sprinkled here and there, provided they be closely joined and associated together for the common work. But whatever may be their position in the cerebral organ, they are as a matter of fact isolated; all disposable energy has been accumulated in them, and they do not communicate it to other groups; whence their supreme dominance and exaggerated activity. There is a lack of physiological equilibrium, due probably to the state of nutrition of the cerebral centres.

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Esquirol called the fixed idea a catalepsy of the intelligence. It might also be compared to a phenomenon of the motor order—contracture. Contracture is a prolonged constriction of the muscles; it results from an excess of irritability of the nervous centres and the will has not the power to destroy it. The fixed idea has a similar cause; it consists in an excessive tension, and the will has no power over it.

DOUBLE PERSONALITY AND DOUBLE SOUL.

Consciousness, or the centralized and intensified feeling of the central soul, does not remain equally the same throughout our life. It is sometimes more, sometimes less, intense. Its highest state of concentration, when it is most intense, we call attention,* and a mental condition in which concentration is lacking, we call a distracted or absent-minded state. The Germans in this sense speak of a person as being "dispersed," *zerstreut*, when his attention is not focused upon one central idea, but is dimly distributed over a larger field.

The object of attention is that idea in which and to which at a given moment our entire psychical activity converges. It may be called the centre of the central soul. It is that part of our soul which, being the content of the present state of consciousness, represents at the time our ego.

The object of attention can and usually does change rapidly. Indeed a certain power of self-control is necessary to fix attention upon one object for any length of time. The importance of the power of attention can scarcely be overrated, and M. Ribot quotes with approval Helvetius, who says: "All intellectual differences between one man and another spring only from attention."

The *central* soul, the ego proper of man, his conscious personality, is not limited to the present state of consciousness. It possesses the peculiar quality, that the present state of consciousness is connected with the most important memories of former states of consciousness. In other words, central soul-life is a continuous process, and its continuity is felt, it is conscious. The continuity of the central-soul is its history in shape of living memories, that stand in connection with its present.

The facts of our life are thus represented in our mind in the shape of a series of memories, and it is this series of memories that constitutes our personality.

It is but natural that under normal conditions every man should have a personality of his own. A man's personality is the history of his life and the sum total of his experiences. The memories of former experiences influence our actions even now. They guide us in our decisions and are constituent parts of our present state of consciousness.

If a certain sensory impression is perceived,—for instance we read a certain sentence in a book,—the impression is recognized as something we had heard or seen before. Most likely every word is familiar to us, the combination of words in this sentence alone is new. All the memories of these words are awakened, not only the memories of the letters, the written words, but also of the sounds; then the memories of the conceptions are revived, the thought-images of which these words are symbols, and with them all those mental activities that are therewith associated. Thus the state of our present consciousness is in a constant contact with the past, it grows upon and it adds to it. The memories of old experiences and the reactions upon certain conditions in former situations are the foundation from which our wishes and desires, our hopes and longings, rise;—they are the elements of that which as one whole is called character—in a word they constitute our conscious personality.

* * *

Consciousness does not act continually. The activity of the central soul sinks at regular intervals below the level of consciousness. It goes to sleep every night, and the existence of the central soul, it thus appears, is for a short time periodically wiped out.

We know that sleep is by no means a state of inactivity; but while in a waking state the life of the central soul is predominent, in sleep the peripheral soul develops an unusual activity. It performs the work of restoration. The peripheral organs clean the brain of its waste materials and restore the loss of its consumption, by building up those living nerve-struc-

* We here refer the reader to M. Ribot's excellent disquisitions on this topic, translations of which are now being published in our columns.

tures that contain the energy which during the waking state is drawn upon.

In the deepest sleep all consciousness disappears, but in lighter slumbers part of the borderland between peripheral and central soul-life remains active, and then forms in the subumbra of dreams a new centre of its own, which may be called the dream-ego. The dream-ego need not be, and, indeed, as a rule, it is not connected with the normal ego of the waking state, so that usually we have a vague recollection only that during sleep we were dreaming of something but cannot tell what it was.

The ego of the dream possesses a chain of memories of its own, which perhaps has never been connected with the memory-chain of the conscious ego in the waking state. In that case, if we do not know of what we dreamed, we cannot properly speak of our having forgotten the dream. We never knew it, for it was never in connection with our consciousness. Yet should we, on the day after the dream, happen to see one of the objects that appeared in the visions of our slumber, we might be enabled by this observation to recollect the whole dream.

We can easily understand this fact, for the sight of the object that we dreamed of brings the waking consciousness into contact at one point with the memory chain of the dream-ego. Thus an association is produced between both, and the whole chain of the dream-memories or a great part of them can be hauled up, as it were, to the surface of conscious recollection.

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There exist certain cerebral diseases, in which, the continuity of the present state with past memories is interrupted through an impairment of the brain. In such cases a new chain of memories is usually formed, and the unconnected states of consciousness combine among themselves into a new ego, which (not unlike the dream-ego) on its own part is not connected with the original, normal ego. Certain important memories that constitute the normal personality being wiped away, the new ego may in all its main characteristics be vastly different from the normal ego. When the normal ego reappears, it knows nothing of the second ego. It will continue its existence from the moment it had ceased, and takes as little notice of the other ego as a man in the waking state bothers about the dreams of the previous night, of which he knows nothing. Both states, the normal and the abnormal ego, may alternately appear, just as the waking-ego and the dream-ego may come and go. It is as if a dream-ego of a sleep-walker had acquired a continuity of its own. In such a case besides the normal personality another personality is formed in one and the same body.

Certain activities and habits,—namely, those that are usually performed unconsciously,—remain common to the normal and abnormal personality, but the two egos constitute separate spheres. Physicians who have observed and described such states, most forcibly and correctly designate this phenomenon as cases of "double personality," and we explain them as a doubling of "the central soul within one common peripheral soul."

Ribot quotes the following remarkable instance * of a young American woman from the "Philosophy of Sleep," by Macnish:

"Her memory was capacious and well stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking she was discovered to have lost every trace of acquired knowledge. Her memory was *tabula rasa;* all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn everything again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she evinced considerable proficiency.

"After a few months another fit of somnolency came upon her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had hefallen her afterward. She is as unconscious of her double character as two distinct persons of their respective natures. For example, in her old state she possesses all the original knowledge, in her new state only what she acquired since. . . . . In the old state she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new she writes a poor, awkward hand, having had neither time nor means to become an expert."

In this manner there are formed two entirely different and independent chains of recollections. When the one appears, the other disappears. This duplication can be due only to a temporary interruption of consciousness with its chain of memories, thus causing the obliteration of the conscious personality. Peripheral soul-life continuing its activity, forms a new concentration and produces another central soul which in the course of its development has to create its own material. The patient thus appears to lead a double life, by possessing two central souls, which are encompassed by one and the same peripheral soul.

How much the cases of double personality, rising from the obliteration of normal personality, are similar to the formation of a dream-ego, may be learned from an instance quoted by M. Ribot in his "Diseases of Personality," where a constant change of personality is effected. He says:

* We do not cite here the famous case of Dr. Azam's Felida X——. The statement of the case does not appear well defined and seems to be self-contradictory in important points. It seems strange that, accordiog to the account, the patient's memory in the abnormal condition covered also that of the normal, while the reverse did not take place. And yet Dr. Azam states that a radical change of character took place; while the patient appeared modest and decent in the one, she was coquettish and frivolous in the other. Such a change is not possible without the obliteration or at least impairment of cortical brain structures—which after all are memories, if not of actual experience, yet of instruction and education.

"An insane woman of Charenton, possessing very remarkable power and originality of mind, from day to day would change in personality, in condition, in life, and even in sex. Now she would be a young lady of blood royal, betrothed to an emperor; anon a plebeian woman and a democrat: to-day a wife and in the family-way; to-morrow still a maid. It would happen also that she would think herself a man, and one day she imagined herself to be a political prisoner of importance, and composed verses upon the subject."

The cases of double personality are similar to the cases of a double soul, in so far as both show two or more distinct consciousnesses. Yet, while the case of a double soul may exhibit the normal symptoms of the peripheral and the central activities of the soul in their isolation, a case of double personality shows an unusual and a continuous rise of a second central soul with a new and distinct chain of memories rising from the subconscious spheres of peripheral activity. This being possible only if the normal central soul is temporarily extinct, its appearance must be considered as the symptom of a severe and most probably fatal disease of the brain.

The phenomenon of double personality is a special and an abnormal case of double soul-life, it is a case in which by the weakness of central soul-life part of the peripheral activities usurp the centre for a certain period. It is like a change of party in the government of the mind; other elements representing new ideas and principles with traditions of their own, assume the executive power. The symptoms of independent peripheral activities are like the individual exertions of private citizens. A duplication of personality accordingly can be effected only by ousting the original personality that is in possession of the central executive powers in our body, represented in the motor regions of the hemispheres and controling the muscles of our limbs, especially the organ of speech.

The inference that can be drawn from the fact of double personality seems to be, that the peripheral soul-life of an organism has the intrinsic tendency to build a central soul out of its own materials. Could we amputate the central soul of a man, *i. e.*, his conscious personality, the subconscious and unconscious activities of his nerves would again grow together or at least show the tendency to grow together and become focused in a new centre. Similarly a tree, the top of which is cut down, will send forth new branches to replace the loss.

* * *

The result of our investigations confirms the proposition that all nervous activity is in a certain way psychical. Even its so-called unconscious functions are processes accompanied with a kind of feeling. Accordingly, they are (considered by themselves) to a certain extent conscious. They can not properly be called conscious, because by "conscious" we mean the strongest and most concentrated kind of feeling, and not mere irritability. Yet the irritability of organized substance is the germ from which consciousness is developed.

If the work performed by the many different minor ganglions of the peripheral parts is called unconscious, this should only mean that the feeling remains isolated in the peripheral sphere, and that it is not known to, *i. e.*, it stands in no connection with, the larger central ganglions. The activity of the central ganglions and the activity of such parts as are at the time in connection with them, are the constituent elements of our consciousness.

The central consciousness being stronger than the rest eclipses all the others. So the stars disappear before the rays of the sun, although they continue to remain in their places. If we speak of our ego, or of our personality, we think first and almost exclusively of that part of our mind which we have defined as our central soul.

There is no doubt that the different parts of living substance have by division of labor lost certain properties to such an extent that they scarcely retain the rudimentary features thereof. Feeling is one feature only of organized life. While the dim feeling of irritability has been concentrated in a central consciousness; it is more than probable that in certain and perhaps in most parts of the peripheral activity of the soul it has simultaneously been reduced to a minimum.

In our great cities we have often occasion to observe in the evenings pictures of magic lanterns used as advertisements in the streets or on public squares. We may often be puzzled whence the picture comes; whether the lantern stands in front in a hidden place on the opposite side of the street, or whether it stands behind the picture. The effect only appears and all the many rays of light which are intercepted by the white screen, are imperceptible. No wonder that the lantern in former centuries was considered as a magic instrument.

The Psyche with its glowing, its brilliant, and ever changing life similarly appears as a wonder that cannot be accounted for. Not knowing whence it came, we are almost driven to the conclusion, that here is the inscrutable interference of an extra-natural power. Nevertheless, patient inquiry will after all convince us, that there is no exception to, no annihilation of, natural law. The same natural powers are at work in our soul as in the surrounding universe.

Our central soul appears to us like the white Alpine summit when seen from afar. It can scarcely be distinguished from a roseate cirrus-cloud that hovers free in the air. Nevertheless, the Alpine summit rests on solid rock and stands firmly upon the ground from which it has risen. We see only the snow-covered top

and are not aware of its granite base. Yet the base is there, and though it appears dark to us, it consists, in the main, of the same material as its top in its majestic grandeur.

Certainly, nature manifests herself in our soul in a peculiar and extraordinary way. Nature seems to be concentrated here in all her glory and, if anywhere, here she demonstrates that she is no chaotic agglomeration of dead matter, but a living power, everywhere conforming to law.

Law is not imposed upon nature, but is immanent in nature. It is, fundamentally, nothing but the fact that nature is consistent; nature remains faithful to herself. Thus being a law unto herself and being a living power, she naturally makes life grow according to law *i. e.*, she organizes in living organisms. Living organisms therefore can truly be said to be created in the image of the living cosmos. They are microcosms and can be looked upon as revelations of the macrocosm, of the immeasurable All.

This is the more true, the higher an organism is, and most of all it is true of man. We cannot doubt that there is a scientific truth in the words of Moses, when he says: "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him."

SUPERSTITION IN AMERICAN LIFE.

BY L. J. VANCE.

In a recent issue (No. 107) of The Open Court, I argued that the superstitious element enters into habits of thought and action which still hold in the United States, and, at the same time, I briefly indicated the principal sources from which this element in American life had been derived. My argument was reinforced by many striking items of superstition which seem out of joint with the times, because there is nothing left to which they are suited. In some of these items, we detect savage ways and ideas, which, happily, have fallen into a state of "innocuous desuetude." Like the heroine in "Fortunes of Fairy Lore," the student of folk-lore complains that the world has become uncomfortably wise, and that even the young people, no longer capable of wonder, smile knowingly at the stories of mother Fancy. Indeed, our folk do not like to give prominence to their inherited lore, which seems so foreign and so opposed to other parts of their knowledge. Not alone that people nowadays hide their shortcomings, but most of us, I think, underrate the surviving superstitions which are in our day and age, but not of it. Thus, it remains to consider some of the ways in which superstition has influenced the national life; and, also, the manner in which it illustrates some modes of thought and action, which still exist in the States.

In one of her novels, George Eliot says that "superstitions carry consequences which often verify their hope or their foreboding." As an illustration that this is indeed the case, we refer to the witchcraft movement in New England during the seventeenth century. To be "in all things too superstitious" was the prime characteristic of the American Puritans of this period, just as it was the fault of the Athenians in St. Paul's time. Now, in the matter of witchcraft the New Englander was not a whit different from his contemporaries elsewhere; in Europe, as Mr. Lecky remarks, witchcraft was regarded as "a phase of the miraculous and the work of the devil." It was popularly believed that men and women could, by compact with the powers of darkness, obtain power to suspend the ordinary laws of the material world, and could thus injure their neighbors and fellow-men and women, in some occult way. The New Englander lived in a world of supernaturalism. He was ever on the *qui vive* for "Illustrious Providences in New England." Can we wonder then, that the witchcraft movement carried consequences which verified their hope or their foreboding? Not at all. Thus, speaking of Increase Mather in his recent history of the "English Colonies in America," Mr. Doyle says: "About 1684 he bethought him of publishing an account of what he called 'Illustrious Providences in New England,' in other words, a miscellany to which any one might contribute an account of anything which sounded like a miracle. The condition of life in New England made such a publication peculiarly dangerous." (Vol. III, p. 302.) And why dangerous?

Manifestly, the New Englander was in such a frame of mind that he could carry a superstitious system to its logical consequences. Now, gunpowder is comparatively safe, until you ignite it. So too, the witchcraft-system was comparatively harmless until the people of Salem did not scruple to make practical application of it. Consequently, Increase Mather's book was as a firebrand to a magazine. The "Wonders of the Invisible World," by Cotton Mather, only served to add fuel to the consuming flame. The writings of the two Mathers raised evil spirits not very different from those that they sought to drive out and away. They unchained the tiger in men and women, and whetted the animal appetite for blood. If I understand it rightly, the Salem tragedy can be charged to literary sources. In New England a system was revived by scholars, and the people readily took up with superstition because it verified their hope or their foreboding.

There is a vague notion abroad in the minds of our people and in our literature, that witchcraft follies in New England came to an abrupt close in the seventeenth century. Such, however, is not the case. The successors of the two Mathers in the eighteenth cen-

tury did not hesitate to preach from the pulpit their unwavering belief in "the work of the devil." Thus, the Rev. Ebenezer Turell, a graduate of Harvard, left at his death, in 1778, a manuscript account of a case of witchcraft. Speaking of divination, he says: "Turn not the sieve, etc., to know futurities. . . . . You only gratify Satan, and invite him into your company to deceive you." Specially interesting is notice of superstitious practices current in New England. He says:

"The horse-shoe is a vain thing, and has no natural tendency to keep off witches, or evil spirits from the houses or the vessels they are nailed to. If Satan should by such means defend you from lesser dangers, 'tis to make way for greater ones, and yet fuller possession of your hearts! 'Tis an evil thing to hang witch papers on the neck for the cure of the agues, to bind up the weapon instead of the wound, and many things of the like nature, which some in the world are fond of."*

What a clear insight into superstitious usages which some of our forefathers 'were fond of'! How natural the minister's advice sounds!

Indeed, it is within the memory of those still living that this particular mode of thought quite generally disappeared in American life. But wherever New England settlers went, superstition was sure to go: it followed them into the wild and woolly West, and there became the lore of the fireside. The belief in witchcraft, as the authors of the life of "Abraham Lincoln," in the *Century* magazine, remark, "survived far into this century in Kentucky and the lower halves of Indiana and Illinois—touched with a peculiar tinge of African magic." The authors there say that, "when a person believed himself bewitched, a shot at the image of the witch with a bullet melted out of a half-dollar was the favorite curative agency."

It would be easy to give examples of witchcraft notions in our own time. It is not an uncommon thing nowadays to read of the wonder-working powers of some "witch woman." Thus, I have before me a very long, and evidently authentic account of Barbara Fisher, "the famous witch woman of northern Lancaster Co.," Penn, written by a correspondent of the *New York Times*.† The writer says that, "the woman had the reputation of being a vindictive witch": that, she possessed the power, according to the belief of the people in her community, of bewitching her neighbors, their cattle, their wells, or what she chose"; that, she did not hesitate to act according to the wishes of her patrons and the size of the fee," and that, "she succeeded in maintaining such implicit confidence in her powers in a community where she had lived and operated for more than sixty years that at her death her reputation was as great and unquestioned as it had ever been."

* Quoted by Duyckinck in "Cycl. Am. Lit.," Vol. I, p. 126.
† Nov. 1, 1888.

There is one item of witchcraft superstition which seems to be very general in the States, but which, so far as I am aware, has no foreign parallel. Writing of the Pensylvania Germans in the *Journal of American Folk Lore*, Dr. Hoffman says: "The housewife sometimes found difficulty in butter-making, the 'spell,' being believed to be the work of a witch, *as every locality boasted of such a personage*. The remedy was to plunge a red-hot poker into the contents of the churn, when the spell was broken, and the butter immediately began to form." (Vol. I, p. 134.) I have run across this same superstition in two different states—in New York and in Ohio. Besides, I have a printed account of a case located in York township, four miles south of New Philadelphia, O., in which a well known farmer complained of "witches in the cream," "brought on by a woman in the neighborhood through spite."*

How oddly witchcraft follies survive! To this does the old woman with the broom come at last! Or, as the poet Whittier humorously says:

"*Our* witches are no longer old
And wrinkled beldames, Satan-sold,
Bnt young and gay and laughing creatures,
With the heart's sunshine on their features,—
Their sorcery—the light which dances
Where the raised lid unveils its glances."

(*To be concluded.*)

WITHOUT AN EPITAPH.

TRANSLATED AND ADAPTED BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

[A sketch by the historian of the Podolian Jews. Karl Emil Franzos says:—"I have striven to give my histories poetic value, ... but I have never permitted my love of the beautiful to lead me into the sin of falsifying the facts, etc. . . . ."]

WHAT a lovely autumn day that was when last I was there! The path takes a course of its own, meandering through fields and gardens. No companions had I but the sunshine, and the whispering, withering leaves. Familiar enough was the road, for each year I go there when I visit the old homestead, and each year my attachment grows warmer. What numbers of the people I once knew lie sleeping their last sleep in this sequestered spot! Probably the day is not far distant when all whom I knew shall be found in this little city of the dead.

The quiet precinct was named the "good place." It was the only place beyond the reach of the Pole's whip, and of the greedy hand of the rabbi. The oppressed soul is here released from a double ban. Who shall count the victims? The Eastern Jews never plant flowers upon the graves; they leave the gentle hand of nature to lay the green sod in its own time, and to waft thither the sweet fragrance of the summer bloom. Alas! until within a few years the burial-place was the only piece of land those poor people were allowed to possess.

* *Pittsburgh Dispatch*, April, 1888.

The "good place" of Barnow is of remarkable beauty. September is bright, and the air indescribably clear and pure. The heather takes on a deep red, and contrasts with the fading foliage of the Linden. Here and there a still pond looks up, like a calm, thoughtful eye. Whoever visits this churchyard, and looks round upon the moorland, cannot remain insensible to its unique beauty. Yet, I know not,—perhaps one has to be born on the moor to feel what I mean.

The "good place" is situated upon a hill from which one can overlook the whole neighborhood. Several villages are to be seen, whose straw-thatched huts appear like so many bee-hives. The town of Barnow, wretched hole though it be, looks quite respectable at this distance. In taking so extensive a survey a feeling of joy comes over one. The only limit is the sky, excepting on the West side, where rises the magnificent Carpathian range.

The Jews regard death as a powerful and stern master, well-disposed toward men and filled with compassion for them.

As one wanders up among the graves, heart and brain grow busy with many thoughts. Of course, I do not refer here to these eternal questions—a torturing legacy which one generation hands to the next—to which only fools expect definite answers. But, in truth, are we not all fools, poor fools, a bandage upon our eyes and a thirst for knowledge in our hearts. I refer to questions quite other than these. Whoever, for example, walks down the cemetery hill to the valley alongside the river, cannot help reflecting on the dire consequences of the actions of two Polish nobles who both determined at the same time to show their philanthropy in the same way. In this valley four hundred tombstones record as many deaths in the same year, hour, day. A monstrous iniquity! Four hundred deaths in blood and tears! It happened thus. As long as the Polish kings had power in the land, the Jews paid tribute to the Jagellons in return for protection. But as the royal authority became less and less, two rival powers thought it would be a fitting opportunity for them to constitute themselves the guardians of Barnow. Barnow was able to pay a good tax, and moreover, to take this people in charge would be a service to God. Two armies were drawn up, one on each side of the city, and a like message was sent from each :—"Choose me for your protector or else I shall slaughter you." The poor Jews were in a terrible strait, and there was no time for deliberation. They got together what money they could, and sent the same answer to both candidates, *i. e.*, they paid to have the protection of both. The result was disastrous. Neither aspirant was satisfied, and a slaughter was begun at both ends of the town. The slaughter lasted three days and three nights. And this was done in the service of God and man!

The autumn sun shines as tenderly over these close-lying graves as elsewhere, and the grasshoppers chirp as merrily in the grass. Here is peace. And yet, and yet, it seems as if a cry must suddenly arise—a terrible cry from these graves, and rent the air. A cry, not of complaint, but of accusation, and not directed solely at Tulste and Barnow.

There are crowds of other graves, besides those just mentioned, that bear the same date. There are those that were filled when Czartoryski hunted the Jews, because game was scarce. There are also the victims of the cholera which, in this century, raged through the great plain. The poorest person here has a burial-place and a tombstone to keep until . . . . the last trumpet shall sound.

Every headstone is of the same form. There are no figures, no elaborate carvings: the faith forbids all that. The poor man has a small stone and the rich man a large one. The inscription on the poor man's grave tells that he was honest; that on the rich man's declares him to have been the noblest person who ever lived. That is all the difference. The inscription is arranged according to the rules of the Talmud. First comes the name of the tribe, then that of deceased, then the names of the parents, and, finally, the occupation. Frequently the last is omitted: 'usurer' or 'briber' would hardly sound well, not to speak of anything worse. In such cases it was the custom to put, "He learned the doctrine and loved his children," and usually that was true.

Whoever reads these inscriptions and believes them, need no longer search for the island of the blessed, nor for that Eden where angels walk. The Semitic race is more anxious than any other to show reference for the dead. For the Romans *De mortuis nil nisi bonum* was enough. With the Semites, if no good at all could be found in a man, silence was observed regarding him.

Silence—the most terrible curse known to this people. "His name shall be blotted out." Nothing could be worse than that. In such a case no name is found upon the headstone. There are many nameless graves in the Podolian cemetery. This is meant for a punishment. And there is another meaning to it. When the last trumpet sounds and the angel of God comes to awaken the sleepers, he will go from stone to stone, and call out the names as he finds them written—the righteous to eternal blessedness, and the sinners to eternal suffering. But if no name be on the grave, the angel may pass on and the sleeper never be disturbed. Let us hope so.

The "good place" at Barnow contains many such

graves. In some cases the punishment may have been deserved: not seldom it is the most dreadful that the sinner has met with. The deed was done; the darkness of the grave hid it forever. The Podolian Jews tremble before the world, and a Christian sits at the law court. They prefer to judge their erring brother themselves, and they do it as well as they can. He is compelled to give of his money, or to fast, or to make pilgrimages. While he lives his crime may not be made public; only after his death is it discovered.

We wonder at some of the things that are considered crimes, and punished as such. Whoever thinks deeply on this subject can hardly forbear asking a very bitter question—an old question, and one that will continue to agitate the human race as long as men walk upon the earth.

There was, for example, an old beggar at Barnow—a discharged soldier, crippled and helpless. Nobody showed any interest in him. The Christians would not recognize him because he was a Jew; the Jews would not recognize him because he had eaten so long with Christians, and because he was given to swearing. A pretty desperate position, and the man not entirely to blame for either fault. No army has placed its commissariat under the supervision of a rabbi since the Maccabees went to sleep; and, as to swearing, that seems to be part of an old soldier about as much as an acorn is part of an oak. But, at any rate, the poor fellow was left to starve to death. His rich relations put a tombstone on his grave, but epitaph there was none.

Alongside of the soldier lies a man who met with a similar fate. An odd sort of man was Chaim—a shoemaker by trade. Shoemakers are often fond of philosophical speculation; perhaps sedentary occupation disposes to this. Chaim was certainly a philosopher. The beginning and end of all his investigations was, "Who knows the truth?" It was not enough for people that Chaim made good boots and shoes. His heresies brought him to the grave.

Strange, strange crimes these! As I stood by the two graves that autumn day I felt as if I must bow down and call to the dead, "O, forgive them: they know not what they do."

The light will come some day.

The next grave that arrested my attention was a very lonely-looking one that lay quite apart from the rest; a nameless grave; a woman's. What could she have done?

Two men were standing a short distance from me, so I went up to them and asked them if they could tell me whose grave it was.

After some parleying they said it was the grave of Leah, the wife of Ruben; Leah with the long hair. She was an awful sinner. She violated the law; she and her husband,—Ruben of the town-hall. A wonderful story.

The wonderful story was then related; a history so terrible that I know most persons will not be disposed to believe it. Only those who have some knowledge of what ignorant superstitions Judaism is, can comprehend how such things actually take place. All I can say is that I did not invent the story: it is all too true.

Leah was a lovely girl in every respect. Her father was Gawriel, landlord of the yellow inn. Neither father nor mother nor the two sons had anything attractive about them, either in appearance or otherwise. How did Leah come by all her loveliness? I cannot tell. She was like a bright sunbeam in a dark place.

A Jewess is rarely a blonde, but Leah had such a wealth of long, golden hair as never was seen on anyone else. There is in the Belvedere at Vienna a portrait of a Viennese maiden, by an Italian artist. The orginal was a German girl. That portrait is so remarkably like Leah that one would suppose it had been intended for her.

Pretty Leah brought not only light but joy to the inn. Her relations took great pride in her and delighted to show it. Old Gawriel was able to dress her handsomely, and he did it. He did not do much for her education. She was taught only what was customary among the Jewish women of Eastern Europe.

Leah was unaware how much she was admired: yet was she a good deal enamored of her own beauty, and especially of her long, golden hair, which, when unloosed, fell about her like a golden mantle—a robe for a queen.

It was from this that she was always known as Leah with the long hair.

The men of Barnow were convinced that Leah would never marry; at least they feared not. Old Gawriel—a rare exception among Jewish fathers—left her to do just as she fancied. As a rule the Jewish youth has his wife selected for him; he may not see her until the betrothal or, perhaps, even the marriage day.

Leah did not want for suitors, but to all the same short reply was given—a decided "No." Thus was Josef P—— dismissed, although he was the son of the richest man in the place; and likewise Chaim M——, a relation of the great rabbi of Sadagora. How could any other suitor dare come forward after that? The matchmakers were at their wits end. Herr T—— would say: "I am an old man, but I hope to live to see the marriage of Leah—and the coming of the Messiah! The last seems the more likely!"

One day to the astonishment of Barnow it was announced that Leah was engaged. To whom? To

Ruben Rosenmann of the town-hall; a man serious and dignified, not rich, nor belonging to a pious family, and a widower.

When Leah was asked for what she had taken Ruben, her reply was, "Because I liked him." Such a reason was never before heard of from Jewish maiden. Nobody believed it. By whose diplomacy could such a thing have been brought about? True, Ruben had sent old Herr T—— to plead for him, but Leah had refused him an interview, saying, "If Ruben has anything to say to me, let him come himself!"

Ruben went. He had a long, long talk with Leah and ere he departed he was heard to say: "I consent; but be careful to keep your secret else it will be the destruction of us both." The father asked, but in vain, to be told what the secret was.

Soon afterward the marriage took place. Under the *Trauhimmel* Leah looked lovelier than ever. But her wealth of golden hair was wanting. A married woman is prohibited from wearing her hair. It is cut off or shaved previous to the ceremony. An artificial erection of silk or wool, called a *Scheitel*, is worn after that; for it would not only be immodest, but an awful sin against God, for a married woman to wear her own hair. Leah would not allow any one to put a finger on her hair, but retired to her own room to cut it off by herself.

And Leah was happy, to the surprise of everybody, and Ruben was thought a lucky fellow.

One hot, sultry day there was service in the synagogue and Leah was there. The air in the building became sickening and stifling, for a large number of people had been there for some hours. It was an atmosphere to affect the strongest person. Leah's head began to feel dizzy, and with a low cry she fell forward. Some persons rushed up to catch her, but in a moment a shriek echoed from a hundred voices. Leah's *Scheitel* had become displaced, and the long, golden hair, longer than ever, was flowing over her shoulders like a halo round her pale face.

Leah's secret was found out.

The scene that followed will not bear description. There was yelling and cursing and fighting. Had the crime been murder, the wrath of that mob could not have been greater. Who can say to what length the misguided zeal of fanatics will lead them!

Ruben came, forcing his way through the infuriated mob, and, lifting his wife as if she had been a child, he carried her down stairs and home through the streets—the imprecations of the crowd following them all the road.

Ruben was summoned before the council. On being asked if he would consent to the cutting off of his wife's hair now, he answered, "No,"—for that would be breaking the promise he made her when they were betrothed.

Excommunication was the punishment inflicted on Ruben—the worst penalty. It is a terrible ordeal; too awful to ponder over. No customers came near Ruben's shop. He was maligned and persecuted on every hand. This went on for some time. Late one night some men entered his dwelling, bound him, and then rudely cut off his wife's long, golden locks. Yes, this is what those zealots did. Leah never got over the terrible fright. She pined and died in great anxiety and tribulation.

Ruben remained at Barnow till the judicial examination was over, and then went away with a broken spirit.

Years have gone by. Possibly he too has found his rest, and has slept away the deep sorrows of his heart in some far corner of the world.

Forgive them: they know not what they do.

BOOK NOTICES.

The November *Revue Philosophique* contains much important and interesting matter. The opening article is by G. Tarde, upon "Crime and Epilepsy." Speaking of the relative potency of inherited tendencies, and habits acquired in society, M. Tarde says: "Repetition by heredity, despite the character of irresistible fatality apparently inherent in it, is surely more in our power to eradicate, is more easily manageable, than criminal habits acquired by repetition in the social environment; and if we earnestly wish it, we may, by preventing certain marriages and favoring certain others, force the great, omnipotent machinery of heredity to work to the profit of society. Society, to a certain extent, is thus guilty of the crimes committed by born-criminals, whose birth it might have prevented."

* * *

The second article is by M. Alfred Binet, "A Study of the Voluntary Movements in Hysterical Anæsthesia." The graphic method, with which our readers are familiar, is employed; M. Binet continuing his researches upon the alterations of consciousness and the double personality of hysterical patients. Dr. Korsakoff, instructor in Psychiatry at the University of Moscow, contributes a "Medico-Psychological Study of one Form of the Diseases of Memory," and M. Paul Regnaud an essay upon the "Origin and Worth of the idea of the Root and the Suffix in the Indo-European languages." Under the title of "Miscellany" is an account of the origination of the Congress of Physiological Psychology recently held at Paris, with a report of the transactions. The idea of an international Congress of Psychology originated, it seems, with Prof. Ochorowicz of the University of Lemberg, in Galicia

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NOTES.

Announcement is made of the following lectures to be held under the auspices of the Secular Union, at the Princess Opera House, 558 W. Madison St., Chicago, Sundays, 8 P. M.—*viz.*: Sunday, Nov. 24th, "Jesus Christ and other Christs," by James Abbott; Sunday, Dec. 1st, "The Sunday Question," by Augusta A. Holmes; Sunday, Dec. 8th, ——, by Horace Bennett; Sunday, Dec. 15th, ——, by C. S. Darrow; Sunday, Dec. 22nd, An Ethical Address, by the Rev. James Vila Blake; Sunday, Dec. 29th, "The Bill of Rights," by John F. Geeting.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THANKSGIVING-DAY.

BY C. P. GEOFFREY.

As the sun rises to-day from the depths of the Atlantic, he beholds a great and prosperous nation celebrating one of the most beautiful festivals of the year. It is the day of giving thanks for all the bounties which Nature, our common mother, has showered upon us in the year gone by. It is the day of giving thanks for the rich harvest now being gathered into the barns of the farmer, and which we who are not farmers, shall none the less enjoy. For all of us, the merchant and the artisan, the manufacturer and the banker, the artist and the scholar, the soldier and the sailor, all of us who make an honest living, depend ultimately on the blessings that Nature bestows upon us, the fruits that grow in the fields, and the meat that she provides.

It is true that we must work for it. In the sweat of our face we must eat our bread. But all our labor would be in vain if Nature ceased to yield the harvest which in abundance she annually offers.

* * *

Considering the state of affairs in this light, we must have a feeling of pride and at the same time of modesty. Of pride, because our prosperity, our property, our life with all its future hopes, are the result of our own work; what we are is the product of our own and our forefathers' endeavors. Of modesty, because all our labor would be in vain if that omnipotent power of natural forces did not continually carry along upon its mighty billows of life the courageous boats of thinking beings.

We must learn to know, that what we are, we are through nature only; for we ourselves are but parts of that great power in which we live and move and have our being.

Our fathers in their gratitude called that power of omnipotent Nature God, and Christ taught us to revere it in child-like love as a Father. If we have ceased to believe in a humanized Deity, if we no longer adopt the idea of a personal God, we must not forget that there is a great truth in the words of the psalmist who sings:

> Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain.
>
> It is vain for you to rise up early, to sit up late, to eat the bread of sorrows: for so he giveth his beloved sleep.

* * *

It is a noble feature in man's nature that prompts him to celebrate great events and to remember the momentous days of his existence. But our feasting must not consist of good eating and drinking alone. Our festivals must be a consecration of our life. Festivals, if celebrated in a truly humane spirit, will elevate man's actions by thought and ennoble his work by reflection.

> "'Tis that alone which makes mankind—
> And 'tis the purpose of man's reason
> That he consider in his mind
> His handiwork of every season."

You who are happy, you who look back upon a year that has yielded its harvest, rejoice in the blessings of Nature, rejoice in the health of life, rejoice that you behold this day! Be thankful for the bounties you have received and close not the doors of charity to the needy and the poor who are less fortunate than yourselves!

The unfortunate, the sick, the poor are invited to join in the general joy and to rejoice in the general prosperity of our country, in the glorious growth of our nation, and in the noticeable progress of all mankind which apparently leads more and more to higher and purer ideals of the universal brotherhood of man.

Those who are prosperous will celebrate this sacred day with a grateful mind, sympathetic towards those who are stricken with the many ills that flesh is heir to. Let us remember our own weakness, let us consider that what we are we are not of ourselves. Thus we shall learn the wisdom of modesty that teaches us to look upon the forlorn and shipwrecked as brothers, so that we shall lend them a helping hand. Let us assist the fallen and downtrodden in the right spirit, not in the arrogance of our own merits, of our own good luck and fortune, but in the fraternal love of a pure-minded and heartfelt kindness.

* * *

Blessed be the sun that shines upon this day, and blessed be is return in all future years. Blessed be the country that yields us the fruit upon which we live, and blessed be that great nation that flourishes in this wonderful land of liberty. May the highest ideals we cherish, be realized in her destinies!

ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGY IN FRANCE AND ITALY.

BY JOSEPH JASTROW, PH.D.

In France and Italy psychology though pursued with great energy and devotion may be said to be an avocation rather than a vocation. While we find everywhere important contributions to psychology from representatives of other sciences, this is particularly true of France and Italy. The chief upholders of scientific psychology in these countries are alienists, physiologists, and anthropologists, together with general physicians, sociologists, philosophers, and *litterateurs*. Of these the alienists are sufficiently numerous to warrant the selection of a department of morbid psychology as most representative of French and Italian activity. The great medical schools and hospitals of Paris together with the naturally volatile and nervous French temperament have been important factors in this development. The portions of psychopathology specially prominent in French psychology are the diseases of the nervous system, the various forms of mania, of idiocy and epilepsy, of hysteria and melancholia, all of which branch out into obscure and subtle mental defects, hallucinations, delusions, anæsthesias, perverted sensations, abnormal emotions, changes of personality, and the like. It is in the careful description of these outlying and rarer forms of mental impairment that the French alienists have been prominent. Hysteria and hystero-epilepsy, nowhere so common as in France, present to the psychologist the most protean aspects, at times seeming to reveal hidden forms of working of the nervous centres, and again presenting a mere bizarre and capricious picture from which no generally valid inferences can be drawn. More particularly, the genesis of illusions and hallucinations; their explanation as attempts more or less unconsciously elaborated by the patient to account for abnormal sensations; the diseases of language furnishing the most valid analysis of the several elements of the process; the diseases of the will showing the various stages of muscular inertia up to complete psychical paralysis; the many forms of the diseases of memory revealing the relative inter-dependence of various portions of the mental domain; the diseases of personality showing how gradual and subtle are the processes by which that most realistic of feelings the consciousness of being oneself is destroyed,—all these together with their many species and varieties form a most attractive chapter of French psychology. Out of this region there has emerged within the last decade a study now claiming the attention of every psychologist in France, and to which must undoubtedly be allowed the distinction of ranking as *the* French psychological specialty—Hypnotism. As though to atone for the psychic epidemic introduced by Mesmer as well as for the varied and pernicious consequences that followed in its train, the French have rescued the field of activity most closely associated with his name from the odium attaching thereto and have elevated it to the recognized science of Hypnotism. Not taking into account the very important works of James Braid in England, and of Dr. Esdaile in India, we may date the beginning of the scientific era in the study of hypnotism from the taking up of the study, little more than a decade ago, by Dr. Charcot and his associates of the *Salpêtrière*, though in so doing we neglect the thoroughly excellent and independent work of Dr. Liebault, at Nancy, and a few others.

Owing to the incredulity regarding all 'mesmeric' phenomena induced by the frequent claims to supernormal powers on the part of operator, subject, or agency, and their equally frequent failures to substantiate their claims, it became necessary to demonstrate the genuineness of the phenomena, and to affiliate them to our knowledge of the nervous system and its functions. Braid had already done much by showing that the method of hypnotization and the personality of the operator were entirely insignificant factors, and indeed this conclusion had been reached by the first commission appointed by the French Academy of Sciences, on which served Lavoisier, Bailly, and Benjamin Franklin. By applying rigid physiological tests, such as the execution of normally impossible movements or the equally abnormal prevention of reflexes; such as exalted conditions of sensibility as well as of insensitiveness to normally unbearable pain,—the reality of the condition was placed upon a sure footing. As it would be impossible here to record the several stages in the unparalleled progress of the study it may be most serviceable to present the two important views of hypnotism now maintained in France and the chief lines of study now cultivated.

The school of Charcot recognize certain physical agencies as characteristic in the production of the phenomena and certain physiological agencies as equally characteristic of the hypnotic stages themselves and as furnishing the means of distinction between them. The school of Nancy, represented by Bernheim, regard all the phenomena and the modes of producing them as purely psychological in origin, and see in the term "suggestion" the key to them all. The former distinguish three stages, the cataleptic, the lethargic, and the somnambulic, characterized by unnatural immobility, by neuro-muscular excitability, etc.; the transition from one to the other proceeding by opening or closing of the eyelid, pressure upon sensitive regions, and so on. The latter distinguish only different *degrees* of hypnotization, characterized by mental differences such as consciousness of surroundings, re-

membrance of what is done in the hypnotic state and the like, and depending upon individual differences of susceptibility and training. It should be said that this latter view is rapidly gaining ground, being the one upheld by the chief writers of hypnotism in Germany and Switzerland, in Italy, Belgium and elsewhere. Accordingly the selection of points for exposition here will be made from this latter standpoint. Regarding, first, the *nature* of the state, it is likened to a natural sleep, in which communication with the outside world is possible through the operator. The higher controlling powers are put out of play, and the subject becomes an automaton at the mercy of the suggestions made to him. These suggestions are unlimited in variety and no matter how absurd or abnormal, will be obeyed by facile subjects. One may take away sensibility to touch, to sight, or any particular visual image, say, of an individual, of all objects of a certain color and so on. One may effect an unusual sensibility such as reading within a few millimetres of the eye, and directly or indirectly hyperæsthesia of almost every sense has been observed. One may obliterate the memory of a class of events, a period of life, or of a particular occurrence; one may induce the subject to accept as reality what is purely imaginary; one may induce changes of personality; place the subject in imaginary relations and see him act out the part to the best of his capacity; in brief there is hardly a phase of muscular, sensory, or psychic activity that cannot be modified in a variety of ways by suitable suggestions.

From the many important facts to be revealed by a careful analysis of these phenomena in relation to the condition of mind and body that give rise to them, I will select the following four as typical and instructive:

1. The extreme *influence of the mind over the body* is nowhere more clearly shown. Not only the use of hypnotism for curative purposes that furnishes the kernel of truth in the faith-cure movements, but the demonstrated possibility of changing the heart-beat, the temperature, of producing bleedings and healing sores, under the obedience to suggestions, reveal the vast reserve of energy that in this unusual condition is at the disposal of the mind. What must otherwise be rare and complex observations are here reduced to rigid and definite experiments.

2. In the *post-hypnotic suggestion* we have a suggestion impressed during hypnosis but executed during the normal waking condition. In so doing the subject usually accepts the act as of his own doing, giving reasons for it and repudiating any implications of the influence of the suggester. At times the act is done automatically, the subject not remembering at all that he did it though otherwise fully awake and conscious. We have thus revealed different strata of consciousness as it were, showing that this, as well as unconsciousness, is a matter of degree, and suggesting, too, that a large realm of mental phenomena now baffling explanation could be brought into order were we more intimately acquainted with these subconscious strata. Perhaps, too, we have here an experimental proof of the dictum of Spinoza, that the feeling of free will arises from the ignorance of the motives of our actions.

3. Nothing better illustrates the kind of analysis that hypnotism furnishes than the "*negative hallucinations.*" These consist in rendering imperceptible to the senses an object really present. If it is suggested that one of the company has gone away, he may now speak to the patient, pinch him, stand in his way without the least effect. If he places a hat upon his head the subject sees it mysteriously suspended in mid-air, and so on. Or again, if the suggestion be given that the subject cannot read the word "not" he will read whole pages correctly always omitting that word. To do this he must really see the word in order to recognize that it is the word not to be read, and yet he does not see it. It is a condition similar to "psychic blindness," and again illustrates how hypnotism substitutes experiment for observation. The eye sees but the brain has a constant order that when such and such an impression knocks for admission, it should not be received.

4. The *analogies of hypnotism to more normal states* are many. Not only in sleep but in the waking condition, we find susceptible subjects, easily subjugated to the will of another, credulous, and by reiteration of their fancies acquiring a firm belief in their truth and perhaps embellishing them with a mass of interesting detail. Hypnotic subjects in the waking condition often accept and act out suggestions just as if hypnotized, and such observations shed valuable light upon the genesis of illusions.

The interest in hypnotism is not confined to the description and explanation of its varied appearances, but several practical applications of it have been made. Foremost is the therapeutic use of it in the treatment of disease. By systematically giving suggestions that pains shall disappear, that abnormal processes shall cease, and diseased functions be restored, accompanying such suggestions by rubbing, etc., to fix the attention upon the part concerned; by gradually moving members the control over which was lost, a very considerable number of ailments have been successfully treated. This means that by applying an admittedly mysterious power of helping the action of nature, or by removing more or less imaginative obstacles to a natural cure, many, of course not all, forms of disease may be alleviated. Again, an edu-

cational hypnotization to the removal of bad habits by moral suggestions has been tried.

Finally, the law has had to deal with hypnotism; because these suggestions may be for evil as well as for good, may be abused as well as utilized. Not only is it possible to inflict injury upon a person hypnotized, or get him to injure others; to obtain his signature to an important paper; but the possibility of post-hypnotic suggestion gives opportunity for a large number of crimes, committed by persons apparently in normal condition and fully accepting the responsibility for their acts. These in the main are the problems to which the French psychologists are devoting their energies, and to the elucidation of which they have largely contributed. In addition to the overwhelming and constantly increasing literature of hypnotism, there exists the *Revue de l'Hypnotisme*, appearing monthly, and in August last a very successful international congress of hypnotism was held in Paris.

Although the main psychological interests in France run in the channels already outlined, there are a number of by-streams that give evidences of vitality in other directions. What may be termed sociological psychology is eagerly cultivated, in particular the study of the criminal classes as sociological defectives; the effects of heredity in preserving acquired characteristics; the effect of the environment in the process of mental evolution—have been fully treated. Again, those general relations of sensation, of the feelings, of the movements, represented for example in the works of Paulhan, Beaunis, Féré, Binet, Egger, and Ballet, have received clear and interesting expositions. In comparative psychology we may cite the work of Espinas on animal societies and of Perez on the various stages of child development. The psychological laboratory and distinct professorships of psychology are almost unknown in France. The chair of experimental and comparative psychology that M. Ribot holds in the *Collège de France*, is a striking exception. By this position as well as by the editorship of the *Revue Philosophique*, a monthly periodical, always full of interesting psychological matter, M. Ribot has claims to rank as the leader of the modern psychological school in France. His admirable compilations have done much to give unity to what would otherwise be scattered results, and the position he represents shows that in spite of its somewhat disjointed character, psychology in France is a very active and promising study.

What is true of France is largely true of Italy, except that hypnotism plays a less essential rôle. Morbid psychology in all its branches is assiduously cultivated, and the more important Italian journals of psychology are largely under the control of alienists. Sociological psychology is also very prominent, as is evidenced by Morselli's work on "Suicide," and the school of psychological criminologists headed by Lombroso. In his classic work, *L'Uomo Delinquente*, Lombroso regards the criminal as a distinct biological variety of the human species, and collects with great ingenuity the bodily and mental characteristics by which he can be distinguished from more normal men. The number of psychological students in Italy is small, so that the dominant interests of individuals are important. One should mention the works of the Florentine anthropologist Mantegazza, upon the expression of the emotions, upon the physiology of love, and upon the various forms of ecstasy; of Mosso on the psychology of fear; of Tamburini and Seppili on hypnotism; of Lombroso on genius and insanity; of Vignoli on myth and science, and upon animal intelligence; and the very admirable handbook of physiological psychology written by Sergi, Professor of Anthropology at Rome. The Italian contributions to psychology though few, are of a high order and in the intellectual revival which that country is experiencing, the interests of psychology will surely be e furthered.*

WHAT IS HYPNOTISM?

In recent times a number of quite unexpected disclosures have been brought to light by the aid of hypnotism. The wonderful reports about hypnotic experiments at first seemed so highly incredible, that, perhaps justly, they were received with distrust. They seemed to merit general disbelief. But, the experiments were repeated and again and again proved successful. At the present time we have at our disposal an abundance of well-accredited facts. England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and particularly France, have been the theatre of eager researches. Nor has America remained altogether unconcerned in the matter. In recent years the literature relating to this subject has reached fabulous proportions.

The more conversant we have become with hypnotic phenomena, which at first appeared quite abnormal, the more occasion have we had to convince ourselves that, after all, they are not more wonderful than other phenomena of life. The phenomena, at all events, which after strict, critical investigation

* I know of no general account of psychology in France. Under hypnotism I would select the works of Bernheim on suggestive therapeutics (translated), of Binet and Féré on animal magnetism (translated), of Liegois on the legal aspects of hypnotism, and of Janet, *l'Automatisme Psychologique*, as representing the typical phases of the study. Max Dessoir has published an admirable bibliography of hypnotism including over 800 titles. For Italy I can refer to *La Philosophie expérimentale en Italie*, by Alfred Espinas. In Switzerland and Belgium the state of psychology is similar to what it is in France and Italy; as the number of psychologists in these countries is small, individual interests are again important. In Switzerland may be mentioned Forel, who is primarily an alienist, but has written upon the psychology of the ant, and has introduced the study of hypnotism into Switzerland; Herzen, primarily a biologist, who has written upon the fundamental relations of body and mind, etc. Switzerland is also closely related to Germany, and many of the interests of German psychology are also represented. In Belgium the name of Delboeuf is important. He has written upon the psycho-physic law, upon the nature of sensation, and recently upon hypnotism.

and experimental treatment have been confirmed and retained as facts, are easily arranged under the head of biological and psychical laws, with which we are familiar in our daily experience.

At the very threshold of the new science we are embarrassed by the different answers which are given to the question, "What is hypnotism?" I have sought in vain after a simple and precise definition among the most prominent authors of the department. The psychologists of France and Switzerland are divided into two hostile camps, from both of which the ingenious founder of scientific hypnotism, M. Charcot, seems to keep equally aloof.

M. Charcot considers the hypnotic state as à *psychosis, i. e.*, a diseased state of the soul, and has become more and more convinced, according to accounts that have appeared in French and German journals, that the therapeutic employment of hypnotism leads to injurious results, or, to say the least, its efficacy is very doubtful.

The two hostile schools, one at Nancy, the other at Paris, unite in their opposition to Charcot's view, that the hypnotic state is a psychosis. The Nancy school is headed by Prof. Bernheim, the Parisian by Dr. Luys. Prof. Bernheim looks upon hypnotism as throughout psychical; he resolves all its facts into products of suggestion; while Dr. Luys believes to have produced physiological and even extra-physiological changes in his hypnotic subjects. Both schools devote their entire powers to establish hypnotism as a panacea for innumerable ailments that visit humanity. Hence their opposition to Charcot.

The question, "What is Hypnotism?" is answered by Bernheim as follows:

"The hypnotic state is a peculiar, psychical condition, which can be provoked artificially, and which to a varying degree *augments suggestibility;* i. e., it has the power of influencing any single idea received by the brain in such a manner that under all circumstances the subject strives to realize the same."*

He adds:

"All the different processes can be reduced to one; *viz.*, suggestion. . . . . There are hypnoses without sleep."

Dr. Forel is a follower of the school of Nancy. He also declares that:

"The vague conception of hypnotism must ultimately be recognized as the idea of *suggestion.*"

But suggestibility can also be observed in persons that are not hypnotic. Have the masses in France been hypnotized perhaps by Boulanger, because by augmenting their suggestibility, he has prompted them to all kinds of whimsicalities? Surely not. Suggestibility is a general phenomenon of soul-life, which can be observed everywhere, but which appears in a special, and indeed in a morbid, condition in the hypnotic state.

The idea of suggestion, it seems to me, is much vaguer than that of hypnotism. If suggestion were the core of hypnotism, if it were its characteristic feature, every teacher who imparts knowledge, and plants ideas in the minds of children, would be a hypnotizer.

Dr. Luys embraces in his definition all the details, that he actually has, or believes he has, observed in the hypnotic subject. Hence his definition is overloaded, and that which is essential is not carefully distinguished from that which is unessential. That which is perfectly accredited is introduced together with observations of doubtful character. Dr. Luys says:

"Hypnotism is an experimental extra-physiological state of the nervous system. It is an artificial neurosis which is developed in a predisposed subject, a pseudo-sleep which is imposed, and during which the subject that is experimented upon, loses the notion of his own existence and the external world."

The last part of the definition applies to sleep no less than to hypnotism; and in the first part the expression "extra-physiological state of the nervous system" appears to have the greatest weight.

This is not the place for subjecting the expression "extra-physiological" to analysis and criticism. We cannot adopt an expression that is of a negative kind. Instead of elucidating it perplexes, and, in addition, we cannot admit experiments exhibiting extra-physiological states to that class of facts which have been and can be verified by repetition.

Here is the difference between the Nancy school and the Paris school. The Paris school maintains that the phenomena of hypnotism depend upon physiological changes; they represent extra-physiological states: effects are produced such as anæsthesia, hyperæsthesia, contractures, hemilateral or bilateral transfers, rigidity by the use of magnets, or by the touch of medicines contained in glass tubes. The Nancy school denies all these propositions, and Dr. Bernheim declares, that "all the pretended physical phenomena of hypnosis are of a psychical nature. Catalepsy, transfers, contractures are effects of suggestion only."

The simplest definition, which at the same time completely covers the matter at issue, is the following:

> Hypnosis is sleep produced at will from artificial fatigue. And hypnotism is the scientific treatment and investigation of hypnotic states.

* * *

In many respects we agree with both the Nancy and the Paris school; even where it seems that they are irreconcilable. There are, no doubt, physiological changes taking place in the nervous system in natural sleep as well as in artificial sleep; but at the same

* We quote this definition from a report of the Psychological Congress of Paris in the "*Internationale Klinische Rundschau,*" Vienna, August 25, 1889; Dr. Bernheim's book on suggestions not containing a proper definition—although he maintains repeatedly that "hypnosis must be reduced to its real foundation, which is suggestion."

time we recognize that all nervous activity is psychical, although it may not be in connection with the central soul of consciousness. Yet the term "suggestion," in one respect too wide, is in other respects too narrow, too special. It does not cover the characteristic features of soul-life in the state of dreams and of sleep. Dr. Bernheim overlooks this difference. In the preface to the second edition, he goes so far as to identify sleep and suggestion. He says: "Sleep itself [meaning thereby natural sleep] is only the effect of suggestion."

This is a palpable error.

* * *

What then is sleep?

Sleep is a reduction or total obliteration of consciousness. Natural sleep regularly follows in normal conditions upon fatigue. A person becomes tired after having exhausted a certain part of the potential energy stored up in his body, and especially his brain. Sleep, accordingly, is the state of restoration of lost energy during an apparent inactivity of our mind, accompanied with the more or less marked disappearance of consciousness.

We can artificially produce sleep by alcoholic drinks or by different kinds of drugs, such as morphine and opium. This is called *narcosis*. The narcotic state, especially if produced through alcoholic blood poisoning, seems to be the result of a fatigue, produced through an abnormal combustion that takes place in the brain after the introduction of such materials as possess a strong affinity for oxygen.

The extinction of consciousness can also be accomplished through a disturbance of the conditions of nervous activity. A deprivation of oxygen, or an inhibition of the blood circulation at once renders persons unconscious.

Hypnosis is distinguished from normal sleep by being provoked artificially and at the discretion of the hypnotizer. Further it differs from narcosis so far as the means employed are not of a material but of a psychic nature. Thus, terror can hypnotize. As experience teaches, men and animals can be rendered motionless through fright. Monotony likewise lulls asleep those who allow themselves to be swayed by its impression; gentle swinging or rocking, the aspect of uniform views, prairies, deserts, large corn-fields, and continuous sounds, as the ceaseless murmuring of waves, cause sleep in persons who yield to their monotony. In the same manner unexpected, exceptionally violent emotions (sudden, startling sounds, glaring, dazzling light), or intense concentration upon a single idea may also cause unconsciousness.

When one all-absorbing idea that happens to be of a religious nature engrosses consciousness, the state of mind is, by ascetics and penitents, called ecstasy.

The concentration of ecstasy upon a single idea is akin to and yet, as a rule, vastly different from the concentration of attention: as can be observed for instance in a close student. The former is monotony or uniformity in general, the latter "monotely,"* or uniformity of aim. The former is an enforced inactivity, the latter an exceedingly strained activity. The worker in a state of attention considers systematically one and the same object in all its different relations, and does not tire in his absorption in the matter at hand; the ecstatic penitent absolutely drops all relations and distinctions, he loses himself in a passive contemplation or intuition enforcing through monotony absolute cessation of all activity, be it in thought or in deed. But the consequence of both is in several points similar. Both are forgetful of all other things and both will in time succumb to fatigue.

Besides these means of producing sleep, the Nancy school added that of suggestion. People are made to believe that they will fall asleep, and lo! they actually do fall asleep.

There is much truth in Prof. Bernheim's theory of suggestion, but we must beware of its one-sidedness. The suggestion of sleep will undoubtedly often make people sleep if it produces the feeling of fatigue. Without producing real fatigue, the effect of suggestion appears to me very doubtful.

The animal and the human soul are hierarchical organizations of living substance. Innumerable organisms, performing physiological and psychical functions, are coördinated and super-ordinated, so as to form one system that finds its centralization in the summit of the hierarchy which we call the central soul.

Living substance is, as we know, extremely unstable and the function of life consists of two processes which are closely interwoven; the one is building up structures containing potential energy, the other breaks them down and spends their energy. The former is the alimentary or trophic, the latter the vital, or the active, process of organized life. Fatigue is expenditure of energy, involving a want of rest for restoration.

Sleep is the break-down of the top of our soul-organism; it is a temporary abolition of the central soul. The hypnotizer causes this break-down, either by the shock of sudden fatigue, applied to the very centre of consciousness or by leveling the central soul by cutting away the summit of the psychic hierarchy through monotony. He fills it with an idea or sensation so vast, so vague, so broad, that there is no mark of distinction for a centre, there is no occasion for a rise of the soul's activity in one spot. The hierarchy is destroyed at its top, the central soul disappears and all psychic life is dissolved in peripheral activities.

* * *

*From τέλος, end, purpose, aim.

Hypnosis, that is, sleep induced through psychic agencies, betrays symptoms similar to those of natural sleep and of narcosis.

Charcot distinguishes three phases of hypnosis:

1. Somnambulism; 2. Catalepsy; and 3. Lethargy.

All three phases of hypnotism display striking resemblances to corresponding states of sleep. Lethargy corresponds to the deep, dreamless sleep, while somnambulism represents the light slumber of the dream, in which the normal consciousness is obliterated and makes room for the rise of a dream-consciousness. Between both states catalepsy represents an intermediate condition.

In the cataleptic state consciousness has become extinct as in lethargy, but certain functions of the nerves remain active. The limbs are pliant and plastic like wax; they easily assume any position and persist in any motion imparted to them.

The acts of falling asleep and of awaking take place in a regular succession of a series of transitional states, which sometimes may be passed through swiftly, almost suddenly indeed, but which cannot be skipped by leaps.

The state of consciousness is like the surface of the quicksilver column in a barometer or thermometer. May it ever so suddenly fall or rise, it has to pass through all the intermediate degrees.

Fatigue causes the diminution of our power of concentration. We no longer prohibit the rise of ideas that distract our mind and so we commence to dream awake. Our muscles cease to obey and our head sinks down, we commence napping. Light slumber with dreams yields to deep and ever deeper sleep until all consciousness vanishes. Our central soul has apparently disappeared. But the nervous activity of the peripheral spheres has not yet ceased entirely. Its psychical manifestations become lower; but the more pronounced the sleeper's inactivity appears, the stronger seems to grow the trophic or nutritive faculty in sleep. There is no expenditure of energy and the time of rest is employed in building up the broken-down nerve structures, and in restoring the energy that was spent during the state of activity.

Thus the natural result of sleep is the gradual disappearance of fatigue. The more the loss of expended energy is restored, the readier will a sleeper be to awake. By and by some of his memories will be revived; he will dream again, and at last, when the greatest part or all of the broken-down nerve-substance is rebuilt, the faintest noise or a weak ray of light will be liable to resuscitate him from his sleep into full consciousness.

The activity of the soul having remained for a certain time below the zero of consciousness seems to be pressed upward again through the restoration of its vitality from the basic periphery to the higher summit of central soul-life. This applies to normal sleep as well as to the hypnotic and even to narcotic states.

The parallelism between hypnotic and natural states can be explained most easily and quickly by the annexed diagram which is symbolically arranged as a psychometer—an indicator of soul-life. The scale shows the order of the phases of psychical activity as they rise from and above one another. P. C.

* Here insensibility overcomes the subject. "Psychic" is used in its usual and narrower sense. Psychic denotes that which is feeling. The highest kind of psychic activity is consciousness and self-consciousness; the lowest kind of feeling that we can reproduce in our recollection is the dim shadow of a dream. Any feeling that we suppose to exist below this point can be called "psychic" only if the word is used in its broader and original meaning of "pertaining to the activity of the soul." The feelings manifested beneath this point, are better called irritability of organized substance.

† Here torpor sets in; the greatest number of reflex motions cease to respond to their proper stimuli; only such as breathing and the beating of the heart continue.

‡ Here not only the beating of the heart and breath become low, but the trophic activity of the nerves appears arrested. Hence danger of death.

SUPERSTITION IN AMERICAN LIFE.

BY L. J. VANCE.

II.

No account of superstition in American life would be complete without some reference to our negro-lore. Through the warp and woof of our native folk-lore run the dark threads of African superstitions. In the Southern States we detect a mode or cast of thought which still exists in the Dark Continent. The superstitious elements in Southern life, at any rate, have been deeply colored by the surviving beliefs and usages of the negro folk.

Now, it is true, that many savage customs and usages survive in negro rites. But we must remember also that the lore of the Southern negro is a queer jumble of fetichism, of totemism, of anthropomorphism, and of modern European folk-lore. Consequently, it is not always easy to trace negro-superstitions to their true or proper source. As an illustration, Voodoo-Worship may be mentioned, which is

habitually practiced in many parts of the United States under the name of Voodooism. Thus, both the broad assertion of Mr. J. A. Froude, that the practices of the "Voodoos" in Hayti is "the horrible revival of West African superstitions—the serpent worship, the child sacrifice, and the cannibalism," and the current statement that "Voodoo is an African worship which negroes have imported into America," alike contain more fiction than truth. Now, so far from being a relic of African barbarism, Mr. W. W. Newell has recently shown (*Journal of Am. Folk-Lore*, Vol. II, p. 41) that 'Reports of Voodoo-Worship in Hayti and Louisiana,' can be referred back to reports concerning the Vaudois of the fifteenth century, who were commonly accused of practicing mystic rites, licentious and savage in character. Yet, he is constrained to admit that "remains of African worship may be, here and there, mixed up with the mythical Vaudoux ritual." Allowing for the generous scepticism of the writer, I am inclined to think that this is the case. In point of fact, few, if any, outsiders have witnessed the real ceremony of the Voodoos. According to Mr. Cable (*Century*, April, 1886), the sect in New Orleans had a queen, who appoints a night for the annual gathering, which takes place at a secluded spot near Lake Pontchartrain, on the Eve of St. John. The affair of June, 1884, as described by two eye-witnesses, says Mr. Cable, "was an orgy already grown horrid enough, when they turned their backs upon it." Without doubt, sorcery under the name of "Voodooism" is in vogue among the negroes, specially in the South, but, whether any form of Voodoo-Worship can be substantiated is a matter of great doubt.*

However, the chief point to which I wish to call attention is this: negro folk-lore is, in more ways than one, savage ritual. Our idea is, that negro lore and ritual retains many savage rites and superstitious usages and customs. We go so far as to say that the negro has had certain reasons for keeping up dark and mystic rites, weird and magical in character. One of the reasons for keeping ritual has been tersely stated by Mr. Lang. "Ritual," he says, "is preserved because it preserves *luck*." It may fairly be said that three-fourths of negro-superstition is about *luck*. Thus, Voodoo (often changed to Hoodoo) signifies a person or thing whose influence is supposed to bring *bad luck*. It is the opposite of Mascot,—a person or thing whose influence brings good luck.

It would not be very difficult, I take it, to bring forward innumerable examples (if it were necessary) in support of our assertion; for negro belief in a savage or primitive kind of luck is so widespread as to be matter of notoriety. Indeed, there is hardly a negro settlement that cannot bring any number of superstitions, which can be attributed to this belief or principle. For the sake of illustration one or two cases may be adduced. I have before me an account headed, "A Whole Town Hoodooed," referring to Irwinville, Ga. The writer states that the people were "in arms over the conjuring of its colored people," who "would become sick in the most unaccountable manner." Witness, that when the people located the conjurer and took away his Hoodoo or "jack"—"a red flannel bag, sewed up all around, about two inches wide containing No. 4 gunshot and one buckshot, wrapped up in red flannel"—the sick recovered their health. Another case is not less interesting. A negro was recently arrested in Baltimore for assault, and, in searching him, the police took out of his pockets a little bone. "Fo' God's sake, Cap'n, don't take dat way f'om me," he exclaimed. "Dat's my lucky bone. Ef dey ole woman keches me widout dat she'll kunjer me, sho' 'nuf."

Such cases of negro superstition as these bring clearly into view the primitive belief in a kind of luck attached to this or that person, to this or that thing. The more primitive the civilization, the more magical and the more supernatural is the luck. The savage would sooner do without his wife than without his lucky, or fetich, stone. He can do without his wife, but in hunting, in fishing, or in war, he cannot do without his 'luck.' As Mr. Theall says "the Kaffir is a perfect slave to charms, and hardly ever undertakes any matter of importance without using them." ("Kaffir Folk-Lore," p. 205.)

Again, closely allied to the belief in the supernatural power of fetiches is the notion of the magical power of charms. Among the negroes of the coast region of Georgia and the Carolinas, says Mr. C. C. Jones, "the potency of charms and philters were freely admitted, and it was necessary to restrain the practice of fetichism by positive inhibition." ("Negro Myths," p. 151.) All kinds of fetiches were fabricated, but the ordinary fetich, adds Mr. Jones, 'consisted of a bunch of rusty nails, bits of red flannel, and pieces of brier-root, tied together with a cotton string' (p. 152). In many cases the object in view is to 'cunjur' the neighbor who is to be injured. If, then, a person is the fortunate possessor of a powerful talisman to protect him from danger, he can snap his fingers at his enemies.

Once more, these modes of thought show how deeply-rooted is the belief that there is a real connection between object and figure, between a being and its image. That is to say, as man guards himself by an object, so he may be cursed or conjured through his image. Thus, we find in common use among the negroes of the South one of the magical arts so extensively practiced in ancient and mediæval times. We refer to the custom of making a wax or dough image

*An account of "Voodoo" in Boston *Herald*, Sept. 1889.

of an enemy, and piercing it with pins, or else of putting it in the fire. This is a singular piece of magic in which King James of England and negro conjurer quite agree. The black doctor can cure or kill, by putting the life of his patient into the image upon which he practices. There is often an odd seriousness in the way in which the negro mind confuses the image with that which it represents. Mr. Cable finds the same kind of magic among the negroes of Louisiana. "To discover on his door-sill at daybreak a little box containing a dough or waxen heart stuck full of pins. . . . . will strike more abject fear into the heart of many a stalwart negro or melancholy quadroon than to face a leveled revolver." On another occasion a planter found a charm—"a bit of cotton cloth folded about three cow-peas and some breast feathers of a barn-yard fowl, covered with a tight wrapping of cotton thread"—and when he proposed to take it to New Orleans, his slaves exclaimed, "Marse Ed., ef ye go on d' boat wid dat—ah, de boat 'll sink wi' yer."

It would seem that a similar train of thought shows itself in Southern life. In fact, negro superstitions are a common possession in the South and the uneducated whites can no more escape from their influence than from the air they breathe. There are few Southern villages of any size that do not yield numerous items of superstition which can be traced to colored sources. Mr. Mooney says that among the poor whites of North Carolina, the rabbit's foot is esteemed a powerful talisman to bring good fortune to the wearer and protect him from danger. ("*Journ. Am. Folk-lore*," Vol. II, p. 100.) Again, Professor Frank Baker in a paper on "The Human Hand," says that detached portions of the dead hand are quite commonly used for some supposed lucky influence that they bring. This is, he adds, a form of the belief that makes it lucky to carry the forepaw of an animal. ("*American Anthropologist*," Vol. I, p. 51.) It is well known that President Cleveland had several fetiches sent to him by admirers, a rabbit's foot from Texas and from Florida, and a bear's paw from Canada. Indeed, not a few people in Virginia believe that the extraordinary large vote for General Fitzhugh Lee was due to the fact that he carried a rabbit's foot during his canvass.

Finally, I cannot see that the abiding faith in charms shows signs of breaking down in American life. Did you ever have an opportunity for testing your neighbor's belief in charms or omens? No? Then, just observe how the most matter-of-fact man believes in signs indicative of good luck or bad luck, or how he believes that certain persons are favored with good fortune, while others are naturally unlucky. But is not this superstition? Of course it is, and it is an interesting case of intellectual survival. To cite a trivial instance, this summer I noticed that a considerable number of men and boys, stripped for swimming, wore next to the skin many kinds of fetichistic and totemistic badges. Thus, I saw around the neck, and never removed, the Church cross, the charmed beads, and the sanctified sachet-like bags. The object in view was manifestly, to have a charm against accident or injury. I saw, besides, a few other charms against disease; these were worn around the arm, above the elbow, both above and below the knee.

The plain truth is, that our people have great faith in "luck," either of one kind or another. The burglar carries a bit of coal in his pocket 'for luck'; the merchant carries an old penny or nail 'just for luck, you know.' The superstition of gamblers is notorious, and a certain kind of 'flash' literature gives evidence of the multiplicity of their superstitions, and of the cat-like tenacity with which the speculator clings to them. Thus, Wall Street is a hot-bed of superstition. Like the Kaffir, the ordinary stock-broker is often a slave to charms and signs, and he seldom goes into any matter of importance if the signs portend evil. A newspaper correspondent sometime ago collected a number of superstitions current in "the Street." One big operator would not engage in any important enterprise on Friday or on the 13th. Another well-known financier has faith in dreams, and is in fear of a cross-eyed man. A third broker has a deep-set prejudice to meeting a red-headed man or a black cat. And so the list might be multiplied.

Our people still retain quite a number of beliefs in omens about different birds and animals. Superstitious fears in connection with the raven are found in various parts of the world. We know, too, what uncanny use the poets from Shakespere, in "Macbeth," to Edgar Allen Poe have made of

> "This grim, ungainly, ghastly, gaunt, and ominous bird of yore."

The cat has figured in folk-lore and in superstition more, perhaps, than any other animal. The traditionary character of the animal is commonly diabolical, and in ancient and mediæval times the cat was eyed with superstitious fear. In the United States, the cat is commonly regarded as weather-wise. Among the Pennsylvania Germans, when a cat washes her face it is a sign of clearing weather.* The old English superstition is that, "when the cat washes her face over the ears, we shall have a great store of rain." This same belief is found all over the States. The presence of the cat in the house is commonly considered an omen of good luck. But it is bad luck, the world over, to have a cat cross your path when you go out in the morning, or when you are going on a journey. I have, on several occasions, heard people say that a cat, when left alone with an infant, or a sleeping person, will

* *Journ. Am. Folk-Lore*, Vol. II, p. 24.

suck the breath away. Dr. Hoffman finds this notion among the Germans in Pennsylvania, and so does Mr. Mooney among the uneducated whites of North Carolina.

It is not to be wondered at, that the dog and the horse have largely figured in our folk-lore. In Rome, the howling of a dog at night at the door was deemed a presage of death. This superstition is found all over Europe, and is one of the most popular omens in the States. A few years ago, an ancient superstition about the "white horse" was revived, and many people claimed this current notion as a new fad. Now, in the world's folk-lore, white horses have figured in one way or another. The modern belief doubtless dates back to pagan times when deities were supposed to ride on white horses. Just as in Shropshire, to dream of a white horse is a presage of death, so, again, in some of our States, to meet a hearse drawn by white horses is a death-warning. Grohman says that, in Bohemia, a white horse in the stable is popularly supposed to bring good luck, though the traditionary character of white horses makes them regarded as warnings of death.

Prominent among superstitious notions in American life are those which cluster, in one shape or another, round the vegetable kingdom. Current superstitions relating to the different plants might be the subject of a separate paper of no inconsiderable interest. A few minor illustrations for the sake of comparative interest may here be offered. Mr. Dyer, in his recent volume on "The Folk Lore of Plants," says, that "If a white rose puts forth unexpectedly, it is believed in Germany to be a sign of death in the nearest house; and in some parts of Essex there is a current belief that sickness or death will inevitably ensue if blossoms of the whitethorn be brought into the house; the idea in Norfolk being that no one will be married from the house during the year" (p. 274). A similar belief is current in several of our States. Thus, in Central New York I learned that when fruit-trees blossom, or when plants flower, out of season, it is a sign of misfortune in the neighborhood. The same sign is current among the Pennsylvania Germans, and has proved a true omen in several cases, according to the experience of a lady cited in the *Folk-Lore Journal.**

There are numerous charms connected with the different forms of plants. The four-leaved clover is universally supposed to bring luck to its finder and possessor. According to the old English superstition,

> "A clover, a clover of two
> Put it in your right shoe;
> The first young man you meet
> In field, street, or lane
> You'll get him, or one of his name."

* Vol. II, p. 21.

In North Carolina, it is said that "If a young girl will pluck a white dogwood blossom and wear it in her bosom on May morning, the first man met wearing a white hat will have the Christian name of her future husband." Moreover, as on the Continent, so in the United States, a lover puts the four-leaved clover under the pillow to dream of his or her love. The current superstition is rhymed by Miss Wilkins thus:

> "Whoso'er I first do meet
> With the Boy's love in my shoe,
> He's the one I'm sure to wed,
> Sure to wed and love him true."

Again, many curious notions have clung to the flax plant. In many parts of Germany, the flax is supposed to have health-giving virtues and is considered a lucky plant, for, when a young woman gets married, she places it in her shoes as a charm against poverty.* This superstition has evidently been carried by the Germans to their Pennsylvania home, where, at wedding feasts, it is usual to "dance for flax." Parsley is notoriously an unlucky plant. The old English belief, that the act of cutting or of transplanting parsley will be followed by sickness, death, or some other misfortune, has survived in some parts of the Union. There are still not a few people who will not have parsley grown in the garden on this account. Finally, I can hardly call to mind a plant which is not regarded by the folk in *two* ways—both as lucky and as unlucky.

Now, superstition in American life brings pretty clearly into view two important matters. In the first place, such superstitions as have been enumerated are often striking cases of pure survival; that is, some of our superstitions do not properly belong to our own day and age, but somehow they have managed to survive the storm and stress of our time. In the second place, this folk-lore stands, in the midst of civilized communities, for those primitive usages and crude beliefs that characterize uncivilized communities; that is, some of our superstitions represent the low forms of thought out of which modern culture has been evolved. As to surviving superstitions in our own time, enough has been said to show that they have been retained in this country by inheritance, by tradition, or by force of habit. As to primitive beliefs and usages something might be said to show that they have by no means passed out of national life. Lastly, as to both matters, a good deal might be said to show that Buckle's exultant cry, that the fiat has gone forth, and that the dominion of superstition, already decaying, shall break away, and crumble into dust, is even now a great ways from practical realization. For it must be remembered that some folk like to be afraid of their own shadows. Again, there are other people who do not want things cleared up and made prosaic-

* (Friend's "Flowers and Folk-Lore," Vol. I, p. 134.)

ally plain. But, happily, the number of these people grows less and less every year, and Science makes Superstition more and more a kind of luxury.

AN OPEN LETTER FROM AN OCCULTIST.

IS IMMORTALITY CONDITIONAL?

At the recommendation of Mr. Elliot Coues, to whom the communication in question was originally addressed, we present to our readers the subjoined discussion of "a phase of thought that"—as our correspondent remarks—"is now exciting much attention." It is published with the approbation of the Gnostic Theosophical Society.

My Dear Sir:—I should long ago have attempted to unite myself with the Theosophists of America, but was deterred by the obvious impostures of Madame Blavatsky. According to my views thaumaturgy is a thing entirely outside of religion, and those who require miracles to convince them of truth, are fetichistic and unacquainted with true religion. I send you my views, not knowing what are your own, because I recognize the great service you have rendered to humanity. I look forward to the day when there will be no churches, and no priests, and when every husband and father of a family will himself inculcate religious truth. If to-day religion is of the seventh day only, a thing belonging to priests, exercising no influence on politics, or business, or science, it is because it has been made a profession, and a source of bread-winning.

My views were not founded upon ancient symbols. I developed them by brooding, and it was with the utmost astonishment that I recognized in Egyptian, Etruscan, and Toltec symbols my own faith. I was able to distinguish the various heresies that sprang up thousands of years ago, and by analysis I found that the causes of error are permanent, being part of humanity, and therefore certain to repeat themselves.

I believe that there are two Infinite Existences: one feminine—an Infinite Soul; the other masculine—an Infinite Intellect. Between these two there is absolute repulsion. The Infinite Intellect is the creator of all matter; the Infinite Soul, the creator of all Life. She invades the lifeless worlds, which are the visible result of correlated will-forces, breathes into matter the breath of life, from the beginning, and works upward to man through the great law of Love.

With man commences the beginning of the end for which she strives. She is love, and love will have love. She desires to surround herself with intelligences that will second her, and do her will. For she herself is all soul, and in her never-ending combat with Infinite Intellect she requires the aid of beings possessed of intellect. In human beings she has the opportunity which she seeks. A man has a body, an intellect, and a soul. The intellect is undoubtedly material, and its quality depends upon the structure of the brain, and the intricacy of its convolutions. We may believe that the intellect is a sort of nervaura, bearing to flesh the same relation that steam does to water. Of the soul we know only this, that it is feeling. Of itself it can have no memory. Divorced from the action of nervaura, the soul must return to the Infinite Soul. It is like a drop of water which was forced up into the tropical sky by solar heat, fell upon a mountain plateau in the form of rain, descended with a river from the mountain to the sea, and again became a drop in the ocean. But is it not possible that there may be a higher stage for a chosen few? Cannot the soul by a peculiar kind of endosmic action seep up sufficient nervaura to possess itself of the faculty of memory, which does not belong to it? If it can (and I believe it can), then such a soul will become a separate entity, and immortal, having all the intellectual power which the Infinite Soul requires in her servants, and living forever to do her eternal service.

Whilst it is impossible for us to comprehend that which had no beginning, we can easily comprehend a beginning immeasurably remote. The idea of Christ is intelligible if we consider him the eldest son of the Virgin (the name by which Infinite Love is called in symbolism), but only as regards that group of lives which we call the solar system. He was the first to attain immortality. Now one of the blessings of "the elect" in this life is in the power of the soul to grow. The body grows by the assimilation of matter; the soul grows by the absorption of the Infinite Soul which pervades all universes, eager to strengthen the finite souls that have turned to her, and are eager to be her angels. There is no limit to the growth of the soul when freed from the bonds of clay. Hence "the Christ," the first born of salvation, is an immense soul, infinitesimal as regards the Infinite Soul, but infinite as regards the poor strugglers upon earth. He looks after the welfare of his worlds as a shepherd tends his flock. And as a shepherd has a faithful dog, so has the Christ for each world where there is life an Archangel assisted by subordinate angels. But because it is the duty of this Being (the Archangel) to tempt "the elect,"—to try them, as a bridge-builder tries his beams, and girders, and ties,—poor humanity has considered him the Enemy. In some aspects he is Satan, in other aspects he is Jehovah, and then again some call him St. Michael. But his name in old times was *Anathoth*, and this is the secret, sacred name which the Jews feared to pronounce, and which, it is said, they have forgotten.

There is no place of rest for the elect, for they desire no rest. They look forward to death as a boy looks forward to the time when he will go out into the world. They have to grapple with the adverse and malignant disposition of "omnipotence," the Ouracan, or Typhon of antiquity. They have to breathe suggestions into sleeping ears, for they can act upon the intelligence, whereas Infinite Love can only be the still, small voice of conscience, so easily quelled by the egotism of the intellect. And there is no place of torment for the wicked. What is to be punished? Not the soul which is an emanation of Infinite Love, which must return to her if it does not become an immortal entity by the conquest of memory. Not the intellect, which is a part of the material side of humanity and perishes with it. Under no supposition can there be distinct places of reward and punishment. We can conceive that there are immortal entities which used the powers gained by the conquest of the soul over memory for personal ends, who in fact became backsliders. Their worm dieth not, and their fire is never quenched. They are immortal, but they are separated forever from communion with Infinite Love. Their souls cannot grow. Neither can they receive much sympathy from omniptence, whose servants in the end they become, loving evil, and trying to counteract the good influences of the servants of the Virgin.

There is not a thought here which is not exemplified in the symbols I have mentioned. Even the ideas that Infinite Soul is feminine, and that angels are a mingling of feminine souls with masculine intellects, which seem so quaint and fantastic, are so forcibly shown that there can be no mistaking them.

Yours faithfully,

Edward R. Gauzynski

TO ARCHDEACON FARRAR.*

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

Some see the dawning in their own despite;
Who quits his bed to greet it loves the light.

* See *The Forum* of November

SONG—FOR MUSIC.

BY MARY MORGAN (Gowan Lea).

RUSHING onward, mighty river!
Toiling ever onward, on!
Undertones sound through thy waters
As if saying, "Lost and gone!"

Lost and gone forever, say they?
Some sweet treasure lost and gone?
And thy restless torrent seeks it
While it rushes onward, on?

Hast thou taught me thy sad burden,
River, as thou flowest on?
Or has my heart been thy teacher,
For its song is, "Lost and gone!"

MODERN ICELANDIC LITERATURE.

A SKETCH.

IT is rather interesting to observe, that even the literary societies of modern Iceland continue to uphold the ancient prestige of that remote and barren island of the North Atlantic. Moreover, the Icelandic periodical literature and newspapers appear to be written in a genuine modern spirit. They are thoroughly acquainted with all the intellectual and literary currents of the time, and in recent issues of Icelandic newspapers, we notice some able translations from the works of the latest German and French authors, that actually have not as yet appeared in the English language. Incidentally we may even observe, that the Icelandic "Thjódhólf" does not omit to present its readers with a pregnant and correct criticism of Dr. P. Carus's recent publication, "Fundamental Problems."

* * *

It cannot be denied, that this intellectual activity of modern Iceland presents a striking and phenomenal contrast to the intellectual apathy and sterility of certain populous European islands in more favored climes, such as Sardinia and other islands of the Mediterranean.

* * *

The Icelandic and American-Icelandic papers frequently present their readers with direct translations from the Russian and Hungarian novelists. But, of course, Icelandic, even modern Icelandic, literature is to the natives a higher and more exclusive department. It is probably more difficult to write classical Icelandic, as demanded by the fastidious, hypercritical standard of their national literature, than to write in Russian, Modern Greek, or Italian. How they stand in this respect see the recently published work in two volumes by a German, Prof. Dr. Schweitzer: "History of the Literature of the Scandinavian North." The entire first volume of Dr. Schweitzer's work, and even a part of the second volume, relates exclusively to Iceland. He seems to regard Iceland as the "central soul" of the entire intellectual life of Scandinavia—both past and present. And rightly and correctly enough, by virtue of certain favorable historical circumstances. According to the "Landnáma" or Doomsday-book of Iceland, every family of settlers, Norse, Swedish, Danes, Low Germans (Nieder-deutsche from the Elbe and Holland), Irish, Norsemen, Fins, and Welsh, brought along with them one or another fragment of national tradition. In Iceland it thus came to pass, that every valley, province, and quarter of the island obtained its own saga-cycle of common Germanic interest, and upon this racial stock under the Icelandic Commonwealth was grafted and developed the national Icelandic literature.

The Icelandic Family-Sagas, the historical studies and enlightened criticism of Ari Frodhi and Snorri Sturluson welded the huge mass of primeval Germanic traditions into a lasting homogeneous unity, which still survives in modern Icelandic literature. Dr. Schweitzer seems to admit that Iceland of to-day can boast, at least, three modern lyrical poets, who would compare favorably with the lyrical poets of any other country—Matthias Jochumsson, Steingrim Thorsteinsson, and Benedikt Sveinbjornsson Egilsen-Grondal, the last named a son of Dr. Egilsen, the author of the Poetical Dictionary of the Old Norse, translations of the Odyssey, etc. The first-named, Sira Matthias Jochumsson, from 1871 to 1881 the editor of Thjódhólf, until 1887 was rector of the parish of Odda—one of the chief livings of Iceland, where Saemund, the learned, eleventh century scholar, who had studied in Germany, taught and collected the elder Edda But Jochumsson since two or three years has thrown up his living, become a radical in religious matters, and at present is the editor of a small print "Lydhur" (People, *Leute*), published at Akureyri, a thriving little village almost under the Polar circle.

BOOK REVIEWS.

ONE QUESTION. [Dedication to M. B. D.] New York, Chicago, etc. Brentano's.

> "Here is offered you no finished drama
> Filled with startling incidents and rounded
> To a perfect close. Alas, this story
> Is not closed, but living on among you!
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> This is truth, one truth among the many
> Lived before your unobserving vision.
> This is but the heart-cry of one woman
> To one man's entreating need and anguish—"

are the polished theme-declaratory lines of this newest contribution to love's misfortunes. The metre of the book, upon the whole, is excellent; the diction choice; the comparisons and figures of speech employed indicate a thorough and helpful acquaintance with classical English literature. Cyril Davenant—runs the plot—is in love, passionately, with Eloise Mayburn; is about to be married. Cyril's wife, believed to have perished, appears in the nick of time, prevents the union, and insists upon her privilege of reinstatement. Eloise flees to Italy; Cyril follows. Shall now—the question arises—Eloise yield to the impulsion of love, or obey the mandate of duty. Cyril advocates the former; conscience admonishes the latter: and Eloise—bows to conscience. The dialogues are long; perhaps, necessarily so. And that immemorial prerogative of the lover, to paint with the brush of a Rubens the transcendent glow and intensity of his own flame—to pile his Pelion on the world's Ossa—has here, also, been richly employed.

We are asked impliedly, in "One Question," to seek artistic beauty—to seek the truth of art and harmony, and not the truth of probable reality. And the commendation may be hazarded that in this anonymous opuscule a greater measure of truth, and beauty, and taste is to be found, than in the majority of current poetical productions. *μκρκ.*

THE BIBLE; Analysed, Translated, and Accompanied with Critical Studies, published in parts of Books, Single Books, and Collections of Books. By Rev. *Leicester A. Sawyer.* Whitesboro, N. Y.: L. A. Sawyer.

THE IMMORTAL BIBLE. Stepping-Stones to Agnosticism, No. IV. By *F. J. Gould.* London: Watts & Co.

Of the Sawyer series nine numbers have been published; the part before us being the first—an "Introduction" setting forth the scheme of the work, and covering fifty-five pages. Mr. Sawyer begins with the order and distribution of the books of both the Old and New Testaments, then takes up the sources of the New Testament collection and the canonical authority of both Testaments, and finally comes to critical remarks and comments upon the three respective series into which the material has been divided. These criticisms are concise and comprehensive; advantage having been taken of the latest researches in Biblical history; they argue

well for the unpublished parts as well as those that have not come to our notice. The style of the text of the translation will be that of modern prose, and the rendering, it is stated, is based upon the most approved texts.

"The Immortal Bible," by Mr. Gould, is a small pamphlet of thirteen pages, constituting a short but interesting sketch, from the human, natural standpoint, of the origin, growth, and completion of the Bible. "The Bible," says Mr. Gould, "the natural Bible, is pre-eminently a book for Sceptics. Scepticism is, at bottom, a religious revolt, an intellectual and ethical protestantism. The Bible is a text-book of revolt." Mr. Gould maintains, that when accorded its true historical position, it is to the Sceptic "indispensable, immortal, and ever fruitful in inspiration and progress." μκρκ.

DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHE DICHTUNG, a collection of poetical productions by German-American authors, published monthly by Messrs Konrad Nies and Hermann Rosenthal, of New York, offers a very attractive table of contents. We may mention a humorous poem by Mr. Emil Dietzsch, "Nur keine Biervergeudung," a burlesque of Luther's historical encounter with the Devil, and the jaculation of the ink-bottle. The following stanza is taken from a pretty poem, "Was würde meine Mutter sagen":

> Du kannst dich weit verirren nicht
> Geh'st auf den falschen Weg mit Zagen,
> Wenn es noch leise in dir spricht:
> "Was würde meine Mutter sagen!"

The *Art Amateur* for November is a bright and attractive number. The fourth design of the elements after Boucher is Water and is the most pleasing of the series. The colored print is a free and graceful sketch of a spray of roses in a glass bowl. There are other good designs for various articles of ornament or use.

The first paragraph in the Note Book gives us not only the agreeable promise of the coming of the "Angelus" for exhibition in this country, but of the proposed addition of a hundred of the best French pictures in the country to be seen at the same time. If the wealthy possessors of the masterpieces of Millet, Delacroix Corot Diaz, Rousseau, and others named in this article, really consent to the loan of their pictures for a popular exhibition, they will show a generous spirit and true love of art that will prove them to be worthy of the great privilege of owning such treasures. It will afford a rare opportunity of studying the best school of modern French Art.

A list is given of the artists in oil and water-colors and of the engravers on medals and sculptors who have received prizes at the Paris Exposition, and many persons will be pleased to find the names of their favorites upon it.

The excellent articles on pen-drawing are continued and the present number is illustrated by very strong if rather harsh facsimiles of pen-drawings by Watteau and Dienay. A striking portrait of Bradlaugh, the English radical, recalls his face very vividly, although it looks much older than he did when in this country.

Some hints on portrait-painting will be interesting to those who are attempting this important and difficult branch of art. China painting receives much attention and the rose designs for it are very pretty. An interesting article on furniture is well illustrated. The prospect for 1890 offers increased attractions and we predict for the *Art Amateur* a continuation of popularity and success. E D. C.

The two latest parts of *Diesterweg's Populäre Himmelskunde und Mathematische Geographie* (Popular Astronomy, etc.,) are at hand. The present edition, the eleventh,—a significant evidence of its worth and popularity,—is being published under the supervision of Dr. Wilhelm Meyer, of the Urania Society, and Dr. B. Schwalbe, of the Realgymnasium at Dorotheenstadt. A feature of the parts before us is the magnificent photograph of the moon taken by the Lick telescope in 1888 By an ingenious device—the superposition of a sheet of oiled paper, upon which the names of geographical localities are imprinted—the accuracy of a map is combined with the softness and distinctness of photographic reproduction. Diesterweg's *Himmelskunde* is perhaps the most complete handbook of popular astronomy now published. (Berlin: Emil Goldschmidt. Price, for each part, 60 pfennings—15 cents.)

Prof. George P. Fisher begins in the forthcoming number of the *Century* a series of articles upon the nature and method of revelation. The first is entitled "Revelation and the Bible." A great deal of the current criticism of the historical writings of the Bible, Prof. Fisher claims, is affected by a pre-existing bias against the supernatural element in these narratives; there is a prejudice at the start which warps the judgment respecting their date, and authorship, and general credibility. Prof. Fisher's position is, that here the same critical judgment must be called into exercise that is requisite in dealing with all other historical documents. The exercise of that criticism, however, is circumscribed by the dictum of the Apostle, that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels that the excellency of the power may be of God, and not of us." Criticism, with Prof. Fisher, only modifies, never destroys.

In *Poet-Lore*, Vol. I, No. 11, for December, an entertaining review of Russian Drama is found. The writer, Mr. Nathan Haskell Dole, traces the influence of Shakespeare upon Russian dramatic development; Russia's first dramatist, Pushkin, having constructed his works upon the model of the English poet. A few pages of translation from the Russian accompany the criticism.

The December number of *St. Nicholas* is exceptionally rich and attractive. "The Boyhood of Thackeray," by Anne Thackeray Ritchie, the opening article, is a collection of reminiscences of the novelist's childhood days; several fac-similes of early letters are given, and excellent portraits reproduced.

NOTES.

We offer our readers, under the title of "Is Immortality Conditional?" a specimen of Theosophic lore, communicated, though not sanctioned, by Mr. Coues, of Washington; and in the same connection we call attention to the concluding paragraph of Mr. Vance's essay in this number.

Mr. Charles Watts, the editor of *Secular Thought*, will lecture before the Secular Union, at the Princess Opera House, 558 W. Madison st., at 8 o'clock, Sunday evening, Dec. 1, upon the subject "Life and Death from a Secular Standpoint." Mr. Watts's lecture will take the place of that of Augusta A. Holmes, announced in the regular schedule published last week in our columns.

Prof. Ernst Haeckel, of Jena, Germany, sends us the eighth edition of his *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, which is just out. The success of this well known book is due to the clearness with which the author understands to deal with scientific subjects. Prof. Haeckel is a man full of religious enthusiasm for science and scientific investigations. The interest that naturally attaches to the great problems of a history of creation is increased by the warmth of zeal to trace the truth. We do not doubt that the book will have a large sale in America. It is a stately volume of 836 pages, with 20 plates, innumerable illustrations and a good portrait of the author. Its contents are as rich as can be expected from a scientific Book of Genesis, treating on almost all the subjects that concern the evolution of life upon earth.

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THE OPEN COURT is not exclusive or sectarian, but liberal. It desires to further the efforts of all scientific and progressive people in the Churches and out of them, towards greater knowledge of the world in which we live, and the moral and practical duties it requires. To this end it asks for circulation in the Churches, and also in all Ethical, Secular, and other Liberal societies. It hopes for a well-wishing co-operation in what all must admit to be true, good, and practical in the conduct of life, individual and collective.

DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE CONQUEST OF DEATH

Jesus Christ said to his disciples: "In the world ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world!"

This is the grandest advantage of religion that it comforts him who has religious faith, while he who has it not, must tremble in this world of worry, of turmoil, of struggle, and of death.

A scientist who had pondered over many deep problems and had been successful in the solution of several mysteries of nature, said with suppressed emotion: "Religion is a sweet self-delusion that helps us to overcome the desolateness of life."

Why is it a self-delusion? Because, he might have answered, the ground upon which religious comfort is based, is scientifically untenable; yet is it sweet, because religion alone can overcome the vanity of the world; religion alone can fill the emptiness of a perishable fleeting life that seems to consist only of troubles and cares, the joys of which, if closely examined, are found to be stale and unprofitable.

The Christians, it may be conceded, delude themselves when believing all the many dogmas of their church. But is it a self-delusion, if they have really conquered the world, and if they face all the agonies of death with equanimity? Granted that their belief is wrong, we often observe their moral courage to be of the right kind. They prove by their example that death can be conquered, that we can raise ourselves above the narrow sphere of selfishness and lead a life that is inspired by the religious ideal of a victory over death.

I confess that I am not a believer in the current doctrines of the Christian churches, but at the same time I openly declare, that I am a believer in Religion. I have no theological creed to which I adhere, I know of no confession of faith which I would adopt, but I have a faith, that man, without any act of self delusion, can overcome the desolateness of life; he can fill the emptiness of existence with imperishable treasures —with those treasures that are laid up in the spiritual empire of human aspirations, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal. I have a faith, that man can conquer death and can build an ideal life of spiritual loftiness upon the material existence of his being.

This faith is that of the mustard-seed. This faith does not look behind as do all the creeds; this faith looks forward. This faith does not anxiously cleave to the past; as do all the dogmatic confessions of faith. The right kind of faith, the only faith which deserves that beautiful name, clings to the future. The mustard is indeed the least of all seeds, but when it is grown, it is the greatest among herbs and becometh a tree; so that the birds of the air come and lodge in the branches thereof.

* * *

Religion therefore, as I understand it, is no formula of confession, it is a moral act, it is the soaring above the lower life of animal nature. And religious faith is not a belief in something that has happened two thousand years ago: it is neither the acceptance nor rejection of the story of David's son born of a virgin, the pathetical story of the heroic martyr who died at the cross and is believed to have risen from the grave bodily. Religious faith is the confidence that we can do our duty, that we can gain the victory of spirit over matter, and that we can achieve the conquest of death.

It is death that makes it necessary for man to have religion. If there were no death in the world, we would not be in need of religion. But death, the stern messenger of eternal peace, awaits every one of us. If death did not exist, we might as well think that man is born to live happily and enjoy as much as possible the pleasures of life. But there is the pale phantom that hovers over us day and night. We know not when it will call us to the silent rest in the grave, but we do know that it will call and take us away from the circle of our family and friends, away from the field of our activity and labors.

There are some men who live like animals from day to day without giving a thought to death and without care of what may come after them. That is no life worthy of a human being. They do not fear death, it is true, but not because they have conquered death. Like the brute they do not fear it—like dumb cattle that are driven to the shambles without knowledge, without a consideration of their fate.

Life is a serious duty; and the experiences of life should teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom.

If you ask me what Religion is, I say: Religion is the creation of a higher life and the laying up of imperishable treasures. Religion is the conquest of death.

AN EXHUMED SKETCH BY NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE.

AND SOME REFLECTIONS THEREON.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I HAVE before me an interesting sketch by Nathaniel Hawthorne, written before his name had been widely heard by the world, and which he did not consider entitled to a place in any of his volumes. But it is striking, and just now particularly so. It appears that in his youth, or about fifty-five years ago, he embarked on a Canadian steamboat at Ogdensburgh, New York, and voyaged westward on Lake Ontario.

"There were three different orders of passengers: an aristocracy in the grand cabin and ladies' saloon; a commonalty in the forward cabin; and, lastly, a multitude on the forward deck, constituting as veritable a Mob as could be found in any country. These latter did not belong to that proud and independent class among our native citizens who chance, in the present generation, to be at the bottom of the body politic; they were the exiles of another clime—the scum which every wind blows off the Irish shores—the pauper dregs which England flings out upon America. . . . . In our country, at large, the different ranks melt and mingle into one another, so that it is as impossible to draw a decided line between any two contiguous classes as to divide a rainbow accurately into its various hues. But here the high, the middling, and the low had classed themselves, and the laws of the vessel rigidly kept each inferior from stepping beyond the proper limits. . . . . Here, therefore, was something analogous to that picturesque state of society, in other countries and earlier times, when each upper class excluded every lower one from its privileges, and when each individual was content with his allotted position, because there was no possibility of bettering it. I, by paying ten dollars, instead of six or four, had entitled myself to the aristocratic privileges of our floating community. But, to confess the truth, I would as willingly have been anywhere else as in the grand cabin. There was good company, assuredly;—among others a Canadian judge, with his two daughters, whose stately beauty and bright complexions made me proud to feel that they were my countrywomen; though I doubt whether these lovely girls would have acknowledged that their country was the same as mine. The inhabitants of the British provinces have not yet acquired the sentiment of brotherhood or sisterhood towards their neighbors of the States. Besides these, there was a Scotch gentleman, the agent of some land-company in England; a Frenchman, attached to the embassy at Washington; and some dozen or two of our own fashionables, running their annual round of Quebec, Montreal, the Lakes and Springs. All were very gentlemanly and ladylike people, but too much alike to be made portraits of, and affording few strong points for a general picture."

After studying the forward cabin, with its second-class passengers,—feasting on relics of the first cabin banquet,—Hawthorne observes the crowd of the forward deck, who had no cabin at all, not even for their sleep; this being "on the wide promiscuous couch of the deck," where men and women carelessly disrobed, and lay where they could. "A single lamp shed a dim ray over the scene, and there was also a dusky light from the boat's furnaces which enabled me to distinguish quite as much as it was allowable to look upon, and a good deal more than it would be decorous to describe. . . . . I know not what their habits might have been in their native land; but, since they quitted it, these poor people had led such a life in the steerages of the vessels that brought them across the Atlantic, that they probably stepped ashore far ruder and wilder beings, than they had embarked; and afterwards, thrown homeless upon the wharves of Quebec and Montreal, and left to wander whither they might, and subsist how they could, it was impossible for their moral natures not to have become woefully deranged and debased. I was grieved, also, to discern a want of fellow-feeling among them. They appeared, it is true, to form one community, but connected by no other bond than that which pervades a flock of wild geese in the sky, or a herd of wild horses in the desert. They were all going the same way, by a sort of instinct,—some loves of mutual aid and fellowship had necessarily been established,—yet each individual was lonely and selfish. Even domestic ties did not invariably retain their hallowed strength. . . . . I found no better comfort than in the hope and trust that it might be with these homeless exiles, in their passage through the world, as it was with them and all of us in the voyage on which we had embarked together. As we had all our destined port, and the skill of the steersman would suffice to bring us thither, so had each of these poor wanderers a home in futurity—and the God above them knew where to find it. It was cheering, also, to reflect that nothing short of settled depravity could resist the strength of moral influences, diffused throughout our native land; that the stock of home-bred virtue is large enough to absorb and neutralize so much of foreign vice; and that the outcasts of Europe, if not by their own choice, yet by an almost inevitable necessity, promote the welfare of the country that receives them to its bosom."

There is a subtle suggestiveness in Hawthorne's remark that his enjoyment of aristocratic privileges came by ability to pay $10, instead of $6 or $4. In America classes are fused in a gold crucible. The old Virginia aristocracy is largely pauperized at home, and many of its chief representatives are living in New York, making money, while cherishing their native State in an antiquarian way, by forming a society known as "The Virginians." The "Four-hundred" in New York are the rich people. Birth and breeding tell for little. Religion is being steadily moulded by the dollar. The Episcopal Church is prevailing over others in the great cities, because, in the lapse of dogmatic differences and beliefs, the standard of value in sects has become secular and utilitarian. The Episcopal godliness is profitable. It is rich enough to attract investments for social and material welfare. One may vary Scripture a little and say, "I have been young and now am old, yet have I never seen an Episcopalian forsaken nor his seed begging bread." But it is a more important potency of the dollar that it has become the pillar of fire, leading the westward pilgrimage of humanity. Early immigrations, with few exceptions, were due to other motives. The New England Puritans came to found a religious commonwealth. Catholics came to Maryland, and their Hugenot victims to Virginia, to escape oppression. Quakers, Baptists, and some minor sects sought spiritual freedom. To the "Old Dominion" came refugees from Cromwell's reign; and in another age the loyalists were followed by the rebellious refugees. All of these old motives for migration have ceased; religious and political heretics are as free in the greater part of the Old World as in America. Immigration is now drawn by the dollar. And it has become so vast that it becomes difficult to take Hawthorne's hopeful view, that the outcasts of Europe "by an almost inevitable necessity promote the welfare of the country that receives them into its bosom." The religious and political immigrant came for the purpose of Americanizing himself, but the fortune-hunter brings his mental and moral province with him. The digesting power of America for discordant races is undergoing a severe test. It appears that our national principle is more feeble than was once supposed. The Irish, who crowd our shores, bring with them a sentiment of Irish nationality, stronger than the American sentiment of our politicians, insomuch that these, for partisan ends, cater to the Irish nationality. We shall never digest this Celtic lump which we have swallowed until the nation insists that Ireland shall be expelled from its politics. The German has been fairly digested. Even the Jew has largely surrendered his racial self-concentration. We may hope that the Irish elements will be absorbed. The Chinese we have, so to say, vomited. The Indian we are managing to hold by the ears till he shall perish. The most serious race question before us is that of the negro. The negro was kidnapped into this country; he has been kept out of social advantages in it; and has increased—is increasing—so rapidly, as to be in some regions a competitor for the soil with the race which ostracizes him. The general surprise shown at the election of a Virginia negro as its orator by the senior class at Harvard, and of another as base-ball player by Yale, indicates the universality of the color-line. Soon after the first negroes were imported and sold in the colony of Virginia, the clergy claimed that a baptized negro was free. He was a member of Christ's body. The planters appealed to England, which decided in the interest of tobacco. In the lapse of eight generations that enslaved Christian has sundered the nation, has sundered the great churches; and he is still before the nation and the churches, listening from outside to the declarations within that all men are free and equal, and that what we do to the least of Christ's brethren, we are doing to Christ himself. The great Episcopal Convention in New York has just said to him, "Go thy way for this time; at a more convenient season I will call for thee."

But it is to be feared that some disasters will have to occur before the convenient season arrives. For this trouble has deep roots. The new president of Columbia College, the Hon. Seth Low, pointed out to the Episcopal convention that the negroes preferred to have their schools and churches to themselves. The reason he gave was that the negroes desired opportunities of promotion as teachers and preachers. This, however, only shows that the nation has excluded them from every other line of promotion.

But there is another aspect of the situation which Mr. Low did not consider. The negroes are almost the only literal and primitive Christians left among us. They really believe all that Jesus said about brotherhood, and meekness, and unworldliness. Their faith has cheered this race through the long night of oppression, and that faith is as different from anything taught in "white" churches as Buddhism is. The negro and the white man worship different Saviours and look forward to different heavens. As, before the war, for them there was "neither bond nor free" in Christ, so now there is in Christ no "black," certainly,—but whether there may not be a "white" the negro (unconsciously) doubts. Can he recognize in the great churches around him the lowly Jesus, or the followers who love not the world, seek not their own, turn the cheek to the smiter, mind not high things but condescend to men of low estate. The negroes are morally and religiously excluded from the "white" churches, alienated by their own devoutness. And the tendency is to wider alienation; insomuch that

they may eventually become a people apart, like the mediæval Jews in Europe, with a partition ever rising between them and the white races. It is a perilous situation. It looks as if this prolific colored race would ultimately break through the fraudulent schemes which restrain them from political domination in certain Southern States, or else that a separate empire will have to be formed for them in our southwestern region. They cannot sail on forever on the "forward deck" of the ship of state whatever their ability to buy place in the cabin, without mutiny and peril to the ship.

Mr. G. W. Cable thinks that the problem can be solved by Christianity, but he forgets that the New World has shaped Christianity after its own fashions and interests. Nor can it be safely left to natural evolution. Slavery was left to that and we know the cost. We need a combined humanitarian, ethical, and statesmanlike effort, to understand and deal with this threatening social *imperium in imperio*. The problem has been relinquished by the churches; it now belongs to the good and wise of the nation without regard to political or religious parties, or creeds.

ECSTASY.

BY TH. RIBOT.

THE fixed idea which we have discussed in a preceding number, might be termed the chronic form of hypertrophy of attention; ecstasy being its acute form. It is not our purpose here to investigate exhaustively this extraordinary state of the mind. We have treated it elsewhere,* in its negative aspect, as annihilation of will. At present we are to consider it from its positive side, as exaltation of intellect.

The comparison of attention and ecstasy is not novel; the analogy between the two states being so great that various authors have actually employed attention to define ecstasy. "It is," says Bérard, "a vivid exaltation of certain ideas, which so absorb attention, that sensations are suspended, voluntary motions arrested, and vital action itself frequently slackened." Michéa defines it as "a deep contemplation with abolition of sensibility and suspension of the locomotive faculty." A. Maury expresses himself even more explicitly, saying: "A simple difference of degree separates ecstasy from the action of forcibly fixing an idea in the mind. Contemplation implies exercise of will, and the power of interrupting the extreme tension of the mind. In ecstasy, which is contemplation carried to its highest pitch, the will, although in the strictest sense able to provoke the state, is nevertheless unable to suspend it."†

As in the fixed idea, so between the normal state and ecstasy, intermediate degrees are distinguishable. Men endowed with great power of attention, can isolate themselves at will from the external world. Inaccessible to sensations and even to pain, they temporarily live in that particular state which has been called *contemplation*. The oft-quoted story of Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse, whether true or not as fact, is certainly psychologically true. The biographies of Newton, Pascal, Walter Scott, Gauss, and many others, have furnished numerous examples of this intellectual rapture.

"Before the invention of chloroform, patients would sometimes endure painful operations without betraying any symptom of pain, and afterwards would declare, that they had felt nothing, having by a powerful effort of attention concentrated their thoughts upon some subject, by which they had been completely entranced.

"Many martyrs have endured torture with perfect serenity, which, according to their own confession, they experienced no difficulty in maintaining up to the last. Their entranced attention was to such a degree absorbed by the beatific visions that were presented to their enraptured eyes that bodily tortures did not give them any pain."*

Political fanaticism has more than once produced the same effects. But everywhere and always some great passion has served as the basis of support; still further proving, that vivid and stable forms of attention depend on emotional life and on that only.

Passing by the intermediate degrees, in order to come to ecstasy proper, and neglecting all the other physical and psychical manifestations that accompany this extraordinary state, let us consider exclusively a single fact, namely, extreme intellectual activity accompanied by intense concentration upon a single idea. This is a state of intense and circumscribed ideation; all life is gathered up, as it were, in the thinking brain, in which a single representation absorbs everything else. Still, the state of ecstasy, although in every individual it may exalt the intelligence to its highest degree of power, is nevertheless unable to transform it. It cannot act in the same manner upon a narrow and ignorant mind as upon a broad and highly cultivated one. From the view-point of our present subject we may, accordingly, distinguish two categories of mystics. With the first class the internal event consists of the apparition of some dominant *image*, around which all else revolves (as the Passion, the Nativity, the Virgin, etc.), and which is expressed by a regular series of movements and speeches, as those of Marie de Mærl, Louise Lateau, and the entrancements of Voray. In the second category—the grand mystics—the mind, after having traversed the

* *Les Maladies de la volonté*, Chap. V.

† Maury, *Le Sommeil et les Rêves*, p. 235.

* Carpenter, "Mental Physiology," Chap. III.

region of images, reaches the domain of pure *ideas*, and there remains fixed. Further on, I shall attempt to show that this higher form of ecstasy may at times reach the state of complete, absolute monoideism, that is, the state of perfect unity of consciousness, which consists in a single state without any change whatever.

In order to trace this ascending progression toward absolute unity of consciousness, of which even the most concentrated attention is but a very faint outline, we need not have recourse to probable hypotheses, nor need we proceed theoretically and a priori. I find in the "*Castillo interior*" of Saint Theresa a description, step by step, of this progressive concentration of consciousness, which starting from the ordinary state of diffusion, assumes the form of attention, passes beyond the latter, and by degrees, in a few rare cases, attains to perfect unity of intuition. The illustration in question is exceptional and single, but in the present matter one good observation is better than a hundred second-rate ones.* The observation deserves, moreover, our fullest confidence. It is a confession made at the behest of the spiritual power, the work of a very delicate mind, and a very able observer that well knew how to wield language to express the finest shades of thought. Furthermore, I must request the reader, not to allow himself to be led astray by the mystic phraseology in which the observation is couched, and not to forget, that here, a Spanish woman of the sixteenth century analyzes her mind in the language and ideas of her time; we shall be able, however, to translate the same into the language of contemporaneous psychology. This task I shall now attempt, endeavoring at the same time to point out the ever increasing concentration and incessant narrowing of consciousness that we have noted, as they are described from her own personal experience.

There exists, says she, a castle built of a solitary diamond of matchless beauty and incomparable purity; to enter and to dwell in that castle is the supreme aim of the mystic. This castle is within us, within our soul; we have not to step out of ourselves, to penetrate its recesses; though, nevertheless, the road thereto is long and difficult. To reach it, we have to pass through seven stations: we enter the castle through the seven degrees of "prayer." In the preparatory stage we are still immersed in bewildering varieties of impressions and images—occupied with "the life of the world"; or, as I should prefer to translate it, consciousness still follows its usual and normal course.

The first objective point, or stage, is reached through "oral prayer." Which, interpreted, means, that praying aloud, articulate speech in other words, produces the first degree of concentration, leading the dispersed consciousness into a single, confined channel.

The second stage is that of "mental prayer," which means, that the inwardness of thought increases; internal language is substituted for external language. The work of concentration becomes easier: consciousness, to prevent aberration, no longer requires the material support of articulate or audible words; consciousness is now satisfied with a series of uncertain images unfolding before it.

The "prayer of recollection" (*oraison de recueillement*) marks the third stage. What this means, I must confess, slightly puzzles me. In this state I can only perceive a still higher form of the second period, separated from it by a very subtle shade, and appreciable only to the mystic consciousness.

Up to this point there has been activity, movement, and effort. All our faculties are still in play; now, however, it becomes necessary "no longer to think much, but to love much." In other words, consciousness is about to pass from the discursive form to the intuitive form, from plurality to unity; it tends no longer toward being a radiation around a fixed point, but a single state of enormous intensity. And this transition is not the effect of a capricious, arbitrary will, nor of the mere movement of thought left to itself; it needs the impulsion of a powerful love, the "touch of divine grace," that is, the unconscious co-operation of the whole being.

The "prayer of quietude" brings us to the fourth station; there "the soul no longer produces, but receives"; this is a state of high contemplation, not exclusively known to religious mystics alone. It is truth appearing suddenly in its totality, imposing itself as such, without the long, slow process of logical demonstration.

The fifth station, or "prayer of union," is the beginning of ecstasy; but it is unstable. It is "the meeting with the divine betrothed," but without lasting possession. "The flowers have but half-opened their calyxes, they have only shed their first perfumes." The fixity of consciousness is not as yet complete, it is still liable to oscillations and deviations; as yet it is unable to maintain itself in this extraordinary, unnatural state.

Finally it attains to ecstasy in the sixth degree, through "the prayer of rapture." The body grows cold; speech and respiration are suspended, the eyes close; the slightest motion may cause the greatest efforts. . . . . The senses and faculties remain without. . . . . Although usually one does not lose all feeling (consciousness), still "*it has happened to me to be entirely deprived of it;* this has seldom come to pass, and has lasted but for a short time. Most frequently, feeling is preserved, but one experiences an

* It is highly probable, that one could find more of the same kind, by examining the mystic literature of different countries. The passages here quoted are from the "Interior Castle," and a few from the "Autobiography."

indefinable sort of agitation, and although one ceases to act outwardly, one does not fail to hear. It is like some confused sound, coming from afar. Still, "*even this manner of hearing ceases when the entrancement is at its highest point.*"

What, then, is the seventh and last station that is reached by "the flight of the spirit"? What is there beyond ecstasy? Union with God. This is accomplished "suddenly and violently . . . . but with such force that we should strive in vain to resist the impetuous onset." God has now descended into the substance of the soul, and becomes one with it. This distinction of the two degrees of ecstasy, is not, in my opinion, without reason. At its highest degree, the very abolition of consciousness is attained by its excess of unity. This interpretation will appear well-grounded, upon reference to the two passages above italicized, *viz.*: "It has happened to me to be entirely deprived of feeling", and "this manner of hearing ceases when the entrancement is at its highest point." We might cite other passages to this effect from the same author. It is remarkable, that in one of her "great raptures" the Divinity appeared to her entirely without form, as a perfectly empty abstraction. Such, at least, appears to be the gist of her own words: "And so I say, that the Divinity is like a transparent diamond, supremely limpid, and much larger than the world."* In this I can discern nothing else than a simple rhetorical comparison, a literary metaphor. It is, indeed, the expression of complete unity of intuition.

This piece of psychological evidence has enabled us, as we have seen, to follow consciousness, step by step, to its furthermost degree of concentration, to *absolute* monoideism. It enables us, moreover, to answer a question, frequently raised, yet which has only theoretically been settled; namely, Can a state of uniform consciousness subsist? The testimony of certain mystics apparently justifies an answer in the affirmative. To be sure, it is a settled and common truism, that consciousness only exists through change; at least it has been admitted since the time of Hobbes: "*Idem sentire semper, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt.*" But this law has been infringed in the case of a few exceptional individuals, in very rare instances and during very short spaces of time. In ordinary ecstasy consciousness attains to its maximum of constriction and intensity, but it still preserves the discursive form: it differs only in degree from very strong attention. The greatest mystics alone have attained, by a still stronger effort, to absolute monoideism. They all, in every country, in all times, and without knowledge of each other, have regarded perfect unity of consciousness, the ἕνωσις, as the supreme and rarely attained consummation of ecstasy. Only four times in his life did Plotinus obtain this favor, according to Porphyrius, who himself obtained it but once, at the age of sixty six years.* Consciousness, at this extreme point, cannot long endure—they declare. But this instability, which they explain in their own way as due to their unworthiness of such beatitude and the impossibility of a finite mortal becoming infinite, is in reality explainable from psychological and physiological causes. Consciousness is placed without its necessary conditions of existence, and the nervous elements that are the supports and agents of this prodigious activity cannot long bear the intense strain. The individual then falls back to earth again, and again becomes "the little donkey a-browsing away his mortal existence."

* Autobiography, p. 526.

LETHARGY, CATALEPSY, AND SOMNAMBULISM.

THE LETHARGIC and cataleptic states are of less interest in a psychological treatise than somnambulism. We shall only mention, that in lethargy, along with the disappearance of sensibility, there can be produced a peculiar muscular rigidity. The skin can be compressed into a fold, and perforated by a pin, without causing pain, and the subject may become stiff as a board. The cataleptic state is characterized by a plasticity combined with a certain rigidity. The subject is like a painter's manikin. He remains even in the most awkward positions in which he is placed, and continues mechanically to perform motions imparted to his limbs.

The difference between the cataleptic and the lethargic state is one of degree, not of kind.

The rigidity of the limbs seems to increase with the loss of sensibility. In the lethargic state the muscular contracture is more than double† that of the normal state. Dr. Luys designates this as a transformation of nerve-forces‡, as if the nerve-energy, which is distributed according to the economy of the organism, as a rule, in an equal manner, were exclusively utilized to contract the muscles. The explanation of Luys becomes probable, in consideration of the fact, witnessed by other experimenters also, that, the deeper the sleep the more nerve force will be at disposal. Thus sensibility may increase also. For instance, in the optic nerves, anæsthesia or insensibility can in lethargy be replaced by hyper-æsthesia, *i. e.*, an unusual and extraordinary sensibility. Dr. Luys calls it *une sorte de hyperesthésie compensatrice.*

Persons, who are left to themselves in a lethargic

* Porphyrius, "Life of Plotinus," Chap. XII.

† Dr. Luys says: "In a series of experiments practiced upon this subject (Esther), I found that one can produce a deflexion of the bent forearm in the normal state with a weight of 10 to 12 Kilogrammes. In the state of lethargic contracture, 20 to 25 Kilogrammes are necessary, and on this point the muscle is not deflected, but the whole body is bent."

‡ "On est amené à constater qu'il y a là véritablement un phénomène de transformation des forces nerveuses qui se manifeste dans des états nouveaux."

state, seem to awaken spontaneously, and complain of an intense sensation of cold. Some subjects have slept longer than twenty-four hours, and it may be assumed that there is danger in the experiment.

The state of ultra lethargy shows symptoms of the most ominous kind. A total exhaustion prevails, respiration ceases, and the pulse becomes extremely low. All nervous activity, even the nutritive functions of regeneration, are more and more suspended.

The somnambulic state is by far the most interesting, because it displays psychical peculiarities that afford abundant parallels, not only to normal dreams and sleep-walking, but also to the narcosis of intoxication, and to insanity. Accordingly, the theoretical psychologist, not less than the practical philosopher, the moralist, the educator and the physician of the insane, will here find the clue to many obscure problems of soul-life, and at the same time valuable hints that can be turned to use in their professions.

THE REALITY OF DREAMS.

We constantly observe the fact, that in dreams we see, hear, smell, taste, and feel as if we had to deal with substantial objects. Our visions are as real to us in a dream as the things we perceive in the waking state.

How does this happen?

Physiology teaches, that a sensory impression upon the skin irritates the nerve. Let us suppose, that a few rays of light have fallen through the cornea upon the retina. The irritation is thence transferred to a ganglion, and from the ganglion into the central ganglions of visual irritations, *viz.*, the anterior lobes of the Four Hills, or corpora quadragemina (*C. Q.*), and in the optic thalamus (*th*). Here, we suppose, is the place where the irritation is felt as a visual image; we now call it a *sensation.*

Accordingly a sensation is the sensed effect of some phenomenon upon a sentient being; it is an image, a sound, a touch, a smell, or a taste that has become conscious. If a visual sensation is called an image, we must bear in mind that it is not a passive or inactive imprint, but it is the sum of all the movements and of their memorial residua, made by the organ of sight in order to map out the outline, the form, and other qualities of an object.

It would be incorrect to say that the elements of a sensation are motions of the sensory nerves, for besides the motions there is another element in sensation which we call feeling. We call the whole process sensation and by feeling we understand that passive element which accompanies sensory movement, and which is known by experience to every sentient creature.

Although a sensation may be fully accompanied with consciousness, it is without value to us so long as it remains an isolated sensation. We do not know and cannot know what it means. It is without significance. In order to give significance to a sensation, it must become a perception.

Sensations are dispatched from the central ganglions to special localities of the brain. The visual sensation goes to the centre of vision in the cortex (*v*). Here exist a multitude of old visual memories, that have been registered there. The sensation that just arrived travels on the path of least resistance to the place where the cerebral cells through similar impressions are predisposed to receive it. The new sensation stimulates the old memories of a similar kind. Its form fits into the forms of certain old memories and thus it revives them, it excites them into new life. When the sensation has been received among the memories of former sensations, and when it is felt to be the same as a special kind of these former sensations, we call it a *perception.*

EXPLANATION OF THE DIAGRAM.

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE MECHANISM OF VISION.

Visual impressions received on the retina travel along the optic nerves through a ganglion to the thalamus (*th*) as well as to the anterior lobes of the Four Hills (the *corpora quadrageminа*) (*C. Q.*). The intermediate ganglion is called "the external *corpus geniculatum.*" (It appears in the adjoined diagram as the internal. In reality the external optic ganglions (*corpora geniculata exteriora*) lie almost directly above the internal. If they had been thus represented, the diagram could not with any distinctness show the connections of the nerves.) In the anterior lobes of the Four Hills or in the thalamus, perhaps in both, sensations of sight must be supposed to take place. Details as to the latter point are not yet known. That part of the thalamus, in which the fibres from the external optic ganglion immerge, is called "pulvinar."

The posterior lobes and the internal optic ganglions, which are connected with them, act, according to Wundt, as motory agents of the organ of sight. Gudden has pointed out that they have no connection with sensory functions.

According to Wernicke (*Lehrbuch der Gehirn-Krankheiten* I, p. 70, et seqq.), the band of white fibres which connects the Four Hills as well as the pulvinar of the thalamus with the cortical centre of vision must be considered as a continuation of the optic nerves. It is the path for the transmission of visual sensations to the cortical centre of vision.

The distinction which we make between sensation and perception will be elucidated by an experiment made by Prof. Munk. A dog whose centre of vision was extirpated had lost all visual memories of the past. He had not, however, lost the power of sight; his visual sensations were apparently uninjured, but they are new to him as though all his former experiences, gained through sight, had been wiped out.

Prof. Munk says:

. . . . "After extirpating the cerebral cortex of a dog on both sides at the place A, (Fig. p. 1974), and when, on the third or fifth day after the lesion, the inflammatory reaction is past, the hearing, smell, taste, motion, sensation, etc., of the animal do not present any abnormity whatever; only in the domain of the visual sense

are we struck by a peculiar kind of perturbation. The dog will move about freely and easily whether in the house or in the garden, without ever running against an object, and if we heap up obstacles in his path, he will regularly avoid them, or if they cannot be avoided, he skillfully overcomes them, by creeping through, for example, beneath a foot-stool, by carefully leaping across the foot of his master or over the body of any animal obstructing his way. But the sight of human beings, which formerly he used to greet with joy, now leaves him indifferent, and likewise indifferent the sight of the dogs with whom he was wont to play. The restless and rapid movements he executes, are prompted by hunger and thirst, and yet howsoever keenly the latter are felt, he no longer as of old hunts about the corners of the room, where he used to find his food, and if we place a plate of food and a dish of water in the middle of his path, he again and again turns away and takes no notice of them. Food, when held up before his eyes, leaves him unmoved, so long he does not smell it. A finger or lighted match, when brought near to his eyes, no longer causes him to blink.



BRAIN OF A DOG, ACCORDING TO MUNK.

A, Centre of vision.
B, Centre of hearing.
C.–F, Sensory Regions.
C, Hind legs.
D, Fore legs.
E, Head.
G, Ears.
F, Eye.
H, Neck.
I, Trunk.



BRAIN OF A MONKEY, ACCORDING TO MUNK.
Description as in the preceding cu'.

The sight of the whip, which formerly would regularly send him into a corner, does not frighten him in the least. He had been trained to give his paw, whenever a hand was moved past one of his eyes ; but now one may move one's hand in whatever way one will, but the paw does not stir until we call aloud "Paw!" And there are many more observations of the same kind.

There can be no doubt as regards their meaning. By the extirpation of a part of the brain, the dog has become "soul-blind," *seelenblind;* that is, he has lost the old visual representations he possessed,—the memory-images of his former visual perceptions, so that he no longer knows or recognizes what he sees. Yet the dog sees, the visual perceptions reach his consciousness, attain the state of sensation, and cause the rise of representations concerning the existence, form, and position of external objects, so that there are acquired anew other visual representations and still other memory-images of the visual perceptions.

One might maintain, that, as regards his visual sense, our act of intrusion has transported the dog back to the condition of earliest youth, to the condition of a puppy, whose eyes have just been opened. As the puppy must learn to see, that is learn to know what he sees, so also our dog again must *learn* to see, except that its ripe capacity of motion, the advanced development of the other senses, etc., may shorten the time of his apprenticeship. And an apprentice he appears in fact. Our restless, goggle-eyed dog, with neck stretched forward, and moving incessantly to and fro, when the fever is past, will stare at every object around him cautiously testing and prying into every nook ; and thus he acts both in lying down and in moving, the latter of which he seems to prefer. And first of all he will have set himself right concerning the things that are most important to his existence. We need to duck his head only once or twice into the pail till his nose touches the water, and thereafter, when thirsty, he will always find the pail of his own accord. The same is true of the plate from which he feeds. And thereafter by slow degrees he learns to know human beings and surrounding objects,—first large, later smaller objects. The more he has learned anew to see, the less his unrest becomes, and the more moderate his curiosity. Things, concerning which he does not anew gather fresh experiences, remain unknown to him: He remains startled by the sight of a staircase when he is confronted for the first time by such an object, after the lapse of weeks just as after the lapse of a few days. He will shun the whip after a few days' acquaintance, or only after weeks, all according as sooner or later he has felt its effects upon his back. If nothing that is subject to experimental test has been withheld from his knowledge, our dog in some three or five weeks after the operation mentioned will have been restored in the region of the visual senses, and can no longer be distinguished from other healthy animals of his species."

The registration of many perceptions of the same or a similar kind cannot be better explained than by a comparison to composite photographs, although the simile must not be regarded as a sameness. One memory is laid upon the other as one photograph covers the other, on one and the same sensitive plate. The common features in all pictures appear stronger, while the particular and individual traits either disappear from weakness, or being contradictory to one another become blurred and are lost sight of.

This is the origin of generalizations that takes place in animal brains. All perceptions grow together into one general idea and if we speak not of a single, but of a whole, class of perceptions of the same kind, we call it a *conception.*

Conceptions attain their compactness and unity by being named. The whole group of many perceptions is united into one idea by being comprehended under a common word symbol. Thus language becomes the

mechanism of abstract thought and the speaking animal will be a rational being.



DIAGRAM SHOWING THE CORTICAL MECHANISM OF SPEECH ACCORDING TO WERNICKE.

x, Sensory centre of speech; *a x*, Line of acoustic transmissions; *y*, Motory centre of speech; *y m*, Line of motor impulses to the muscles of speech. *f s*, Fissure of Sylvius;

We add that *x* is associated with other centres of the cortex, for instance with *v*, the centre of vision. With the sound of the word dog, all the visual memories of dogs which we have seen are awakened.

Physiology has taught us that our perceptions do not take place in our sense-organs but in the hemispheres of the cortex; they are the combined result of the present state of conscious sensations and of old memories with which they can be associated. This explains easily why hallucinations and dreams must naturally appear no less real than the sensations in the normal state of waking consciousness.

It is but in agreement with all the other facts of nervous activity that, if a sensory fibre is irritated in sleep (be it by an internal or an external cause), and if the irritation is transmitted to its cortical centre, it will produce there a re-awakening of former memories in the same way as a sensation does. This re-awakening is perceived as a present sensation, and not being contradicted by the testimony of any of the senses, it appears as real. Indeed it is (considered as a percept) as real as a sensed perception can be. It is produced by the same organs in the very same place.

We have been taught by experience to find the corresponding objects of our sense-percepts outside of ourselves. Thus they are projected to the place of their supposed origin. Is it not quite as natural that dream-visions should be treated in the same manner? They are projected to a place where their origin under normal circumstances must be supposed to be.

An irritation at any place along the whole line of a sensory nerve-fibre produces a sensation which is imagined to take place at the origin of the nerve. To that point the irritation is always projected—even if that part of the nerve no longer exists. If a special nerve in the stump of a limb or along the line of the nerve up to its cortical centre is hurt, the pain appears as real and at the same time is as distinctly specified or localized in the missing limb as if the latter still existed. An irritation in the nerve of the big toe is felt in the big toe even after the amputation of the whole leg, as if foot and toe were still in connection with the body. In fact, the pain *is* real and so is the vision of a dream. But the cause of the pain is wrongly interpreted, and so is the cause of a vision.

Let us suppose, that the enemy of a certain country had been able to bribe the telegraph-operators, and the latter had sent to the capital a spurious dispatch about some great victory. Would not in this case the report of the victory, the joyous celebration and measures taken in consequence thereof, be just as real and positive, as if the victory were true? When the sensory organs in their totality or in part remain inactive, and the central organs are set into motion through internal incitements, the result will be precisely the same as if the incitement had come from the sense-organs.

Every recollection that a man has, is an image of former sensory impressions. Certainly, it is weak in comparison with the present sensation, it is faded and dim. Nevertheless it is a real image. And when the image of a memory is revived not by mere association through commissural fibres, but through the same sensory fibres, which in the waking state transmit sensations, it is but natural that the image will appear as vivid and as present as a real object.

Maury has sought by experiment to produce dreams of a certain kind.* He begged a friend to remain beside him in the evening, and as soon as he fell asleep to excite certain sensations in him, without telling what they were to be, and to wake him after giving him time to dream. On one occasion eau-de-cologne was given to him to smell; he dreamed that he was in a perfumer's shop, then the idea of the perfume aroused that of the East, and he dreamed that he was in Jean Farina's shop at Cairo. The nape of his neck was gently pinched, and he dreamed that a blister was applied to it, which recalled to mind the physician who had attended him in childhood. When a hot iron was brought near his face he dreamed of stokers. When he was asleep on another occasion, a person present ordered him in a loud voice to take a match, and he dreamed that of his own accord he went to find one.

It appears as a natural consequence of this view that we can dream such things only as we have experienced. Our dreams are confined to the materials stored up in our memory; yet this material can be so rearranged, it can so appear in new combinations, that we may sometimes be astonished at the originality of our dreams.

The wealth of intellectual life also depends upon the store of memories hoarded up in the hemispheres. The sensations which we receive at present and which become conscious in our mind, derive all their significance from their associations with former sensations.

* Maury, Sommeil et Rêves, p. 127.

When we see an old friend of ours and hear his words, it is not the present sensation alone that excites us. His appearance and the timbre of his voice are recognized as identical with old memories, and may thus arouse a storm of awakening recollections in all the corners of our brain. How many memories of olden times have been, as it were, asleep in our mind, but in a moment, when by some association they are connected with the present state of consciousness, they rise like spirits from the depths of unconscious existence,—like spirits and yet in such a vivid manner that the past seems to become present and the imaginary appears as real.

Gœthe describes the awakening of old memories most beautifully in his dedication of Faust. In his old age thinking of the beloved ones of his youth, Gœthe says:

Again ye come, ye hovering Forms! I find ye
As early to my clouded sight ye shone!
Shall I attempt this once to seize and bind ye?
Still o'er my heart is that illusion thrown?
Ye crowd more near! Then be the reign assigned ye,
And sway me from your misty shadowy zone!
My bosom thrills, with youthful passion shaken,
From magic airs that round your march awaken.

Of joyous days ye bring the blissful vision;
The dear, familiar phantoms rise again,
And, like an old and half-extinct tradition,
First Love returns, with Friendship in his train.
Renewed is Pain: With mournful repetition
Life tracks his devious labyrinthine chain,
And names the Good whose cheating fortune tore them
From happy hours, and left me to deplore them.

The present surroundings of the poet disappear, while the memories of the past rise in his mind and become reality again. Gœthe concludes the poem with these lines:

What I possess I see far distant lying,
And what I lost, grows real and undying.

These stanzas are not mere figures of speech. They depict the awakening of old memories as they rise in the mind of the poet gradually filling the actual present with their reality. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MARRIAGE VS. CELIBACY.

A REPLY TO C. D. LUCE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

THE proposition contended for in "Celibacy and its Effects, etc.," was that celibacy palsied the heart and dwarfed the intellect, and that the celibacy of the intellectual *élite* was a public calamity.

Incidentally we claimed that to woman was due the honor of sexual selection, and that, as Darwin says, we must look to sexual selection more than environment for the improvement of the race. We recognized that in the discussion of such questions mere enthusiasm or preconceived ideas had no place, and that our proposition must find support in something firmly rooted in human nature, and therefore relied on history, observation, and experience, and the data of medical writers to the effect that body and brain are one, and that neglect or injury to either affects both.

Mr. Luce says, "To assert that celibacy deteriorates the human family is certainly talking at random."

Let us see if it is so when viewed in the light of human nature and history.

Wherever celibacy has been general, has it not always resulted in debauchery and promiscuity? Take for one single example the effect of celibacy in the Catholic church and among all ascetics. Did even Saint Augustine escape its effects? The chief interrogator in his dialogues was his natural son, whom he called the gift of God. Lecky, in his *History of European Morals*, (Vol. II, p. 123, etc.,) after an account of the miseries and joys of an ascetic life in the fourth and fifth centuries, and subsequently, says: "Religion assumed, under the conception of life and teachings of the Fathers, a very sombre hue; the business of the saint was to eradicate a natural appetite and to attain a condition that was emphatically abnormal. The consequence of this was, first of all, a very deep sense of the innate depravity of sex-desire; therefore the business of the saint was to eradicate it; the supreme value placed by them on virginity and celibacy led to the belief that marriage was an inferior state and a condition of degradation." (This is the teaching of the Catholic church of to-day.)

"We must," St. Jerome declares, "cut down by the axe of virginity the wood of marriage, and if saints consent to praise marriage it is because it produces virgins."

This doctrine had the most deadly effect on individual and national life. Victor Hugo asserts, that "the monasteries and nunneries of Italy had eaten out its vitals, and together with its wars had left no one but idiots and imbeciles to beget children."

France and Spain have suffered from a like cause. Germany and England are to-day the superiors of those nations, and all because Protestantism has taught them truer and more rational conceptions of life and its duties.

The effect of celibacy on the Catholic Priesthood has been to produce a character of deadly faults combined with noble excellences. Prohibited from forming sympathetic ties which soften and expand one's nature, the Priest, in consequence, has been, in past and present ages, conspicuous for fierce and sanguinary fanaticism, and for indifference towards all interests except those of the church.

Asceticism has had a deteriorating effect on the individual and on purity of mind. As Lecky describes it, "In the ghastly gloom of his cell, forms of lust appear to haunt the hermit. By fasting, abstinence, and continence, his imagination is strained to the utmost and depicts to him shady groves, soft, voluptuous gardens, filled with groups of dancing girls, upon whose undulating limbs and wanton smiles he fondly dwells; the sweet songs of his youthful days come floating to his ears; the soft eyes of youthful maidens answer love with love, and he feels that in their arms he could find rest, but in the loneliness of his cell he can find no peace for his soul." Surely, the coarseness of Luther was better than the purity of such saints.

In all ages and among all races celibacy has debased the mind if not the morals. The morality of Mahomet was perfect and yet it was while a celibate that he depicted the Houri, and the joys of the lascivious heaven that awaited the followers of his faith, in the next world, and it was the brain of an unmarried woman that gave birth to "The Quick and the Dead." It may be safely asserted that the writers who have corrupted the morals and debased the heart of their youthful readers, have been, as a rule, celibates. Gœthe is certainly not a safe guide. It is doubtful whether his *Faust*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *Elective Affinities*, *The Sorrows of Werther*, have not done more harm than good to the young. Many of the early English dramatists, though men of undoubted genies, so tinged their plays with the color and coarseness of their celibate life, that their works are not fit reading to-day. Marlowe, the greatest of them all, was killed while defending a drab whom he loved; and who that reads his *Faustus*, and *Jew of Malta*, would

not see that they were the product of an irregular life and of a brain made mad by debauchery. Shakespeare married when he was eighteen ; and while, in his dramas, he has the plain speaking of his age, he is never positively coarse.

Guizot, in his *Civilization in Modern Europe*, says, "It was as wife and mother, that the feudal Saxon baron, imprisoned in his castle, learned the value of woman." John Stuart Mill, truly wrote in his "Subjection of Woman," "the man who only knows woman through his amatory sense, has no true idea of her worth and character." Mommsen in his Roman History thus enforces the same truth. "While the citizens of Greece and Rome led a strict and serious life, and kept their households simple and virtuous, and unflinchingly bore their part in public affairs, and while the glory and might of the community was felt by every individual as a personal possession, to be transmitted to their sons, these countries remained powerful, but, when social morality grew lax, and marriage became unfashionable, and ambitious, and accomplished women became avowed courtezans, then came the downfall of Greece and Rome.

Grote, Macaulay, Green, Freeman, Lamartine, Guizot, Taine, all tell the same story as to the periods of which they wrote, where the family and marriage were held in contempt, for, without marriage there cannot be for the majority purity of life.

As Dr. Rainsford, of St. George's church, said in a recent lecture on "Social Impurity," "This sin is the sphinx to whom the flower of our youth is each year sacrificed." Phillips Brookes, in the recent episcopal convention held in New York, while discussing the attitude of his church on the question of divorce, said, "we must not make it too difficult for people to get married."

Bebel, in his book, entitled "Woman," gives an appalling account of the disastrous effect of deferred marriages in many parts of Germany and particularly in Bavaria, where the laws and public opinion were strongly against early unions. In Bavaria vice runs riot, and, as a consequence, marriages are usually barren, for a too early indulgence in sex-affection, or where one has spent his early manhood in the Augean stables of the world, he has become incapacitated for fatherhood.

The celibates named by Mr. Luce as distinguished, we do not recognize as men of genius, barring Michael Angelo, Hume, and Humboldt.

Michael Angelo, though he never married, came under the influence of the high-born, gifted, and beautiful Vittoria Colonna ; with her he spent the happiest days of his life, and when he stood mourning by her lifeless clay, he said, "I was born a rough model, and it was for thee to reform and remake me." In the words of Swedenborg, "The Lord has taken the beauty and grace of the life of man and bestowed them upon woman ; when man is not reunited to this beauty and this grace of his life, he is harsh, sad, and sullen ; when he is re-united to them he is joyful and complete." Thus we see that love, like fire in the veins of the earth, is always detected in some crevice of a great man's destiny.

It was the death of the lady to whom Dr. Mühlenburg was engaged that inspired in him the beautiful hymn, "I would not live alway."

Phillips Brookes is a bachelor, because the course of his true love did not run smooth.

The limitations of Mary Anderson's genius, Modjeska says, are because she is deficient in the maternal instinct, and that this will be remedied when she becomes a wife and mother.

The Carey sisters had some humor and pathos, but their genius never took a high flight nor kept long on the wing. Their best productions cannot compare with the Portuguese sonnets and many other poems of Elizabeth Barrett, written after she became Mrs. Browning.

It was the notion that a man of genius should lead the life of a celibate, or, if he condescended to form any relations with a woman, that it must not be by ties of marriage, that brought misery and disgrace upon the family of William Godwin, author of "Political Justice," and regarded as a great thinker in his day. He first lived in illicit relation with Mary Wollstonecraft, whom he did not marry until just before the birth of their daughter Mary, who became the wife of the poet Shelley.

It is a justifiable inference that this daughter's flight with Shelley, while his first wife was still alive, was but a yielding to her inherited impulse, for the empire of the dead over the living, says Comte, is constantly increasing, or as J. S. Mill puts it, "The sum of our desires are all the desires of our ancestors plus our own." Binet, too, regards heredity as nothing more than a "preservative force, a memory of the species."

But hear what Godwin wrote to a maiden lady of marriage, after he had married : "Do not go out of life without ever having known what life is. Celibacy contracts and palsies the mind, and shuts us out from the most valuable topics of experience,—the sentiments of mutual and equal affection and paternal love ; these only are competent of unlocking the heart and expanding the sentiments."

Mr. Luce is evidently a disciple of Malthus, for in his defense of Celibacy he writes : "He who refrains from wedlock and fatherhood cannot, in the overcrowded state of the globe, be charged with violation of his duty to his fellow men."

We believe that a man's first duty is to himself ; the *globe* can take care of itself. Of course, there is an intimate, though generally unnoticed relation between the extent of the wage-fund and the cheapness of food, and the morality of a nation ; low wages, scarcity and dearness of food are causes of immorality. This fact is proven by Prof. Gould of Cornell University, who also shows that, when marriages are fewest, crime is most prevalent. He says, "If we take the average price of food for each year of a century and place it in the first column of a table, prepared for the purpose, opposite that year, and, if we then place the number of marriages in the next column, the number of illegitimate births in the next, and the number of crimes in the next, each opposite to the year of their occurrence, we shall find that in the year when food is the cheapest, the greatest number of marriages occur, and there are the fewest illegitimate births and the fewest crimes committed. On the contrary, when food is dearest there are the fewest marriages, and crimes increase, both in number and malignancy." The principle of Malthus, as laid down in "Principles of Population," that the increase of food may be said to take place in an arithmetical ratio, while population increases in a geometrical, was an incorrect deduction, although there have been periods in the economic history of the world when this assertion might be conditionally true.

Mr. Luce's assertion that the greatest criminals are supplied from the ranks of the married, is explained by the fact that the married constitute the great majority. That married women have shown cruelty and ferocity, is due, to a large extent, to the unkindness, neglect, and infidelities of man. The motives which urged Clytemnestra to the murder of Agamemnon, were revenge for the killing of her daughter, resentment for her husband's breaches of conjugal duty, and her jealousy of Cassandra ; her love for Ægisthus was, we think, but a secondary motive.

If it were conceded that the cares of a family and the broils and troubles of domestic life in some instances hampered and handicapped a man, and prevented him from great achievements, yet even those obstacles and trials are more stimulating to one's genius than the dead calm of single life. It is not to be questioned but that the weight of wife and children may often keep a gifted man from pursuing favorite studies and from reaching success quickly, but we know that in the long run he is the gainer, and is in the position that when success is achieved, he will not

have to say with Dr. Johnson, "Success came to me when I was too old to enjoy it, and too solitary to impart it."

Celibacy is a relic of that monastic spirit that still clings to the English Universities, who, to quote Galton, "offer to every man who shows intellectual powers of the kind they delight to honor, an income of from one to two hundred pounds a year, free lodgings and various advantages in the way of board and society, on account of his ability, and say to him, 'Enjoy it all your life, if you like, we exact no conditions to your continuing to hold it, but one, namely: that you shall not marry.'" Max Müller, knowing of this condition, was about to resign his fellowship when he married, but Oxford, rather than lose so great a man, exempted him from the condition. The effect of this monastic spirit united with the extreme conservatism of both Oxford and Cambridge, has been to keep each of them far in the rear of the religious and scientific progress of the age.

We think that in marriage is to be found the "chart of the passionate current," and that with love at the helm and the child as an anchor, the married can safely voyage through life.

In the joyous morning then of the affections, when the heart is warm and the desire for the companionship of the other sex is strong within us, let each in a calm and sober mind and without fear of consequences, unite with the one he loves.

Marriage is a moral relation and should never be entered into for mercenary ends; prostitution is the subordination of the sex-instinct to gain. We should imitate our ancient Saxon ancestors, who had no amorous songs; love to them was a promise, a devotion, a duty. Such love is an all-embracing warmth, while passion is a disease, a fever in the blood.

As no character, however perfect, can embody perfection, we have not claimed that the married possess all the cardinal virtues. All we have sought to prove is that marriage produces those qualities in the race which are the most widely useful to the individual and mankind. SUSAN B. CHANNING.

NEW YORK, NOV., 1889.

IF HE SHOULD COME.

BY WILLIAM HERBERT CARRUTH.

IF He should come in such a guise
As once He wore 'neath Judah's skies,
And walk about as He did then
Among the busy throngs of men,
And call them to the Last Assize,—

Would not He meet incredulous eyes
And pity or amused surprise
From every Christian citizen
If He should come?

The Scribes and Pharisees would not rise,
Stung by his lashings of their lies,
To nail Him to the cross again,
But merely tap their foreheads, when
He spoke, with sympathetic sighs,
If He should come.

BOOK REVIEWS.

CYRIL. A Romantic Novel. By *Geoffrey Drage*. Third Edition. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 13 Waterloo Place, Pall Mall, S. W.

SANT' ILARIO. By *F. Marion Crawford*. London: MacMillan & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

Cyril is the work of a young, intelligent, and ambitious Englishman. The author has apparently spent the greater part of his later years upon the Continent; scarcely a country in Europe is omitted in the distribution of scenes of action; national traits, national politics, and national manners occupying the largest part of the book. In this sense it is a veritable treatise on European Ethnology. It deals intelligently with comparative politics, although in the attitude assumed with reference to the political methods of the modern German Empire there is a certain bias discernible, adduced no doubt by the careful study of modern political history and German political professors' logical and convincing arrangement of facts Withal, England, and England's just aggrandisement,—England's reinstatement into international importance,—is the key-note of the book. It is imbued with a laudable patriotism, and filled with a lofty and deserved admiration for the institutions that have made England great, and her past glorious. In this Mr. Drage is at his best; he has shown much more art in his enthusiastic and effective description of an Eton-Winchester cricket-match, than in the development of certain other episodical incidents of his story, into the thrilling parts of which are often introduced lengthy monologues and varied topographical sketches. The characters, at least the prominent ones, are perfect in their mental and material equipment. This, we think, frequently leads to supra-realistic positions and predicaments; but when an ideal is at stake we are constrained to pardon any departure from likelihood and must grant the author every freedom that facility of presentment demands. And Mr. Drage's ideals are, without exaggeration, noble; they are portrayed with earnestness, enthusiasm, and fervor; contact with them is elevating.

* * *

"Sant' Ilario" is a novel of action, not of character. The events are prepared, the development hit upon, and the personages made to conform to whatever circumstances arise. The author is continually telling us, that so and so is such and such a kind of person—particularly when it is necessary to adapt the person in question to a given complication of facts. Inconsistency of treatment is impossible here; the characters have no character, and we are not disappointed at anything that occurs. The scene of this "true history of the Saracinesca" is in and about Rome, at the time of the difficulties between Garibaldi, the Pope, and the Italian Government. The life of the Roman aristocracy is skillfully painted—though in sombre colors; an occasional fling at English society is indulged in; and oftentimes the author attempts a bit of psychological analysis, dabbling with the law of association, and venturing an historical sketch of the growth and evolution of conscience. There is love, jealousy, and sweet reconciliation, villainy, forgery, magnanimity, and murder in the book. The tone is healthy, the sentiment ethical Moreover, though much is unclear and much disappointing, the book is interesting. *μκρκ.*

THE KINGDOM OF THE UNSELFISH; or, The Empire of the Wise. By *John Lord Peck*. New York: Empire Book Bureau, 28 Lafayette Place. Price, $1.50.

Says Mr. Peck in his Preface: "This book makes its appearance because the existing stage of social evolution demands something not yet possessed; and it is one of the many things evolved to supply that demand. But it may not prove well suited to the present state of opinion. In that case it will be better adapted to a later one, and if not read in this century may be in the next." Nor is Mr. Peck conciliatory; he says: "That it [the book] will meet with hostile criticism from those who fail to apprehend its best meaning, is quite likely."

The author begins with "the Reliable and Unreliable in Thought"; "the Reliable" is Science, the Unreliable is Conjecture or Nescience. Tradition, revelation, dogma, speculative philosophy—such are conjecture; positive knowledge, based upon observed facts and laws generalized therefrom—such is science. The Reliable and the Unreliable, Science and Religion, are to be harmonized. The organon of the process, the instrument of criticism, is Science; nevertheless, the good of Religion and Philosophy is

not to be destroyed. Mr. Peck first explains "how the moral or altruistic feeling originates" and "then traces its evolution through various forms into a final stage of complete unselfishness . . . . The ultimate purpose of the whole investigation is, through the achievement of the Unselfish Condition to preface the beginning of that Ideal Society which is alike the object of th religionist and the secularist." Religion is the aspiration after moral perfection. "God is the Spirit of Good, which lives in all human hearts everywhere throughout the race in all times and places," etc. ; it is Matthew Arnold's 'power not ourselves'; "it originates with the intelligence, increases with evolution and belongs most to those who possess, not the largest quantity, but the highest order, of knowledge." "When the individual reaches a point of development where he can surrender the last item of his dearly-beloved selfishness in obedience to this Power, represented in, and speaking through, his own conscience, then he will know God, will know what it is to be a Son of God, begotten of the Spirit, and destined to a high condition of happiness of indefinite duration. He will have entered into the Empire of the Wise, and will begin to realize from experience how much of beauty, and glory and blessedness is possible to a perfected humanity." *μκρκ.*

A careful and instructive review of the new Century Dictionary will be found in the current *Atlantic Monthly*.

"The Early Career of Lord Brougham," by Martha J Lamb, is the chief contribution of interest in the December *Magazine of American History*.

Henry Holt and Company, of New York, have published a translation of Dr. Esperanto's (Warsaw, Russia) "Attempt towards an International Language." The plan appears very simple.

The *Freidenker-Almanach* for 1889 contains its usual abundance of instructive reading and valuable information The selections and quotations are throughout felicitous. (Freidenker Pub. Co., Milwaukee, Wis.).

The remarkable series of papers constituting the controversy "Christianity and Agnosticism," lately carried on in the *Nineteenth Century*, by Dr. Wace, Prof. Huxley, and others, has been reprinted by the Humboldt Library, of 28 Lafayette place, N. Y., and may be obtained for 30 cents.

The *Revue Scientifique* (edited by M. Charles Richet, 111 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris), of Nov. 9th, contains a lucid exposition of M. Charles Henry's mathematical theory of expression, "Contrast, Rythm, Measure," by J. Héricourt, and an interesting letter by M. Ch Féré, upon "Acquired Left-handedness." We trust that the *Revue* will find many readers among the scientific people of America. The solid character of its contributions merits the attention of all.

Dr. George M. Gould, in the December *Forum*, discusses the question, "Is Medicine a Science," and answers it with characteristic vigor in the affirmative. "How the query arises," says he, "is easily explained when one considers the erroneousness of the common conception of the term science, the failure to provide the means of proper physiological knowledge in our plans of primary education, the deplorable condition of medical education, and, lastly, the ignorance of what modern scientific medicine has done and is doing."

We acknowledge the receipt from Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein and Co. (Paternoster Square, London) of a little pamphlet by Frances Power Cobbe and Benjamin Bryan upon "Vivisection in America." It is an appeal to the American people to stop the practice of vivisection. We wish that vivisection were unnecessary and dispensable ; but that point is not demonstrated in the pamphlet before us. Reference, however, is made to Mr. Lawson Tait's work, "Uselessness of Vivisection," published by the Victoria Society (same publisher).

Accompanying the article, "The Pardon of Ste. Anne D'Auray," in the December *Scribner's*, are two beautiful illustrations : the frontispiece, "Breton Peasants at a Wayside Cross, by Howard Pyle, and "A Vision of Ste. Anne."

Col. Garrick Mallery's address as Vice President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, upon "Israelite and Indian : A Parallel in Planes of Culture," is concluded in the December *Popular Science Monthly*. Our readers will find it an interesting chapter of research in comparative religion.

The *Canadian Methodist Quarterly* is admirably conducted. With much contained in the present number we naturally do not agree. Of especial interest to us are the articles "Physical Education," by Dr. B. E. McKenzie, and "The Relation of the Bible to Mental Culture," by the Rev. W. Galbraith. Mr. Galbraith's estimate is unquestionably overdrawn. The Bible, especially the Old Testament, all will acknowledge, is one of the grandest monuments of literature. But Christian civilization is not the product wholly of Bible inspiration. Natural conditions have surely contributed a little.

Another monthly magazine, *The Arena*, has appeared. It is edited by Mr. B. O. Flower, published by the Arena Publishing Co., Pierce Building, Copley Square, Boston, and costs $5.00 a year, or 50 cents a copy. It is to be a "great, progressive exponent of modern thought, giving special prominence to the leading moral, social, and economic problems that are to-day so profoundly agitating society." The opening article is by the Rev. Minot. J. Savage, "Agencies that are working a Revolution in Theology." The religious question, in fact, occupies much space in the first number of *The Arena*. Prof. Joseph Rodes Buchanan writes upon the "Development of Genius by Proper Education," and Rabbi Solomon Schindler upon "History in the Public Schools."

NOTES.

Prof F. Max Müller has offered for publication in THE OPEN COURT, with the sole right of disposition, his "Three Lectures on the Science of Language, and its Place in General Education," recently delivered at the Oxford University Extension Meeting. The publication of Prof. Max Müller's Lectures will begin at once. The first will appear in the following number of THE OPEN COURT.

Simultaneously with the appearance of this number will be published M. Th. Tibot's "Psychology of Attention." The little work has been characterized by a French critic as the most remarkable production, for the present year, of the French philosophical press Certain parts (about one fourth of the whole) have been published in our columns ; the chapter on "Ecstasy" appearing this week. It has been translated with M. Ribot's especial sanction. Orders will be received at our office. (THE OPEN COURT PUB. Co. Price, 75 cents.)

We have received from Prof. E. D. Cope a reprint of a paper read, Oct. 4th, 1889, before the American Philosophical Society, entitled "An Outline of the Philosophy of Evolution." Says Professor Cope : "The system outlined in the preceding pages falls "within the field already cultivated by Schopenhauer and especi-"ally by Hartmann. This is distinguished from those occupied "by the older metaphysicians in the important function assigned "to will. The older schools, both idealistic and realistic, occupied "themselves chiefly with the discussion of the principles of cog-"nition. The philosophy of evolution requires something more "than this. If there be anything beyond the world and human "life on it, it can be only discovered by an investigation of the "nexus between mind and matter. And if there be any nexus at "all, in which the mind is not entirely subordinate, it is will. If "there be any directive principle at the bottom of evolution it is "to be found by research in this direction. . . . . The result is "theistic and not atheistic, and optimistic and not pessimistic."

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THE OPEN COURT,

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THE OPEN COURT is not exclusive or sectarian, but liberal. It desires to further the efforts of all scientific and progressive people in the Churches and out of them, towards greater knowledge of the world in which we live, and the moral and practical duties it requires. To this end it asks for circulation in the Churches, and also in all Ethical, Secular, and other Liberal societies. It hopes for a well-wishing co-operation in what all must admit to be true, good, and practical in the conduct of life, individual and collective.

DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE PRICE OF ETERNAL YOUTH.

An unnecessary dread of death prevails among mankind, a dread which is due only to a morbid imagination. Men who are not afraid to suffer pain, are sometimes found to shrink from the mere idea of hazarding their lives. It is not the agonies of death of which they are afraid, nor is it the state after death, the eternal rest of being dead, which appears appalling, but it is the moment of dying,—that it is which they dread most. It is the passage from life to death, the passage through that gate,

> "Which every man would fain go slinking by—
> Where fancy doth herself to self-born pangs compel,
> Around whose na row mouth flame all the fires of hell."

This dread is unnecessary; it is founded upon wrong ideas of death; it is based on errors that can and must be dispelled.

We learned in school that the old physicists believed in a *horror vacui* and explained from it certain natural processes. This *horror vacui*, as we now know, is an error, just as much as the dread of death.

It is a fact that dying persons are, as a rule, under the impression that they have passed through a crisis for improvement, for the agony is overcome and pain has ceased. The feeling is due to a blunting of our sensory nerves and organs, and must be compared to the pleasant sensation which a fatigued person enjoys when quietly falling asleep. In sleep the sense-impressions become gradually dulled and sweet visions of dreams rise before our mental eye, until the light slumber passes into a profound sleep where all consciousness ceases. There is no more reason for the dread of death than for horror at lying down to sleep.

A sage of antiquity said: "Why should we fear death? Death is not here, so long as we are here. And if death is here, we are no longer."

We must meet death in the sense that the Stoic philosopher on the throne prepared himself to accept all the gifts of nature. He said: "Everything harmonizes with me which is harmonious to thee, O Cosmos. Nothing for me is too early nor too late which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature. From thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return."

Death is a natural phenomenon not less than birth; and the agonies of death are generally less painful than the throes of birth. The problem of death is closely interwoven with the problem of birth, so that you cannot disentangle the one without unraveling the other.

Birth is, as our scientists teach, the growth of an individual beyond its individuality. It is the nature of living beings to live and to grow. The lowest kind of animals do not die; they grow and divide and thus they multiply. The amœba may die from violence, it can be crushed to death by your foot; it may starve from lack of food; but it knows no natural death. The animalcules which you can observe to-day are the very same creatures that lived millenniums ago, long before man appeared upon earth. Immortality is their natural state.

How did it happen that death came into the world of life, into the realm of immortality? Is death the meed of sin that is due to a violation of nature's laws? Or if it is a natural process, pray what is it?

Death came into the world as the brother of birth, and death became necessary when birth with its rejuvenescent power lifted organic life one step higher in its evolutionary career, so as to allow a constantly renewed progress, so as to create innumerable fresh beginnings and to give new starts to life, new possibilities to the development of life.

Birth is growth beyond the limit of individuality. Thus the creature born is the very same creature as its mother and its father, just as much as the two amœbas are the very same substance the mother amœba was before her division. But the creature born has one great advantage over its parents. It can commence life over again. It is identical with its parents, but it is its parents in a state so little fixed and formed, so young, so unimpaired, so pure, like the fresh dew that glitters in the morning-sun, that it can make a new start, it can travel new paths and can climb to higher planes, which seemed inaccessible to its ancestors.

Not only men but all creatures are naturally one-sided; they develop to be one-sided through their occupations and their experiences, and become more and more so the longer they live. What can life wish for better, than to be allowed to drop again and again the fresh prejudices constantly acquired, which we even admit may be justified in the men that hold them. But we know that they would become injurious if mankind

clung to them forever. It is for the best of humanity, that it can drop the errors which are perhaps, as we freely grant, partial truths. Humanity must gain not only renewed vigor, but also virginity in life and in love, in hopes, and in ideal aspirations.

This is done through the introduction of birth into the empire of life. And this makes it possible that life is always young, that it is virgin-like, and endowed with renewed courage as well as interest.

Is the boon of a constant rejuvenescence of the race through birth bought too dearly by the surrender of our individual existence to death? Certainly not, if the good features of individuals can be transmitted to their descendants, if their death is only a partial obliteration of life, where it has lost the capacity of progressive endeavor, where impartiality of judgment is gone, so that we no longer can see the light when a new morn dawns with greater and higher possibilities.

Nature does not intend to ossify life, it makes life plastic, and in order to preserve the plasticity, the vigor, and virginity of life, nature endowed life not only with immortality that through the act of birth makes life extend and grow beyond the limit of individual existence, but at the same time it bestowed upon it, through the same means of birth, that wonderful desirable gift, eternal youth, without which immortality would become an unbearable burden.

What would life be, what would immortality mean, if it were not identical with eternal youth? If humanity must buy eternal youth at the cost of death—at the cost of the death of individuals, it is certainly not bought too dearly.

Death then is a necessity; but serious though the idea of death must make our thoughts, it is not terrible; awful though it may be, it must not overawe us. Death is like the northern sunset. The evening twilight indicates the rise of a new morn. The nocturnal darkness of the end of life is the harbinger of a new day, clothed in eternal youth. So closely interwoven is death with immortality!

The lesson that death teaches let me express in the words of our poet:

> "So live that when thy summons comes to join
> The innumerable caravan that moves
> To the pale realms of shade, where each shall take
> His chamber in the silent halls of death,
> Thou go not, like the quarry slave at night
> Scourged to his dungeon, but, sustained and soothed
> By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
> Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
> About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND ANIMAL.

BY PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER.

THERE seems to be some truth after all in the old English saying that familiarity breeds contempt, or, at all events, indifference.

There is nothing we are more familiar with than our own language. We learn it, we hardly know how. While reading, writing, arithmetic, and all the rest, are not acquired without considerable effort, and are often forgotten again in later life, we learn our most difficult lesson, namely, speaking, without any conscious effort, and, however old we may grow, we never forget it again.

But I ask you, Have you ever tried to find out what this language of ours really is; how it came to us; when and where it was made; and what it was made of?

Of course, you will all say, we learnt our language from our father and mother, or rather from our mother and father. Yes, but from whom did they learn it? From their parents, and these parents again from their parents, and thus *ad infinitum*.

Even this simple answer, which is by no means quite correct, is full of import, and ought to have been taken to heart far more seriously than it seems to have been by certain philosophers who maintain that parrots and other animals also learn to speak, exactly as children learn to speak, and that therefore language is after all nothing so very wonderful, and cannot be said to form an impassable barrier between man and beast. It is quite true that children now-a-days do neither create their own language nor inherit it. Speaking any language is not an acquired habit that descends from father to son. The necessary conditions of speech, however, exist in man and in man only; for if these necessary conditions were present in the parrot as well as in man, it would indeed be strange, to say no more, that there should never have been a *Parrotese* language, and that no parrot should ever have learnt his language from his parents, and they from theirs, and thus *ad infinitum*. A parrot never learns to speak, as little as a child would ever learn to fly. These facts are so simple and so obvious that it is difficult to understand how they can ever have been disregarded by philosophers. And yet to the present day, most thoughtful writers go on repeating the old fallacy, that a parrot learns to say 'poor Polly,' just as a child learns to say 'poor Polly.'

To put it on the lowest ground, do these philosophers not see that every child of man is the descendant of an animal that *could* frame language, and *has* framed language; while every parrot, and every other animal is the descendant of an animal that never framed a language of its own? When a parrot learns to speak, it is simply tempted to utter certain sounds, in more or less close imitation of English or French, by such rewards as sugar and other sweetmeats, or by severe punishments on the part of its keepers. As to any parrot inventing a language of its own, and teaching that language to its young, not even Mr. Romanes would believe in such a miracle.

It is therefore not enough to say that we learn our language from our parents, and they from their parents, and thus *ad infinitum*. That would be a very lazy way of handling our problem. This retrogression *ad infinitum* would be a mere confession of ignorance, and such a confession, though it is very honorable when we know that we cannot know, cannot be tolerated except in cases where we know also *why* we cannot know.

When we see the history, or, as it is now the passion to call it, the evolution of language, we cannot help admitting that there must have been some kind of beginning. A language, such as English, for instance, does not tumble down from the sky; and, even if it did, it would have to be picked up, and to pick up a language, as you know, is not a very easy task, particularly for a person supposed to be dumb and without any idea of what language is meant for. In former times, as it seemed to be impossible to account for language as a piece of human workmanship, it was readily admitted that it was of divine workmanship, that it really had tumbled down from the sky in some way or other, and that curiously enough man alone of all animals then living upon earth had been able to pick it up.

But when languages began to be more carefully examined, traces of human workmanship became more and more visible, and at last the question could no longer be pushed aside, how language was made, and why man alone of all living beings should have come into possession of it.

Now I ask, If language is that which, as a matter of fact, distinguishes man from all other animals, is it not disgraceful that we should be so careless as not to attempt to find out what language is, and why we, and we alone of all animals, enjoy the privilege of speech? I know quite well that attempts have been made again and again to show that language is not the distinguishing characteristic of man, and that animals also, though they have never yet spoken, possess the faculty of speech, and may in time begin to speak. Even Kant seems to have indulged in the hope that the chimpanzee might some day begin to speak. But if faculty means originally facility, or that which enables us to do a thing, surely it is not too much to ask, why hitherto no animal should ever have cultivated that gift; why no animal should ever have said, 'I am an animal,' or, 'I am an ape.' Mr. Romanes, in his recent work on 'Mental Evolution in Man,' has done his very best to throw a bridge over the gulf that separates all animals from man, namely, language; and if *he* has failed in showing how human language could have arisen from animal utterances, I doubt whether anybody else will ever lead that forlorn hope again.

It is easy enough to show that animals communicate; but this is a fact which has never been doubted. Dogs who growl and bark leave no doubt in the mind of other dogs, or cats, or even of man, of what they mean. But growling and barking are not language, nor do they even contain the elements of language. All names are concepts, and to say that we think in concepts is only another way of saying that we think in class-names. Mr. Romanes admits this fully; in fact the very words I have used are his own words (l. c., p. 22, note). But has he been able to discover any traces or germs of language, or what he calls 'intellectual symbolism,' in any animal known to us, and more particularly in that animal from which he thinks we are more immediately descended? Evidently not. 'Anthropoid apes,' he says (p. 364), 'are the most intelligent, and, therefore, if specially trained, would probably display greater aptitude in the matter of sign-making than is to be met with in any other kind of brute.' 'But,' he continues, 'I do not press this point. What I now refer to is the fact that the existing species of anthropoid apes are very few in number, and appear to be all on the high road to extinction. Moreover, it is certain that none of these existing species can have been the progenitor of man, and, lastly, it is equally certain that the extinct species (or genus) which did give origin to man must have differed in several important respects from any of its existing allies. In the first place, it must have been more social in habits; and, in the next place, it was probably more vociferous than the orang, the gorilla, or the chimpanzee.'

Against such arguments it seems to me that even the gods would fight in vain. We are told that man is descended from some kind of anthropoid ape. We answer that all anthropoid apes, known to us, are neither social nor vociferous. And we are told that in that case man must be derived from an extinct ape who differed from all known apes, and was both social and vociferous. Surely, if this is a scientific argument, scientific arguments would in future rank very low indeed.

I know of no book which has proved more clearly that language forms an impassable barrier between man and beast than the book lately published by Mr. Romanes on the 'Origin of Human Faculty,' though his object was the very opposite. Taking that point therefore for granted, it seems to me disgraceful that in our general system of education, and even of elementary education, no place should have been found as yet for the Science of Language, and that a single child should be allowed to grow up, without knowing the worth and value of his most precious inheritance, without knowing what language is; language, which alone distinguishes him from all other animals; language, which alone makes man man; lan-

guage, which has made him the lord of nature, and has restored to him the consciousness of his own true Self.

And here I must guard at once against an outcry that is sure to be raised. It will be said that all these arguments are inspired by an ill-disguised pride, and arise from a wish to claim a higher position for man than for other animals. We are told that we ought to be more humble, and love our neighbors and venerate our ancestors, even though they were hairy apes. I plead 'Not guilty' to all such charges. By suggesting motives, any discussion may be poisoned, but such suggestions have really nothing whatever to do with the question which we are discussing. If it could be proved by irrefragable evidence that only a hundred years back all our ancestors were hairy and speechless, that would not make the slightest difference in our argument. On the contrary, it would only enhance our admiration of language, which, whether in one or in a hundred centuries, could have wrought such a marvelous change. It would only make it more incumbent on us to find out what language really is, that it should have produced, not only a new species of animal, the *homo sapiens*, but an entirely new world. That language *has* raised man into an entirely new atmosphere, an intellectual atmosphere which no other animal can breathe, is admitted on all sides.

Is it not disgraceful, then, I ask once more—is it not disgraceful that we should pass through life without attempting to know what that atmosphere really is from which we draw our best intellectual life? No one is considered educated without a knowledge of writing, reading, and arithmetic. To me it seems that no one should call himself educated who does not know what language is, and how it came to be what it is.

At first sight all we seem to be able to say of language is that it is wonderful, that it passes all understanding, or, as some people would say, that it is something supernatural and miraculous. That certain vibrations of air which we produce by various emissions of our breath should represent to us and to others all that has ever passed through our mind, all we have ever seen or heard or felt, all that passes before us in the countless works of nature, and all that passes within us in our endless feelings, our imaginings, and our thoughts, is marvelous indeed. In fact, next to the great miracle of existence there is no greater miracle than this translation of all existence into human speech and human thought.

But, as with all true miracles, so with this, our first duty is to try to interpret it, because then only will it reveal to us all that it was meant to reveal. And with regard to the miracle wrought by language, nothing is really more miraculous than its simplicity. It is generally supposed that the philosophy of language is a subject far beyond the reach of ordinary minds. I should be sorry to suppose that there were any minds which could not take in the simple lessons of the Science of Language. We never know anything truly, unless we can make it as clear as daylight to the commonest understanding. Every one of us starts from the level of the ordinary understanding, and however far we may advance, unless he has lost the thread of his own knowledge, that is, unless he has allowed his own mind to get raveled, tangled, and knotted, he ought to be able to lead others step by step to the same eminence which he has reached himself.

In no science is this more easy than in the Science of Language. It is difficult to teach a man music who cannot play a single instrument. But we all play at least one language, and can test the teachings of the Science of Language by a reference to our own language.

I shall try therefore to show you what the Science of Language has achieved, by taking my illustrations chiefly from a language which you all know—from English. And though I cannot in a few lectures attempt to give you more than the A, B, C of our science, still even that A, B, C may be useful, and may possibly encourage some of you to pay more attention to the study of so familiar, and yet so little explored a subject as our language is. It has indeed many lessons to teach us, many mysteries to reveal to us, and there is in it more work to do for any one who wishes to do useful work, than in any other science which I know of.

When we are told that the English language consists of about 250,000 words, we are no doubt staggered, and do not know how such a number or signs could have arisen, and how they can all be kept in our memory, each in its own place. But this large number of words is really an accumulation of many centuries, and nothing like that number could have been kept alive, except through the influence of literature.

Now literature, or, at least, a written literature, is a mere accident. Let us try, therefore, to realize what a language would be which possesses as yet no literature, and, therefore, no literary standard. Such languages still exist, and we find them generally full of dialectic variety. They vary as spoken colloquially in each family; they vary still more as spoken in different clans and colonies. In both these forms, as colloquial and as dialectic, they are full of what we may call slang,—expressions started by the whims of individuals, but often retained, and admitted after a time into more general use.

The first beginning of a settled form of speech is made at public gatherings, where a language must be used that is intelligible to persons belonging to different families and coming from distant settlements. This

public language, which is soon adopted for sacred poetry also, for popular legends, and for legal enactments, becomes in time what is called the sacred, the literary, or the classical dialect. But it does not absorb the whole life of a language. On the contrary, each language runs on in its natural channels of colloquial speech and dialect and slang, and supplies from time to time new material to the classical dialect.

What thus takes place before our very eyes in illiterate languages, must have taken place in all languages, and we can see the same forces at work, even now, in such highly cultivated literary forms of speech as English.

There is one kind of English which is spoken in parliament, in the pulpit, and in the courts of law, which may be called the *public*, the *ordinary*, and *recognized* English.

The *colloquial* English, as used by educated people, differs but slightly from this parliamentary English, though it admits greater freedom of construction, and a more familiar phraseology.

The *literary* English again requires still greater grammatical accuracy, and admits a number of uncommon, poetical, and even antiquated expressions which would sound strange in ordinary conversation.

The *dialectic* English is by no means extinct. The peasants in every part of England and Scotland and Ireland, though they understand a sermon in church, and read their newspaper, both of which are written in literary English, continue to speak their own language among themselves,—a language full of ancient and curious expressions which often throw much light on the history of classical English. These dialects have of late been most carefully collected, and this is a branch of study in which everybody, if only he has a well-trained ear, is able to render most valuable assistance.

Lastly, in discussing special subjects, we are driven to use a large number of *technical*, *scientific*, *foreign*, and even *slang* expressions, many of which are quite unintelligible to the ordinary speaker.

It is these technical, scientific, foreign, and slang terms which swell our dictionaries to such an enormous size. We are told that the new Oxford Dictionary will contain a quarter of a million of words. Does any one of us know 250,000 English words? I doubt it. It is extraordinary how many words this small brain of ours will hold, but there are limits to everything. In China a young man receives his first or second class in examination, according to the number of words he can read or write. But in order to obtain the place of an imperial historian, a candidate is not required to know more than 9,000. *We* do more than this. Most of us can read Shakespeare's plays, and in order to do that, we must know about 15,000 words. But though we understand most of these words (there are only about 500 to 600 words in Shakespeare which may justly be called obsolete), there are many we should never think of using ourselves. Most of us, I believe, never use more than 3,000 or 4,000 words, and we are assured that there are peasants who never use more than 300 or 400. This does not mean that they would not understand more than that number, for the Bible which they hear in church contains about 6,000 words;* these they would understand more or less accurately, though they would never think of using them.

THE INTENSITY OF SUB-CONSCIOUS STATES †

BY ALFRED BINET.

In this new chapter of our study of the doubling of consciousness I propose to enter upon an exceedingly delicate problem, and one that is of the greatest importance to psychology. At the Paris Congress of Physiological Psychology recently, I raised a discussion upon the subject in question, and for the benefit of the readers of this review, I now desire again to set forth the opinion I hold and the experiments I have instituted; at the same time profiting by the various remarks and objections that have been addressed to me by other physiologists.

The problem that I seek to solve is, to understand how and why in hysterical patients a division of consciousness takes place. Not to present the question in too abstract a form, I shall recall to mind a few experiments that once again may better convey the idea of what this so-called doubling of consciousness really is.

We have repeatedly seen that in hysterical anæsthesia sensation is preserved and may reappear in a secondary consciousness, distinct from the principal consciousness. The observations that we have hitherto published related to the sense of touch. We showed, in this way, that an anæsthetic hand, hidden behind a screen, would take a pen or pair of scissors, which had been brought into contact with it, and with these several objects would perform various intelligent movements; which proved not only that the contact of the objects in question had been perceived, but that even their nature and functions had been recognized. To these observations we are now able to add still others, which show, that also the sensation of pain may be preserved. Two subjects I observed revealed in one half of their bodies a total insensibility to punctures, pressure, burning,—in short, to the most varied kinds of painful sensations; but when we put a lighted match into the anæsthetic hand, the fingers would

* According to W. T. Adey, *The English of King James's Version*, the Old and New Testaments contain 6,000 words.

† In continuation of the series "Double Consciousness." See No. 115.

draw back from the flame in proportion as the latter advanced, and would finally relax, allowing the match to fall to the ground. Pain caused by burning, accordingly, is actually felt in an apparently anæsthetic limb; there even existed, it seemed, a certain prevision of pain and corresponding defensive movements; yet all this did not reach the principal consciousness of the subject; the sensations and movements of the anæsthetic limb, by grouping themselves together, formed a secondary consciousness, which in its development did not amalgamate with the main consciousness. I must add, that, according to my own experience, it is less easy to impress on the anæsthetic regions a sensation of pain than a sensation of touch; with most subjects the anæsthetic hand which is able to adjust itself in adaptation to familiar objects, does not seem to feel the sensation of pain caused by a burning match, and does not perform any defensive movement to avoid it.

I trust that the details given in regard to the division of consciousness in hysterical subjects, will suffice to impart a perceptible form to the problem that we are endeavoring to solve. That problem is, to find out why sensations provoked in an anæsthetic region do not reach the principal consciousness of the patient; indeed, our wonder is all the greater that the sensations in question should be perceived by another ego, and should provoke appropriate movements. In other words, the question we ask is, what are the psychophysiological conditions that determine the formation of a second consciousness? Having put the question before the reader, we shall, for the sake of greater clearness, at once point out the solution we propose.

It is a matter of observation, as we shall presently show, that if among sensations belonging to the same organ of sense, (for example, to touch or to sight,) some belong to one consciousness and others to a different consciousness, there will exist among such sensations a difference of intensity. We are unable in cases of hemi-anæsthesis to demonstrate this fact directly; for it is utterly impossible to compare with one another, from the point of view of intensity, the tactile sensations of any two, sensible and insensible, parts of a body; because each of the consciousnesses knows but one of these two groups of sensations. We may, however, take a roundabout way, and resort to an artifice based upon the following fact, that in cases in which the hysterical patient presents an approximatively regular hemi-anæsthesis, the organs of sense situated in the insensible half will share the anæsthesis to a less degree than the skin will; thus, the eye may reveal a loss of the perception of certain colors, or a concentrical contraction of the normal field of colors. It is, accordingly, possible to institute comparative experiments upon the sensibility of the healthy eye, and likewise upon that of the eye on the anæsthetic side, with the view of ascertaining whether the sensations caused in both eyes by a same excitant exhibit differences of quality or of intensity. The two following experiments seem to furnish an answer to this question.

M. Charpentier has demonstrated, that a minimum of perceptible color exists, depending upon the extent of the stimulated part of the retina. The same fact is verified in the hysterical patient, yet on a much exaggerated scale, for in order that an hysterical person may be able to perceive a color, the colored surface must be larger than is required for the normal eye. Now, it is highly important to be able to establish that the chromatic minimum is not the same for both eyes. Let us take an example. To perform the experiments, it is not necessary to employ pure colors, since the main fact of importance lies in the comparison of the two eyes. Thus, in the case of Dem . . . . , a hemi-anæsthetical patient on the right side, a piece of red paper, to be perceived as such by the right anæsthetical eye, had to be at least six millimetres square, while in the case of the left eye two millimetres square is a sufficient size. It is thus seen that the quantity of excitation necessary for the production of the sensation of red is not the same for both eyes. This is not a matter of interpretation, but the actual fact itself; whence, it appears, we may conclude with a certain degree of probability, that if to both eyes we apply one and the same excitant, the sensation produced on the sensible side will possess a greater intensity than that produced on the anæsthetical side.*

A second experiment, likewise performed upon the sense of vision, yields a result which, in my opinion, leads to an analogous interpretation. We know that when we present simultaneously to each of both eyes two surfaces representing different colors, there is provoked what is called a conflict, an antagonism of the visual field. If, for example, we present to the right eye a red back-ground, and to the left eye a green one, the observer will perceive a field which seems alternately red and green. I have attempted to reproduce this experiment with hysterical subjects, by employing certain colored glasses, that have kindly been lent me by M. Ch. Henry. I have used only glasses the color of which my patients could perceive with both eyes. In hemi-anæsthetic hysterical subjects, submitted to my investigation, I have established the fact, that there is not produced a concurrence of the visual fields, as in normal individuals; the color placed before the eye of the sensible side is the only one perceived. If, for example, into the frame of a pair of spectacles we insert a red glass and a green glass,

* M. Parinaud, director of the opthalmoscopic department at the "Salpêtrière," has verified the same fact in a slightly different form. (Anesthesie de la retine Bruxelles, 1886.)

which are almost complementary and, when superposed, extinguish each other, the subject will only perceive the color of the glass placed before the eye of greater sensibility; he thus only perceives red in the one instance, and green in the other. Like the former example, this new experiment seems to me to demonstrate, that, given an equal degree of excitation, the sensations of the sensible eye will present a greater intensity than those of the anæsthetic eye.

This conclusion might be further strengthened by researches that I have recently made with reference to the times of reaction in visual excitations. The times are longer when the excitation is performed upon the anæsthetic eye; which seems again to prove, that the sensation of this eye, for any one excitation, is of a less intensity than that of the sensible eye. M. Féré has made observations on the times of reaction to tactile excitations, in cases of incomplete anæsthesias of the skin, and has obtained similar results.

In the researches of which I have just given a condensed exposition, we have hitherto compared the sensations produced in a sensible region and those produced in an anæsthetic region from the point of view of intensity only. If the conclusion derived—although provisorily—from these first researches is correct, we ought to be able to generalize it, and to assume in advance, that if we progressively diminish the intensity of an excitant that acts upon the more sensible organ, there must arrive a point at which the sensation is sufficiently diminished in intensity as no longer to form a part of the secondary consciousness, but become sub-conscious, as are the sensations of the anæsthetic regions.

And experiments, indeed, completely confirm this prediction. Here again we are by preference referred to visual excitants, in order, as far as possible, to obtain precise and mensurable results.

We have, in fact, already published the experiment required, in our study of the hysterical eye. (No. 102 of THE OPEN COURT.) We have seen, that if we place an hysterical person before a graduated scale of letters, the writing of the insensible hand, unknown to the subject, is able to reproduce diminutive letters that the subject himself cannot see. Now, it is easy to establish here, that a difference of intensity exists between the sensations forming part of the two consciousnesses.

The word intensity, I well know, has, when applied to sensations, a rather uncertain sense. But we call attention to the fact, that the intensity of visual sensation here corresponds to an objective fact, susceptible of measurement—the size, namely, of the retinal image; and all things being otherwise equal, it is allowable to say, that to the largest retinal image corresponds the most intense visual sensation. Now, just as when we diminish the retinal image—through the choice of ever smaller letters—a point arrives where the size of the image becomes insufficient to allow of reading, but nevertheless is sufficient to determine automatic writing, it is manifest, that the principal difference existing in this case between the sensations of the two consciousnesses, is a difference of intensity.

This second series of experiments reaches, we see, the same conclusion as the former. We shall presently expound still others, which belong to an entirely different order.

Among the most curious and important facts that have recently been discovered in the domain of physiological psychology, we must mention the phenomena of dynamogeny, as produced in hyperexcitable subjects under the influence of peripheral excitations, that is to say, of sensations of every kind. M. Féré, who long has studied these dynamogenetic actions of sensations, has demonstrated that they make themselves felt not only upon the movements, but upon the sensibility, upon circulation and the other physiological functions.*

These psycho-mechanical experiments can furnish a fresh argument in support of the thesis we advance; showing, that if the sensations we provoke in an anæsthetic limb, do not reach as far as the principal consciousness of the subject, it is caused by lack of intensity. In fact, when we subject the limb or the insensible region to the influence of a dynamogenetic agent, as a magnet or to electricity, the sensations provoked in this limb become conscious according as the power of dynamometric pressure is increased; there is, accordingly, probably produced the same augmentation of intensity in the psycho-sensorial process, as in the psycho-motory process.

If there remained any doubt in regard to the preceding interpretation, such doubts, I trust, would be destroyed by the recital of a somewhat complex experiment upon the visual organ, which I have performed upon several patients, and notably with L. L——. Let us again place this subject before the black-board with its scale of written letters. The patient's visual acuity, as previously stated, is equal to 0·5: the visual acuity, revealed by the automatic writing, is a trifle higher, it is equal to 0·75. If, while the subject is attempting to decipher the letters, we subject him to a dynamogenetic excitation, such as a simple pressure upon the anæsthetic hand, the visual acuity of the conscious subject increases, it becomes equal to 0·75, and, consequently, equal to that which guides the automatic writing. We are able to interpret this first result by asserting, that peripheral excitation renders conscious to the principal subject certain visual sensations, in that it augments their intensity.

But the most curious fact that occurs in this ex-

* *Sensation et Movement.* Paris: Félix Alcan.

periment is the following. This same dynamogenetic excitation exerts its influence upon the visual acuity that is in connection with the automatic writing. The measurement of this visual acuity shows even, that it can become equal to unity, namely, to that of a normal eye; the acuity of conscious perception remains less, and only attains 0·75.

It is really interesting to note, that a given peripheral excitation, which suffices to provoke automatic writing, is not competent to provoke the conscious perception of the principal ego. In other words, a degree of sensorial intensity sufficient to provoke automatic writing, does not suffice to provoke conscious perception; which proves once again, that there exists a difference of intensity between the psychological phenomena of the two consciousnesses.

All the experiments above expounded are susceptible of a very simple counter-proof. Up to this point we have seen, that in most cases we are able to render a sensation sub-conscious, by diminishing the quantity of excitation, or, inversely, to render a sensation conscious by augmenting the quantity of excitation. We have not operated directly upon the element of consciousness.

Hypnotic suggestion enables us to modify this element, to suppress it when it exists, or to create it, when it is lacking. By this means we are able to ascertain whether the conscious phenomenon corresponds to a definitely determined degree of intensity of the physiological phenomenon that serves as its foundation. Upon this point, I have performed, in association with M. Féré, an experiment which seems to me decisive. The experiment in question was conducted with an hypnotisable, hysterical woman, who when she voluntarily pressed the dynamometer in the state of rest indicated on it the number 20, and when she pressed the instrument while looking at a red-colored surface, the cipher 40. With this subject an hypnotic suggestion suppresses for a moment the conscious vision of the red. Again, invited to press the dynamometer, while looking at the red surface, which to the subject seems grey, she no longer indicates 40, but a number slightly higher than her normal figure. This experiment demonstrates to us, that the suppression of consciousness is equivalent to a diminution of intensity in the corresponding physiological process.

And this conclusion, which we have already reached a number of times, seems to me to deserve an earnest consideration; but, in order to be well understood, it needs to be made precise. In short, the experiments that we have recapitulated only seem to prove one thing, *viz.:* that a sensation having been given, whether visual, tactile, auditive or other, if we diminish its intensity, it is no longer perceived by the principal consciousness, but may be discovered in a secondary consciousness. A difference of intensity, accordingly, can serve to explain how a tactile sensation *a* belongs to the first consciousness, and a tactile sensation *b* belongs to the second.

But, when the sensations are of a different class, this comparison of intensity becomes altogether insufficient. Thus, there are subjects who will perceive an electric current in a member where they have lost the sensation of mechanical pressure, or of puncture, of heat, or of cold. Evidently we cannot explain this disassociation by saying that electric sensation is more intense than other sensations, because frequently the very subjects that are insensible to the strongest punctures, are able to feel even the faintest galvanic current, and moreover no standard of comparison is really possible between things that are so widely different. But let us call attention to the fact, that if the explanation we have proposed, encounters at this point a limit,—a fact which merely proves that it is not general,—nevertheless, we are able to establish that the notion of quantity and of intensity maintains its importance, even in experiments of the kind referred to. There are, in fact, many hysterical subjects who do not perceive the electrical excitation at the first instant it is applied to the insensible skin; but if the excitation is continued for a few moments, it most frequently happens that sensibility to the electrical current will be aroused under the form of a painful sensation; which proves beyond question, that a certain quantity of electrical excitation is needed in order to arouse conscious sensation, and that quality is not the paramount factor.

In conclusion I shall emphasize a psychological aspect, which appears to me of a certain importance.* I do not believe that a difference of intensity between two sensations of the same sense *ipso facto* justifies their distribution into two different consciousnesses. It is further necessary, that the sensation, however faint, should not possess an interest, a practical importance that might attract the attention of the subject, and by that very fact augment the intensity of the sensation in question.

The hysterical subject, as I, with many other observers, conceive him, is an exhausted subject. The slightest effort is painful to him, and he thus seeks to husband his forces. Like all of us, he experiences a vast number of sensations, differing both in their intensity and quality. He makes a selection from among all these sensations, because he finds it too fatiguing to perceive them all. Generally speaking, he more carefully preserves visual sensations than tactile sensations, because he can less easily dispense with the former; and in a given order of sensations, he pre-

* M. Pierre Janet, à propos of my communication to the Paris Congress had advanced an opinion which closely agrees with the one I set forth.

serves the most intense sensations, because the latter are perceived with the least effort of adaptation of the sensory organ. Such, in my opinion, is the rather indirect rôle of the intensity of sensation in the division of consciousness.

It is because feeble sensations are difficult to collect and to arrange, because they exact greater attention and greater effort, that the subject neglects them and that they form secondary consciousnesses. The division of consciousness, it seems to me, is chiefly explainable by the mental habitudes peculiar to the individual.

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

KANT says somewhere, "Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance, pain of the hinderance of life," and expresses in this sentence an opinion that has been in vogue among philosophers since time immemorial. But it is strange that neither Kant nor any other thinker has greatly troubled himself with a careful investigation of facts. The statement seemed so obvious, so direct and convincing, that it received almost universal admittance in philosophy; and was even employed as a corner-stone for ethics by Epicurus, Bentham, Spencer, Hœfding, and others.

Alexander Bain in his excellent work "Mind and Body," quotes Kant's definition and develops his own as follows (p. 59):

"States of Pleasure are connected with an increase, states of Pain with an abatement, of some or all of the vital functions."

Bain adds:

"There are, however, a few startling exceptions. For example:—Cold may be painful and yet wholesome, as in the cold bath, and under the keen bracing air. But this exception, on closer view, confirms the general rule, while rendering its application more definite. Cold undoubtedly depresses, for a time, one very sensitive organ, the skin, perhaps also the digestive organs; while, in moderate degree (that is, the degree constituting wholesomeness) it exalts, through the capillary circulation, the lungs, the heart, the muscles, and the nerves; and the contrast teaches us that as far as *immediate pleasure* is concerned, we lose more by depressing the functions of the skin and the stomach, than we gain by increasing the power of the heart, the lungs, the muscles, or even the nerves themselves.

"Another very remarkable exception is the painlessness of many diseases, together with the occasional absence of all pain, and even the presence of great comfort, in the sick bed and in the final decay of life. . . . .

"The connexion of pleasure with vitality, and of pain with feebleness or loss of function, does not apply to all organs alike; some are comparatively insensitive, their degeneracy and decay seem unaccompanied with feeling; while in others the smallest functional derangement is productive of pain. Muscular weakness does not give pain, unless we are compelled to efforts beyond our strength; also the nervous system may be enfeebled as regards thinking power without producing discomfort, provided we are allowed perfect repose. . . . .

"Intellectual feebleness, decay of memory, and incapability of thought, are not painful in themselves. . . . .

"We often see patients in the last stage of consumption, still entertaining the most sanguine prospects of recovery; a proof that, instead of being mentally depressed, they are in the opposite or joyous condition. . . . ."

There is no sufficient explanation for all these exceptions to Bain's law identifying pleasure with a growth and pain with a decay of the vital functions. Bain says that sometimes an acute smart will temporarily raise the energies; it will have the effect of a stimulus. But this explains only a few instances, such as a cold bath or the influence of keen, bracing air, and these instances may be used as examples to show that the cold bath in itself can by repeated indulgence and through its wholesome effects become a pleasure. First it becomes a want and then the satisfaction of this want itself, even without taking into consideration the wholesome after-effect, is felt as pleasurable.

Mr. Bain does not, and I think he cannot, from his standpoint, remove the innumerable difficulties arising from exceptions irreconcilable with his law. The degeneration of several functions, the decrease of muscular and nervous activity, and even the dissolution by consumption are by no means always painful processes, and yet if anything they are decay, they are abatement. Certainly, the law is wrong, it is not derived from facts. It is an a-priori statement to which facts have to be fashioned in order to agree.

Pain is apparently due to a disturbance. We have for instance a hollow tooth; the nerve is exposed and the slightest irritation causes most violent pain. There is neither growth nor decay in the nerve, yet there is suffering. The decay of the osseous parts took place without pain. Now we go to the dentist and, supposing that he is unable to save the nerve, he at once removes all pain by the aid of a drop of cocaine, or carbolic acid, or any other drug which causes the nerve to die. Here is decay without pain. When infants are teething, there is growth combined with pain. Whatever the tooth may feel we do not know; yet its growth causes disturbances in the surrounding parts which are perceived as pains.*

In a state of decay the vital functions are abating. The lower the vital functions become, the less pleasur-

* Copulation, which is supposed to be a pleasure, is not growth, but a combination merely. Modern researches by Weismann and others have shown that it is a natural want rising from the insufficiency of an individual to propagate itself. Its physiological condition seems to be the divided existence of the reproductive germ, so that each sex posesses but one part. The continuance and regeneration of life depend upon the activity of the germ. Thus the restoration of the germ becomes a necessity and want of self-preservation. The natural desire for fecundation (not the other sexual instincts, which through heredity became strongly connected therewith) is an expression of the yearning for immortal life.

If growth were a pleasure, then child-bearing in itself, apart from its results should be the height of earthly enjoyment which perhaps should be eclipsed by birth only—birth being growth beyond the limits of an individual. Child-bearing in itself, the growth of a new being, is neither pleasurable nor painful. It often becomes painful by the many disturbances which it is but too liable to cause.

able excitement, but at the same time the less pain will be possible. Decay far from being identical with pain is the annihilation of the possibility of pain.

Pain is caused through perturbation. The more violent perturbations are, the stronger the pain will be. There are wholesome and disastrous disturbances. Among the wholesome disturbances we count not only those which arise from growth, but also such as arouse our energies and indirectly promote our general welfare, disastrous are such as lead directly or indirectly to destruction.

Decay is often accompanied with great suffering, but the suffering is apparently not due to the decay itself, but to the struggle of the animal vitality in order to overcome the decay. The agonies of death are not caused by death but by life's resistance to death. The agony is stronger in youths exuberant with vigorous health, than in old men whose vitality is low.

Pleasure and pain are generally conceived like heat and cold,* as correlatives; and in some respects they are counterparts; they are the two extreme poles of our soul life. But they are unlike heat and cold in so far as the one is not the same as the other differing only in degree.

Pleasure is wrongly considered as active, pain as passive. Prof. Bain attempts to show that pleasurable emotions display "the general erection of the body," while pain "leads to the relaxation of all the extensor muscles" which, he says, are the most powerful. Yet, the flexors of the hand which contract in a fit of anguish, so as to ball the fist, are much stronger muscles than the extensors, and even if that were not the case, Prof. Bain must and does concede, that there is "still an active prompting under pain." He cannot, as he suggests, confine this active prompting to a relaxation of the flexor-muscles alone, for the cry of intense pain is to a great extent executed by the same muscles as the shouts of gay hilarity. Pain as well as pleasure are states of consciousness that accompany the reactions of the nervous system to certain irritations. Pain, it appears, is always caused through a disturbance, (whether this disturbance is good or bad is here a secondary consideration,) while pleasure is the gratification of a want.

There is much confusion shown concerning the nature of pleasure and pain, if the one is called an "accession of vital force," the other "a loss or deprivation of energy."† The different pleasures may be classed partly as the accessions, partly as a spending of vital force. Digestion is an accession, bodily exertion a deprivation of energy. Both are classed together as the most common pleasures of life. They are pleasures in so far as both are satisfactions of wants. A youth, who is glowing with vitality, has a natural want of bodily exertion, and a hungry stomach has a want of food. Take away the want and all that can be called pleasure in the acts disappears. It ceases to be a gratification.

It is generally acknowledged that there are pains which are wholesome, and pleasures which are disastrous. This does not prove that decay may sometimes be wholesome and growth fatal; yet it proves that some disturbances are good and conductive to our prosperity, while, on the other hand, some gratifications of certain wants will be found to be injurious.

The gratification of natural wants cannot, upon the whole, be considered as injurious; although an occasional lack of their gratification will often under favorable circumstances lead to progress. Wants that are not at all or insufficiently satisfied, prompt the inventor to invent, and the courageous to discover new paths that will in the end make possible their gratification. In the evolution of mankind and in the history of civilization this factor, perhaps, has been too little recognized. Ungratified wants are always disturbances in human life, and the more natural a want is, the more disagreeably will the disturbance make itself felt. Every living being has the natural tendency to gratify its wants, and pleasure may be defined as the feeling that naturally accompanies the gratification of wants.

Now we must bear in mind that among the many wants of living beings there are not only lower and higher kinds of natural, but also unnatural, wants. The intensity of a pleasure does not depend upon its being of a higher or lower kind, but exclusively upon the intensity of the want.

The lower natural wants are called necessities of life, and it is noticeable that they cease to be intense pleasures, the more their satisfaction becomes ensured. The energy necessary for their gratification can thus be employed for the higher emotional and intellectual wants. Unnatural wants are the result of unnatural habits, but we can observe that their gratification is just in the same measure as in other cases pleasurable to the degree of intensity of the want.

It would be impossible to draw an exact line between natural and unnatural wants, although there are some about which there can be no doubt where to classify them. The truth is that there is a large group of indifferent habits which are not injurious. They may be considered by one who is accustomed to them, as natural, by another, who has never practiced them, as ridiculously unnatural. Thus the smoking of a cigar, the drinking of a glass of wine, may be to one an intense pleasure, while to the other it appears as an abomination. The performance of certain actions may be an enjoyment for one and a veritable torture

* Bain says: Yet pleasure and pain are as opposite as heat and cold.
† Sir Charles Bell uses these expressions.

to another. There are men who love their trades or their professions, others who abhor them. There are women who delight in attending to their household-affairs, while others loathe the work.

Pleasure and pain are unavoidable so long as life means growth. Every progress causes disturbances which must be readjusted. A state of perfect adaptation, of which Mr. Spencer speaks, is a dream which is not realizable, unless we dam life's great stream in order to convert it into a stagnant lake. But if we succeeded in that, we would be sure to produce worse evils and more disagreeable pains than all the happiness would be worth, which could possibly result from such a state of perfect adaptation.

Professor Bain says: "Inasmuch as we follow pleasure and avoid pain, if pleasure were injurious and pain wholesome, we should soon incur entire shipwreck of our vitality," but he finds it necessary to add, "as we often partially do, through certain tendencies that are exceptional to the general law." Do not, indeed, *most* shipwrecks in life occur because people indeliberately follow pleasure and avoid pain? And is it not for that reason that we have to preach morals? Some ethical philosophers attempt to base their morals upon the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; but they start from the wrong supposition that pleasure is a furtherance, and pain an abatement of life. If pleasure and pain cannot be considered as a furtherance and an abatement of life, they can still less be identified with morality and immorality. It is true that the performance of moral acts should become a want of our nature, and in that case they would naturally become pleasures to us. But, so long as they are not yet natural wants, we must, nevertheless, follow the commands of right conduct. We certainly shall have a very questionable guide, should we follow our feeling of pleasure and pain in determining what is right conduct. Yet we should unhesitatingly obey the behests of our conscience,* without regard to pleasure and pain. P. C.

THE MEANING OF DEATH.†

BY PROFESSOR GAULE.

EVERYTHING that comes into being, comes but to perish; death is inevitable. The consciousness of this has taught us well to prune our hopes and wishes, and to make our plans in this respect for short duration only. But the discerning eye of science has discovered that in the true sense of the word there is no death.

What we call death, is but the separation of the two individual principles of which we are composed.

Take the Bacteria. After a short period of existence we see an individual divide. In its place, two new individuals of the same form appear, which continue the life of the original individual. No cessation of life has here taken place; we seek for the corpse in vain. Assuming the universal presence of proper nutriment, the division and subdivision of these Bacteria would continue without end, until the little rod-shaped creatures finally filled the whole world. But since proper and sufficient nutriment is oftentimes lacking, and since obstacles are constantly set in the way of such a wide extension of animalcular existence, death, under these conditions likewise, enters. Yet it has wholly the character of accident.

* * *

Now, every living creature starts from a germ—a definite mass of active, effective substance. The germ springs from other living creatures and contains the substance in which the latter are united with one another. The Bacterium builds from the dissolved nutriment that nourishes it, substances like itself; and its bodily increase is brought about by the action of every single part of its organization upon the alimental solution surrounding it and the conversion of that solution into component parts of its own life. After these changes have continued for a while, the substance stands in need of reorganization.

* * *

In the fertilized chicken-egg the greater part of the contents of the egg constitutes nutriment for the minute germ. The two active germinal substances are the germ-nucleus and the germ plasm; the two are chemically different. The germ-substances act upon the food-substance, chemical changes set in, and the materials forming the yolk unite with the germ substances. The latter, however, would soon give out, were they not constantly regenerated. But every cell manufactures germ-nucleus and germ-plasm; thus alone can the chicken build itself up, and grow larger and larger; and life cannot be extinguished, because the organization of the germ-substance is being continually replenished.

These processes determine the organization of definite forms in living beings, and consequently have not merely a chemical, but also a morphological character. We ourselves bear these two morphological principles within us, one of which uses up the germ-substance, and the other replenishes it. Both principles are engaged in unceasing conflict; the first ever seeking to draw to itself and to retain the germ-substance supplied by the other, in order to be able to prepare the way for the coming generation. It acquires, too, by growth, in this continuous struggle, a certain

* I here hesitated whether to use the word "conscience" or "reason." I preferred the more popular expression "conscience," although it is so often employed by modern theologians in a mystical sense. The Apostle Paul certainly uses the word in the sense of "a reasoning upon right or wrong conduct." Speaking of the conscience of the heathen he characterises it as "their thoughts, λογισμοί, accusing and excusing one another."

† From a lecture held at Zürich. Translated from the *Freidenker* by μκρκ.

advantage over the second principle; but as soon as the stage of puberty arises, its death is sealed. Thence originates the limited duration of individual life.

We may say, indeed, that we are composed of a principle of the present, and of a principle that prepares for the future; the one face of our Janus-head is turned to the present, the other directs its glance to the future. The antagonistic interests of the two powers lead to long and hard battles, and are the cause that our life is so divided.

But what a fund of consolation lies in the knowledge thus gained for us! After all it is merely the individual that dies, and die it must that the species be preserved. We therefore become reconciled with death, for through death we are enabled to behold life, first, in ourselves and, then, in our children, in whom the type of the race reappears in its purity, having herein reverted to the original mould.

IN REPLY TO CRITICISMS OF "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS."

IV.

THE MODESTY OF AGNOSTICISM.

It is always easier to scold than to reason. Accordingly it is a general rule that if a reviewer cannot, or if he does not care to, answer an argument, he commences to rail at the author whom he dissects. An Agnostic reviewer in the *American Hebrew Standard* says of "Fundamental Problems": "Nowhere in this book "is the modest reserve of the true man of science visible. We "have not the truly liberal spirit of the English school of nat-"ural philosophers, the spirit of a Newton, or a Darwin, or a "Spencer, but the harsh self-assertion of the German school of "metaphysicians, of a Hegel, or an Oken, or a Hæckel."

The honor of being labeled as a metaphysician, I must decline, and if the reviewer had been considerate enough to read the article on metaphysics, p.74, he would most likely have avoided that term.

But why is "the truly liberal spirit" missing, why must "the arrogance of this author's style" be condemned? My reviewer says: "In his insistence upon the value of form, and of formal "knowledge, the author is standing upon firm ground. But when "he attempts to discredit the doctrine of 'the unknowable,' by in-"sisting upon that of 'Absolute Being,' [here we do not know "what our critic means,] he simply does not know what he is "talking about."

Is it not strange that Agnostics usually retreat into the redoubt of modesty? Modesty is made an argument of their dogma. We declare that everything that exists, must exist somehow; it must manifest its existence in some way. And this manifestation can be represented in the mind. We can become aware of it. Accordingly it is knowable. Existence, that does not manifest its existence somehow, is no existence. Absolute existence is equivalent to non-existence. Real existence is real by manifesting itself Therefore existence is always knowable.*

To know the different facts of reality, to be aware of them, and to state them is not sufficient. We must try to understand them. The comprehension of facts is their methodical arrangement. The comprehension of facts is the object of the different sciences, and their ultimate unification in one great system is the object of philosophy. We are answered; "'The Power that the "Universe manifests to us,' may be scrutable to Dr. Paul Carus, "but to all less gifted mortals it remains as it was to Moses,* as it "is to Mr. Spencer, 'inscrutable'—something that 'no man can "see and live.'"

*For details the reader is referred to the work itself.

Now I think that we see the power that the universe manifests to us daily, and yet we live Yes, we live in it and by it. We experience it in every throb of our heart and in every vibration of our brain. If my critic believes that in my insisting upon the value of form and of formal knowledge, I am standing upon firm ground, how can he object to my abandoning the agnostic view of the unknowable? Is it not form and the irrefragable laws of form that make it possible, and more so that make it unavoidable that the world throughout is cognizable? The regularity that arises from the laws of form affords us the key to the problems of nature.

Agnosticism appears at first sight as an expression of most laudable modesty. Who can blame a man for openly acknowledging his ignorance and who can doubt his sincerity? Socrates has been much admired for his confession, 'I know that I do not know anything!' But the agnostic outdoes Socratic wisdom and forefeits all claim to modesty by declaring that no one else can know anything about the mysteries which he himself cannot explain. By changing the unknown into the unknowable, the agnostic turns modesty into arrogance

Let me mention here that the terms liberalism and tolerance are often misunderstood or misapplied. Tolerance means the recognition of other people's right to express their opinion. It means that a man who has an opinion and expresses it, should not be put down with violence, nor should he be cried down with harsh words; he must not be called arrogant, because his opinion differs from ours. Tolerance demands that he should be heard, and if he be wrong, should be answered with good and sufficient reasons. "Truly liberal spirit" does not at all demand that all opinions must be considered as of equal value, nor does it oblige us to withhold our opinion in "modest reserve."

Critics can show their truly liberal spirit, by freely criticizing that which they consider as false; they can show their tolerance by explaining why they disagree with the author criticized. Our agnostic critic might have shown both by informing us what, according to his view, knowledge means. Before anybody declares that the whole world is unknowable, he should first lay down a clear definition of "knowable." Schopenhauer said that "physically everything, and metaphysically nothing is understandable." Very well! My definition of understanding is that of a physical understanding; and I count the conception of a metaphysical understanding which, from its very nature can never be understood, among the superstitions of science. We can easily dispense with such knowledge as is *per se* impossible, and with absolute or metaphysical knowledge, for what it means no one knows. If agnosticism merely meant that metaphysical knowledge is an impossibility, there would be no quarrel.

A philosophy which starts from the positive data of experience, and arranges them in the system of a monistic conception of the world, will meet with many great problems and in solving them will again and again be confronted with new problems. It will always grapple with something that is not yet known. The unknown seems to expand before us like an infinite ocean upon which the ship of knowledge advances. But the unknown constantly changes into the known. We shall find no real unknowable wherever we proceed. The idea of the unknowable is like the horizon—an optic illusion. The more we advance, the farther it recedes. The unknowable is no reality; the unknowable can nowhere prevent knowledge nor can the horizon debar a ship in her voyage, from further progress.

A witty paper contained a few weeks ago a remark to the pur-

*It is an original idea to claim Moses as an Agnostic. Moses's doctrine was certainly not Agnosticism and the holy legend that he could not see God face to face admits of other interpretations.

port, that "he who solves nature's problems is a scientist, but he "who declares them to be insolvable is a philosopher." This was said in jest, but the agnostic is in earnest and when a man propounds another and a positive view of philosophy, declaring, not that all philosophical problems are solved, but that they are solvable, he is arraigned for arrogance.

If philosophy is to be called the conviction that the world is inscrutable, let us abandon philosophy and in its stead let us arrange the knowledge which scientific researches yield us, into a unitary harmonious conception of the universe—call it what you will! P. C.

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

How to be envied is the lot of those
Whose placid minds forever calmly soar
Above the troubled world; who can ignore
The anguish of the present in its throes,

To follow still where idle fancy goes;
Or, undisturbed, with rapt attent explore
The labyrinth of past, or con the lore
That nature's depths from transient eye enclose!

Such is not mine, alas! My cherished theme
Has been begun and left a thousand times,
And noisy rumors make my thoughts to seem

Like timid birds that seldom-ceasing chimes
Frighten from where they still return to teem
On some cathedral spire that into heaven climbs.

1873.

THE PARTING.*

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

The yellow forest shivers,
And falls the withered leaf;
Alas, that what is lovely
Should have a life so brief!

The tree-tops coldly glisten
Beneath a sickly light—
The Summer's farewell kisses
Before she taketh flight.

I feel that I am weeping
My very heart away;
This pensive scene recalleth
Our dreaded parting-day.

Aware that thou wert dying,
I left in saddest mood:
I was the going Summer,
And thou the fading Wood!

BOOK NOTICES.

MOTHER'S PORTFOLIO. A Book for every Mother; containing Messages from Frœbel and the Kindergarten for the benefit of the little folks. Illustrated. By *Cora L. Stockham* and *Emily A. Kellogg*. Chicago: Alice B. Stockham & Co.

This compilation constitutes a volume of between four and five hundred pages. It comprises much information concerning nursery and kindergarten occupations, contains papers from leading educators (among whom may be mentioned Emily A. Kellogg, Cora L Stockham, Mary B. Willard, Alice H. Putnam, Harriet Prescott Spofford, and Florence Pine Bebb), stories (by R L. Stevenson, Andersen, G. MacDonald, and others), music, and typical lessons adapted to the home and the kindergarten. It may be regarded as a popular and practical encyclopedia of kindergarten literature and methods. Clearly and simply written, it is eminently adapted, as its title implies is its purpose, for use in the nursery. It will make a very appropriate Christmas present.

We have received from Lord Queensberry a copy of a poem, "The Spirit of the Matterhorn—" dedicated to the Peers of Scotland. Lord Queensberry was deprived, in 1880, of his seat in the House of Lords. The ground of rejection was, that Lord Queensberry had previously expressed opinions in antagonism to the Christian Religion, and had publicly denied the existence of God. In refutation of these charges the pamphlet before us is written. Lord Queensberry objects to giving a name, such as God, to a power which to him seems undefinable by man; he prefers to call it the Supreme, the Inscrutable. The soul, he holds, is not an essence distinct from the body: it is *the actual result of the body itself*. Man, therefore, is *himself* responsible for the souls of posterity: he may improve, he may debase. The transmission and consequent preservation of what he possesses and has acquired is immortality. With this thesis we agree. But Lord Queensberry believes, with Spencer, that the ultimate aim of progress is universal happiness, the perfectibility of man—man's complete adaptation, socially, morally, and physically, to his surroundings; this is the goal of all striving and of all aspiration. Just this perfectibility it is that, we must insist, is in direct logical contradiction to the process relied upon to attain it; change is the condition of all life; its action is either progressive or regressive; and it is impossible to conceive a stage of existence resting secure upon a foundation that is contrary to the conditions through which it is attained. (Cf. p. 1989 of THE OPEN COURT.) Progress and evolution are the laws of life. (Watts & Co., London.)

A little brochure, by R. Bithell, Ph D., has recently been issued by Messrs. Watts & Co., of London, entitled "The Worship of the Unknowable." Dr. Bithell correctly defines worship, the recognition of worth; its elements are meditation, awe, wonder, veneration; and all culminates in aspiration and in prayer. But every human conception of God,—everything that has hitherto formed an object of worship,—has given way before science and hence become unworshipable; only the Unknowable remains, only the Unknowable is secure against deposition, for that can never be relegated to Science. And why? because it is not, and cannot be, an object of *cognition*. We have too often pointed out the fallacy of an existence which is not existence. However, we could earnestly wish, that wherever existence not capable of becoming the object of cognition is spoken of, cognition and its meaning be explicitly defined.

The opening article of *The Unitarian Review* for December, is by Francis E. Abbot—"Scientific Theology the Ground of all Liberal Religion." For an able metaphysical refutation of the ground upon which Agnosticism rests, we refer our readers to Mr. Abbot's paper. In the same review, Mrs. Celia Parker Woolley writes upon the "Effects of the Higher Education of Woman on her Religious Belief."

With the first number of the coming year, a new department will be added to *Scribner's Magazine*. It will be devoted to the brief consideration of matters of literary and artistic interest and to short *causeries* of the type that the "End Paper" has commonly represented. The promised addition will supply a feature that we have always felt the need of in this excellent periodical.

NOTES.

At the conclusion of the series of contributions by Prof. Max Müller, begun in this number, THE OPEN COURT will publish an essay by Ludwig Noiré, the late distinguished German philologist, upon a related topic.

*Heine.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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CHRISTMAS.

The Christmas bells will soon chime and with their harmonious peals they will bring joy and merriment into every household. There is a secret charm in the celebration of this holy festival. It is wonderful what sacred gladness attaches to the sight of the glorious tree that remains green in winter-time, when it is decked with glittering ornaments and its many candles shed their joyous light upon the circles of frolicking children with roseate cheeks and beaming eyes!

What is the mystery of this jubilant feast, and how is it possible that wherever it has been introduced, there it will remain as the dearest and most cherished of all holidays?

First Christmas was celebrated as Yule-tide by the old Teutons, especially by the most northern tribes of the great Teutonic family, the Norsemen and the Saxons, as the return of the sun, as salvation in midst of anxieties and troubles, as the victory of light over darkness. As many other feasts so Christmas, and Christmas, it seems, more than others, is a festival of natural religion. Then the Christians adopted it and very appropriately selected it as the memorial day of the birth of the Saviour. Now it is celebrated by Christians and Pagans, by Jews and Gentiles, by all who came in contact with Saxons or Germans, or their kindred in the North. No one can withdraw from the sacred spell that the worship of Nature exercises even now upon our minds. Christians like to forget that their Christmas tree is an old pagan symbol of the world. It is Ygdrasil, under the branches of which the three norns of the present, the past, and the future are sitting, lisping runes and weaving the fates of the Universe. There is Urd's well at the roots of the holy tree and its water is sacred. The norns spray the water upon the branches of Ygdrasil which sinks down into our valleys as dew. This keeps the tree ever green and strong.

There are times so dreary that in our anxiety we see no hope but death. There are days so bleak and wintery that we begin to despair, and encumbered with cares we cry, "The evil is stronger than the good in this world, and the power of darkness quenches the glory of light." The days become shorter and shorter. The nights become longer and longer. A general corruption is prevailing and increasing; the moral sense is growing debased and retrogression seems all but universal.

O ye of little faith! Be of good cheer, and in the midst of all your trouble and worry celebrate a joyous Christmas. For Christmas is the commemoration of the holy morn that greets us after the longest night. It reminds us of the undying hope, that light and life are eternal. It is true that life is a world of woe, full of toil and of pain. Nevertheless, there is a saviour born into the world; and this saviour is the son of man. The ideal son of man lies as yet in the cradle. But we know that he will grow; he will rescue the world from those troubles which are caused by folly and crime; he will elevate mankind through purity and justice; and he will consecrate life and the struggle for life through the noble aims which more and more will become conscious ideals in the minds of men.

NO MYSTERY IN LANGUAGE.

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

A language is after all not so bewildering a thing as it seems to be, when we hear of a dictionary of 250,000 words. For all the ordinary purposes of life a dictionary of 4,000 words would be quite sufficient.

Skeat's 'Etymological Dictionary of the English Language,' which confines itself to primary words,—that is to say, which would explain *luck*, but not *lucky*, *unlucky*, *luckless*,—deals with no more than 13,500 entries. Of these only 4,000 are of Teutonic origin; 5,000 are taken from French; 2,700 direct from Latin, 400 from Greek, about 250 from Celtic, and the rest from various sources. If, therefore, we confine our attention to that portion of English which is Teutonic, we find that English proper consists of about 4,000 independent words, and that all the rest derived from these.

Let us now examine some of the words which swell our dictionaries to such an enormous extent, in order to see whether they really belong to the living language, and whether we ourselves should be able to understand them.

And first of all a few *antiquated* words—words which were used some centuries ago, but are now to be found in the dictionary only.

Do you understand *anred* and *anredness*? *Anred* means single-minded. It is derived from *red* (*ræd*), purpose, plan, scheme, and like *anfald*, Germ. *einfäl-*

tig, meant originally without duplicity. Hence *anredness* came to mean singleness, and in the thirteenth century people spoke of the *onrednesse of luve and onnesse of heorte*.

You might guess the meaning of *avenant* when you read in Caxton's Myrr. I. xiv. 45, '*A lytil man is ofte wel made and avenaunt*,' *i. e.* a little man is often well-made and becoming or comely. *Avenant* is derived from *avenir*, to come, to become, and meant agreeable, becoming, handsome; but no one would use that word now.

If you saw two men fighting, and one of them were called a regular *bangster*, you might probably guess what was meant; but though Walter Scott still uses the word in 'The Abbot,' it is no longer a living word. There was an old legal expression to commit a burglary '*by bangstrie and force*.' This again would hardly be intelligible, except to the historical student of law.

There are other words which survive, but the original meaning of which has become antiquated. In the legal phrase, 'by assault and battery,' for instance, *battery* still retains its original meaning, namely, beating or striking. But we could no longer say, to give a boy a battery; we must say, a flogging. In ordinary parlance battery now only means a number of artillery, while men of science speak also of an electric battery.

It is curious to observe in how many words the meaning deteriorates, while it very seldom improves.

A *Knave* was originally a young man, in German *ein Knabe*. In the Court cards the knave is simply the page or the knight, but by no means the villain. *Villain* itself was originally simply the inhabitant of a village. A pleader once made good use of his etymological knowledge. For this is what Swift relates: 'I remember, at a trial in Kent, where Sir George Rook was indicted for calling a gentleman knave and villain, the lawyer for the defendant brought off his client by alleging the words were not injurious, for *knave*, in the old and true signification, imported only a servant; and *villain* in Latin is *villicus*, which is no more than a man employed in country labor, or rather a baily.'

I doubt whether in these days any Judge, if possessed of some philological knowledge, would allow such a quibble to pass, or whether in return he would not ask leave to call the lawyer an *idiot*, for *idiot*, as you know, meant originally no more than a private person, a man who does not take part in public affairs; and afterwards only came to mean an outsider, an ill-informed man, and lastly an idiot.

A *pagan* was originally, like *villain*, the inhabitant of a *pagus*, a countryman. It came to mean *heathen*, because it was chiefly in the country, outside the town, that the worshipers of the old national gods were allowed to continue. A heathen was originally a person living on the heath. Heathen, however, is not yet a term of reproach; it simply expresses a difference of opinion between ourselves and others. But we have the same word under another disguise, namely as *hoiden*. At present *hoiden* is used in the sense of a vulgar, romping girl. But in old authors it is chiefly applied to men, to clowns or louts. We may call Socrates a heathen, but we could not call him a hoiden, though we might possibly apply that name to his wife Xanthippe.

Sometimes it happens that the same word can be used both in a good and in a bad sense. *Simplicity* with us has generally a good meaning. We read in the Bible of *simplicity and godly sincerity*. But, in the same Bible the simple ones are reproved: 'How long, ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity? and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge?' (Prov. i. 22.)

If at present we were to call a boy an *imp*, he would possibly be offended. But in Spenser's time *imp* had still a very good sound, and he allows a noble lady, a lady gent, as he calls her, to address Arthur, as 'Thou worthy imp' (Faerie Queen, i. 9. 6). Nor is there any harm in that word, for *imp* meant originally graft, and then offspring. To graft in German is *impfen*, and this is really a corruption of the Greek ἐμφύειν, to implant.

Brat is now an offensive term, even when applied to a child. It is said to be a Welsh word, and to signify a rag. It may be so, but in that case it would be difficult to account for *brat* having been used originally in a good sense. This must have been so, for we find in ancient sacred poetry such expressions as, 'O Abraham's brats, o broode of blessed seede.'

To use the same word in such opposite meanings is possible only where there is an historical literature which keeps alive the modern as well as the antiquated usages of a language. In illiterate languages, antiquated words are forgotten and vanish.

Think of all the meanings embedded in the word *nice!* How did they come there? The word has a long history, and has had many ups and downs in its passage through the world. It was originally the Latin *nescius*, ignorant, and it retained that meaning in old French, and likewise in old English. Robert of Gloucester (p. 106, last line) still uses the word in that sense. 'He was nyce,' he says, 'and kowthe no wisdom,' that is, he was ignorant and knew no wisdom. But if there is an ignorance that is bliss, there is also an ignorance, or unconsciousness, or simplicity that is charming. Hence an unassuming, ingenuous, artless person was likewise called nice. However, even that artlessness might after a time become artful,

or, at all events, be mistaken by others for artfulness. The over-nice person might then seem fastidious, difficult to please, too dainty, and he or she was then said to be too nice in his or her tastes.

We have traced the principal meanings of *nice* from ignorant to fastidious, as applied to persons. If nice is applied to things, it has most commonly the meaning of charming ; but as we speak of a fastidious and difficult person, we can also speak of a difficult matter as a nice matter, or a nice point.

At last there remained *nice*, which simply expresses general approval. Everything, in our days, is nice, not to say, awfully nice. But unless we possessed a literature in which to study the history of words, it would be simply impossible to discover why nice should express approval as well as disapproval, nay, why it should in the end become a mere emphatic expression, as when we say, 'That is a nice business,' or 'that is a nice mess.'

And here we approach a new class of words which swell our dictionaries very considerably, namely, *slang-words*. Slang is more than a colloquial and familiar expression, it always conveys the idea of being a little vulgar. It is quite true that some expressions which we call slang were perfectly correct some centuries ago, and that they have the right to claim a place among antiquated words. The Americans are very clever at making out that most of their slang was pure classical English some centuries ago. That may be so ; in many cases it no doubt is so. But that does not take away the peculiar twang of what has now become slang. A distinguished American politician declared that under certain circumstances he would let the Constitution 'slide.' That certainly was slang. But when he was blamed for his undignified expression, he appealed to Chaucer and Shakespeare, who use the same word, in such phrases as, 'Wel neigh all other cures let he slyde'; she lete 'her sorwe slide'; 'he lets the world slide.'

It is often difficult to say why certain colloquial expressions are vulgar, while others are allowed to pass. Much depends on the speaker, for you may say almost anything in English, if you know how to say it. There is no harm in saying 'You bet'; yet in America it is a sign of vulgarity. 'I am very dry' is slang, 'I am very thirsty' is quite correct ; yet thirsty meant originally dry, and we may still speak of 'thirsty land,' instead of dry land. *Thirsty* is connected with Lat. *torrere*, to parch, Greek τέρσεσθαι, to become dry.

'I have been enjoying poor health' is certainly wrong, but I doubt whether 'poor or bad health' is a solecism. It is true that health by itself means soundness of body, and is connected with *hale*, *healing*, and *whole* (for *hole*), Greek καλός, Sk. kalyâna. But as we can speak of good and bad luck, there is no serious objection to our speaking of good, or bad, or indifferent health.

The frequent use of the verb *to get* is in bad taste, but again, it can hardly be called wrong. When we read, 'I *got* my things packed, and *got* to the train in time, and *got* to Paris, and *got* to the hotel, and *got* my supper, and *got* sleepy, and soon *got* to bed, and *got* a good night's rest,' we can understand all that is meant, but we feel offended by the poverty and vulgarity of the expression.

Sometimes, however, slang becomes utterly unintelligible, and requires a commentary except to the initiated. I shall read a sentence from a Melbourne paper, which I hope few here present will understand without the help of explanatory notes :

'Say, mate, some our'n cockneys chummet with 'em Melbourne larrikins at yon booze-ken. Flash coves blacklegs, and welchers that they be, they lushed like old 'Arry till one on 'em kicked the bucket. They told a bobby that coomed by as they was gents. "That's all my heye and Betty Martin," says he—and he slips on the darbies and brought 'em to quod.'

This, no doubt, is very vulgar English, but it is English for all that, and if there ever should be a violent social revolution at Melbourne, and the lower classes should become the ruling classes, it is quite possible that this kind of English might be spoken there in parliament and even in the pulpit. We must not forget that in its origin every language may be called vulgar. It is the language of the *vulgus*, before it becomes the language of literature. Even Dante calls his Italian *il volgare*, and he was the first to use that common spoken idiom for the highest literary purposes.

There are slang-dictionaries, as large as the dictionaries of any language, and I am sorry to say that even our universities contribute every year a fair share toward new and enlarged editions of these books. *Little go*, *Moderations*, *Greats*, *to be ploughed*, *to be gulphed*, are well-known specimens of this mysterious language. There are many more which it is perhaps wiser not to mention.

As to technical and scientific terms, they are endless. Try to speak with a boot-maker or a carpenter about his own tools and his own work, and you will be surprised at the unknown treasures of the English language. Not long ago a wine-merchant to whom I had complained about some bottles of wine not being quite full, wrote to me to return the *ullaged* bottles. I did not understand *ullaged*, and I had to consult a dictionary. There I found that *eullage* in ancient French meant that which is required to fill a bottle, from *euiller*, to fill. This *euiller* is supposed to stand for *olier*, to oil. But why to oil? Because in the South of France and in Italy to the present day oil is poured

into a bottle, instead of corking it. That oil has to be dashed out before the wine is drunk, and a certain amount of wine is lost in that process. That is the *ullage*, and hence the *ullaged* bottle. I doubt whether my wine-merchant knew this, and it is strange that a custom which obtained only in the South of Europe of using oil for closing bottles of wine, should have produced an expression which was used in the North of Europe, where oil was never used for that purpose. That shows how words travel forward and backward over the whole world.

When I was in Cornwall I heard the smoked pilchards called by the people *Fair Maids*. I tried to find out why, and this was the result of my inquiries. These smoked pilchards are largely exported to Genua, and are eaten there during Lent. They are called in Italian *fumada*, smoked fish. The Cornish sailors picked up that word, naturalized it, gave it an intelligible meaning, and thus became, according to their own confession, exporters of fair maids. You see the Odyssey and the adventures of Ulysses are nothing compared with the adventures of our words.

A carpenter once told me that the boards of a box ought to be properly *dowald*. I did not understand what he meant, and it was only when he showed me the actual process that I saw that to *dowal* meant to *dove-tail*, to cut the ends so that they should fit like dove-tails.

Scientific terms are likewise technical terms, only put into Greek or Latin. What can be achieved in the manufacture of such terms may be gathered from the following extract from a book on Botany: *

'Begoniaceae, by their anthero-connectival fabric indicate a close relationship with anonaceo-hydrocharideo-nymphaeoid forms, an affinity confirmed by the serpentarioid flexuoso-nodulous stem, the liriodendroid stipules, and cissoid and victorioid foliage of a certain Begonia; and if considered hypogynous, would in their triquetrous capsule, alate seed, apetalism, and tufted stamination, represent the floral fabric of Nepenthes, itself of aristolochioid affinity, while by its pitchered leaves, directly belonging to Sarracenias and Dionaeas.'

I doubt whether any Englishman, unless he be a botanist by profession, would understand the hidden meaning of these sentences, and though these words have to be admitted into an English dictionary that professes to be complete, they cannot be said to form part of the commonwealth of English undefiled.

If, then we confine our attention to those words which form the real stock in trade of the English language, our task will become much more manageable. Instead of 250,000, we shall have to deal with about 4,000 truly English words, or, if we include all French, Latin, Greek, and Celtic primaries, with 12,350 words, and then ask ourselves once more the question, Whence do they come?

No one can help seeing that even amongst the most ordinary words in English there are some which are very much alike in sound. If these words have also some similarity in meaning, we are justified in supposing that they *may* have a common origin.

Take for instance such words as *to bear*, *burden*, *bier*, and *barrow*. They all have the same constituent element, namely *br*; they all have a meaning connected with bearing or carrying. *Burden* is what is carried; *bier*, what a person is carried on; *barrow*, in wheelbarrow, an implement for carrying things.

No doubt, this is only *prima facie* evidence. We must not forget that we are dealing with a modern language which has passed through many vicissitudes. In order to institute truly scientific comparisons, we should have in each case to trace these words to their Anglo Saxon, or even to their corresponding Gothic forms.

How great the danger is of trusting to mere similarity of sound in modern languages, you will see at once, if you take the last word *barrow*, which means not only a wheelbarrow, but also a burial-mound. We have only to trace this *barrow* back to its Anglo-Saxon form *beorh*, in order to see that it has nothing to do with bearing or carrying, but that it is connected with the Anglo-Saxon *beorgan*, the German *bergen*, to hide, to protect.

But though it is necessary, before we institute comparisons, always to go back to the oldest forms of words which are within our reach, still for practical purposes it suffices if we know that such words as *bear*, *burden*, *bier* and *barrow* have all been proved to come from one common source.

And more than this. As *to bear* is used in many languages in the sense of bearing children, we may safely trace to the same source such English words as *birth*, and *bairn*, a child.

Nay, as the same expression is also used of the earth-bearing fruit, we can hardly be wrong in explaining, for instance, *barley*, as what the earth bears or brings forth. In German *Getreide*, M. H. G. *Getregede*, literally, what is born, has become the name of every kind of corn. If we go back to Anglo-Saxon, we find *bær-lic* for barley, in whlch *lic* is derivative, while *bere* by itself meant barley. In Scotland more particularly *bear* continued to be used for barley, and a coarse kind of barley is still called *bear-barley*. *Barn* also receives its explanation from the same quarter. For *barn* is contracted from *bere-ærn*, which means barley-house, or, as it is also called, bere-flor.

We have thus collected eight words, which all contain one common element, namely *br*, and which

* Marsh, *Lectures on the English Language*, p. 186.

prima facie come from the same source. Their various meanings, as we saw, can likewise be traced back to the one fundamental concept of bearing.

From every one of these words ever so many derivatives may be formed, and have been formed.

Think only of the numerous offspring of *to bear*, and the various meanings that can be conveyed by that one word. We have, to bear up, to bear out, to bear oneself, proud bearing, to bear in mind, to bear with, to forbear; then, to bear down on a person, in the sense of to press hard on him, to bear away, said of a ship that sails away, to lose one's bearings, bearable, unbearable, a bearer, an office-bearer, bearing in the sense of behavior, child-bearing, and many more.

Now you begin to see how thrifty language can be, and what immense results it can achieve with very small means. It starts with a syllable of two consonants, such as *bar*, and out of it, by means of derivatives, it forms a perfect army of words. If we had a hundred such syllables, and derived only forty words from each, we should possess what, as we found, is wanted for carrying on all social and intellectual intercourse, namely 4,000 words.

But now we shall be asked, What are those mysterious syllables? What is, for instance, that *bar*, which we discovered as the kernel of ever so many words?

These syllables have been called *roots*. That is, of course, nothing but a metaphorical expression. What is meant is neither more nor less than what you saw just now as the result of our comparison—namely, what remains of a number of words after we separate the purely formative elements. In *bur-den*, *den* is formative; in *birth*, *th* is formative; in *bairn*, *n* is formative. In *barn*, too, *n* is formative, but it is different from the *n* in *bairn*, because it is really a contraction of *œrn*. *Bere-œrn* meant a place for barley, just as *horsern* meant a place for horses, a stable, *slǽpern*, a sleeping place.*

There remains therefore *bar* with a variable vowel, and this we call a root, or an ultimate element of speech, because it cannot be analyzed any further.

This root *bar*, however, is not an English root. It existed long before English existed, and we find it again in Latin, Greek, Celtic, Slavonic, Zend, and Sanskrit, that is, in all the languages which form what is called the *Aryan family* of speech. As this root *bar* exists in Latin as *fer*, in Greek as *φερ*, in Celtic as *ber*, in Slavonic as *ber*, in Zend as *bar*, and in Sanskrit as bhar, it is clear that it must have existed before these languages separated, and that, as you may imagine, must have been a very, very long time ago.

But you may ask, How did these roots exist? Were they ever independent words, or did they only exist in their derivatives? Of course, it is impossible to answer this question by historical evidence. If anything deserves to be called pre-historic, it is the period of language which precedes the formation of Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. But if we argue by analogy, we may say that as in Chinese, so in this Proto-Aryan language, these roots, without any formative suffixes or prefixes, were probably used by themselves. On the other hand, it is quite true that, as soon as one of these roots was used either as a subject or as a predicate, it had really ceased to be a root in the true sense of that word, and had become a noun, or a verb, or an adjective.

Hitherto, it seems to me, there is nothing difficult, nothing uncertain, nothing mysterious in this process of taking our language to pieces, and separating the radical from the formal elements. It is no more than cracking a nut and separating the kernel from the shell. What the result of this cracking and peeling has been, I shall try to explain to you in my next lecture.

*Morris, *Historical Outlines*, § 322.

METAPHYSICISM.

The main error of metaphysicism is the vicious habit of metaphysical philosophers to start with postulates. They take a very broad abstract idea, such as the "Absolute," or "Being," or "Deity," or "God," or "the Infinite," and consider it an actual reality. Upon this abstract idea they build with more or less ability and boldness a complete system of other abstract ideas, and when it is finished they call it a philosophy. As a matter of course every philosopher builds a philosophy of his own. Why should he not? The building-material of castles-of-air is inexpensive—extremely inexpensive!

Many sensible people have turned their backs upon philosophy because they have discovered the hollowness of purely abstract reasoning, which is to no practical purpose in real life. Yet there is another view of philosophy, which in contradistinction to metaphysicism we call positivism.

Positive philosophy* rejects all kinds of postulates and starts from the positive data of experience. The data of experience are the several states of our consciousness. The elements of our states of consciousness are sensory impressions. A sensory impression fully realized in consciousness is a sensation. Sensations become percepts; many percepts of the same kind become concepts. Thus all the objects or our surroundings are mirrored in their relation toward us, and among themselves in the living substance of our brain. From the concepts of things abstractions are made; and by the help of our abstract thoughts we can recognize the finer relations that interconnect the phe-

*For the difference between Comte's positivism and that here proposed see the author's "Fundamental Problems," p. 173 and p. 75, note.

nomena of nature; we can trace the laws that govern the changes of their forms.

Abstract thought is the instrument of science which opens our eye to a deeper comprehension of the facts of nature. The relations that interconnect the phenomena of nature, and the laws that govern the changes of their forms, are not material things; they are not concrete objects like tables and chairs, yet they are nevertheless realities, they are facts and as such they are of great moment. The form of a thing is the most important part of it. The form of a watch is that which makes it a watch. The metal of which it is wrought is another and, truly, an indispensable, part, yet the metal is only the material of which the watch consists. * Similarly justice is an abstract idea. It designates certain relations among men that are of highest importance. Thus justice is a reality in life, and if there were no justice in our law courts, it would still be a most powerful reality, though it existed merely as an ideal in our hearts. And so the relations among things, as well as persons, as in the instance given of justice, are realities, although we know that they are not materialities.

The meaning of positive philosophy is, that it requires every idea, every concept, every abstract thought to be legitimatized. If ideas have not originated from the data of experience, if there is no reality corresponding to them, they have no right to exist; and we are consequently entitled to treat them as mere illusions.

One great advantage of the positive method is that we can never forget, while adhering to it, the origin of abstract ideas. Existence, Cosmical Being, the Infinitude, Gravitation, Natural Laws, Virtue, God, etc., are abstracts; they are symbols for certain generalizations and qualities of, or relations among, concrete things. Considered as abstracts, they are invaluable possessions of our mind; considered as concrete things, they lead to self contradictions.

Metaphysical philosophers are often awe-stricken at their inability to explain their possession of abstract ideas, and think they have come by them through divine inspiration. There are not a few who expect to find in reality some concrete thing that is infinite†; they enquire for the gravitating force behind the falling stone; and when, in their search, they get beyond their depth, the problem is declared insolvable. Facts may be as clear as a mountain-brook; they step into the brook, make its waters muddy, and then declare that it can never be clarified. It is painful to read, for instance, Mr. Spencer's expositions on motion, time, and space. He confounds the issues of his disquisition, and when he arrives at the conclusion "all is unknowable," "all is inscrutable," he seems not to be aware of the fact, that this result is the reflection of his own confusion.

We can not consider as data of experience every assertion made by a visionary dreamer. We must suspect all assertions of so-called facts that stand in contradiction to other facts. The data of experience are such facts only that under the same conditions can be ascertained by every one, and can be re-ascertained and verified by experiment.

Positive philosophy seems to start with a poor capital; yet its foundation is solid, and in former publications of this journal we have tried to develop some of the spiritual treasures which it yields. We found that neither religion, nor art, nor science, lost aught of their dignity by being deprived of their metaphysical tinsel crowns, which were wrongly deemed their most valuable ornaments.

It is commonly supposed that from the positive view all ideals disappear, that all higher and spiritual life vanishes. This is not so, and it has been our earnest endeavor to show that such concepts as God and Soul, Morality, Freedom, Responsibility, and Immortality, are deepened in their meaning. In so far as they are recognized as realities, they grow immensely in importance. In positive philosophy ethics finds for the first time a scientific basis.

Positivism is that view which is to supersede the idealism as well as the materialism of former ages; for it contains that which is true in both, avoiding their common errors. Positivism is the boldest and most radical philosophy that has ever been propounded, yet at the same time it is the only practical philosophy. From the cloud-land of metaphysics it turns our minds toward the duties of real life. It is based on facts; and it is a systematic arrangement of facts. The purpose of philosophy will be found in its being a guide for man's conduct in life; it becomes the basis of ethics and is thus again applied to facts.

Positive philosophy recognizes no revelation, no intuition, no mysticism, no agnosticism; it deals with facts and with facts only. On facts it builds its ideals; and its religion rests upon a scientific basis.

Metaphysicism is a disease of philosophy, and it is indeed a fatal disease, for it leads straightway into the realm of the mystic Unknowable where all philosophy is at an end.

When a metaphysical philosopher descends from the cloud-land of metaphysics toward earth in order to apply his postulates to the realities of life, he becomes entangled into innumerable contradictions wherever he appears with his metaphysical principles. But a

* There is no mystery in the changes and in the new creations of form. We may say that the watch existed potentially even before it was invented; thus the organized life of organisms existed potentially in the non-organized substances before their combination. Yet there is no necessity, as Mr. Wake suggests in the essay of this number, "God in Evolution," for resorting to the supposition of a divine personality who created and preconceived the origin of organized life upon earth.

* The Problem of Infinitude is discussed in "Fundam'l Problems," p. 169.

metaphysical philosopher is never dismayed. As soon as the public gets accustomed to the strange names of his metaphysical principles, he calls them philosophical truths and declares them to be absolute. From their disagreement with the facts of reality he concludes that they are unknowable. They are like God whom no one can see and live. People then bow down in silent reverence and our philosopher returns to the aërial heights, where he disappears glorified in the celestial fog of mysticism.

Metaphysicism is often decked out with many facts of the natural sciences. We must, however, be severe in drawing the color-line sharply. The various metaphysical systems may be different in style and grandeur, they may be different in name, and the borrowed plumage of natural science may be more or less brilliant, but in their principle one is exactly like the other; they are built upon the foundation of mere abstractions to which no reality corresponds and they end as a natural consequence in contradictions which are not so much concealed as masked under the pretense of profundity. The credulous multitude is told that they have got into problems so deep, that they are insolvable. The contradictions of such systems, then, are openly paraded as the Unknowable, the Incomprehensible, the Inscrutable, the Inexplicable, or even the Mysterious and the Occult.

It is the rock of positive facts on which the proud galleys of metaphysicism strike before they sink into the realm of the Unfathomable. The ship that there founders, is irredeemably wrecked. P. C.

DEITY AND THE UNIVERSE.—A CONTROVERSY.

I. GOD IN EVOLUTION.

BY C. STANILAND WAKE.

ALL thoughtful minds, or, shall I say, all thoughtful minds that are freed from the fetters of an effete theology, have ceased to believe in the existence of a Being who created all things out of nothing, and who rules the world as an absolute monarch, guided by the dictates of his own will. Such a being was formerly intended by the term "God," but that is not the sense in which it is now usually employed. The "creative" God of ancient mythology is rightly discarded, and yet the idea of a divine Something in the universe is by no means abandoned by modern philosophers. Even the Positivist followers of Auguste Comte, who founded the so-called "religion of humanity," have an object of worship in the Grand-Etre, which comprises the whole of organic nature on this earth. This cult is in reality, however, based on what is now called "agnosticism," although Agnostics, unlike Positivists admit the existence of Divine Being in the universe, while affirming that we can know nothing of its nature. Mr. Fiske, the authorized expounder of Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy, asserts that "*there exists a POWER to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can know only through those manifestations.*"* He goes further and declares that "the law of gravitation is but an expression of a particular mode of Divine action," adding, "and what is true of one law is true of all laws."* This view of Cosmism even assumes a theological aspect, by affirming that "obedience to the so called 'laws of nature,' which are the decrees of God, is therefore the fundamental principle of religion viewed practically."† Finally. Mr. Fiske declares that Cosmism "assigns to religion the same place which it has always occupied, and affirms that the religious sentiment must find satisfaction in the future, as in the past, in the recognition of a Power which is beyond Humanity, and upon which Humanity depends. The existence of God—denied by Atheism and ignored by Positivism—is the fundamental postulate upon which Cosmism bases its synthesis of scientific truth."‡

These words appear to go a long way towards making of Cosmism a religious system in the highest sense Let us see, however, what is the nature of the Being, to whom it applies the term "God." As opposed to the Pantheistic hypothesis, Cosmism implies that "while the universe is the manifestation of Deity, yet is Deity something more than the universe."§ It is that "Something which underlies and determines the series of changes which constitutes our consciousness"; Absolute Being, that is "existence independent of the conditions of the process of knowing"; the "inexpugnable persistence in consciousness" which is meant by *Reality*, and therefore the "Reality of Realities."‖ And yet, although Absolute Being has an objective existence, the doctrine of relativity requires it to be that of an "Unknowable Reality."¶ We cannot get outside of our minds, so as to know anything beyond states of consciousness, and therefore "the Deity, in so far as absolute and infinite, is inscrutable by us."** At the very utmost we can say only that the intimate essence of the Inscrutable Existence "may conceivably be identifiable with the intimate essence of which we know as mind,"†† but not with mind itself.‡‡ Matter and Force are mere symbols which stand for "certain generalized modes of Divine manifestation."§§ The ultimate teaching of Cosmism on this subject is, that when we speak of Absolute Existence as Deity, we use a purely symbolic term for a Something, whose existence is known through the phenomena of nature, but whose being is inscrutable, and, therefore, absolutely unknowable. We are thus taken by the Cosmic philosophy even further back than the "Unknown God" of the ancients; a by no means satisfactory conclusion

Agnosticism is founded on the supposed relativity of our knowledge of nature, that is, our knowledge of things is only as they exist in relation to our intelligence, and not as they exist independently of it. Berkeley long since asserted, if not proved, that the objects of knowledge are identical with ideas, and that, as we have no idea of an object but as it is perceived, objects exist to us only in the perception of them. This conclusion is declared to be incontrovertible, and yet it is rejected by nearly all modern thinkers in favor of the actual existence of objects outside of our consciousness, although in what mode we cannot know. This conclusion will come to be regarded as equally false with that of Berkeley, and it will be recognized that what we know is real, although not the whole of the Reality. It is usual to assert that the qualities of objects are merely names for different modes in which our consciousness is affected. I maintain, however, that sight and touch together give perfectly reliable information, not only of the existence of external objects, but of their fundamental qualities which are now generally regarded as expressions of internal movements

* Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 414 The italics are Mr. Fiske's.

* Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 428.
† Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 465
‡ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 184.
§ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 424.
‖ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 87.
¶ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 91.
** Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I, p 15-17
†† Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 446.
‡‡ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 88.
§§ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 430.

in the bodies themselves. In effect, we know external objects as having form, that is extension, and resistance, or degrees of hardness, and also as having certain forces, the action of which under proper conditions gives us the consciousness of other qualities, all which constitutes an external actuality of which consciousness gives us a real, and not merely a relative knowledge.

This conclusion appears to me to be required even by Mr. Spencer's own statement that the "inexpugnable persistence in consciousness" is evidence of the existence of something which underlies all phenomena, internal and external, which something is the Reality of Realities. Absolute Existence, or Deity, is, therefore, in, or at the back of, human consciousness, through which it sees its own manifestations in the external world. We must suppose that this Being is cognizant of self in the phenomena of external nature. But how could this be so, if only a confused or distorted image is conveyed through the human organism? This organism may be compared to a camera, through the lens of which nature can be made to perfectly represent itself on the sensitive plate, but not more perfectly than through the lens of the eye on the retina and the brain. If the so-called Absolute Existence knows the external reality through the human organism, so also must the relative existence of which it is the expression. The knowledge in this case is limited, but so far as it extends it must be correct. The *thing* we know to exist, and although some of its qualities may be known to us only as states of consciousness, yet these, as conditions of a mind which derives its existence from the totality of being underlying all phenomena, must give, when they have been properly tested and arranged by the judgment, a true knowledge of external realities. The contrary opinion, which is opposed to common sense and experience, is a negative which can never be proved. To a philosopher in his study, or even in the presence of the ordinary phenomena of external nature, all our knowledge may appear to be resolvable into states of consciousness, but not to him who uses the qualities of matter or directs the forces of nature for working out some great or useful design. The sculptor or artist cannot give outward form to his thought in states of consciousness, nor can the engineer who tunnels under mountains or bridges arms of the sea. The discoveries of science, and their application in the manufacture and formation of works of art, are not consistent with the view that external phenomena are not truly represented in consciousness, whatever may be said of astronomy or any other science as the formulation of the laws of nature.

The view here taken is practically that of Monism. According to this philosophy, "the division of the world into knowable things, as appearing in their operations, and into absolutely unknowable things held to exist behind or in phenomena, is an untenable and self-contradictory dualism." Everything is part only of the All, and "every natural process is only an aspect of the entire indivisible existence of the Universe."* There is, however, one feature of Monism which, as a philosophy of Evolution, it possesses equally with Cosmism, and which appears to me to constitute the weakness of both systems Dr. Paul Carus affirms that we must consider life in its broadest sense as an immanent property of matter, and that "nature is one great and living whole of which man is a part—such a part as contains in its form the quintessence of nature's life."

The theory of evolution requires, therefore, that the protoplasm of organic bodies should have been in the past, if it is not now, capable of formation out of inorganic matter. The meaning of this is that, from a material which has a certain spontaneity of motion, that is motion without being acted on from without, and nothing more, should be made a substance which, in its simplest separate form, the protoplasmic amœba, has almost every function exhibited by animals vastly higher in the scale of organization. That is, it "is capable of finding, seizing, devouring, digesting and assimilating food, has a special provision for collecting fluid and pumping it out of its body, respires by its whole surface, moves about apparently where it will, exhibits a sensibility to tactile impressions, and reacts in all probability to smell, if not to sound and light." Such a work might well be considered hopeless, and although many attempts have been made to establish spontaneous generation or *abiogenesis*, as a fact, it is now fully recognized that every living thing is evolved from a particle of living matter. It is true that the evolution hypothesis requires that it should not always have been so. For, as a late writer on the subject says, "by the hypothesis, the condition of the globe was at one time such that living matter could not have existed on it, life being entirely incompatible with the gaseous state." Prof. Huxley, when speaking of evolution, remarks, however, that "while the course of modern investigation has only brought out into greater prominence the accuracy of Harvey's conception of the nature and mode of development of germs, it has as distinctly tended to disprove the occurrence of equivocal generation, or abiogenesis, in the present course of nature." He adds, "in the immense majority of plants and animals it is certain that the germ is not merely a body in which life is dormant or potential, but that it is simply a detached portion of the substance of a pre-existing living body; and the evidence has yet to be adduced which will satisfy any cautious observer that *omne vivum ex vivo* is not as well established a law of the existing course of nature as *omne vivum ex ovo*."

It has been said that the biologist should regard the qualities including structure and composition) of protoplasm as the expression of internal movements, the organic body being like a fountain, which is always the same, although fresh water is ever rising and falling. This analogy is not perfect, however, as apart from the question of the origin of the motion of the water, the fluid which circulates in the protoplasm is changed by its living action. The organized substance is necessary to the existence of the movements to which the qualities of protoplasm are due, and therefore its own existence has to be first explained. But if it is not possible to form living from not-living matter, except through the agency of matter already living, it is easy to reduce this to a lifeless condition, and in so doing to resolve into the forces of inorganic matter that which constitutes its vitality. The passage which is so easy and direct from the organic to the inorganic, can be accomplished in the other direction only through the agency of an organism, and we are justified, therefore, in assuming that that which constitutes the organic is an ultimate fact in nature. Otherwise, we must admit the gigantic assumption that the order of nature has been changed since the first appearance of life on the earth. There is another feature possessed in common by Cosmism and Monism which has not yet been satisfactorily established That man is the crown of the animal kingdom, and that the development of his organic structure is the result of the continuance of the process of evolution, which has proceeded from the lowest form in the scale of being, cannot be denied. At the same time it has been pointed out by Mr. A. R. Wallace, who equally with Mr. Darwin, is entitled to the credit of formulating the theory of natural selection, that this is not sufficient alone to account for the superiority of man's mental faculties. On this subject I certainly accept Mr. Wallace's conclusion, and if this is well founded, the appearance of man on the earth cannot be explained solely by the accepted theory of evolution. It is another phase of the difficulty which is created by the impossibility of deriving organized from inorganic matter, and it can only be got over in one way, that is, by looking upon nature itself as in some sense an organic existence.

Monism regards nature as alive, but the beginning of life, according to its teaching, is the so-called spontaneous motion, exhibited by matter, which is supposed to have developed to its

* "Fundamental Problems," by Dr. Paul Carus, p. 153.

highest form in the human will.* Monism does not believe in the existence of an unknowable Absolute Being, seeing that what exists must manifest itself somehow, and that "all existence can at least indirectly be or become an object of cognition."† Dr. Carus defines God as the "Ethical Life of Nature," by which he understands "the order of the world that makes harmony, evolution, aspiration, and morality possible." Thus, the God of Monism "is no transcendental thing, existing of itself, enthroned above the clouds; he is immanent, and lives in the hearts of men as their good-will, their honor, their conscience, their ideal, or however else we may please to distinguish it."‡ This is a more satisfactory conclusion than that arrived at by Cosmism, as it applies to the divine order, intelligence, and morality,§ and enables us to know God as existing in nature, and particularly in man, the highest product of its evolution. To me, however, the foundation of Monism is not sufficient to support its superstructure. Taken as a method of unifying knowledge, that is, as "the formal principle of unity," monism is the true philosophy, but the addition of form to matter and energy will not explain the spirituality of the world, and especially of man, unless this principle already exists in nature.

What neither Monism nor Cosmism accounts for is the existence of the organic form, whether specialized as amœba or man, and I do not see how this can be explained unless the universe itself, and therefore God as nature, is organic; not as having special organs or senses, but as possessing the attributes on which organization depends. Surely that from which the protoplasm, with its varied functions, has been derived, must possess at least the qualities displayed by its lowest amœboid form! Mr. Spencer may be correct in affirming that the terms "intelligence" and "volition" are not fitted to describe the psychological attributes of Deity.‖ In this case we cannot ascribe to Him mental states similar to those by which our consciousness is affected to give rise to the conception of qualities and states of matter. But this would not preclude consciousness of matter in some other mode. If, indeed, as Cosmism affirms, "the universe of phenomena is the multiform manifestation" of Deity, the phenomena which give rise in the mind to the conception of matter must be part of such manifestation, and the consciousness by Deity of that which underlies them would be an act of self-consciousness. The developments of consciousness depend on the organism in which they manifest themselves. Hence, we cannot expect the lower animals to display the same intelligence as man, nor the protozoa as animals which possess organs of special sense. But Dr. Michael Foster affirms that "the doctrine of evolution compels us to admit that consciousness must be potentially present in the simple protoplasm of the amœba." If, however, a lump of protoplasm possesses the sensitiveness to irritation and the power of responding to it, which are the beginnings of consciousness, we ought to attribute these properties to that from which the sensitive organism has been derived. Living substance may exist in a condition vastly more refined than the form in which it is known to us, and such a refined substance would possess a sensitiveness far transcending anything we can imagine. It would instinctively respond to the most subtle impressions, and its spontaneity would result in the motion which gives rise to the forces of nature, the manifestations of which, as the expression of divine being, must partake of its own reality. All animated creatures would be its organs, through which to perceive and act upon nature. But who shall say this Being cannot be self-conscious, and therefore directly conscious of its own manifestations in the universe, and be able to affect them through direct volition! It is this Existence, Infinite in space and time, and immanent throughout nature, to which I would ascribe the tide of God. This sentient Being is the true Divine Order which pervades the universe, and guides the evolution of organic nature from the earliest phase of the protoplasmic substance to man, and constitutes the laws of his intellectual and moral consciousness. Such a Being must have a personality, but this will differ from the individuality of man as far as this does from the individuality of the protozoa. His personality is boundless as a sphere of which the circumference is nowhere and the centre everywhere, or wherever the divine consciousness may be focused in the ever-vibrating ether which forms the boundless sphere. The Argus-eyed deity of the ancients was the starry heavens, and this notion may possibly contain more truth than it is usually credited with. The Divine Existence may be said to view Himself and His manifestations through the myriad of stars, each of which is a centre of life and light, and the totality of which fitly represents the Being who is the infinite life and light of the universe. This thought has, however, a higher application. Dr. Alexander Wilder, when speaking of "unconscious cerebration," has well said, "there is an ocean, so to express it, of pure reason which permeates and includes all living intelligences. . . . . We are all in it and pervaded by it through all our mind It reveals itself wherever the conceit of knowledge which proceeds from ignorance is dispelled. The consciousness is above our sense-perception, and hence whatever brain-agency may be associated with it, is wholly inceptive. . . . . It is the partaking of the Universal Intelligence, as our corporeal organism is a partaking of the universal nature. For it matter has no obstruction, space no limit, time no measurement,—not, however, because it "transcends them all," but because it *is* them all, since without it they could not exist.

A writer in the Ency. Brit.* affirms that "it is not so much on grounds of fact and experiment the defenders of the Abiogenesis theory are convinced of its truth, as because it seems to gain confirmation from reasonings of much wider scope; because abiogenesis aids the theory of evolution by tracing the organic into the inorganic; because it fosters the increasing unpopularity of the hypothesis of a special 'vital force'; because, if this theory of the perpetual origination of low forms of life, now, as in all past epochs, were established, it would agree well with the principle of uniformity, and by disclosing the existence of unknown worlds of material for development would release natural selection with its assistant causes from what many consider the too Herculean labor of evolving all species from one or a very few primary forms." Apart from the difficulty, that it is declared by competent authority not to be known to the present course of nature, Abiogenesis can be dispensed with if the view of the Cosmos, I have advocated, is true. This Monism supplies a logical basis in nature for both the organic and the inorganic, without the necessity of deriving one from the other, and it furnishes substance amply sufficient in quantity and vitality to satisfy the fullest wants of that orderly evolution, which uses natural selection as one of its instruments, and ensures uniformity throughout. The original gaseous state of the globe, which is said to have been incompatible with the presence of life, would create no difficulty; for that would be merely a local phase of the activity of the universal existence, which would give the first seeds of life when the earth was fitted for their reception. Prof. Ray Lankester, in his work on the lowest forms of animal life, remarks that "we are led to entertain the paradox that though the animal is dependent on the plant for its food, yet the animal preceded the plant in evolution, and we look among the lower Protozoa, and not among the lower Protophyta, for the nearest representatives of that first protoplasm which was the result of a long and gradual evolution of chemical structure, and the starting-point of the development of organic forms." The existence of the first

*Carus, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
† Carus, *op. cit*, p. 155.
‡ Carus, *op. cit.*, p. 152; The Idea of God, p. 19.
§ Carus, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
‖ Fiske, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 450.

* *Art.* "Abiogenesis."

protoplasm may be granted but not the origin thus assigned for it, which has no support but the supposed necessities of the theory of evolution. It was the earliest to appear, because the protoplasmic was the simplest state in which organic form could be crystalized, so to say, from the waters of the abyss, under the primal conditions of the habitable globe.

Dr. Carus offers an explanation of the failure of scientists to produce organisms artificially, based on the idea that all organized life is the result of memory. He says, "our most powerful microscopes, even if they were a thousand times improved, would be still insufficient to discover even the grossest vestiges that constitute, in protoplasm, the physiological aspect of memory." Moreover, if a living substance which would present the traces of memory were produced, "we should be in possession of the mere potentiality of organized life. In order to produce an organism as low in the scale of life as a moner, we would have to expose it to all the irritations and experiences through which the moner has naturally passed, and we are not sure as to how many thousand years are required for this process, and whether, if it were artificially abbreviated, the same results could be attained."* This may explain why we cannot create a moner, but it does not account for the impossibility of forming such a simple phase of living substance as that which, according to Prof. Ray Lankester, must have existed before the evolution of the lowest type of vegetable organism. Dr. Carus adds, "it is a very strange fact that protoplasm, being a very complex compound, exhibits in its first stage a singular sameness wherever it is found." This, he thinks, indicates, that "the solution of the problem must be looked for in the structure (*i. e.*, the form) of protoplasm," but it points also to the conclusion that this structure has remained constant since its first appearance, and, therefore, that if it cannot now be artificially produced in its simplest form, it never could be thus produced in the past.

In conclusion, the error of the Cosmic philosophy is in distinguishing too sharply between what it terms absolute and relative existence, as that of Pantheism is in identifying them too closely We must conceive of Deity as embracing numberless objects, organic and inorganic, each of which has a real existence of its own, because forming part of Divine Reality, whose existence, on the other hand, is independent of those objects, and would continue although they all ceased to exist. This is the true mean between the *materialism* which asserts that there is no such being as spirit, that all objects are merely the result of the development or activity of matter under special conditions, matter alone being eternal, and the *idealism* which affirms that objects are nothing but ideas, having their origin in the eternal spirit, who alone has real existence. Even Prof. Hæckel, who is usually described as a materialist, endorses the idea of a divine Something in the universe. He says: "This monistic idea of God, which belongs to the future, has already been expressed by Giordano Bruno in the following words: 'A spirit exists in all things, and no body is so small but contains a part of the divine substance within itself, by which it is animated.'" Dr. Richard Westbrook characterizes this as an "astounding confession," and truly remarks from the theistic standpoint, "that this world is not dead matter, but is wonderfully alive because there is a living spirit within it."† True Monism declares the existence of a Universal and Infinite Spirit, whose restless energy is the life of nature, and who manifests his being in the orderly evolution of the objective world, the forms of which depend on the conditions under which the divine force acts through and around them, and their forces on the forms in and through which they operate. If I were asked to give a cosmical illustration of the Deity, I would liken Him to the mysterious all-pervading light, which possesses the properties of heat, luminosity, and actinism, as well as the prismatic colors, a trinary, and at the same time a septennary, combination in unity, which is probably reproduced throughout all the provinces of natural phenomena, and which was predicated of the Universal Spirit by religious philosophers, it may be through the observation of nature, ages before the advent of Christianity.

* *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

† "Man—Whence and Whither," p. 97.

II. SLANDERING THE UNIVERSE.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

On the outskirts of a country settlement nothing is more wretched, forlorn, and woe-begone than "the haunted house." The doors are locked, but the urchins who carried off the fences for fire-wood, have shied stones through every pane of glass, whence strange noises and lights are wont to make night hideous and appall the belated traveler. No one can be even hired to live in it. For who can tell what may happen with a spook for a co-tenant?

When the gossips, therefore, report that a house *is* haunted that is the end of its practical utility and value. To falsely so report, therefore, is to slander the owner out of his property, and to give it over to the realm of ghosts—no longer to be the safe and comfortable home for man.

What the gossips have been doing for the haunted house, the priests of spook-religions have been doing from time immemorial for the Universe. They have declared it to be haunted, and have tortured, terrified, and robbed mankind out of their wits, and often out of their last cent, under the pretense of establishing liveable relations with our ghostly co-tenants or *co-tenant*. Scientific people have always been pointing out that neither the house nor the Universe were really haunted; that there was really no evidence of the existence of spooks in either; that the whole spook-business was the illusion of children and the childhood of our race—when illusions and fears made the gods. In this way science had pretty well exorcised ghosts out of civilized people; fewer houses were haunted: and even the priests had defined away their chief-ghost so that it was hardly worth while to placate him, and having thus hurt their own business, they were on the outlook for more useful work.

But a new ghostly Hierophant has appeared upon the scene, and strange to say in the name of science, evolution, and the "Unknowable." Herbert Spencer, John Fiske, and others have beckoned back the whole departing brood of flitting spirits to their old rookeries. There is not a defender of ignorance and superstition from one end of the world to the other, but is basking in this Spencerian dusk, and dreaming that his "twilight of the gods" may deepen into the good old night again, when gods and devils, ghosts and ghouls by their "grace" or ban, enabled one small part of mankind to deceive, defraud, rob, and oppress the rest "for *their* good."

Various churches, priests, and various societies, authors, lecturers, etc., are therefore coquetting very pleasantly with Mr. Spencer and his "Unknowable," and especially do they lovingly pat John Fiske on the back for his discovery (?) that this "Unknowable" 'wells up' as, or in, human consciousness, and is also the "reality" back of all phenomena; thus identifying this big Unknowable with consciousness itself, and so by one fell swoop bespooking the whole Universe and also every single thing in it! Thus, in the name of science, we are landed in the original Fetichism, which, according to "poor deluded" August Comte, it has taken humanity so many centuries to grow out of—a useless progress. Not a medicine-man nor a rain-maker who does not logically owe a vote of thanks to the authors of the Synthetic and Cosmic Philosophies, and the reason they do not send them on is, because, like Virgil's Farmers, they "do not know their own good things."

It is time to bring this new variety of dualistic spookism to the test of science and logic, and it matters little where or with whom it is begun.

On the 22d of November, 289, before the Liberal Club (No. 220 East Fifteenth St.,) of New York City, Mr. *C. Staniland Wake* a well known English author and thinker, delivered a lecture upon "God in Evolution," which used the name of science and evolution to present the "well up" theory of consciousness aforesaid, and ended in a "Divine Something" which made "the spirituality of the world and of man," and which was a "Divine Consciousness" of the Universe This is slandering the universe in declaring it haunted by a spook.

In reply to this lecture the writer made a ten minutes speech which is condensed and sent herewith.

The speech was as follows :

Mr President:—The audience has heard one of the best statements and defences of modern Spencerian dualism and consequent spookism ever made. Its point is to knock the bottom out of every thing and fill the vacancy by a conscious ghost, and this is done in the name of science ! Now science has not been shown to warrant any such conclusion ; the very facts and laws of science referred to plainly give it a negative.

The case is very simple ;—unless we wish to confuse it, as most of us do. This desire and bias are the results of hereditary instincts which incline us to anything mysterious. As old Gœthe said :

> "Is it then so great a secret what God
> And the world and man may be ? No.
> But no one hears it willingly. So a
> Secret it remains."

Most true ! But it is now an "open secret," which there is no propriety in mystifying. In the proper sense there is no mystery. There are simply limits to our capacities, and as we enlarge the circle of knowledge, its enlarging circumference touches more and more that is open to become known—that is all. But within the circle of the known there is now enough clearly made out to "lay" all the ghosts that ever walked or haunted either house or Universe.

To begin with : The world is plainly inorganic in its great mass of matter forming stars, suns, and planets. On the surface of our earth only do we find organized matter manifesting life. That other stars or planets have this organic matter, we can now only guess to be probable.

First, then, does the *inorganic* or simple form of matter give any evidence of life, spirit, or consciousness ? We know it in five forms, *viz.*, a solid, viscid, or colloid, *i. e.*, jelly form, and liquid, gaseous, and ethereal. Now let us have some evidence that any inorganic form of matter exhibits consciousness, or let us have silence. There is no scientific pretense of the kind. Matter does not choose or think, as far as is known.

Second. As to the organized forms on our earth's surface. It is well known that they are all the results of the action and reaction of one of the viscid, colloid, or jelly forms of matter called *protoplasm*, which is the common physical basis of all life, animal or plant. Let us have some evidence that life or consciousness exists without protoplasm ? There is none, and until it comes, there is no evidence that life or consciousness exists, except at the bottom of the air and water-ocean that surrounds our planet, and in which only, as far as we now know, the conditions and materials necessary to the existence of protoplasm and life and consciousness can be found.

But it is said that we don't know how life comes about in protoplasm. In its finest details perhaps not—but in substance the process is known and given in every biology up to date, for instance in Hæckel's "Descent of Man," Vol. I, p. 156. Inorganic matter, like crystals, increase by aggregation from without. Viscid matter grows within and through its mass by the infiltration or capillar attraction (*Osmosis*) of assimilative materials, which is also itself colloid, or liquid, or gaseous. Growth is determined by and on lines of infiltration, electrical and chemical attraction and affinity ; so that changes of form and motion result. Then the little organisms secrete skins, coverings, etc and finally chlorophyl ; and then plant-life begins *from* animals, reversing the old notion that plants were first evolved

This the lecturer has well shown, and quoted from Prof. E. Ray Lankester's masterly article on *Protozoa* in the last Encyclopedia Britannica.

Now there is no *mystery* about all this. . Life is as plainly the natural action and reaction of these protoplasmic organisms as the fall of a stone is natural from the hand that drops it.

But, it is said, that does not explain consciousness ! Why not ? In THE OPEN COURT, which lies before me, (Nov. 14, 1889,) and in his well-known work on the *Evolution of Mind*, Prof. George J. Romanes points out how and where consciousness comes about in these little organisms and really begins. It is the strain between attractions and changes which brings into play what we call choice. When this strain becomes lessened by use or heredity, the act or choice becomes unconscious, instinctive, and automatic. As walking is a constant strain to the child, but not to the man. Dr. Binet does not assent or dissent in regard to this solution in his critical article in the same paper.

Much, of course, remains to be learned about these delicate processes. But there is no question left but that feeling and consciousness are but results of, and attendants upon, modes of activity of the vital processes, and, therefore, as natural to living protoplasm, as contractility or any other of its properties. Having been thus scientifically discovered in its real origin and true nature, all higher and human manifestations of it are questions of degree and complexity, not of kind or substance. That really ends the story. We have found out how life and consciousness come about, just as we have discovered how water comes about. Water might come in some other way than by the chemical union of oxygen and hydrogen, but the discovery that it does so come, ends the question. Life, feeling, consciousness, and mind might be something else than the results of, and attendants upon, the action and reflex action of protoplasmic bodies. But the discovery that they do so come, leaves the objector in the position of trying to show water without H and O, or a headache without a head !

The world-order is therefore plain, *viz.*: The inorganic matter, (Gœthe said on the seashore,) where earth, water, and air join, produces many varieties of colloids. Protoplasm is one of them ; the nitrogenous carbon (N, C, O, H, P, S,), which grows by "intussusception" as above described The adaptation of this process to the conditions of the environment gives the solid foundation to the process that evolves through twenty-two or more stages till the feeling, consciousness, thought, and will of Humanity blossom out as the real thought of the knowable world, *The Universe*, and is the most wonderful and precious process known.

"O," but it is replied, "we don't know it all ! There is no sense in supposing that the infinite universe can have no other thinking apparatus than the little, trivial, insignificant, human race naturally evolved !" That appeal to our ideas of dignity, size, etc , had a good set down, when the Copernican Astronomy showed that our earth was the third-rate planet of a third-rate spotted sun. Biology shows that life, feeling, consciousness, mind, etc., are simply protoplasmic strains and hesitations,—a choosing effort more or less effectual, to appropriate and equilibrate a changing environment. Its repeated success turns consciousness and will into the smooth and sure action of instinct and automatism. The rest of the world has been going *forever*, who can say that it is unable to go without the limitations, hesitation, choice, and folly of thinking ? Or that the little thinking the human race has been *forced* to do, is not enough ? Thought is a big thing for man, but it would be wholly needless and out of place in the solar system ; and, if the Milky Way, much more the whole world had to think—we can-

not think of the result! Let us have no more of this anthropomorphic nonsense.

But next we are told that the world is a *dualism* made up of *phenomena* and *noumena*, which latter is mind or thought. Old Gœthe pointed out the nonsense of these words. There is no in, nor outside, in or to the world: the centre is everywhere, the circumference no where. In perception we do the feeling and thinking, which are results of facts or changes, resting upon a line of correlations which we may follow to the extent of our capacity even into infinity, without a glimpse of *noumena*. Our thoughts, in a word, are the knowable results of changes in our environment, and not the shade of a thought, ghost, or spook is implied in that natural transaction. Spencer uses the word phenomenon as an appearance, a sham, with a ghost behind it for a reality. Gœthe, Comte and the monists use it as a *happening*, a *fact*, a *reality*—not a spook.

But, finally, the law of the equivalence and correlation of forces cannot have even a *thinkable* exception. The world is made up of correlations, which we cannot think otherwise than as unlimited and infinite. There is then no time, place, or mode for a spook to exist *outside* of the world, or within it. As above pointed out, science not only negatives the hypothesis, but shows how the belief that there could be a spook to haunt any place or time, arose out of ignorance and illusions of the childhood of man and his race, and that the name of science should no longer be used to sustain the delusion. Think not that this is merely a matter of names or of idle speculation. The fundamental mistake here determines whether MAN lives *in* a haunted world-house or not—whether *for* a lot of imaginary spooky co-tenants and their ministers, or for the world, as his God, for his race, as his Christ, and for himself, as the only conscious thought and minister of both!

SONNET.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

How often nature mocks us when we grieve.
  How small we are, how small to bear the pain,
  The burden of the sorrow that has lain
So heavily, so long without reprieve.
We bear it and we pass it, when we leave,
  To those who still have strength and who remain.
  They bear it and they pass it, but in vain—
For none deliver less than they receive.

Just as it was that day four years ago!
The calm glad Alps as then are white with snow,
  The tinted Estérel all shadowy;
The same fruit ripens in the groves below;
  The silent shore still listens to the sea,
  And still the sun shines on eternally!

La Croix des Gardes, Cannes, 1880.

CORRESPONDENCE.

METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I RESPECTFULLY ask leave to offer a few observations on your article in the issue of December 12th on "The Modesty of Agnosticism."

If I may be pardoned the egotism, I wish to explain to you my position first. Being challenged to controversy, some years ago, by young student friends—Atheists, Agnostics, Protestants—I came to understand them and their thoughts.

I was trained before that, by my Jesuit professors, to have only kindly sympathy for those who differ in religion from me. But that idea was first expressed for me in words to suit me, when I read Lacordaire's conferences. He expressed much greater sympathy with those who were constructionists, who sought to edify, to build up, who were not destructionists pure and simple. Such I think expresses the distinction between Agnostics and all others. The Agnostics are destructionists pure and simple. The Monists are constructionists. Therefore I think the Monists are entitled to more sympathetic criticism.

You disclaim the credit of being a metaphysician. But you say, "Real existence is real by manifesting itself." This is certain. You are certain of it by the highest or most intense certainty; just as you are certain that "a thing cannot both be and not be." Yet this certainty is metaphysical certainty. In fact you prove yourself a most skillful metaphysician. Again, where I affirm absolute existence and you deny it, we enter the domain of metaphysics together. (1)

But your proposition above might be taken to imply that real existence is not real *until* it manifests itself. But it is real existence before we exist, real before we comprehend, understand, know, or even become aware of its existence in the slightest degree. (2)

Truth does not derive its force from the assent of men. Truth is truth whether men assent to it or not. Truth is the reality of things. (3)

You say "Therefore existence is always knowable." True, but not always such as we can understand, much less comprehend.

We know immediately that a thing cannot both be and not be; we know other things by the senses; and again we know other things by logical conclusion from first principles.

From thought we know intelligence, from intelligence, the intelligible, from that real being, then contingent being, then necessary and Eternal Being. When you kindly explore to me the parts and action of my brain, I am interested, filled with wonder, and obliged to you. But in the very expression "my brain" you convince me that my brain is one thing, and I am quite another. My brain and my body are instruments given me for my sole use, and form, with *me*, my individuality or personality. (4)

MICHAEL CORCORAN.

[(1) Concerning the use and meaning of the word Metaphysics see "Fundamental Problems," page 74, et seqq. As it is used by Kant, there is no objection to the term. He makes it equivalent to purely formal knowledge.

[(2) Existence is real by manifesting itself somehow. It need not manifest itself to *me*. A pebble on the surface of the moon, which perhaps no living creature has ever seen, manifests its existence by a pressure upon the moon, a reflection of sunbeams, and in innumerable other ways. It is real in so far as it is or can become an object of experience. (See "Fundamental Problems," p. 254, definition of Reality.)

[(3) Truth is not the reality of things; truth is the congruence of man's conception with the reality of things.

[(4) Your brain is not one thing and you quite another. Your brain is a part of yourself.—ED.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

WHITHER? A Theological Question for the Times. By *Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

We extract from the preface: "This book is a product of more than twenty years of study in the history of Puritan Theology, and especially of the Westminster divines, the authors of the Westminster Standards. . . . . When the author came to the study of the Westminster Confession he was surprised to find that it had not only retained the pure faith of the Reformation, but had advanced upon it in the unfolding of the doctrines of Santification, Faith, and Repentance. This was a surprise, because it had not been noted by any of the British or American divines whose works

he had studied, and it was entirely in advance of the faith of the British and American Churches. . . . . These studies of the Westminster divines disclosed the fact that modern Presbyterianism had departed from the Westminster Standards, all along the line. . . . . The author has been troubled for some years with these facts. [But] he has waited for an external call to publish them. This call came in May last, through the action of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America with regard to the revision of the Confession of Faith." So the key-note of Dr. Brigg's work is Revision. To this end his researches have been exhaustive; he has pursued his investigations in Germany, in Great Britain; and at the Union Theological Seminary in New York has constantly had at his disposal "the best Westminster Library in the world." He shows what the Westminster Standards are and follows their history in evolutionary Presbyterian life. He attacks the "false orthodoxy" of the elder and younger Hodge and their Princeton associates, which has "obtruded itself in the place of the Westminster Orthodoxy," and points out that there have been so many departures from the standard in all directions that it is necessary for all parties in the Presbyterian Churches to be generous, tolerant, and broad-minded. Moreover, the author is catholic; what he says of Presbyterianism, he holds, applies to all Protestant churches; organic union is needed—an irenic alliance of all denominations, the Roman included, to discover and to realize "the sum total of truth that God may reveal to us." And thus the main question is answered: *Whither* are Christians to direct their minds and energies?

We shall proffer no opinion with regard to the intrinsic fitness of the material from which Dr. Briggs desires to construct the foundations of Christian Unity. To the liberal mind it may appear absurd to substitute consolidated dogma for segregated dogma, much less to regard the lifeless shell of organization as the kernel of religious truth. Yet it may be characterized as a hopeful step in advance that an orthodox Presbyterian teacher demands and justifies universal dogmatic conistency and a strict adherence to the historical lines of dogma-development. It is progress, however limited its scope. And the inertia of the movement may possibly lead its originators far beyond the boundary intended. *μκρκ.*

WHAT MOSES SAW AND HEARD; or, The Idea of God in the Old Testament. By *A. O. Butler*. Chicago: R. R. Donnelly & Sons.

Mr. Butler's production is a critical examination of the Mosaic books. It is written in a reverent and impartial spirit. Its four hundred and thirty-four pages testify to a careful course of meditation upon the subject and to an extensive acquaintance with Biblical literature. But it is difficult, we are constrained to own, to discover any guiding motive in the work,—at least any that is sufficiently emphasized,—or to refer the desultory observations grouped about the various topics to any thesis of interpretation that philosophically they should tend to establish; in other words, we are at a loss to determine what the book has accomplished. In the main Mr. Butler's examination of *incidents of detail* is marked by strong common sense; "the bible," he says, "like any other book ought to be open to critical inspection and to interpretation by modern methods." It is apparently one of the purposes of the book to harmonize the philosophy of the Old Testament with the thought of the age. "How any person," the author says, "acquainted with the thought of the early world could first have found the idea of absolute creation in the first chapter of Genesis passes comprehension. The writer of the first chapter of Genesis was a philosopher. The chapter is the result neither of a dream nor an ecstacy, but of deliberative thought." "Neither Xenophanes, nor Pythagoras, nor Heraclitus, nor Parmenides, nor Anaxagoras conceived the idea of the incorporeal," and our author, in accordance with the doctrine that the first books of the Old Testament are philosophical productions and as much concerned with the history of the idea of God as the works of philosophers mentioned were, concludes that here too the same course of thought was pursued, and that the concept of the incorporeality of mind did not precede the concept of God as mind: he finds nothing in the Old Testament that teaches the incorporeality of mind and thus designates its teachings as philosophically (and necessarily so) materialistic. *μκρκ.*

CHATA AND CHINITA. A Novel by *Louise Palmer Heaven*. Boston: Roberts Brothers. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

The scene is in Mexico. The characters are numerous, and the plot, or more exactly the incidents, complicated. The descriptions of places are realistic and apparently faithful,—so much so that the novel may be termed, if such a designation have any meaning, a novel of locality. Customs, habits, manners, national and individual, flit by us in panoramic fullness, and people of both high and low degree play their parts in the shifting scenes of the drama. There is much confusion and little certainty, much darkness and little light in the story. The book's attractiveness lies mainly in its local colouring. *μκρκ.*

Some special information concerning the chief philosophical magazine of France, the *Revue Philosophique*, may be acceptable to our readers. This periodical is published monthly by Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint Germain, Paris. Each number contains original philosophical contributions from prominent writers, analyses and recensions of the philosophical publications and periodicals of all countries, with notes, observations, etc, bearing upon the most diverse mooted topics. The *Revue* is the organ of no sect, of no school; the standpoint represented, if any by preference be represented, is that of scientific positivism, of facts based upon experiment. The principal branches treated of are: *psychology*, and therewith the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system, mental pathology, the psychology of lower races and animals, and anthropology; deductive and inductive *logic*; general *philosophical theories* based on scientific discoveries. The editorship of M. Th. Ribot, who also frequently contributes, is itself a not inconsiderable guaranty of the *Revue's* merit and a promise of its continued popularity.

Secular Thought, of Dec. 14, prints the continuation of the notes of the debate between Mr. Charles Watts and the editor of the Halifax *Evening Mail*, "Is Secularism sufficient to satisfy the needs of mankind?" The discussion is ably conducted on both sides. Mr. Watts's popular and excellent lectures are closely followed in *Secular Thought*, and generally republished in full in its columns. In addition thereto, the doings of the freethought world are faithfully reported, and much instructive original matter presented to the readers of the periodical. (Secular Thought Pub. Co., Toronto, Canada.)

In the Christmas *Wide Awake* the article "Children's Portraits in the Louvre" is accompanied with distinct and handsome reproductions in wood. Also the story of "Cleon," by Adeline A. Knight, constitutes an attractive feature of this month's *Wide Awake*. (D. Lothrop Company, Boston.)

NOTES.

We present to our readers, in this number, an interesting discussion between Mr. Wake and Mr. Wakeman on the subject of "God in Evolution." Mr. Wake's essay is marked by scholarly dignity, and Mr. Wakeman's reply by earnestness and intensity. The position that we take on the subject need not be repeated here.

The concluding essay of the series "Aspects of Modern Psychology," by Dr. Joseph Jastrow, the publication of which owing to the pressure upon our columns has been delayed, will appear in the number of next week.

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TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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The Open Court.

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Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

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THE HUMAN SOUL.

The practical purpose of Religion is the salvation of human souls. When Jesus was walking by the Sea of Galilee, he saw two brethren, Simon, called Peter, and Andrew, his brother, casting a net into the sea: for they were fishers. And he sayeth unto them: "Follow me and I will make you fishers of men."

And so shall ministers be fishers of men to save human souls. But how can they save human souls when we are told that modern psychology is a psychology without a soul? The immortal soul, consisting of a trancendent substance, as it was supposed to be by the old schools of orthodox theology, does not exist. There is no such a thing as an eternal and mystical ego which continues to live even if the body dies.

The great Scotch philosopher, Hume, said:

"As for me, whenever I contemplate what is inmost in what I call my own self, I always come in contact with such or such special perception as of cold, heat, light or shadow, love or hate, pleasure or pain. I never come unawares upon my mind existing in a state void of perceptions: I never observe aught save perception .... If any one, after serious reflection and without prejudices, thinks he has any other idea of himself, I confess that I can reason no longer with him. The best I can say for him is that perhaps he is right no less than I, and that on this point our natures are essentially different. It is possible that he may perceive something simple and permanent which he calls himself, but as for me I am quite sure I possess no such principle." *

Modern psychology has fully adopted Hume's position. If a man speaks about himself, he means perhaps his body, or a certain part of his body. In another case he may mean a special idea of his mind. It is that idea which at the time is prominent in his soul and which he pronounces as his opinion. Formerly it was supposed that the ego who pronounces the opinion, "I say this and I say that," was one thing, and the opinion adopted by that ego another thing. And this ego was supposed to form the basis of man's personality, its supernatural unity. Modern psychology now contends that this ego is identical with its opinion; the "I say" is identical with the idea pronounced; or, in other words, the ego and its contents are one. Accordingly, our ego is constantly changing, for it is now this, now that idea, which is prominent in our mind. An ego by itself, a thinking subject without an idea, a perception, or sensation to be thought or felt, does not exist; and our soul is nothing but the sum total of all the ideas that live in our brain.

Very well then! The ego, as a thing independent of its contents, is a sham and always was a sham. Can a man be afraid of losing that which he never possessed? Certainly not! Renounce that ego, and abandon your anxiety about its preservation.

The matter, however, is different concerning the preservation of your soul. Is the soul of man less valuable since it has been proved that it lacks the unity which the ego was supposed to afford to it. Not in the least! Our soul, whatever it be, remains as valuable and precious as ever; if it is the sum total of our thoughts merely, yet that is the sum total of our intellectual and moral existence. The ideas which in their totality constitute ourselves, are the elements that condition our actions, and our actions shape our future; they will lead us to higher planes, or they will undo us and wreck our lives. Thus the purpose of religion, to save the souls of man, it seems, becomes rather more urgent than before.

Science seems to destroy Religion. But it does not; it destroys its errors only. Indeed, it becomes the basis of Religion, and Religion based on Science will be truer, purer, and grander. When our long cherished errors fade away before the light of science, life appears so empty and truth seems void of comfort. Let us, however, not be dismayed! After all, truth is better than error and a deeper insight always proves in the end that the truths taught by science are by far nobler and greater than the loftiest fiction and fairy-tales of our imagination can be.

Let us but consider how easily souls are lost! The purpose of religion becomes more imperative when we bear in mind the fact that souls can grow and expand. We can implant in the souls of men new thoughts and purer ideas, which will preserve them in temptations and guide them through the many allurements and dangers of the world. We can by instruction and example transmit to the minds of children our own souls, and thus build again our characters in the growing generation.

Gœthe said: 'The son should be better than the father'; and yet the son can be better only if the father rears the better part of himself in the soul of his son. Thus humanity will progress, it will advance

* Hume, Works, Vol. 1, p. 321.

more and more in the triumphant march of evolution.

The child that lies in the cradle possesses a most precious soul. But the infant's mind is a promise rather than a real and full grown soul; it is the bud not the fruit; it is a dear hope, a potentiality, but not the harvest of maturity. The most valuable parts of his soul, the elements of manly strength and of moral character that will give stability to his will and direction to his purpose, must be implanted into the tender mind of the child. All that which makes of man a human being, must be grafted upon the inherited predisposition of his mind. And how easily is that purity lost, how quickly is that innocence gone which appears as the sweetest charm in the beaming eyes of children. When they come in contact with the lower tendencies of life, how readily evil thoughts enter their minds and impure ideas poison their souls and the habits of their lives. Therefore David prayed, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me."

The soul of man is not immortal in the sense that matter and energy are now known to be indestructible. On the contrary, the soul of man *is* mortal. But seeing that we can make it immortal, that we can preserve our souls even after death in the coming generations, that we can implant our spirit in our children, the purpose of religion grows in its scope and importance.

The pure, the noble, the great, the moral thought will live and will exercise upon everyone a wholesome influence. If our soul is the sum total of our hopes and wishes, of our aspirations and longings, of our concepts and our ideas, let us take heed and beware not to introduce evil thoughts, but let us receive into our soul the love of truth and the eagerness of performing that which is right and just. This is the object of religion; and this is the sum total of the religion of mankind.

Bad thoughts as well as good thoughts are like leaven; and a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. Let the religion of humanity thus enter your souls not as words without a meaning that slumber like a dead letter in your mind, but as a power of enthusiasm which, like the leaven in meal, pervades all your thoughts and sentiments until the whole be leavened and changed into another and better substance.

Morality is that which preserves our soul, and it is the moral part of our soul only which we wish to preserve in our children. Immorality is that which leads to wreck and ruin, but morality makes life everlasting.

The immortality thus acquired is greatly different from the old dogmatic view of immortality. The old view of immortality is a chimera of Utopian character, the new view is a truth established by science, a truth that can be verified. The old view of immortality is a holy legend, and the best that can be said of it is this, that it foreboded the true view of immortality which teaches that there is a continuation of our soul-life after death. This continuation, however, is not an inherent quality of the soul, nor is it given to us as an act of mercy. The continuation of our soul-life must be acquired by our own efforts, it must be worked for, it must be earned by hard struggles, and it must be deserved.

I see all the world gathering earthly treasures to leave an inheritance to their children. But I see few who care for their souls. All interests are taken up with the desire for riches, but the most valuable riches which you might possess, remain neglected. You provide for meat and raiment and other necessities of life, but you disregard to provide for the immortality of your soul.

What are all the possessions of man if he is not wise enough to use them well, and what is power and earthly blessings if the men to whose lot they have fallen, cease to progress or even commence to degenerate? What is an inheritance left to your children, be it ever so great, if you disregard the education of their souls? The word of Christ will forever remain a great truth: "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" (MARK VIII. 36.)

SOME AMERICAN THOUGHTS ON THE FRENCH EXPOSITION.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE great Exhibition has come to an end, and my admiration of it is accompanied by a shudder at the thought of any such thing occurring in New York. I do not merely consider the inevitable and permanent congestion of our one lung there,—Central Park,—but of the certain injury to regular trade. An exhibition stimulates into feverish activity hotel business, newspaper enterprise, and trade in trifles; but all regular commerce suffers. So many souvenirs, trinkets, pretty things, are bought, that little money is left for solid things. I am informed also that every Exhibition in Paris raises prices,—the tradesmen wish to make hay while the sun shines,—but that the prices never recede from their exaggerated level. I need not say how disastrous this would be in New York, where prices are already so inflated. If Chicago wants the Columbus-Exhibition of 1892, I hope she will get it, but I speak as a New Yorker, and with a consciousness of being like the Salvationist girl who said that she found her jewels were carrying her to the devil, and gave them all to her sister.

After this preface, it may appear contradictory to say that France has been benefitted by this Exhibition, but no doubt such is the fact. Paris is so normally the great mart of bagatelles, that the Exhibition, though it inflate, does not demoralize its regular bus-

iness. It is always the world's bazaar. Then it has in its Champ de Mars a place at once apart and near, so that its Elysian Fields are not injured. So much being secured, one may contemplate with satisfaction the political advantage gained by the Republic in having shown its ability to get up a more splendid Exhibition than the Empire did in 1867. The French masses, being grown up children, (perhaps little the worse for that,) are made happy by this big show and have a fair chance of forgetting the empire.

How well do I remember that brilliant day, over twenty-two years ago, when Napoleon III. and his empress received the homage of European courts. It was in a vestibule of the Exposition (1867), which they were opening, and I remember that the emperor stood near a statue which appeared to represent Mirth, until you took a step or two—then the merry face was found to be a mask held up before a face aged with pain. When soon afterwards it was known that in that glittering moment the emperor and empress knew they were being drawn to the cataract over which they were precipitated, I remembered that masked statue. The next time I saw Louis Napoleon he was starting out to Metz to fight Prussia; and I saw him at the end of that journey—laid out in an English country-house with candles burning around him. Whether the present felicity of France is to have a like tragical termination will depend on her ability to outgrow the vendetta feeling towards Germany. It was the only pity of the exhibition that Germany was conspicuously absent,—necessarily, perhaps; for whether Paris would have been moved to wrath or amiability by her conquerer's presence, is a question too doubtful for the risk to have been incurred. There are some hopeful signs of the decline of the feeling of revenge. In a booth where people try their skill in aiming, at two cents a shot, the objects shot at were toy Germans in the windows of a "Citadel of Prussians." In a few of the provincial theatres cruel "Prussians" and heroic Frenchmen appear on the stage. But this kind of thing seems to be confined to the more illiterate populace. On the other hand the election of Prof. Curtius, of Berlin, as corresponding member of the French Institute indicates the growth of a healthier sentiment among the intelligent. It is true that the name of the historian Mommsen was set aside at the same time because he was reported to have advised the late emperor to conquer Alsace. He has written a letter declaring the report untrue; but it is to be feared the masses here will for some time go on believing it as firmly as they do that General Grant telegraphed the Emperor of Germany congratulations after his every victory.

The exhibition closed in a blaze of glory. In the evening of that day, I looked from an elevation on a city of many-colored flame, with twenty great fountains playing, and domes of light; and at the end the Eiffel Tower turned to a Pillar of Fire. There was a roar of artillery besieging for the last time the rebuilt Bastille. The Tunisian dancers went through their last contortions, the shout of a million voices was heard. The pictorial prophecy of the Parliament of Man and Federation of the World was sealed. Floquet, eloquent President of the Deputies, elicited bravos from the newly-opened Assembly by declaring, "A lightning-flash of the Fraternity of 1789 issuing from Paris has passed over the world."

For the moment the sequel of the Exhibition is not very fraternal among Americans in Paris. Our artists, because only one of their number was decorated,—and he a member of the jury, who decorated himself,—are much humiliated. This juryman is accused by some of wishing to enhance his distinction by taking care that no other American artist should obtain the like. Our publishers, too, have had some gall mingled with their honors. When one was proposed for some honor in his business, M. Ollendorf protested that the said publisher had made much money out of his father's linguistic school-books, but that no Ollendorf had ever received a cent from America. This gentleman's protest was overcome by the unsatisfactory method of reminding him that many foreign authors had similarly suffered, and many American publishers offended, and that the honors might be given in gratitude for better things hoped for in the future. It says much for French amiability that every suggestion of honors to American publishers and artists was not hooted, in view of our outlawry in the matter of copyright, and our almost prohibitory duties on foreign works of art.

The excessive ambition of Americans to wear the little red badge of the Legion of Honor is significant: I attribute it chiefly to the absence of any adequate recognition of art and literature in the United States. A good many of our ablest youth have gradually expatriated themselves in sentiment as well as in residence. I have conversed with some of them, and they declare that they do not mean to return: they count for nothing in America compared with a speculator; they do not get their money's worth there; they find life commonplace there; they have gone back now and then, but were always happy to return. The mischief of all this is that, on the whole, it is true. It ought to be considered by our people that their brains are being largely exported to Europe by an uncivilized attitude towards art and literature,—in the absence of international copyright,—while at the same time they are importing "Europeanism" in thought by substituting the unpaid labor of foreign brains for American work. I was present in a literary company in Paris when this subject was discussed, and was asked whether any author in the United States was supporting himself by

independent literary work. I could hardly recall one. Even our great men,—Emerson, Longfellow, Lowell, Holmes,—have had to be lecturers or professors; some —like Bancroft, Hawthorne, Motley, Lowell—have had to seek office. And our brilliant writers—Howells, Gilder, Arlo Bates, Julian Hawthorne, and many others —have had to dispose of themselves to magazine and newspaper publishers, and write their more real and congenial works in the intervals of such popular work. It looks as if presently there would be only magazine literature in America. It is true that under these conditions our American magazines are becoming the best in the world; and no one can regret that a great deal of talent should go into them. But it would be discreditable to the new world if it should prove unfavorable to the evolution of thinkers born to liberate the popular mind rather than cater to it, or merely please it. The two American heroes of the exhibition seem to have been Edison and Buffalo Bill. No doubt they are both, in a sense, representative men; but, without disparaging either, an American can hardly regard them as filling his new-world horizon. One would have been glad to see something from across the Atlantic more striking in the way of fine art,—although our gallery of pictures was generally good. In fact, it would be good enough for a young nation, were one certain that the tendencies were towards something better,—and something American. But the American gallery was a sort of second-class European exhibition. I remembered that when George Washington was offered a large donation from his state he declined it, personally, and passed the gift on to found a University in the District of Columbia. He said that it was important that American youths should not be compelled to seek their culture abroad. The money remains unutilized. The University is not yet built. But the Papacy has founded a University at Washington. There is no "Monroe doctrine" to prevent the invasion of America by European superstitions when they are outgrown in the region of their origin.

I do not mean to suggest, by these reflections, that humanity in the New World should break with its past in the Old World. But surely it were better to develop an American intellect capable of digesting foreign literatures and arts, and converting them into our own western tissues, rather than—as it were—plagiarizing them. Both our political constitution and our religion are plagiarized from Europe. They are anachronistic plagiarisms too: we give fresh repairs and leases to institutions that in Europe are no more inhabited than its mouldy castles. We need, not less, but more of the new Europe which has grown since Plymouth and Jamestown were founded, and since the Revolution of Independence. But in order to convert this new Europe into American fibre, we must manage to keep our best American hearts, and finest American brains, at home; to secure for them there a free and full habitat. And this cannot be so long as our artists are encouraged to mediocrity by artificial protection against foreign competitors; and while our literary men are compelled to compete against foreign laborers without wages.

PARIS, November.

ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

BY JOSEPH JASTROW, PH.D.

IT is difficult for several reasons to describe justly and briefly the status of psychology in Great Britain. The mere enumeration of the more prominent authors and their works would hardly give much insight into the underlying influences and interests to which these works owe their origin. On the other hand in singling out certain phases of activity as representative, there is danger of slighting others, as well as of giving to British psychology an appearance of harmony and unity that it does not altogether possess. I shall attempt a middle course between these tendencies. Again, we must remember that the connection of present teachings with the past has been kept very vital in English philosophic thought, and that the specialization of psychology from the other mental sciences has not been as marked as elsewhere. The associationist-school directly continue the present with the former philosophical interests, and the traces of this parentage are evident in those who have adopted new methods and modern ideas. The names of Bain and Sully at once suggest themselves; both of whom have contributed largely to the maintainance of a healthy interest in mental science and have distinctly advanced the status of psychology in their country. Two other authors should be mentioned as eminently influential in furthering the scientific view of the relations of body and mind, as well as in disseminating in attractive shape sound views of the minor forms of mental abnormality,—Carpenter and Maudsley. The former has given us the most attractive exposition of the chief phenomena of every-day mental life, as well as guided into healthy channels the popular views regarding hypnotism, thought-reading, and the borderland of mental science; while the latter in his "Physiology and Pathology of Mind" offers an equally forcible treatment of allied problems. There should be mentioned, too, as illustrating the same line of activity, the work of Dr. Hack Tuke upon the "Influence of the Mind on the Body." From a more distinctly pathological point of view we may cite the papers of Dr. Hughlings Jackson, and of Dr. Ireland (in his volume "The Blot upon the Brain"). The psychology of Herbert Spencer is too

well known to need more than a mention here. Independently of any final verdict as to the merits of the general system in which this psychology finds a place, one must attribute to the influence of his works an essential share in the present psychological interests, as well as the general acceptance of facts and views that have contributed to clear and rational modes of thought. We could similarly pay tribute to other English psychologists, such as Croom Robertson and Ward, Romanes and Grant Allen. But it will better answer the present purpose to venture to trace the underlying spirit and attitude that inspire and unify these contributions, even though in so doing we run the risk of giving undue unity to the position.

Accordingly I should select, as most representative of British psychological activity, the study of comparative psychology. That much of this activity is directly due to the influence of Darwin can hardly be doubted. The general deepening and widening of interests in biological matters that the introduction of the evolutionary hypothesis brought about, bore similar good fruit in the world of mental facts. Darwin's own work upon "The Expression of the Emotions in Men and Animals," his essays on instinct, and his study of the mental development of his own child, together with the numerous psychological observations with which his works abound, furthered and directed this interest. The detailed elaboration of the progressive scale of intelligences from protozoön to man has nowhere received a more studious cultivation than in England. The fullest and most systematic of such expositions is that given by Dr. G. J. Romanes, an eminent personal disciple of Darwin. In the first of his three works "Animal Intelligence," he has arranged and interpreted an abundant collection of instances illustrating the adaptation of means to ends at all stages of the animal scale. Constantly utilizing this interesting and valuable store-house of facts, Dr. Romanes proceeds in his second volume, "Mental Evolution in Animals," to trace the guiding principles that shall bring law and order into this domain. A portion of the result finds expression in a scheme indicating at what levels of intelligence certain typical emotions and actions first make their appearance, and such traits are further utilized to illustrate the correlation of mental with bodily function, both being regarded as resulting from favorable variations in the struggle for existence. In the completing work of the series, "Mental Evolution in Man," the same derivative argument is applied to the faculties of man, the especial object being to analyze critically the specific bases of human superiority, and to show that the step from the highest stages of animal to the lowest stages of human development are not steeper than nature presents elsewhere. In the very painstaking and suggestive elaboration of this argument, Dr. Romanes has expounded general principles and proposed psychological distinctions of faculty, both human and animal, that have a high value independently of their place in his system. However little we may agree with the complete system of Romanes, and admitting that he classifies the facts of animal intelligence rather more systematically than nature offers them, we must recognize in his work a distinct advance upon anything that existed before, and feel assured that every future comparative psychology will build upon the foundations here laid down. If others have expressed themselves less systematically, they have none the less been guided by the same impulses and have contributed to the same end. Sir John Lubbock, in his study of "Ants, Bees, and Wasps," devotes his best energies to ingeniously testing the powers of their senses, their instincts of orientation, their modes of communication, their ways of solving the perplexing problems that an arbitrary change in their environment produces and so on. The same zeal in bringing a large number of apparently disparate facts into serial order dominates Grant Allen's exposition of the growth and development of the Color-Sense, as well as his treatise upon the origins of the pleasurable and painful effects of sensation and emotion,—"Physiological Æsthetics."

Such studies have an intimate relation with the anthropological aspect of psychology, in which department English activity has been eminently successful. Of this the authoritative works of Tylor, upon "Primitive Culture," and "The Early History of Mankind," and of Lubbock, upon "Prehistoric Times," are sufficient evidences. Their admirable expositions of the evolution of arts and customs; the varied career of the foundations and development of culture; their discussion of the beginnings of expression and communication, both pictorial and oral; their analyses of the more or less unconscious psychological systems that underlie the peculiar beliefs and thought-habits of primitive peoples; and the equally interesting tendencies to a reversion towards such beliefs, that appear all along the zig-zag line of advance in culture,—certainly no more entertaining chapters of mental development have been written.

In the remaining department of comparative psychology, "Infant Psychology," the English have shown a deep interest though they are represented by few original studies. In the closely allied field of the application of psychology to education, much appreciation has been felt in Great Britain, and it may suffice to again refer to the works of Bain and Sully.

The products of a mind so original as that of Francis Galton could not readily be classified in the psychological activity of any country. His studies of "Hereditary Genius," tracing by aid of painstaking

methods the heredity of exceptional mental and physical gifts; his similar study of the effects of heredity and environment, of nature and of nurture, upon the production of English men of science; and the more general exposition of the laws governing the distribution of faculty in his latest work, "Natural Inheritance," are all deeply permeated with the evolutionary doctrines and form a unique chapter of science, interesting no one more deeply than the student of scientific psychology. Mr. Galton's studies of the strengths of the links that hold together the chain of ideas, of the peculiar associations of sounds with colors, and the equally strange "number-forms," together with his invention of composite photography and many other ingenious devices for measuring and recording human faculty,—all merit careful attention and will be found in his "Inquiry into Human Faculty," and other works.

Although the present sketch makes no attempt to render a complete account of British psychology, it would be decidedly lacking were no mention made of a movement that at the present moment contributes more than any other to the discussion of psychological matters, and is amassing more rapidly than any other a vast and heterogeneous literature—I mean the "Psychic Research" movement. The "Society for Psychical Research" has in the six or seven years of its existence accumulated a bewildering mass of material, bearing on one phase or another of the miscellaneous group of problems that lie partly within and partly upon the border-lines of science and the mysterious borderland that some call the supernatural. One must refer, though not without misgivings, to the voluminous numbers of the "Proceedings" of the society and to the two volumes of the "Phantasms of the Living" for a more detailed account of the movement and its results. The main interest has centered in the possibility of the transference of thought from mind to mind apart from the recognized channels of sensation; which possibility the society has accepted as proven and termed "Telepathy." While acknowledging that the observations contributing to this result have brought to light many unsuspected phenomena of genuine psychological value, I cannot refrain from expressing my conviction that this premature verdict of the society and especially the application of this theory to the explanation of the still more dubious death-bed presentiments and the like, will have a deterrent influence upon the progress of psychology in Great Britain. The work of the society in investigating spiritualistic phenomena and in studying the psychology of deception deserves especial credit. The society has made many and interesting studies of Hypnotism and has added several instructive experiments to this study. They have also done well in rescuing from oblivion many facts either of psychological or anthropological value that without such organized effort are not apt to be accessible. While the future progress of the society has the good will of all psychologists, and its "Proceedings" will continue to be eagerly read, one must regret the tendency of this interest to withdraw attention from other and more important departments of psychological research.

Turning from Great Britain to our own country, I find it still more difficult to properly characterize the status of scientific psychology. While in many respects we follow English traditions, using their text-books, and absorbing their literature, we diverge from them in being more eagerly on the alert for promising lines of work wherever found, in a readiness to introduce innovations whenever circumstances will allow, and in brief in utilizing the freedom, though not without appreciating the disadvantages, of intellectual and educational youthfulness. On the one hand the same interests that have been indicated as representative of British psychology will be moderately true of America. Biological science is in a very flourishing condition in this country, and the interests in the mental side of life that such study furthers, has been duly cultivated. We have, too, an "American Society for Psychical Research," studying the same phenomena as the English society,* that has yet published comparatively little, but has maintained a cautious attitude, and brought to light quite a number of phenomena of high psychological importance. On the other hand we have found a great inspiration in the experimental psychology of Germany. While a very fair proportion of Wundt's students at Leipsic are Americans, I believe no Englishman has ever studied there. Amongst us the place of leadership in this field belongs to G. Stanley Hall, formerly Professor of psychology at the Johns Hopkins University, and now President of Clark University. At the former institution Prof. Hall introduced the psychological laboratory and conducted a vigorous department of scientific psychology. Some of the studies from this laboratory were published in *Mind*, the English journal of philosophy and psychology, and were continued in the *American Journal of Psychology*, when that periodical was inaugurated by Prof. Hall two years ago. This journal maintains a high standard of original contributions, presents a survey of current psychological literature such as is not to be found elsewhere, and may perhaps be regarded the most important contribution to psychology from this side of the Atlantic. There can be little doubt that with the advantages that Clark University offers, that institution will soon form the nucleus of psychological research in this country. Prof. James, of Harvard College, though with some-

*Since these words have been written the American Society has decided to become a branch of the English Society.

what different interests, has contributed by personal influence as well as by a series of brilliant essays to the furtherance of psychological studies amongst us. Moreover, there are many indications that the career of scientific psychology in the United States is full of promise. Dr. Cattell, a pupil of Wundt, has organized a department of experimental psychology in the University of Pennsylvania, and other institutions are looking forward to a similar step. I may be allowed, too, to mention the chair of "Experimental and Comparative Psychology" at the University of Wisconsin, which I now occupy and with which is maintained a laboratory of experimental psychology. While thus we have simply entered upon the initial stages of our career, our interests are wide and well grounded, our foundations are securely laid, and one may be allowed to confidently hope, if not to predict, that amongst the advances in Psychology that the future holds in store, a good share will come from American psychologists.

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT.

THE physiological aspect of thought is the activity of living brain-substance. We think in that we are aware of certain states of ourselves; in short, because we feel. Thinking, accordingly, is a special kind of feeling; it is developed from feeling and may be called *articulated feeling.*

Feeling is here employed as the general term. Sensation is one kind, thinking another kind of feeling. Sensation is the product of two factors: the feeling subject and the sensed object. Thus every sensation of a feeling being has a foreign element in it. Thinking seems to be free of this foreign element, for thinking is a purely internal act. It only *seems* to be free from this foreign element, for in truth, it is not free. It is free in so far only as the foreign element in the meantime has become our own. Thinking is concerned with the memories of sensations, and these memories are part of ourselves. Yet they were imported into the thinking subject by former sensations. Without former sensations and their memories, that internal kind of feeling, which we call thinking, is impossible.

Thought is distinguished from feeling by a distinctness that in all other feelings is lacking. The distinctness of thinking is due to its being a repetition of a feeling perceived before. The oftener a feeling is repeated, the greater will be its distinctness. Its form will appear more and more regular. Thus distinctness is the recognition of regularity, *i. e.*, of conformity to law. Similarly the articulation of speech and song are due to the regularity, and the recognition of regularity, in the production of sound waves.

Upon an introspection into the process of feeling in general and of articulate feeling in particular, we state the following facts:

1. *Feeling is caused by irritation.*
2. *Feeling tends to motion.*

Feeling is a process that takes place between irritation and its reaction. Irritations may be either internal or external. External irritations are impressions produced by contact with the surrounding world; by the rays of light upon the eye, by waves of sound upon the ear, etc. Internal irritations are such as hunger and thirst.

Living substance, being irritable and endowed with memory, adapts itself to such conditions of contact with surrounding objects as are often repeated, and thus a regularity is produced, which by and by leads to distinctness. Living matter in its lowest forms is irritable throughout. Very soon, however, irritability is specialized as feeling in the sensory nerve-cells and eventually mounts to a clearness which is called consciousness. The highest form of feeling is attained when it appears in distinctly articulated speech; and it is this articulated feeling which we call thought. What is stated for feeling holds good for thought also:

1. *The process of thinking is directly or indirectly caused by irritations;* and
2. *It ultimately results in motion.*

The tendency of thought to pass into motion is called *will.* Will, as all tendency to motion, must have a direction or an aim. The aim of will is called *purpose.* The motion produced by will is called *action.*

Thought need not directly originate from irritations, it may proceed from the memories of former irritations. Irritations certainly remain its ultimate foundation, and the substance of all thought throughout exists only because irritations have been previously received. The most abstract thought, our conception of form, and with it all purely formal sciences, even erroneous thought, the shadowy chimeras of the mind, have all ultimately originated from feeling of some kind. We arrived there through some process of abstraction. In this respect the old dictum of the schoolmen remains true forever: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu.* Nothing is in our mind which has not been before in our senses.

Certain feelings correspond to certain contacts. They thus become representatives first of the contacts, then of the objects themselves which cause the contact. Thus living creatures acquire a possibility of depicting their surroundings in their own substance. They can in their feelings map out the world in which they live. The different feelings become so many images of the objects to which they correspond. Not only the things of the outside world, in their effects upon ourselves, but also the movements of our members in their actions upon things external are portrayed in the feeling nerve-substance. Both together furnish all the data for our knowledge of the world.

Cognition, accordingly, may be characterized as a process of orientation in the world. The macrocosm outside is depicted in the microcosm within, and the more correctly the latter represents the former, the nearer it is to truth.

Our next statement derived from these considerations we formulate as follows: Feeling, and more so

3. *Thinking, is a representative process.*

The process of orientation is of greatest importance to living beings, because it facilitates adaptation to their surroundings. They can pre-arrange certain adaptations in their thoughts; they can make plans of their movements before the execution of the movements takes place.

4. *The mechanism of thinking consists in combining, in separating, and re-combining the representative images or symbols.*

Thinking is an inner experimentation with images and symbols of things, to the end of deciding, how an intended action (the reaction against the irritation) shall take place. Thus it becomes a great saving in the economy of animal activity. Instead of trying all possibilities in reality, until one is found that is best suited to the occasion, the images of things, obtained through the feelings of previous experiences, are associated and disassociated within the brain, until there results the desired combination, which thereupon is executed. Then the purpose of thinking is attained; it ends in a reflex action against irritations.

Students, as a rule, are confined to their study. They represent the brain of a community and may be considered as the specialized organ of thought in mankind. It is natural, perhaps, that students and thinkers should often imagine that thinking exists for its own sake. Their opinion is repeated by those who may be called the dilettanti in the art of thought, and thus it happens to be a fashionable dogma of the time. Nevertheless it is an error.

5. *The purpose of thinking is adaptation to surrounding conditions.*

Thought, you may object, sometimes does not end in action, but in the suppression of action. Inhibition, however, is an action also. Thought should always end in the regulation or adjustment of our behavior toward our surroundings. If it does not, it is not the right kind of thought. Thought for its own sake is a disease. If muscles contract neither for a special purpose nor for the general purpose of exercise, we call the contraction a cramp. Thought for its own sake is a spasm of the brain.

Abstract thought is a still greater economy than thinking in concrete images, because it introduces the principle of economy into thought itself.* Images of single objects are substituted by more comprehensive symbols which find their best expressions in words, and one word-symbol represents many images. In this manner the representative process is enhanced. Words become representations of representations, and each further advance of human intelligence, as Ernst Mach has pointed out, will be characterized in some way as an "Economy of Thought."

Higher thinking, (thinking, κατ' ἐξοχήν,) as we find it in the human brain, is called abstract thought, because it is conditioned by abstraction. Particular qualities that are common to several things, are mentally severed from the images of these things, and then combined into a new unity by a special symbol. The most natural symbols being words (in so far as they are most easily communicated), language is the means by which abstract thought becomes possible. Noiré said: "Man thinks because he speaks," *i. e.*, man thinks "in abstracts," because within his mind notions of abstract qualities by means of word-symbols have been combined into unities.

Still, in a different sense the inverse is also true: "Man speaks because he thinks." In this case thinking is employed in its broader sense. Man has learned to speak because his mind was filled with images, of which a great many similar ones naturally tended to combine. In the broader sense of the word all animals may be said to think; in the strict sense of the term, man alone thinks.

THE RISE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

If thought is called articulated feeling, we may call consciousness condensed or intensified feeling. Consciousness can only have arisen from feeling through an inhibition of reflex motion. It is, undoubtedly, the failure of the purpose of reflex motion to which living substance owes its higher development. If all reflex motions that react against irritations, had always answered their purpose, there never would have been a need of consciousness and the animal world would lead an unconscious, purely instinctive life not very much different from that of plants. Animal life would only consist in the performance of simple reflex motions.

Let us suppose that the reflex motion of coughing in a patient were attended with pain, by which the irritation in the throat would rather be aggravated than relieved, would not, as a rule, the patient seek to restrain the cough, and would he not, by and by, attain a point where the reflex-ganglion would resist the irritation and suppress the reflex-motion even in sleep?

Dr. Mœbius,* professor of zoölogy at the university of Kiel, relates an interesting experiment performed by Mr. Amtsberg, of Stralsund.

* Economy of thought does not mean that we should think less but that thought should become more effective. By economy we are enabled with the same amount of thought to accomplish more work.

* *Schriften des Naturwissenshaftlichen Vereins von Schleswig-Holstein*: quoted from Prof. Max Müller: "The Science of Thought," Vol. 1, p. 10.

"A pike, who swallowed all small fishes which were put into his aquarium, was separated from them by a pane of glass, so that, whenever he tried to pounce on them, he struck his gills against the glass, and sometimes so violently that he remained lying on his back, like dead. He recovered, however, and repeated his onslaughts, till they became rarer and rarer, and at last, after three months, ceased altogether. After having been in solitary confinement for six months, the pane of glass was removed from the aquarium, so that the pike could again roam about freely among the other fishes. He at once swam towards them, but he never touched any one of them, but always halted at a respectful distance of about an inch, and was satisfied to share with the rest the meat that was thrown into the aquarium. He had therefore been trained so as not to attack the other fishes which he knew as inhabitants of the same tank. As soon, however, as a strange fish was thrown into the aquarium, the pike in nowise respected him, but swallowed him at once. After he had done this forty times, all the time respecting the old companions of his imprisonment, he had to be removed from the aquarium on account of his large size

"The training of this pike was not, therefore, based on judgment; it consisted only in the establishment of a certain direction of will, in consequence of uniformly recurrent sensuous impressions. The merciful treatment of the fishes which were familiar to him, or, as some would say, which he knew, shows only that the pike acted without reflection. Their view provoked in him, no doubt, the natural desire to swallow them, but it evoked at the same time the recollection of the pain he had suffered on their account, and the sad impression that it was impossible to reach the prey which he so much desired. These impressions acquired a greater power than his voracious instinct, and repressed it, at least for a time. The same sensuous impression, proceeding from the same fishes, was always in his soul the beginning of the same series of psychic acts. He could not help repeating this series, like a machine, but like a machine with a soul, which has this advantage over mechanical machines, that it can adapt its work to unforeseen circumstances, while a mechanical machine cannot. The pane of glass was to the organism of the pike one of these unforeseen circumstances."

Deliberation before action and with it all higher kind of thought becomes possible only through an inhibition of reflex action. The tendency to act still continues, even if action itself is inhibited. The desire to do a certain thing and the memory of pain or disappointment that inhibits it, come into conflict and a struggle between them results, that will either lead to the entire suppression of the intended act or it will bring about an adaptation to circumstances. If the latter takes place, the tendency to act has gained the upper hand over inhibition, nevertheless the resultant is different from what it would have been as a simple reflex motion without having passed through the process of deliberation. It is modified and most likely better suited to the circumstances.

One of the most important tasks of education is that of accustoming youth to self-discipline. The will need not and must not be suppressed or even weakened, but there must be developed a still stronger power of control which, if it be necessary, will inhibit impulses of the will or, at least, prevent them from passing into action before they have been submitted to a thorough critical examination. This scrutiny consists in comparing all the resultant consequences of the intended act with the memories of similar cases, be they of one's own experience or implanted in the mind through information from other sources.

Men, in whom this process takes place, are not so easily decoyed into actions, which later on they must repent. Such a self-control makes it possible, that not only the desire which at the time excites us will be decisive, but all the other ideas, the memories and images that live in our mind, will also have an influence upon the final decision. If impulses are thus controlled, we behold, as it were, an orderly meeting, called to order by a presiding officer, who by turns grants the word to each and all present, who might have anything to say concerning the matter under discussion. The meeting consists of our own ideas, our hopes, our wishes, our longings, and aspirations, while the presiding officer is represented by our power of self-control. The mind of a man who is exclusively swayed by the influence of the moment, who easily yields to the present impulse, resembles the gathering of a mob where the most impetuous talker is always the leader. The sudden impulses of the will are then executed before the other side of the question can be heard. Such a man is limited to the situation of the moment; he becomes a sport of circumstances and a slave to his own passions. Moral freedom, that higher condition in which all ideas of our mind enjoy equal rights and perfect liberty, is possible only by an inhibition of action through self-control.

The inhibition of a reflex motion does not annihilate the suppressed irritation; it makes it even more intense. A suppressed sneeze thus can provoke a very disagreeable sensation. In certain circles, where etiquette banishes sneezing as a breach of manners, people have discovered a means of suppressing the irritation by the aid of a counter-irritation. They press the bridge of the nose between the eyes, and by this simple method they free themselves from the tickling irritation that causes sneezing.

This will do for the suppression of a sneeze, but it is a different matter when the irritation appears in the form of hunger, which, if not satisfied, will keep increasing. It will again and again start a process of deliberation and consider every circumstance that may be turned to advantage. Hence the proverb says, that hunger sharpens the wit.

If the necessities of life cannot directly be satisfied, they must be indirectly. If their end is not immediately attainable, means must be invented, which on a longer, yet on a better and safer, way will after all accomplish the end. And the means that had to be inserted between a will and its end or purpose, made thinking necessary. Deliberation was wanted in order to introduce the means to the end, and thus it is want

that produced in living creatures the development and further perfectionment of thought.

The strong impulse of self-preservation, and the impossibility of directly satisfying this craving, compel organized substance to rise from the lower state of a dim feeling to that of clear consciousness. Want is an inner irritation that can produce the most terrible pain and bring man to the verge of despair. Like the Sphinx of Œdippus, it cruelly sacrifices innumerable beings and thus sternly demands the solution of problems that will and must be solved under penalty of painful perdition. Thus guides the fear of death to a higher stage of life. But it guides only the courageous thinker, the Œdippus who by the power of thought is the victor in the struggle for existence. The faculty of thinking, and with it the clearness of conscious thought, has been forced upon us.

We learn from these facts that the philosophy of Deism which prevailed among liberals of the eighteenth century and is still in vogue to-day is an erroneous notion of God. The divinity that shapes our ends, the all-life that manifests itself in nature, is of a different kind than the deists imagined. The deists regarded God as an all-loving, benevolent father, whose purpose was the happiness of his creatures. God's good intentions, however, were too often frustrated through the malevolence and ignorance of men.

In contrast to this view, it must be admitted, that the old orthodox conception of God is far more correct. The God of the Bible is free from the philanthropic sentimentality of the eighteenth century, and agrees better with positive facts. The God of the Old Testament is a stern master, who through servitude guides to freedom, and after visitations dispenses his blessings.

It must strongly be doubted, whether men amidst mere enjoyments, living in a state of constant happiness, would ever advance. Man received into his household certain animals, as sheep and oxen, and took good care of them. Their lot must now appear as more desirable than that of their previous state of freedom; they are unacqnainted with the hard struggle for existence, and upon their verdant pastures they have no evil foreboding of their imminent death. And even death itself, if they are destined for meat, is inflicted in the least painful manner.

If anywhere among living creatures there has been realized the ideal picture of undisturbed happiness, and of a pure enjoyment of life, it certainly is to be found among the herds on our cattle-farms. Yet, at what a price! While the wild sheep and the wild bull are eminently distinguished from other animals by their intelligence, domestic sheep and oxen under the care of man have to such an extent become obtuse, that their very names have strikingly become the symbols of irredeemable stupidity.

The real God, who rules supreme in the evolution of cosmic life, is free from all sentimentality. He may certainly appear cruel in comparison with the ideal of a fatherly and philanthropic grandsire. He rather resembles a stern father, who does not, in a weak good-naturedness spoil his children, but educates them now with severity, now with kindness, in order to develop their powers. The history of evolution proves that he does not intend to bring up faint-hearted, sentimental children of happiness; he wants his sons to be intellectually and physically self-reliant, reared in the bracing atmosphere of freedom. P. C.

THE GROUND OF ALL LIBERAL RELIGION.*

BY FRANCIS E. ABBOT.

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"The nineteenth century is drawing to its close; it will soon pass into history forever. What, for educated men, stands out conspicuously as the one great, established, and irreversible result of the nineteenth century in the sphere of religious thought? Briefly, this: that *Nature means the All of Being*, and that *the only road to knowledge of Nature is the Scientific Method.* This truth our children will inherit, for it is the very thought-atmosphere of the modern man; the educated think it, and what the educated think to-day, the uneducated will think to-morrow. In other words, the old dualism of Nature and God, as two independent or semi-independent realities, has died out of the modern mind. Supernaturalism in all its forms is disappearing into the past as an 'outgrown standpoint'; henceforth, for the well-informed and cultivated mind, the only God is the Immanent God. Struggling against this irrevocable verdict of the facts is to-day but wasted energy; whoever would win and hold even the attention of disciplined intelligence must concede the absolute unity of Nature as the All, and the sole sufficiency of the Scientific Method to establish the truth about Nature. For all who have eyes to see or ears to hear these results have been put beyond all reasonable doubt by the great discoveries of the nineteenth century. . . . .

"Two great opposing parties, intrenched in two great opposing philosophies, dispute possession of the Scientific Method itself, as Lucifer and Michael are imagined to have disputed possession of the body of Moses. Agnosticism declares that the Scientific Method applies only to *phenomena*, to the appearances or shows of things, and has no possible application to *noumena*,† or things as they really exist in their internal relations and constitutions; while Scientific Theology declares that the Scientific Method applies necessarily both to phenomena and to noumena, both to things as they seem and to things as they are. Agnosticism declares that it is impossible 'to climb through Nature up to Nature's God,'—that Nature is knowable and known, while God is both unknown and unknowable; and this position it takes because, floundering still in the antiquated dualism of the last century, it has

*A paper read before the National Conference of Unitarian and Other Christian Churches, at Philadelphia, Oct. 30, 1889.

† *Phenomenon* means "appearance" (*Erscheinung*), derived from φαίνεσθαι to appear; *Noumenon* means "thought or idea" (*gedankending*), derived from νοεῖν to think. Kant calls the former *Sinneswesen*, (object of the senses), the latter, *gedankenwesen*, (object of thought). Phenomenon is now frequently used in the sense of "natural process," and noumenon in the sense of "thing in itself." Prof. Huxley as well as Mr. F. E. Abbot uses the word noumenon as equivalent to "thing in itself," and it seems as if Mr. Abbot uses the word "thing in itself," as equivalent to "thing," *i. e.*, "the thing as it exists independently of thinking subject." We use the word in its original meaning (as "thought").—Ed.

no scrap or shred of comprehension of the modern monism which conceives God as immanent in Nature. But Scientific Theology declares that it is impossible to know Nature in any degree without knowing God precisely in the same degree,—that both are knowable, but neither is wholly known, by man,—and that the progress of natural knowledge is itself the ever-progressive revelation of the Immanent God. . . . .

"Whenever Agnosticism is not contending for mere victory in controversy (as was the case in Professor Huxley's recent articles), it plants itself avowedly on the principle that things in themselves, or *noumena*, are unknowable, and that phenomena alone are knowable. Notwithstanding his too adroit and diplomatic ignoring of his own fundamental principle in these articles, Huxley himself frankly avowed it five years ago, when he said: 'Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may be beyond phenomena.' In that sentence is summed up the whole meaning, the whole power, the whole danger of the attack. Upon that principle alone, be it strong or be it weak, rests the Agnostic contention that the Scientific Method is valid for phenomena, but invalid for noumena,—in other words, that nothing can be known by man, whether in the present or in the future, respecting God, Freedom, or Immortality. Prick that principle, and philosophical Agnosticism, the only pretense of an intellectual foundation for popular Agnosticism, is gone like a bubble. . . . .

"To-day, the great conflict of the ages is concentrated on this fundamental question: *can we, or can we not, know anything in itself,—that is, not merely as it seems, but as it is?* If we cannot, science is as false as theology; if we can, science is itself theology. If we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must either know them as they are *not* in themselves—which would be *absolute error;* or else we cannot know them *at all*——which would be *absolute ignorance*. To one or the other of these, absolute error or absolute ignorance, the Agnostic principle reduces all human knowledge, turning science itself into absolute nescience. . . . .

"The scientific materials for a scientific world-conception are all here, if we have intellectual ability to handle them; if we cannot handle them, it is no fault of theirs. Agnosticism holds *two* in one hand and *two* in the other hand, yet does not comprehend that it holds *four* in both hands; it does not know enough to see the whole in the sum of the parts. Intellectual feebleness, philosophical incapacity—this, despite the eminent abilities in other directions which I recognize and admire in so many Agnostics, is the charge which I deliberately and advisedly bring against Agnosticism itself, as a pretended 'philosophy.' Mere specialists in science, however able in their specialties, are not philosophers; philosophy must be universal, not special, and climb high enough to see the whole in the sum of the parts. He who cannot do this, who cannot find in the wealth of universal science enough material to frame a world-conception, is too ambitious when he erects his own individual inability into a universal limit of knowledge, and presumes to declare the impossibility of knowing that which science, by the very law of its being, is bound to know. As surely as human reason is active, irrepressible, and in the long run victorious over all difficulties, so surely will the Scientific Method yet generate a truly philosophic world-conception; and that world-conception, solidly grounded in science and in philosophy, will be the future's Idea of God. . . . .

"The doubt or disbelief of God will soon be followed by doubt or disbelief of the Moral Law itself. True, ethical relations must exist wherever moral beings exist. But moral beings could not be moral beings, if morality were not a universal law above them,—nay, the all-pervading law of the universe itself. . . . .

"No ethical enthusiasm which is empty of a scientific idea can long sustain itself in the wild turmoil of modern thought; it must at last go down before any idea sufficiently virile to ground itself upon scientific reason. Enthusiasts who seek to unite Ethics with Agnosticism imagine that the Agnostic principle destroys Theology alone. What fatal blindness! The Agnostic principle destroys Ethics no less certainly than Theology. When Agnostics begin to demand, as they will demand, some cosmical reason why Ethics should not be thrown overboard together with Theology, what faintest glimmer of a reason has Agnosticism to offer? 'Indeed,' says Mr. Salter, in his recent most beautiful and noble book, 'no serious man wants a reason.' So wide of the truth is this, that no man *is* serious until he *does* want a reason; all seriousness begins in wanting reasons. Without a reason, Ethics itself must die down into mere custom or convention; the ideas of reason and of right are Siamese twins. The 'ethical passion,' if it contain not the ethical idea, is the weakest passion of the human soul—has in itself no more continuance or abiding life than a beautiful cut flower; yet, for modern men, there can be no ethical idea which is not grounded in the known constitution of an ethical universe. It is pathetic, it is tragic, to behold a sincere and lofty ethical movement seeking vainly to establish itself upon an Agnostic foundation. Who cannot foresee the end of such a movement? Either it will seek, before it is too late, a new foundation in Scientific Theology,* or else it will die of intellectual and spiritual thirst in Agnosticism. For it stands written in the nature of things that, amidst the fury of contending passions, the Moral Ideal itself shall go to the wall, unless it drink omnipotence from the Divine Idea."

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

We have above reproduced from the essay of Mr. F. E. Abbot in the *Unitarian Review* a number of forcible passages of which we approve; but we have omitted the remaining part of the essay, because we cannot follow Mr. Abbot into the conclusions he draws from his so-called "Scientific Theology."

Mr. Abbot correctly says: "The reality of a World-Order is itself the possibility of a World Science"; and we might have expressed the same idea in the very same words; indeed, we have expressed it in almost the same terms.† Further on Mr. Abbot says, "In the final upshot, what men think of God, must depend on what they know of Nature, and that knowledge is science." We agree with this also, for we declare with Mr. Abbot that God is immanent; God and the Universe are one.

But Mr. Abbot becomes inconsistent with himself when he calls God an Infinite and Eternal Person, by whom all things live. The unity of the universe he declares to be "Omnipresent Self-conscious Energy or absolute Personality." When Mr. Abbot maintains, that "morality could not be the all-pervading law of the Universe itself, if the universe were impersonal or non-moral," we must most emphatically object. The universe, or if you prefer God, is neither moral nor immoral. That power in which we live and move and have our being is simply such as it is. Morality means to be in harmony with that power, it means obedience to the law. Human beings can be moral or immoral, according as their conduct agrees with, or does not agree with, God. But God himself cannot be said to be moral. If we want to find out what He is, we must study nature, we must learn how He works The Universe is a law unto itself; and concord with that law law is morality. There is poetry in the conception of God as a person, but there is no science in it.

Mr. Abbot says that there are three ultimate types of being: namely, the Machine, the Organism, and the Person. The Machine is mechanical causality, the Organism is organic finality, and the Person is ideal morality. This is, indeed, most beautifully

*We accept the expression Scientific Theology, if it is identical with Science; we reject it if it signifies the postulate of a Divine personality.—Ed.

†See "Fundamental Problems," under Definitions and Explanations, p. 254, "Upon the Order of the World depends its Cognizability."

expressed; and Mr. Abbot, standing on the principle of monism, declares that the three are one.

Certainly the three are one. The person is a perfect organism and the organism is a perfect machine. But not *vice versa;* not every machine is a perfect organism, nor every organism a perfect person. The mechanical principle that regulates the motions of the celestial bodies, cannot be considered as personal. Nor, because evolution tends everywhere to develop higher forms from lower forms, can the universe as such be supposed to be a moral being or a person. For this is the great lesson taught by evolution, that life as it is now, can transcend itself; it can transform itself, and *must*, according to nature's laws, transform itself into a higher form of life.

Since we know that evolution is a reality, we can dispense with the anthropomorphic conception of God; we need no longer believe in the contradiction of a personal God, for now we know that God is immanent, that Nature and God are one; or to express it in Mr. Abbot's own words: "Real knowledge of Nature is real knowledge of the immanent God."

* * *

Mr. Abbot on several occasions in his book, and again in his address, speaks of "the consensus of the competent" as a criterion for truth. We do not believe in the consensus of the competent; nor does it agree with Mr. Abbot's position. Kant, for instance, would reject Mr. Abbot's position; and Mr. Abbot speaks so highly of Kant that we are certain he would include him in the list of the "competent." Indeed, there may be a difference of opinion even among the highly "competent," and from this difference of opinion the progress of science rises. In other words, competency is relative, not absolute. If those who are really competent agree upon a subject, that upon which they agree is either a common prejudice of the times or it is a settled question. But with regard to the scientific problems of the day, it is a matter of course that the competent will disagree; while the incompetent do not count or at least should not count at all. The incompetent, as a rule, side with the wrong man, though, taken by himself, this man may be competent enough. The masses are always conservative as regards the errors and superstitions of the age. They rather side with the Ptolomæan astronomers against a Copernicus, and will make it out as if the consensus of the competent were complete, because the one man who opposes all the others with his supposedly absurd ideas seems to be of no consequence.

* * *

There is another question wherein we cannot agree with Mr. Abbot, and that is his view of "Universals." All philosophical interest in the Middle Ages hinged upon the problem whether Universals are real entities or not. The two parties were the Realists and the Nominalists. The Realists said with Plato, "Universals are real things, they exist independently of things and would exist even if things did not." The Nominalists said, "Universals are not entities, they are not objects (*res*) but mere names (*nomina*). They would not exist if things did not exist, for they are abstracted from things.

The famous Anselm, bishop of Canterbury, said, *Universalia sunt ante res* (Universals are before things); accordingly, they are the real entities, they are *realia*. Roscellinus, on the contrary, said: things are real, and universals are generalizations only, which we acquire by the mental process of abstraction.

We need not mention that the word "Realism," as it is used in modern times, is employed to designate a wholly different direction of thought. Indeed, Modern Realism may be considered as equivalent to mediæval Nominalism, and the scientific method of Realism, in the sense the word Realism is used to-day, is the outcome of nominalistic philosophy. The Mediæval Realists were victorious in their time, for the church threw the weight of her authority into the scales of Realism and rejected Nominalism as a heresy. At the Realistic Council of Soisson the consensus of the competent stood by Realism; but History decided for Nominalism. From the date of that decision the gap between the church and science deepened more and more; and it led eventually to a breach known in history as the Reformation, in which the progressive part of Christianity separated from Rome.

Nominalism, as Mr. Abbot correctly declares, culminated in Kant, and at present all liberal thought stands upon the principle of Nominalism.

* * *

While upon the whole rejecting Mr. Abbot's interpretation of Mediæval Realism and his criticism of Nominalism, we are greatly indebted to him for having called attention to the fact that the Universe does not consist of matter alone. The relations among things, the forms of things are realities also. They are not materialities, not things, but they are real nevertheless. They are most important realities and all higher life, all intellectual existence, and all ethical aspiration depend upon them. *The world of forms indeed is identical with spirituality.*

This is the truth in Mr. Abbot's position, and it is this which is so little understood by those philosophers who imagine that the world can be explained from matter and motion alone. It is this truth which THE OPEN COURT inculcates in all its publications.

The human soul is form; it is a special form of life. The human soul is mortal: for every form can be broken. But the human soul can be made immortal; for every form can be built again. Thus Christ spoke plainly about himself: "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." JOHN. II. 19.

Every philosopher who is not clear about the nature of form, will be unable to account for the problems of evolution. He will end in mysticism; *i. e.*, the belief in some occult principle. He will end in agnosticism, *i. e.*, in the statement that the problem is insolvable, it is beyond our ken, it is unknowable.

* * *

A few words concerning Kant's position on this question will perhaps greatly contribute to clear the situation—or at least characterize our own standpoint.

Mr. Abbot* calls attention to the stupendous proposition of the great sage of Königsberg: "Things conform to cognition, not cognition to things." And Mr. Abbot adds that, this is tantamount to the assertion that things-in-themselves are utterly unknown."

In his "Prolegomena" § 36, Kant argues that the highest laws of nature (we call them "formal laws") are the very same as the highest laws of reasoning (we call them "the laws of formal thought"). The word "highest" is here identical with "most general." Kant continues: Either we have derived them from nature by experience, or, *vice versa*, nature has derived them from our cognition; they are the condition of the possibility of cognition. The former, he says, is impossible, because the highest laws of reasoning are *apriori*, they are independent of experience. Therefore, he concludes, they are not derived from nature by experience, they do not belong to the objective world, but they are part of the thinking subject. The thinking subject is so constituted that it cannot help but consider reality clothed in the forms of cognition. Cognition transfers its own forms upon the things. Therefore things conform to cognition, not cognition to things.

We do not accept Kant's standpoint. We say:

The thinking subject is a part of the objective world. The same laws hold good for both. It is all but impossible that the formal laws of the one should be different from the formal laws of the other. Thus the extension of our body is tridimensional, and

* "Scientific Theism," Introduction, p. 3.

there is not the slightest reason why it should be an exception to the outside world. We do not hesitate to declare that reality in general is tridimensional also.

The highest laws of nature are the laws of form and the highest laws of reasoning are the laws of the form of reasoning. Accordingly both are identical.

Therefore:

Things conform to the laws of form.

The formal laws of the objective world of nature are not different from the formal laws of the subjective part of the world, of the thoughts of the subject.

The laws of form are the condition of the world-order and the laws of formal thought are the instrument of cognition.

* * *

I here take occasion to call the reader's attention to Kant's "Prolegomena," especially to § 36, headed "*Wie ist Natur selbst möglich?*"

I do not hesitate to consider this chapter as the most important one in Kant's works. He has written many glorious passages which contain truth, and nothing but truth. This chapter, however, contains "the key to the main error of his "Critique of Pure Reason"; and I make bold to say: no one understands Kant who is not familiar with the motive that led him to adopt the strange doctrine of the ideality of time and space, and pronounce that bold sentence: "Things conform to cognition, not cognition to things." Said Schiller:

> "Let but an error be hid in the stone of foundation. The builder
> Buildeth with confidence on. Never the error is found."

I admire the strength of a man who has the courage to accept the logical conclusion, even of a small mistake which he considers as a truth. If Kant had seen his mistake, he would have inquired into the origin of the apriori (which he did not do), he would have found it to be the laws of form, and he would undoubtedly have come to the same conclusions that are laid down in the chapter "Form and Formal Thought" in "Fundamental Problems."

When I read Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," everything was so bewildering to me, so labyrinthine, so incomprehensible. When I read his "Prolegomena," everything became clear, for then I began to understand Kant's chief fallacy and was thus enabled to pick out the forcible lessons which the great German philosopher teaches us.

* * *

Mr. Abbot is one of the strongest and one of the most scholarly American thinkers. How much importance he attaches to the points in which we disagree from his views, we do not know. But I am inclined to consider them as difference of expression rather than as actual contrarieties. For on the one hand Mr. Abbot employs theological terms in a wider and in a philosophical sense, and we are justified to interpret them accordingly. On the other hand we feel the monistic, the positive spirit in every line of his powerful address.

P. C.

THE IDEAL NEWSPAPER.

In the latest *North American Review*, Mr. Henry E. Rood advances a suggestion regarding the foundation of an ideal Daily Newspaper. He appeals to the rich of the United States who are "possessed of noble ideas and generous spirits, who are anxiously searching for a way to benefit mankind through a proper disposition of their property," and suggests "a plan for founding an institution which would be more far-reaching than any college, which would accomplish untold good, which would make evil-doers of whatever station tremble, which would aid struggling humanity to better its condition; an institution more powerful than pulpit, stage, or forum,—an absolutely truthful, unprejudiced, independent, daily paper, whose news columns shall tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and whose editorials shall discuss both sides of every important question."

Mr. Rood continues:

"The vast power of American journalism cannot be denied, even fettered as it is on all sides. It accomplishes much good, but it also is responsible for much evil. Prejudiced, fearful, and often corrupt as is the press of to day, it still remains the most influential factor in American civilization. In this respect all else sinks into insignificance beside it; and yet its bulwarks have been raised at an awful expense to good morals and good government.

"Who is foolish enough to play the races on newspaper 'tips'? Why does one journal suppress all but bare mention of a certain railroad accident, while another publishes a column account of the same? Why do papers cater respectively to the Irish, the German, the Italian vote? Why does one fight Catholicism, and a second war upon Protestants? Why do newspapers support party candidates, whether the latter are known to be honest men or the veriest scoundrels in the ward?

"Every day an irresponsible reporter or correspondent hurls misery, shame, disgrace, upon some family for the sole purpose of lengthening his space bill. Within a month two suicides have been recorded whose causes are ascribed to the publication of certain articles. The men who took their own lives may not have been mentally sound; but is that any reason why homes should be invaded by unscrupulous ghouls of the press?

"The journal of to-day is edited from the counting-room. The ideal newspaper has not yet made its appearance. The editorial and the business departments should be absolutely independent of each other. The paper should speak the truth, no matter how its advertising patronage or its political 'pull' is affected.

"A free and unsubsidized press—where will you find it? Papers all over the land will rise up, and each, patting itself, cry 'Here!' But those in command know that the daily paper which prints the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, the daily paper whose editorial opinions are absolutely fearless and unprejudiced, does not exist in the United States.

"The ideal paper should print in its news columns nothing but that which has been verified. Readers might not get particulars of a race war so soon as in one of the present "enterprising" journals; but when published in the ideal paper the news could be absolutely relied upon. The editorials should discuss in parallel columns both sides of leading questions. For example, articles advocating free trade and protection should appear simultaneously. In the case of a great strike, one column should contain the employer's views, another the laborer's arguments. Chicago should have the chance of putting forth her reasons for wanting the World's Fair as well as New York. The Southern and the Northern sides of the race problem should both be discussed. The paper should argue for and against every great question, local, national, international. Then could the people read, reflect, and decide who and what is the right.

"Would such an impartial journal pay? Perhaps not in money at first. But the people of the United States are willing to be convinced; they want the best government, the best officials, the best of everything. That paper in time would be read from Maine to California, and beyond the seas. Its influence would be inestimable, its power transcendent. Evil-doers of whatever party and station, rich or poor, black or white, alien or native, would fear it. Good citizens would eagerly support it. The poor would pray for its success.

"The ideal paper should not be pledged to support any party, community, state, or government. It should be nothing less than the exponent of humanity. And it must occupy this grand plane if not an advertisement is received, if not a single copy is sold.

How can this be accomplished ? Here lies the millionaire's chance to see his name grouped with those who have made nations, who have conferred lasting benefits upon mankind.

"Endow such a paper as colleges are endowed. Let it be managed by a board of trustees. Let the employees represent the faculty ; the readers, the students. Pay salaries large enough to command the best editors, writers, and publishers. Have the trustees select for these various positions men of integrity, of broad minds, of education, ability, culture, and noble ideas. Be liberal, so that they put forth continually their best efforts. Guarantee to the paper a regular income, that it may be published day after day and decade after decade, if the advertising columns are blank, if every copy has to be given away.

"The time is ripe, the people are anxious, the field is unoccupied. A great daily paper which could be relied upon absolutely would be a monument forever to its founders.

"Where is the man or the group of men who will improve this opportunity ?."

We have nothing to add to the plan suggested by Mr. Rood and express our full sympathy with it. Yet we must state that in our judgment Mr. Rood should not appeal to the vanity of the rich, but to their love of truth only. It is true that there is a chance for a man or a group of men, who would engage in a cause like this, "to make for themselves name and fame undying." But this should be a secondary consideration, if any consideration at all, with the men who are willing to make a sacrifice to truth and to the best policy, which is and will forever remain Honesty. I am told (I do not know whether it is true) that in one of our great cities a newspaper was founded with the outspoken policy not to pander to, but to educate, the public. The founders hoped that if they offered a daily journal, the pages of which were clean, and free from slander, and honest in politics, their enterprise would be appreciated and aided by general sympathy. After having sustained great losses, counting many tens of thousand, they were obliged to give up part of their principles, and the journal, I am told, is now perhaps somewhat, but not much, different from its contemporaries.

If we really had a great daily which were clean in every respect and at the same time ably conducted, it would have to educate the public before it could expect to be a success. The public at present rather sustains those journals which cater to their lowest tastes. This we say not in pessimism but as a statement of fact, and it would be unjust not to add that a tendency for better is perceptible almost everywhere. P. C.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CELIBACY CONTROVERSY.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

I.

XANTIPPE.

I'd like to know if Socrates,
Before he fell upon his knees
  To fair Xantippe, really knew
  That she was such a horrid shrew,
Or if she forced herself to please.

Some say he left a life of ease
To school himself by her disease
  To bear the worst the world could do ;
    I'd like to know.

For if he married her as these
Pretend, aware how she could tease,
  Ought we not call him boldest too
  As well as wisest ? What say you ?
Didn't he rival Hercules,
    I'd like to know ?

II.

KHADEEJA.

Mahomet loved Khadeeja well
From marriage feast to burial,
  Though he was young and she was old
  And he was anything but cold,
From what the true believers tell.

He made the Koran let him dwell
With many wives when death befell
  This first. What charm then could she hold
    Mahomet loved ?

'Twas this,—she felt the Prophet's spell
When all the world was infidel ;
  She bade his failing heart be bold ;
  She watched while angel words were told,
And Islam lauds the sentinel
    Mahomet loved.

BOOK NOTICES.

The editor of the "Agnostic Annual" for 1890 has gotten together some very interesting reading-matter in the fifty-three pages that the pamphlet comprises. This is the seventh year of the publication of the "Annual," whose single purpose is the firmer establishment and wider dissemination of Agnostic principles. Mr. Samuel Laing contributes the opening article, entitled "Agnosticism and Immortality," and we may also note a gracefully written poem by Mr. W. B. McTaggart. (Charles A. Watts, editor ; Stewart & Co., 41 Farringdon Street, E. C. London, publisher.)

Lippincott's table-of-contents for January is highly attractive. Julian Hawthorne opens with "Millicent and Rosalind" ; Mr. Edward Fuller writes a few pages apropos of "The Theatrical Renaissance of Shakespeare," in which our own opinions are fully voiced ; while the editorial pages,—not uncommon with *Lippincott's*,—are very bright.

Messrs. Longmans, Green, & Co., of London, issued early this year a cheaper edition of Crozier's work on "Civilization and Progress." The questions of which the author of this book so intelligently treats, are of far-reaching fundamental importance, and we shall have occasion, later on, to review the work at length.

The *Amerikanischer Turner-Kalender* for the coming year contains its usual wealth of information, and interesting discussion of engrossing topics. The selections of epigrammatic sayings and the extracts from current German-American literature are well made. (The Freidenker Pub. Co., Milwaukee, Wis.).

We acknowledge the receipt from Mr. H. L Hastings, editor of the Anti-Infidel Library (10 Paternoster Row, London, E. C.) of several pamphlets "designed to convince sceptics, instruct inquirers, and assist believers to 'put to flight the armies of the aliens.'"

From a note in the London *Freethinker* we learn, that the "Biographical Dictionary of Freethinkers," by Mr. Wheeler, is completed, and that the work will be put on sale within a fortnight.

NOTES.

With the purpose in view of extending the influence of the work of THE OPEN COURT, and our list of subscribers, we shall be pleased to offer our periodical, free of charge, for the term of six weeks, to any person who shall wish to take advantage of this opportunity to become better acquainted with the aim and nature of our efforts. Address The Open Court Pub. Co.

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THE OPEN COURT is not exclusive or sectarian, but liberal. It desires to further the efforts of all scientific and progressive people in the Churches and out of them, towards greater knowledge of the world in which we live, and the moral and practical duties it requires. To this end it asks for circulation in the Churches, and also in all Ethical, Secular, and other Liberal societies. It hopes for a well-wishing co-operation in what all must admit to be true, good, and practical in the conduct of life, iudividual and collective.

DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE LIBERAL'S FOLLY.

There was a man in the Fatherland to whom liberty was dearer than life. He bravely stood up against the Government and against the Church, for both proved oppressive, both curtailed the liberties of the people. There was no freedom in the Old Country, and no hope of ever attaining freedom. So this man left his home and the place of his childhood; he crossed the Ocean and came to the Land where the Stars and Stripes float in the breeze as an emblem of the new ideals that have become actual facts under our western skies.

This man arrived here poor, but he was industrious, frugal, and intelligent. He worked first as a laborer, then as a mechanic, then as an inventor. He earned money and he saved money; first cents, then dollars, then hundreds, and then thousands of dollars. After a life of energetic labor he had become one of the wealthiest citizens of his adopted country.

He had children and they were educated according to his principles. They should not be suppressed, as he had been during childhood; they were brought up in liberty.

To-day this man is broken-hearted. Part of his wealth is gone, through the imprudence and folly of his son. Everybody had seen it, but the father had not, that his son brought up in liberty had become a scamp, a foolish, rude lout, a boisterous scape-grace. The father had enjoyed the pranks of the frolicking child; but he was disappointed when the adult son repeated the same pranks in business—not to mention other dissipations and follies.

Who is that man? His name is legion. Look around, and you will recognize him at every turn among your acquaintances and your business friends. This man can almost be considered as the typical Liberal. It is not always his immediate son who thus shows the folly of his errors; in many cases it is the grandson or the child of the grandson. For the virtues of the parents remain a blessing to the second and third generation. The capital of moral strength is not suddenly exhausted; yet it dwindles away rapidly.

The children of men of this stamp sometimes still remain in possession of their father's wealth. If not laborious and industrious, yet they are shrewd business men, sometimes unscrupulous too; but they have mentally and morally degenerated, and in the place of the republican simplicity of their grandsire they assume aristocratic habits. They are ashamed of the honesty, the industry, and frugality of their ancestors and make themselves ridiculous as servile imitators of European nobility.

Let us institute an aristocracy of the mind, and of loftiness of aspirations. Rotten is every nobility that boasts of wealth. It is a shame that we Americans, "the brave and the free," are always vaunting in the face of foreigners the immeasurable, inexhaustible riches of our country. It is a poor country where that is the best to be gloried about, and it is a poor man whose riches are everything of value that he possesses. Let us cease to admire the rich because they are rich; and ye, the moneyed aristocracy, cease to pride yourself upon your possessions. The pride of wealth is the lowest kind of pride, the meanest, the poorest!

But ye liberals, beware that ye are not under the same curse as the typical liberal. Ye liberals have a great mission, for ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt has lost his savor, wherewith shall it be salted? It is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out and to be trodden under foot of men.

Liberty is a great thing and we should give, if need be, our lives for liberty. But liberty must be deserved; it must be the fruit of our labor. Do not be deceived by the false prophets who preach in high-sounding words, who promise happiness and enjoyment, and then decoy you into the abysses of the pleasures of the world. They come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves; they tell you that liberty enlightens the world. Do not be deceived, for it is just the reverse. Liberty does not bring enlightenment, but enlightenment brings liberty; and there is no liberty which is not based on enlightment, on education, on culture, on morality, on wisdom, and good will.

The impoverished immigrant is the fool of whom the gospel speaks. His ground had brought forth plentifully, and he thought within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room where to bestow my fruits? and he said, This will I do: I will pull down my barns, and build greater; and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods, and I will say unto my soul, Soul thou hast much goods laid up for many

years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry. But God said unto him, 'Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee, then whose shall those things be, which thou hast provided?' So is he that layest up treasures for himself, and is not rich toward God. For a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth, but in the abundance and purity of his soul.

The rich man was a fool because over the cares for worldly goods he forgot the one thing that is needed. He neglected his soul; and his soul was taken from him.

The man to whom liberty was dearer than life neglected his soul and he neglected to build up the souls of his children. Thus they degenerated and involved their old father in their own ruin.

You liberals call yourselves free-thinkers and you rail from the platform at the churches and at religion. Ye blind guides! Why behold ye the mote that is in your brother's eye, but perceive not the beam that is in your own eye? Either, how can you say to your brother, Brother let me pull out the mote that is in thine eye, when you yourself behold not the beam that is in your own eye? Ye hypocrites, cast out first the beam of your own eye and then shall you see clearly to pull out the mote of your brother's eye.

How insignificant is the mote in Mr. Gladstone's eye in comparison to the beam of Mr. Ingersoll's, in spite of his great attainments and enthusiastic sincerity! Can the blind lead the blind? Shall they not both fall into the ditch?

It is true that our churches and the dogmatic tenets of the churches are full of errors, and religion as generally taught, is defaced with superstitions. But the freethinker who casts away religion is like the bear of the hermit. To drive away the fly on the face of his master, he crushes his head and kills him.

You hate oppression and yet you make your children slaves of their follies. You love liberty but you shut the door to that enlightenment without which liberty is impossible. The Churches with all their errors are by far superior to the wiseacre who destroys only, but does not build!

It is not the churches you should oppose, but the errors of the churches; it is not religion you should destroy, but the superstitions of religion! If you undermine the basis of ethics in the name of Liberty, then you are the salt that has lost its savor.

The churches have repeatedly refused to be the leaders of humanity. Whereat liberal thought was called upon to shape the future destinies of man. Ye men of a liberal mind and of progressive views, ye are now expected to be the masterbuilders, to lay the foundation. But it appears that on you the word will be fulfilled again. Many are called, but few chosen. The many have again rejected the only foundation upon which the temple of humanity can be raised.

Our people will pay dearly for the errors committed by the blind guides. The cornerstone of man's welfare is religion, and if man will live, he must take care of his soul. Tear down religion, neglect the most precious treasures that are entrusted to you, the souls of yourselves und your children, and you will reap the destruction which you deserve. The masses of our nation seem to be blind to the truth. They follow the false prophets. But let us not despair, for in the end our people will bethink themselves of the right path. Then religion shall be raised up again and the rents therein shall be closed. Then the prophetic word will come true again: The stone which the builders rejected, the same is to become the head of the corner!

THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE.

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

We saw at the end of our last lecture by what process the constituent elements of a language can be discovered. It is a very simple process. You take a word, remove from it all that can be accounted for, that is, all that can be proved to be purely formative and derivative; and what cannot be accounted for, what cannot be further analyzed, you accept as an element, as an ultimate fact, or, as scholars are in the habit of calling it, as a root.

Now let me tell you, first of all, that this chemical analysis of words is by no means a new invention. It was performed for the first time more than 2,000 years ago by the grammarians of India. They reduced the whole of their abounding language to about 1,706 roots.* Given these roots, they professed to be able to account for every word in Sanskrit, and to a certain extent they achieved it. Considering the time when that experiment was carried out, it strikes us as perfectly marvellous. Still, we have made some advance over Pâ*n*ini, and Mr. Edgren has reduced the number of necessary roots to 816, afterwards to 633, and at last to 587.† With these roots he thinks that the great bulk of the Sanskrit vocabulary can be accounted for. And here again we may say that, with certain well-understood exceptions, this promise has been fulfilled. For instance, the root *bar*, or *bhar*, particularly if we include the words derived from Latin *ferre* and adopted in English, such as, for instance, *fertile*, *far* (barley), *farina*, barley-flower, *reference*, *deference*, *conference*, and all the rest, would yield more than a hundred English words. We should not want therefore more than a hundred such roots to account for 10,000 words in English. Now, as a matter of fact, the number of Aryan roots which have left offspring in English, is

* *Science of Language*, vol. i, p. 306.
† *Science of Thought*, p. 377.

only about 460.* When all the offspring of a root dies, of course the root itself comes to an end, and this is what has happened to a number of roots which are required to account for words in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, but no longer, for any words existing in English.

It stands to reason that all these statements are broad statements. There is in every language a considerable residue of words which has not yet been traced back to any root. There are likewise many words which are not to be derived from roots at all, but come straight from imitations of sounds, or interjections. To this class belong such words as *cuckoo*, *moo* (cow), *bah* (lamb), *to click*, *to hiss*. The Greeks called the formation of such words *onomatopoeia* or word-manufacturing, by which they meant that they formed a class by themselves, that they were mere made words, artificial words, not real and natural words, like all the rest.

Besides there are interjections, such as *ah*, *oh*, *fie*, *pooh*, *pah*, and all the rest.

Still, to put the matter broadly—and I cannot here attempt more than to give you the broad outlines of the Science of Language—we have now come to this. Instead of being startled and staggered by 250,000 of words, all crowding in upon us and asking us what they are and whence they came, we are now only confronted by four or five hundred words or roots, and have to render some account of them. If we can do that, the world-old riddle of the origin of language is solved. How from these roots the whole wealth of English was evolved has been shown by Comparative Grammar. Here all formative elements, such as suffixes, prefixes, infixes, all case-terminations, all personal and tense-terminations, have been classified, and traced back, more or less successfully, to so-called demonstrative elements. Here also much remains still to be done, but the broad fact is established once for all, that all we call grammar is the result of synthesis between predicative roots and demonstrative elements, often also between words, ready made.

Thus *birth* was originally *bhar*, to bear, *plus* a demonstrative element *ti*, in English *th*, which localizes the act of bearing here and there.

The Sanskrit bi-bhar-mi shows us the same root reduplicated, so as to express continuous action, and followed by mi as a personal demonstrative. *Bearing-I* comes to mean, I bear.

The English *bear-able* is a compound of *bear* with the Roman suffix *able*, the Latin *abilis*, which expresses fitness.

Instances of composition of ready-made words, we have in English in such words as *huzzy*, which stands for *housewife*; or *world*, which stands for *ver=man*, and *eld*, age; *god-less*, which means loose or away from God; *god-ly*, which means like God.

We have now to face the final question, What are these roots? If we can answer that, we shall know what language is. We shall not simply stare at it in silent wonderment, nor shall we repeat the old answer that we learnt it from our mother, and our mother from her mother, and thus *ad infinitum*. We shall probably wonder at it all the more, but with an intelligent wonder and pleasure, and not simply with a vacant stare, that so much could have been made out of so little.

All roots which we find in English, in Sanskrit, or rather in that stratum of language which lies even beneath Sanskrit, are perfectly definite in sound. Their consonants are guttural, dental, or labial, surd, sonant, or aspirated. These consonants can be modified according to certain rules, but they are not vague and indefinite, as is often the case with the vowels and consonants of less developed languages.

Secondly, they nearly all express acts, such as bearing, striking, pushing, cutting, tearing. And you will find, if you trace even the most abstract and elevated notions back to their original source, they are borrowed from such material concepts as tearing, pushing, and all the rest. *Abstract*, for instance, is what is torn away, *elevated* what is pushed aloft.

Thirdly, they are all conceptual, that is to say, they do not express a single percept, as, for instance, the sound of *cuckoo*, or *moo*, or *bah*, but they signify acts, or qualities, conceived as the result of acts. *Percept*, as you know, is the technical name given to our cognizance of a single object actually perceived by the senses; while concept is the technical term for our cognizance of something common to several objects, which can never by itself be conceived by the senses. Thus *snow* is called a percept, the *white* of snow a concept.

When logicians ask, how we came to form concepts, they seem to see no difficulty whatever in this process. There was *white* in snow, in chalk, and in milk; and the sign for this common quality was the sound *white*. So, no doubt, it is with us; but in the evolution of the human mind, the forming of concepts represents quite a new epoch, and like everything else in that evolution, we must try to discover some natural necessity for it. Now the first natural necessity for our taking cognizance of two or more percepts as one, lies in our own acts. Most of our acts are repeated acts. We do not strike, or push, or rub once only, but repeatedly. This consciousness therefore of our own repeated acts as one action, grew by necessity into our first conceptual knowledge, and that primitive conceptual knowledge is embodied in those very roots which, as we saw, were the feeders of all human

* Skeat, *Etymological Dictionary*, pp. 729, seq.

speech. When this conceptual tendency was once started, it would go on growing stronger with every new generation, till at last our whole intellectual life became, as it now is, conceptual. It is the beginning of this peculiar mental operation that has to be explained, and it should be explained, if possible, as brought about by the same natural necessity which forces us to see and to hear. I do not say that the consciousness of our own repeated acts is the only possible way in which the beginning of concepts can be explained. All I say is that it is the most natural explanation, and that it is confirmed in the most unexpected way by the facts of language.

One more question now remains. Why should the consciousness of our acts be accompanied by certain definite sounds, such as *bhar*, to bear, *mar*, to rub, *stâ*, to stop, *tan*, to stretch? Here again our answer can only be hypothetical. Often though we cannot drive our shaft into a deep geological stratum, we can guess by analogy what its constituent elements must have been. It is the same in the geology of language.

With regard to the sounds accompanying our notions, we know from physiology that under any muscular effort it is a relief to the system to let our breath come out strongly and repeatedly, and by that process to let the vocal cords vibrate in different ways. That is the case with savages, and it is the case even with us. These natural sounds accompanying our acts, are called *clamor concomitans*. Navvies when they have to lift a heavy weight together, shout *Yo heo*. Sailors when they pull together, have their own monotonous song. Even children when they march or dance, break out naturally in some kind of rhythmic singsong. Here we have at all events a hint,—for I will say no more,—how this natural music which accompanied the acts of early people, this *clamor concomitans*, could have supplied the outward signs of the inward concepts of these acts. What we want are natural signs of concepts, not of percepts. If our thoughts and our language consisted of percepts only, the sound of *cuckoo* for the cuckoo, of *moo* for cow, and *bah* for lamb would have been amply sufficient. But we must take language as it is. Language as it is, is derived from sounds which express the consciousness of our acts, and which are *ipso facto* conceptual. Such sounds can be supplied, as it seems to me, through one channel only, namely, from the sounds which accompany our acts, and particularly such acts as are performed in common with our fellow-men. From the fact that these primitive acts were performed in common, another advantage arises, namely, that the sounds which accompany them, and which afterwards are to remind us of them, are naturally understood by others as well as by ourselves, in every part of the world where a beginning of social life is made.

Let us see now what are the results at which we have arrived, not by *a priori* theories about language and thought, but by a mere analysis of facts, of the facts of language, as garnered in our dictionaries and grammars.

We found that a small number of insignificant little syllables, such as *bhar*, or *dhar*, or *mar*, or *pat*, or *man* formed the elements with which the whole English language had been put together. We found that a somewhat larger number sufficed to account for the whole verbal harvest of all the Aryan languages, such as Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Russian, German, and Welsh. I may add that a similar analysis of the Semitic languages, such as Hebrew, Syriac, and Arabic has led to exactly the same result, and that in other families of languages also, outside the pale of Aryan and Semitic, something corresponding to our roots has been discovered as the residue of a careful etymological analysis.

We may now with perfect safety make another step in advance.

These so-called roots, these insignificant little syllables, which form the foundation of all that we call language, form at the same time the impassable barrier between man and beast. Whatever animals may be able to do—and no one who has watched intelligent animals without preconceived opinions, can doubt that they can do almost everything that we do, only in their own way—but whatever the cleverest animals are able to do, they cannot form these little syllables as signs of concepts. And as what we mean by a concept cannot come into existence except by a sign, we may argue, with a certain amount of plausibility, that animals have not what we call concepts, and that this is the true reason why they have not what we mean by language. It may seem a very small matter, this being able to use a number of syllables as signs of concepts; but it forms nevertheless the *sine quâ non* of language, and no one will venture to say that language is a small matter, even though it consists at first of 300 words only. The first rays of language, like the first rays of the dawn, change the world from night to day, from darkness to light, from a strange phantom into our own home. However humble we may try to be, no one who really knows what language means, and what it has done for us, will be able to persuade himself that, after all, there is not a radical difference between him and the parrot, the elephant, or the ape.

Here then, is one of the lessons which the Science of Language teaches us. It opens our eyes at first to the marvellousness of language, and makes us see that the language which we speak, and which seems to us so very simple, so very natural, so very familiar, is really something so magnificent, so wonderful, so different from everything else we have or do or know,

that some of the wisest of mankind could not help themselves, but had to ascribe it to a divine source.

It shows us secondly that, like all the most marvellous things, language also, if carefully studied, discloses a simplicity more wonderful even than its supposed complexity. As chemistry has shown us that the whole universe, the sea and the mountains, the earth and the sun, the trees and the animals, the simplest protoplasm and the most highly organised brain, are all put together with about sixty simple substances, Comparative Philology has taught us that with about 400 simple radical substances, and a few demonstrative elements, the names and the knowledge of the whole universe have been elaborated. Only by being named does this universe become our universe, and all our knowledge, the accumulation of the labor of countless generations, is possible only because it could be handed down to us in the sacred shrine of language. Let us be humble, as much as you like; but on the other hand, let us not depreciate our inheritance. We have not made our language ourselves, we have received it. We are what we are by what those who came before us have done for us. Like the coral islands which have been built up by the silent and self-sacrificing industry of millions of millions of living beings, our languages have been elaborated by the incessant labors of millions of millions of those who came before us. Whether those ancestors of ours were hairy, whether they had tails, whether they walked on all fours, or whether they climbed trees—what does that matter to us? Our body is a mere conglomerate of cells. It comes and goes, it is born and dies. It is not ours, it is not our own self. But whatever these prehistoric ancestors of ours may have been, they were able to bring to maturity and to compound in ever varying forms those intellectual cells which, for want of a better name, we call roots, and which constitute a barrier between ourselves and all other living beings—a barrier which fortunately does not vanish by being ignored. The Science of Language, better than any other science, teaches us our true position in the world. Our bodily frame is like the bodily frame of the animals; it is even less perfect than that of many animals. We are beasts, we are wild beasts, and those who have fought with wild beasts, not only at Ephesus, but within the arena of their own hearts, are least likely to forget that lesson. But there is a light within us, which not only lights up our own true self, but throws its rays upon the whole world that surrounds and holds us. That light is language. Take away that language, and man is lower than the dumb animals of the field and of the forest. Give us that language, and we are not only higher than all animals, but lifted up into a new world, thinking thoughts and speaking words which the animal may obey, may even imitate, but which no animal can ever create, or ever impart to its own offspring.

THE ROLE OF SUGGESTION IN PHENOMENA OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY ALFRED BINET.

We shall conclude our investigation of the subject of double consciousness, by attempting to define accurately the relations existing between the phenomena treated of and those of suggestion. The subject of suggestion has been extensively and carefully studied, of late years, in France. At the present day, the facts of this department are the best known and the least discussed. They are daily reproduced in our hospitals upon subjects of the most diverse characters; and they will undoubtedly soon take their place in the current practice of medicine. Some writers, of a type of mind too prone to generalization, have exaggerated the importance of suggestion, and are determined to find suggestion at every turn; they have asserted even, that suggestion is the sole cause and key of all physical and moral phenomena capable of being provoked in hypnotized subjects.

Owing to repeated experiments, it is comparatively easy to give a fairly precise definition of suggestion; and such a definition is absolutely necessary if we desire to avoid the error committed by many writers who have come to explain everything by suggestion only because they confound under this convenient term things that are quite different. First of all, suggestion implies, in the majority of cases, the setting into activity of the intellect of the subject; it is pre-eminently a psychological phenomenon. When a hypnotized subject, for example, is told that there is a snake or a bird in front of him, and when, following thereupon, he fancies he sees a serpent crawling at his feet, or a bird flying in the air, this constitutes a suggestion, for, to provoke the hallucination, an appeal has been made to the intellect of the patient. The same result may be reached without making use of words to convey to the subject the thought in question: oftentimes a simple gesture, a sign, an attitude, or even the form of the experiment, are sufficient to apprise the subject of what the experimenter wishes; and the thought that the latter has in mind is often hit upon and carried into execution by the subject with a rapidity and a sagacity that are astonishing. In this phenomenon we come upon one of the greatest obstacles and one of the most easily committed errors attending psychological experiments with hypnotized subjects.

A second feature of suggestion, at least in the majority of cases, is the assumption of an influence exerted by one person upon another. The subject of the suggestion is at the orders of the experimenter; he listens, he appropriates the latter's thought, he feels every-

thing the experimenter desires him to feel, obeys every wish and every caprice the experimenter entertains. The instances of resistance offered, frequently met with, are evidence of incomplete hypnotization or of incomplete suggestion. Of the observations that firmly establish this passive obedience on the part of the subject, I shall cite that of M. Richet which I deem very remarkable. The experiment was conducted with one of his friends, whom, after having been put to sleep, M. Richet compelled to pick up, twenty times in succession, a piece of chalk that he kept throwing under the table.

Such is what contemporary authors understand by suggestion. The notion currently entertained thereof may be explained by putting it some such form as this, namely, that it is the setting into activity of the intellect of a subject by another person, who exerts upon the subject a power more or less absolute.

I have no hesitation in declaring, for my part, that a definition of this sort is beyond question insufficient and that it would be unsafe to accept it; it is much too broad; it comprehends too many facts; it comprises, in effect, all psychology, and on this score every psychological phenomenon becomes a phase of suggestion—a state of affairs that would divest words of their worth and complicate all questions involved. With a very few authors, among them M. Pierre Janet for example, I hold that we must restrict the term suggestion to cases, precisely determined, in which a subject carries into effect a given phenomenon because he has previously had the idea of it. He has conceived the phenomenon, he has willed it, or at least he has given it his adhesion, and he carries it out. Such is suggestion. For example, we tell him to steal a handkerchief; he understands what we require of him, and does it. Or perhaps, we tell him that his picture is drawn upon a sheet of white paper; he understands what is told him, he represents to himself the portrait and believes he sees it. In all these cases, we establish, when we analyze them, the fact that the subject is conscious of the end that he pursues and that the experimenter has indicated it to him.

A psychologist will have no difficulty in recognizing that suggestion, understood in the sense last indicated, pre-supposes a great number of intellectual elements. It appeals, in the first place, to the functions of perception, then to the functions of ideation, of comprehension; the entire intelligence can, in certain cases, intervene in the shape of reasoning, of memory, and of imagination; and finally, the will, the emotions, the entire personality of the subject may play a part in it, be it by engaging in the suggestion, be it through modifying the same, or in opposing it. Suggestion clearly represents an intellectual activity that is extremely elevated and complex.

But it is plain that all the manifestations of the mind can not be referred to a phenomenon of this kind, as type. Every one possesses, within the sphere of his psychological life, acts of a more simple, of a more elementary order; and these more elementary acts must, in hypnotized subjects, plainly be retained. The following are instances of such acts. If some one sharply strike our knee, at the tendon just below the cap, while our legs are crossed, we will suddenly lift and extend the leg outward; if a person, behind us, strike, unawares, a vigorous blow with a stick upon a Chinese gong, we will be stunned by the deafening sound for which we were unprepared, and will make a gesture of surprise or of fright, or we will give forth a cry. We have here, it may be said, elementary psychological phenomena; which do not contain a trace of suggestion, for we have not had the idea or the intention of making a movement of our leg before receiving the blow at the knee, or the idea of crying out before having heard the noise made by the gong. Now the fact that these phenomena are produced in hypnotized subjects is no reason that they should alter in character, and we believe, accordingly, that suggestion does not comprehend all psychological phenomena.

The reader is now well enough acquainted with the subject to understand why it is insufficient to explain everything that takes place in hypnotized subjects by invoking the hackneyed term suggestion. "Suggestion," people say. And that suffices for all purposes, that explains everything, and like the panacea of the ancients it cures everything. As a matter of fact, theories of suggestion, thus invoked, amount to nothing less than make-shifts to save people the trouble of serious and delicate investigation.

We have now come to the especial subject of our inquiries. Without doubt, we shall find here suggestion; but it is not suggestion that explains the division of consciousness in hysterical patients, at least the spontaneous division observable in persons affected with anæsthesia. Far from being the cause of the division of consciousness, it is its effect. This latter idea was first propounded by M. Pierre Janet, and appears to me eminently correct. A word will suffice to elucidate it.

Suggestion, when successful, consists of an idea impressed upon a person and reigning dominant in the consciousness of that person; reason, critical powers, and will are impotent to restrain it. If a subject believes he is holding a bird upon his knee, in consequence of the simple fact that I have told him so, the conclusion evidently is that he has lost the power of controlling, examining, and judging the ideas given him. For suggestion to develop itself, accordingly, it is necessary that the subject's field of consciousness do not contain too many antagonistic ideas. Now, it is

exactly this psychological situation that is found realized in the duplication of consciousness. As a consequence of such a phenomenon of bipartition, each of the consciousnesses occupies a more narrow and more limited field than if there existed one single consciousness containing all the ideas of the subject. This retrenchment of the field of consciousness constitutes what is called suggestibility.

We are able, to a certain extent, to test directly the exactitude of the interpretation indicated, by recurring anew to the experiments set forth in our previous articles. When an hysterical subject presents an anæsthesia of half of the body, the sensations received into that half form, as we have seen, a consciousness distinct from the principal consciousness. Now, in many subjects, this second consciousness appears to occupy a field of activity much more limited than the principal consciousness, for the suggestions given it are executed in a more automatic manner. For example, let us command the subject, that is to say, the principal consciousness, to take a pen and to write his name; perhaps the subject will obey our injunction, but it is also possible that he will resist it, and that in the waking state he will be very slightly susceptible to suggestion; the field of his consciousness includes a certain number of antagonistic ideas against which a struggle must ensue, and over which victory is not always certain. But the case is quite different when, without saying a word to the subject, we slip a pen into his anæsthetic hand, and make him trace a word behind a screen; the anæsthetic hand, in the majority of subjects, does not hesitate to re-write the word; indeed, it will write it successively a great many times —proving the limited power of initiative of the impoverished consciousness that receives the sensations of the anæsthetic member. This incessant repetition of the same graphical movement has been discovered in several pathological cases, and the name of "verbigeration" has been given it. This absence of the power of initiative action is indeed so great that in the majority of subjects that I have studied, a suggestion of conduct or action through the intermediary agency of the anæsthetic hand could not possibly be effected. If we cause to be written by the anæsthetic hand the orders "Cough," "Sing," "Get up," the hand will reproduce automatically the order written, but the act suggested will not be carried into execution. This circumstance shows us that the phenomona of automatic imitation constitute an inferior psychological life.

M. Pierre Janet, whom I have frequently cited—for he has pushed his investigations very far upon this particular question and his conclusions often coincide with my own—has discovered an interesting method of utilizing this especial suggestibility produced by the division of consciousness. Although I have no inclination, on this occasion, to occupy myself with anything that relates to the practice of medicine, I may nevertheless point out that our researches in the province of psychology may in case of necessity possess a very great advantage for patients and contribute greatly to the treatment of their diseases.

Up to this point I have investigated only that division of consciousness that is spontaneous, that preexists in subjects before any sort of experiment is instituted. M. Janet has invented an ingenious means of effecting an artificial division; it consists in distracting the attention of the subject while some one is talking to him. For example, we take advantage of a moment when the subject is chatting with some other person, or is absorbed perhaps in a fascinating book, to talk to him in a low voice; whereupon a mental bipartition is produced; one part of the subject's mind is conversing with the first-mentioned person, and another part with the second. Two distinct consciousnesses are thus formed, and each one is wholly occupied with the task before it. The suggestions that can be induced in this manner in a subject divided by distraction, are much more efficacious than direct suggestions; they have, in addition, the advantage of being capable of accomplishment without it being necessary to put the subject to sleep, and we warmly recommend this class to all those who seek to alleviate the diseases of hysterical patients.

PARIS, 1889.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF UNIVERSITIES.

BY MORRISON I. SWIFT.

HOWEVER superficially we look at society, it is clear that old things are passing away and new things are to be. What once appealed to men, no longer moves them as before. The church is losing its hold, the common schools are attacked, we hear of the university as out of joint with life. So it is necessary to plan movements that all can believe and assist in, particularly with reference to helping the many who are compelled to lead unsanitary lives in cities.

It is important to bear always in mind the central difficulty, and to arrange all sociological and philanthropic schemes with it before us. This central difficulty is that the working people as a class do not receive enough pay for their work, that a considerable portion of the social product that belongs to them, is intercepted before it reaches them. Diluted philanthropy is one thing; anybody can 'slum it' in *coupe* and kids, or send a Christmas turkey to employés whom he underpays all other days of the year; but this sort of philanthropy, and any other that does not have the wage-problem before it, are insufficient.

The people must first learn what to do, and think-

ers ought to be striving to tell them, for the wage-problem is economic and ethical. But our universities are rather exalted and exclusive, and think a little cheaply of propositions to turn energy that might be devoted to monographic historic insights, to the solution of problems that have not yet receded to the realms of pure and cool theory. On themes relating to Socrates and Seneca, or the text in which they spoke, our universities are laudably alive, but is it not curious that in the objects at which those gentlemen aimed, the very same universities are unanimously torpid and comatose? There are living ethical problems, and the great English colleges are cordially facing them, while our representative college people for the most part deem such lay proceedings opposed to the university idea. Perhaps our retrospective feelings will hereafter be more comfortable if we hasten rapidly over this period.

Assuming that the university idea will grow, which cannot be doubted, what shall the university undertake in these modern times, and what can it suitably encourage and support? I will sketch a brief program.

The Kindergarten is the basis of all good educational work. The universities should give more attention to the development of these beginnings. The Kindergarten is likewise the basis of much that is best in sociological work. Every neighborhood in the worse portions of cities should have its Kindergarten-room, and these rooms should be utilized for some of the following projects.

1. *Economic Conferences.* This enterprise has already been initiated in Chicago, where a series of addresses on economic subjects were given to the public by representative men from the camps of labor and capital respectively. The two sides are brought together, the grievances of each are heard by the other. Work of this kind should be organized in every city, and it presents few difficulties.

2. *Concerts and Lectures.* A hall may be obtained in the poorer part of town where from time to time concerts, arranged by the well-to-do, and lectures shall be given free to those specially invited, or at a nominal cost—if concerts—to the public. The low Variety Theatre now occupies the field, and in regard to it we think everybody must agree in its condemnation, with a writer in *The Westminster Review* on "The Characteristics of American Cities." He says, "The 'Varieties' Theatre is a vile cancer, which is eating the life out of many a community in the United States, and nowhere, probably, is there a viler one than in Portland in Oregon. It is to be hoped that in time the municipality may provide for the native working-classes within its limits, entertainments as decent, sober, and honorable as those which the Chinese have provided for themselves. To this a Western critic will at once reply that the 'Varieties' are visited only by the lower class of Americans, and that the vice of these classes stops there; whereas the Chinese—decent enough in public—are in private profoundly immoral, having, in fact, no sense of what morality is. We are convinced that this statement is exaggerated. The 'Varieties' theatre—with its cheap debit of the corruptions of Europe and of the great cities of the American Atlantic coast—does reach and corrupt other than the lowest American classes. A theatre into which decent women will not go, but which their husbands and brothers think it no shame occasionally to frequent, is a public danger which cannot be too soon done away with."* Is it not time to begin to supplant the "Varieties" with something better?

3. *Taking Residence.* Young men, graduate students of the University, and others, may go into those parts of town where higher influences are needed, simply to live. They would continue their studies and work elsewhere as before. Perhaps nothing is so necessary as a movement of this kind, and it involves no machinery. Any one can do it. If the rent of a room in the better quarter of the city can be paid, the less rent in a worse district can be met easier.

4. *University Extension Lectures.* Out of 2d and 3d the Extension Lecture would in time naturally grow.

5. *A University and City Committee.* To promote the mutual interests of the university and city in these and various other ways, to obtain for the city the greatest advantages from the university, and for the university the fullest support of the city, a conference committee, composed of a small number of representative persons from each body, might be established. Every city of importance either contains a university or has one near it.

What would be the results of this expansion of the university? I have elsewhere described some of them, and I will quote from that paper.† "A man in the college or university looks at the world through spectacles, and it takes him a year or more to learn to conduct himself with perfect rationality in real life. But if he goes at once to teach, he makes his faulty judgments inveterate. A few months with sturdy, unveneered, plain-speaking, substance-wishing men of physical toil would vaporize many dear delusions. A near acquaintance with uncompromising facts and persons wishing to know definitely what to do and resolved to do it, would be invaluable training to him. It would be both a pedagogical and humanitarian study. It would teach him sincerity; it would show him what there is for educated men to do in the world. It would instruct him how to be plain, and direct, and simple, and forever tolerant, for it would let him into

* *The Westminster Review*, July, 1888.

† *Journal of Education*, June 7th, 1888, Art. "University Extension."

the secrets of human nature, laying bare its needs and defects and workings. The average teacher has had no experience with which to compare youths. He has never mingled and struggled with unprofessional men, or visited insane hospitals.

"The educated man should lead society out of its prejudices toward breadth; he should therefore not become an aristocrat nor partial; he should affiliate with all classes. Nothing would lift and educate and encourage the people like this intercourse. The university is the product of all society; wage-workers have helped to create it, their disaffection would annihilate it; the artisan class has then a claim to its direct and intentional interest. A conduit must be formed between the university and the people which will give the latter the immediate benefit of progressive knowledge. The very act of establishing this relation between the working-classes and the highest educators would be an immense stride toward mutual comprehension of classes and social harmony. I have already hinted at its value as helping to furnish truthful conceptions to economist and moralist. It is no less bad to sit in a study and theorize about the needs of an economic class without ever going among them, than it would be to speculate about amputations without having seen a knife; also a morality to-day that does not take hold of actual situations and renovate real lives, that is not social and cannot improve the relations of social classes, is abortive and metempirical. But for this purpose it is necessary to know society and classes intimately."

It will be readily seen that I am inclined to doubt if the university is the highest court of appeal on all subjects. In the days of Lord Salisbury's connection with the *Saturday Review*, when that journal "made a specialty of scorn and contempt for everybody who did not keep hunters or had not graduated from Oxford or Cambridge," the university had a theory of itself at which our time smiles; but the tradition of those days is hardly extinct. "The higher education is not for the helots of society, but for the captains," said some recent writer, and unfortunately this view finds supporters in the university itself. Professor Swing is wiser. "After the youth has passed through the common school, of country or city, self-education not only becomes possible, but easy."* I would say more. The education that a young man may obtain by keeping himself clear of the university, so long as it is subject to the ideas that at present have mastery in it, may be much better than he could obtain in the university itself. The university lessens the personality of many men. But universities are entering upon a period of expansion, and the main question is, When will the breath of life be breathed into this or that educational body?

If there were some single organization devoted not to all reforms and good works but to social reforms specifically, and this were to take these new projects in charge, they would soon prove their feasibility and usefulness. Perhaps the Nationalist Societies which are springing up so rapidly, will appropriate this field. The power of education has not yet been fairly tried in matters that relate to the improvement of society, and it should be the object of an organization for social progress to institute an education based on its conception of society as it should be, and tending to make the better arrangement real. In connection with universities, or with the aid of independent university men, they could inaugurate the work here suggested.

* See article "Aids to Self-Education," in *The Christian Union*, December 6, 1888.

ERNST PRUSSING.

A FUNERAL ADDRESS BY W. M. SALTER.

I COUNT it an honor to say a few words over the remains of this brave and true man. A man of conscience, of stern veracity, of courage; a man who sympathized with forward movements in society and who supported them generously; a man of tender feeling, who loved his family and his friends—the community has none too many such, and we who are here, and many more besides, must mourn his loss. To me he was a personal friend,—a counsellor, a supporter, and I valued his support the more, because there was a touch of magnanimity in it, he not being able to agree with all my views. What a warm-hearted man, what friendliness shone out in his face, how he loved all simple, innocent human joys! "Always young for liberty," said Dr. Channing once of himself; so did Mr. Prussing always seem young for truth, for right, for humanity. There was a heart of fire in him that made him indignant at injustice, that made him the enemy of degrading superstition, that made him zealous to spread the light, as it was given him to see it. I never met a man who rang truer. Of many persons you cannot say where they stand—how much is real, how much is sham in their professions. What Mr. Prussing said he believed, and what he believed he said; there was no sham in him—he was a living illustration of those earnest words of the poet,

> "Speak thou the truth, let others fence,
> And trim their words for pay;
> In pleasant sunshine of pretence
> Let others bask their day.
>
> "Show thou the light. If conscience gleam
> Set not thy bushel down;
> The smallest spark may send a beam
> O'er hamlet, tower and town."

Mr. Prussing showed the manhood that was in him, when, while still a university student in the Fatherland, he enlisted in a company of volunteers that swore fidelity to the Revolutionary principles of 1848. For

that loyalty to conscience, he was compelled in 1849 to leave his native land; and what was the old world's loss, was the new world's gain. He came to this city of Chicago at once and after three years of work for others, established himself in a business, which he honorably pursued almost to the time of his death. Here, too, he espoused the cause of freedom. He was an abolitionist when to be such was not the honor that it has since become; he had for personal friends some of the leaders in that movement. What effort to promote freedom and progress in religion has he not seconded in our midst? If a man or a cause was worthy of his friendship, when did he ever fail to bestow it? And if he was ever mistaken in judgment, his error but showed his generous heart. He was devoted to just politics—to politics with principle in it; he strove for juster methods of taxation, he believed in a state without a church or any remnants of one, he wished all property, ecclesiastical or other, taxed on equal terms. He served our city faithfully as a member of the Board of Education. He welcomed the idea so contrary to the reigning custom, of bringing the purifying and cleansing influence of fire to bear upon the remains of the dead, and so leaving the earth sweet and wholesome for those who came after; In accordance with his wish, his own remains will be disposed of in this manner.

And now upon this active, earnest life have fallen the shadows of death. For him death had no terrors. He knew that, as Lord Bacon says, "It is as natural to die as to be born," and as I have heard how quietly, how painlessly he drew his last breath, I have thought of those other lines of Bacon, "He that dies in earnest pursuit, is like one that is wounded in hot blood, who for the time scarce feels the hurt."

My friends, what real harm can there be in that which happens to all alike, which is a part of the order of nature? And who knows what is death and what comes after? In the absence of knowledge, we fear; but why should we not, with as good logic, trust and hope? And whether we fear or whether we hope, what difference can it make to a man as to the reasons for noble living now? Socrates, not knowing much of the things below, was convinced that he did not know; but this he did know, that to do wrong and disobey any one, whether God or man, who is better than yourself, is wicked and shameful. It gives one immense rest to know that the life of truth and justice and love is not an arbitrary prescription from without, but is the dictate of man's own conscience and heart. It was this serene consciousness to which he attained, in whose honor we are gathered to-day; he followed his own heart, and because his heart was pure, his life was full of sweet satisfactions and he gave comfort and cheer and joy to all about him.

He has gone from us—gone from wife and daughters and sons, on whose sacred sorrows I shall not here intrude, gone from those who loved and honored him as friend; but he lives on as a presence in our memories and in our hearts. Who of us will forget him, who of us does not feel that his life is richer for having known him, who of us will not feel a new reason for fighting the battles of justice and right in the world now that this valiant soldier has laid down his arms? These human lives of ours are at best very short. "Do not act," said the Emperor Aurelius, "as if thou wast going to live 10,000 years. Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good." Ah, what work there is to do in the world, and how indifferent and self-concerned we are often in the midst of it! How little we do for humanity, how much we try to do for ourselves! How we conform to the customs and traditions of the world, instead of being nobly true to our own thought and our best convictions! Such was not the type of this man. O ardent, zealous, unselfish soul, too soon with all thy years passed away from earth, may we be like thee, may we honor thee by taking up afresh the work which thou hast laid down!

DREAMS AND HALLUCINATIONS.

In the artificial sleep of hypnosis the dream-images are as perfectly real as in natural sleep, and in post-hypnotic suggestions the images likewise appear equally real, to such a degree, that a subject is very seldom able to distinguish them from reality. It seems as if even a fever-patient could more easily discern between truth and delirium than the hypnotic subject.

Concerning the reality of suggested hallucinations Professor Forel says:

> I have frequently made the following experiment. During the hypnosis I told Miss L., that on awaking she would find two violets in her lap, both of them natural and beautiful, and that she would give me the prettier flower; but I laid a real violet on her lap. On awaking she beheld two violets; one was brighter, more beautiful, she said, and therewith she gave me the corner of her white pocket-handkerchief, but kept for herself the real violet. I now asked, whether she believed that both violets were real or, whether one of my supposed presents, known to her from previous experience, were among them. She said, that the brighter violet was not real, because on the pocket-handkerchief it looked so flattened.

In this case the subject could distinguish to some extent the hallucination from reality. Forel continues:

> I repeated the experiment with the suggestion of three real, equally dark violets, not at all flattened, but fragrant, with stem and palpable leaves; but I only gave her one genuine violet. This time Miss L—— was completely deceived, and was utterly unable to tell me, whether one of the violets or two, or indeed all three, were real or suggested; all three, as she thought, were this time genuine; at the same time she grasped with one hand the air, and held the genuine violet in the other.

Hence we learn, that when we suggest sensations for all the senses, the illusion is complete.

For example, I hand to another hypnotized lady a real knife, and tell her, that there are three. Though fully awake she is absolutely unable to distinguish the supposed three knives one from another, not even if she employs them for cutting, if she touches them, or drums on the window-pane. When other persons later derided her on the score of her illusion, she grew angry, and firmly maintained, that there had been three knives, that I only later had hidden two of them ; she had seen all three knives, felt, heard them, and would not yield on this point."

Bernheim once gave to a patient of his hospital in an hypnotic state the following suggestion :

"In six days, during the night between Thursday and Friday, you will see the nurse come to your bed and pour cold water over your feet." On the following Friday, she loudly complained that the nurse had poured cold water on her feet during the night. The nurse was called, but naturally denied it. He then said to the patient :—"It was a dream, for you know how I can make you dream ; the nurse has done nothing."—She emphatically declared, that it was no dream ; for she had clearly seen it, felt the water, and become wet."

Beaunis relates the following suggestion, which may at the same time serve as a natural explanation of second sight :

"On the afternoon of the 14th of July, 1884, I hypnotized Miss E., and gave her the following suggestion : "On the first of January, 1885, at 10 A. M., you will see me ; I shall come to wish you a happy New-Year ; after that is done I shall immediately disappear."—I did not mention this suggestion to anybody. Miss E. lives in Nancy. I was myself in Paris on the first of January, 1885. That day, Miss E. told a friend, a physician and several other persons, that on the same day, at 10 A. M., when she was in her room, she heard somebody knocking at the door. She said : 'Come in!' and to her astonishment saw me enter, and heard me with a cheerful voice wish her a Happy New Year. I immediately went out ; she at once hastened to the window to see me leave the house, but did not see any further trace of me. To her surprise, she also noticed that I, at that season, had come to her in a summer dress. (The same clothes that I wore at the time of the suggestion.) Her attention was in vain called to the fact that I was in Paris on the first of January, and could not have come to her on that day. Nevertheless she maintained that she had seen and heard me, and she is still convinced of that, in spite of my declarations that it was impossible."

One of the strangest facts as to the reality of hallucinations is the observation of Messrs. Féré and Binet, that the laws of optics hold good for suggested images as well as for real ones. Thus they suggested to a hypnotized subject that she would see a portrait on a table. The subject when awakened saw the portrait, and when Dr. Féré placed a prism before her eye, she was greatly astonished to see the portrait double. Dr. Féré informs us that the subject had no education and could not possibly have any idea of the qualities of a prism. Other instruments had in the same way their natural effect. The mirror reflected the suggested image, while an opera glass brought it nearer, and if inverted, projected it to a greater distance. Yet upon close examination, it was found that the magnified picture only showed larger proportions, but revealed no finer details than could be seen with the naked eye.

There is, accordingly, a difference between dreams and hallucinations. Dreams are, as a rule, products of inward incitements solely. Suggestions, however, are associated with certain external sensations. If the suggestion is given that a subject will see a bird on her hand, she will see, before a mirror, the reflection of her hand and with the hand also the bird reflected. Whatever change the object suffers with which the suggestion is associated, the same will be observed in the suggestion.

There is a story about a man who when going to bed put slippers on his feet and armed his eyes with spectacles, because he used to dream that he stepped into glass-splinters which caused him much pain. He did not notice the glass in his dreams, because of his shortsightedness.

We are not informed of the success attending his remedy, but if the frequent occurrence of the odd dreams had to be attributed to an itching in his soles, if, as we suppose it did, the pain existed first and the dream consisted in an interpretation of the pain, the ingenuous method of protecting his feet with slippers, it is most probable, was of no avail.

It would be different if a hypnotic subject had been told that the surface of the lawn was strewn with glass. In that case he would feel innumerable wounds in his feet, if he walked over the lawn bare-footed, but he would be protected against the pain if he saw that a thick leather sole remained between himself and the grass.

The reality of dreams, which subjectively considered cannot be distinguished from the reality of sensations, is the source of many errors in philosophy, as well as religion. Schopenhauer * derives from this fact his idealism. The subjectivity of the world, (*i. e.*, the world in so far as it is my conception, the world as it appears to me) is mere appearance (*Erscheinung*) ; it "is in this respect akin to dream" ; Schopenhauer says, "it belongs to the same class. The same cerebral function which in sleep produces an objective, visible, and palpable world must be no less active in the production of the objective world in the waking state."

Schopenhauer claims, and undoubtedly he is right, that there is a remarkable difference between dreams and the play of our imagination. Yet it is a difference of degree not of kind. The imagination of the savage is real and objective like the images of dreams, while the imagination of the philosopher and the inventor is more abstract. The poet—at least the modern poet—may often stand between both. Even such a man as Goethe, critical though his mind was, could not entirely free himself from visions. Yet we must remember

* *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol II, p. 4.

that the account of his vision is reported in a book which he entitled *Wahrheit und—'Dichtung.'* It seems probable that memory pictures appear real only when innervated by the nerve-fibres that rise from the central ganglions of the brain. These nerve-fibres being the usual channels for the transmission of sensory impressions, it seems natural that the effect of their innervation is the same whatever the cause of their irritation may be. The commissural fibres, however, that serve the purpose of association, cannot have a stronger effect in dream than in the waking state. The innervation by commissural fibres awakens conceptions and images only in such a way as they appear in our imagination.

The savage who is almost incapable of abstract thought, will naturally be limited to an imagination of palpable visions, while the thinker or the inventor, whose brain is filled with commissural fibres, can better dispense with the dreams of the waking consciousness and exercises his imagination chiefly in abstract thought.

The life like corporeality of dreams appears natural when we consider the physiology of sensations and the kinship that obtains between sensations and dreams. There is no evidence, as Schopenhauer imagines, for our possessing a special organ of dream which he supposes to have its seat in the great sympathetic plexus; and still less can it prove that the soul is endowed with the power of producing an extended world out of itself. Schopenhauer says, "As the stomach and the bowels change everything which they digest into chyle, thus the brain reacts upon all irritations by producing tridimensional images, subject to the law of causality." We see no possibility that a being whose sensations were always tridimensional, should have four-dimensional visions in his dreams.

In concluding this essay we call attention to the fact that the life-like reality of dreams must be considered as the origin of man's belief in ghosts. In Homer we find the following passage:

"Hush'd by the murmurs of the rolling deep,
Achilles sinks in the soft arms of sleep.
When lo! the shade, before his closing eyes,
Of sad Patroclus rose. He saw him rise
In the same robe he living wore. He came
In stature, voice, and pleasing look the same.
The form familiar hover'd o'er his head,
"And sleeps Achilles (thus the phantom said:)
Sleeps my Achilles, his Patroclus dead?
Living, I seem'd his dearest, tenderest care,
But now forgot, I wander in the air,
Let my pale corse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below."
"And is it thou? (he answers) To my sight
Once more return'st thou from the realms of night?
O more than brother! Think each office paid,
Whate'er can rest a discontented shade;
But grant one last embrace, unhappy boy!
Afford at least that melancholy joy."
He said, and with his longing arms essay'd
In vain to grasp the visionary shade!
Like a thin smoke he sees the spirit fly,
And hears a feeble, lamentable cry.
Confused he wakes; amazement breaks the bands
Of golden sleep, and starting from the sands,
Pensive he muses with uplifted hands:
"'Tis true, 'tis certain; man, though dead, retains
Part of himself; the immortal mind remains;
The form subsists without the body's aid,
Aërial semblance, and an empty shade!
This night my friend, so late in battle lost,
Stood at my side, a pensive, plaintive ghost:
Even now familiar, as in life, he came;
Alas! how different! yet how like the same!"

Dreams were considered as caused by the hovering phantoms of the departed spirit. This we know is an error. Yet let us not forget, that there is a truth even in this superstition. The vision of our dream is a reality, although there is no ghost standing at our bedside. The images of the deceased continue to live in our brains, they continue to influence our actions and prove themselves in many cases most powerful presences. Shakespeare depicts in several of his dramas, how real are the ghastly shadows of innocent victims in the imagination of the murderer. And how often is the memory of a mother a veritable blessing to her child, better and more valuable than the inheritance of wealth and worldly goods. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GOD IN EVOLUTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

A FEW words from me in reply to the statements contained in Mr. T. B. Wakeman's article, entitled, "Slandering the Universe," will not be inappropriate.

In the first place, I deny that the world is "plainly" inorganic in its great mass of matter forming stars, suns, and planets. Hypothetically it may be so, but of the constitution of the heavenly bodies we are ignorant, except so far as the spectroscope informs us of the existence on them of certain gases, metalloids and metals. For what we know to the contrary, organic life may play a much more important part in other spheres than it does on the earth. We are at least justified in assuming that organic life is present on such of the heavenly bodies as are fitted for its existence.

Secondly. We do not know inorganic matter in *five* forms. Mr. Wakeman cites Hæckel's "Descent of Man," Vol. I, p. 156, on the subject of growth, and there the renowned German writer speaks of four different *conditions* of density or aggregation, of which *three* are of inorganic bodies, and the fourth is the organic condition. He adds, "the inorganic bodies may be either in a solid, fluid, or gaseous condition. They grow by apposition. Organic bodies, on the contrary, are in the fourth, the soft or semi-fluid condition of aggregation."

Thirdly. Therefore, what Mr. Wakeman calls the "viscid or colloid, *i. e.*, jelly form" of matter is organic, as he himself immediately afterwards affirms in calling it *protoplasm*. No one denies that feeling and consciousness are natural, under certain conditions, to this living matter, but its existence has first to be accounted for. Hæckel (Vol. II, p. 50,) explains it by saying, "for the origin of the first monera upon our globe, the assumption of spontaneous generation is a necessary hypothesis."

Mr. Wakeman settles the question by first making "viscid or colloid" matter inorganic, and then calling it protoplasm! Hæckel's hypothesis assumes the original spontaneous generation of more than one moner, but Dr. W. T. Thiselton Dyer declares in the

Ency. Brit., *Art.* "Biology," that "if all living beings have been evolved from pre-existing forms of life, it is enough that a single particle of living protoplasm should once have appeared on the globe, as the result of no matter what agency. In the eyes of a consistent evolutionist any further independent formation of protoplasm would be sheer waste." With this conclusion Mr. Wakeman's definition of life, as "the natural action and reaction" of protoplasmic organisms, is not consistent. How could there be such "action and reaction" with only one particle of protoplasm? If he prefer to side with Hæckel, he will still have to solve the problem of spontaneous generation, which is not simplified by his statement of its conditions.

That organic bodies resembling lumps of jelly are to be met with on the seashore, is no proof that inorganic matter produces either protoplasm, or any of the other varieties of colloids referred to by Mr. Wakeman. Nor would the existence at the bottom of the sea of the fabulous monster to which Professor Huxley gave the name of Bathybius. It is a case of pure assumption arising from the necessity of the received hypothesis of material evolution; and so also is the assertion that, as life and consciousness are *attendant upon* "the action and reflex reaction of protoplasmic bodies," therefore they are the *results of* such action and reaction. This cannot be true if, as evolutionists assert, protoplasm was spontaneously generated. Hæckel declares (Vol. II, p. 45,) that the structureless amœba, to which he gives the name of moner, exercises "the organic phenomena of life, of nutrition, of reproduction, sensation, and movement," and these functions must have been exercised by protoplasm at its first appearance.

Finally, while thanking Mr. Wakeman for the expression of his opinion in the opening sentence of his speech, I would reply that, instead of my essay being an argument in support of dualism, it embodies a special phase of monism, based on the impossibility of accounting for the origin of life, excepting on the hypothesis of the existence of a living essence throughout the universe. The arguments of Mr. A. R Wallace, the most consistent advocate of evolution through the agency of natural selection, in support of the existence of a world of spirit and its agency in the three stages in the development of the organic world, have never been answered. Mr. Wakeman may apply the word "spook" to the universal principle of life denoted by the term "Deity" or "God," but by so doing he cannot alter facts. I still maintain that without such a principle the universe would lack vital energy, and that if it exists it must have a certain personality, although not the exercise of a creative power, nor necessarily a preconception of the forms of organic life on the earth. The universe may have a world-spirit without its being haunted by "spooky co-tenants." This is a very different question, as to which, however, reference may be made to the suggestive article by the Rev. M. J. Savage which appeared in the December number of the *Forum*.

C. STANILAND WAKE.

GOETHE A SAFE MORAL GUIDE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

In your number of December 5th, page 1976, Mrs. Susan B. Channing writes thus:

"It may be safely asserted that the writers who have corrupted the morals and debased the hearts of their youthful readers, have been, as a rule, celibates. Goethe is certainly not a safe guide. It is doubtful whether his *Faust*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *Elective Affinities*. *The Sorrows of Werther*, have not done more harm than good to the young."

All this is very mysterious to me. Has Mrs. Channing the impression that Goethe was a celibate? Or does the saving quality of wedlock consist to her mind not in the mutual fidelity of husband and wife, but in an ecclesiastical sanction? Or had her opponent (I have not now Mr. Luce's letter before me) referred to Goethe as one of his capable bachelors, and does she take this method of capturing a pawn in the argument when she might have had king, queen, and castle, by claiming him as a married man? In any case it seems proper to observe that from the time of his marriage in 1788 Goethe was an exemplary family man. For many years, to be sure, the marriage was only a conscience-marriage, but that is precisely the kind of tie to test a man's moral fibre; and I know of no evidence that Goethe was ever unfaithful to his wife. The pair lived in happy companionship and devoted attachment to each other until the death of Frau Goethe.

As to the corrupting influence of Goethe's works upon the "young," that is old straw which I do not now wish to thresh over. I do wonder, however, why *Werther* should appear in the above list. I can think of nothing in that which even a very keen-scented pruriency could find to feed on. And why should the *Elective Affinities* be mentioned in such a connection? The book was written largely for the express purpose of counteracting the loose notions of marriage which prevailed extensively in German society at the beginning of the century. It is a campaign pamphlet on the importance of husband and wife's cleaving to each other and guarding carefully the avenues of their affection. I do not see how any actual reader of the book could think it immoral unless he also condemned the parable of the prodigal son. As to *Meister* there is perhaps more room for discussion. That is certainly not a book for children; but then children do not and cannot read it. The dulness of the story is an all-sufficient solvent of any harm it might conceivably do to the very young. And as with *Meister*, so with *Faust* No one can read either until he is old enough to distinguish between depicting immorality and recommending it. And one who is old enough for that—old enough to read *Hamlet* without feeling his own homicidal propensities in the least excited by the killing of Polonius, or wishing to hang Shakespeare for the murder—is old enough not to allow his thoughts to be diverted from the higher aspect of a poet's work and fixed on its incidental sensualities.

The world is full of people who find in Goethe a perpetual source of ethical inspiration and ennoblement; but I would willingly undertake to found an asylum or build a monument (commemorative of unmatched stupidity) for any well authenticated case of man, woman, or child whose "morals" have been "corrupted," or whose "heart" has been "debased," by the reading of the great poets's works. Goethe is an eminently safe "guide" for young or old, married or single, provided they only read *him* and study him intelligently in the light of known facts, instead of making up an opinion at second hand out of what Peter, James, and John have chosen to write *about* him.

Respectfully Yours

ANN ARBOR. CALVIN THOMAS.

NOTES.

The second number of the new magazine, *The Arena*, is in every respect equal to the first. Mr. Ingersoll writes upon "God in the Constitution," Dion Boucicault upon "Spots in the Sun," *videlicet* Shakespeare, Lawrence Grönlund upon "Nationalism,' Mr. Pentecost upon "The Crime of Capital Punishment," Henry George upon the means "To Destroy the Rum Power," and W. H. H. Murray furnishes a graceful legend of the Saguenay entitled "The Mamelons." A comment may be made upon the *Arena's* motto, selected from Heine, "that we do not take possession of our ideas, but are posessed by them; they master us and force us into the arena, where like gladiators we must fight for them." The battle we allow; but our ideas are we ourselves; we are bundles of ideas, and *theirs* is the conflict in the arena; to speak of their possessing us and forcing us contains a tinge of dualism, for which we must take even Heinrich Heine to task. Few magazines present such a rich variety of solid and entertaining matter as *The Arena* in its first two numbers has afforded us, and we hope that each succeeding month will find it equally as effective and instructive.

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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF "THE OPEN COURT."

THE DATA of experience are perceptions.

REALITY is the sum total of all that is.

TRUTH is the conformity of cognition to reality.

[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.

At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called *Wirklichkeit* in German, derived from *wirken*, to take effect. Reality is not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effectiveness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence and its manifestation are not two different things; both are one.

The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also untenable; it would imply the existence of an object whose existence is not manifested *i. e.*, existence without reality; *Sein ohne Wirklichkeit*—which is a contradiction, an impossibility.]

SCIENCE is the search for truth.

The nature of science is the economy of thought. (*Mach.*)

Economy of thought is possible through application of the laws of form to thought.

KNOWLEDGE is the possession of certain truths.

[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge. The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowledge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vagueness, errors, and misconceptions.

The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over nature.]

MONISM is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual, as a part of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the All.

RELIGION is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.

[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of THE OPEN COURT, but all definitions that have been presented are in strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as "man's union with the All" (taking the definition from the Lutheran Catechism "Religion ist der Bund des Menschen mit Gott durch Gott," and replacing the Word GOD by the more comprehensive word THE ALL). The editor has defined Religion as "man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das Allgefühl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see foot-note page 965); as "man's conception of the world that serves him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]

MORALS are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.

[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or preacher may justly be asked, "On what authority dost thou justify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not personal; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly his authority is that of religion. If it were not so, all his good precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]

ETHICS is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must, and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison with the All.

Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms of existence.

Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which enhance progress, and *morally bad* are those which are not in harmony with the All, *i. e.*, those which retard or prevent progress.

[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that science as such is a sham.

It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed and re-adjusted.

The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of progress for both.]

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THE VOCATION.

When I was a youth a voice came unto me and said: "Preach!" And I answered: "What shall I preach? Lo, I am young and have not sufficient knowledge." "Go into the world," I was told, "and preach the truth."

That voice came from my parents and grandparents, from my teachers and instructors; and it found a ready response in my soul. To be a preacher of Truth, what a great calling! Is there any profession more glorious, is there any work more celestial and divine? I will go and preach the truth, I avowed; and in the secretness of my heart I swore allegiance to the Banner of Truth. I vowed to seek for Truth, to find it, to confess it, to go into the wide world and to preach it, yea, to give not only all my labor and efforts, but, if it were necessary, even my life, my blood, myself, and all that I was, for truth.

That was a holy hour in which I devoted myself to the cause of truth, and yet it was a rash decision, a preposterous act. It was an act that I had to regret in many dreary hours when I desperately pondered upon the problems of truth, when I had hopelessly lost myself in the labyrinths of life, and when I despaired of Truth's very existence.

When I was young, Truth seemed so simple to me. What is Truth? I asked, and the teaching of my childhood always echoed forth the ready answer: Truth is the gospel, and doubt in Truth is the root of all evil.

I knew the gospel by heart, and I studied eagerly, that I might be a worthy minister of the word of God. But the more I studied the more that sinful tendency to doubt grew, first secretly, then openly, first suppressed, then frankly acknowledged, until doubt ceased to be doubt; it became an established conviction. A cry of despair wrung itself from my heart: "The gospel is not truth; it is error! It is a falsity to preach it, and he who preaches it, preaches a lie!"

A pang of discord vibrated through my bosom and tore my whole being into two irreconcilable parts. Could I step to the altar in this condition and swear to preach the gospel? Never! I had believed that the gospel was but another name for truth and I now saw that whatever truth might be, the gospel certainly could not be truth.

Is there truth at all? No! I thought; there is no truth! There are opinions only, and one opinion is as good as another. Man likes to look upon the world as a cosmos—but there is no cosmic order, there is no higher law, there is no justice and no truth in the world, there is disorder everywhere, the universe is a chaos of forces, natural laws are indifferent to good or evil, and the lie rules supreme in society, sham gains the victory over truth, cunning and selfishness triumph over virtue and love.

Oh! these were dreary hours when I had lost the ideals of my childhood. I had cast my anchor into the ground of religious belief and had suffered a shipwreck, in which I expected to perish.

There was a time when I did not know which I hated more, Science that had taken away the comfort of my religious faith, or Religion that had promised all to me and had proved false. Religion could not justify itself as Truth before the court of scientific research.

I abandoned religion and followed science.

Years passed away amid earnest labors, and science reluctantly opened to me her treasures. She made me see the wonders of life. Life appeared different to me. The universe of science is another world than that which I imagined to see around me in the chaotic turmoil of the struggle for existence. I perceived invisible threads that connected distant events. I recognized that while the laws of nature might work blindly, yet they produced order. The more my views expanded, the clearer I saw that the chaotic attaches to the single, to the isolated only, not to the whole, not to the greater system, and the All itself is identical with order. The All is a cosmos truly.

Opinions clash with opinions in the empire of science; and the knowledge that we possess is almost always an approximate statement only of the truth. Nevertheless, there is truth and there is error. One opinion is by no means equivalent to every other opinion; there are wrong opinions and correct opinions, there is Truth in this world and Truth is a power. She reveals her sacred face only to him who earnestly struggles for truth. Truth may seem awful at first, but fear her not; trust her, have confidence in her, even as does a child in its mother. Give up your prejudices and your misconceptions even if they are holy to you, even if they seem to constitute the very life-blood of your spiritual being.

In the meantime I had given up every intention to preach the gospel and found satisfaction in the retired hermitage of the study, where I became an adept of truth in quite another sense than I had intended in the preposterous ambition of my youth. I was not a teacher, not a preacher of truth, but her pupil, not a master but a disciple who plodded modestly and patiently. How often, O how often, was a grain of truth dearly bought through the toil of many, many hours—and yet never too dearly!

In former years I had answered the question What is truth, with the words: "Truth is the gospel." Now I learned to reverse the statement. I had met so much misery and woe in the world and in looking around for salvation, I said: If there is any gospel, it must be truth—and truth must be found by patient labor, by scientific, honest research and by severe exactness. What a folly in man to imagine that truth should drop down from heaven as a revelation. Truth must be conquered by our own efforts. Truth would not be truth if it were acquired in some other way.

Years passed away and, again a voice come unto me and spoke: "Preach! Preach the truth." I answered and said: "How can I preach? Am I not a mere disciple who has no hope ever to become a master? I am no preacher and no one has appointed me to speak in the name of truth. When I was a youth I felt the strength to preach, and lo, I had it not. I had almost stepped to the altar and had almost made a vow which I now know I should have had to break. Let me study truth, let me devote my labor to science, but send another man worthier than I. Besides, I am not eloquent: but I am slow of speech and of a slow tongue. I know not how to speak as a preacher to the congregation.

But that voice came again: "Preach the truth." He who is called to proclaim the religion of mankind will not be bound by any oath to adhere to this or to that confession of faith. He is pledged to be faithful to truth only. If you have the conviction that truth—mere truth and nothing but the truth—will be the gospel of mankind, that the salvation from error can come from it alone, that science, whose fruit seemed so bitter at first, contains the germs of a higher religion, step forward upon this platform and preach that new faith which is greater than the old faith, because it is truer.

I feel as if a preacher that has not joined any of the many churches, must be a voice crying in the wilderness. But that should be no reason to decline the calling. Therefore I shall accept the call upon that platform. One thing alone shall be sacred to the preacher of the religion of humanity, and that is truth. There shall be no oath of allegiance to any dogma, no pledge to any creed. I accept the calling, yet I do it with hesitation, because I am aware of its difficulties. And at the same time I accept it in gladness, because I know that the new religion which grows out of science—out of the rock upon which the old creeds were shipwrecked— will not come to destroy. The new religion will come to fulfill the old faith.

PROBLEMATIC TRADITIONS.*

BY FELIX L. OSWALD, M. D.

NATURALISTS are often puzzled by the analogies of animal life in regions divided by vast distances; for instance, the close resemblance of the Alpine brook-trout to a species of salmon found in the highland-lakes of the northern Andes, or the identity of a South-Mexican tree-lizard with a variety found nowhere else but in the hill-forests of the Philippine Islands.

With a similar surprise the students of international traditions must often notice a phenomenon that might be defined as a metempsychosis of popular myths: a reappearance (sometimes with all details of incident) of political or religious legends among different nations connected neither by commercial intercourse nor by ethnological affinities.

In certain cases such coincidences may be attributed to the local adaptation of pre-historic sagas, while under other circumstances the only possible explanation would seem to be a marvelous similitude in the tendencies of the "myth-making penchant." The William Tell legend, for instance, has been traced to a vaguely similar tale of our Indo-Germanic forefathers; but how shall we account for the far more circumstantial analogies of many traditions found among nations as different as the Aryans, Semites, and eastern Mongols?

That remarkable and wholly abnormal event, the "Murder of the Innocents," for instance, has its parallels in not less than five different creeds.

Krishna, the incarnate God-son of Hindoo Mythology, barely escapes the emissaries of King Kamsas, who causes the slaughter of all his brothers, sisters, and cousins, and confesses the motive of his atrocity to have been the warning of a learned astrologer. The book of Zerdusht Nameh describes a similar episode in the childhood of Zoroaster, who by a miracle escapes the persecutions of truculent King Duransarun. Mohammedan traditions speak about an inspired seer who predicts the mission of the future prophet and incites a number of Christian and Hebrew fanatics to seek the life of the fatherless boy. Buddha, according to the Chinese version of the Sutra scriptures, alarms the astrologers of King Bimbasaras, the ruler of Magadha, with the omens of his great destiny, and one of the King's advisers elaborates a plan for preventing the decree of fate by the timely murder of the god-like in-

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fant. Buddha, Zoroaster, and Krishna had royal, as well as celestial ancestors; the birth of Confucius and Mohammed, Buddha, Zoroaster and Krishna is announced by angelic messengers, and the Brahman Asita greets the new savior of Buddhism almost in the exact words of old Simeon (Luke II, 25—39).

The boy Buddha visits a temple to argue theological questions before an assembly of learned Brahmins, whom he amazes by this knowledge of scriptural commentaries. Confucius and his rival Lao-Tseu surprise the sages of their native land in a very similar way, and Mohammed, according to the apocrypha of Ibn Abbas, had not yet completed his eleventh year when he vanquished a Christian monk in a debate on the unity of Allah. Mohammed, like Christ, fasts in the desert to prepare himself for the arduous work of his mission, and Buddha retires to the solitude of Uruvilva, where he abstains from food and denies himself every comfort, till his spirit has been sufficiently purged from earthly desires to receive the revelation of a world-redeeming truth.

Mara, the spirit of worldliness, (the prototype of the Christian "Prince of this World,") tempts the saviour of Buddhism by offering him dominion over the kingdoms of the earth. "All this is yours," he says, "if you acknowledge my power; I am the gratifier of all desires, the ruler of the elements; demons, men, and animals obey my commands." "You may be the ruler of earth," replies Buddha, "but you are not the ruler of light: do you know me? I myself am the Lord of Law: Powerless one! Even before your eyes I shall receive the glory of revelation." The demon then changes his tactics: "You are faint with hunger," he says, "and your soul sickens, you will succumb if you do not break your fast. Dear child, one must live to fulfill the duties of life." Buddha unmasks his design and names his confederates: Passion, greed, sloth, lust, fear, doubt, wrath, and ambition. "These," he says, "are your black allies: avaunt, tempter." The demon retires in despair, and hosts of angels descend to serve the victorious Buddha.

An exactly analogous temptation precedes the victory of Zoroaster in his contest with the emissaries of Ahriman. "Remember your mortal descent," says the demon, "do not strive with immortal spirits; acknowledge my power, and I shall reward you with the possession of everything coveted by the sons of men." "The law of Ormudz is more precious," replies the prophet, "your promises will not bribe me, your threats have no terror for the servant of truth."

About A. D. 632 a Chinese pilgrim, Huen Tsang, visited the birthland of Buddhism, and was conducted to the sacred fig-tree of Rajagriha, where the prophet of renunciation conceived the chief doctrines of his gospel, and where his votaries had erected a large number of *stupas* and votive pillars. Under this fig-tree, according to the account of the Lalita Vistara, Buddha converted his first disciples, half of them formerly followers of his precursor Rudraka. The first disciples of Christ (JOHN I, 46, etc.) are seceders from the followers of John the Baptist, the precursor of the world-renouncing Messiah. "I have seen you before, *under the fig-tree*," says Jesus when his converts introduce Nathanael. Nathanael then at once recants his doubts. Sitting under the sacred fig-tree is one of the mystic tokens of Buddhist Messiahship. The earlier Buddhas assembled their votaries under a fig-tree whose boughs trembled and whispered at the approach of the holy redeemers.

One of Buddha's disciples is his master's favorite, another becomes the "pillar of the faith," a third turns traitor and comes to an evil end. In a later period of his mission Buddha sends out seventy apostles to "preach the word to all nations of the earth." The *Kia-Iu* or "Speeches and Maxims" of Confucius contain a special chapter on "The Master's Seventy Disciples."

Buddha enjoins his followers to renounce all their earthly possessions, and to leave their parents and friends, wives and children, for the word's sake. "Leave all you have and follow me." He himself wanders homeless, glorying in sorrow and poverty; and the spread of his doctrine develops numerous orders of mendicant friars, besides world-renouncing saints and anchorites.

When the penniless founder of Buddhism appears on the shore of the Ganges, a ferryman refuses to serve him: he walks on the waters and thus reaches the opposite shore. He heals the sick and lame, restores sight to a blind man, revives a corpse, expels devils and feeds the hungry. During a conference with the spirits of two former saviours, Buddha is transfigured, and after his death his disciples acquire the gift of preaching in foreign tongues.

Tacitus, in his biography of the Emperor Vespasianus, relates the following remarkable miracle. During the emperor's sojourn at the city of Alexandria a poor man, known to have been blind for years, fell down and embracing his knees, conjured him in the name of the God Serapis to effect his cure by the touch of his hand. The Cæsar hesitates, and the blind man then specifies his request: "Moisten your fingers *with the spittle of your mouth*, and touch my eyebrows and eyelids." The emperor then complies and at the first touch of his hand the blind man rises from the ground seeing, and praises the mercy of heaven.

When the Buddhist saviour died at Kusinagra, the mountains shook, fire burst from the rocks and the world was darkened by a total eclipse. His garments were distributed among his friends, and the body was

consumed by the flames of the funeral-pile; but a few days later Buddha returned from heaven and appeared to several of his disciples.

But the most curious parallel to the traditions of the synoptic gospels is the legend of Apollonius, the Cappadocian reformer and miracle-worker. Nearly all of the works quoted in the biography of Philostratus were more or less completely destroyed by monkish fanatics during the first seven centuries of our chronological era, but their remnants suffice to almost justify the mistake of the Pagan chroniclers who confounded the Tyana philosopher with the prophet of Nazareth. Born of parents in humble circumstances, Apollonius soon attracted attention by doctrines and miracles which induced his followers to revere him as a supernatural being. His enemies accused him of performing his prodigies with the aid of the arch-fiend, and on his first visit to Italy he was persecuted for witchcraft, but his converts openly claimed his divine origin and after his death Tyana, the place of his birth, was actually raised to the rank of a sacred city and became the goal of numerous pilgrims who hoped to obtain forgiveness of their sins or find relief from all sorts of bodily ailments by gathering relics of the soil that had been trodden by the feet of the great teacher. Like the founder of our faith, Apollonius tried to reconcile the creeds of his native land with the doctrine of renunciation, and demonstrated the sincerity of his personal convictions by despising riches, and wandering about in humble attire, homeless, unmarried, deprecating the obtrusive homage of his worshipers, and devoting his life to preaching the gospel of unworldliness and to the performance of miraculous cures. He healed the lame and blind, cured sick people by a mere touch of his hand and on one occasion created a prodigious sensation by raising a young woman from the dead. On his first visit to Rome he was preceded by the rumor of that exploit and the excitement assumed proportions that induced the municipal authorities to banish the oriental magician. He repeatedly rebuked the zeal of enthusiasts who urged him to use his potent art for secular purposes or mistook him for a political Messiah. Like the prompters of Pontius Pilatus, enemies denounced him to the Emperor Domitian, who had him indicted on a charge of conspiracy, and after considerable hesitation, sent him to prison. Various similar persecutions were offset by the fervid, and at last altogether idolatrous, veneration of his converts, who gathered the records of his miracles and after his death worshiped him as a demigod.

On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone.—M. AURELIUS.

THE LESSON TAUGHT BY THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

THE Science of Language teaches us our true position with regard to animals. The same science has taught us likewise our true position with regard to our fellow-men.

I mentioned before, that English belongs to what I call the Aryan family of speech. That means that in the same manner as Italian, French, and Spanish are derived from Latin, English, and the other Aryan languages are derived from a more ancient language, which is lost, but which must once have had a very real historical existence. This lost language we call *Aryan*, or *Proto-Aryan*. The descendants of the Proto-Aryan language are known to us in seven great branches, called the *Teutonic*, the *Celtic*, the *Italic*, the *Greek*, the *Slavonic*, the *Iranic*, and the *Indic*. The first five constitute the *North-Western* or *European*, the other two the *South-Eastern* or *Asiatic division*.

Now let us consider for a moment what all this means. English belongs to the Teutonic branch of the Aryan family; that means that English, and German, and Dutch, and Danish, and Swedish, and even Icelandic, are all varieties of one type of Aryan speech, and that all the people who speak these languages are held together by the closest ties of a linguistic relationship.

It is said that blood is thicker than water, but it may be said with even greater truth that language is thicker than blood. If, in the interior of Africa, surrounded by black men, whose utterances were utterly unintelligible, we suddenly met with a man who could speak English, we should care very little whether he was English, or Irish, or American. We should understand him, and be able to exchange our thoughts with him. That brings us together far more closely than if we met a Welshman speaking nothing but Welsh, or a Scotchman speaking nothing but Gaelic; or, for all that, an Englishman who, having been brought up in China, could speak nothing but Chinese. A common language is a common bond of intellectual brotherhood, far stronger than any supposed or real community of blood. Common blood without a common language leaves us as perfect strangers. A common language, even without common blood, makes the whole world feel akin.

It is quite true that the different Teutonic dialects have changed so much, that at present an Englishman can hardly understand a Dutchman, a Dutchman can hardly understand a German, while to a German, Danish, and Swedish, and Icelandic sound as strange as French and Italian. Nevertheless, in spite of dynastic and national feuds, English, Dutch, Germans, Danes; and Swedes, feel themselves as one, when

brought face to face with Slavonic or Romanic nations. They know that by their language, if not by their blood, they represent a unity in the history of the world. The same feeling is shared most strongly by all Slavonic people. However much they may be separated from each other by government, religion, and general civilization, against Teutonic nations the Slaves are one. There can be no doubt, however, that during the middle ages, and also in modern times, the mixture of blood between Slaves and Germans has been enormous. The Slavonic names of places and families in Germany, and the German names of places and families in Bohemia, Poland, and Russia tell their own tale. Nevertheless, a man who speaks Bohemian, Polish, or Russian, feels himself a Slave; a man who speaks German feels himself a German, and he can hardly understand what is meant when he is told that the blood of his great-grandfather was either Slavonic or Teutonic. Nor do I think that any biologist has as yet given us a scientific definition of what is meant by Slavonic or Teutonic blood, by Slavonic or Teutonic hair, or skulls, or skin; and until that is done, such undefined words should simply be boycotted in all scientific discussions.

The Science of Language, however, professes to teach us something else. Whatever the so-called national antipathy between people speaking Slavonic and Teutonic and Romanic languages may be, they have now to learn a new lesson—a lesson that may bear good fruit in the future, namely, that these very Slavonic, Teutonic, and Romanic languages, which at present divide the people who speak them, belong to one and the same family, and were once spoken by the common ancestors of these divided and sometimes hostile nations.

At present such lessons may seem to possess a scientific interest only, in so far as they have made scholars take a completely new view of the ancient history of mankind. The old idea that our languages were all derived from Hebrew, has been surrendered long ago; but it was not surrendered without an effort, an effort almost as great as that which made the world surrender its faith in the central position of the earth.

After that came a new surrender, of which I still remember the beginning and the end. I myself was brought up in the most straitest school of classical scholarship. I was led to believe that there were only two so-called classical languages in the world—Greek and Latin—and that all the other nations of Europe were more or less of barbarians till they were debarbarised by contact with Greek and Roman civilization. That the language of the ancient Germans or Celts could have been anything but an uncouth jargon, as compared with the language of Homer and Virgil; that the grammar of the Goths could have been as perfect as that of the Hellenes; that the natives of Gaul and Germany could have possessed a religion, a mythology, and an epic poetry that could be compared to the religion, the mythology, and the epic poetry of Greeks and Romans—these are ideas which would have been scouted by all scholars, in fact by all educated people, at the beginning of our century. But facts will have their way, however much they may be scouted at first. That the Gothic language was as finely organized as Latin, admitted of no contradiction. That the religion and the mythology of the Teutonic nations flowed from the same source as the religion and mythology of the Greeks and Romans, had to be granted even by the best Greek and Latin scholars of the day, such as Gottfried Hermann, Otfried Müller, and Welcker. And that the epic poetry of Iceland, and of Germany, the Edda and the Nibelunge, contained fragments of as peculiar beauty as the Homeric poems, was freely acknowledged by the foremost poets and critics in Germany, such as Herder and Goethe.

Though no one would have denied the superiority of the Greek genius, and though the glory of having raised the world from darkness to light will for ever remain with the Greeks, yet the Greeks, and their pupils, the Romans, could no longer command a position apart from all the rest. They had made a better use of the talent committed to them; it may be they had received from the beginning a richer endowment. But those whom in their pride they had called barbarians, had now to be recognized as of the same kith and kin from the beginning, nay, destined hereafter to outstrip even their masters in the historic race after the true, the noble, and the good. Classical scholars who can remember the events of the last fifty years know best how radical a change every branch of classical learning has undergone, when it became possessed by this new comparative spirit.

Like many movements, true in themselves, this movement also has sometimes been carried too far. No one, it was boldly asserted, could know Greek who did not know Sanskrit or Gothic. No one could understand Roman mythology who had not studied modern folk-lore. All this is true in a certain sense, but it has been much exaggerated. Still, our historical horizon has been permanently enlarged. Greeks and Romans have been placed in a new historical environment, and so far from losing in their prestige, they only stand forth in bolder relief by the historical background with which the Science of Language has supplied them.

But if this feeling of fraternity between the principal languages of Europe can only claim a scientific and literary interest, it has produced very practical results in other quarters. The feeling between the white and the black man is deeply engrained in human

nature, and in spite of all the arguments in support of our common humanity, it was not to be wondered at that the dark people of India should look upon their white conquerors as strangers, and that the white rulers of India should treat their dark subjects almost as people of another kind. That feeling seemed wellnigh unconquerable, till the discovery of Sanskrit proved beyond all manner of doubt that the languages spoken by the inhabitants of India must have sprung from the same source as Greek, Latin, and English. The name *Indo-European* marked not only a new epoch in the study of language; it ushered in a new period in the history of the world. Language, as I said before, is thicker than blood, and while a so-called community of blood conveys really no definite meaning at all, a community of language that extended even to consonants, vowels, and accents, proved an intellectual fraternity far stronger than any merely genealogical relationship.

When the Hindus learnt for the first time that their ancient language, the Sanskrit, was closely connected with Greek and Latin, and with that uncouth jargon spoken by their rulers, they began to feel a pride in their language and their decent, and they ceased to look upon the pale-skinned strangers from the North as strange creatures from another, whether a better or a worse world. They felt what we feel when later in life we meet with a man whom we had quite forgotten. But as soon as he tells us that he was at the same school with ourselves, as soon as he can remind us of our common masters, or repeat some of the slang terms of our common childhood and youth, he becomes a schoolfellow, a fellow, a man whom we seem to know, though we do not even recollect his name. Neither the English nor the Hindus recollected their having been at the same school together thousands of years ago, but the mere fact of their using the same slang words, such as mâtar and *mother*, such as bhrâtar and *brother*, such as staras and *stars*, was sufficient to convince them that most likely they had been in the same scrapes and had been flogged by the same masters. It was not so much that either the one or the other party felt very much raised in their own eyes by this discovery, as that a feeling sprang up between them that, after all, they might be chips of the same block. I could give you ever so many proofs in support of this assertion, at all events on the part of the Hindus, and likewise from the speeches of some of the most enlightened rulers of India. But as I might seem to be a not altogether unprejudiced witness in such a matter, I prefer to quote the words of an eminent American scholar, Mr. Horatio Hale. 'When the people of Hindostan in the last century,' he writes, 'came under the British power, they were regarded as a debased and alien race. Their complexion reminded their conquerors of Africa. Their divinities were hideous monsters. Their social system was anti-human and detestable. Suttee, Thuggee, Juggernaut, all sorts of cruel and shocking abominations, seemed to characterize and degrade them. The proudest Indian prince was, in the sight and ordinary speech of the rawest white subaltern, only a "nigger." This universal contempt was retorted with a hatred as universal, and threatening in the future most disastrous consequences to the British rule. Then came an unexpected and wonderful discovery. European philologists, studying the language of the conquered race, discovered that the classic mother-tongue of Northern Hindostan was the elder sister of the Greek, the Latin, the German, and the Celtic languages. At the same time a splendid literature was unearthed, which filled the scholars of Europe with astonishment and delight. The despised Asiatics became not only the blood-relations, but the teachers and exemplars, of their conquerors. The revolution of feeling on both sides was immense. Mutual esteem and confience, to a large extent, took the place of revulsion and distrust. Even in the mutiny which occurred while the change was yet in progress, a very large proportion of the native princes and people refused to take part in the outbreak. Since that time, good-will has steadily grown with the fellowship of common studies and aims. It may freely be affirmed, at this day, that *the discovery of the Sanskrit language and literature has been of more value to England in the retention and increase of her Indian Empire, than an army of a hundred thousand men.*'

This is but one out of many lessons which the Science of Language has taught us. We have become familiarized with many of these lessons, and are apt to forget that not more than fifty years ago they were scouted as absurd by the majority of classical scholars, while they have proved to be the discovery of a new world, or, if you like, the recovery of an old world.

But there are many more lessons which that science has still in store for us. There is still much gold and silver to be raised by patient labor from the mines that have been opened. What is wanted are patient and honest laborers, and it is in the hope of gaining fresh recruits that I have ventured to invite you to listen to my pleading.

SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY.

Two means can be employed for provoking hallucinations in a hypnotized subject; *first*, the pantomimic attitude, and *second*, the verbal suggestion. We can impart to the subject a certain position that is closely associated with the memories of the state of mind to be provoked: a clenched fist, for example, is associated with the notion of anger. But it is much

more convenient to produce hallucinations through the words that are connected with this or that mental state. A verbal suggestion attacks at its very centre the idea that is to be aroused. Thus the alarm of "Fire" suddenly raised in a crowded theatre, will create the wildest confusion, and the most dangerous excitement. The unexpected but impressive and natural shout "a mouse" will cause terror among a company of ladies. Some will at once jump upon chairs, before the truth or untruth of the terrible announcement can be ascertained; and if, perchance, a slight rustling in the paper basket is heard, witnesses will probably come forward who have seen a mouse in bodily form, and who in perfect good faith would maintain upon oath the truth of their statement Such witnesses, it cannot be doubted, have seen a mouse,—the real image of a mouse,—but it was only a hallucination.

The suggestion given to hypnotic subjects, works in a manner that is not much different. It is the awakening into a vivid reality of certain images in their mind. The suggestion, therefore, is upon the whole limited to the material found in the brain of the subject, and consists mainly in combinations of extant ideas. It may, accordingly, be perfectly possible to suggest to an untutored individual the conceit, that he or she is a great mathematician; but, by virtue of this, the subject will by no means really become such. To make this possible, one should indispensably have to suggest to him all the single propositions and lessons that are laboriously learned at school. Suggestion can only occasionally add something entirely new and even then it is a mere trifle in comparison to the memory-material which it employs.

A most remarkable phenomenon is the post-hypnotic suggestion, which, like an alarm-clock, is set to take place at a definitely fixed point of time. The French call it *suggestion à échéance*. The suggested idea remains unconscious, and at the time determined spontaneously appears with astonishing accuracy.

Dr. Frederick Björnstrom relates the following episode of an experiment performed by Drs. Liègeois and Liébault:

Liègeois has succeeded with a suggestion of one year's duration. On October 12, 1885, he hypnotized in Nancy a young man, Paul M., already before subjected to hypnotic experiments. At 10.10 A. M., he told him during the hypnosis that the following would happen to him on the same day one year later. "You will go to Monsieur Liébault in the morning. You will say, that your eyes have been well for a whole year, and that for that you are indebted to him and to M. Liègeois. You will express your gratitude to both, and you will ask permission to embrace both of them, which they will gladly allow you to do. After that, you will see a dog and a trained monkey enter the doctor's room, one carrying the other. They will play various pranks and make grimaces, and it will greatly amuse you. Five minutes later, you will behold the trainer with a tame bear. This man will be rejoiced to find his dog and his monkey, which he thought he had lost; in order to please the company, he will let his bear dance also—an American grizzly bear, of large frame but very gentle—and you will not be afraid of him. Just as the man is about to leave, you will ask M. Liègeois to let you have ten centimes to give to the dog, who will beg, and you will give them to him yourself."

Liègeois and Liébault, at whose clinic the experiment was made, naturally kept the suggestion a secret, so that the somnambulist might not get any knowledge of it.

One year later—on the twelfth of October, 1886—Liègeois was at Liébault's before 9 A. M. At 9.39, as nobody had arrived, the former considered the experiment a failure and returned to his rooms. But at ten minutes past ten, the youth, Paul, who had better remembered the hour, came to Liébault and thanked him, but also asked for Liègeois. The latter arrived immediately, called by a messenger. Paul arose, rushed to meet him, and thanked him also. In the presence of fifteen or twenty reliable witnesses, the hallucinations now clearly developed themselves in Paul as they had been predicted one year before. Paul saw a monkey and a dog enter; he was amused by their antics and grimaces. Then he saw the dog approach him, holding a box in his mouth. Paul borrowed ten centimes from Liègeois and made a gesture as if to give them to the dog. Then the trainer came and took away the monkey and the dog. But no bear appeared. Nor did Paul think of embracing any one. With the exception of these two details, the suggestion had thus been fulfilled. The experiment was ended. Paul complained of slight nervous weakness. In order to restore him, L. hypnotized him; but took the opportunity during the hypnosis, to ask for information about what had just happened.—"Why did you just now see that monkey and that dog?"—"Because you gave me suggestion of it on the twelfth of October, 1885."—"Have you not mistaken the hour? I thought I said at 9 A. M."—"No, it is you who remember wrong. You did not hypnotize me on the sofa I am now occupying, but to the one opposite. Then you let me follow you out into the garden, and asked me to return in one year; just then it was ten minutes past ten, and it was at that hour that I returned."—"But why did you not see any bear, and why did you not embrace Liébault and me?"—"Because you told me that only once, whereas you repeated the rest twice."

All those present were struck with the precision of his answers, and Liègeois had to acknowledge that Paul's memory was better than his own. Awakened after ten or fifteen minutes, Paul was entirely calm and had no remembrance of what he had just said during the hypnosis, nor did he remember what happened before the hypnosis in consequence of the suggestion of October 12, 1885.

Post-hypnotic suggestions can be given not only so as to produce harmless hallucinations, but also to prompt the subject to the execution of crimes. In Dr. Charcot's clinic a patient was ordered to kill an assistant physician and a slip of cardboard was suggested to her as a dagger. The woman promptly obeyed the command and after the performance of the deed gave a fictitious reason for committing the crime, never doubting that she had acted on her own account.

* * *

Suggestibility is an attitude which can be observed in normal soul-life, not only now and then, as an exception but as an everyday occurrence. It is man's disposition to receive and accept ideas. The best "drum-

mer" for a business-house is he that most surreptitiously insinuates to his customers the belief that they stand in need of his goods. The best teacher is he, that, in the simplest manner possible, imparts to his pupils the knowledge which he possesses. The best preacher or orator is he who most strongly impresses his moral injunctions upon his hearers. In short, suggestion is met with wherever ideas are transplanted from brain to brain.

Suggestibility in its highest stage of normal soul-life is called docility. It constitutes the receptiveness of the soul, the faculty of receiving, assimilating, and appropriating ideas. When this receptivity is joined to clear consciousness, the new ideas will not be received simply, they will be compared with the old ones, and either arranged among them in proper order or rejected as conflicting ideas. In such case they are relegated to the lumber-room of the brain among those concepts which we class as absurdities and errors. But when, in sleep or in hypnosis, the activity of consciousness has been reduced, and when the memorial chain of past experiences has been broken, receptivity also is lowered to an indiscriminate and uncritical reception of anything that offers itself; thus we see, that both in the dreamer and in the hypnotized subject any absurdity may find ready entrance. All control, all critique is lost, when a comparison with old experiences has been rendered impossible.

The three phases of hypnotism, in their variety and with their numerous transitional states, can be characterized in the following manner:

The suppression of consciousness (*i. e.*, the consciousness of the central soul) is common to all three states. In the hypnotic state we encounter an automatic-mechanical working of intelligence. If we say to an hypnotized subject, "you have murdered a man; look, there is blood still clinging to your hand," he proves unable to coördinate this idea with other notions. Therefore he accepts it without criticism as a fact. He not only believes the suggestion, but he even acts accordingly. He washes his hands, and devises plans with logically correct arguments, often showing great intelligence in the effort to escape the consequences of his imaginary transgression. With individuals, in whom religious feelings and ideas are strongly developed, there is evinced a readiness to take upon themselves the consequences, and to expiate the deed by submission to punishment. But in every case the somnambulic process of reflection is effected with the same regularity and with the same intelligence as if the individual were in full possession of his consciousness. Nay, the process is accomplished more swiftly, because the inhibition which in various ways occurs through the presence of consciousness falls out entirely. The ideas that once have been stimulated, be it fear or hope, or conceptions liable to rouse fear or hope, will work with mechanical exactness, according to the dynamical power which the brain-structures that represent these ideas in the subject, possess.

The hypnotic state is thus a process of intelligent automatism; it is a phenomenon of mental deliberation with the exclusion of a centralized consciousness.

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE MECHANISM OF SOMNAMBULISM.

EXPLANATION.



Centralized consciousness, which manifests itself in conscious sensation as well as conscious will, is excluded. A suggestion is given by certain sensory impressions (*S I*) which produce an irritation of their sensory ganglion (*I S N*). It is thence transmitted to the memories of the hemispheres. There it takes effect as a suggestion. (*Sugg.*) Not being properly coördinated with other ideas, it is readily accepted without any critique. The wary guardian, consciousness, being asleep, there is no inhibition to check the progress of innervation. As in the case of sleep-walking, the ideas awakened innervate directly and unhesitatingly the motor ganglions, (at *I M N*) which at once produce muscular motion (*M M*).

In the cataleptic state, besides consciousness, the activity of intelligent mentality is also suppressed. The nerve-process is, in this case, limited to simple reflex-motions. Man becomes a living muscular manikin, which submits to being placed, at the hypnotizer's discretion, in any position.

EXPLANATION OF THE DIAGRAM.



In the highest state of consciousness, attention is concentrated upon one object or idea; all thought that is not subservient to, or may interfere with this purpose, is checked. In the corresponding abnormal state this concentration is so absolute that it produces a kind of intellectual trance, called "ecstasy." Ecstasy is a fixedness or torpor of consciousness, which, as we learned in a former discussion on the subject, will lead to a real trance,—it will hypnotize.

A very high state of consciousness, which however need not be so high as that of attention, is the attitude of mind called "docility" in which sensations or ideas are perceived and correctly recognized. It is a state of receptivity. In the corresponding abnormal state, the ideas received are not compared with the memories of former experiences; they are accepted in good faith without discrimination.

The senses of a man in a state of fatigue become gradually dulled. They cease to perform their work with accuracy. At the same time thoughts become visionary; they turn up promiscuously, often without any logical connection, but following a very loose association which gives to their appearance the shape of fortuitous incidents. Single ideas or memory-images may still remain awake. They can under

circumstances afterwards be remembered as dreams. In profound sleep all thoughts and dreams cease, while through the increase of the trophic [nutritive] functions in the nervous substance, the expenditure of energy is restored and a new rise of consciousness is prepared.*

In the lethargic state a great part of the mechanism of the nervous reflex-motions is, in addition, rendered inactive; the reflex centres of breathing, the beating of the heart, and the trophic functions alone remain at work. In a hypo-lethargic state even these last signs of nervous vitality become low and the similarity of the state to swoons and trances warns the experimenter of the danger to which the subject here is exposed—a danger which naturally forbids further experiments.

THE CO-ORDINATION OF MENTAL ACTIVITY.

We may compare the hemispheres of the brain to a hollow globe upon the walls of which all the memories of former experiences are inscribed. There are images of concrete objects and symbols of abstract thoughts, but all of them are alive; and every one of them is directly or indirectly in a two-fold telegraphic connection with the outside world: every one of them receives and sends out dispatches; there are afferent and efferent nerve-fibers. The hollow globe is sometimes, and always in part, dark; for the living memories may perform their work unconsciously; every one of them is living and feeling; but the feeling remains comparatively low, so long as it is isolated. It is in such case not communicated to the central soul. In order to be conscious, it must be centralized, it must be connected with the organ of concentration which coördinates all ideas and thus locates the one that at the moment comes to the front.

A special idea (a sensation, or the memory of a sensation, or an abstract thought) being for a moment centralized among all the other ideas of a brain, attains a prominence and a strength in feeling which is called consciousness. Consciousness is nothing but exalted feeling; it is, so to say, condensed and centralized feeling. In its highest state which it attains through coördination we may call it self-consciousness.

The idea that at the time flashes up in consciousness may be compared to the centre of vision. The object which we look at is clear and distinct; yet it is not the only image present in the field of vision. The other objects grow more and more indistinct the farther they are from the centre and many things will remain unnoticed, although they are pictured upon the retina of the eye. Similarly the ideas in our mind that are grouped around the present centre of consciousness grow dimmer and dimmer and disappear at last in the gloomy twilight of unconscious vagueness. The intermediate states we call subconscious. Yet even those nervous structures which at the time are unconscious, must not be considered as utterly void of feeling. So long as they are alive they can in an instant be centralized, and thus come to the front in consciousness.

The mechanism of concentration, it seems, is located in a special organ. The operation of this mechanism may be compared to an electric battery which provides the hollow globe with light.

Then the process of conscious thought would be like the illumination now of this and now of that spot in the hollow globe of the hemispheres. That spot which at a given moment receives the full effect of the incandescence forms, as it were, a centre of brightness. But the vicinity about it also appears luminous, indeed the whole hollow globe is more or less strongly illuminated from that one spot; and the subumbra increases with the distance from the centre. Yet it may be that here and there, where direct associations obtain, spots that are relatively brighter, will appear amid the dusk of the remoter regions. It is not always the same spot which forms the centre of brightness. The centre is changing and may rapidly change. As a rule it is all but impossible for it to remain the same for any length of time, because the energy of that one idea would soon be exhausted. Every concentration upon one idea is tiresome, and we know that concentration is one of the means employed by hypnotizers to produce artificially that state of sleep which is called hypnosis.

We have reason to believe that this function, which we have compared to the operation of an electric battery, is a real and a special organ in our brain, and incidentally it may be mentioned that we suppose it to exist in the Striped Body (corpus striatum) situated, almost centrally, in each of the two hemispheres. It is a ganglion, the structure of which is analogous to the structure of the hemispheres, not only in so far as it has grown out from the walls of the hemispheres but also because its gray substance (especially in the *putamen*) forms a terminus similar to the cerebral cells in the cortex, with which latter, furthermore, it is in various directions intimately connected.*

Some psychologists suppose that in the somnambulic state the hemispheres are completely asleep. Yet this is apparently inconsistent with the theory that somnambulism is an intelligent automatism—unless we give up all our present notions about the operations of the hemispheres as the organ of intelligence. It is true that some physiologists consider the hemispheres as the seat of consciousness, and thus it seems

* In No. 118 of THE OPEN COURT, this same diagram was used to show the parallelism that obtains between the stages of normal and abnormal soul-life. In that diagram, by a typographical error, the word "hypnotic" was made to represent the abnormal state corresponding to the normal state *Dreams, etc.*, it should have been *somnambulic*, and not *hypnotic*.

* In succeding essays we shall again touch upon this subject from a physiological standpoint. Here it may suffice to indicate that the facts hitherto ascertained by observation and experiment seem to establish the theory that the large ganglions of the nervous system, the cerebellum, the thalamus, and corpus striatum, are, each in its way, organs of coördination.



Diagram showing the growth of the Striped Body (*corpus striatum*) from the hemispheres. The drawing represents a human brain in a fœtus of two and a half months, according to Dr Ludwig Edinger.*



A Vertical Section of the Human Brain:

Showing the situation and shape of th Striped Body in a full-grown individual. It consists of two parts, the caudate body† (*nucleus caudatus*) and the lentiform body (*nucleus lentiformis*), divided by the internal capsule (*capsula interna*). The lentiform b: dy consists of three, sometimes of four, stripes, the outermost one of which is called the shell (*putamen*).

* *Zwölf Vorlesungen über den Bau der nervösen Centralorgane.* By Dr. Ludwig Edinger. Leipzig: F. C. Vogel.

† The caudate body has the appearance of a large comma, the biggest part of which lies in front, with the tail turned backwards. The lentiform body, in that part which lies opposite the claustrum appears as a lense.

that, if consciousness is asleep, the hemispheres should remain inactive. But the experiments of somnabulism, no less than other and kindred facts of unconscious soul-life, prove that acts of automatic intelligence are possible, and thus point to another solution. The piano virtuoso has the complex motions of his fingers not in his hand alone, but in his brain, in the storehouse of his memories. If he executes these movements unconsciously, the hemispheres of his brain do not remain inactive. Yet the activity of the hemispheric structures is not always connected with the consciousness of the central soul. After a longer process of conscious exercise, they have become sufficiently fixed as to work automatically. *Automatic* means "self-moving," "self-acting," or "independent." Acts of automatic intelligence are such as are performed independently of the centralization of consciousness.

Unconscious cerebration can no longer be considered as extraordinary. On the contrary, it is a distinctively normal feature of soul-life. All cerebration, it appears, remains unconscious, so long as it is not concentrated and properly coördinated, so long as it remains unconnected with the centre of soul-life.

P. C.

NEED OF AN AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND FINE ARTS.

BY F. DE GISSAC.

The greatest, perhaps the only, defect of American civilization is, as lately remarked in *The Century* by the distinguished critic Hillman, that it is anti-artistic and without ideals.

This intense prosaicism of American life is deeply deplored by all the best friends of our country, natives or foreigners, who are anxious to see this great Republic evolving out from that prosaicism into intellectual and artistic refinement.

Instead of being prejudicial to the legitimate material interests of a country, artistic refinement is greatly favorable to them as is to-day so well evidenced by the great Centennial Exposition of Paris.

It is not by reason of the extent and riches of a land, the number of its inhabitants, and the enormous wealth of its nabobs, that a nation truly deserves to be called great, but rather by the artistic refinement of its civilization. Ancient Greece, in spite of its small extent of territory, has deserved to pass into history as the greatest nation that ever flourished on earth.

Now one may ask: 1. What are the causes of this great defect in American civilization? 2. What ought to be done to correct it —to awaken and develop the genius of our nation?

To answer these two important questions is the object of this paper.

I.

If, as a whole, the American people were naturally incapable of artistic life and civilization, constitutionally incapacitated for the conception, love, and culture of idealty, forever condemned to understand and love materialities only, it would be useless to preach to them the unknown God—the ideal. Nobody would think of advising a man congenitally blind to open his eyes and to behold. But such is not the case with the American people, their blindness is accidental only, not native, and it can be easily cured.

For, as well, if not better, than other peoples, Americans are by nature constituted and intended to climb to the higher summits of artistic civilization, if only well governed and educated. That which Michelet said about the origin of the French people applies with the same justice to the origin of the American, which as a whole is built up from the very best and richest variety of ethnological materials. As a composite of Celtic, Roman, and Teutonic blood, the American people naturally inherits the aptitudes and qualities that are peculiar to each of these extensive families of the great Aryan race. The Celtic blood furnishes its brilliant, witty imagination, its delicate emotions, and chivalrous spirit; the Latin, its wisdom, harmony, polished acuteness, and its constructiveness; the Teutonic, its deepness and patient thoroughness. So it is not in any constitutional or hereditary incapacity that the causes of the present defective character of American civilization are to be found. This defect is merely the natural outcome of two causes. The first is that immense and continual flood of immigration from the lowest classes of Europe beneath which this continent is so completely submerged.

In the times of Washington the country was smaller, the people were simple and poor, but more polished and chivalrous. To-day the finest old American families of Independence times have been pushed to the wall and superseded by those rude and ignorant immigrants who have taken hold of the public wealth of the country and established on it the stultifying yoke of an upstart, selfish, narrow-minded, moneyed aristocracy.

So this low, mercenary spirit and ignorance, imported by European emigration is the first cause of the evil.

But there is another cause which, if at present not as powerful, is more permanent and dangerous in its nature. It is the tyrannical and quasi-exclusive influence exerted by England, by Anglo-Saxonism over the thought and customs of this English-speaking country. Americans are not Anglo-Saxons, cousins of John Bull, as this old fellow cunningly says when anxious to sell his goods or to advance his interest on this continent, but Americans, by the fact that the English language is their national tongue, are reading English literature only, and are too completely and too exclusively under the influence of English ideas, prejudices, and prosaicism.

Anglo-Saxonism is synonomous with "heavy animalism," remarked, some years ago, a distinguished American writer and contributor to the OPEN COURT, Mr. Moncure D. Conway, who has spent many years in England and knows that country well. Anglo-Saxonism, however, has been equally condemned by the most competent English writers, such as Ruskin, Carlyle, and many others, among whom it will be sufficient to quote one of the greatest Anglo-Saxon authorities, Matthew Arnold, who wrote:

"The most eloquent voice of our century uttered, shortly before leaving the world, a warning cry against 'the Anglo-Saxon contagion.' The tendencies and aims, the view of life, and the social economy of the ever multiplying and spreading Anglo-Saxon race, would be found congenial, this prophet feared, by all the prose, all the vulgarity among mankind, and would invade and overpower all nations. The true ideal would be lost, a general sterility of mind and heart would set in. The prophet had in view, no doubt, in the warning thus given, us and our colonies, but the United States still more. . . . . There the material interests are most absorbing and pursued with more energy; there the ideal, the saving ideal, of a high and a rare excellence, seems perhaps to suffer most danger of being obscured. Whatever one may think of the danger to the world from the Anglo-Saxon contagion, it appears to me difficult to deny that the growing greatness and influence of the United States does bring some danger to the ideal of a high and rare excellence."

II.

From what precedes it appears evident that the remedy for the evil will be found in the education of the upper classes of the nation, and in that only. A total, radical change in the spirit and character of collegiate education is needed. What is to day the character of American collegiate education? Is it idealistic, artistic? Or is it not rather the reverse, taming, destroying, or prosaicizing the genius of young America.

The great majority of the colleges and universities of the land are irrevocably subjected to the mercantile law of "demand and supply." Instead of directing education and raising its standard, they try to "please" their patrons in dispensing just the small quantity and trashy quality of education that is required by the "paying" and dictating ignorance of these patrons. Not long ago the principal of a large sectarian college deploringly confessed to me that he could not do as he knew to be better, that in order not to bankrupt the college he had to conduct it as a mill, on paying business principles, with the main object to attract and to please customers.

It must be acknowledged that in the absence (West Point and Annapolis excepted) of national colleges, the education of the nation, completely abandoned to private or sectarian "enterprise," can possess no national, high, and ideal character such as it ought to have for the good and glory of the country. The American government ought to create national, intellectual, and educational institutions, such as is, for instance, the National University of France with all its faculties and colleges disseminated over the whole land, and crowned by a great institute composed of all the intellectual lights—littérateurs, savants, and artists of superior genius. It is by that institute only, not for the common public by the *profanum vulgus*, that the education of the nation should be directed.

* * *

This could be done without at all interfering with liberty of education, without injuring private or sectarian schools, but rather with benefit to them. For when there would be a national program and public examinations by circuit United States professors to confer the United States degrees on candidates, then all the educational institutions of the land would feel themselves compelled to raise their teaching to the level required by the national standard necessary to obtain the United States' degrees. In presenting as a model the national educational institutions of France, I merely follow the example of the American Minister McLane who proclaimed them to be excellent. I do not pretend, however, that Americans could not improve on that system, if they wanted to. But such as it is, it is to it more than to anything else that France is indebted for her success not only in her artistic triumphs but also in her material wealth and financial credit.

So let this Republic also have her National Department of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND FINE ARTS, her National Institute, her National University, with its academies in the great centres, and its colleges in each state of the Union. Too exclusively devoted to material interests, the American people has failed to provide in its government a department for the intellectual interests of the country. It is high time to repair this fatal omission and neglect.

* * *

If I have not had the honor, that fell to the lot of my countrymen of a century ago, to assist in establishing American independence, I am none the less than they devoted to this country and to the great principles with which it is her glory to have enlightened the world, nor less anxious to see her always inviolate and glorious as well in peace as in war. It is under the impulse of these feelings that I take the liberty to submit this important subject to the thoughtful consideration of the readers of THE OPEN COURT and to repeat to them, that Americans by all means should establish a national system of education with its dependent institutions, and should have in their government a department and secretary of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND FINE ARTS!

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SLANDERED UNIVERSE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

MR. WAKE still tries in your last issue to justify what seems to me a plain case of Anthropomorphism.

1. He "denies" that the world is plainly inorganic as to its mass of matter forming stars, etc.; but then he is compelled to admit, practically, as I stated in my former article, that we can only, in the absence of knowledge, *assume* organic life to be present on other heavenly bodies. What then is the sense of denying what neither of us know ?

2. Mr. Wake says we do not know of *five* forms of inorganic matter, *viz* , solid, viscid, fluid, gaseous, and *ethereal*. This is merely a difference of terms. Hæckel and all agree that the viscid or colloid form or condition of matter is *the* one in which vital action appears. Mr. Wake does not pretend that vital action or life is found in any other form or condition of matter. So we have no difference there.

3. Mr. Wake seems to say repeatedly, that I call *all* the viscid or colloid forms of matter inorganic *and* protoplasm. Not so. Protoplasm is the organized, but simply *one* of the many forms or conditions of viscid matter, and *the* one in which vital action occurs,—in which, as Mr. Wake admits, "no one denies that feeling and consciousness *are natural*." But then, he says, we are bound to account for the existence of this protoplasm.—Well ! (1.) Did it always exist ? (2.) Did it come by miracle ? or (3.) Did it evolve through action of natural causes and processes ? All scientists are obliged to accept this latter conclusion, because they find that everything else has come by natural causes and processes. Let Mr. Wake, or some one, show us some *one* instance of miracle or creation, so as to have *one* fact at the bottom of this hypothesis, or let them remain silent ! Not one single fact of that kind has ever been shown. Not only is the uniformity of the whole known world against it, but it is upon analysis unthinkable—for it assumes something out of nothing.

Finally, Mr. Wake seeks to escape by "the hypothesis of the existence of a living *essence* throughout the Universe." "A world of Spirit," which "if it exist must have a *certain* personality." "The Universe *may* have a world-spirit without its being haunted by 'Spooky Co-tenants.'" How ?—and we ask in vain ! Mr. Wake was challenged to give some evidence of a "living essence," or any vitality *outside of protoplasm*. He does, and evidently can do, nothing of the kind. His defence is a plain confession. If his "essence," his "world-spirit," his "certain personality," "throughout the Universe," is not a "Spooky Co-tenant"—what can it be ?

But Mr. Wake thinks that Mr. A. R. Wallace and others are as guilty as he ; and that may be worth noting, as an excuse or otherwise. It is no excuse, but a further good reason why this unscientific fog should be blown away by facts, laws, and logic. Mr. Wallace is an egregious offender. Instead of being a consistent Scientist, he is a Spiritualist studying science, which he drops as soon as it endangers his Spiritualism ; just as our creation-clergymen used to study and drop geology. Strange, that Mr. Darwin's example should not teach all evolutionists that science admits of only one prepossession—the love of truth ; and, that the *monistic* world has no need of, nor room for, an "essence" or a ghost to run it, or evolve it or any part of it. T. B. WAKEMAN.

NEW YORK, December, 289.

CITIZENSHIP AND OUR RELIGIONS.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

NOW COMES the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* of December 18th, with other newspapers, and urges that matters of religion should not be discussed in Secular journals. There is great danger that this view so generally urged may prevail. In it there is danger to the public welfare and to the religions themselves. There is not half enough of free expression about religious creeds, obligations, endowments, etc., in our free press. What our citizens can be made to "religiously" believe is of the highest consequence to every citizen. The "religious scruples" of one juror has prevented the enforcement of the law in the Cronin case at Chicago, and done what a million voices could not do for the "anarchists." To abolish capital punishment it is only necessary to work a "scrupulous religionist" on the jury.

So, too, with our common school system. A few religionists of the Romanish domination in office will leave our republic with a large part of its children under the exclusive control of its deadliest enemies.

There the Presbyterians insist upon "putting God into the Constitution," and erecting the Theocracy of Jesus Christ as "the Lord of all."

There also are the Mormon brethren who want the Republic to take its bands off of the Church of the Latter Day "Saints." So that they can build one *imperium in imperio*. So the list could go on, and prove conclusively that there is no safety but in the keen light of publicity which brings all creeds, churches and dogmas to the test of truth, the safety and welfare of the Republic, and the public good. Turn the light on.

NEW YORK CITY, Dec. 20, 1889. W. B. T.

AGNOSTICISM, METAPHYSICS, ETC.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT :—

I thank you for your esteemed criticism, in your issue of Dec. 19th, at foot of my letter.

While I decidedly favored the Monists, as against the Agnostics, I do not desire to be unjust to those who may desire to be classed as in agreement with Prof. Huxley. The latter, in his chapter on Descartes, when saying that Descartes consecrated doubt, explained that, he meant the active scepticism which seeks to conquer itself ; and not that other sort of doubt which seeks to perpetuate itself, as an excuse for idleness and indifference, (*Lay Sermons*). In this, it seems to me, he but expresses what ought to be the attitude of every rational mind, whether Christian, Monist, or Agnostic. When, too, in a recent article, Prof. Huxley claims, or contends, that it is wrong for a man to believe any proposition except upon logical grounds, I cannot, for the life of me, see how any can dispute him ; and if this were all that the highest class of Agnosticism meant the disputation would be speedily terminated.

By the way, I notice, that the Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbot replied to that proposition of Professor Huxley's and took exception to it, on behalf of his own Christian denomination. But the reverend writer, evidently, does not see that he has fallen into a trap. He left himself open to the home thrust that his objection would imply, that a man ought to believe without logical grounds, that is to say irrationally. Which is a complete surrender ; and surely above all no man ought to have Faith, or if I may express it so, yield the assent of Faith, in the course of his investigations, except upon logical grounds.

May I refer to your comments on my letter ? You say, (1) Kant "makes it (Metaphysics) equivalent to purely formal knowledge." Surely he would not deny that it is also equivalent to purely formal reasoning ; or the *ne plus ultra* of pure reason.

You say again : "truth is not the reality of things ; truth is the congruence of man's conception with the reality of things." I cannot see much difference between us, as I assent to the definition that, whatever idea, conceived, or expressed, which conforms to the reality of things, is the Truth, is a true or correct idea.

As to your last remark you never fail to convince me of my dual nature, by the expression my brain; by the act of exploring it, or its representative, with your kind aid; and by the act of analyzing my own thoughts.

Very Truly Yours,

LINCOLN, Neb. MICHAEL CORCORAN.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A REPLY TO DR. LIGHTFOOT'S ESSAYS. By the Author of "Supernatural Religion." London: Longmans, Green, & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

In this volume of one hundred and seventy-four pages, the author of "Supernatural Religion" has presented to the public, in collected form, a series of essays that appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* as a reply to the strictures of the Rev. Dr. Lightfoot. They are entitled as follows: "A Reply to Dr. Lightfoot's First Essay on Supernatural Religion"; "The Silence of Eusebius—The Ignatian Epistles"; "Polycarp of Smyrna"; "Papias of Hierapolis"; "Melito of Sardis—Claudius Apollinaris—Polycrates"; "The Churches of Gaul"; "Tatian's Diatessaron"; and "Conclusions." The republication of these essays, the author says, was forced upon him by the fact of Dr. Lightfoot's having put into book-form the articles he had originally written for a Review and thus perpetuated his position, with which, it seems, a goodly quantity of "elaborate literary abuse" and *argumentum ad hominem* had been mingled. Dr. Lightfoot, it is declared, had in no part of his essays entered upon the fundamental proposition of "Supernatural Religion"; and what our author complains of with reference to his antagonist, that Dr. Lightfoot, namely, shows remarkable eagerness and ardor in rushing up all the side issues and turning his back upon the more central proposition, is eminently true of almost every orthodox theologian that has entered of late years in the lists of controversy. The following paragraph, which we quote, as indicating the key-note of the discussion, contains in itself a refutation of the cast of Agnosticism that might be detected in it:

"The argument so often employed by theologians that Divine Revelation is necessary for man, and that certain views contained in that Revelation are required by our moral consciousness, is purely imaginary and derived from the Revelation which it seeks to maintain. The only thing absolutely necessary for man is Truth; and to that, and that alone, must our moral consciousness adapt itself. Reason and experience forbid the expectation that we can acquire any knowledge otherwise than through natural channels. We might as well expect to be supernaturally nourished as supernaturally informed. To complain that we do not know all that we desire to know is foolish and unreasonable. It is tantamount to complaining that the mind of man is not differently constituted. To attain the full altitude of the Knowable, whatever that may be, should be our earnest aim, and more than this is not for humanity. We may be certain that information which is beyond the ultimate reach of Reason is an unnecessary as it is inaccessible. Man may know all that man requires to know."

THE STORY OF MUSIC. By *W. J. Henderson.* New York: Longmans, Green, & Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg Co.

Mr. Henderson has accomplished a work for which, we may unhesitatingly say, both the lover of music and the thoroughpaced virtuoso are immeasurably indebted: the one, in that his art has been faithfully represented; and the other, because he will find here the complement and the verification of the indefinite and fragmentary knowledge he may before have possessed. It has been the author's design "to give a succinct account of the progressive steps in the development of modern music as an art"; he has digressed, accordingly, from the usual biographical plan of the standard universal histories, and, separating the history of the art from that of the artist, has sought to trace in general outline the total advancement of musical creativeness throughout Europe. Beginning with the little we know of ancient music, we are brought through the crude and imperfect attempts of the early Middle Ages, the isolated efforts of later mediæval and early modern composers, Peri, Lulli, and the rest, to the *Génération harmonique* of Rameau, from which work the progress of modern music dates. Following thereupon Mr. Henderson portrays the parts sustained in the development of music by Bach, Händel, and Haydn, sketches the rise of the art of orchestration and the work of the great instrumental writers, and finally analyzes with much acumen the growth of the grandest creation of musical activity—the modern opera. While leaning, perhaps, towards the Wagnerian ideal, the author fully recognizes the beauty and luxuriance of that which Italy has produced; he says that the possible outcome of the present confliction may be, "a combination of the Italian wealth of vocal melody with the German intellectuality, symmetry, and logic of form and development." The book is supplied with a valuable chronological table, but we lament the absence of an index. The typography, and in fact all externalities, are excellent. *μκρκ.*

HUMAN LIFE; or, "The Course of Time" as Seen in the Open Light. By *Caleb S. Weeks.* New York: Byington & Co., 334 Fourth Avenue.

Mr. Weeks "puts this work before the world because he believes that a great poem, of a former generation, calls for a truer presentation of its subject, and that the rythmical style of that poem is most appropriate for this purpose." The book contains three hundred and fifty-nine pages, and each page from thirty-three to thirty lines, making a grand total of, say, 10770 lines. This to the reader of the present day is, from the start, an obstacle; and notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Weeks possesses a singular mastery of the metre in which *Paradise Lost* has been written, we are nevertheless constrained to doubt his thesis that the rhythmical style is the most appropriate wherein to convey the lessons of modern science and modern thought. But the purpose of Mr. Weeks is well-meant, and his doctrines are pure; in his own words, his success will have been equal to his ambition if he succeeds in helping to remove the "moralistic" errors that enslave thought and obstruct the development of true ethics.

NOTES.

We shall publish within a very short time a reply by Mr. George J. Romanes to M. Binet's latest article (No. 116) in the controversy "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms."

From a desire to verify his researches as to the causes of failing nutrition in aging organisms, Mr. C. A. Stephens, of Maine, offers to microscopists and biologists three cash prizes, of $175., $125., and $100., respectively, for the best three comparative demonstrations, by means of microscopical slides, of the blood capillaries in young and in aged tissues, canine, or human. For particulars, conditions, etc., we refer persons interested to "C. A. Stephens's Laboratory," Norway Lake, Maine.

Arrangements have been perfected for organizing a liberal woman suffrage association of a national character, its initial convention to be held in Washington, D. C., Feb. 24–25, 1890. This has become necessary, the originators of the movement maintain, because of the increasing conservative tendency of the present societies, and also because of the rapidly increasing danger of a union between Church and State—as shown by the efforts of "The Christian Party in Politics," composed of both Catholics and Protestants, towards the subversion of our secular form of government. Persons in consonance with this plan are invited to correspond with Matilda Joslyn Gage, Fayetteville, N. Y.

W. SAYLER, LAWYER, Room 34, 116 La Salle Street, Chicago. Abstracts Examined. Advice free. All cases.

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Mysticism is the blight of science. Mysticism in science is like a fog in clear daylight. It makes the steps of the wanderer unsafe and robs him of the use of his most valuable sense—the sense of sight. There is impenetrable darkness around him; everything is confused by insolvable problems. The whole world appears to the benighted mystic as one great and inscrutable enigma.

Mysticism in religion is widely different. It is here where the value of mysticism must be sought for. But religious mysticism does not claim that truth is unknowable. It claims not only, as does science, that truth can be *known*, it claims that truth can be *felt* even before it is known. Truth is a strong and wholesome power, unconquerable and omnipotent, which is available not only to the knowing but to those also who grope in the dark, yet cherish the love of truth in their hearts.

A scientist can scientifically enquire into the social laws, and can after a life-time of long and laborious study arrive at the truth, that what is injurious to the swarm is not good for the bee. The ethical maxims: thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt honor father and mother, the scientist will perceive, are not cunningly invented by religious or political leaders, they are the indispensable conditions under which alone society can exist. Wherever they are not heeded the whole community will go to the wall. The individual that sins against these laws will injure society, yet he will ruin himself at the same time.

The ethical truths are important truths, and it is good to know them, to understand their full importance. Yet even those who are unable to grasp them in their minds; those who have not the scientific knowledge to see how the moral law works destruction to the trespasser and is a blessing to him who keeps the law—even the unscientific, the poor in spirit, can feel the truth; they can trustingly accept it on faith and *can be sure* that they are right. And truly, if they do accept it, if they act accordingly, they are better off than those scientists who have arrived at some approximations that upon the whole it is perhaps after all even for the single individual better to be honest, than to be shrewd.

There are scientists and among them some of great name and fame, who after a life-time of long and laborious study did not arrive at the ethical truths that the moral commands will preserve, and that they do preserve, both the individual who keeps them and the society to which that individual belongs. There are naturalists who are very familiar with a certain province of nature, especially with the brute creation. They say, not the morally good will survive, but the strongest, the cunningest and the shrewdest. The naturalists who say that, are most learned professors; they are crammed with biological data, and have made many zoölogical observations; they know facts of nature and have classified them as natural laws—but Nature herself has not revealed her divine face to them. They have not entered the holy of holies in the temple of Creation, for they see parts only, and do not perceive the whole; they overlook the quietly working tendencies of the whole. They misinterpret the meaning of the partial truths that happened to come under their observation.

Moral truth can be felt. Therefore let religious mysticism gain hold of man so as to make him feel the truth of the moral law even before he is able to understand it.

The moral feeling is man's conscience. The moral law and man's trust in the truth of the moral law must not be planted into the reasoning faculty of man only, it must be planted by example and instruction into his heart long before the reasoning faculty of his mind is developed. It must be made part of his inmost soul long before he commences to study, to learn, and to observe. It must be the basis of his whole being, and the determining factor of his will.

If the moral law were merely superadded in later life, if its presence in our minds rested upon abstract conclusions only, upon logical arguments and syllogisms, how uncertain, how precarious would its influence be upon our lives. Rational insight must come to strengthen the moral truth of our soul, but its roots must be deeply buried in the core of our heart. Science will come to explain what conscience is, and why conscience is right in this or in that case, science will also assist us to correct an erring conscience, but if the basis of a man's character has not been laid in early childhood, science will come too late to benefit him through moralizing arguments.

A conscience that is grounded upon ratiocination only, is weak in comparison to a conscience that permeates the whole being of a man, his emotions, his will, and his understanding; his heart as well as his head. Conscience must be, as we say in popular speech, our "second nature"—yea, it must be our "first nature," so that in all situations of life, in tribulations, and in temptations it will well up unconsciously with an original and irresistible power, even before we can reason about the proper course of our actions.

The tempter approaches us always in the name of science, but his arguments are not science, they are pseudo-science. The tempter says: "Do not be foolish, be wise. The criminals are convicted not for their crimes but because they were fools; they were not shrewd enough to escape the consequences of their deed. Be wise, be cunning enough, and thou wilt outwit all the world." There is no criminal who did not think himself wise enough to escape the law, and if he regrets at all, he will commonly regret not the deed but one or the other of his mistakes which, as he supposes, betrayed him. The criminal tries to remove the vestiges of his deed; yet the acts done to this purpose become new and powerful witnesses against him. They, chiefly, become the traitors that deliver him to the judge.

Do not be deceived by the pseudo-wisdom of your thoughts that lead you into temptation. They will lead you into ruin, if you follow them. Do not be deceived by the escape of evil-doers from their legal punishment; they carry a punishment within them which is worse than the penitentiary. Neither be deceived by the success of the unprincipled. Many of those whom you suppose to be morally depraved, are perhaps after all not so unscrupulous as you think. They may have virtues and abilities, strength of will, power of concentration, industry, intelligence, foresight in business combinations, of which you think little, but which meet the wants of their time and serve the common good. Such men succeeded, perhaps, in spite of those faults in their characters to which you erroneously attributed their success. If they are really unprincipled, and are successful in their enterprises, do not judge of them before you have seen the fulfillment of their destiny.

The royal psalmist of Israel, the shepherd boy, who was a poet and at the same time a hero, who became the king of his nation because he treated even his enemies with justice, had during his career often seen the unprincipled succeed, and so he sang:

I have seen the wicked in great power and spreading himself like a green bay tree.

But David continues:

Yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not; yea I sought him but he could not be found.

Mark the perfect man and behold the upright, for the end of that man is peace.

It may seem to you as if crooked means were better than straightforward truth, as if small trickery and well-calculated deceptions would gain the victory over the simplicity of honest dealing. It may seem so to you and it may seem so to your friends and advisers. It is not! Truth and justice are always stronger than the strongest lies. And if you do not understand it, believe it and act accordingly.

I do not mean to say that if your cause is just, if you are morally good and honest in your purpose, that truth and justice will come down like gods from heaven to assist you. O, no! You must fight for truth and you must stand up for justice with all your abilities and foresight. What I mean to inculcate is not blind confidence in the victory of truth and justice, as if they intended actually to appear on earth to work for you, instead of your working for them: I mean to say that, under all circumstances, falsity, untruth, injustice, and all immoral means, however cunningly they may be devised, are the most dangerous allies. Whoever associates with them will be sure to go to wreck and ruin. The way to success, to a final and solid success is only that steep and thorny path on which virtue led the Greek hero to Olympus. Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life and few there be that find it.

IS LOGIC A DUALISTIC SCIENCE?

BY PROF. JOHN DEWEY.

THE Newer Logic may be roughly described as an attempt to take account of the methods of thinking employed by science, that is, of the methods the aim of which is truth, and which deal with a material of fact. It thus contrasts with the old scholastic logic, which may be roughly described as an attempt to deal with thinking *in vacuo*, that is with methods which leave out (or abstract from) the material of fact, and which have no aim except non contradiction of their own premises—self-consistency. We may call the latter the Logic of argument, not of truth; but the former is the Logic of science, *i. e.*, of actual knowledge.

Lotze, Sigwart, Wundt in Germany, Jevons, Bradley, and Bosanquet in England are representative names in this new logic. To it also Venn's *Empirical Logic* is a most noteworthy recent contribution. While written from a philosophical standpoint differing from that of most of the foregoing names, it has an aim common with theirs. It treats thinking as a process having relation to truth. I confess, for my part, that I could have wished Venn had chosen another philosophical standpoint; but without going into matters of ultimate interpretation, Venn raises plenty of questions well worth discussion on their own account as purely

logical. Among these, as one of the most important, I would place this: Does logic imply a duality, which for logic is ultimate? Venn answers in the affirmative, calling attention however to the fact, that he means only to assert that dualism is ultimate for *logic;* the metaphysical question is not raised.

Venn's own statement is as follows: We must take for granted a duality. On the one hand, outside of us, there is the world of phenomena pursuing its course; and, on the other hand, within us, there is the observing and thinking mind. Logic is concerned with the judgments of the latter about the former. "The thorough-going retention of this duality is one of the leading characteristics of the whole treatment adopted in this work" (Page 22). He then goes on to show the evils resulting from a purely subjective or a purely objective treatment. The latter "would confine us to a bare statement of those laws which lie at the basis of all inductive inference," while logic must always bring in the attitude of the mind in estimating or appreciating facts. The objective view would thus exclude the whole field of inference. The purely subjective treatment, on the other hand, would reduce logic to the bare logic of self-consistency, without relation to the true or to the false. So Venn concludes (p. 26) that while there are "some sciences, like Psychology, in which the primary reference is throughout to the mental processes, there are others, like the ordinary physical sciences, in which the primary reference is throughout to the external phenomena. But a science like logic, which has to do with the processes of the human mind when judging about phenomena, occupies necessarily an intermediate position."

Now when I say that all that Mr. Venn says about the evils of a purely subjective or purely objective treatment seems to me wholly sound, and that I would agree with him in saying logic deals with the process of thought in judging about phenomena,—when I say this, I may seem to have closed the door to further discussion. But I would call attention to the fact that these phrases may have two meanings. They may mean that the mental process, the 'internal thought,' and the objective phenomena, the 'external thing,' are, for logic at least, wholly independent and separate data, and that then the logical process comes in as a third thing and brings one to bear upon the other. This is the sense in which Mr. Venn interprets the dualism and is the sense in which I should reject it. Or, again, the dualism may be interpreted as being *inside*, as it were, the logical process. That is to say, we may hold that the "mental process of the mind in judging about phenomena" is for logic, at least, ultimate and decisive. The duality between the object perceived and the thought conceived is not one with which the logical process begins, but is the result of a logical process; that is, so far as *logic* has anything to do with it.

We may illustrate the difference as follows: *There* is the physical object, the sun moving in the heavens. *Here* is my idea or concept of this object. Does logic begin with this dualism and then go on to consider how the idea may be brought into conformity with the object?

Mr. Venn would answer 'Yes.' To me it seems as if the judgment of the mind were, for logic, the primary fact, and as if the distinction between the idea and the fact were one which takes place within and on account of the judgment—the logical process. The question involves more than at first appears. Are there, for logic at least, two worlds, of which one has to be brought into conformity with the other, or is there but one world, and that one logical through and through?

If the question concerned a world of objects wholly unrelated to mind, it would be impossible to discuss it without raising all manner of metaphysical difficulties; but, fortunately, Mr. Venn accepts the doctrine of the 'relativity of knowledge.' He says (page 16), "we postulate a world or aggregate of objects—not out of relation to human faculties in general, which would be absurd—but conditioned in relation to our representative state of faculties." And on page 28 he expressly says: "We are in no wise concerned with the question which for ages perplexed philosophers, viz., in what sense our ideas 'resemble' or are 'copies of' actual external objects. All that we compare is the impression at first hand and at second hand, the presentation and the representation." And so on page 384 he says, that it is the general aim of logical processes to secure a complete and accurate correspondence between what we think and conceive within us, and what we *observe* and *feel* without us. The question is then: How are perception and observation logically related to thinking, to conception? Does logic take up its task when these are furnished to it ready-made, thus having a dualistic basis, or do logical processes enter equally into both perception and conception, so that, from a certain standpoint, each has a logical character?

I shall attempt to sustain the latter position. In holding that logic is not dualistic, because logical processes enter into presentation as well as into scientific methods, I may, in some sense, rely upon the authority of Mr. Venn himself. One of the striking features of his logic is the way in which he attacks our "habit of regarding what we call 'objects' as being in a way marked out by nature, always and for all beings" (page 6). This habit is so far from being justified that as he says (page 5), "Select what object we

please—the most apparently simple in itself, and the most definitely parted off from others that we can discover—yet we shall find ourselves constrained to admit that considerable mental process had been passed through before that object could be recognized as being an object, that is as possessing some degree of unity, and as requiring to be distinguished from other such unities." And Mr. Venn shows clearly and decisively, to my mind, that in the most elementary recognition of an object processes of analysis and synthesis of very considerable complexity are involved. In his forcible comparison, to expect a dog who could not exercise quite a complex analysis and synthesis to perceive a rainbow, would be hardly more reasonable than to expect him to 'see' the progress of democracy in the place where he lives—although the ultimate constituent sensible events are as accessible to his observation as they are to ours (page 7; compare pages 143–144).

In a like manner, Mr. Venn attacks what he well calls the 'alphabetic' view of nature; the idea that objects come to us, so sharply discriminated and separated that one may be represented by *A*, another by *B*, and so on. "Generally speaking what we mark out by the letters *A*, *B*, *C*, are more or less fictitious entities, that is, they are manifold groups, held together in a mental synthesis with the cohesive assistance of names. . . . . The mere reference to individuals, as the basis or starting point of our instruction presupposes that something has already been done to recognize and constitute these *A*, *B*, *C* as individuals" (page 345).

Now it seems to me that as soon as we give up the view that objects are presented to the mind already distinguished from others and united into cohering wholes, we are tacitly admitting that logical processes enter into the recognition, or observation of facts. When we go further and say that the individual object becomes such to us only through a process of mental synthesis and analysis, it seems to me that the admission is more than tacit—it is express. The only ground on which the logical character of recognition of objects could be denied, would be that mental analysis and synthesis are not logical processes. I hardly think Mr. Venn would take this position; still less can I see how he or any one else would uphold it. Mr. Venn when treating more expressly of the nature of analysis and synthesis, remarks (page 398) that "these processes are best regarded as being merely subdivisions of a much more far reaching process, viz., that of framing hypotheses or suppositions. Set this faculty to work; employ it in separating wholes into their parts and gathering up parts in order to constitute new wholes, and we have what are known as analysis and synthesis." From this view it would certainly follow that our first perceptions of objects, being due to analysis and synthesis, are, in a sense, tentative hypotheses which we form in order to account for our experiences. Of course from the standpoint of ordinary experience it sounds absurd—and is absurd for that matter—to say that 'the fire burns' is a hypothesis. But from the logical standpoint, it is far from being absurd. Whence the whole chemical theory of combustion, and what is the need of it, unless the first judgment that 'fire burns' is, after all, only a tentative and crude analytic-synthetic process, needing to be carried farther, to be corrected, and, finally, transformed into a hypothesis more nearly agreeing with facts? If this is not evident, substitute the judgment 'the sun moves' for the one 'the fire burns.' The objection most likely to be made to this doctrine that presentation itself has a logical value and basis, is, I imagine, that logical processes begin only when we are aiming at truth—only when we have a definite end in view which controls the process, and that there is no such aim or end in ordinary observation. That we are not *consciously* aiming at truth and that there is no *conscious* criterion or standard which controls the mental process in pre-scientific perception, is, of course, admitted. And this unconscious functioning of logical processes in perception seems to me to be just its *differentia* (logically, I would not say psychologically or metaphysically) from scientific thinking. Ordinary perception and scientific reflection have just the same material, and follow, in the rough, the same methods. There is hypothesis, induction, and deduction, inference, generalization, classification, analysis, synthesis, whatever logical process you please to take, in the perception of the sun as shining. But for the very reason that these processes are unconsciously followed they are uneconomical, imperfect, incorrect; they contain irrelevant material and leave out what is really coherent. In a word, since the logical principles are unconscious, the result is largely illogical, that is, false. Compare such a statement as 'the sun shines' with the statement which a modern astronomer would make, when speaking from the standpoint of science, about just the same experience. The latter judgment would be carefully qualified; it would be accurately quantified; the conditions, chemical and physical, of the fact would be developed. The transformation would be so great that an ordinary layman reading the scientific proposition would probably not recognize that it had any kinship to his judgment—'the sun shines.' But the real subject-matter would be the same.

We do not have then two things first given—one, the facts of observation, the other the mental concepts, and then, thirdly, a logical process, starting from this dualism, and attempting to make one side of it con-

form to the other. Knowledge from the first, whether in the form of ordinary observation or of scientific thinking, is logical; in ordinary observation, however, the logical process is unconscious, dormant, and hence goes easily and inevitably astray. In scientific thinking, the mind knows what it is about; the logical functions are consciously used as guides and as standards. But knowledge, experience, the material of the known world are one and the same all the way; it is one and the same world which offers itself in perception and in scientific treatment; and the method of dealing with it is one and the same—logical. The only difference is in the degree of development of the logical functions present in both.

We get the same result, if we consider from a somewhat different point of view the relations of observation and inference. And here, again, Mr. Venn may furnish the starting-point. For he himself admits that we cannot find any material which is 'pure' observation—that is observation without any element of inference. "Really ultimate data can no more be reached than can a first point or absolute limit in time or space." "The starting point is a merely conventional one, assumed for convenience. Everywhere, wherever we look or find ourselves, we seem to be in possession of data which are familiar to us and are justified by experience. This is our starting-point, and not any really primitive data" (pages 115 and 116). The ground for this position will occur to anyone familiar with Mill's analysis of the proposition, "I saw my brother at a certain hour this morning," where he points out that everything is inferential excepting some data of color. Venn chooses a somewhat more complex case. Some one proposes to join a walking party and it is said of him: "I can see plainly enough that he will not be fit for our excursion." The least analysis would resolve this into: 'I see the man is ill, and therefore conclude he cannot take a long walk.' But do we *see* that the man is ill? Obviously, we only see that he is pale, has a lax gait, etc., and hence *infer* he is ill. And each one of these apparent observations may be analyzed into an inference. Even our estimate of paleness, a color pure and simple, psychological analysis shows to be no ultimate datum, but in great part an inference.

Now if it be admitted that observation involves inference indefinitely continued, what becomes of the duality which logic had to assume as its starting-point? If there is no *pure* presentation, no fact of sense-perception not already qualified by logical processes, how can it be said that logic has to do with a comparison of the concept with the datum of presentation? Logic seems somehow to be concerned with the observation itself. Instead of having a dual material supplied to it, it is present wherever there is any known material. There is but one world, the world of knowledge, not two, an inner and outer, a world of observation and a world of conception; and this one world is everywhere logical. As the world of ordinary perception it is logical, but its logical character is undeveloped, is latent, and hence is utilized at random, that is to say, extravagantly and erroneously. As the world of scientific reflection, it is more completely logical, because its logical character is brought to consciousness, is rendered explicit, and is thus used as a criterion, or a standard, in a word, as the truth by which the false and the irrelevant may be excluded. The result is that logic has no dualistic basis.

ANN ARBOR, January, 1890.

THOUGHT THICKER THAN BLOOD.

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

I HAVE been asked the question, a very natural question, and one that has often been discussed since the discovery of Sanskrit and since the establishment of a close relationship between Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Russian, German, English, and Welsh—Does the close relationship of these languages prove a real relationship between the people who speak these languages?

At first sight, the answer seems very easy. As a negro may learn English and become, as has been the case, an English bishop, language by itself could hardly be said to prove relationship. That being so, I have always, beginning with my very first contribution to the Science of Language—my letter to Bunsen 'On the Turanian Languages,' published in 1854—I have always, I say, warned against mixing up these two relationships,—the relationship of language and the relationship of blood. As these warnings, however, have been of very little avail, I venture to repeat them once more, and in the very words which I used in the year 1854:—

'Much of the confusion of terms and indistinctness of principles, both in ethnology and philology, is due to the combined study of these heterogeneous sciences. Ethnological race and linguistic race are not commensurate, except in ante-historical times, or perhaps at the very dawn of history. With the migrations of tribes, their wars, their colonies, their conquests and alliances, which, if we may judge from their effects, must have been much more violent in the ethnic than ever in the political periods of history, it is impossible to imagine that ethnological race and linguistic race should continue to run parallel. The physiologist should therefore pursue his own science, unconcerned about language. Let him see how far the skulls, or the hair, or the color, or the skin of different tribes admit of classification; but to the sound of their words his ear should be as deaf as that of the ornithologist must be to the notes of caged birds. If his Caucasian race includes nations or individuals speaking Aryan (Greek), Turanian (Turkish), and Semitic (Hebrew) languages, it is not his fault. His system must not be altered in order to suit another system. There is a better solution both for his difficulties and for those of the philologist than mutual compromise. The philologist

should collect his evidence, arrange his classes, divide and combine, as if no Blumenbach had ever looked at skulls, as if no Camper had ever measured facial angles, as if no Owen had examined the basis of a cranium. His evidence is the evidence of language, and nothing else; this he must follow, even though it it were in the teeth of history, physical or political. Would he scruple to call the language of England Teutonic, and class it with the Low-German dialects, because the physiologist could tell him that the skull, the bodily habitat of such language, is of a Celtic type, or because the genealogist can prove that the arms of the family conversing in this idiom are of Norman origin? With the philologist English is Teutonic, and nothing but Teutonic. Ethnological suggestions as to an early substratum of Celtic inhabitants in Britain, or historical information as to a Norman conquest, will always be thankfully received by the philologist; but if every record were burnt, and every skull pulverised, the spoken language of the present day alone would enable the philologist to say that English, as well as Dutch and Frisian, belongs to the Low-German branch—that this branch, together with the High-German and Scandinavian, belongs to the Teutonic stock, and that this stock, together with the Celtic, Slavonic, Hellenic, Italic, Iranic, and Indic, belongs to the Aryan family. . . . .

'There ought to be no compromise of any sort between ethnological and philological science. It is only by stating the glaring contradictions between the two sciences that truth can be elicited . . . . Ever since Blumenbach tried to establish his five races of men (Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, and Malay), which Cuvier reduced to three (Caucasian, Ethiopian, and Mongolian), while Prichard raised them to seven (Iranian, Turanian, American, Hottentots, Negroes, Papuas, and Alfonrous,), it was felt that these physiological classifications could not be brought to harmonize with the evidence of language. . . . . This point was never urged with sufficient strength till at last Humboldt, in his Kosmos (I, 353) stated it as a plain fact, that, even from a physiological point of view, it is impossible to recognize in the groups of Blumenbach any true typical distinction, any general and consistent natural principle. From a physiological point of view, we may speak of varieties of man,— no longer of races, if that term is to mean more than variety. Physiologically the unity of the human species is a fact established as firmly as the unity of any other animal species. So much then, but no more, the philologist should learn from the physiologist. He should know that in the present state of physiological science it is impossible to admit more than one beginning of the human race. He should bear in mind that Man is a species, created once, and divided in none of its varieties by specific distinctions; in fact, that the common origin of the Negro and the Greek admits of as little doubt as that of the poodle and the greyhound. . . . .'

I have made this long extract from a book written by me in 1854, because it will show how strongly I have always deprecated the mixing up of Ethnology and Philology, and likewise that I was a Darwinian long before Darwin. At that time, however, I still entertained a hope that the physiologist might succeed in framing a real classification of races, on the evidence of skulls, or the skin, or the hair, as the philologist has succeeded in forming a real classification of languages, on the evidence of grammar. But in this hope we have been disappointed. Mankind has proved obstreperous, it has not allowed itself to be classified. According to Darwin, all men form but one species, and to his mind that species overlaps even the limits usually assigned to mankind. So far there seems to be at present a general agreement among physiologists. But all further attempts at classifying the human species have signally failed. Some biologists (Virey) have proposed two classes; Cuvier proposed three, Linnaeus four, Blumenbach five, Buffon six, Prichard and Peschel seven, Agassiz eight, Pickering eleven, Friedrich Müller twelve, Bory de St. Vincent fifteen, Morton twenty-two, Crawford sixty, and Burke sixty-three.* This does not prove that all these classifications are wrong. One of them may possibly hereafter be proved to be right. But at present not only is there the most decided disagreement among the most eminent biologists, but some of them, and these men of high authority in biological science, have themselves given up the whole problem of classifying mankind on physiological grounds as utterly hopeless. Oscar Peschel, in his classical work 'The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution,' sums up his conclusions in the following words: 'We must needs confess that neither the shape of the skull nor any other portion of the skeleton has afforded distinguishing marks of the human races; that the color of the skin likewise displays only various gradations of darkness; and that the hair alone comes to the aid of our systematic attempts, and even this not always, and never with sufficient decisiveness. . . . . Who then can presume to talk of the immutability of racial types? To base a classification of the human race on the character of the hair only, as Haeckel has done, was a hazardous venture, and could but end as all other artificial systems have ended.'

Nor does Peschel stand alone in this honest confession that all classification of the human race based on the color of the skin, the texture of the hair, the shape of the skull, has completely failed. No one has of late done more excellent work in ethnology than the indefatigable Director of the American Bureau of Ethnology, Major Powell. Yet this is what he says†: 'There is a science of anthropology, composed of subsidiary sciences. There is a science of sociology, which includes all the institutions of mankind. There is a science of philology, which includes the languages of mankind. And there is a science of philosophy, which includes the opinions of mankind. But there is no science of ethnology, for the attempt to classify mankind in groups has failed on every hand.'

The very Nestor among ethnologists, Horatio Hale, from whose essay on 'Race and Language'‡ I have largely quoted, has, after a long life devoted to ethnological and linguistic studies, arrived at exactly the

* Horatio Hale, *Race and Language*, p. 340.
† *Science*, June 24, 1887.
‡ *Popular Science Review*, January, 1888.

same conclusion, and expressed it with the same openness, that the classification of mankind cannot be founded on color, hair, or skull, but must be founded on language.

This is, no doubt, a great collapse. We had all been brought up with a belief in a white, a yellow, a brown, a red, and a black race; or, if we entered more deeply into the subject, we seemed perfectly certain of a Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, and Malay race. More recently, the division of the human race according to the texture of their hair, as proposed by Haeckel and adopted by Friedrich Müller in his learned work on Ethnology, was accepted by the new school of ethnologists as meeting all objections that had been made to former classifications. Still, it is far better to confess that no satisfactory classification has as yet been discovered, than to maintain that hair, color, and shape of skulls have proved real criteria of racial distinction. It does not follow by any means that further research may not bring to light a real divisor of the human race. At present, however, color of skin is in conflict with shape of skull, and shape of skull is in conflict with texture of hair. What we want is a principle of division that shall do justice to most, if not to all, the essential qualities of the varieties of man, provided always that such essential qualities can be discovered.

Till this is done, I agree with Mr. Horatio Hale that the most satisfactory, nay the only possible division of the human race, is that which is based on language. No one doubts that languages can be classified, and that the true principle of classification is their grammar. If some languages stand as yet apart, which hereafter may be proved to be related, or if other languages have not as yet been analyzed at all, that does not interfere with the enormous area of human speech which has been carefully surveyed. It is, of course, of that area alone that we can make any assertion, and our assertion is that the people who speak the same or cognate languages may, nay must, be treated as closely related. In modern times the frequent intercourse between all the people of the world, and the facility with which foreign languages may be acquired, are apt to make us look upon language as something, not essential, but purely accidental. But that was not the case in ancient times; and though the acquisition of a foreign language may be accidental, language as such is not. It is language that makes man man. Language is surely more of the essence of man than his skin, or his color, or his skull, or his hair. Blood, flesh, and bone are not of our true essence. They are in a constant flux, and change with every year, till at last they return to the dust. Our body is our uniform, very tight sometimes, very painful to put on and to put off, but still our uniform only. It matters very little whether it is black or white. Language, on the contrary, is the very embodiment of our true self. Take away language, and we shall indeed be mere animals, and no more. And, besides that, it is language that binds individuals together into families, clans, and nations, and survives them all in its constant growth, thus enabling us to base our classification on general and permanent characteristics, and not on peculiarities which, for all we know, may be the result of climate, diet, and heredity.

There can be no doubt that in the beginning at all events, the members of one family spoke one and the same language. When families grew into clans and nations, they would continue to speak the same language, and if colonies started from their original home, they could not but carry the same language with them.

But it is objected, that in the spreading of nations a mixture would necessarily occur between, say, white and black tribes.

No doubt it would, and it is for this very reason that physiological classification breaks down, while linguistic classification, though it becomes more difficult, does not become impossible. After blood has once become mixed, no scientific test has yet been discovered for distinguishing its ingredients. No one can tell, for instance, whether the offspring of a white man and a black woman should be classed as Caucasian or as Negro. The color may be quite white or quite black, or something between the two. The nose and mouth may be Negro-like, and yet the color may be fair, and the shape of the skull and the texture of the hair may be Caucasian. After one or two generations certain varieties may either become permanent, or they may, by the force of atavism, return to their original type. New mixtures of mixed or mongrel offspring with other mongrel or with pure breeds will make confusion even worse confounded, and after hundreds and thousands of years, the very possibility of pure breeds may very justly be doubted. How then should we dare in our days to classify mankind according to such variable peculiarities as color, skull, or hair?

The case is very different with regard to languages. No doubt, while this social intercourse between black and white people takes place, the white might adopt some words from the black, and the black from the white people. But these words could nearly always be distinguished, as we are able to distinguish French, Latin, and Greek words imbedded in English. And there would always remain the criterion of grammar, which enables us to say that English is and remains a Teutonic language, even though every word in an English sentence should be, as it often is, of Latin origin.

Lastly, it should never be forgotten, that if we speak of Aryas, we mean no more than the speakers of Aryan languages. As to their color, skull, or hair, we neither assert nor imply anything, unless we happen to know it from other sources. We may thus use 'languages' as a synonym of 'people,' just as Nebuchadnezzar addressed his subjects, 'O people, nations, and languages.' It is quite possible—in fact, it is almost inevitable in the constant turmoil of history—that the same language may come to be spoken by the white and the black, or any other variety of man. We take that for granted, and we should always have to make allowance for it, whenever we have to make any assertions as to the physical appearance of the Aryan or Semitic or Turanian speakers. But even then there remains the fact that, whenever there is a mixture of language, there is at the same time a much greater mixture of blood; and while it is possible to analyze mixed language by scientific tests, no tests whatever have as yet been discovered for analyzing mixed blood. It would be very hazardous to say that hereafter such tests may not be discovered, and that a classification of the human race according to physiological peculiarities is altogether impossible. What I maintain is that all attempts *hitherto made* have failed, and that if we want to classify the species to which we belong, we can only do it on linguistic grounds.

Much fault has been found with a remark which I made many years ago, that the same blood runs in the veins of the Sepoy and of the English soldier, that they are brothers in blood as well as brothers-in-arms. And yet, though it is difficult to prove it in every single case, all speaks in favor of supposing that the soldier who speaks English and the soldier who speaks Bengâlî, must be descended from ancestors who in far distant times spoke the same language and shared the same blood. There may be Sepoys of Mongolian origin; but though of course I did not mean them, yet the probability is that even they, if they have learned to speak an Indian vernacular, are descended from ancestors who intermarried with women of Aryan origin. As a rule, no tribe, whether conquered or conquering, adopts the language of the conquerors or the conquered, and abstains at the same time from intermarriage. And what one single marriage may produce can easily be shown. Let there be one couple of a black man and a white woman, and suppose they have two children, a boy and a girl. Let that boy and that girl marry two outsiders, whatever their color may be. Then, if each of these couples has again two children, there would be four mongrels. In another twenty years these four might produce eight, and in another twenty years these eight might possess a family of sixteen mongrels. If this process is carried on at the same not very extravagant ratio of two children to every couple, six hundred years would suffice to produce a population of 2,149,196,448 human beings. This, I believe, is more than the population of the whole earth. If we ask what the language of all these people would be, the answer is easy. It would be the language of one of their two ancestors, and it need not differ from that language more than the English of to-day differs from that of Robert of Gloucester. But however much it differed, we could always discover whether the grammar, the lifeblood of their language, was like that of the Negroes or like that of the Greeks. With regard to color, skull, and hair, however, it would be impossible to hazard any conjecture. If the original white man and black woman were only varieties of a common type, and their color was due to climatic influences, their offspring might be neither black nor white, but any color,—grey, brown, or red. The noses of their descendants might be Greek or Negro-like, their skulls dolichocephalic or brachycephalic, their hair straight, or curled, or tufty.

It was necessary to enter into this subject more fully, because, whether from a dislike of the idea that the same blood might run in the veins of the Sepoy and of the English soldier, or from some other cause, the idea of an Indo-European humanity has often been scouted, and our ancestors have been sought for in every part of the world rather than somewhere in Asia. You will now understand in what sense Indo-European speech is equivalent with Indo-European race, and how far we are justified with Nebuchadnezzar to use languages as synonymous with nations.

It may be that the practical usefulness of the lesson taught us by the Science of Language, that all Aryas do not only speak the same tongue, but are children of the same parents, is at present confined to the dark inhabitants of India and their fair rulers who came from the extreme West of Europe. But in time to come the same lesson may revive older and deeper sympathies between all Indo-European nations, even between those who imagine that they are divided, if not by language, at all events by blood.

The Celts of Ireland are Aryas, and speak to them only the language of the Aryan brotherhood, and the wild fancies of a separate Fenian blood will soon vanish.

The French are Aryas, and more than that, they are, to a very considerable extent, Franks, and their veins are as full of the best Teutonic blood as their language is of the best Teutonic speech. Why should the French and the Germans not learn again those neighborly sentiments which have made the westward march of the Aryan brotherhood the triumphal progress of true civilization?

The Slaves are Aryas, and so far as they are Aryas, tillers of the soil (for that is the original meaning of the word), they have preserved some of the noblest features of the Aryan race. Why should they be taught to look upon their German neighbors as aliens and enemies, when they have so many interests and so many duties in common? Why should there be strife between their herdmen, when they know that they are brethren, and there is land enough for all of them, on the right and on the left?

These may seem but idle dreams, of little interest to the practical politician. All I can say is, I wish it were so. But my memory reaches back far enough to make me see the real and lasting mischief for which, I fear, the Science of Language has been responsible for the last fifty years. The ideas of race and nationality, founded on language, have taken such complete possession of the fancy both of the young and the old, that all other arguments seem of no avail.

Why was Italy united? Because the Italian language embodied Italian nationality. Why was Germany united? Because of Arndt's song, What is the German's Fatherland? and the answer given, As far as sounds the German tongue. Why is Russia so powerful a centre of attraction for the Slavonic inhabitants of Turkey and Germany? Because the Russian language, even though it is hardly understood by Servians, Croatians, and Bulgarians, is known to be most closely allied. Even from the mere cinders of ancient dialects, such as Welsh, Gaelic, and Erse, eloquent agitators know how to fan a new, sometimes a dangerous, fire.

The Science of Language has encouraged the various national aspirations in places even where separation and national independence would mean political annihilation; it has called forth a spirit of separatism. Yet it has also another lesson to teach, that of an older, a higher, a truer brotherhood—a lesson too often forgotten, when the opposite lesson seems better to answer political ends. As dialects may well exist by the side of a national speech, nay, as they form a constant supply of life, and vigor, and homely grace to the classical language, so imperial rule does not exclude provincial independence, but may derive from the various members of a great empire, if only held under proper control, its best strength, its permanent health, and that delightful harmony which is the reward of all true and unselfish statesmanship.

VITALISM AND THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY.

A great difference appears to exist between an animal that moves about and a stone that remains on the spot where it has been placed. It seems as if every child might easily explain it. And yet it required the lapse of centuries before scientists could tell us what were the characteristic features of animal life.

In former centuries people were satisfied to state that the animal was alive, while a stone was not alive. And we may perhaps, even in the present day, accept this explanation. But we refuse to be paid with empty words. We now ask: What is life?

In past ages it was assumed, that certain things were alive, because they contained vitality or a vital principle. This simple explanation was called Vitalism. The vital principle, it was held, manifested itself through spontaneous motion. Things that contained no vital principle were not alive; and could therefore be moved by push only, by a *vis a tergo*, as they said; that is, through a mechanical pressure from without.

The striking feature of living things, of both plants as well as animals, is their organic growth of which inanimate objects are destitute. Thus it became customary to distinguish an organic and an inorganic kingdom; and when chemistry, the youngest science, was born, a new flood of light was expected to be shed upon the obscure problem of vitality.

Chemists, indeed, discovered, that all living substance of the animal and the vegetable kingdoms consisted chiefly of four elementary substances; viz., of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. There were very slight admixtures only of a few other ingredients, such as phosphorus, sulphur, iron, chloride of sodium (salt), etc. Life, it appeared, must depend upon the interaction of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. Accordingly, these four elements were called organic substances. They were supposed to be the substances of life.

But the hope that from a difference of matter the problem of vitality could be solved, was preposterous. In many respects the so-called organic substances do not differ at all from the inorganic substances, and there exist many combinations of the organic substances that are neither of an animal nor of a vegetable nature We cannot therefore look upon living things as combinations of the organic substances; they are more than combinations of organic substances; they are organic substances in a special form which admit of a constant interaction. Substances of such a form are called organized substances—well to be distinguished from organic substances. The idea of a life-substance had to be abandoned, and scientists now tried to explain the problem of vitality from the supposition of a vital energy. This vital energy was considered as different from any other kind of energy, and many very prominent scientists looked upon it as a supernatural quality which lay beyond explanation.

The theory that a vital energy animates living bodies was maintained until half a century ago by our most prominent physiologists. But it received its

death-blow, when the law of the conservation of energy was recognized to the full extent of its importance. We now know that all forces in nature are motions of some kind: light and electricity are undulations of ether; heat is a molecular vibration; and mechanical motion, change of place or visible movement, can be transformed into any other energy, electricity, light, or heat. *Vice versa*, motion can be reproduced from the other energies.

Energy* certainly often seems to disappear and can apparently be created again. But it can be shown that energy, when it disappears, reappears in another form, and that the energy thus created did exist before, it was only transformed. Energy may be latent; and latent energy can be set free again. Because latent energy *can* be set free again, it is called *potential* energy (*L. L. potentialis*, from *possum*, I can).

Suppose my hand exercises a force represented by $A\ B$ upon your hand, and your hand resists the pressure by exercising an equal force in the opposite direction $B\ A$, there will be no motion. Let the stress between the two hands represent the force of $A\ B+B\ A$. This stress is latent energy; it is potential and can be converted into an energy of motion, or, as it is termed, into *kinetic* energy.

If it takes a pressure of $A\ B$ to set the spring of a toy gun, the spring will exercise the same amount of force ($B\ A$) upon the catch that keeps it compressed. There will be no motion, so long as the catch is strong enough to endure the pressure $B\ A$. But the force $B\ A$ is not annihilated; it still exists as potential energy and can be set free at any moment by the removal of the catch, which is done by pulling the trigger. The pressure $B\ A$, that the spring exerts, was created through the expenditure of the force $A\ B$ during the act of setting the gun. The spring is, so to say, loaded, it is freighted with a certain amount of energy; and if the trigger is pulled, a kind of explosion takes place—i. e., kinetic energy is suddenly set free, which is available for doing work. In a toy gun it is used for throwing pebbles or peas.

A house of cards in the same way represents potential energy. One card keeps the other standing by pressure and counterpressure. If through the interference of some change the pressure of one card ceases to be quite equal to that of the other, the house breaks down, thus changing stress into motion—or, in other terms, thus changing potential energy into kinetic energy.

The building up and breaking down of a house of cards is a process visible in all its details. But there are chemical compositions that are similar to such houses of cards, yet do not show the details of the building up and breaking down. It takes a certain amount of energy to build them, and they thus contain potential energy. Whenever a very small change, a slight concussion, an increase of temperature, or a spark, can cause their breakdown, they are called "unstable." Gunpowder and all other explosives are of this character.

Although kinetic energy may disappear when it is changed into potential energy, yet energy itself cannot be destroyed. Neither can it be produced. Like matter, energy is indestructible.

The question now arises: Is vital force different from both these energies? And the unequivocal answer is, No! The energy which living beings expend in their activity, in their motions, their passions, and in their thought, is the same energy that we meet with everywhere, and which is produced in animal bodies in a more complicated way, yet in a similar manner as work is done by machines.* As machines are fed by coal and heated by the combustion of coal, so the animal receives food, which through the organs of digestion is assimilated and transformed into highly complicated, unstable combinations. Like gunpowder, or like a drawn spring, these unstable combinations contain potential energy. An unstable combination of high complexity, when breaking down into a more stable combination of less complexity, sets free that quantity of kinetic energy that was necessary to build it up and to keep it in a state of tension. In the animal body, as in the fire-box of a steam-engine, a process of combustion takes place: the exceedingly unstable oxygen of the air combines with carbon and nitrogen compounds, which are also unstable and to which oxygen bears a great affinity, i. e., it easily combines with them into more stable compositions. All the details of this process are not yet fully known and calculated; but the theory itself can no longer be doubted.

Combustion means oxidation; and oxidation, converting substances into more stable combinations, sets energy free, which appears either as heat or as work performed. The process of oxidation in the fire-box of a steam-engine is a luminous process, while in the body it is not strong enough for developing visible flames. Oxygen, in the process of combustion, unites with carbon into carbonic acid and leaves behind water and other incombustible parts.

Oxygen is conveyed into the body by respiration; in the lungs the blood is oxidized, which carries the oxygen to the different organs. Through the oxidation of the tissues in the nerves, in the muscles, and in other living substances, potential energy is set free which partly appears as heat, partly as work per-

* Leibnitz called a force that acts as motion of some form "*vis viva*," or "living force." He defined *vis viva* as twice the mass times the velocity, $2\ M\ V$. But now the term kinetic energy (from κινεῖν, to move), energy of motion, has become customary, and we understand by kinetic energy half the mass times the square of velocity ($\frac{1}{2}\ M\ V^2$). See Maxwell, *Theory of Heat*, page 90.

* See Gavarret, *De la chaleur produite par les êtres vivants.*

formed. The heat is called animal heat, the work performed is the movements of the body. The products of the oxidations are carbonic acid, water, and certain nitrogen compounds, which are given off in the secretion of urine, in the air expelled from the lungs in breathing, and through perspiration.

Professor Bunge in Basel has again recently adopted the expression vital energy. Bunge justly maintains, that the forces that appear in a living animal organism are entirely different from all other forces in nature. In this manner he re-admitted the obsolete term vitalism. In Professor Bunge's writings, however, the term vitalism is in so far modified and modernized, that the Professor does not at all contest that this vital energy is just as much energy as any mechanical movement, heat or electricity, and that it originates by way of transformation from other forms of energy. Vital energy is nevertheless entirely different from other forces, even as electricity differs from heat or from visible motion, from friction, or from light.

In the old electric machine friction is transformed into electricity, and we know that electricity as well as friction is a certain mode of motion: still electricity is not friction. Thus, vital energy is likewise quite a special form of energy, which form is different from all the other forms of energy from which it can be produced.

Vitality is an energy just as well as all other energies, but its form is peculiar; it is neither electricity, nor light, nor heat alone, nor any other energy we know of, although it may be more or less similar to the one and to the other. Vitality originates from the same great reservoir of energy as all the other forms of energy, and it stands with them in a constant interaction. Yet the only engine by which, to our knowledge, vital energy can be created, is the animal organism. According to the present state of knowl edge, we can, to say the least, hardly expect to be able to produce vital energy in any other manner. This truth is most concisely formulated in the statement that life comes from life only.

IS THE UNIVERSE MORAL?

A LETTER FROM MR. FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT. WITH A REPLY BY DR. PAUL CARUS.

I.

DR. PAUL CARUS :—

DEAR SIR :—I am obliged to you for your very kind letter, inviting me to reply to your criticisms on my recent address in the columns of THE OPEN COURT. Although extremely pressed for time, I cannot forbear showing my respect for your frankness and courtesy by at least a few words on one or two main points. In devoting itself so largely to philosophical subjects, THE OPEN COURT probably sacrifices something of popularity and immediate influence on affairs; but I ought not to let slip this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of its great improvement in the editorial columns, in point of ability and interest for thinkers, since you have had charge of it.

Under your predecessor, the standing notices announced that the paper was devoted to "Monism and Agnosticism, as positive and negative aspects of the one and only rational scientific philosophy." A more inane or self-contradictory position than this it would be difficult to imagine. Monism is a definite theory of the universe in its unity and wholeness, as a known noumenal reality; Agnosticism is the principle that every such theory is groundless, and that human knowledge is strictly limited to phenomena. To profess Monism and Agnosticism at the same time, therefore, betrays hopeless ignorance of the very *A B C* of philosophy. No such ludicrous blunder is chargeable to you. Your bold and explicit rejection of Agnosticism, as utterly unphilosophical in principle, has commanded my admiration and hearty sympathy; and, while I often differ from you, I am quite as often struck by your genuine insight and penetration into principles about which so many flounder in impotent bewilderment.

There is an instance of this among your criticisms of my address, many of which however are based on a hasty misreading of it. I quote your own words here :—

"The relations among things, the forms of things, are realities also [as well as matter]. They are not materialities, not things, but they are real, nevertheless They are most important realities, and all higher life, all intellectual existence, and all ethical inspiration depend upon them. *The world of forms, indeed, is identical with spirituality.* [Your own italics.] . . . . We do not accept Kant's position. We say: The thinking subject is a part of the objective world. The same laws hold good for both. It is all but impossible that the formal laws of the one should be different from the f rmal laws of the other . . . . . The highest laws of nature are the laws of form."

All this is most admirably said. Follow out those principles and you will come to agree with me where you now think you most dissent.

Is not the MORAL LAW the highest formal law of the thinking subject? Does it not give form, meaning, and worth to the highest personal activity? Very well, then; you yourself see, and say, that "it is all but impossible that the formal laws of the one [the thinking subject] should be different from the formal laws of the other [the objective world]; and from this it must follow that the Moral Law is a formal law of Nature, and the highest of all her known laws. Hence, on patient and calm reflection, you will recall your "most emphatic objection" to my position that morality is the all-pervading law of the universe; you will withdraw your declaration that "the universe, or, if you prefer, God, is neither moral nor immoral." For your own principles, quoted above, are my best answer to these criticisms.*

Another point, connected with the foregoing. You say: "The Universe is a law unto itself; and concord with that law is morality." This is most truly and most beautifully said, *provided the law of the Universe is the Moral Law;* but it is utterly untrue, and as utterly unbeautiful, *if that law is mere blind, unintelligent, unmoral Force.* If the latter alternative is the truth, morality consists in defying the law of Force even unto death, and obeying that Moral Law which man knows and the Universe knows not—though how man can know any law which is not a law of the Universe itself, you altogether omit to explain.

Think more deeply, and more consistently with your own best insights, and you will begin to see more truth than you imagine

* In fact, you expressly say, in your "Fundamental Problems," p. 152: "The idea of a God as the possible presence of a Moral Law in the world to which we have to conform, is a conceptioa of pure thought, which involves no self contradiction." I do but show positive grounds for this possible conception.

now in the positions you controvert. They will bear study—long and close study; and the reward will be great.

I have time left for only one correction of your rather numerous misapprehensions of my meaning. You say:—

"The person is a perfect organism, and the organism is a perfect machine. But not *vice versa:* not every machine is a perfect organism, nor every organism a perfect person." And you seem to suppose that I meant to affirm they were. Allow me to quote what I actually said:—

"Each and every one of us, is, at once, a Machine, an Organism, and a Person; each and every one of us comes under the law of Causality in Motion, of Finality in Life, and of Morality in Conduct. The three types and the three principles are united in one harmonious system and one harmonious action in the Person, and *in the Person alone; they meet, they unite, in nothing else within the whole scope of human experience.* Here, then, in human experience and positive science, lies the only possible foundation for a scientific conception of the universe which shall embrace within itself all the elements of known truth. The Machine involves, but does not explain, the Organism; the Organism involves, but does not explain, the Person; but the Person both involves and explains the Organism and the Machine. All types of real being, therefore, are united and identified in the constitution of the Person; all principles of real being are united and identified in in the principle of Personality."

If you compare your words with mine, you will see that we said precisely the same thing, and do not differ on this point at all.

It is a pleasure to find a critic who does not, like some others, feel afraid to "go into a consideration of the arguments." Perhaps, when you have pondered as long as I have the profound question, *What is the Form of Nature?* you may arrive at the same answer, *Personality.* But, even if not, it will not lessen the respect or the sincerity with which I subscribe myself,

Very Truly Yours,

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., Jan. 8, 1890. FRANCIS E. ABBOT.

II.

MR. FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT:—

DEAR SIR:—If you understand by "moral" that which is good, or that which has, perhaps better that which ought to have, every one's approbation, I do not hesitate to call the laws of the Universe moral. But in that case you are obliged to explain what you understand by "moral or good." People are not at all agreed upon that which is to be called good; and certainly sentimental goodnaturedness is not a quality of the Universe. In that sense God is not good.

If you understand by "Morality" the conformity of an individual to the laws of the All, you cannot properly call God or the Universe moral. God then may be called the standard of morality; its objective ground and the determinative measure to which all moral rules must be referred in order to be tested.

But we do not haggle about words. I have no objection to your usage of the word "moral," provided you do not attach an anthropomorphic conception to the word. And I hope that these few sentences suffice to explain my meaning when I say: The All is non-moral; it is as it is; and we are moral in so far as we are in conformity with its laws.

* * *

Our difference in the usage of the word "moral" does not seem to imply a difference of opinion. There is another difference, however, concerning which I am not so sure. You say: "The moral law is the highest formal law of the thinking subject." Morality, it is true, is, as it were, the logic of conduct. Morality is based on the laws of formal thought, and ethics, the science of morals, is a regulative science. All regulative sciences are based on the laws of form. Arithmetic is the regulative science of calculation; it contains purely formal statements, and its figures are empty abstractions. But such purely formal statements, as for instance, 'five times five is twenty five,' hold good under all circumstances; and the empty figures may be applied to apples as well as to suns or planets, and they will ever prove reliable. Thus ethics, as Kant has shown in his excellent monograph on the subject, has its formal aspect; it must, as a logic of conduct, be based upon the laws of form Nevertheless, I object to calling ethics a formal science, for all formal thought, abstractly considered, is empty. Mere formal ethics, like pure logic or the empty figures of arithmetic, is an abstract "ought" that is applicable to the code of a band of pirates just as well as to the laws of a society of honest men.

The logic of conduct has a special content which is derived from experience A purely formal ethics would remain without application; it would be like Aristotle's formal logic, in which the most foolish and futile propositions can be made; they remain correct so long as they do not contain contradictions Yet valuable though purely formal logic may be to free our minds from errors, this science will never help us to find out a positive truth. For that we have to go to the ever-flowing well of facts, we must face the actualities of real life and gather in the treasures of experience. Purely formal ethics has no value, unless it derives its content from, and again applies it to, experience.

Why do we consider it wrong to kill a man, yet eat the meat of oxen and other animals which we know have been slain for that purpose? There is no apriori answer to this question; it is a matter that has to be decided, not by formal laws, but by experience; although, as a matter of course, experience must be guided by the calculation and foresight which become possible through an application of formal laws. The thinking subject therefore cannot evolve out of itself alone the moral law by an apriori process of reasoning The thinking subject must study nature and must then comply with nature's laws. By nature I do not mean here the earth, its mountains and vegetation, but all that is, human society and the laws of human society included.

You are very strong yourself on this point, that God or Nature can be, and must be, scientifically investigated. Will you limit the source of information to the formal merely?

I have devoted to this question more space than its importance seems to command. It may be that we agree on this point. Yet it is a question of principle; it is the principle of method (it is the method, how to arrive at a statement of that which must be considered as moral); and whether we agree or not, we ought first to be clear about the principles upon which we stand and from which we proceed.

* * *

The main difference between our positions, unquestionably, is our conception of the idea of God. You call God a person, and I reject the personality of God. God is that power of the All which has produced us, which lives in us, and which commands our obedience. So long as we observe its behests, it will live in us; and so long as it lives in us, we shall continue to live. Although this form of life, the bodies in which we now live, may be broken, God will rise again and again in other and similar forms, undestroyed and indestructible.

God, as I conceive him to be, is not less than a person, but more than a person. The frailty of personality does not apply to him; there is no limitation, no individuality, no distinct idiosyncrasy about him. He is not (as according to my conception every person is) one special form and combination, yet he is the universality of law, inflexible, immutable, eternal. You can adapt yourself to him, but you can never adapt him to yourself. The hea-

thenish custom to attempt an adaptation of God to ourselves, is not yet extinct in Christianity.

It is for that reason that I prefer the expression "God is non-moral," because I look upon God as the highest and ultimate and absolute authority of that which has to be considered as moral. When you call God moral, you imply that he is in conformity with the highest law of the Universe. In that case the moral law is more divine than God, and God would be divine only in so far as he is in harmony with it. A God who is moral, whether he be impersonal or a person, becomes redundant for those who make the highest law of the Universe their God. Let us obey that very highest authority, to be in conformity with which even Gods are endeavoring, and we need not mind the wrath or favor of any divine personality, for that law is ths supreme God, it is the only true God.

Certainly the Universe is not mere force, but is force ruled by law. I find that "Law" and "Force" are often called blind by naturalists. Natural laws are called blind, I suppose, because they allow of no exception whatever; because they do not adapt themselves to circumstances, as persons might do. But is not the expression "the blind laws of nature" nevertheless a contradiction, or at least an inadequateness of simile? If natural laws do not adapt themselves to us, we must in our turn adapt ourselves to them. But is that any reasonable pretence for calling them blind? Certainly not; for they make it possible that we need not grope blindly about; being irrefragable, they throw light upon natural phenomena and thus become our guides and teach us, how we can adapt ourselves to nature.

We welcome the idea that God is no person, but a law; not a being adaptable to circumstances, but an irrefragable authority, no deified egotism but the omnipotent power of All-existence! This idea is the republican conception of theology which can conceive of order and of law without a Prince, and of religion without the fetish of anthropomorphism.

We have no objection to representing the moral law of the Universe to which we have to conform, as a person. We may compare it to a father, and with Christ call it "Our Father," just as well as we like to speak of Mother Nature But we wish to have it understood that this expression is a simile only—a simile which, if carried out, will lead to serious misconceptions

Respectfully Yours,

PAUL CARUS.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GOETHE AS A CELIBATE AND AS A MORAL GUIDE.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

TO CLARIFY matters for Prof. Calvin Thomas, permit me to say that Goethe in his thirty-ninth year took under his protection Christiane Vulpius, a young girl, in no way his social or intellectual equal; for over twenty years she remained his mistress, and when nearly sixty he married her from apprehensions as to the position of his eldest son. As a matter of courtesy his "conscience marriage" might entitle him to be ranked with the married, but we do not feel that he acquired any right to such position until after his conceptions of life and duty had taken a form which his seven to ten years of actual married life did not and could not in the nature of things substantially change

In our article "Marriage vs Celibacy" we maintained that Goethe was not a safe moral guide to the young in matters relating to the sex-impulse—we still hold this view.

Professor Thomas evidently belongs to that class of Goethe's admirers, who, as Bebel says, "read, without the slightest moral indignation, how Goethe wasted the warmth of his heart and the enthusiasm of his great soul on one woman after another." Goethe neither in his life nor works idealizes love. Meister, Faust, Edward, Werther were of the earth earthy; each must have his "pound of flesh."

Not only what we know but what it is possible for us to conceive depends upon what we have experienced Goethe's experience unfitted him for dealing with the sex-passion; he had never felt or said to himself: this *one* and *no other* The instinct of promiscuity was strong in him, and Professor Thomas unwittingly bears testimony to this fact when in reference to *Meister*, and *Elective Affinities*, he says: "No one can read either until he is old enough to distinguish between depicting immorality and recommending it."

Nature has a Nemesis for every sin One cannot have lived an impure or irregular life without showing the effect in his writings, and will unconsciously instill ideas that debase As Goethe says in Meister, "whoever spends his early years in mean and pitiful society, though at an after period he may have the choice of better, will yet constantly look back with longing towards that which he enjoyed of old, and which has left its impression blended with the memory of all his young and unreturning pleasures."

The question of Professor Thomas, whether I regard wedlock as consisting not in the mutual fidelity of husband and wife, but in an ecclesiastical sanction, is certainly a strange one. Does Professor Thomas not believe that in civilized society there must, in the sex-relation as in all other matters involving the integrity or welfare of the community, be something firmly settled by law, some controlling power stronger than the "moral fibre of a man"? Does he not recognize with Matthew Arnold, that conscience is the most changing of rules; conscience in the strong is presumptuous, in the timid, weak, and unhappy wavering, in the undecided, an obedient organ of the sentiments that sway us; more misleading than reason and nature?

On this question Goethe himself says, "It is essential that we lay down and continually impress on men certain laws, to operate as a kind of hold in life. Nay, I could almost venture to assert, that better to be wrong by rule than be wrong with nothing but fitful caprice of our disposition impelling us hither and thither. And in my way of viewing men there always seems to be a void in their nature which cannot be filled up except by something decisive and distinctly settled."

Goethe is always read with profit by the thoughtful and mature, for his motto in life was that of his hero Faust:

> "All of life for all mankind created, shall be within my inmost being tested."

And as Madame Roland said, "those who have seen much are always worth hearing, and those who have felt much have always seen more than others"

Goethe had certainly both seen and felt much, and hence those who know how to follow Shakespeare's advice, "Do not pick bad from bad, but by bad mend," can read him with benefit.

NEW YORK, January, 1890. SUSAN CHANNING.

NOTES.

Dr. Morrison I. Swift will give a course of lectures, in Philadelphia, during the month of January, on topics of "Social Economy."

The *Magazine of American History* for January, contains a highly entertaining article by the editress, Mrs. Lamb, upon "William Cullen Bryant in History." The magazine presents its usual wealth of historical matter. (New York, 547 Broadway).

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A WEEKLY PERIODICAL.

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THE RELIGION OF RESIGNATION.

Among the many religions upon earth there are two that exceed all the others in the number of their devotees. They are Buddhism and Christianity. Neither Judaism nor Mohammedanism, nor even Paganism, can approach them. The latter taken together do not as yet equal one of the two former; it is as if the world were divided between them.

Buddhism and Christianity have one common feature. Both proclaim the gospel of salvation from the evils of this world by resignation. Both point to a higher life which can be gained through the sacrifice of our individual selves. Other religions require sacrifices of lambs and goats. Buddhism and Christianity demand the surrender of self. Mohammedanism promises enjoyment and happiness upon earth and in heaven. Both Buddhism and Christianity preach endurance in affliction and submission to tribulation.

It seems natural to seek pleasure and to shun pain. The religious injunctions of Buddha and Christ are a reversion of this instinctive desire. They preach this: Do not shun pain, and do not seek pleasure. Says Christ: "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me."

Buddhism, it is well known, did not succeed in overcoming the many superstitions of its converts. Christianity became ossified as soon as its mythology was systematized into theological dogmas. The Christians, while clinging to the letter of their creed which killeth, lost the spirit of their teacher's doctrine.

We shall not here point out the errors of these religions, but try to find the key to their wonderful success. And can there be any doubt about it?

Their success can be due only to their thorough conquest of death. The Buddhist who has taken his refuge in Buddha, and the Christian who is earnest in his following of Christ, will not tremble in the face of death, for to them death has lost its sting. The Christian lives in God, and the Buddhist has even upon earth spiritually entered into Nirvana. They have placed all their hopes in a higher life, "where there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are passed away."

This victory over death is not accomplished by avoiding death and by shunning the anguish of life, but by a surrender to death of that which cannot escape death and by finding rest in the ideal world of immortal life. Whatever be our fate,—they say unto themselves,—the kingdom of God will be victorious; all other things are mere trifles; therefore let us remain children of God and we shall inherit his kingdom. Luther sings:

> Strong t.wer and refuge is our God,
> Right goodly shield and weapon;
> He helps us free in every need,
> That hath us now o'ertaken.
> Take they then our life,
> Wealth, honor, child and wife,
> Let these all be gone,
> No triumph have they won.
> The kingdom ours remaineth.

This song with its powerful melody was the slogan of the new faith that regenerated Christianity and conciliated religion with the progress that science had made before the Reformation. Yet Luther and other Christians believed in the immortality of their ego, and it seems as if their religious confidence were based upon this error. We have ceased to believe in a mystical soul-substance which was formerly supposed to inhabit the body as a stranger, and which after death will hover about somewhere as a spectre. We have ceased to believe in ghosts; science has banished the phantoms of disembodied spirits out of the provinces of psychology and philosophy. But must we for that reason cease to believe in life and in spiritual life? Must we therefore consider death as a finality? Does not science teach the persistence of life and of spiritual life; and is there the slightest reason that we should cease to believe in the immortality of our ideals? Is it not a fact, scientifically indubitable, that every work done, be it good or evil, continues in its effects upon future events? Is it not a fact established upon reliable observations that the evolution of mankind, and of all life generally upon earth, is one great and continous whole; that even to-day the efforts of our ancestors are preserved in the present generation; their features, their characters, their souls now live in us. Certainly not all features are preserved, but those only which nature considered worth preserving. So our characters, our thoughts, our aspirations, our souls will live in future generations, if they are strong enough, if they are noble and elevating. In order to be strong, they must be in accord with nature, they must be true. In order to live, they must be engen-

dered by the evolutionary tendency in nature, which constantly endeavors to lift life to higher planes. It must be, as the Christian expresses it, in harmony with God, if God is meant to be that power in nature and in our hearts that ever again and again prompts us to struggle and to strive for something higher.

Our soul can no longer be considered as that unity which it used to be to our forefathers. It is a part of the soul of humanity in a certain phase of its development. As such it is a rich combination of certain ideals, thoughts, and aspirations of hopes and fears, of wishes and of ideals. Our ego is nothing but an ideal thread on which are strung the invaluable pearls of our spiritual existence. The ego is nothing but the temporal succession in which these ideas are thought.

It is not the belief in an immortalized ego that can conquer death, but it is the surrender of this ego and of all its egotistic desires. This ego we now know is no real thing ; it is an illusion and possesses a fleeting, momentary, sham existence only. Reality of life is not to be found there, and if its continuity is broken in death, our individual existence ceases, but not necessarily the life of our soul. The ideal world of our mind can outlive our body, and we can gain an immortality of that part of ourselves which is most worthy of being preserved.

This it appears, is the truth in Buddhism and Christianity, this is the secret that explains why they conquered the world. Resign all egotism, do not place your hope upon this fleeting existence, and devote your efforts to the creation of that higher life, of that ideal world, where death is unknown and the petty tribulations of life disappear !

This life cannot be realized by the poet and philosopher only, not by the great only, the heroes of mankind : it can be realized by every one of us. It is this that Christ preached, and it is this that Buddha proclaimed. Every one of us is called to participate in the higher life, for the intellectuality of a higher life is one phase of it only, and it is not its grandest part. Its sum-total is comprised in all those many ideals and aspirations that, in one word, we call morality. It is, as Paul says, Faith, Hope, and Charity ; but Charity is the greatest among them.

Men who have given up their individual ego, who have risen to the height of that spiritual life which knoweth not death, will live in this world as though they lived not ; they that weep, as though they wept not, and they that rejoice as though they rejoiced not, and they that buy as though they possessed not, and they that use this world as not abusing it : for the fashion of this world passeth away.

They will live, as though they lived not, because their life is no longer the fleeting sham-existence of their egotistic desires. Their life has become an expression of that higher life which is immortal. They buy as though they possessed not, because they know that they shall have to leave their possessions.

They consider themselves as stewards to whom property is entrusted for a wise use. Even their joys and pains, their recreations and troubles become transfigured by the universality of the spirit that animates their whole being.

The religion of the future will not be Christian dogmatism, it will be no creed, no belief in any of the tenets of the church. Yet it must preserve the spirit of Christianity which has enabled it to conquer death. It must be a religion of resignation. If thou wilt enter into life eternal, cease to cling to that which perishes, and become one with the Life Immortal !

TWO PERILS OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN.

BY PROF E. D. COPE.

It has seemed to me that especial attention should be called to two problems which confront us, and which will probably become more pressing as time advances, until they are settled by the adoption of a definite policy with regard to them. They are questions which arise from the implications and necessities imposed by our physical constitution, and are therefore especially obvious to students of nature. I refer to the future relations of race and of sex to the government of the United States, and hence to all forms of popular government whatsoever. Thanks to the development of the higher functions of mind, man is becoming a more or less idealistic thinker, and the tendency to idealism has been especially fostered by the theologies which the majority of the white race profess. Fortunately the advance of positive knowledge, or science, is keeping pace with the growth of pure thought, and it is the white race which is developing this field also. But idealism has such a hold on us, that it is difficult for us to give to the facts of our material relations their just due, when they seem to conflict with abstract propositions which are in themselves logical and apparently ethical. But nature is neither logical nor ethical, but acts according to methods of her own : for instance, inversely as the square of the distance ; or according to the law of inheritance ; or the nature of the environment ; etc. We must be as logical as possible, subject to natural conditions ; and our action will be, when both these elements have their just influence, truly ethical, and then only. Various examples of the folly of acting on purely idealistic grounds have been presented in history. The celibacy of the early papal Christianity ; and the conferring of suffrage on the liberated slaves of our country, are illustrations of the folly which may result from the endeavor to conform to an abstract theory of right without regard to natural conditions.

Peace-societies and socialists would have us fly like the moth into the brilliant light of their ideals only to return to our natural element, scorched and discomfited. And yet at some immeasurably remote future these dreams may be realized.

In the matter of race we have to consider our relations to the Negro. We may have to consider also the Mongolian at some future day, but the latter does not as yet form an important part of our population, and is not disposed to become so. But the negro considers the United States his country, and so it is from the stand-point of history and proprietary right. It is to one aspect of the negro question that I wish to call attention.

The American-African is a citizen and a voter. He has become so in opposition to the judgment of persons of various shades of opinion, political and otherwise, and he will apparently continue to be such, so long as he remains in the country. His unfitness to exercise these priveleges was asserted beforehand, and has been demonstrated by many years of experience since. He increases by an immense numerical proportion the weight of dead material which the republic has to carry, and which is always an element of danger in a form of government where intelligence is essential to a proper conduct of its affairs. It has been said many times that the negro has not had opportunities to become what the white man is, and that with education and time he will become his equal, or at least become abundantly capable of fulfilling the duties of citizenship.

This assertion has enough truth in it to make it dangerous. What the negro may become after centuries of education, the present writer does not pretend to say. But he has had as much time in the past as any other race, and he has not improved it, or been improved by it, as the case may have been. There is considerable probability that he is even an older race than the Indo-European. Let the causes have been what they may, the negro remains undeveloped mentally, and in all probability will remain so for a long time to come. He is like other members of the animal kingdom, susceptible of education in his youth, and bright and intelligent to a considerable degree. But with the advent of maturity his mind undergoes more or less of an eclipse. The necessities of the body demand his exclusive attention, and they mostly get it. His physical development expresses this fact, as is the case with all vertebrated animals. With adult age the lower part of the face preponderates over the upper; the *relative* dimensions of the brain diminish; and the sutures of the skull unite, thus precluding much further growth. Of all the races of man, the Indo-European undergoes the least change at maturity. His face retains its relatively smaller proportions, and most of the cranial sutures remain open, thus permitting continued growth of the brain throughout life. As every anatomist knows, quadrumanous features in all parts of the structure are far more frequently observed in the negro than in the white race.

I state these well-known facts, because they appeal very strongly to the naturalist who has had experience with the question of the persistence or variability of the characters of species. In spite of the general belief in evolution, it is well known that species-characters are often very permanent. Evolution is not possible under all circumstances; it has its definite laws; it is not a process of general change. Only certain types have been susceptible of evolution in the ages of past time. Great numbers, in fact all, the forms of life, but one, i. e. the ancestral predecessors of man, have been in each geological age, so to speak, side-tracked and left behind. The possession by all races of man of the faculty of speech, renders us especially liable to error in regard to their powers. It matters little what a man says; it is the record of his acts that tells us what he is. Intellectual and kindly qualities enter into the mental constitution of men of all races, and language is invented to express them. But the question is not whether such qualities exist, but whether they are sufficiently strong to guide the conduct. The traits mentioned are found in various members of the animal kingdom below man, but they avail little, as a rule, to restrain the flow of mere vital activity, and to properly direct the force of animal desire. The superior races of man demonstrate the possibility of the development of an intelligence which directs, and an ethical sense which controls action; and it is the possession of these qualities that renders self-government possible, and it is this power which places the forces of nature within the grasp of civilized man.

This unfavorable comment on the capacities of the negro is not designed to discourage those who take an interest in his education. It is probable that the future development of this race depends to a great degree on the education which he has received and is receiving in America, and good seed is being sown which will bear much fruit. But I suspect that it will be only after many days, and in another continent, i. e. Africa.

Can we carry the load until that far future when the Ethiopian shall "change his" mental "skin"? Have we not burdens enough to carry in the European peasantry which we are called on every year to receive and assimilate? Is our own race on a plane sufficiently high, to render it safe for us to carry eight millions of dead material in the very centre of our vital organism? History shows that even the most ill-favored of the Indo-European stock is susceptible of growth

in intelligence and ethical knowledge and practice, if they only have a chance; for it is in the race. But we breed our own poison in the slums of our great cities in sufficient abundance to give us plenty to do to protect our institutions. We want no allies of destruction in the untaught children of other races who can be bought and sold by the money, and intimidated and enthused by the fables, of designing demagogues. Sufficient unto our own race is the evil thereof.

The present position of the negro-question in the Southern states deserves the prompt attention of lovers of their country. The Southern whites naturally and properly object to a government by negroes. But in the manner of the endeavor to rid themselves of the danger, they do not act wisely. The difficulty must be avoided by constitutional methods, and not by illegal violence or fraud. It is possible and indeed very important to restrict the suffrage for both whites and blacks by an educational or property qualification, or both. But our southern people do not adopt this remedy, for the reason that a reduction in the registration of voters, means a reduction of their representation in Congress. So to save the latter they prefer a course which is in the highest degree dangerous to the future peace of the country. How long, I ask of any rational southern white man, will the country or any large part of the country, consent to be governed by a majority which has been obtained by the suppression of a part of the vote of the people represented in the apportionment of members of our national government who are thus elected. The first rumble of the approaching storm is to be found in President Harrison's message, where he proposes that the polls in the south shall be no longer under state, but under federal control. And this thing will go on until honest counts are had all over the country, and the negro will rule when he is in the majority, as he ought to, until a legal mode of redress is found.

There is plenty of evidence to show that negro rule is a travesty of government; and the reasons may be gathered from what has been said above. But whether he rule or not, there is another aspect of the question of still more urgent importance. It is that of the race mixture of whites and blacks which is inevitable, and which some persons believe will be the ultimate solution of the whole matter. Some persons seem to believe that this is a desirable prospect, and that there will be produced thereby a race superior to either of its progenitors. But the evidence is against such a view. With a few distinguished exceptions, the hybrid is not as good a race as the white, and in some respects it often falls below the black especially in the sturdy qualities that accompany vigorous physique. The highest race of man cannot afford to lose or even to compromise the advantages it has acquired by hundreds of centuries of toil and hardship, by mingling its blood with the lowest. It would be a shameful sacrifice, fraught with evil to the entire human species. It is an unpardonable sale of a noble birthright for a mess of potage. We cannot cloud or extinguish the fine nervous susceptibility, and the mental force, which cultivation develops in the constitution of the Indo-European, by the fleshly instincts, and dark mind of the African. Not only is the mind stagnated, and the life of mere living introduced in its stead, but the possibility of resurrection is rendered doubtful or impossible. The greatest danger which flows from the presence of the negro in this country, is the certainty of the contamination of the race.

In view of this fact there is but one remedy, and that is one which places the risk of political complications out of the question. This is the return of the African to Africa where he rightly belongs, and from which he was wrongly carried by our ancestors. This project involves of course the purchase of his property at a fair valuation by the government, or the furnishing to him of an equivalent property in Africa by the same, and the payment of the cost of his transportation to his new home. The knowledge of Stanley of Africa will be very useful as a guide to suitable locations for colonies. It appears to the writer that this is the only solution of a danger that threatens, first, the purity of the race over the fairest part of our country; and second our political harmony, and perhaps even our national integrity. It appears to the present writer that the adoption of this course is essential to our self-preservation, and that it cannot be carried into effect at too early a day. (Since the above was written two bills have been introduced into Congress by Senators Butler and Morgan, looking to the transfer of our negroes to Africa.)

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

The recent publication of the life of William George Ward * ought to draw the attention of thinkers to that great religious movement at Oxford fifty years ago, which has hardly yet been estimated at its proper value. For it was not merely a dispute about ecclesiastical forms and usages, but about something far deeper; it was a deliberate, courageous, and skillful attempt on the part of believers in Supernatural Religion to stem the rising flood of Agnosticism. It was the first bout in the duel between Revelation and Science; and as the champions of the former candidly admitted the strong position of their opponents, and appealed to elemental principles, their methods and

* *William George Ward, and the Oxford Movement:* by Wilfrid Ward. London: Macmillan & Co.

conclusions are just as pertinent to-day, as when they were fresh. Let us, therefore, review the battle.

The historian who shall write the annals of nineteenth-century Christianity will have to record the decline on all sides of the power of dogmas, and the corresponding expansion of a liberalism due in part to the application of critical laws to theology, and in part to the discoveries and to the larger generalization of science. But while the spread of Agnosticism,—or "honest doubt,"—has been, as I believe, the most significant spiritual fact of the century, almost every Christian sect has experienced in some of its members a revival, a quickening, an effort to recover that validity before the consciences of men, without which creeds and dogmas become obsolete.

This counter-wave of Christian regeneration may be traced in its onward-sweep in each country by the position of a few religious leaders: among Catholics, in Italy, Rosmini, Gioberti, and Manzoni, men of spotless lives and of superior intellectual force, infused into their Church more spirituality and practical piety than it had known since the Reformation; in France, Chateaubriand, Lamennais, de Maistre, and Lacordaire worked, by somewhat different means, for the same end; in Germany, Döllinger and his fellow-Catholics of the Old Catholic School sought to introduce so much of the German criticism as was compatible with the fundamental dogmas of their creed. Among Protestants, the century has witnessed among other symptoms in America the development of Unitarianism, from Channing to Parker; the rise of Universalism, the liberalizing of Presbyterianism, as typified by Beecher; Father Taylor's influence among the Methodists; the spread of Swedenborgianism; while in England, we find Martineau, Irving, Spurgeon—I mention only a few important names almost at random;—and in Germany, Schleiermacher, to recall but a single eminent spiritualizer.

But in some respects, the most interesting Protestant revival, whether we judge it by the principles involved, or by the moral character and ability of the men who engaged in it, is the Tractarian, or Oxford Movement within the Anglican Church. Widely different were the aims of these leaders—as different, indeed, as the doctrines on which they based their belief—but taking their work, and that of other men whom I have not mentioned, as a whole, we can discern that it was inspired by no narrow and local sectarianism, nor by a spasmodic sentiment, but by a general purpose in the very heart of men to make Christianity once more a real, a vital religion, an active and sure guide for the leading of holy lives, a trustworthy interpreter of the mysteries and perplexities which beset the path of every earnest seeker, a comfort in sorrow, a stay in adversity, a comrade in peace, a forerunner in joy. Looked at from this view-point—and we ought to look at every historical episode in the broadest manner compatible with reason, if we would approach nearest to truth—these various religious movements in Italy, in France, in Germany, in America, and in England, no longer seem isolated and confused; whatever may be our personal convictions, they awaken in us a reverence we never feel for the quibbles and wrangles of sectarian cliques: for we perceive that the Spirit of Good breathes through them, that it strives to express itself in all, and does express itself in proportion as each has organs to articulate and communicate its aspirations. The results have been as various as the variety of aims would lead us to expect; some of the leaders have retreated, others have advanced, beyond doctrinal lines whither their disciples have refused to follow them; yet, whatever may have been the loss in doctrine, there can be no doubt but that there was gain in practical morals. To specify only one point, there has been a signal gain in tolerance—a quality which, when it springs from respect for and not from indifference towards the serious convictions of honest opponents, is a mark of high morals and of humanity.

Speaking broadly, the attitude of professing Christians during this century has been conservative: it could not be otherwise. Science, pursuing the study of Nature, has established laws not consistent with the Biblical account of the creation. Criticism, investigating and comparing the history of religions announces that Christianity is not the only religion whose founder was believed by his disciples to be the incarnation of God, or whose genuineness is attested by miracles; furthermore, Criticism scrutinizes the dogmas of current Christianity, and, confronting them with Christ's teachings as reported in the Gospels, declares them to be later additions and aftergrowths, the constructions which men who never saw the Master put upon his words; and so Criticism describes how Christianity was first remoulded in the intense theological mind of St. Paul, how it borrowed some of the darkest precepts of Manichæism, how, age by age, one vigorous theologian after another stamped upon it his individual doctrines, which he believed to be the truth—Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Athanasius, in the early times, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, Loyola and the Council of Trent on one side, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli on the other side at the time of the Reformation, and subsequent to the Reformation, Fox, Wesley, Channing, and others almost innumerable—so that in our epoch the word Christian has become indefinite and vague and needs to be further qualified in order to be understood.

The student of religious history points out, that this ingrafting of dogmas and splitting up into many

contradictory sects, are not peculiar to Christianity—the same processes are traceable in Buddhism, for instance, or in Mohammedanism, nay, that they have gone on in the Christian sects themselves, in Lutheranism, in Anglicanism, to cite no more; and he attributes these phenomena to the necessary laws of human thought, and to the diversity of human temperaments. Science says, therefore, to the Christian of whatever creed: "I have searched the laws of nature, and find no warrant, either in them or in reason, for accepting as true the supernatural scheme of redemption which you base upon miracles and revelation; as to man's destiny, I can only say, I do not know; but on one—and that the most important—point, I cannot agree with you, to wit: You assert that mankind has fallen from grace, lapsed from a primeval state of perfection through the sin of its first ancestors, whereas all the evidence which science has accumulated indicates that the order of growth in every department of organic life, and in mankind itself, is from lower to higher, from the simple to the complex. Man, therefore, has not fallen, but is rising, and the earthly perfection which you yearn for is to be found, if at all, not in the dim and brutish Past, but in the Future. You believe in special creations, in breaks and interruptions, but the records of geology and palæontology testify to a uniform, uninterrupted and progressive operation of laws which still govern the Universe."

Thus Science speaks; and the declarations of Criticism and History are similarly antagonistic to the assumption of Christian Theology. Logically, there is no compromise possible, no middle ground attainable between them: and it is perhaps the highest merit of the leaders of the Oxford Movement—especially of Newman and Ward—that they early saw and untiringly proclaimed, that in the battle they were fighting the fundamental principles of Supernatural Religion on the one hand, and of Agnosticism on the other were at stake. To many persons, indeed, it seemed that the Tractarians wasted their energy upon non-essentials and theological technicalities, but whoever searches the matter thoroughly will perceive that they kept ever before them the vital issue, and hoped once for all to draw the line between genuine Christianity and scepticism. In this respect they were both more couragous and more candid than many members of their own and other churches, who either tried to ignore the fact that the discoveries of Science could in any way affect religious belief, or else, blinding themselves to elementary and mutually destructive distinctions, followed Reason up as far as they dared without wholly dropping the hand of Faith. Hence, confusion, half-heartedness and incongruities; hence, bigotry and sectarianism the more vehement in proportion to the irrationality on which they were founded. To correct these evils in the Anglican Church, to sweep away abuses, to lay bare an immutable rock on which Faith might build, and revive holiness and true Christian conduct—these were the aims which the Tractarians set before themselves.

And seldom has a Christian church been so sorely in need of regeneration as was the Established Church of England at the beginning of this century. Always the church of the aristocratic and the rich, its high offices were then filled for the most part by wordly-minded men, and its lower places were parcelled out among the dependents of influential families. The average Englishman regarded it as an institution, like horse-racing, cricket, grouse-shooting, prize-fighting and the Constitution, to be kept up because it was thoroughly English. Piety counted for little; even scholarship, which has often won a bishopric, was less potent than fawning or favoritism in securing ecclesiastical prizes. Spiritual insincerity was no barrier to preferment. Carlyle relates that although his friend Thirlwall was at heart no more of an Anglican than himself, yet Thirlwall consented to fill a bishop's see, and the Church saw no impropriety in his doing so. The Government of the Church, as was inevitable, was completely controlled by the State, or, to be precise, by the party in power, which distributed clerical offices, from a curacy worth £50 a year, to an archbishopric worth £20,000, to extend and perpetuate its political supremacy. Pluralism was part of the corrupt system. By its very essence aristocratic, as I have said, the Anglican Church represented the English aristocracy at a time when George IV. was its model of virtue and piety. Strict in interpreting by the letter and not by the spirit, formal in its observances, arrogant in its pretensions, indifferent to the brutalized condition of the lower classes, it furnished a superficial solemnity to State pageants, and gave the aristocratic, but unspiritual, John Bull the comfortable assurance that, having enjoyed the luxuries and privileges of life on Earth, he would in due time be translated to life everlasting in Heaven.

But at length signs of regeneration appeared: of intellectual life, in the logical works of Archbishop Whately, of spiritual quickening in the writings and even more in the conversations of Coleridge. Still more stimulating was the influence of the discussion of reforms in political, economical, and social conditions, which convulsed the United Kingdom during the third decade of the century. Radicals, like the Mills and Bentham, were already clamoring for a reorganization of the Church, and even conservatives foresaw that the Church could not remain stationary should the proposed change be effected in the other institutions. It was at this time that Dr. Arnold of Rugby published a

pamphlet on Church Reform, in which he was the advocate of "the sinking of dogmatic differences, and the inclusion of Dissenters within the pale of the State Church." He held that the actual immorality and irreligion which corrupted all classes of the nation could be overcome only by uniting all Protestant sects under the State; and that the true aim of all religious men should be, not to cramp nor to nullify their efforts for good by internecine quarrels and by selfishly seeking to establish the supremacy of one sect over the rest, but to combine on the Christian principles which they acknowledged in common against their common enemy, evil. Arnold's scheme, so liberal, yet so Utopian, was eagerly embraced by a coterie of earnest followers, many of whom were men of unusual intellectual force, and all of whom emulated him in their endeavor to make their individual lives and examples righteous and lovable.

Simultaneously with the spread of Arnold's Latitudinarian, or "Broad Church," views, the Tractarian Movement started and quickly gathered force. Its most conspicuous originators were Keble, Pusey, and John Henry Newman, who set out from the same desire as Arnold, to purge and spiritualize the Church, but who soon diverged from his path, because they were all men upon whom tradition had a stronger influence than it had upon him, and also because they were all more logical than he in following their premises to their logical conclusions. Newman has described (in his *Apologia pro Vita Sua*) the steps by which he advanced in the course of a dozen years from orthodox Anglicanism to orthodox Romanism. Believing mankind to be "implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity," he believed that God graciously sent his son Jesus Christ into the world as an atonement for human wickedness, and to promulgate those doctrines by which the race might thenceforth be saved. This divine revelation, made in the first instance to Christ's disciples, was entrusted to the primitive Church and transmitted by it in an unbroken order, from generation to generation. The Church was the supreme judge, as she was the perpetual custodian of the rules and dogmas necessary for salvation. If innovations were proposed, she decided, through the councils of her bishops, the direct successors of the Apostles, what should be adopted, and what should be condemned. From her decision there was no appeal; for there could no more be two antagonistic forms of orthodoxy, than two antagonistic multiplication-tables; one must be true, the other must be false. This was the fundamental belief of Newman and his friends; furthermore, by their descent and education they regarded the Anglican as the actual representative of the Apostolic Church. But how account for the evident inefficiency of that church, for the worldliness of its ecclesiastics, the listlessness of its laymen? Errors of belief and unwarranted practices of ceremonial must have crept in, owing to the torpor or ignorance of her guardians: it was the urgent duty of every devout Christian, therefore, to examine her records in order to the restoration of pure forms and to the weeding out of schismatic tenets.

So Newman and his colleagues turned their eyes backward, to discover in the Past the authentic standard of their faith. The eighteenth century, pre-eminently unspiritual, gave them nothing; but they paused for a time at Laud, who, more than any other man, moulded Anglicanism in the shape it was to wear for two centuries. Still, there were discrepancies in Laud's teaching, and the investigators turned back yet another century to Cranmer, Latimer, and those other churchmen of the Reformation, under whose guidance the Church of England had separated from the Church of Rome. And here the crucial dilemma confronted them. The Romanist asserted that his Church could be traced in unbroken line to the Apostles, and that when the English, in the reign of Henry VIII., seceded, they became schismatics; the Anglican rejoined on the contrary that his church had preserved the unsullied apostolic faith, and that the Roman Church by accepting unwarranted and corrupt doctrines had, in the 16th century, forfeited its orthodoxy. Which was right? Both disputants appealed to the authority of the early Fathers, who had received their doctrines from those who had (presumably) listened to the Master himself; and Newman accordingly searched the patristic writings and the records of primitive Christianity.

At the outset of his career he had held Romanism in that holy horror characteristic of Protestants in countries where the tradition of papal interference in matters temporal still lives. For an Englishman especially, his political inheritance makes it hard to accept the Roman religion, because the Pope claims temporal as well as spiritual sovereignty. Catholics owe their first obedience to him, then to the State of which they are citizens, but in case of conflicting interest, their patriotism must give way to their obedience.

In spite, however, of his instinctive British repugnance to Romanism, which includes repugnance to the temporal pretensions of the papacy, and to the spiritual headship of the bishop of Rome, who had long been denounced by Protestants as the Anti-Christ—Newman's investigation of the teachings of the early Fathers convinced him that the Church of Rome was the genuine and sole depository of the authentic dogmas of Christianity. He saw that in the early history of the Church the same questions had come up, had been debated and settled, as were now per-

plexing him; that doctrines long ago banned as schismatic were identical with those of Anglicanism; and he came very slowly, and at first unwillingly, to the conclusion that he could not consistently proceed along that Via Media—that Middle Road between Arnoldism and Romanism—which he had hoped would conduct to Truth. And indeed, how was a middle road possible? Granting that there is a revealed scheme of salvation, and that that scheme is confided to a church with authority to decide what forms are necessary, what shall be believed and what shall be regarded as error, how can individual license be tolerated? If every man be allowed to interpret the law according to his preferences and interests, there can be no law. To sanction different interpretations of faith, as Arnold proposed, would inevitably result in confusion, and finally in scepticism: for each man would construe in accordance with his powers, whereas the body of church doctrine represents the authentic interpretations handed down by the Apostles, and cherished from age to age by the most devout worshipers and the wisest theologians. On what ground, therefore, can men who differ as widely as Protestants differ, stand? To the Anglican the belief in the unbroken episcopal government is essential; but the Evangelical rejects the authority of bishops; and how can either Anglican or Evangelical, were they able to adjust their mutual differences, make common cause with the Unitarian, who even denies the divinity of Christ, and cannot consistently be called a Christian?

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

NEWSPAPERS; THEIR RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

BY SLASON THOMPSON.

It is the ungrateful fashion of the hour to rail against the daily newspaper. Wherever two or three men are gathered together,—whether on the street, at the club, or in the saloon,—the faults of the press are an unfailing subject for raillery, criticism, and condemnation. Millionaire, monopolist, and professional anarchist raise their voices in unaccustomed harmony as each berates it for pandering to the interests of the other. There is an incongruous concord in the epithets they fling at the "demagogue press" and the "capitalistic press." It is represented as the tyrant of this age which doth bestride the world like an irresponsible colossus; the fecund child of the father of lies, multiplying mendacity with electricity, steam, and perfecting presses; the heartless inquisitor into the sacred privacy of the living; the ghoul that respects not the cherished memories of the dead.

So general is this sweeping and indiscriminate arraignment of the press by the people who talk and write, *not* for publication, that I think it is fair to assume that there is a conspiracy to destroy the influence of the press for good, to which I think a great many good people are unwittingly accessory. It is easy to understand why the evil-doer should rail against the daily newspaper. He dreads its eternal vigilance in pursuit of news a hundred-fold more than he does the bull's-eye of those guardians of peace, of whom the legend runs "we never sleep." Neither is it difficult to account for the unconcealed contempt in which criminal corporations, their managers, attorneys, and agents hold the daily press. Without its garrulous watchfulness the way for greedy schemes at public expense would be greased by ignorance, and the price of public officials would be cheap through the removal of the costly risk of detection.

We have not far to go to lay the finger of exposure on the reason why all things selfish, all things sordid, all things petty, mean, and of bad report, belie, belittle, and berate the press. They belong to that great section of humanity that loves darkness and hates the light. Nor does it give us of the press any very deep concern that every criminal that walks the streets unwhipped of justice, every lawyer who fattens upon his ability to make the worse appear the better reason; every quack who practices upon the immutable gullibility of mankind; every merchant who prospers upon false weight, short measure, and misrepresented quality; every capitalist who grinds the face of industry; every politician who steals the thunder of patriotism to further his schemes of personal spoliation; every Pharisee of literature who sells his delusive word-castles for what they will bring; every indolent huckster in theories who teaches that man was not born to eat his bread in the sweat of his face—in short, it matters little that these and their entire kind join in the hue and cry against the press. Its highest honor is their blame; it should begin to suspect itself if it won their praise.

But it is a matter of the deepest concern to the press and of infinitely deeper concern to the community, if to the snarling chorus of crime, greed, and phariseeism, there is added justly or unjustly the condemnation of honest, unselfish, and unbiased intelligence.

The belief that as a general rule the average newspaper of to-day does not transgress the limits of its rights any more than it is in human nature to o'erstep that which is not definitely forbidden, brings me to consider what are the rights of a newspaper. These I take first and foremost to be a faithful record of, and a fair commentary on, the happenings of yesterday, nothing extenuating, setting down naught in malice. This may perhaps be more properly termed the purpose of a newspaper than its right. But with this end in view comes the right to treat the brief abstract of yesterday's doings, so that it will attract the most attention to-day and leave the most vivid impression for to-morrow. And here is where the much maligned

element of sensationalism comes in. Some kind of sensationalism is as necessary to the life of a newspaper, as courage to a soldier, beauty to a woman, or power to motion. Without causing some kind of sensation in the minds of its readers every day, the daily newspaper becomes stale and flat to its readers and unprofitable to its proprietors.

In its character as a chronicler of daily life the newspaper is like unto a history and it must not permit the necessity for sensation to pervert history. It therefore seeks out those happenings which, the experience of mankind has taught, attract the most general attention of mankind. We of the press are constantly confronted with the daily accusation and proof that newspapers give up a disproportionately large share of space to the dark and seamy side of life. Crimes, famines, plagues, pestilences, man's barbarity, and woman's frailities, jostle each other for space and precedence in the columns of our most "highly esteemed contemporaries"; while as a general rule accounts of the doings of the virtuous, healthy, and happy are thrust into out-of-the-way corners or entirely omitted. But here again it is the sensation which any given event will create that governs its importance in the editor's mind. Let any discovery of science, any deed of heroism, any gift of charity, any convention of clergy, any achievement of genius, become in any way a phenomenon, likely to appeal to the general craving for something new, and the editor will turn with thankful avidity from the sensations of darkness and crime to those of sweetness and light. For the benefit of that profession which dwells most bitterly upon the unlimited space devoted to base-ball, prize-fights, and horse-racing in the newspapers compared with the brief mention of sermons and the doings of the clergy, I would recall a couple of verses from the New Testament, which are often cited for another lesson they teach. Christ was criticized by the Pharisees and Scribes for receiving and eating with publicans and sinners, and he spake unto them in this parable:

"What man of you having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness and go after that which is lost until he find it? And when he hath found it he layeth it on his shoulders rejoicing. And when he cometh home he calleth together his friends and his neighbors, saying unto them, Rejoice with me for I have found my sheep which was lost. I say unto you that even so there shall be joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth, *more* than over the ninety and nine righteous persons which need no repentance." The point of this, as likewise of the parable of the woman and the ten pieces of silver, lies in the application. It is always the thing which is lost, or about which there is doubt, chance, or surprise, that attracts the attention of men as of angels. We take a very mild interest in the millions that travel safely by land and sea, but let a train run over an embankment, or a ship founder in mid ocean, and the eyes of the world devour with startled eagerness the details of the horror. Why? Because it creates a sensation and not because to the great world of readers the wreck of a train, or the loss of a ship makes much more difference than the fall of a sparrow, or the sinking of a pebble.

But I suppose the greatest difference of opinion between the publishers of newspapers and the critics exists over the right of newspapers to ransack the earth, to drag family-skeletons from their closets, to invade the privacy of homes, and push the inquisition of the interview into the affairs of individuals in the unceasing search for sensation. It may be difficult to define where the rights of the public to information, and of the individual to privacy begin and end, but it is understood and acted upon in every newspaper office in this country every day in the week, and every hour of the day. And with all respect to the criticism, mostly inspired by the agonies of galled jades, I think the wonder is not that the right is abused, but that it is so seldom abused. Of course, we can all recall instances where gross injustice has been done by the Paul Pryism of the press, but the rights of the public have to be governed by the broad principles of universal good and not by the hardships, or even the heart-breaks of particular cases. Restrict the right of the newspaper to follow virtue into its sanctuary and you cannot commission it to track crime into its secret haunts. Forbid the reporter to enter the drawing-room of the rich, the office of the lawyer, or the study of the learned in pursuit of information, aye, even of gossip, and you cannot authorize him to search the tenements of the poor, or the back-alleys of vice for the relief of the distressed, or the detection of guilt. Liberty of inquiry and investigation is necessary to the full exercise of the highest office of the newspaper—the exposure of all manner of public rascality and rapacity. It is this that makes it a terror to bad and designing men who systematically foster the idea, derived from a legal axiom, that it is better that ninety and nine knaves should escape exposure than that the private feelings of one honest citizen should be disturbed by seeing his name in print.

I admit that the daily newspaper is in some respects a vast clearing-house of worthless gossip, but so long as this gossip is free from scurrility and free from malice, little if any harm is done. All history that is not taken up with the rise and fall of dynasties in blood, intrigue, and infamy, or with the dry narration of human progress, is gossip; and it is through this gossip that we derive our truest notions of the manners, lives, and characters of our ancestors.

In the State of Illinois the rights of newspapers are defined and limited by a law which, if justly administered in the courts, would be ample protection to them and every citizen. Broadly, their right is to tell the truth under all circumstances where the community is to be served, avoiding malice, falsehood, and gratuitous scandals.

As for the duties of newspapers I believe they are coextensive with their rights. They should be conducted as quasi-public institutions, with temperance, boldness, and truth, for their guiding principles. Any publisher who looks on his newspaper as a private enterprise to be conducted merely as a sewer for the world's filthiest news and as a purveyor of corrupt, sordid, and hypocritical opinions—because it pays to conduct such a newspaper—is a public enemy. And every citizen who as a subscriber or advertiser patronizes such a newspaper is *particeps criminis*. Let there be no mistake about this. The publisher of such a newspaper has the excuse that in a corrupted world filth and falsehood pay. If there were no market for his tainted and damaged goods he would reform.

But to one accusation involving the motives or probity of a publisher, you have a thousand charging newspapers with an absolute incapacity for telling the truth. The old saw that "All men are liars," has been revised to read "All newspapers are liars." From ex President Cleveland and the ex-Minister to St. James down to the lowest pimp that rails against the liberty of unlicensed printing, the alleged mendacity of the press is a byword. Now one of the first duties of the newspaper is to TELL THE TRUTH. It is a duty enjoined by law and established by expediency. From the youngest reporter up to the editor-in-chief, all the members of the newspaper staff are impressed with the necessity for accuracy of information and statement. You may smile your incredulity. But it is the truthful reporter that wins the confidence of his chief, and it is the accurate editor who comes to be relied on by the publisher and by the public. There is no place in the world where veracity commands a higher premium and mendacity is at a more general discount than in a newspaper office. No man can get on in this business whose reports whether of a horse race or a transit of Venus take liberties with the fractions of time or truth. To any one practically conversant with the difficulties of obtaining accurate accounts of the most commonplace event, the general truthfulness of the reports in the newspaper excites admiration and not mistrust. Do you realize that no two men ever see the same thing from the same point of view? The base line of vision in no two men is precisely alike. No two men hear the same thing in the same way. No two stenographic reporters take down the same thing with the same signs, and no two men transcribe their notes without variations. It is a fact, incredible as it may seem, that no man is able to write his own thoughts on paper as he thinks them, and the law libraries of the land are glutted with decisions of courts trying to construe documents to give effect to the real intentions of grantors, lessors, testators, etc., etc., all set out with the expensive verbiage of the ablest lawyers in the world. And so I am amazed at the general truthfulness of hurried newspaper writing, rather than distressed over its occasional misstatements. Of course, I do not pretend to defend or excuse the wilful misrepresentations of party organs, or of editorial controversialists. These must be charged up to the debasing tendency of politics, and the general cussedness of human nature, which is the same in the editor of a country newspaper, as in a John Milton, a Sam Johnson, or a Lord Macaulay.

Briefly put, the right of a newspaper is to get and print all the news, and its duty is to please, instruct, and increase its readers.

THE PRESS AS IT IS.

BY GENERAL M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE address of Mr. Slason Thompson, editor of *America*, to the "Sunset Club" last Thursday evening, was a strong and eloquent plea for the modern newspaper as a truthful chronicler of events, an honest advocate and critic of measures and men, the incorruptible censor of wrong-doers and wrong, the scourge of the guilty, the defender of the innocent; a moral guide whose end is,

> "To hold, as 't were, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time, his form and pressure."

This was not the exact language of Mr. Thompson, but substantially it answers very nearly the description he gave of the daily newspaper of our time.

There was not a man at the banquet who did not feel that Mr. Thompson was defending an ideal press, the newspaper as he would like to have it, not the newspaper as it actually is; a newspaper which, as he himself portrayed it, "shall publish a fair record of the happenings of yesterday, with a fair commentary on them; and that shall extenuate nothing, nor set down aught in malice." That good character came from the higher ethics of the press. It does not fit the newspaper of the present, but of the future. Let us hope that Mr. Thompson may live long enough to see such a daily newspaper as he issued from his imagination and presented to the Sunset Club.

By way of contrast, will Mr. Thompson kindly look at the picture of a real newspaper exhibited for public scorn in the columns of *America*, July 18th, 1889. The newspaper exposed by *America* formerly existed in Chicago, and still exists here under the

same name, but under different management. The story of its mercenary, cold, and heartless methods is told by a lady who for several years was a writer for the paper. It is fascinating in its picturesque details of editorial cruelty and greed. After showing us a glimpse of the libel factory whose business it was to blast the reputations of men, to break the hearts of women, and to fill innocent homes with agony, the lady says :

At one time, I remember handing in an article that was published without close scrutiny, and brought me a severe reprimand for its criticism of a prominent man.

"But it is *true*," I persisted, "and I have been told the . . . . . was never afraid of the truth."

"That man pays the . . . . . five-hundred dollars per year to let him alone, and nothing must ever again be handed in derogatory to *him*."

At another time I was told to write something caustic about Mr. H. H. Honore.

"Why ! What has he done ?" I asked.

"He's rich enough to pay the . . . . . to let him alone, and he will do it if he's properly attacked."

"He is my friend," I answered. "Nothing could tempt me to write anything against him."

"The . . . . . recognizes no individual preferences. Consider your engagement with the . . . . . ended until you are willing to obey orders."

And it ended. Yet an editorial afterward appeared so closely imitating my style of writing, that my most intimate friends thought I had written it against one who had possessed always my friendship.

The above sample may not be an exact type of the present-day newspaper, but it is a faithful portrait of many newspapers which hold high rank in the daily press. Is it not a truer pattern than the model exhibited by Mr. Thompson ?

In his forcible address Mr. Thompson said : "It is the fashion of the hour to rail against the daily newspaper." If this is true there must be some good cause for the fashion. People do not rail against the blacksmiths, or the shoemakers ; and why should they rail against the newspapers, if they are correctly described by Mr. Thompson ? With fine contempt, he specifies the classes who rail against the press. He says :

"The law-breaker, the selfish corporation, the criminal unwhipped of justice, every quack, every dishonest lawyer, every merchant who gives short weight, every huckster in theories joins in the hue and cry against the press "

That is very severe, but surely Mr. Thompson will admit that the railers thus defined by him, do not set the "fashion of the hour," nor fairly represent the multitude, who, he says, "find in the faults of the press an unfailing subject for raillery, criticism, and condemnation." He must have recognized this when preparing his address, for he said :

"But it is a matter of deepest concern to the press and of infinitely deeper concern to the community, if to the snarling chorus of crime, greed, and phariseeism, there is added justly or unjustly the condemnation of honest, unselfish, and unbiased intelligence."

Fortunately, the good and honorable people of the community are in the majority, and these are the classes who rail against the newspapers ; not against their valuable features, but only against that destructive power of the press which is used for evil.

If every quack is a critic of the press, why do the quacks of all kinds patronize the papers, and why do the papers patronize them ? How shall we account for the columns of quack-advertisements which appear in the newspapers every day ? The censure of the press by "selfish corporations" is not heavy ; a great deal more censure comes from the victims of the "selfish corporations," because those corporations are defended and assisted by the press.

It is doubtless true that many law-breakers criticize the press, but the fashion of railing at the newspapers, which Mr. Thompson condemns, is made by people who do not break the law. As to the "hucksters in theories," they would have no customers were it not for the popularity given to their merchandise by the press. There is no more hearty and wholesome reading to be found anywhere than the lashings given in the columns of *America* to the press for its servile habit of huckstering for votes, offices, and patronage. No more scornful indignation can be found in our journalistic literature than has been expressed in the columns of *America* against the mercenary and servile press for huckstering with that ignorant importation which is so dangerously hostile to our civil and religious freedom.

The rights of a newspaper are limited by the moral code and the usages of enlightened society. Every right is attended by its corresponding duty. A person, who in his pride as a gentleman scorns to calumniate his neighbor, will sometimes as an editor practise the trade of slander for an income. No doubt, a newspaper has the right to publish the news of the day, but that right is limited by the duty to publish only the truth, without malice and for justifiable ends. This duty lies heavier on editors than on any other class of men. The ordinary person who bears false witness against his neighbor in private conversation, does comparatively little injury, while an editor, who prints a lie in his newspaper, may thereby tell it to fifty-thousand men.

Conceding the right of the newspaper to publish the news, and to comment on men and affairs, yet the right of the citizen must be considered also. He may defend himself from an assault upon his character, as from a blow against his life. How far the man who buys a newspaper is *particeps criminis* in the mischief it may do, is a question of reponsibility which every man must answer to his own conscience. The reck-

less editor, who publishes helter-skelter news and gossip, regardless of private character, or family-happiness, is well described in the Scriptures. As a madman who casteth firebrands, arrows, and death, so is the man that deceiveth his neighbor, and saith, "Am not I in sport?"

ORGANIZED AND NON-ORGANIZED LIFE.

If by life is to be understood spontaneous motion, we must acknowledge that the whole universe is animated, and that the animal world owes its life, its growth, and its whole existence to the universal life of nature. For a long while, under the influence of materialistic philosophy, it was believed, that we should be able to explain the psychological and physiological action of the animal world from the chemical and purely mechanical processes of nature. The world was considered as a dead machine moved by push from the outside. As a matter of fact, the inverse is true; science has been compelled to explain even the mechanical processes through the facts of physiology and psychology. For there is life and spontaneity everywhere in nature; in the falling stone no less than in the blowing of buds and in the decisions of the human will.

The simplest mechanical movements appeared so self-evident, that scientists believed they might properly be regarded as the most general facts, to which for the sake of explanation all other natural phenomena would have to be reduced. Mechanics, after all, only explains the form of visible motion; it only shows how one form of motion necessarily proceeds from another or how it is transformed from potential energy. The fact of the motion itself remained unexplained. How a stone falls can be correctly calculated; the cause that occasions its fall in each single instance can be stated, but the reason why it falls, why it is attracted toward the earth, remained an open question. Repeated attempts were made to explain gravitation from the pressure of a surrounding ether, simply because scientists had been accustomed to regard organic nature as dead. In this, however, they entirely overlooked the fact, that even if in such case the descent of a stone could be sufficiently explained through mechanical pressure (we need not mention here the many contradictions arising from this hypothesis), the pressure itself, which the ether exerts, would remain unexplained. By virtue of this explanation the presence of ether must cause all movement, and ether would be the source of all life, the agency that produces the spontaneity of nature. But, if ether itself is not alive, through what push or pressure could it have attained its energy? In this manner the problem is only delayed,—and can be delayed *ad infinitum* without the approach of anything that looks like an explanation. We therefore regard these ether-theories as a failure, and rather adopt the simpler conception, according to which nature as a whole is endowed with spontaneity, i.e., self-motion. A stone is not pushed toward the earth by a pressure, by a *vis a tergo*, but it spontaneously moves. The stone (like all bodies) has a quality, called gravity, which is manifested in gravitation. One body attracts another body inversely as the square of their distance. Gravity is not outside of the stone pulling or pushing it; it is in the stone itself, it is an inseparable part of it, a quality being identical with its mass. Accordingly, the falling stone is not acted upon, it is self-acting.

This same principle applies to all more complicated processes, and even to human action itself. A chemical combination is not affected through the pressure of some unknown or unknowable agent outside the substances that pushes them together; but through their own inherent energy, through qualities that are inseparably connected with their very existence—qualities that in their totality constitute their whole being.

The spontaneity of living creatures, which in the form of organized life is called vitality, is accordingly derived from other forms of energy, just as the materials that are constantly building up the body are substances that are found everywhere about us in nature. We drink the water that falls from the clouds or is drawn from a spring. The carbonic acid of the air is transformed in plants into hydrates of carbon, and we consume them in our daily bread. We breathe the oxygen of the air, and through all the complex and peculiar processes which these substances undergo within our body through constant combinations and decompositions, we derive in every second of our life fresh strength from the great store-house of living nature to live, and move, and have our being.

Spontaneous motion is the universal feature of all natural processes. But if spontaneity is not the characteristic feature of animal life, if the self-motion of living men and animals is only a special instance of the universal spontaneity of nature, if they are but a peculiar form, a particular, grand, and wonderful revelation of the same—what then is to be regarded as the essential difference between both these kingdoms? A difference which, despite the intimate connection of both, is so very striking and manifest.

That which particularly distinguishes so called living beings in their contrast to the so-called not-living beings of inorganic nature is their organization. We, therefore, must carefully distinguish between organic substances and organized substance.

Organized substance, or rather organizing substance, is that which displays all the special functions, which exhibits the properties of life in the narrower and

in the ordinary sense of the word. Organized substance not only possesses that spontaneity of movement which is common to all substances, and which it shows in a striking manner especially by the transformation of potential into kinetic energy; it also possesses the faculty of continuing without interruption the process of self-organization. It takes from its environment fresh substances, which it assimilates into the higher (that is, unstable) combinations of its own; whereupon in animal beings these higher and unstable compositions again are decomposed through oxidation.

The process of organization, accordingly, consists in what we usually understand by assimilation of food, resulting in nutrition and growth, accompanied by dis-assimilation, i. e., a constant expulsion of the used elements. In animals, moreover, the setting free of energy in the form of motion is a further characteristic trait of the most important peculiarities of the higher forms of organizing substance.

We learn from this that every trifling act of vitality, be it ever so insignificant or little, the slightest movement, even the blinking of an eye, and also every thought and every emotion of our soul, is a decay of built-up living substance. How closely, then, are death and life akin! Nay, they are in this sense identical, for each act of life is an act of death and the old hymn is true, *Media vita nos in morte sumus:*

In the midst of life by death we are surrounded.

And this idea contains even a deeper truth than was dreamed of by the poet of those lines, or by the millions of human souls of past ages, who in their anxieties and in danger of death repeated the words of that grand hymn.

Decay is the condition of activity. Thus the characteristic feature of death is the very nature of life. Death constantly hovers about us, and out of his hand we receive—through the decay of the forms which hoard potential energy, that vitality which warms our hearts and glows through all our being, which we expend for our own necessities as well as for the weal of future humanity.

The truth, that every vital act is at the same time an act of death, would find a wrong application if its influence would drive us to melancholy, if it would make our lives gloomy and our souls despondent. On the contrary, it must make us brave and courageous, for indeed it does not show life in a terrible and death-like shape, but death himself with all his terrors appears in a milder and nobler aspect. Death, the giver of life, will bestow the richer gifts, the better we learn to appreciate their value. To both the spendthrift who wastes, as well as to the miser who leaves his powers of life unused, the fountain of life will cease to flow. But through wise use we may do both, preserve and even increase its bounties. P. C.

THE LETTER.

[A RONDEAU TO THE OLD YEAR.]

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

Shall I burn it? Shall I not?
Letter, relic of the Past:
Useless now, why hold it fast?
Better that it be forgot!

On the embers glowing hot
Now the tattered treasure cast—
Shall I burn it? Shall I not?
Letter, relic of the Past.

Is the olden time a blot
To consume with fiery blast?
Why before it stand aghast?
What would be the difference—what—
If I burned it? I will — — not!

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE. COMPILED FOR POPULAR USE. By *Lelia Josephine Robinson*, LL. B. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

Miss Robinson devotes some seventy-two pages of her little work to a discussion of the law of domestic relations; the remainder is occupied by digests and abstracts of the statutes and laws of the several states. The authoress confesses that, in cases of emergency, advice must be sought from counsel; and we conclude, accordingly, that the knowledge derivable from the treatise will go little farther than to afford a basis of operations in possible domestic skirmishes. The book is written in an elevated tone. It is primarily addressed to women, although the authoress says that the subject of the work is of the same interest to men, remarking that "whatever stage of enfranchisement our sex may attain, we can never enter the marriage relation independently of the other."

The information that the book contains is clearly and concisely presented. μκρκ.

The Truth Seeker Annual and Freethinker's Almanac for 1890, published by the Truth Seeker Company, 28 Lafayette Place, N. Y., contains an excellent calendar of free-thought historical events for the twelve months of the year, several poems, and various historical contributions, among them Mr. T. B. Wakeman's "Inauguration of the Bruno Statue."

NOTES.

The continuation of the controversy "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms" between Mr. Romanes and M. Binet will appear in our following number.

We have recently received from Oakland, California, a series of circulars setting forth the proposed activity for the present winter of the Emerson Section of the Starr King Fraternity,—a society organized for self-culture, philanthropby, and general usefulness to the community of which its members form a part. The distinctive feature of the organization, we may judge, is the logical division of labor established, and its execution by sections organized with especial reference thereto; a feature that we think eminently adapted to the effectiveness of societies for self-culture, for in this manner the special talents of the respective members may be best employed to the advantage of all, and the conflict of interests and efforts, however well intended, avoided. In the course of the "Emerson Section," we may note, that Mrs. Julia Ward Howe has given an entertaining talk of personal reminiscences of the Emerson family, and that the leader of the section, Mr. Charles J. Woodbury, is a disciple and in youth, was a friend of the poet-philosopher. The philosophical section is engaged in the study of evolution. The Rev. C. W. Wendte, pastor of the Unitarian Church of Oakland, is the originator of the organization.

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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.

BY GEORGE J. ROMANES.

[The five Arabic numerals that occur in the text of Mr. Romanes's contribution, refer to the remarks of M. Binet, correspondingl/ indicated, at the close of the article.—Ed.]

A very few words will now be sufficient to terminate this correspondence so far as I am concerned, seeing that M. Binet's courteous reply in The Open Court for November 14th appears to narrow our points of disagreement almost to vanishing quantities. Nevertheless, as there are still one or two matters with reference to which I fail to understand him, while there are two or three touching which he seems to have misunderstood me, I will briefly explain what these matters are.

Taking first the points which appear to be somewhat obscure on his side, my original criticism consisted in pointing out the insufficient evidence on which he relied to prove the occurrence among "Micro-Organisms" of the *majority* of those emotional and intellectual faculties which are presented by the higher mammalia. To this M. Binet now replies in effect, that he never intended to accredit his micro-organisms with "consciousness," or, *a fortiori*, with "intelligence"; but only with adjustive movements under the influence of appropriate stimulations.(1) Now, of course, if I had understood this in the first instance, there would have been no occasion for my previous paper in The Open Court; for no one doubts the fact that micro-organisms exhibit many adjustive movements of a simple order, and this fact is fully recognized in my own books. But I was under the impression that the whole issue between M. Binet and myself had reference to the question whether or not the adjustive movements of micro-organisms are due to conscious intelligence as distinguished from unconscious automatism. And I am still unable to perceive why, if this was not the issue between us, M. Binet should ever have taken me to task for not having sufficiently accredited the micro-organisms with those sundry emotional and intellectual faculties which in his own book he most unequivocally assigns to them. Moreover, although it is perfectly true, as he now says, that the phenomena of adjustive movement "may be studied from two points of view: from the subjective mental point of view, and from the objective material point of view"; it appears to me on this account all the more necessary that terms and phrases belonging to one of these points of view should be carefully avoided by any one who has undertaken to deal with such phenomena from their other point of view. For instance, we read in M. Binet's book that I have greatly erred in not expressly accrediting the micro-organisms with feelings of fear and surprise; and he adds, "We may reply upon this point, that there is not a single infusory that cannot be frightened, and that does not manifest its fear by a rapid flight through the liquid of the preparation." Now, if all that M. Binet meant by such expressions is, that infusoria will make movements of escape from the presence of stimulating agents, why did he not say so in the first instance? Why did he adduce such movements (touching the occurrence of which there is no question) as evidence of *fear*?(2) Why did he call his book "The *Psychic* Life of Micro-Organisms"? Or why is the whole of that book directed towards a repeatedly expressed attempt to prove *intelligent* action on the part of such organisms? To these questions I confess myself unable to supply any answers. But at least it appears evident that if he were writing only "from the objective material point of view," he can scarcely wonder that I should have misunderstood his meaning, when he everywhere employs terminology which has reference only to "the subjective mental point of view." Was he writing a treatise on the *physiology* of micro organisms? If so, why does he say that it was a treatise on their *psychology*? Or, in other words, is it anything less than a contradiction in terms to say, as he now says, "I undertook to write a psychology of micro-organisms without concerning myself to ascertain whether these low-class creatures were or were not conscious of the stimulations they receive from their environment, and of the movements of adaptation they perform in consequence of these stimulations?" Surely *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark would be a highly finished work, compared with a psychological analysis which does not concern itself to ascertain whether the prime condition to there being any subject-matter for such analysis is present or absent.(3)

However, although I am not able to understand what M. Binet's original "point of view" can have been, I am sincerely glad to find that he now appears

to sanction our taking his psychological terminology as having been intended to bear a metaphorical or pictorial signification; not a literal or scientific one. For, if this be the case, the differences between us have been reduced, as I have said, to a vanishing point. I never questioned his facts "from the objective material point of view"; I only challenged his interpretation of these "from the subjective mental point of view"—which, as he now explains, he "had systematically excluded" from his study of micro organisms. And, unintelligible though it still remains to me why, if "the question of consciousness" (and, *a fortiori*, of intelligence) were thus "systematically excluded," it should everywhere have been expressly included as apparently the precise and particular subject-matter of his "study," at least it is satisfactory now to understand that the differences between us seem to have resolved themselves into mere matters of terminology.

Turning now to M. Binet's counter-criticisms, I shall hope to make it clear that they all arise from a slight misunderstanding of what I have written.

First he thinks I am inconsistent in attributing to micro-organisms the "psychical faculties" of "excitability, discrimination, and conductility." But none of these "faculties," as I have defined them, are "psychical." I use these terms in the sense employed by physiologists; and although seeing in them "the root-principles of mind," I am careful to represent that in my opinion they are not in themselves indicative of consciousness or intelligence.

The only other point I have to notice has reference to M. Binet's comments on my "Criterion of Mind." This criterion is "the power of learning by individual experience," and it is criticized by M. Binet on the grounds, as I understand them, that in applying the criterion we can never be sure whether in particular cases we may not be excluding the mental element, when in reality this element is, in some degree, present. But in my book on "Mental Evolution in Animals" this criticism is expressly anticipated, as the following quotation will sufficiently show.

"It (viz. the Criterion) is not rigidly exclusive either, on the one hand, of a possibly mental character in apparently non-mental adjustments, or, conversely, of a possibly non-mental character in apparently mental adjustments. . . . . It is clear that long before mind has advanced sufficiently far in the scale of organization to become amenable to the test in question, it has probably begun to dawn as nascent subjectivity. In other words, because a lowly organized animal does *not* learn by its own individual experience, we may not therefore conclude that in performing its natural or ancestral adaptations to appropriate stimuli, consciousness, or the mind-element is wholly absent; we can only say that this element, if present, reveals no evidence of the fact. But, on the other hand, if a lowly organized animal *does* learn by its own individual experience, we are in possession of the best available evidence of conscious memory leading to intentional adaptation. Therefore, our criterion applies to the upper limit of non-mental action, not to the lower limit of mental."(4)

It is thus sufficiently apparent that the object of this criterion was to furnish a practical line of demarkation between the subject-matter of physiology and the subject-matter of psychology: not to prove the actual absence of mind or feeling in any particular cases. It appeared to me that in writing a treatise on comparative psychology, the first thing to do was to find some objective principle of discrimination between adjustive actions which furnish proof of conscious intelligence, and adjustive actions which fail to furnish any such proof. And although the objective principle which seemed to me best for this purpose labors under the necessary defect of not being able to *create* any proof of conscious intelligence in cases where (if present) such intelligence does not carry its own proof, at least the criterion is always good for the only purpose intended—viz., preventing the gratuitous attribution of "psychic life" to any "organisms" which do not present any real evidence of its occurrence.

Failing to perceive this the only object of my Criterion of Mind has led M. Binet to find "very difficult of comprehension" what appears to him a "very apparent contradiction" in my definition of Instinct. This is what he says:

"Upon again carefully reading his work on 'Mental Evolution in Animals,' I believe I have come upon a point, in his definition of instinct, very difficult of comprehension. On the one hand, Mr. Romanes says, that 'the only distinction between adjustive movements due to reflex action and adjustive movements accompanied by mental perception, consists in the former depending on inherited mechanisms within the nervous system being so constructed as to effect particular adjustive movements in response to particular stimulations, while the latter are independent of any such inherited adjustment of special mechanisms to the exigencies of special circumstances.' Further on, he insists on 'the variable and incalculable character of conscious adjustments as distinguished from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex adjustments.' After carefully reading the passage quoted, one is astounded to find instinct defined as 'reflex action in which there is an elément of consciousness' . . . . notwithstanding 'the instinctive action be similarly performed under similar circumstances by all the individuals of the same species.' The contradiction is very apparent."

Now, the point here is that, unless for some reason

or another we suppose that there *is* a conscious element in any given instinctive action, we have no right or reason to call it an instinctive action : in the absence of any such supposition there would be nothing to distinguish it from reflex action. It is the element of consciousness, and the element of consciousness alone, which can be taken to differentiate the phenomena of instinct from those of purely non-mental adjustment; and although in particular cases the question may (and often does) arise whether we ought or ought not to suppose that an apparently instinctive action is accompanied by consciousness of its performance (and therefore is really instinctive), this does not affect the validity of my *definition* of instinct. In such cases all we can say is, if the inherited mechanism, while leading to the performance of the action, is associated with consciousness of the performance, then the action is instinctive; if it be not so associated, the action is reflex.(5)

In conclusion, it remains for me to acknowledge the personally courteous tone of M. Binet's reply, and to assure him that I do not appreciate less highly his important researches in the domain of experimental psychology, because I have failed to understand his theoretical views on "the Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms."

London, November 28th, 1889.

REMARKS BY M. BINET.

[REFERENCES ARE TO FIGURES IN THE TEXT OF MR. ROMANES'S ARTICLE.]

(1) Not entirely that; as I shall presently show.

(2) Fear is an especial physiological state which may or may not be accompanied with consciousness, but which, in any event, is something more than a movement of escape.

(3) I believe that the study of psychology may be pursued in the investigation of unconscious states. It is in this way that psychologists have studied unconscious judgments, that is to say, processes that are purely physiological. The following is an instance that will illustrate our point. I press the ball of my eye at the outer angle of the eye-lids; a luminous circle is seen to appear at the side next the nose. The psychologist explains this localisation by the results of past experience applied to the interpretation of a new but similar experience. In other words, analysis brings to light in the fact in question all the elements of conscious judgment—a major and minor premise, and a conclusion; but since the operation is apparently not conscious and appears to consist in a simple physiological act, the term unconscious judgment has been applied to it. Plainly, this is a psychological terminology applied to phenomena that are (perhaps) purely physiological. But what is the harm? Moreover, I do not allow the contention of Mr. Romanes, that such an employment of terms is not a scientific one; for everybody is competent to translate the words "unconscious judgment" into their equivalent, which is this: "the material process that accompanies judgment when judgment is conscious." This point postulated and thoroughly grasped, it is conceivable how we may undertake the same task with regard to all psycho-physiological functions. This is the work I sought to accomplish in the case of micro-organisms. It is strange to observe the difficulty Mr. Romanes experiences in comprehending the standpoint from which I proceeded. It is true, his was quite different. To recapitulate the whole in a single illustration, it may be said, that if the case before us for study had been that of the localisation in an animal of the visual sensation of which I have just spoken, Mr. Romanes would first have occupied himself with the question whether the localisation was or was not accomplished *with consciousness*, while I, by preference, would have studied the mechanism of the operation and its features of approach to a judgment. Furthermore, it is now currently admitted in France, as I infer, that unconscious phenomena have a place in the domain of psychology. And it could not be otherwise. For if psychologists refused to concern themselves—for example—with unconscious judgments, and to illuminate them by a comparison with conscious judgments, physiologists, reduced to their own sole resources, could tell us nothing about them. In concluding upon this point, let me recall to mind that I set aside the question of consciousness in that which pertains to micro-organisms, but I do not intend by any means to place a limitation upon the question in any direction of investigation. I do not know, and no one, in my judgment, can know, whether the Micro-Organisms are conscious or not of the highly complex physiological acts, pertaining to their life of relation, that they execute under certain conditions.

(4) The passage quoted does not fully answer my argumentation. I said, and I maintain, that introspection cannot enable us to ascertain the limits of our consciousness, and consequently cannot furnish us with a criterion of consciousness. It is for this reason that I reject the criterion of Mr. Romanes, which is founded upon the data of introspection.

(5) Mr. Romanes has not comprehended my objection. I shall recapitulate: *a*. The criterion of consciousness, according to Mr. Romanes, is the power to learn by individual experience. *b*. His definition of instinct is the power to react in the same manner under the same conditions for all the animals of the same species. (Romanes). *c*. It follows from the latter definition that instinct does not result from individual experience and that it presents the charac-

teristics of an activity incompatible with the idea of consciousness. *d.* Accordingly, when Mr. Romanes admits consciousness as an index of instinct, a contradiction is involved.

PARIS, January 5, 1889.

A CRITICISM OF THE WORK OF "THE OPEN COURT."*

BY HERMANN BOPPE.

Translated from the *Freidenker.*

We have often explained wherein we agree with the aims proposed by THE OPEN COURT and wherein we differ. We both propose, and strive to attain, the same end; but in practice and method differences appear that are not unessential. We are decidedly opposed to the pouring of new wine into old vessels, and we resist every effort to make it appear that science, that insists inexorably upon truth and firmly abides by truth, will allow of reconciliation with any form of ecclesiasticism whatsoever. We would prefer that a less flexible interpretation might be given to words and ideas that, through tradition, have acquired among the people a definitely fixed meaning, and that their use were rather renounced. We maintain that such attempts at adaptation are but productive of confusion, that they stand in the way of lucidity instead of introducing it, much less furthering it.

* * *

That the address of Mr. Hegeler, in and of itself, is permeated by a broad and humane spirit, that it contains many a golden word of truth, we readily and willingly recognize. Nevertheless the charge of inconsequence is justified. However much "liberality," in the effort to establish a point of contact with the Church, we may show in the employment of the words "God," "Religion," and the like, still, the science that the confessing Lutheran, without prejudice to his church, admits, is something entirely different from the science of the Monist. Little would be left of the dogmas of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church, if science, in the judgment of the same, were taken as sole criterion. A single glance at the Lutheran catechism would show that such a position and the facts are not in consonance.

* * *

The fact, too, that, apart from the selfishness of the priesthood, the efforts of churches,—and not only the Lutheran denomination but also other sects and creeds,—are generally guided by laudable motives, and wish the best to humanity, we do not dispute. Nevertheless, Science and the Church are opposites. Ecclesiastical dogmas conflict with the method and spirit of scientific research.

* Evoked by the Address of Mr. E. C. Hegeler, in THE OPEN COURT, No. 106.

THE KERNEL OF RELIGION.

A REPLY TO THE CRITICISMS OF "THE FREIDENKER" UPON THE ADDRESS HELD AT THE LAYING OF THE CORNER-STONE OF THE LA SALLE LUTHERAN CHURCH.

BY EDWARD C. HEGELER.

THE *Freidenker*, Vol. V, No. 37, took occasion to discuss the address I held at the laying of the corner-stone of the Lutheran Church of La Salle and reproduced in its columns the greater part of the same—especially the passages in which Christian humility, and prayer as supplication, and the sacraments of the church, in their traditional sense, are repudiated. A passage, however, was omitted, that throws light upon a point criticized: I refer, namely, to the statement made, that "a freethinker should not endeavor under any circumstances to reconcile his principles with an ecclesiastical system." The concluding paragraph of my address reads as follows: "And particularly may this "remain a seat of tolerance as to day it is; of tol-"erance from those who cling to the olden teach-"ings towards me who think progressively; of toler-"ance, too, from such as think like me towards those "who only with hesitation change the creed of their "childhood."

A correspondent of the *Freidenker*, (in No. 39,) criticizes the view I take, that "in the most essential teachings the Christian Religion and Science are not in opposition." He thinks that they are.*

To this I say in reply:

The substance of religion consists of teachings that have been derived from experience,—teachings that stood in harmony with the knowledge of the time in which they arose. With the increase of knowledge, the doctrines of religion have also undergone correction. The question that now presents itself is, whether, after all corrections made, the true pith and kernel of the religion that was taught us does not still remain. And I believe that it does.

I emphasized, in my address, only the most essential differences between the doctrines of the church and the religious views that I myself hold. But it is to be inferred from the very statement of my position, that there is much additional in the catechism of the Lutheran church that I cannot accept.

I was never taught that the Mosaic account of creation must be regarded as the essence of religion, as your correspondent believes it to be regarded. Only in my earliest childhood, when I heard the account from my teacher, did I believe the story of creation. The instruction I then received—and, as I now think,

* The passage in question reads: "The most important, indeed, the only fundamental doctrine of the entire Christian "Religion" rests upon the belief in the Mosaic story of creation and "the fall of man."

with a purpose in view—was not called Religion, but Biblical History.

The true kernel of existing religions is this, that they recognize under the name of God an overwhelming power that prescribes to man a definite conduct, and threatens him, if he do not follow it, with punishment and annihilation.

This same power Science finds in Nature; and by Nature must be understood all that exists, man included. For millions of years Nature has been at work, producing, here on earth, ever higher individuals, and to this end it continues to work, and thus, we can foresee, it will continue to work for millions of years to come: and they that do not remain at the height of progress reached, will perish. This, the Darwinian, doctrine harmonizes perfectly with the kernel of religion, whereas it stands in contradiction to the results that, among other liberal thinkers, England's best known philosopher, Herbert Spencer, has reached. Spencer believes he has found the object of religion in an "Unknowable." Being unable to derive an ethics from the activity of a power that is unknowable, Spencer seeks to discover the basis of ethics in the striving after happiness (in the surplus of pleasure over pain). He believes that mankind will reach a state of perfection, upon attaining which, conflict and destruction, and, consequently, further progress, will cease. A portion of humanity,—a given nation, say,—if it shape its mode of life to harmonize with what such theories demand, may succeed in attaining for a time the ideal that Spencer has set, but nature and history tell us, that when such a nation has arrived at its Arcadian state, it will be engulfed by its progressive neighbor, or will fall to ruin from some inner decadence of its own.

The true pith of Protestantism, as taught by the example of the Reformers, is, that the Protestant himself shall pass judgment; and no priest, bishop, or synod for him. The position of an Evangelical Lutheran pastor, as I view it, is this: that he acquaint his congregation and their children with the doctrines of the Christian, and in particular with those of the Lutheran church, as they are in their genuine form; expounding the former standpoint of Science as compared with the standpoint of to-day, and then presenting to his followers, and especially to those accepting confirmation, the views he has reached himself. His hearers (and particularly the candidates for confirmation) are then to judge of their own accord that which they are to believe. Above all, it is his duty, that they shall firmly engrave in their souls the unswerving determination *to seek the truth and to tell the truth to others and to themselves.*

The *Freidenker* has repeatedly affirmed, in editorial remarks, that it is wrong for freethinkers to retain the words "God" and "Religion," and stigmatizes such a proceeding as "efforts at adaptation."

Adaptation to old words is a necessity. Efforts at adaptation, however, in the sense of yielding subservience to antiquated ideas, cannot be tolerated. Words are *a part of ourselves.* They are structures of living nerve-substance formed in the brain by education. They cannot be taken out, as, for instance, a tooth can be extracted.

Certainly the reader will sustain me in my position, that the mind of man is not born with him, but is formed in our brain by education in its widest sense. "Man," it has been said, "is the product of education." Furthermore, Ludwig Noiré and Max Müller teach us, that mind (thought) and language are identical. And accordingly, in order to attain clearness for myself in matters of thought, and peace within, I have to employ the old words imprinted in me during youth. I was baptized, confirmed, and brought up in the Evangelical-Lutheran church. The foundations of my mind are consequently liberalized Evangelical-Lutheran ideas—such as my family possessed. These ideas are definite conceptual and verbal combinations, and among these words or concepts the words "God," "Religion," "Soul," "Mind," and "Immortality" are the most prominent. From the mind of my childhood days, by doctrines afterwards attached and later on imprinted in me—doctrines partly corrective—was formed my present mind. This process took place in me by degress, and the newly added ideas either worked themselves into, or fought their way through with the old ideas to a new harmonious whole. Before that happened, no inward peace was attained.

With other people it may happen that what is implanted in them in youth under the name of religion is merely mythological vesture. New knowledge came to them and won the mastery; the old ways of thinking were simply suppressed, without becoming amalgamated, after a struggle, with the new; and a species of double religious personality, made up of two irreconcilable view-points, is formed in their brain, whereof the older one, which, at the time, is the weaker, is held in subjection by the more recent one. They do not speak with one another. And, as the pathology of the memory teaches, in old age the personality formed in the brain in youth again easily acquires the upper hand.

We that have thus been educated cannot otherwise identify Nature with the idea of God than by calling nature God. We must speak it out in words, "Nature or God," until it automatically repeats itself in us. Unless we do this, an inward voice will ever remain within us, and when we speak of nature, that voice will say, be it ever so softly, "there is something higher

still." I have accustomed myself, of recent years, to put the word "All" in the place of the pantheistically used expression "God"; yet, at the word "All," I long had to add, softly, as in explanation to myself, "God and the World," or God and the Universe, which are the same.

If we call Nature God, and convey therewith the meaning, that nature is the highest that is, then by the word "God" we signify something real. So with the words "I" and "reason." To them, too, there is still a superstitious notion commonly attached. Yet we must continue to retain the words "I" and "reason," for the sake of that in them which is real, after the erroneous has been cast away.

The word "I" now stands for the hand of the speaker, now for his foot; and now again for an idea, which, just as in the wax of the phonograph, so in the living protoplasm of his brain is imprinted in connected links of words.

This, too, is the teaching of the modern Science of Language: "No Thought Without Words." Ideas composed of combinations of words are reasonable when they conform to Reality; when they do not thus conform they are unreasonable. The words "five times seven are five-and-thirty" are reasonable, because they accord with reality; as often as they are repeated, they never come into conflict therewith, and they thus ever become more firmly imprinted. We may, indeed, put together the words "five times seven are six-and-thirty"; but they do not, in that case, accord with reality, they come into conflict with every experience and memory of ours, and this word-structure that has formed has consequently *no element of lastingness*. Theories of reason that connect with reason anything beyond this, anything that is at all mysterious, are superstition.

In conclusion let me add that I deem it of the utmost importance to retain of the belief in the immortality of the soul or the mind, and to guide into the right channels, that thereof which is true. The true belief in the immortality of the soul is, I think, the highest of the ideas that jointly constitute the soul, and the strongest factor in its struggle for existence. [For the exposition of my doctrine of the soul see the extracts from former essays, appended to this article.]

Mind, or Soul, is not a mystical something, a bodiless essence, a spiritual hobgoblin: It is the form-structure of our brain produced by our education, in the widest sense in which that term is used. This structure of form is not mere nothingness. The idiot does not possess it. The special form is here a more important part of reality than the substance that has taken the form. In the Sistine Madonna of Raphael, the form in which the colors have been distributed upon the canvas is the principal thing and not the color taken from the painter's palette. In a ball of lead that which we call the ball is as real as the lead.

The form-structure of the human brain, the soul of man, is the result of the work and struggle of the living world on earth for millions of years. To preserve this work-of-art of nature's making, and to develop it to a higher form in the rising generation, seems to me to constitute the main duty of our life. *It* is the content of all morals. And the mightiest instigation to such a preservation of the soul seems to me to be the conviction that we thereby again build up ourselves.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

[EXTRACTS FROM PREVIOUS ESSAYS OF MR. E. C. HEGELER, ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE IMMORTALITY POSITION OF THE FOREGOING ARTICLE.]

"The soul is the form of a very complicated, self-acting mechanism of living matter, which feels in a part of the living substance which is in action; the feelings correspond in *form* to the most essential parts of the mechanism."

"Feelings are of different intensity, as one pain is stronger than another. Single feelings may be of longer or shorter duration, and between them there may be definite intervals of time. Feelings also differ among themselves as various tastes or odors, or as those accompanying different musical notes. In this way I speak of the feelings I have on hearing a melody, as corresponding to the geometrical form of the line in the tin foil of a phonograph that records it.

"If I am familiar with the melody, I hold that living atoms in my brain have arranged themselves in a form analogous to the longitudinal section of the scratch in the tin-foil on my previously hearing it. This chain of atoms is stimulated by and then feels the melody, that is, is conscious of it. Separate chords of the melody awaken other memories; the melody combines them."

* * *

"This is what I take a perception to be: If a child sees an apple for the first time, the lens of the eye will throw a photograph of it on the retina, which photograph, as we now know, is fixed there for a short time, in a similar way as in a photographer's camera. From this photograph, through nerve-fibres, an analogue of the photograph is assumed to be brought to the gray matter of the child's brain, making a record there upon living, feeling matter; this has received the name photogram—in this case the photogram of an apple."

"So if the child sees the apple again at another time, it is the living, feeling photogram of an apple *resulting from its first sight*, which is stimulated thereby and feels, or, as we say, becomes conscious of the apple. *This photogram is the ego*, for the instant."

I regard the feeling called consciousness, which accompanies the motions of the brain-structures, as a

passive phenomenon. To use the simile of Huxley, it is like a shadow that attends the movement of an object.

"In our whole body, and so in the mechanisms in our brain, the feeling (conscious), living matter is constantly renewed by new feeling, living matter of the same kind. The new living atoms constantly enter into the relative positions of those which they replace, thus preserving the form of the mechanisms, and with that our memory.

"I imagine I had died and another man was formed of living matter, so that in him the atoms were in the same relative position as in me; he would be my continuance, he would be the same man that I am, as I am the same man that I was yesterday; he would know all I know, would know every person I know and would be known as I am. He would feel as I do, would act as I do under the same circumstances, would give the same answer to the same question; he would have the same character, the same conscience, the same morals, *he would have my soul.*

"Can we thus renew ourselves? Yes, we can to a great extent. We can form our soul again in the growing generation through education and example, individually and collectively."

* * *

"What the human soul is has been made clear to me principally by the leading German author of our time—Gustav Freitag. He propounds his view of the immortality of the soul in a dialogue which takes place between Professor Werner and his wife Ilse. Standing before the shelves of his library he says about the books:

"'They are the great treasure-keepers of the human race. They preserve all that is most valuable of what has ever been thought or discovered from one century to another, and they proclaim what was once existing upon the earth.'

"And further on the Professor explains how the souls of men actually are in books:

"'Since the invention of books almost all that we know and call learning is to be found in them. But that is not all,' he continued in a whispering tone; 'few know that a book is something more than simply a product of the creative mind, which its author sends forth as a cabinet-maker does a chair that has been ordered. There remains attached, undoubtedly, to every human work something of the soul of the man who has produced it. But a book truly contains under its cover the real soul of the man. The real value of a man to others—the best portion of his life—remains in this form for the next generation, perhaps to the most distant future. Moreover, not only those who write a good book, but those whose lives and actions are portrayed in it, continue in fact living among us. We converse with them as with friends and opponents; we admire and contend with, love or hate them, not less than if they dwelt bodily among us. The human soul that is inclosed in such a cover becomes imperishable on earth, and therefore we may say: In the book lasts on the soul-life of the individual, and only the soul which is *incased* in a book has reliable duration on earth.'*

"'But error persists also,' said Ilse, 'and so do liars and impure spirits if they betake themselves into a book.'

"'They undoubtedly do, but are refuted by better souls. Very different, certainly, is the value and import of these imperishable records. Few maintain their beauty and importance for all times; many are only valuable for a later period, because we ascertain from them the character and life of men in their days, while others are quite useless and ephemeral. But all books that have ever been written, from the earliest to the latest, have a mysterious connection. For no one who has written a book has of himself become what he is; every one stands on the shoulders of his predecessor; all that was produced before his time has helped to form his life and soul. Again, what he has produced has in some sort formed other men, and thus his soul has passed to later times. In this way the contents of all books form one great soul empire on earth, and all who now write, live and nourish themselves on the souls of the past generations.

"'From this point of view the soul of mankind is one interminable unity. Every single individual belongs to it—he who lived and worked in past times as well as he who now breathes and creates new ideas. The soul which people of past generations felt as their own was and is still transmitted to others. What has been written to-day will to-morrow, perhaps, be the possession of many thousand strangers. Who long ago returned his body to nature, continues to live on earth in an unceasingly renewed existence, and comes to new life again daily in others.'

"'Stop,' cried Ilse, entreatingly, 'I am bewildered.'

"'I tell you this now, because I feel myself an unostentatious worker in this earthly soul-empire. This feeling gives me a pleasure in life which is indestructible, and it also gives me both freedom and modesty. For whoever works with this feeling, whether his powers be great or small, does so not for his own honor, but for all. He does not live for himself, but for all, as all who have existed, continue to live for him.'"

* In the translation of the quotations from Gustav Freitag I have used the word *soul* for the German word "*Geist*." I might have translated "*Geist*" by "spirit" or by "mind," but the word "soul" expresses truly what I understand the author to mean by the word "*Geist*."

TWO PERILS OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN.

BY PROF E. D. COPE.

[CONCLUDED.]

THE question of sex is a more delicate one, which men would mostly prefer to evade, were it not that it is being thrust upon us with more and more persistency every year. And there are not a few men who, as they say, are "willing to try the experiment" of woman-suffrage principally to get rid of the subject, and trusting to luck to come out all right, and that we will, after all, "light on our feet." But the question resembles that of race in this respect, that if the propositions of the advocates of sex equality in the national government are once incorporated into our constitutions, it will be difficult to get them out. As with negro-suffrage, the political party that gains by the change will insist on the execution of the law to the letter, and disorder of a serious character will result, when the working of the law is found to be intolerable. The original question will be lost sight of, as in our late war of secession. How many of the men engaged in that struggle on the side of the North would have entered it to suppress slavery alone? But a small proportion. The greater number fought to "suppress the rebellion," and to maintain the integrity of our common country.

No matter how developed the race of man, the relation of sex remains the same. The ovarian cell and the spermatozoön are always represented in the characteristics of body and mind in woman and man. In the one the conservative habit; the preponderance of the element of nutrition, and of the persistent type of personal benevolence; in the other the stimulating energy, the self-sustaining enterprise, that brings discovery and invention. The male creates, the female preserves. On these bases are built a complex of mental organisms which, while parallel, are different, and while equally good as a whole, are not both equally good for particular functions. Women reason, and reason is always reason. But they do not reason as much as men, and their reason *in extremis* yields to their affections. This quality utterly excludes that sex from effectiveness as executives of purely impersonal laws, and always will. It cannot be otherwise, nor ought it to be otherwise. The human species cannot spare women from the beneficient rôle they fill, to assume another where they cannot shine. Women may often perceive the aims of government, but it is men who must be relied on to secure those aims. The force, the endurance, and the emotional indifference which are necessary to the task, are the heritage of the man and not of the woman.

Of course there are many men who do not come up to this standard of their sex. Men brought up in ease and luxury frequently have no opportunity to show the stuff of which they are made; and the lack of emotional stimulus to their lives, gives them the appearance of a lack of productive energy. Several generations of this kind of life may very probably emasculate men, so that their true sex-qualities are almost entirely overgrown by a negative mask, which displays a resemblance to the woman, but which lacks the vital and mental vigor which belongs to her in her own field. A pitiable imitation indeed! And we now obtain a glimpse of the second danger that threatens our race; viz.: the possibility of the effeminization of men, and the masculinization of women. For one of these conditions is a natural consequence of the other. When men become effeminate, women are more or less compelled to supply the places in daily life that are left vacant by them. And thus we get counterfeits of both sexes, each a fraud to the other, and both together frauds before the world and the universe! For the one can never become the other, let them try ever so diligently. Nature settled that matter so long ago, that everything else will disappear save life itself, before the fundamental difference can be eradicated. It seems to be forgotten that the development of women is not the masculinization of woman, and that her education cannot change her sex nor her fundamental qualities. It is one of the functions of science to teach this truth, and it should be taught in view of the ignorance or incredulity which prevails on this question. Men fear to grant women the best educational facilities lest they lose her. Women seek those facilities that they may become the equals of men. Both are equally wrong. Nature's well-established sex-types cannot be changed, and evolution which carries both sexes with it, maintains the relation between them with which it commenced. But if both sexes begin to believe in an equality which does not exist, they will be disillusioned, and by a process which cannot be a pleasant one.

The first step in the process of sex confusion is to be found in the woman-suffrage movement. It is an expression of the discontent of many women with the condition of their sex. Some of this discontent is justifiable, and some of it is not. It is fair to claim equal educational facilities with men, and this claim is being granted, but not with the promptitude that the occasion demands. It is fair that women should have the right of separation from intolerable husbands; a right which they have in some states, while in others they have not. It is fair that they should be supported by husbands so long as they live with them, and this right they have everywhere. It looks fair that a woman should be protected in her property rights when married; but it is a difficult point to decide how far law should go in giving a wife such a position, as will enable the husband to defraud his creditors. But these are minor matters compared with the complaints

we hear of the general "subjection" in which women are held, and the injustices to which they have to submit. And the only cure for these ills is to obtain equal political rights, and then woman will gain her true position, and man will no longer be able to play the tyrant over her as heretofore.

I venture to say that nearly all the ills that women suffer from in their relation with men, arise from their want of faith in their own femininity, and their attempts to adopt masculine methods in the procurement of their desires. And *vice versa;* the unkindness or hardness on the part of men, of which some women complain, is due to the fact that the husband thinks that his wife is for the time being not a true woman, or fears that she may become something unwomanly. On the other hand the discontent of a woman with her husband is justifiable, when he ceases to be a man; when he follows the guidance of passion rather than of reason, and is weak when he should be strong. But all this will not be improved by the attempt of the sexes to change places. The proposition is simply an aggravation of the disease, and is the worst possible solution of the difficulty. The cultivation by each sex of its true characters furnishes the real remedy, and the result will be that mutual admiration and respect which makes love imperishable, and which is the guarantee of vigorous vitality of both body and mind.

Many men have declared that they have owed their success in life to their wives, a statement no doubt true, and yet one easily misunderstood. In some sense most men owe their success in life to some woman. Without a wife most men are discontented and unstable, both good reasons for failure. The reponsibilities of marriage, and the demands of affection form the very basis of male industry. And in the field of intellectual effort proper, some men owe much to the ambition of their wives; the stimulus they impart is of a telling description, and it has made many a man a far more important person than he would have been without it. John Stuart Mill acknowledged this in the most ample way; yet neither he nor many of the others of the claimants for sex-equality, seems to have asked whether the women in such cases could have carried out and performed the work of which they were more or less the inspiration. Unless Mr. Mill was a dishonest plagiarist Mrs. Mill did not, and could not have written his books.

And the above paragraph expresses *in petto* the actual function which woman will ever fulfill in aiding human progress through grown men. She will suggest reforms, and stimulate to great labors and heroic deeds; but she will not perform them herself to any considerable extent. In her natural office as stimulator and proposer, she will and does not unfrequently make impracticable and even absurd propositions. Witness the vigorous efforts to prevent men from drinking wine and smoking tobacco in moderation. See also the propositions sometimes made to abolish marriage laws, on the false supposition that the latter are made entirely in the interests of men (!).

There are men who, recognizing the virtues of women, think that on this account they should be clothed with the functions of men, and they labor with good will to bring about that result. Some of these men are effeminate and long-haired; others do not understand the logical consequences of what they propose, nor would they recognize them until they stared them in the face. Should a spirit of revolt become general among women, every woman so affected would have to pass through a life-lesson in order to understand the real inwardness of the question. This would cost her and one or more men their happiness for a shorter or longer time, and cause the raising of a lot of bad children. Should the nation have an attack of this kind, like a disease, it would leave its traces in many after-generations. During its time "a man's foes would be those of his own household." How many such households have been already created by the woman's-suffrage movement, and its attendant discussions cannot be well determined. With domestic discord comes degradation of the sex-relation, for the chief beauty of the relation has departed. Without this both man and woman live on a distinctly lower plane. Man especially suffers and becomes a barbarian more or less veneered. Women's sufferings then begin over again; and ages might pass before she would recover the place she had lost. Need the lesson be carried further? Woman's stronghold is the sex character of her mind. With that she is the mistress of the world; but if she once abdicates it, she becomes the slave of the man, who will then regard her for her body only. Let us have no more feminine men or masculine women.

THE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE.

If we understand by the "soul of a thing" the formative principle which gave and still gives shape to it so as to make it the thing it is, we use the word soul in quite a legitimate yet in a broader sense than is usual. The laws that rule the changes and formations in the world, are not material things, yet they are realities nevertheless. When we call them realities, we do not mean that they are entities which exist of themselves, nor are they mysterious powers outside of or behind things. They are in the things and are part of the things; and it is through the mental process of abstraction that we acquire an insight into them.

The universe does not consist of matter alone, but of the relations among things, the forms of things, and their changes, also. The so-called laws are formulas

only, abstracted from many instances, and summing up their common features, so as to enable us to recognize in a general survey the regularity that prevails in the innumerable variations of all the particular and special cases. Although the relations among things and their forms are not palpable concrete objects, they are of greatest concern, for it is the form that makes a thing what it is. The form is the soul of the thing, and the possibility of all higher life, all intellectual existence, and all ethical aspirations depends upon the evolutions of forms. The practicability of ideals rests upon the feasability of a new arrangement of things, upon the possibility of a re-formation of ourselves as well as the world around us.

Taking this view of the importance of form and using the word soul to signify the formative factors of the various forms and their relations that have been evolved and constantly are evolving and re-evolving; we are naturally led to the conception of a soul of the universe. The soul of the universe we call God.

God, accordingly, is to be conceived as the law that shaped and is still shaping the world, that is forming and ever re-forming, evolving and ever re-evolving the universe. God is the factor that produced the solar system out of the concourse and whirl of the nebula. God is the factor that created vegetable and animal life upon earth. He is the light of mentality that flashes up in consciousness and finds its divinest expression in the clear thought of articulate speech. God is the moral law that binds human society and leads it to ever grander ideals, to always higher goals and aspirations. God in one word is the *sursum* that everywhere animates nature, the upward and forward tendency that manifests itself in the natural growth of things and in the progress of evolution.

If after millions of millenniums—long after the time when humanity, tired of life, has disappeared from the earth—the solar-system should break to pieces and be scattered as cosmic dust among the other solar systems of the universe, our present world would be destroyed, but its life would not be extinct. The scattered parts would roam about through cosmic space as comets. Some of such comets, rushing, the one upon the other, according to the law of gravitation, would blaze out in a gorgeous conflagration and produce a new centre of attraction for the cosmic dust that is to be gathered in the new forming nebula. God does not die with the break-up of a solar system. The formative power of the universe will prove itself active again and again. It is a living presence indestructible and eternal. The formative law of the world is as eternal as are matter and energy.

In approaching the idea of God from this side we gain more than one advantage over all the methods employed by other philosophers and theologians. The greatest advantage I deem to be, that we need not give up the principle of Positivism [as explained in a former article (in No. 121) of ours]; we need not leave the secure and firm ground of positive facts. God as defined by us is no mere fancy of our mind, no creature of our imagination. He is a reality of actual life, a reality whose presence in the universe is as undeniable as the quality of gravity in matter, and whose manifestation is as demonstrable as the correctness of the rule $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2\,ab + b^2$ in mathematics.

We may mention points of secondary advantage also. By conceiving God as we do, we enter the domain of science and can state, according to scientific methods, what God is like, and what he is not like. We propose positive issues which can be investigated and discussed impartially *sine ira ac studio*. We can arrive at results based upon scientific inquiry, results that are beyond the trivial impositions of private opinions and personal authorities. Private opinions, suggestive thoughts, sermons full of sentiment, be they ever so ingenious and beautiful, are after all empty talk and vain repetitions.

Thus we get rid of the useless controversies with atheists as well as with dogmatists; the latter stating a-priori that by an act of special revelation they are in possession of the only true idea of God, and the former stating a-priori that there is no God, because they do not believe in the God of the dogmatists.

The objection may be made that God as here defined is no God, but a natural law; that he is a principle of all-importance, but not necessarily a deity, as are the gods worshiped by Heathens and Mohammedans and Christians. To this objection we answer, that whether we name the creative, i. e., the formative, factor of the world God or not, whether we call it the soul of the universe or anything else, it remains as it is, and indeed it remains of equal all importance. For it is that formative power, that creative principle, that life giving law, in which, as St. Paul beautifully says, we live and move and have our being.

We have after a long consideration adopted, or rather re-adopted, the word God as a signification of this highest reality in the world, for there is no conception of God, be it ever so pagan and anthropomorphic, that does not contain a noticeable endeavor to express this our idea of the world-soul, of the creative principle of the cosmos and the life of the cosmos. The idea of God signifies at the same time in every religion the standard of morality and the highest authority, which must be obeyed. God is that law in life which visits the iniquity of the evil-doer unto the third and fourth generation, and which blesses the righteous unto the thousandth generation. And in this respect our conception of God is not at all different from that of former times. Those among freethinkers who are

pleased to call themselves atheists, lack a proper word and often they do not even feel the need of one for expressing the authority or norm according to which they regulate their rules of conduct. If there is a difference of importance between our view and that of dogmatic orthodoxy, it is this, that the conception of God as proposed by us from the standpoint of a positive philosophy, is free from all anthropomorphism.

Theologians claim that this highest reality of the world, the soul of the universe, its formative law, must be supposed to have been fashioned by a great personal being, by an omnipotent God. But in this they show their misapprehension of the independence and inherent necessity of natural and of formal laws. They are like children that look upon their teacher as the author of the multiplication-table. Some one, they think, must have arranged and fixed these tables, that such order and harmony and proportion could be in them. Theologians think there is a God above the God of the Universe who created the divinity of the Cosmos. But the divinity of the Cosmos, its order and harmony, is a God so divine that he cannot have been created or produced.

We are in no need of such an hypothesis. We can better do without the assumption of a supernatural arithmetician, who so arranged the formal laws and dictated them to the atoms that they would obey them. For we know that the formal laws are necessary in themselves. They could not be otherwise than they are. Their harmony is intrinsic and immanent. The order which they naturally produce cannot have been imposed upon them by the ukase of a personal master, be he ever so great. There is no way out of this, and therefore the idea of a personal God, of an extramundane author of the immanent God as the soul of the universe, is untenable.

What is a person but a human individual? And what is an individual but a thing which, if broken or divided, ceases to be that which it is? A quartz-crystal is an individual; if you crush it, it ceases to be a crystal, and is mere grains of sand. A plant may, but need not, be an individual. There are plants that you can cut in twain, and each part represents all the characteristic features of that plant. Some plants are individuals, and if divided, will grow into individuals again; each part will continue to grow and perfect itself. Most animals are individuals, but there are some that are not individuals, some that can be divided and will continue to live. Amœbas, properly speaking, are not individuals; they are lumps of living matter—mere specimens of animal life.

A person is the highest type of an individual; it is an individual that in its activity does not depend upon simple reflex-motions only, but can regulate its actions with the assistance of former experiences and under consideration of probable results. Thus a person is an individual that should not and need not follow the impulse of the moment, but can look freely around into the past as well as the future. We can, accordingly, make a person responsible for his actions, we can expect him to use the advantages which he enjoys. In short, a person is an individual endowed with freedom of action and moral responsibility.

Every individual, and more so every person, possesses a special idiosyncrasy; an individual is of a particular form and limited in space and time. Every individual at the same time possesses a soul of its own; its formative principle makes a unit of it, it organizes it into a microcosm. The microcosm of individual existence, it is true, represents the order of the macrocosm upon a smaller scale, and it could not be different, for every individual has grown out of the cosmic universe. How can it be otherwise than created in the image of the whole cosmos? Man, being a microcosm, has a right to shape his idea of God, of the soul of the macrocosm, after his own likeness, for the human soul cannot but be a part, an exponent, a revelation of the soul that pervades the All. Yet in fashioning our idea of God after the pattern of our own soul, we must be careful not to select those characteristic features which are individual and belong to the limitedness of our existence. We must select those which are not limited, those which show the universality of God; we must not select the properly human, but the divine, not the transient, but the eternal, not the fleeting and unstable, but the immutable, the permanent and the everlasting. The blossom is a revelation of the whole tree, so is every leaf; but the blossom is a more perfect revelation. Says the blossom: "I am made in the image of the tree. Accordingly the tree is one huge blossom. He is just like me and not like the leaves." Let us beware of such narrowness.

God, as I conceive him to be, is not less than a person, but more than a person. The frailty of personality does not apply to him; there is no limitation, no individuality, no distinct idiosyncrasy about him. We welcome the idea that God is no person, but a law; not a being adaptable to circumstances, but an irrefragable authority; no deified egotism but the omnipotent power of All-existence! This idea is the republican conception of theology which can conceive of order and of law without a Prince, and of religion without the fetish of anthropomorphism.*

We have no objection to representing the moral law of the Universe to which we have to conform, as a person. We may compare it to a father, and with Christ call it "Our Father," just as we like to speak

* The two last paragraphs are reprinted from my answer to Dr. F. E. Abbot No. 125 of THE OPEN COURT.

of Mother Nature. But we wish to have it understood that this expression is a simile only—a simile which, if carried out, will lead to serious misconceptions.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GOETHE AND THE MARRIAGE RELATION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

In view of Mrs Channing's latest communication I am perhaps called upon to define somewhat more clearly the point of view from which I wrote you my recent letter about Goethe. One may of course say that Goethe was not legally married in 1788. One may say that the woman who from that time presided over his house, became the affectionate mother of his children, and was known to himself and his friends as his wife, was not his wife, but his mistress. There are people who do not shrink from applying this name to George Eliot. But I do shrink from applying it in such cases. It seems to me that the essence of marriage, at least for the purposes of an ethical discussion, is fully attained in the cohabitation of one man with one woman in mutual fidelity and love until death do them part. As to the ceremonial form which inaugurates such a union, it may not be unimportant, but it varies with time and place and its value to society consists chiefly in the help it affords average couples in being faithful. It does not impart the ethical quality of the relation. Such a union as that of George Henry Lewes with Marian Evans is much better entitled to be associated in our minds with whatever of high sentiment gathers about the word "marriage" than are half the weddings constantly celebrated about us with full benefit of clergy.

Now in this view of the matter Goethe was a married man from 1788 The ceremony of 1806 changed nothing in his life and character; he went on living as he had been living. The ceremony simply gave his wife and children their legal status as such and was a formal public recognition of duties and responsibilities which he had long privately performed.

I hope no one will understand me as defending the conscience-marriage of Goethe or of anybody else. Any man makes a mistake when in showing his independence of conventional ideas, he does that which compromises not simply himself but others whose fate is linked with his, and who may be less able than he is to bear opprobrium. Goethe made this mistake. In due time he saw it, and did what he could by deed and word to make reparation What I urge is only this: That in judging the conduct of a man like Goethe, a man whose life, taken as a whole, was lived upon a very high plane of aspiration and endeavor, and whose contributions to the science and the art of right living are simply priceless to the modern world, we should take the broad historical view of particular acts which, from *our* standpoint, we must disapprove. Try any great historical character by standards which were not his standards, and it is easy to condemn him. If Socrates were now living in Chicago, the authorities would certainly not give him hemlock for corrupting youth; but they would very likely regard him as a street-loafer and an intolerable bore and might lock him up for vagrancy

So when we come to look historically at the Goethe of 1788, we are not at a loss for an explanation of his conduct. He had just returned from Italy. Hellenism and Spinoza had replaced the pietistic leanings of his youth. The sanctions and sacraments of the church had come to have for him only an historical and æsthetic interest. The French revolution was in the air. The *Aufklärung* of the eighteenth century was in its full glory. The traditional ordinances of society were being examined in the light of reason, and here and there the foundations seemed to be crumbling. No one could foresee the future. Gifted men and women were wavering in their views of the marriage relation and were putting their ideas into practice. What wonder then that Goethe, feeling himself at best somewhat out of sympathy with the German public and chafing under what just then seemed the narrowness of civic life and the pettiness of conventional notions in his own land, should have been carried too far in his spirit of independence and have been led to take a step which we can now see, and which he himself a little later saw, to have been a mistake?

Mrs. Channing seems to make something of the point that Goethe's wife was in "no way his social or intellectual equal." But surely we must concede to a man the right to choose his own wife, and if a man of intelligence occasionally prefers a wild rose to a jacqueminot, let us criticize his taste if we will, and fire our familiar Latin proverb at him, but let us not think his taste necessarily evidence of moral depravity. For this rest it should be said that Frau Goethe has been a very much maligned woman. Her letters just published in the last volume of the *Goethe-Jahrbuch* do not, to be sure, suggest a woman of genius, but they certainly convey no suggestion of coarseness or vulgarity. She appears as a sprightly, affectionate woman, of a fair order of mental ability, by no means dead to her husband's intellectual life, and eagerly doing her best to make his home pleasant and to further his interests She was very much the sort of woman that German men of letters to this day like to have for a wife.

Mrs. Channing supposes that I "belong to that class of Goethe's admirers who, as Bebel says, read without the slightest moral indignation, how Goethe wasted the warmth of his heart and the enthusiasm of his great soul on one woman after another." Well, if the indictment were true, I should, I dare say, be properly indignant. But the simple truth is that all such statements as that quoted are absurdly extravagant and unhistorical. Goethe passed his youth in an epoch of emotional expansion and universal gush. It was the fashion of young people to wear their hearts upon their sleeves, and to make a parade of their emotions. Goethe was a "man of feeling" like the rest. In his old age he concluded to dress up the reminiscences of his youth in an autobiographical romance. In publishing *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, he not only misled many people with regard to facts, but he set the vogue for a manner of talking about his "love-affairs," both the earlier and the later, which has given them an altogether factitious prominence in the story of his life When we come to read of these "attachments" in the light of contemporary documents, we find some things to wonder at, a good deal to be amused over, but precious little which calls for the heavy artillery of "moral indignation." Expressions like that quoted nearly always go back to a reading of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* by some one who has not learned to distinguish the *Dichtung* from the *Wahrheit*.

"Goethe neither in his life nor works idealizes love." Really that is a very hard saying. An editor of "Torquato Tasso" may be excused for feeling a trifle weary at the very thought of tilting at *that* proposition.

"Werther and Faust were of the earth earthy." This strikes me as a very faulty account of the facts. It is the key to the character of Faust that he has "*two* souls in his breast." Do the lines

> "Du regst und rührst ein kräftiges Beschliessen
> Zum höchsten Dasein immerfort zu streben,"

sound "of the earth earthy"? Such a judgment as Mrs. Channing's can only rest on isolated passages, and if we make up our verdict in that way, we shall find Romeo of the earth earthy, and Othello, and the Iliad, and the Nibelungenlied. If Mrs. Channing really means only that *all* poetry which touches the passion of love upon its sensual side is unsuitable reading for children, I do not know that I should care to express dissent; though personally I had rather trust a pure-minded boy or girl absolutely in the hands of

the great poets than to turn him or her loose in a library of modern Sunday-school fiction. I had rather that the pyramid of the moral sentiment have a broad base than a fine point. Still I do not press this opinion, it is one upon which thoughtful parents might disagree. The idea to which I took exception was that among the great poets Goethe should be labelled as particularly dangerous to the young. And here my position was and is, that if by the "young" we mean children, these do not and cannot read the kind of literature we are talking about. If any of it should get into their hands they would not understand it. But if by the "young" we mean youth who have begun to *think*, even a little, of what they read, then I urge that the study of the great poets who see life as it is and depict it as they see it, will act *in the long run*, in spite of the incidental lubricities which occur in the book only because they occur in life, as a moral tonic. This position seems to me to be impregnable for any one who holds to the possibility of a scientific ethics; or believes as I do, and as I understand THE OPEN COURT to believe, that the art of right living can find a permanently satisfactory basis in nothing else than the science of life. Respectfully Yours,

ANN ARBOR, Jan. 18, 1890. CALVIN THOMAS.

GOD AND NATURE

I.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I HAVE read your reply to Dr. Abbot, in which I mainly agree entirely with you. And yet I do not quite like that phrase of yours, "God is that power of the All which has produced us, etc." I think you do not mean to say God is any special manifestation or potency of the All, although you seem so to say; but rather that of the Infinite All we are certain manifestations or processes. Do you not totally identify God and the All? In other words, the All as related to us is Law or God. The larger our outlook or knowledge, the more we know of law. Obedience to what we recognize as right creates in us the conception of morals, that is obligation. In that proportion or degree the All-Life, which is no person at all, bears special relations of obligation to us, and to us sustains a personal relation. We may therefore address the All as Father. At this point the great mass of people must take up their emotions and thought; and the words of Jesus are wise and beautiful, "Our Father in the Heavens." I do not cease to admire that prayer Our Father, not of the earth, but universal; for the Greek word is not at all heaven as a locality, as you well know.

Yours Cordially,

E. P. POWELL.

II.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I HAVE been greatly interested in your criticism of F. E. Abbot's "Ground of all Liberal Religion." It seems to me he confounds Nature and God. He says, "Scientific Theology declares it is impossible to know Nature in any degree without knowing God precisely in the same degree."

I am an Agnostic—or one who will not say he believes a thing unless he has a scientific reason for such belief—yet I have a "comprehension of the modern Monism which conceives God (or the All; the Unknown behind phenomena) as immanent in Nature"; but I cannot agree with his views as quoted above.

A knowledge of Nature is after all but a small knowledge of certain facts, or what we call facts, which we classify as best we may. Nature may be the work of a supreme intelligence, or, to use Mr. Abbot's words, of an "Omnipresent Self-conscious Energy"; but it does not follow that to know a work is to know the worker. If Mr. Abbot insists that it is, then the "worker" in this case has in his work, "red in tooth and claw," most unaccountably left us in the dark as to his motives in placing us in a world so full of woe—woe so bitter to sensitive minds.

If he would reply this is because we do not know, I answer this is just what I say, and that no further mundane experience will help us to know more.

"The progress of natural knowledge is itself," he says, "the ever-progressive revelation of the Immanent God." Certainly not, I reply. It is but an increase of experience in the action and working of laws in the environment of which we live.

BRISTOL, England. W. A. LEONARD.

EDITORIAL COMMENT.

It may be, as Mr. Leonard says, that Dr. F. E. Abbot "confounds Nature and God," and it may be that, from the standpoint of our correspondent, we are open to the same charge. Whatever are our differences concerning the idea of God, in that point we are one with Dr. Abbot.

The words "God" and "Nature," as I use the terms, are not identical, yet I would say that God and Nature are inseparable, they are one indivisible whole.

When we speak of "Nature," we think of the world with reference to its physical laws chiefly. We see before our mental eye mountains and forests, minerals and plants, animals and men, and human institutions, from which the word Nature has been abstracted and which embraces them all. But if we speak of "God," we think of those facts of nature's life chiefly, that are at the bottom of its evolution, of those facts that have produced all that is great and noble and good, for they are the conditions still of our ideal aspirations and make their realization possible.

God and Nature were formerly considered as two separate beings. We now look upon them as being one. God, accordingly, means Nature, or the Cosmos, or the All, or the Universe considered in its ethical importance, considered as that power which works out our future and as a matter of fact, constantly elevates, enhances, and ennobles life. This power is no unknown or unknowable thing; the laws of its manifestation are perfectly ascertainable, and a society in which these laws are not obeyed, will hopelessly rot away and perish.

Nature and God, as we conceive them, are ideas equal in their circumscription. They cover the same field of facts; yet they are different in so far as each of the two expressions makes different features more prominent.

The words "my house," "my residence," "my home," are three expressions, it may be, for the very same thing to a man who owns the building in which he lives. Yet each of these words makes a different feature more prominent without positively excluding the others. He says "My house," when thinking of it as the building he owns; he says "My residence" when thinking of it as the rooms in which he resides, and he says "My home" when thinking of the seat of his family-relations and all the pleasant remembrances connected therewith. For different purposes we would employ different expressions, and yet in reality they may signify one and the same thing.

Thus also, God and Nature are one, and yet they are different. God is nature, and nature is God. Yet by nature we understand God's life and manifestations in their roughest outline only, in so far as they are palpable to every living being. However, by God we mean more than the word Nature conveys; we mean chiefly the still and grand and powerful workings of nature, almost invisible to mortal eye, yet plainly perceptible to the knowing, in their awful majesty and holiness. P. C.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE TARTUFFIAN AGE. By *Paul Mantegazza*. From the Italian by W. A Nettleton. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

A disquisition upon hypocrisy. The Tartuffian principle, Mr. Mantegazza seems to think, is one of the fundamental properties of living substance. His researches are not confined to human society. He begins with animals and seeks the Tartuffe in cats, butterflies, and fishes. But his investigations have the color of literature. He is not a scientist. He believes that hypocrisy is a function, a faculty, innate in animate creation. To Mr. Mantegazza, the butterfly assumes the hue of the leaves of the forest in which it lives, not because that transformation was the condition of the preservation of its species, but because the butterfly is Tartuffian, and possesses some recondite organ of hypocrisy. And he triumphantly generalizes from this and similar facts that the Tartuffian principle is universal, inherent in every protoplasmic manifestation upon earth. Mr. Mantegazza is a dualist.

When the author is purely literary he is at his best. His portrayals of the deceptions of human society from the cradle to the grave, when not marred by monotonous fervor, are excellent, and sustain his reputation as a writer. If he were a despot, here, for example, is what he would enact: "In all the domain of the Kingdom of Sincerity the use of superlatives is absolutely forbidden, these being properly only suitable for the savage races and for the babes of civilization. Every superlative used in conversation shall be punished with forced labor. Hyper-superlatives, laudatory hyperboles, and all other similar fulsome verbal compliments shall be reckoned as equivalent to homicide. and accordingly punishable by death or by hard labor for life." The book is well translated. *μκρκ.*

In the *Revue philosophique*, for January, MM. C. Secrétan, R. Bourdon, and Adrien Naville contribute, in the order given, the following essays: "L'économique et la philosophie"; "La certitude"; and "Remarques sur l'induction dans les sciences physiques." Professors Lombroso and Ottolenghi reply to M. Binet's criticism, in a former number, of their work in hypnotism. M. Beaunis reviews at length Liébault's "Le Sommeil provoqué," M. Rodier does the same for Paulhan's "L'Activité mentale et les éléments de l'esprit," and M. Héricourt likewise for Richet's "Chaleur Animale." (108 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris.)

"By far the greater part of the declaration of principles set forth by the Nationalist party," says Francis A. Walker in the *Atlantic Monthly*, "consists in the denunciation of competition. . . . . Mr. Bellamy declares that competition is but the expression of the 'devil's maxim, "Your necessity is my opportunity."' It may be so, for his Satanic Majesty is reputed a very sensible and sagacious gentleman; but it is God's maxim as well."

An excellent résumé may be obtained of current conceptions of the limits of English fiction by a perusal of the symposiac "Candour in Fiction," in the present month's *New Review*. The discussion is conducted by Mr. Walter Besant, Mrs. Lynn Linton, and Mr. Thomas Hardy.

"Life among the Congo Savages," by Mr. Herbert Ward, in the February *Scribner's*, may be read with profit; the illustrations of negro types show with remarkable clearness the points emphasized by Professor Cope in the discussion of the negro problem in No. 126 of THE OPEN COURT.

Wide-Awake for February contains a charming and edifying Grecian tale by Adeline A. Knight, describing "boyhood in Athens."

Mr. John P. Dunning, late correspondent at Samoa for the Associated Press, graphically retells, in the February *St. Nicholas*, the story of the great storm in the harbor of Samoa.

NOTES.

Professor Preyer contributes to the last *Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift* a concise review of what science has accomplished in the investigation of the physiology of protoplasm

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Professor Fisher, in the third paper of the *Century* series on "The Nature and Method of Revelation," describes the differentiating of Christianity from Judaism, and devotes a good deal of space to the work of the Apostle Paul. Professor Fisher says that Paul "took a stand at Jerusalem like that which Luther took at Worms." He adds that "but for Paul there would be no Luther."

In the *Athenæum* of December 28 there was an unfavorable review of Canon Rawlinson's "History of Phœnicia." The reviewer stated that the greater part of the historical section of the book was "borrowed from the works of Mövers (spelt Movers throughout the book) and Kenrick." Unfortunately the man's name was Movers, not Mövers! In the *Academy* of January 4 Professor Sayce reviews the same book more mercifully. But, he writes, "we miss that extensive acquaintance with the modern literature of his subject which the student of ancient history is now in the habit of demanding. . . . Even the classical work of Movers is not only not quoted in his notes, but is not even mentioned in the list of authorities at the end of the volume." Movers died in 1856!

Mistakes are made even in the best journals.

The *Ethical Record* protests against Dr. F. E Abbot's remark that the Ethical Movement is seeking "to establish itself upon an Agnostic foundation." From the context of Dr. Abbot's remarks we cannot but believe he meant that the Ethical Movement is seeking to establish ethics upon no basis whatsoever. He complains about their philosophical and religious indifference and declares that ethics needs a firm foundation or it will become mere conventionalism and moral sentimentality.

Dr. Abbot says:

"No ethical enthusiasm which is empty of a scientific idea can long sustain itself in the wide turmoil of modern thought. Without a reason, ethics itself must die down into mere custom or convention. The ideas of reason and of right are Siamese twins The 'ethical passion,' if it contain not the ethical idea, is the weakest passion of the human soul—has in itself no more continuance or abiding life than a beautiful cut flower."

The *Ethical Record* says that the ethical movement is "the building up of practical righteousness in the world," and all who sympathize with this aim are invited to join "whatever may be their theological or philosophical opinions." The ethical movement is "founded wholly and solely on the facts of the moral life."

But what are the facts of moral life? Are we to understand by the facts of moral life that which popular sentiment by custom and convention calls "moral." As soon as we attempt to give a clear and precise, an exact or scientific, definition of that which must be considered as 'the facts of the moral life,' we have to go down to some philosophical foundation of morals. What does ethics mean but the science of morals, the philosophy of conduct? And an ethical society, in order to be true to its own principles, should above all seek to establish itself upon a solid philosophical basis.

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THE REVISION OF A CREED.

We have at present the strange spectacle that in one of our churches the proposition is discussed to change some grave particulars of creed. The old doctrines have become "unpreachable," as it is expressed, either because the ministers no longer believe them, or because people are loath to listen to ideas which now appear as monstrosities and absurdities.

We naturally hail the progress of a church and its development into broader views of religious truth. Yet at the same time we feel the littleness of the advance. What is the progress of a few steps, if a man has to travel hundreds of miles! Moreover, what is any progress, if it is done under the pressure of circumstances only and not from a desire to advance and keep abreast with the true spirit of the times! The change of a creed should not be forced upon a church from without by the progress of unchurched thinkers, but it should result from the growth and expanse of its own life. The church, as the moral instructor of mankind, should not be dragged along behind the triumphant march of humanity, but should deploy in front with the vanguard of science!

The eternal damnation of noble-minded heathen and of the tender-souled infants who happen to die unbaptized, was sternly believed in by the ancestors of our Presbyterian friends. They declared, without giving any reasonable argument for their opinion, that this is part of the divine order of things, and whosoever does not believe it, will be damned for all eternity, together with the wise Socrates and the virtuous Confucius.

Who made Calvin the councillor of divine providence and who gave him the right of electing or rejecting the souls of men? On what ground could his narrow view, excusable in his time, be incorporated into the creed of a church? The argument on which Calvin's view rests, was very weak, but the founders of the Presbyterian Church being convinced of its truth, thought to strengthen it by incorporating the doctrine into their Confession. An idea, once sanctified by tradition, has a tenacious life. Reverence for the founders of a church will keep their errors sacred and will not allow an impartial investigation of their opinions.

Reverence is a good thing; but all reverence toward men, be they ever so venerable, must be controlled by the reverence for truth. And this is the worst part of the change of the Confession. The change, it appears, is not made because the objectionable doctrines are recognized as errors; but simply because they are at the present time too repulsive for popular acceptance.

Why are the doctrines of eternal punishment not openly and confessedly branded as errors? Why can it not be acknowledged that tenets which our fathers considered as truths of divine revelation, were after all their personal and private opinions only?

We ask why, but receive no explanation. Yet there is a reason that lurks behind; although it seems as if the men who are most concerned were not conscious of it. If the error were acknowledged, a principle would be pronounced which opens the door to a greater and more comprehensive reform. And such a reform is not wanted. The clergy seem to be afraid of it. If the error is conceded, it means the denial of the infallibility of the Confession. The dogmas of the church cease to be absolute verities; and truth is recognized above the creed of the church, as the highest court of appeal—truth, *ascertainable by philosophical enquiry and scientific research.*

This would be equivalent to the abolition of all dogmas and would mean the enthronement of a principle to fill their place. This principle, if we look at it closely, is nothing new; it is an old acquaintance of ours; it is the same principle on which science stands. And the recognition of this principle would be the conciliation between science and religion once for all.

Brethren, do not shut your eyes in broad daylight, but look freely about and follow the example of the great founder of Christianity. Worship God not in vain repetitions, not in pagan adoration, as if God were a man like ourselves. Worship God in spirit and in truth. Acknowledge the superiority of truth above your creed, and be not ashamed of widening the pale of your churches.

If you acknowledge the supremacy of truth and make your changes in the Confession because truth compels you to make them, your progress will be that of a man who walketh upright and straight. But if you do not acknowledge the superiority of truth above your creed, if you identify truth with your creed, your

progress will be the advance of a soldier loitering in the rear of his army, who is afraid of being left behind. You will unwillingly have to yield to the necessity of a change ; and you will have to do it again and again, and always without dignity.

Is it dignified to alter a religious creed because it appears as a relic of barbarism, because it has become odious to the people, and because it no longer suits their tastes ? Your Confession should be allegiance to truth. Will you degrade it to be the unstable expression of the average opinion of your members ?

There is but one way to free yourselves from all these difficulties. Recognize no dogma as absolute and reverence no confession as infallible ; but let truth, ascertainable truth, be the supreme judge of all doctrines and of all traditions.

Your bible, your hymn-book, your catechism, the history of your church, and the reminiscences of your venerable leaders shall remain respected among yourself and children, but let them not be overrated in their authority. Truth reigns above them all, and the holiness of truth is the foundation of all true religion.

When Luther stood before the emperor and the representatives of church and state, he begged to be refuted, and if he were refuted, he promised to keep silence ; but as he was not, he continued to preach and he preached boldly in the name of truth as one that had authority. Therefore let religious progress be made as in the era of the Reformation, not in complaisance to popular opinion, but squarely in the name of truth.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

II.

[CONCLUDED.]

THUS did Newman pronounce Arnoldism to be untenable, and a *Via Media* to be impossible : Scepticism and Roman Catholicism are, he finally concluded, the inexorable alternatives. The steps of his conversion were marked by the publication of a series of *Tracts for the Times*—whence the name Tractarian—mere broadsides at first, but subsequently extended to religious treatises, in which he and his friends registered the course of their investigations in theological history, explained the points at issue, and upheld a higher ideal of holiness and sincerity in the Church and of personal righteousness among its members. Those *Tracts* made a deep impression, and well they might ; for they were written with great earnestness and, unlike most theological literature, they combined acute criticism and exposition of hard and abstruse dogmas with a vivifying spirituality. Furthermore, those which Newman contributed had those literary qualities,—terseness, variety, and grace,—which have made him one of the masters of English prose style ; charms too rarely met in theological literature. Above all, his personality, not less than his intellectual endowments, drew to him disciples of very different temperaments, and made his presence, for more than ten years, a spiritualizing influence at Oxford.

One of these disciples was William George Ward, ten years younger than Newman. His father was a Tory member of Parliament, but even better known as the best cricketer of his generation. Ward had a remarkable, yet very odd, mind. He was passionately fond of music, yet cared nothing for painting, or the other fine arts ; he excelled in mathematics and logic, yet had no liking for history, and no aptitude for criticism. Underlying all, was a deep religious nature. If a subject did not interest him, he simply ignored it, and never pretended to even a superficial knowledge of it. At the University he was recognized as a man of unusual but eccentric parts, an inveterate debater whose skill in dialectics caused him to be compared with Socrates. He was elected to a fellowship and taught mathematics at Balliol College. His religious leaning was at first towards Arnoldism : but the inconsistencies of its principles, its evident tendency towards scepticism, and, more potent than all, an inborn craving for a fixed and unvarying creed and for forms of worship, which should stimulate and support his devoutness, led him away from Arnold. His habitual attitude was that of a man who depends upon a leader : and that leader he soon found in Newman, the holiness of whose life and the brilliance of whose intellect satisfied Ward's spiritual and intellectual needs. Ward, logician though he was, nevertheless lacked the primal requisite of a logician—unflagging zeal in searching evidence back to its fountain-head : so he never established at first-hand the conclusions he accepted in the controversy between the Anglican and the Roman Church. He deemed the historical evidence unimportant, although upon that, and that only, can rational conclusions be based ; but, accepting the opinions which Newman deduced from his personal review of the origin and development of Christian dogmas, he used them very effectively in his discussions. In a less ingenuous man this might have seemed inconsistent, but he was always perfectly frank in stating from whom he took his principles, and he would have agreed that it is as unnecessary for a controversialist to collect all his material for himself, as for a fencer to go down in a mine and dig out the iron for his sword. Ward, both by the temper of his mind and by the lighter responsibility of his position, was more rapid than Newman in his advances towards Romanism. Newman was long sincerely bent on finding the Middle Road ; his associations with the Anglican Church were strong : Ward,

on the contrary foresaw that a compromise was impossible, and he had from early manhood felt an aversion for the Reformation, which had suppressed many of the means towards and symbols of a pious life. Newman, seeing numerous followers dependent on his guiding, was bound to proceed no faster than his conscience and reason would justify; but Ward was under obligations to himself only.

By the year 1838 there were symptoms of an approaching crisis in the Movement. Newman had already acquiesced in some doctrines which some of his colleagues and disciples could not accept; and churchmen outside of the Movement already declared that he was hastening towards Rome. The Tractarians, in general, revived ritualistic ceremonial and adopted in their daily lives many of the ascetic habits which were popularly associated with mediæval Romanism, practises which, to souls imbued with mysticism and devoutness, aided the spiritual growth, but which, seen by the average practical—not to say Philistine—Englishman, appeared superstitious and idle, and were associated with popish degeneracy. And as their forms of worship took on a close resemblance to those which, three centuries before, had been banished from the Church of England, the Newmanites made more vigorous assaults on Anglican doctrines, until early in 1841, Newman published *Tract No. 90*, in which he examined the thirty-nine articles of Anglican belief, and showed how inconsistent they were one with another, and how they represented a chaotic mixture of Romanism and Protestantism, and could not be expected to satisfy either. The authorities of Oxford were aroused. Newman's opponents accused him of "shifty" and "ambiguous" expressions, of "hateful verbal sophistry and mental reservation," of Jesuitical subtlety, of having covertly worked in behalf of Romanism, while he held a position in the Established Church. Newman, without retracting his opinions, agreed to discontinue the publication of the *Tracts*, and soon retired from active leadership. When the bishops condemned *Tract No. 90* he wrote that "if the view (advocated by the *Tract*) were silenced he could not remain in the Church," and he thought of issuing a protest to show that he had not been silenced, but this project he abandoned "in despair." Soon afterwards, in translating St. Athanasius he discerned what he believed to be an "ominous condemnation of the Anglican position." "The pure Arians," he writes in his *Apologia*, "were the Protestants, the semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and Rome now was where it was then."

It was at this juncture that Ward became conspicuous. He uttered without reserve, opinions which Newman had expressed more cautiously: he showed that the *Book of Common Prayer*—to which Anglicans pointed in justification of their faith—was excellent because in reality it was compiled from the Roman breviary; whereas the thirty-nine articles had been framed for the obvious purpose of pleasing Protestants and of coaxing Catholics to accept them. He stigmatized Cranmer and his fellows in the Reformation, as rebels and perjurors—rebels from their obedience to their spiritual superior, perjurors in that having taken oath to abide by and maintain the Catholic doctrines they actively supported a heresy, which had its ignominious origin in the desire of a profligate king to be divorced from his lawful wife. Those articles, Ward insisted, could be subscribed by candid men only in a "non-natural sense," and he maintained further that they are so elastic as to justify anyone in adopting even the interpretation which Romanists attach to them. So complete, however, was his deference to Newman, that he avowed his willingness to retract any of his conclusions which Newman should declare to be unwarranted. In the two following years it became evident to Ward that the reformation of the Anglican church in the direction he desired was not to be. Even so late as 1842 both he and Newman appear to have hoped that Anglicans, having abolished one by one the heresies in creed and practice which had corrupted their church since the time of Henry VIII, would peacefully and almost insensibly return to the fold of the Catholic church from which they had wandered: the reunion would neither shock nor surprise them; on the contrary, they would be surprised to see how near they had been to the gate of the fold during three centuries. But now this consummation was despaired of: instead of the natural and easy remerging into Romanism, two courses lay before the extreme Tractarians: either immediately to renounce Anglicanism and join the Catholic church—thereby confessing that the chasm between the two was unbridgeable; or to put to a final test the question whether the Thirty-nine Articles could be so interpreted as to permit a person who subscribed them to hold views and to use forms popularly condemned as Romish. Sibthorp, one of the weaker followers of Newman, took the first course, his conversion causing dismay among the Anglicans, who looked upon it as the first stone of an avalanche towards Rome: Ward, by the publication in 1844 of a book entitled *The Ideal of a Christian Church considered in comparison with existing practice*, sought to bring the conflicting and ambiguous canons of Anglicanism to a trial.

This work ranks next to Newman's tracts as the most important literary product of the Oxford movement. In it Ward states very fully those views to which I have briefly referred. He asserts that there is no middle ground between dogmatic religion and scepticism. Our reason, he shows, can never attain

to a knowledge of God, and cannot therefore be the foundation or the criterion of belief: nor, on the other hand, can mere faith be depended upon, because it springs from the emotions, which are subjective, fickle, inconsecutive. But if both reason and faith are untrustworthy, what guide remains to conduct us to religious verity? An infallible guide, Ward replies, our conscience. Let a man follow that, which is the moral nature, the divine inspiration, and it will lead him to a knowledge of God, and to a holy life. Let him use those spiritual aids which lie nearest to him, testing each by conscience, and he will advance into the Catholic life, which alone has all the means, all the forms, all the symbols and practises, suited to the development and sustenance of the whole religious nature. You cannot judge the merits or defects of a moral scheme from the outside: adopt it, order your life by it, if you would discover its virtues. Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are the "notes" of moral truth; they are to be found complete only in the Catholic Church; other communions may have a fraction, she possesses them all by divine favor.

Such are the main arguments of Ward's *Ideal*—supplemented by criticisms of Anglicanism, and by application of his principles to the current needs of society.

In a few weeks after the publication of the *Ideal* not only conservative Oxford but all the strongholds of Anglicanism were in a ferment. The Vice-Chancellor of the University summoned Ward before him, and, confronting him with "six of the most startling and extreme passages of the *Ideal*," asked him if he wished to disavow them. Ward declined to make any statements until he should be informed what action the heads of the University proposed to take. This soon appeared in a notice, published by the Vice-Chancellor, summoning a convocation for the 13th of February, 1845, at which a resolution should be voted upon, declaring that the passages in the *Ideal* were inconsistent with the Thirty-nine Articles to which Ward had subscribed before being admitted to the degrees of B. A. and M. A. Ward rejoiced at this determination, because he felt that the ambiguities of Anglicanism would at last be cleared up: the Convocation could not condemn his interpretation of the articles until it should formally and officially proclaim what it held to be the orthodox interpretation. But it was soon evident that to carry out the proposal would shake the Established Church from top to bottom. If the Low Church test were adopted—and the Low Church party seemed to predominate in the University—members of the High Church would be placed in as difficult a position as Ward himself. All factions awoke to the bewildering fact, that they belonged to a Church whose canons were so loose that no construction could be put upon them which would not brand with heresy a considerable number of its members. And while all were unanimous in agreeing that Ward's Romish tendencies could not be tolerated, yet they acquitted him of the imputation of bad faith, and conjured the University heads to withdraw the test. Tait (subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury), Dean Stanley wrote nearly forty years later, "issued a powerful and convincing protest against the danger of enforcing this new test on the whole Church of England. Mr. Maurice, forgiving all the obloquy with which he had been loaded by the High Church party, came forward at the same time. Professor Donkin, the most serene, unimpassioned intellect of Oxford, wrote a short and trenchant pamphlet on the subject. Mr. Hull, the venerable opponent of the Athanasian creed, became the champion of the party now placed in so much danger of being themselves the victims of a popular clamor. Milman, from his retreat in the cloisters of Westminster, loudly protested against the impolicy of the whole proceeding." "Probably, after all," wrote Maurice to a friend, "Ward signs the documents about as honestly as the rest of the world." Gladstone, who had published in the *Quarterly Review* a criticism hostile to the conclusions of the *Ideal*, now wrote: "Yet more do I feel the false position in which the University and the Church will be placed if in these judicial proceedings it be found, that men may tamper with the Articles in relation to the Holy Trinity and the Offices of our Lord and retain their degrees, while a man who sins on the particular points of issue between Rome and the Church of England is to be deprived of his, at the instance of a Board of which that very man is a member." The University withdrew the test, and thereby the Church of England showed her unwillingness or inability squarely to define her position. Ward, by her retreat, could claim a victory: for did it not imply that she tacitly admitted the inconsistencies and conflicts in her Thirty-nine Articles to be irreconcilable, and incapable of a simple, uniform, and straightforward interpretation?

So when the Convocation met in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford, on February 13, the proceedings were limited to giving Ward a chance to retract the six obnoxious passages quoted from the *Ideal*, and to depriving him of his University degree, if he refused. In accordance with the pedantic traditions of Oxford the proceedings were carried on in Latin, but Ward was allowed to conduct his defense in English, and this he did with remarkable energy and candor, restating his objections to the indefiniteness of the Thirty-nine Articles, and declaring that if it was the intention of the Church of England that they necessarily be subscribed in their natural sense, there should be no subscribers to them at all. "They would never

have let Ward speak in English if they had known how well he could speak," Stanley remarked to Jowett: but the result was a foregone conclusion, and could not be altered by eloquence or logic. The vote of censure on the passages from the *Ideal* was carried by 777 to 391; that of degradation by 569 to 511. An attempt was then made to pass a vote of condemnation on Newman's *Tract No. 90*, but the assembly grew uproarious, and adjourned.

With this dramatic episode the Oxford movement collapsed: or rather let us say that the antagonistic elements which for nearly fifteen years had been held in suspense were now precipitated. Ward and his friend Oakeley formally joined the Church of Rome, Newman soon followed; Pusey and his company did not go over, but remained on the Romeward frontier of Anglicanism; the majority of the younger men who continued to hold places in the University or in the Established Church, abode by Broad Church principles; and, finally, a considerable number of those who at one time or another had felt Newman's spell, passed out of Anglicanism altogether, and were counted among the Rationalists.

The fruits of the Movement cannot be easily reckoned; yet some of them can be specified. Taken as a whole the Oxford Movement represents the chief spiritualizing energy within the English Church during this century; and though the points on which it finally split were inevitably points of doctrine, yet its religious inspiration exercised a lifelong influence upon all, no matter which path they took after the division. It added few members to the Romish Church in England, yet they were men who for intellectual ability and piety commanded a deeper respect than had been felt by Englishmen for English Romanists during more than three centuries. It brought out anew the anomalies inherent in Anglicanism, which Milton, to mention but a single critic of the Established Church, yet the greatest,—had held up to the light. It emphasized the fact, which every sincere believer in religion cannot afford to ignore, that there is no logical middle ground between Faith and Agnosticism—that to allow individual interpretations to be put on Scripture, destroys that unity of doctrine which is the chief sign of orthodoxy. It forced every Anglican to ask himself: "What do I believe? and why?"—questions most pertinent at a time when men accepted the Established Church because their fathers had accepted it, and when they repeated its formularies without inquiring into them.

The course of the Established Church during the past half century has been mainly in the direction opposite to that in which the Tractarians would have led it, whence we might superficially conclude that their influence was brief and narrow; more extreme ritualism has, to be sure, obtained among some of its members, but the majority have tended towards a larger liberalism: Maurice, Robertson, Kingsley, Stanley, Church, Tait, Jowett, and Gladstone represent the phases of that liberalism. Their work, whether ecclesiastic or lay, has been more practical, and less dogmatic; their church has been purified of many of her abuses; she has been turned more closely than ever before to the daily needs of men, and, although she is still the rich man's church, she no longer despises the poor. This purification and tolerance and practicalness are no doubt in some measure a reflection of the spiritualizing influence of the Oxford Movement; in even larger measure they are the expression of that great ethical inspiration which, as has been already remarked, has quickened all sects.

Three centuries and a half ago when the Church of England separated from the Church of Rome, each, as it gained the ascendant, persecuted the other: Anglicans were burnt in the bonfires kindled at Smithfield and Oxford; Romanists were imprisoned in the Tower, or banished beyond the sea. In our century a similar splitting up has taken place, but without bonfires and persecutions, and even without the loss of mutual respect on the part of those who, standing together at the outset, traveled far asunder. Tait and Stanley, Jowett and Church, have only admiration to express for the character of Ward; Matthew Arnold never speaks of Newman but with reverence and gratitude. In this respect, and in many others, the Oxford Movement, which I have described briefly, not attempting to interpose opinions of my own, because it is better that every one should judge for himself,—is among the most interesting and significant of modern times. Nor can a review of it be closed more fittingly than by quoting these stanzas of Clough—himself one of the noblest of the men connected with it, and the spokesman of the religious longings of many earnest souls of the present day.

"As ships becalmed at eve, that lay
With canvas drooping, side by side
Two towers of sail, at dawn of day
Are scarce long leagues apart descried:

"When fell the night, up sprung the breeze
And all the darkling hours they plied,
Nor dreamt but each the self-same seas
By each was cleaving side by side.

. . . . . .

"One port, methought, alike they sought
One purpose hold where'er they fare
O bounding breeze, O rushing seas,
At last, at last unite them there."

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., 1889.

SHALL COLORED CITIZENS BE BANISHED?

BY FREDERICK MAY HOLLAND.

THE OPEN COURT for January 23, contains a demand for "the return of the African to Africa," by Professor Cope, who holds "that the adoption of this

course is essential to our self preservation, and that it cannot be carried into effect at too early a day."

Now, in the first place, it must be remembered that our colored people have always hated this plan; and that it was largely in consequence of their protests, sixty years ago, that the Colonization Society proved a failure. Even then they preferred slavery to Africa; and they have much more reason to object to Africa now. The indignation which they showed against Andrew Johnson's threat to banish them would break out once more, if there were serious danger of their being forced away without their own consent; and it is certain that this consent would be generally refused. The most intelligent and influential among them hold positions for which they could find no equivalents in Africa; there are many others who depend for support upon white employers and customers; and local attachment is strong throughout the race. Their unwillingness to leave is increased by the fact that the proposal to remove them involves a denial, not only of their value as citizens but of their right to citizenship. This was their main objection in 1830; and it is sure to be felt by all of them at present. There might not be any general resistance to removal by force, for they are a very peaceable people; but there would be so much sorrow and suffering as would make this the saddest scene in modern history. The woes of Evangeline and her people would be of no importance in comparison. A closer parallel might be found in the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain; and the main difference is that our victims would be much more numerous.

Fortunately, however, the Constitution of the United States makes it as completely impossible to banish citizens on account of complexion as on account of religious views; and even if the colored people were willing to depart as a body, the expense would be so great as to make the plan impracticable. Moreover, the South cannot afford to lose so many laborers; and the Republican party would be badly off without the colored voters. If they had not supported Hayes and Harrison, neither would have been elected.

We are not going to send those eight millions of industrious and loyal citizens out of the country, even if they are willing to go. We must make the best of their being here; and the less that is said about sending them away, the better will be their treatment, as well as their behavior, both South and North. Common humanity requires that we treat them as if we are willing to have them remain among us. If we do not feel so, we cannot behave kindly and honestly.

The condition of the colored people is rapidly improving, even in the South; but, even in the North, there is still so much prejudice against them as to make it very important to answer what Professor Cope says against their value. In his opinion, "The greatest danger which flows from the presence of the negro in this country, is the certainty of the contamination of the race." This is the old argument which used to be brought up against emancipating the slaves, "Do you want your daughter to marry a nigger?" The abolitionists took that risk; and it has not proved serious. A recent book by a Southern clergyman, Haygood's Pleas for Progress, shows from careful investigation, that the cases in which children are born from parents of different races, are now much more rare than before the war. Amalgamation was the child of slavery, and is fast following its parent into oblivion. Colored women are now able to protect themselves; and the feeling against mixed marriages is strong enough in both races to prevent any alarming frequency.

The Professor is also alarmed at the danger from the disfranchisement of the freedmen to "our political harmony and perhaps even our national integrity." "The first rumble of the approaching storm," he says, "is to be found in President Harrison's message, where he proposes that the polls in the South shall no longer be under state but under federal control." Judging from the utterances of Republican members of Congress from the South, as well as leading Northern newspapers, I should say, that there was nothing worse in the message than heat-lightning. At all events, to banish the freedman, because he is disfranchised, is too much like the old custom of forbidding an anti-slavery meeting, because there was likely to be a mob against it. There will, I hope, come a time, when colored men shall vote in every state of the Union, with as little hindrance as in Tennessee or Virginia, and with as little injury either to "political harmony" or to local interests. No sensible colored man wishes to revive the rule of the carpet-baggers; and the present desire of the South, to give an equally good education to all her children, must ultimately force her to acknowledge fully the educational value of the ballot-box. The one thing which is most certain, however, is that we must not send the negro away because we cannot do him full justice.

And justice demands vigorous protest against such statements as "The negro remains undeveloped mentally." . . . . "He has had as much time in the past as any other race, and he has not improved it." Now, even in Africa, we find that the Mandingoes, ancestors of many of our slaves, have taught themselves to build walled towns, work in iron and gold, weave cotton cloth, and cultivate a considerable variety of crops. The Ashantees, too, and many other negro tribes have risen far above the primitive condition of man. What is more to the purpose, is that the negro has shown a singular capacity for learning from other races. He flourishes in such close contact with civ-

ilization as kills Indians, Australians, and other savages. There is nothing which we can teach, not even astronomy or sculpture, or authorship, which he has not readily learned. There was once great difference of opinion about the meaning of our national constitution. Most of our statesmen held that it sanctioned slavery; and the white abolitionists, very generally, held that they ought to refuse to vote. Mr. Garrison even carried his dislike of the constitution so far as to burn it publicly; and both he and Wendell Phillips were constantly opposing desire to preserve the Union as hostile to Abolitionism. Now it is a curious fact that the free colored people, while almost worshiping Garrison and Phillips, very generally refused to follow them into dis-unionism. They insisted on voting, and they kept hoping for a time when slavery would be abolished constitutionally. We all know that this proved to be the case. It was the desire of the North to preserve the Union which finally led to emancipation. There were very few white men, before the war, who saw the real meaning of the constitution, or the actual tendency of the times as clearly as colored men like Douglass and Ward. The latter was a full-blooded negro, so black that "when he shut his eyes, you could not see where he stood." It was his arguments which converted Douglass from Garrisonianism. He was also able, by the might of his presence and eloquence, to quell a mob of rioters who were trying to break up an anti-slavery meeting, under the pretense that negroes were no better than monkeys. Ward was a good proof of the fact that his race has developed mentally, especially as he had been the pastor of a white congregation. I might cite dozens of such instances.

But let me, in conclusion, say that the heroism shown by our colored soldiers, in spite of much injustice from the government, proves that there is no part of our population whose presence could less safely be spared. If we ever have a war with any foreign nation, we must rely mainly on colored regiments for garrisoning the southern coasts; and we shall not rely in vain. The record of the race, not only as soldiers but as laborers, is so good, that our anxiety should be, not how we can get rid of them, but how we can make them appreciated.

CONCORD, Mass., January 29, 1890.

A DRAGON HUNT IN THE RIVIERA.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I.

IN the fictitious world, created by superstition over the real world, there are characteristic fauna and flora, and traceable evolutions of genera and species. These creatures, originally imaginary, have been given actuality by embodiment in institutions. The world becomes to us really what we believe it to be. Some of the forms created by superstition have been tamed and turned to the service of civilization; some are reduced to domestic pets, and only occasionally bite or scratch us, like our cats and dogs; others still run wild, and in remote regions are dangerous; and some species are fossilized. But there are species of which, though generally extinct, specimens survive here and there in artificial habitats.

Of this class is the Dragon. There are two or three churches in Christendom erected in honor of dragon-slayers, where it is a necessity of faith to believe in the actuality of the vanquished monster. Some years ago, being invited to give a course of lectures at the Royal Institution, London, on Demonology, I began my preparations in Rome, and, having to deal with Dragons, visited the ancient church of Saint George. The sacristan showed me the banner borne by the saint in his encounter with the dragon, and the spear thrust down the monster's jaws; but when I asked to see a bit of the dragon the priest eyed me suspiciously, as if I were jesting,—though I was never more serious,—closed up the relics, and vanished. I recalled an incident related by Dumas in his "Voyage en Suisse." He went to some church where a hair of the Virgin Mary is preserved, but, on gazing in the glass case, said, "I cannot see it." The sacristan shrugged his shoulders and remarked, "I have been showing it twenty years but have never seen it yet." There are things that can only be seen by the eye of strong faith, and the dragon, at Rome, seemed to be of this category.

But I renewed my quest in France. That was the great field of dragons and dragon-slayers. In a delightful little volume of "Essays" by Miss Dempster, an English lady residing at Cannes, there is a chapter in which the dragon-slayers of France are enumerated. There was St. Martin on the Garonne, 4th century; St. Julien, 1st; St. Pol, 6th; St. Radigonde, at Poitiers, 6th; St. Bertian, Comminge, 6th; St. Romanus, Rouen, 7th; St. Amand, on the Scarpe, 7th; St. Arnel, Isle of Vilaine (?); St. Florent, Saumur, 3d. St. Gilles slew a dragon somewhere; St. Martial delivered Bordeaux from one; St. Marcel delivered Paris; St. Veran, Arles; St. Bie, Vendôme; Sieur de Chin, Mons; Raymond de Sulpy, Neufchâtel; St. Loup, Troyes. St. Hilary and St. Donatus also slew dragons in France. The town Tarascon on the Rhone derives its name from the monster "tarasque," said to have desolated that region. He had been vainly encountered by knights; but soon after the crucifixion, Lazarus, and his sisters, Mary Magdalene and Martha, came into this region, and St. Martha successfully encountered the monster. With a crucifix for her only weapon she met the dragon in a forest and pres-

ently returned with his dead body tied to a ribbon worn at her waist.

Renan told me of an island on the coast of his native Brittany from which some saint had exterminated serpents, after the fashion of Patrick in Ireland, and where the peasantry go to get a little of the soil to use as a vermifuge. But it is rare to find so much faith as that left in any dragon-exterminator. After visiting various regions I have found such traditions faint among the populace, and growing fainter under the republican régime. But at length I got fairly on the trail, as it were, of a dragon. In a book printed nearly thirty years ago I read that a stuffed dragon was suspended over the altar of an old church at Cimies, near Nice, having been subdued by St. Victor, chief saint of the Riviera. I hastened to that region—this was many years ago—and was grievously disappointed. There was nothing of the kind visible, and when I asked about it the priests sharply disowned knowledge of any such thing. An old resident, however, told me that there had been a dragon over the altar, which, some years before, had been taken into Nice. I sought in Nice, and was there informed that the dragon had gone to pieces—crumbled to dust—not an inch of it being left. So my last hope of seeing a bit of dragon faded.

But now I am again in the Riviera, and have just returned from a visit to Cimies. I have seen the dragon! The church was closed, but a Franciscan friar admitted me, and showed me various reliques. When I asked him about the dragon which used to be there, he was genuinely puzzled for a time, but presently exclaimed—"Ah, the crocodile! You mean the crocodile!" Then he conducted me to a closet behind one of the altars, unlocked it, and there, sure enough, suspended from the ceiling was a crocodile. He said that it had long hung in front of the altar, but in the lapse of time bits of it began to fall on the worshipers and it was removed into the dark closet. Of its legend he seemed to know nothing, and I fear could not realize the mystical picturesqueness of the proximity of the mummied crocodile to the mummied St. Victor—the dragon-slayer—which he showed me as the great relique of the church.

In the time of Cæsar, Cimies then called Cemenelum, was the capital of this region, Nice being merely its port. It was destroyed by the Lombards thirteen centuries ago, and now consists chiefly of a church and convent (Franciscan) and the few houses which supply their needs. A monument of its ancient greatness remains in the magnificent ruin of an amphitheatre and a temple of Apollo. The church is a converted shrine of Diana and part of her temple may be in the church—though it is only some 500 years old. The name of Nice was Nike (Victory), given by the Phoceans of Marseilles after their victory over the Ligurians, the original inhabitants of this place. St. Victor's name may have been derived from Nike, i. e., Victoire. This saint is said to have propagated the faith in this region about the year 1200. And it seems that to him was popularly ascribed the death of the desolating dragon, which, though it had killed all the warriors who encountered it, surrendered to the saint's crucifix and expired quietly at his feet. It indicates the potency of faith that a crocodile of moderate dimensions should have been able for many centuries to do duty as a desolating dragon. When this stuffed animal was first set up as a dragon, the crocodile, one would say, must have been unfamiliar on this side of the Mediterranean. But it may be that the myth of Cimies originated in a tradition—possibly not without basis—that the Riviera was once infested with such huge reptiles; their extermination would of course be claimed for the priest and his crucifix. This Cimies crocodile might have been preserved as a specimen of the exterminated brood, and the legend gradually assumed the more common form of a single combat between saint and dragon. The relic was somewhat foreshortened, and some feet above me, and perhaps seemed smaller than it really was. It looked about eight feet long. How could a creature so small, a foeman so little worthy of the saintly steel, have been regarded with awe? I have observed in several ancient sculptures and pictures of combats between heroes and dragons that the monsters are rarely larger than their conquerors. Perhaps this may be explained by the popular belief that the dragon's desolating strength was preternatural, satanic: its terror was invisible. When the primitive science of dragons was lost, this crocodile must have been ridiculed. So it could no longer prove the potency of any saint, and naturally crept to its dusthole. There with cracked skin, jaws expanded only to show their lost teeth, broken claws, the pitiable relic appeared a type of hideous dogmas which once awed the people, from pulpit or altar, but have become mere jests for the populace. The dragon of Cimies, and the saint who subdued him, could they revive for a ghostly midnight interview, might feel a certain sympathy for each other. They are similarly dried up, and equally neglected by the great world. In no Guide Book can I find mention of either. St. Victor's real services, whatever they were, have been harvested by others, and endowed other reputations than his own. His fame depended largely on his dragon. It is said that the peaceful surrender of the dragon to the saint was the miracle which converted the entire region to Christian faith. The regenerate dragon was thus himself a sort of missionary, and, in quietly dying, a martyr; he deserved his place at the altar. When the dragon disappeared,

the saint's glory must have measurably faded. There is now no witness at Cimies to any practical achievement of St. Victor, except this crumbling crocodile hidden away in a closet, and forgotten even by his holy custodian,—who did not dignify him with the title of dragon, but merely called him "crocodile."

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

THE ETHICS OF PARTY.

BY GENERAL M. M. TRUMBULL.

It is related of Thaddeus Stevens, that when he was "leader" of the Republican party in the House of Representatives, he once questioned the chairman of the committee on elections, concerning an election case then pending. The chairman said that it was of no great consequence either way, as both of the contestants were infernal rascals. "Very true," said Mr. Stevens, "but our duty is to take care of our own infernal rascal." This reply was in harmony with the orthodox ethics of party.

The recent riot in the House of Representatives over the case of Smith against Jackson, an election contest from West Virginia, shows that the ethics of Mr. Stevens continues to prevail in Congress. Each party stood loyally by its own. With patriotic indifference to the merits of the case or the rights of the parties, the Republicans were "solid" for Smith, and the Democrats for Jackson. The case was tried before the committee on elections, according to the ethics of party. The Republicans on the committee dutifully believed all the testimony offered by Smith and disbelieved all that was offered by Jackson; while the Democrats, equally faithful, accepted all Jackson's evidence as infallible gospel truth, and all the evidence for Smith they consistently held to be rank perjury.

The Republican majority, having as in duty bound, according to the ethics of party, prepared a report in favor of Smith, the Democratic minority, as in duty bound, following the same rule of action, prepared a report in favor of Jackson. The matter coming into the House for settlement, Bedlam broke loose, and Anarchy ruled for a week. The minority resorted to that useful device of party ethics, known as "filibustering," or the tactics of obstruction, confusion, and delay. The special manœuvre adopted in this case is called "breaking a quorum." Breaking a quorum is so easy that boys can do it. All you have to do is to talk against time, offer motions and resolutions, demand the Ayes and Nays, and when the roll is called remain silent, and refuse to vote. You make as much noise as possible until the clerk begins to call the roll, and then you become suddenly deaf and dumb. As soon as the vote is announced you recover your speech again and shout "No quorum," if the numbers announced are less than a majority of all the members elected.

In the present case the manœuvre was defeated by the Speaker of the House, who decided that the number of members present in the House, and not the number voting, was the test of a quorum. As soon as the Speaker made this decision, the House of Representatives resolved itself into a turbulent, howling mob, the members of each party threatening and reviling the other, while the presiding officer was denounced as a tyrant and usurper. His calls to order were met with defiance and derision. Whatever one man said was cheered by his own party and hissed by the other. The floor of the House was converted into a circus arena and the honorable members played their noisy parts to a delighted gallery.

A couple of months ago, a contest between two notorious prizefighters whose names curiously happen to be Smith and Jackson, took place at the rooms of the Pelican Club, in London. A very fair quality of Pandemonium was presented on that occasion. The cries of "foul," "fair," "fair," "foul," the cheering, hissing, hooting, and howling of the rival partisans actually charged the telegraphic wires with extra electricity, exhibited in blue sparks. The Smith and Jackson contest in the American Congress was a very close and correct imitation of the Smith and Jackson contest at the Pelican Club in London.

It is strange that the American Congress, although in existence more than a hundred years, has not yet found out the numbers necessary to constitute a quorum to do business. The Speaker holds that if a majority of all the members elected, is present in the House, there is a quorum within the meaning of the constitution: the "filibusters" maintain that a majority of all the members elected present and *voting*, is necessary to constitute a quorum, and that the only evidence of a member's presence is his vote. They were very indignant that the Speaker should impeach their veracity by counting them as present when they were actually telling him to his face that they were absent. No matter how vehemently they told him they were not there, he counted them as present.

From whatever party ground the question is examined, a decision by the House on party lines weakens confidence in the honesty of our statesmen. Surely there can be no question of higher privilege than the right of a member of Congress to his seat: yet this important issue between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson is decided, not on its merits, but on party grounds alone. Had the House of Representatives been a tribunal to decide a question between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson, as to the ownership of a horse, the members would have given their decision according to the very right of it as revealed by the evidence. In deciding

election cases, the House of Representatives is a judicial tribunal and every member ought to vote impartially as a judge. Controlled by the ethics of party, reason and conscience abdicate their offices for political advantage.

THE THREE PHASES OF REFLEX-MOTIONS.

The entire field of the activity of psychic life, which under normal circumstances can be connected with, or, as it were, illuminated by, consciousness, shows three different phases or stages, which like the steps of a ladder rise one above the other.

The first and lowest stage is that of simple reflex-motions, which are executed without necessarily entering into consciousness. Such reflex-motions are many kinds of muscular movements, the unconscious facial expression of emotions, winking, sneezing, coughing, sucking, chewing, swallowing, and vomiting. These reflex-motions may, or may not, be accompanied with consciousness. If we do not direct our attention to them, they, or at least some of them, may take place unconsciously upon the occurrence of the irritation by which they are provoked, and against which they must be considered as reactions. Most of these reflex-motions, also, we can bring about at will. In that case the mere thought of them may serve as an irritation to provoke the reflex-motion. The mere idea of the act becomes, as it were, an inner irritant that produces the reflex-motion.

The simple reflex-motions constitute what we commonly call 'reflex-motions in the strictest sense of the word.' Agreeably to their nature, they stand, as a rule, below the threshold of consciousness. Without thinking of it, without being constantly aware or conscious of it, our heart beats, we breathe and wink, and execute most complicated movements. In the adjoined diagram we represent a simple reflex-motion, thus :

DIAGRAM OF SIMPLE REFLEX-MOTION.

G.—Ganglion.

SI.—Sensory Impression.

ISN.—Irritation of the sensory nerve.

IMN.—Innervation of the motor nerve.

MM—Muscular motion.

The centres of the simple reflex-motions, physiology teaches, are situated in the bulb (*medulla oblongata*).

We shall now speak of the second phase.

Everybody, perhaps, is from his own experience acquainted with some phenomenon in human soul-life that might be designated as 'a direct and simple reflex-motion of conscious will.' This occurs in those unusual or extraordinary situations in which prompt action is demanded, no time being left for deliberation; for example, in the emergency of a sudden danger. We assume, for instance, a father comes home from work and finds the tenement-house in which he lives, on fire. From a window he hears his child crying for help. Without stopping to think whether he can, or whether he cannot, save the life of his boy, whether the staircase might be wrapped in flames, or whether he can reach the place whence the cry proceeds, he rushes into the house at the risk of his own life.

This is a reflex-action that passes through consciousness, but the impulse to action is so overwhelmingly strong that it gives no time or opportunity for any deliberation.

Irritations coming from sensory impressions, if connected with consciousness, in so far as they give information through some of the senses, are called *sensations*. An innervation of motory nerves or the initiative process of motions by muscular contraction, if connected with consciousness, is called *will*. That which causes a motor innervation accompanied with consciousness (an act of will), is called *motive*. A motive may be a sensation, it may be also the memory of, or a thought abstracted from, former sensations. The word "motive" conveys the proper idea of being that which sets in motion. The process of reflex-motion, if connected with consciousness, is called reflex-action, or simply *action*.

An act that is a simple reflex-motion of conscious will may be a direct action without deliberation, because of the strength and urgency of the motive which allows no time for reflection ; such is the case above de scribed. But it may arise from a lack of intelligence also. Observers of animals know many instances where even higher-organized beings, such as apes and dogs, can speedily be provoked to actions, if only the proper motives are applied.

Æsop tells in one of his fables of a monkey-show in which a spectator spoiled the performance by throwing nuts among the actors. The sight of the nuts so strongly engaged the monkeys' attention as to exclude for the moment all other motives; they forgot their training and even their master's whip, and fell into a scramble over the nuts. Similarly Reynard the Fox, in the animal fable, entices Bruin the Bear with a prospect of honey, and Puss the Cat with the suggestion of mousing, to inconsiderate actions.

DIAGRAM OF SIMPLE REFLEX ACTION, BEING A REFLEX-MOTION, CONNECTED WITH CONSCIOUSNESS.



SI.—Sensory impression.

ISN.—Irritation of the sensory nerve.

S.—Sensation.

W.—Will.

IMN.—Innervation of the motor nerve.

MM.—Muscular motion.

In the life of human society simple reflex-actions are rare, though they may frequently be observed

among children, savages, idiots, and the so-called quick-tempered people. In the mind of an educated man every psychical irritation that acts as a motive upon the will, before passing into act, has to run through a shorter or longer process of deliberation.

The memories of former sensations are, as it were, stored up in the mind; they make up the stock of that which goes by the name of *experience*. In so far as they are arranged in a systematic order, they are called *intelligence*. The richer the storehouse of memories is, and the better they are arranged, or associated, the quicker will the old experiences be at hand to interfere with, and perhaps to modify, reflex-actions. The higher the intelligence of a creature is, the less prone will it be to simple reflex-actions, and the stronger will be the power of inhibition, so as to make a process of deliberation possible, before the motive passes into act. A reflex-action of this kind may be called an "act of deliberation."

DIAGRAM SHOWING AN ACT OF DELIBERATION.



SI.—Sensory impression.

ISN.—Irritation of sensory nerve.

S.—Sensation.

P.—Perception starting a chain of deliberation by passing through the memories *M1*, *M2*, *M3*, and ending in

PE.—The plan of execution.

W.—Will.

IMN.—Innervation of the motor nerve.

MM.—Muscular motion.

These three phases of reflex-motions represent three stages of a more and more complicated activity of the soul. The first considered by itself has its place below the threshold of consciousness, although it may be brought within its sphere: it may become conscious. The second reaches to and stands upon the threshold of consciousness; the third fills out the whole sphere of consciousness and appears in orderly connection with all the memories of experience.

* * *

Nature in all things proceeds with great economy. This is particularly manifest in the function of consciousness.

We may compare consciousness to a light, which illuminates certain activities of the human soul, but leaves others to be performed in the gloom of unconsciousness. Consciousness itself has not the power to accomplish a single one of all the activities which it illuminates. It only accompanies them and sheds light upon them, bearing now upon the one and now upon the other object of attention, as they severally appear at the focal point of our central soul-life. If but the innervation of the respective fibres be accomplished, the motions of our bodies and even the thoughts of our brains will take place just as well without consciousness as with consciousness; not otherwise than a machine, that is set a-going, will work in darkness as well as in light.

If all the activities that are performed within our body, or at least all those that take place in the highest and most unstable living substance—the nerves and the brain—were without exception connected with consciousness, what a prodigious chaos would our soul in that case exhibit! In the general turmoil we should not find a moment for deliberation. In the midst of so much excitement and work, no leisure would be afforded for the selection of that which at the time is most important and most needed. The new and extraordinary could not be discriminated from the mass of ordinary events that follow the settled course of routine. The restriction of consciousness to a narrow field is, therefore, a most excellent arrangement. And this arrangement has not the slightest disadvantage, because the limitation is not at all stable; on the contrary, consciousness can be quickly shifted about, it can at a moment's notice be attached to any kind of psychic activity, as occasion may demand.

When a child is learning to play on the piano, how laboriously must he learn to distinguish every note and every key, and to associate the notes with the keys that belong to them! His consciousness must again and again be concentrated upon the task with the most intense attention, and in spite of all his attention, how awkwardly do his hands blunder over the key-board! Compare his play to that of an accomplished player. How swiftly and with what unconscious ease the virtuoso's fingers glide across the piano! The same difference of conscious awkwardness and unconscious adroitness is noticeable in all arts and in all sciences. What enormous exertions of conscious thought the schoolboy makes in his calculations, while the mathematician operates with his formulas with unconscious certainty, like a machinist whose hand even in the dark is able to find and to use every screw and every lever of his engine.

When the mental activity of our present consciousness sinks down into unconsciousness, all the attention of the mind that is available can be directed upon new difficulties, and thus our thoughts gain sufficient freedom for better and higher, or more needed, work. When mental processes in the sphere of intelligence have become automatic, we call them acts of unconscious intelligence.

Unconscious intelligence works more rapidly than conscious intelligence, because its mechanism is simpler than where the same mental acts are accompanied with consciousness. And unconscious intelligence often works with more exactness than conscious intelligence, because, machine-like, it works with mechanical accu-

racy. In former times, so long as thinking was identified with consciousness, unconscious thought was the greatest stumbling-block of psychology. Since psychologists have learned to distinguish between the activity of intelligence and that of consciousness, they find no difficulty in the fact that unconscious thought is possible.

Lest the ideas 'unconscious thought' and 'unconscious' feeling be misunderstood, a few words may be added on the meaning of the word "consciousness." Consciousness is that intensified and concentrated feeling which constitutes the character of the central soul. Its condition is a coördination of all the feelings into a system grouping them, as it were, all together within the circumference of a circle, in the centre of which is located the present object of attention. There are many feelings that are too far from the centre to be singly discriminated; they form one indistinct mass of feeling concerning the general state of the whole organism. The German physiologists most appropriately call this indistinct mass of innumerable feelings "*Gemein-gefühl*"; the English language, wanting a good Saxon expression, had to resort to the Greek word *cœnæsthesis*. We shall as an equivalent term introduce the expression "general feeling" which appears to be more congenial to the spirit of the English language and less heavy than the foreign-sounding "*cœnæsthesis*." *

Unconscious thought and unconscious feeling are by no means altogether bare of feeling; yet they are called unconscious, because, and in so far as these thoughts and feelings are not discriminated in their individuality, they disappear among the whole mass of the general feeling and cannot therefore be remembered in their individuality. The concentrated feeling of the central soul naturally can recall only those thoughts and feelings in their clearness and distinctness which appeared with clearness and distinctness, or in other words those which appeared in the centre of its system of coördination. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"MISCEGENATION" NOT A DANGER IN THE SOUTH.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I HAVE read and enjoyed "Two Perils of the Indo-European." I do not think "race mixture" probable. It is not inevitable, nor will it solve the "race question." It is no peril, nor does it threaten. I have not examined the statistics and therefore only write from observation. I am warranted, I believe, in saying fewer mulattoes, offsprings of white and black, are born to-day than ever within the last sixty years. The number of such births is decreasing. A white man with a negro-family is a rare thing to see in these days. It is seldom one meets a negress with a mulatto child, the offspring of a white paramour. When I say seldom, I mean all the word conveys, and do not confine the word as relative to the past. I was nearing my teens when the war closed. I have had many companions, but I remember but one instance of any of them being the father of a child by a black mother, and not one of them but this one, with a mistress who had negro blood in her veins. I can distinctly remember how indignant the denial was when a charge of such a connection was made.

Let Prof. Cope appreciate some additional facts—potent factors. Examine the question of the number of negresses married and investigate the number of births, legitimate and illegitimate, and the number of deaths—including abortion and the still-born. I include among legitimate children the offspring of blacks living as man and wife without legal marriage because it is not at all uncommon. I doubt if he would find in proportion to population as many illegitimate births among blacks as among whites Why? Not because the whites are less pure. During slavery children meant money to the owner of the mother. A child means expense now. The slave-owner, if actuated by no other motive than gain, took care of, and gave the best of medical attention to the offspring of his slave. There is less probability of the blacks being absorbed now than ever. Miscegenation is prohibited in some of the states by law. It is prohibited in all of them by a public opinion which is stronger than law. A white man to-day who would live with a negress and have children by her is disgraced and dishonored, ostracized from decent society, and relegated to such associations as bars him out from any decent position in the community.

I have written briefly as I could what has come under my observation. I could say much more, but my purpose has not been to find fault, but to call Prof. Cope's attention to conditions and facts which have never been investigated and never counted as factors in the discussions of the race problem.

Yours truly,

NEW ORLEANS, La. E. E. MOISE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

DIE GESETZE DER FREIHEIT. Von *Dr. Franz Staudinger*. I. Band, Das Sittengesetz. Darmstadt: Verlag von L. Brill.

In a former number of THE OPEN COURT we had occasion to note a pamphlet by Mr. Staudinger, which embodied the general purpose of the present work. Three volumes were there announced; only the first, the volume before us, has appeared (1887). It is entitled *Die Gesetze der Freiheit* (The Laws of Freedom), *Untersuchungen über die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, der Erkenntniss, und der Gesellschaftsordnung* (Investigations upon the scientific foundations of morality, cognition, and social order). The system of Dr. Staudinger may be designated as rational socialism. He is a pronounced opponent of all indeliberate and revolutionary methods. He is the pronounced opponent, too, of all half-hearted attempts at alleviation. He believes that all reform must start from the basis of existing conditions; yet contends that development must lead beyond them. For the exposition of the civil polity of the social organization sought to be established, we must refer the reader to his pamphlet *Sonst, Heut, und Einst*, and to the forthcoming volumes of the work itself. The salient feature to be remarked in this, Mr. Staudinger's, performance—and a feature so strangely in contrast to the fantastic speculations and imaginative reveries of current nationalistic movements—is its logical, comprehensive, and philosophical disposition. Where others dream, Dr. Staudinger reasons.

We shall examine, here, but the scope and methods of the first volume.

Dr. Staudinger begins with the proposition of a distinction

* The proper English translation for "cœnæsthesis," (κοινός, common, and αἴσθησις, feeling,) the German "Gemein-gefühl," would perhaps have been "common sense," or common feeling. The word "common," however, has acquired a specified meaning through the Scotch school of so-called "common-sense philosophers."

between theoretical and practical freedom ; or, with the question of determinism and indeterminism. In theory, our actions and conduct are determined ; reason and fact point to it ; the objection of the consequent destruction of moral responsibility does not apply, for the objection assumes the point in issue. In practice, however, the contrary appears true ; an inner voice cries, at critical moments, and intuitively, "I am free." Therewith, the first problem arises. The immediate consciousness that tells us we are free and the mediate ratiocinative process that tells us we are not free, are in contradiction. To the solution of this difficulty must be undertaken (1) an examination of the material content of our ethical consciousness, and (2) an investigation of the nature of the law of causality, and of the character and the extent of cognition : to which task the first two books are devoted.

In intimate connection with the latter question comes the problem—the chief problem of the work—of ascertaining the actual motives and factors whereby, consciously, we are inwardly impelled to a certain line of volition ; in other words, the determination of the conditions of morality, and the establishment of the moral law. An act, or phenomenon, viewed from the observative, rational standpoint, evokes the simple investigation of its truth, its existence, the interconnection of its parts. Viewed from the moral standpoint, an act, a human act, calls forth an entirely different species of judgment ; we approve or disapprove of the act ; not its existence, not its truth are drawn in question, but its admissibility is the issue before the mind. This is denominated the moral judgment, and with the moral judgment we come to the third question of the book, namely, Why do we pass a character of judgment upon acts that does not predicate their existence or truth, but merely expresses the approbation or disapprobation referred to ? and, What is the standard by which we may determine whether an act is really good or bad, moral or unmoral ?

Again, to reach this fundamental moral law, what is the method to be employed ? Not the critical collation of the moral sense of the cultured. Nor the comparative method of ethnology. Nor the evolutionary *modus explicandi*. But the method of the so-called exact sciences. Some peculiar characteristic property is hit upon, and freed from all superfluous appurtenance ; only those conditions of manifestation are retained without which the 'property' in question would not appear ; wherever these conditions are present, the 'property' is present. This peculiar property, or characteristic, Dr. Staudinger says, is the moral judgment. We are to inquire, accordingly, what and how we think when we think ethically ; we are to inquire what ethical is, and not what is ethical. We investigate, we ascertain, what conditions an act may be stripped of without causing the disappearance of the moral judgment and what the conditions are that remain and without which the moral judgment is not present ; and having found these, we proceed analytically further, till we strike the elements of mind from which the moral judgment results as a logical necessity.

The foundation of the moral judgment lies not in our acts themselves, but in their consequences and motive intentions ; accompanying which latter there must further be the consciousness of obligation, of an 'ought', which 'ought', to be ethical, must be attended by individual volition. Necessarily, having found an 'ought', we seek the law from which it is derived. That law cannot be external to us ; it cannot be the greatest happiness of the greatest number, nor the norm of utilitarianism, nor any of that character ; it must be recognized as a subjective inherent potency ; it must be one that comprises all that I am bound to do and that consequently I simultaneously will to be done. In the search for this law the author recognizes in Kant the one that has best emphasized the principle from which he starts—namely the origin *in reason* of the obligatory moral law. Which is formulated as follows : *Regulate thy will to conform to the accepted principle of an organic order of human society, and strive, so far as in thee lies, to form and fashion that order.* It is this phase, the social phase, that must be added to Kant's rule ('so act that the maxim of thy conduct may be fit for universal law'), in order that the latter fully comprehend the conditions under which the will of one individual may be brought into true accord with that of every other ; the ideal and logical outcome of the universal law of freedom.

The successive steps by which Mr. Staudinger develops his system, the valuable collateral argumentation employed, and the criticisms of defunct and currently entertained doctrines, we have not the space to enter upon. A word may be said, however, relative to his solution of the difficulties involved in the question of practical freedom, before referred to. To him, the conditions of morality are the conditions of freedom. They indicate the province wherein we may do what we will, provided we will what is included within the ethical law. Within that province reason is mistress. And practical freedom is nothing more, nothing else, than the consciousness of the unrestricted dominance of reason in the province that is her own. *μκρκ.*

Psychology as a Natural Science, Applied to the Solution of Occult Psychic Phenomena. By C. G. Raue, M. D. Philadelphia : Porter & Coates.

The object of this work is defined to be, the application of psychology as a natural science to the solution of occult psychic phenomena. Dr. Raue accepts as the groundwork of his investigations the researches of Friedrich Eduard Beneke, as the outcome of whose labors, he maintains, psychology as a natural science must be regarded. Beneke's activity extends over the period from 1820 to 1853 ; his instrument of psychological research is self-observation or introspection, and that alone ; he rejects the aid of physiological psychology ; he is opposed, from the outset, to any scheme that would explain mental phenomena from physical causes, and may be characterized as occupying the standpoint of spiritualism in the philosophical sense of the word. Dr. Raue, in insisting upon this standpoint says : "The psychologist will always thankfully receive the diligent researches of "physiology, as they undoubtedly tend to clear up the complex "*conditions* under which mental phenomena manifest themselves, "but he must earnestly protest against the hasty assertions which "make conditions causes and pretend to possess in physiology the "only and sufficient means for the explanation of mental life. Even "the simplest mental phenomenon in its origin and nature cannot be "satisfactorily explained by physiology. How utterly inadequate "this science proves for the explanation of higher mental processes !" The bulk of Dr Raue's work is devoted to an exposition of the principles of psychology viewed from the anti-physiological standpoint. The pronounced purpose of his examination of modern psycho-physiological research is to reject the results that that branch of science has attained and not to find in it an auxilliary, however feeble, to the elucidation of the nature of soul and mind, or even to recognize it as a legitimate engine for the discovery of psychological truth ; Dr. Raue has a thesis to establish, and the conclusion to which he seeks to arrive is the criterion employed in the establishment of that conclusion. How different and more satisfying the treatment could have been made, had the author not contemned the investigations of physiological experimental research ! Those investigations have thrown a flood of light, for instance, upon the nature of attention—as may be learned from M. Ribot's critical and masterly monograph ; but Dr. Raue without their aid, "finds no difficulty in giving" in two pages "a full analytical account of the *mental process usually designated attention*." Similarly, with the treatment of the topics "consciousness," "concepts," "intellect," etc., we need the corrective knowledge attainable from Galton's works, from Binet's "Psychologie du Raisonnement," and Max Müller's "Science of Thought." The

conclusions of modern French psychology are utterly disregarded. Of the theory of consciousness which those conclusions bid fair to establish, not a word. In fact, in the very department that forms the purpose and culmination of the work,—the explication, namely, of the so-called occult phenomena,—in which France acknowledgedly stands pre-eminent, the researches of Charcot, of Luys, of Bernheim, and a score of others are given no place—or at best are merely referred to under the comprehensive and impersonal designation of "theories."

Finally, after five hundred or more pages of foundation, we meet with theses like the following: "The soul is a system of diverse psychic forces, united into one whole organism. These forces are spaceless; they have no corporeal extension, and therefore are not encumbered by space. Their action is spaceless and conditioned only by psychic relations." "The soul is an organism of *psychic* and *not* of material forces, and as such lies absolutely out of the range of mechanical and chemical analysis, and consequently also beyond the grasp of the physical laws of dissolution." Surely, the pursuit of psychology is not demanded to affirm such a theory! We at least—and Dr. Raue has anticipated our opposition by attaching uncomplimentary epithets to the presumption of those who would affect wisdom through the appellation "we"—must unceremoniously reject it. But we admire the candor and conviction of Dr. Raue, however much we may disagree with the position maintained. The following, the concluding paragraph of the work, will explain his position. "In the "elucidation of this subject it was my part to state, and to state "fairly, that on the one side there exist *possibilities* by which an "appearance of communication between man and spirit may be "produced, and yet be only the effect of natural psychical action "of mind upon mind; that imitation may and does succeed in "taking the appearance of spirit interaction, and yet be only the "result of cleverly construed physical contrivances. On the "other side, I had to show that the assumption of a like possi-"bility of an intercourse between man and departed spirits is not "only warranted but necessitated by the existing psychical facts, "because this assumption is in accord with the nature of the soul "of man, and the laws by which the psychic organism is governed "throughout its existence in this wonderful world of psychic and "material forces combined." *μκρκ.*

Geschichte der Ethik in der Neueren Philosophie. By *Friederich Jodl.* First Volume. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.

The first volume of Dr. Jodl's *History of Ethics in Modern Philosophy* appeared in 1882, while the author held a Privatdocentship at the University of Munich; the second, which we shall review in a later number of this periodical, appeared last summer. During the interval Dr. Jodl received a call to Prague, where he now holds the chair of philosophy.

The work of Dr. Jodl is occupied with the historical investigation, in modern philosophy, of the development of the two problems, What is ethical? and Whence does the ethical originate?—or, paraphrasing the latter,—In what fundamental circumstances of the world-order and the constitution of man does Morality take its rise? The author's researches are confined, necessarily, to the theoretical phrases of the evolution of the science of ethics; they being, at the present day, the most important. His method is systematical as well as historical; not only is the historical interdependence of ethical systems shown, but their tenets and results are systematized.

The two first chapters are an historical résumé of the ethical philosophy of antiquity and early Christianity. Dr. Jodl then passes to the danger that first threatened the dominance of Christian dogmatism, namely, the Humanistic movement and the Protestant reformation. He shows how the former ended in cultured indifference, and the latter in the adoption of the same policy as that employed by Catholicism. All Christian confessions clung, in the last resort, to the dogma that without faith and belief in their peculiar tenets moral reward was hopeless. Ethical culture aside from the church, was declared impossible. The liberation of ethical research from dogmatic fetters, the recognition of ethical science as a department of human opinion independent of theological principles and governed by its own peculiar laws, had yet to be established. And we find that the work was done in that momentous century of secular and religious struggles which constitutes the basis of modern political and intellectual freedom. At the termination of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, in France, the Netherlands, and England, this tendency, it is seen, clearly appears. The productions of the epoch were not, indeed, systematic. They did not seek the origin of the ethical. Their significance was negative. But the important point is this, that ethics now demanded philosophical legitimation.

With Charron and Bacon the movement began. Grotius and Hobbes followed. The activity of Hobbes Dr. Jodl rates as of the greatest moment; his logic, insight, and critical acumen are finely emphasized, and the close connection of his theories with the doctrines of the Cambridge school and his later opponents of the sixteenth century clearly pointed out. Then comes the examination of the ethical philosophy of Locke with the characterization of the impulse it gave to modern ethical thought. Clarke and Intellectualism, Schaftesbury and Naturalism, Mandeville, Butler, Hartley, Warburton, and Paley follow. The Scottish school, whereof Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith form the nucleus, is next discussed. Then we pass to France, to Descartes and Malebranche, Bayle and Helvetius, Voltaire and Rousseau, the Encyclopedists, and Baron Holbach. And, finally, Spinoza and Leibniz (these two with especial care and comprehensiveness) are critically set forth. The genetic relation of each system with that which precedes and that which follows is uniformly insisted upon, and its influence traced throughout the various ramifications of the history of modern philosophy.

With the systematization of the ideas of Leibnitz by Wolff, the volume closes. In his researches, Dr. Jodl is conscientious and exhaustive. His information is derived at first hand. And his appreciation of the currents of English thought, especially, is exceptional. All in all, Dr. Jodl's work may be marked as the most important and most reliable historical examination of ethical philosophy hitherto published. *μκρκ.*

NOTES.

We cannot agree with Mr. W. R. Thayer when he says: "There is no logical middle ground between faith and agnosticism." If he understands by faith irrationalism and by agnosticism rationalism, he is right. But do we not meet as often with rational faith as with an irrational lack of faith? Cardinal Newman and his friends found no other way. Representing the intellectual life of their church, they saw the inconsistencies of the creed they confessed and imagined that there was no other choice than that between Rome and irreligion. If they had seen a way on which they could have advanced, we do not doubt that they would have done so. The Open Court is devoted to the work of pointing out that a religion is possible on the basis of scientific truth; and this religion is the only true religion toward which all creeds, all denominations naturally tend. It is the humanitarian religion, the coming of which is hoped for everywhere, and to the tenets of which the most radical freethinker can subscribe.

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RELIGION AND IMMORTALITY.

Johannes Scherr, one of the most zealous of infidels, who used all his great historical scholarship and philosophical acumen to forge fatal shafts to hurl at religion, says in one of his lucid sketches:

> Religion is a groping from the Temporal into the Eternal; a pathfinding from the Finite into the Infinite; a bridge-spanning from the Sensible to the Supersensible. If we follow—and I speak now only of men who have the material and the courage to think logically—if we follow, I say, this idle worry and contention to its deepest root within us, we shall find it to mean this: terror at the thought of inevitable dissolution, abhorrence of imagined void, dread of death. Man yearns for existence beyond the bounds that are set to his life. The happy man, that he may further enjoy in a kingdom to come the comforts he possessed on earth. The unhappy one, that he may find in the land "above" the fortune he was robbed of "below." And the ideal enthusiast, that he may at last arrive at those "regions bright," where "pure forms dwell"—the prototypes of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Only men who through and through are men, who, in the beautiful words of Lucretius, have advanced to the point where they are able *pacata posse omnia mente tueri*, can sternly face the inexorable thought of the annihilation of the Ego and the Self, and, when the last hour is come, say with stoic resignation in the words of Manfred, "Earth, take these atoms!" The others, the millions and hundreds of millions, all wish to gain "salvation"; which means, to live beyond the grave and after death. And since it is the fashion of man to believe and to hope what he wishes, so do they believe and hope that their dear Self is "immortal" and predestined, after corporeal death, to be promoted to a higher class in the eternal school of perfection, or, as the pious in current parlance term it, "to behold God."

Scherr characterizes religion very well as the dread of death, and as a desire to live beyond death. And truly, he is right when declaring that with many religion is nothing more than the desire to make their dear ego immortal. But Scherr is decidedly wrong when he looks upon death as a finality. It is not matter alone that man consists of, but his form also; and his humanity lies not in the clay but in the spirit. In order to sustain animal life, it is sufficient to eat and to drink; but to sustain spiritual life, man must be nourished with thoughts. Our children imbibe their mental existence from parents and instructors, and the ideas with which they are reared are the very souls of the heroes of past ages; they are the souls of their ancestors and the valuable results of the lives of the departed.

The earth takes part of its atoms again in every moment of life, and it is not the atoms that we must care for most. Man does not live by bread alone, the nourishment of his soul is the word; and the word makes of him a human being. Man's life is not ended when all the atoms that shape his body return to the dust from which they came. Nature has devised means to preserve that which is human and to let the soul of man continue even after death.

I read of late in an historical essay some sentences to the following purport: 'American freedom was not possible but for the determination and strength of the Puritan character. The Puritans were not possible but for Luther, and Luther was not possible but for Paul.' If that is so, and I expect there is no one who will dispute it, can it be said that death was a finality to Luther or to Paul? When the earth took the atoms of these men, did the earth really take their whole being? No, it did not. Their better parts, those elements of their souls which were pure and noble, were preserved and will be preserved as long as men live upon earth. The ideals which they aspired to, the truths which they taught, are immortal. And like the torch in the mysteries of Eleusis that passed from hand to hand, their soul-life will be handed down faithfully from generation to generation.

The purpose of religion, indeed, is the preservation of the soul. The preservation of the soul beyond death is no illusion, no chimera of fanatic minds. It is a fact of our experience, it is a reality that can be scientifically proved. Death is no mere dissolution into all-existence. Certain features of our soul-life are preserved in their individuality. Copernicus still lives in Kepler, and Kepler in Newton; and to-day Copernicus lives in every one of us who has freed himself from the error of a geocentric conception of the world. The progress of humanity is nothing but an accumulation of the most precious treasures we have—it is the hoarding up of human souls.

THE CRADLE OF THE ARYAS.

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

Let us return from the present and the future to the most distant past.

If we are all members of the great Aryan brotherhood, the question whence the Aryas came, and what was the original Aryan home, was a natural and legitimate subject of a scholar's curiosity. The question was asked and answered without much hesitation,

though, of course, with a clear knowledge that the answer could be speculative only. Traditions among the South-Eastern Aryas, the Indians and Persians, might point to the North, the legends of North-Western Aryas, the Greeks and Germans, might point to the North or the East, as their earthly paradise; but such dreams would be of little help in settling events supposed to have taken place two, three, it may be four or five thousand years before the beginning of our era. The only arguments, if arguments they can be called, or, we should rather say, the only impressions by which scholars were guided in giving a guess at the whereabouts of the cradle of the Aryan race, were first of all *geological*, and afterwards *semi-historical*. Geology tells us that the first regions inhabitable by human beings were the high plateau of Pamir in the Belurtagh, and the chain of the Caucasus between the Caspian, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. No geologist would ever think of any part of Europe as inhabited, or inhabitable, at the same period of time as these two highest points in Asia. From the same high plateau spring the rivers Oxus and Yaxartes, which would have served as guides to the West and the North-West, and the Indus, which would have served as a guide to the South-East; the former leading the Indo-European race to Europe, the latter to India.

And when we leave these distant geological periods, we find again all the beginnings of what we may call civilised life in Asia. I say nothing of China, or Babylon and Assyria, of Egypt, Phenicia, and Palestine. All these countries were teeming with civilised life when, so far as history tells us anything, Europe may still have been a sheet of ice, a swamp, or a howling wilderness. But if we confine our attention to the Aryas, we find them entering the land of the Seven Rivers, as they called the country of the Panjâb, at a time when Europe had hardly risen above the horizon of legend, much less of history. If we claimed no more than 1000 B.C. as the date of that Aryan immigration into India, the language which they brought with them presupposes untold centuries for its growth. When we proceed to Media and Persia, we find there, too, traces of an ancient language and literature, closely allied with that of India; and we can watch how in historical times these Medes and Persians are brought in contact with an even more ancient civilisation in Babylon, in Egypt, and in Phenicia. When that Median and Persian wave rolls on to Asia Minor, and after the conquest of the Ionian settlements there, threatens to overwhelm Europe, it is repelled by the Greeks, whose civilisation was then of a comparatively recent date. And when, after the Persian wars, the stream of Greek civilisation flows westward to Italy, and from Italy overflows into Gaul and Germany, sweeping everything before it, it meets there with hardly any monuments of ancient growth, and with no evidence of a language more primitive than Sanskrit, or of a literature and religion to be compared for freshness and simplicity with the religious literature of the Vedic age.

It might have been intelligible if, under these circumstances, the cradle of the Aryan race had been sought for in India or Persia, possibly even in Asia Minor, in Greece, or in Italy. But to place that cradle in the untrodden forests of Germany, or even on the shores of the bleak Scandinavian peninsula, would seem to have required a courage beyond the reach of ordinary mortals.

Yet, this feat has been accomplished by some German ethnologists, and the south coast of Sweden has actually been singled out as the hive from which the Aryas swarmed, not only into Germany, Italy, Greece, and Armenia, but into Persia and India likewise. Scholars shook their heads and rubbed their eyes, but they were told that this counted for nothing, and that the least they could do was to prove that Sweden had *not* been the original home of the Aryas. Now, you know how difficult it is under all circumstances to prove a negative; but in this case it became doubly difficult, because there was hardly anything adduced that could be disproved. There was no evidence of any Aryan people having lived in Sweden much before the time when Persia invaded Greece, and when the ancient Vedic religion, after a sway of many centuries, after long periods of growth and decay, was already being supplanted by a new religion, by Buddhism. The statement quoted as having been made by a defender of the Scandinavian theory, that the date of the Aryan migration into India was about the seventh century, must clearly rest on a misprint, and was probably meant for the seventeenth century. For, after all, whenever the Aryans started from Scandinavia, they must have been near the Indus about 1500 B. C., speaking Vedic, and not modern Buddhist Sanskrit; they must have been in Greece about 1000 B. C., speaking the Dorian dialect of the Greek branch of the Aryan stock of speech. They must have been in Asia Minor, speaking the Ionian dialect of the same Greek branch at a time early enough for their name of *Yavan* to be quoted by the author of Genesis, for their name of *Yauna* to be joined with those of Media and Armenia as provinces of Persia in the cuneiform inscriptions of Darius; nay, possibly for the same name, under the disguise of *Uinen*, being found in Egypt in the hieroglyphic inscriptions of the fifteenth century B. C.

These are facts that have to be accomodated, when we are asked to believe that the ancestors of all these

Aryas came from Sweden, where we know of no traces of human life, much less of Aryan life, much before these very wars between Persians and Ionians. Even then we only find *kitchen-middens* and funeral barrows, and who is to tell us whether these *beaux restes* of prehistoric dinners were left by Aryas or by pre-Aryan hordes, and whether these silent dolichocephalic skulls spoke once an Aryan or non-Aryan dialect?

With all these palpable facts against them, it can hardly be supposed that the supporters of the Scandinavian theory had no arguments at all on their side. Yes, they had, but let us see what their strength really is.

It has been said that Latham, who first started this theory, pointed out that at present the number of Aryas, speaking different Aryan dialects in Europe, is much larger than the number of Aryas in Asia, and that it would therefore be absurd to derive the majority from so small a minority. First of all, I doubt these linguistic statistics, even at the present day. I am not at all certain that the number of people speaking Aryan dialects in Asia at the present moment is smaller than that of Aryan speakers in Europe. But at the time of which we are now speaking, say 500 B. C., when one great period of language, literature, and religion had already come to an end in India, the population of the North of Europe and of Scandinavia was of the scantiest, and even if they were Aryas, and not Basks, or Laps, or Fins, their number would have been a mere nothing compared with the enormous number of Aryas at that time living in India, and Persia, and Asia Minor. How then these Aryas who composed their Vedic hymns on the banks of the Seven Rivers between 1500 and 1000 B. C., should have migrated from Sweden, passes my understanding.

A stronger argument that has been adduced in favour of Sweden being the cradle of the Aryan race, is a passage from Jordanes, or Jornandes, as he is commonly called. At all events we have here something tangible that can be handled, that can be proved or disproved. It is said that Jordanes has preserved the ancient tradition that Sweden was 'the manufactory of people,' the *officina gentium*, as he expressed it.

Before we quote an authority, our first duty is to find out who he was and what means of knowledge he possessed. Now Jordanes lived about 550 A. D. He was originally a notary in Bulgaria, and became afterwards a monk, possibly in Ravenna. He wrote a book *De rebus Geticis et De origine actuque Geticae gentis*, which is chiefly based on a lost work of Cassiodorus, the friend and adviser of Theodoric, on Orosius, and on similar authorities. He himself is a most ignorant and uncritical writer. Besides that, he writes with an object, namely to magnify the Gothic race and bring it somehow in connection with Troy and the fabulous ancestors of the Romans.* He certainly, whether rightly or wrongly, believed that the Gothic and other German tribes among whom he had lived on the Danube, came from the north, and from Sweden. He therefore called the island of *Scancia* or *Scandza* the *officina gentium*,† the manufactory of peoples. But by these peoples he clearly understood the Teutonic tribes, who had overrun the Roman Empire. The idea that other nations, such as Romans, or Greeks, or other Aryas could have come from Sweden would probably have completely staggered his weak mind.

On such evidence then we are asked to believe that tradition had preserved in the year 550 A. D. some recollection of the original migration of the Aryas from Sweden, say 500 B. C. Poor Jordanes himself never dreamt of this, and a theory must indeed be very near drowning to grasp at such a straw.

What would the upholders of the Scandinavian theory say, if *we* appealed to the famous legend of Odin's migration from Asia in support of the Asiatic origin of the Aryas in Europe? And yet that legend meets us only a century later than Jordanes, namely, in Fredegar, 650 A. D., and then grows from century to century till we find it fully developed in the Heimskringla and the Prose Edda in the thirteenth century, nay, believed in by certain scholars of the present day.

If we reason soberly, all we can say is that the separation between the South-Eastern branch of the Aryan family, the Hindus and Persians, and the North-Western branch, the Germans, Celts, Slavs, Greeks, and Italians, cannot be proved to have taken place in Europe, because at that early time we know absolutely nothing of Europe being inhabitable or inhabited by any race, whether Aryan or non-Aryan. The angle from which these two streams of language might have started points to Asia, and points to that very locality where geologists tell us that human life became possible for the first time, the high plateau of Pamir, or rather the valleys sloping down from it towards the South.

We can construct a picture of the life of these as yet undivided Aryas from the words which the Northern and Southern Aryan languages share in common, and all the salient features of that picture fit in with the picture which recent travellers have given us of the neighbourhood of Pamir. Let us examine a few of them.

* Jordanes, cap. 9, and 20.

† Ex hac igitur Scancia insula, quasi officina gentium, aut certe velut vagina nationum, cum rege suo Berich Gothi quondam memorantur egressi.

We are told that the climate is cold, the winter long, and that there is plenty of ice and snow. We should therefore expect that the Aryas, before they left that neighbourhood, should have formed names for snow and winter, and that these names should have been preserved in both branches of the Aryan family. And so it is. We find in Sanskrit the same words for *snow* and *winter* as in Greek, Latin, and German. This proves at all events that the original home of the Aryan language could not have been in a tropical climate, for there snow and ice being unknown, names for snow and ice would not be wanted.

Snow is *snizh* in ancient Persian, *snaivs* in German, *nix* in Latin. Winter was h é m a n in Sanskrit, *χεῖμα* in Greek, *hiems* in Latin, *zima* in Slavonic. *Ice* is i s i in Zend, *îs* in Old High-German.

The most common trees in Northern Kohistán are the pine, the birch, and the oak. One of these trees, the birch, has the same name in Sanskrit and in English. *Birch* in English is b h û r *g* a in Sanskrit. The names of the other trees exist in the South and the North, and must therefore have been known before the Aryan separation; but their meaning varies. The word which in Sanskrit is used for tree and wood in general, d r u, appears in Greek as *δρῦς*, meaning tree, but especially the oak. In German *triu* is likewise used for tree in general, but in Celtic *daur* means the oak, while in Lituanian *dervà* has become the special name for fir. We see a similar change of meanings in another name for *oak*, the Latin *quercus*. The same word appears in Lombardian as *fereha*, and in the A. S. *furh*, the English *fir*. The *beech* has not a common name in Sanskrit and Greek, whatever the defenders of the Scandinavian theory may say to the contrary. They mistook the name of the birch for that of the beech, and, more than that, they assigned a wrong *habitat* to the beech.

One of the strongest, if not the strongest argument against the Asiatic origin of the Aryas has always been that there are no common Aryan names for lion, and tiger, and camel in their ancient language, while there are common names for swine, sheep, ox, dog, and horse. First of all, this reasoning is not correct. We may safely conclude, when we find the same words in Sanskrit on one side and in Greek and Latin on the other, that these words existed before these languages separated, and that therefore the objects signified were known. But we cannot conclude with the same safety that because the same words do *not* exist in these languages, therefore the objects signified by them could not have been known. Words are constantly lost and replaced. It does not follow, for instance, that the Aryas, before they separated, were ignorant of the use of fire, because the Sanskrit word for fire, a g n i, is not to be found in Greek. It is replaced in Greek by *πῦρ*, but in Latin the Sanskrit word for fire, a g n i, appears as *ignis*. Though the positive argument is irresistible, the negative argument has always to be used with great caution. But the latest traveller in Kohistân, M. de Ujfalvy, * tells us that even the zoölogical foundation of this argument about lion and tiger is wrong, and that these wild beasts are not to be found in those cold regions where the home of the Aryas is most likely to have been. The fact therefore that the Southern and Northern Aryan languages have not the same names for lion and tiger, so far from being against us, is in perfect harmony with the theory that the original home of the Aryas was on the slopes of the mountains which form the junction between the Hindukush and the Karakorum chains, what may be called Northern Kohistân.

I call it a theory, for I do not see how it can ever be more than a theory. It was in order to guard against useless controversy that I have always confined myself to the statement that the Aryan home was 'somewhere in Asia.' This has been called a vague and unsatisfactory conclusion†; but all who are familiar with these studies know perfectly well what it meant. No one would suspect me of deriving the Aryas from India, Persia, or Asia Minor, nor from Burma, Siam, China, Mongolia, and Siberia, nor from Arabia, Babylon, Assyria, or Phenicia. Then what remains? Not much more than that high plateau from which the Himâlaya chain branches off toward the south-east, the Kuen-lün chain towards the east, the Karakorum towards the west, and the Hindukush towards the south-west: the region drained by the feeders of the Indus, the Oxus, and Yaxartes. That is still a sufficiently wide area to accommodate the ancestors of our Aryan race, particularly if we remember in how short a time the offspring of one single pair may grow into millions.

This question has now been so fully discussed, and so splendidly summed up by a Dutch scholar, a Jesuit, worthy of the name and fame which that order once possessed in literature and science, Van den Gheyn ‡, that I hope we shall hear no more of Sweden as the cradle of the Aryas. It would be best, perhaps, to accept a proposal made in the interest of peace by my learned friend and fellow-worker, Professor Sayce, who thinks that he might be able to persuade all ethnologists to use the name *Aryan* in a purely physiological sense, and to restrict it to the dolichocephalic people, with blue eyes and blonde hair, regardless of the language they speak. Whether

* *Expédition scientifique Francaise en Russie, Sibérie et Turkistan*, par Ch. E. D. Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kovesd, Paris, 1878.

† See Horatio Hale, 'The Aryans in Science and History,' in *The Popular Science Monthly*, for March, 1889, p. 673.

‡ *L'Origine européenne des Aryas*, Paris. 1889

all people with blue eyes and golden hair in Greece and Italy, in the Caucasus, in Persia, and in Central Asia, have come from Scandinavia, ethnologists would then have to settle among themselves; but we should at all events have peace within our borders. Aryan is a mere adjective, which we could well spare. We should then retain the old classical name of Arya for those people who brought the numerous varieties of Aryan speech from Asia to Europe, whose thought still runs in our thoughts, as their blood may run in our veins--our true ancestors in spirit and in truth, whether their heads were long, their eyes blue, and their hair golden, or whether their heads were round, their eyes dark, and their hair black.

And here I must conclude my plea for the Study of the Science of Language. I hope I have shown you that it really is a disgrace for any human being to go through life without some knowledge of what language is and what it has done for us. There are certain things which are essential to education—not only reading, writing, and arithmetic, but a general knowledge of the earth on which we live (*Geology* and *Geography*); of the sky and the stars which tell us of infinite law and order above (*Astronomy*); of the great men who have made the world what we found it (*History*); and of some of the greatest men who have told us what this world ought to be (*Religion* and *Philosophy*). I add to these the Science of Language which, better than anything else, teaches us what we really are. You have only to try to imagine what this world would be, if it were inhabited by speechless beings, in order to appreciate the full importance of knowing what language really is to us, and how much we owe to language in all we think, and speak, and do.

It is quite true that life is too short for any human being to gain a thorough knowledge of these fundamental subjects. But life is not too short to allow us to gain a sound knowledge of the general outline of these subjects, and of the results that have been garnered up in some of our best school-books and manuals. And this is particularly true with regard to the Science of Language. As I said in a former lecture, we all can play at least one language, many in these days even know two or three. We therefore possess the facts; we have only to digest, to classify, and to try to understand them.

PATRONAGE AND PREROGATIVE.

BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

A PORTENTOUS cloud hangs over Illinois, while croaking soothsayers prophesy political earthquakes that will "split the party," and "lose the state." This convulsion threatens the commonwealth because of a dispute about prerogative between the President of the United States and a senator from Illinois, whose home is in Chicago. Judging by the papers, rarely has a tempest in a teapot so violently agitated the minds of men.

The cause of this phenomenon is the action of the President in appointing a collector for the port of Chicago, in opposition to the wishes of the Senator. This eccentricity, although strictly constitutional, is rebuked as an invasion of the senatorial prerogative, because the Senator had selected another man for the place.

This trivial quarrel over an office worth about five thousand dollars a year has been inflated by the press and the politicians, into an affair of national importance.

The Senator is not angry on his own account; his grief is for the "people" who have been wronged by this appointment. The "people" wanted Campbell but the President wanted Clark. Who are the people? If the inhabitants of Chicago are meant, outside the friends and acquaintances of the persons named the "people" knew nothing about them, and cared nothing whether either or neither of them got the office.

The senatorial prerogative contended for, is vicious as it is illegal. The appointing power is in the President, and he has no right to abdicate in favor of senators, representatives, judges, or any other persons. The evolution of a mischievous practice was from "Advice" to "Patronage," and from that to "Prerogative."

Early in our national history it was found that the President, in distributing offices, must consult with men acquainted with the citizens in the neighborhood where the offices belonged, such as representatives and senators in congress. It was also natural that after the "spoils' system" was engrafted on our politics, he should consult only with advisers belonging to his own political party. This he did; and here is where the mischief began.

After a time those representatives and senators claimed the *right* to be consulted. This was conceded, and then a claim was made that the public offices were their private perquisites, and that they had a right to dismiss as well as appoint the civil officers of the government. This was conceded also; and the offices thus became the "Patronage" of the representatives and senators. They became the "Patrons" of the offices and of the office-holders. This patronage easily developed into "Prerogative" a very right, appendant to a seat in either house of congress. Under this arrangement, the offices were degraded into bribes and payments for personal service, and devotion to the patrons, who held the offices in their gift.

Mr. Lincoln, when president, once appointed a

collector on the demand of Mr. Jones, the member of Congress from the district where the office was. A cabinet officer, who happened to know that the appointment was improper, remonstrated against it; but the President said: "What can I do? Jones wanted him." "What of that?" said his friend; "are you president of the United States, or is Jones president?" Mr. Lincoln thought for a moment, and replied: "Jones is president." And he was, —for that district.

There is a question of political morality involved in this dispute, which notwithstanding the acres of print expended on the subject, has not been mentioned by the partisans of either side; and yet it is the only question in it worthy of consideration. It grows out of the senator's business and the collector's duty. The senator is extensively engaged in the importation of merchandise from foreign countries, and for that reason he is the very last person who should have a voice in the selection of the appraiser or collector for the port of Chicago. Were not the public conscience drugged into stupor by the medicines of party, it would be regarded as a scandal that the collector of the port should be dependent on any importer, or under any obligations to him for the office that he holds.

It is freely conceded here, that in this particular case the patronage of the office would not result in any return favors from the officer to the patron, and that partiality would neither be offered by one side nor accepted by the other; yet the relationship would excite suspicion, although both parties were "chaste as ice, and pure as snow." All rival importers would be jealous, and with good reason, because a moral principle is violated when any importer is permitted to appoint the collector of the port. Even Matthew, who sat "at the receipt of custom" long ago, would have seen his official action clouded with suspicion had he been indebted for his appointment to some great merchant of Jerusalem.

And the principle here contended for is in harmony with the spirit and the letter of our law. The first day that Gen. Grant took his seat as president, he appointed Mr. A T. Stewart, Secretary of the Treasury. The Senate was about to confirm the appointment when a venerable clerk, a relic of a past age, called Mr. Sumner's attention to an ancient law passed in the days of Washington, whereby it was forbidden that any merchant or importer should be Secretary of the Treasury.

Although this law had been forgotten it had never been repealed, so the President was advised to withdraw the nomination, as the appointment was illegal. Instead of doing so, he asked that the law be repealed. This was refused, not because there was any suspicion of Mr. Stewart, but because the law was right. The meaning of it was and is, that no merchant or importer shall have patronage or power in the Custom-house.

POINTS, MATHEMATICAL AND LEXICAL.

BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.

"THERE is something funny about this doctrine of chances," said an ingenious friend to me the other night. "The first time one throws a silver dollar, for instance, the chances of head and tail are equal; but if one throws head, say, five times in succession, the chances are against his throwing head the next time, although meanwhile nothing has happened to the coin, which still has only the same two sides, and may be thrown the same way as before. What has altered the chances? I know they are altered; but I don't understand why." As some others may be in the like predicament, and as the point anyhow is somewhat subtile, and goes very deep into the doctrine of chances, I submit it to THE OPEN COURT. A solution, however, is not far to seek, as it appears to me.

Not only are the chances of head and tail equal at the outset, but, if the coin is thrown often enough, the number of heads and tails will be equal at the close. This follows immediately from Bernoulli's theorem, that, in the case of an event which must either happen or fail, the number of trials may be so great that the ratio of its occurrences to the number of trials will equal the ratio expressing its *a priori* probability, within less than any assigned quantity. As the *a priori* probability of throwing head is one-half, and that of throwing tail is also one-half, the number of throws to which the number of heads or of tails stands in this ratio must of course equalize them. The proposition is indeed identical. For the sake of illustration, suppose this number to be twenty. Out of the twenty throws, then, ten must turn head, and ten tail. I say *must;* for the supposed number, be it remembered, represents hypothetically the actual number, whatever that may be, within which the two ratios are equal to each other, and within which, consequently, the heads and tails must be equal. Not simply must the heads and tails together number twenty, therefore, but the heads and tails must be equal in number—as necessarily equal as if drawn from an urn containing ten of each and no more. Now, the chances of head and tail are equal at the outset, because one or the other must be thrown, whereby the probability of throwing either is one-half. If in the case supposed heads have been thrown five times in succession, however, there remain only five heads to be thrown, facing ten tails, fifteen all together, making the probability of throwing head the next time five-fifteenths or one-third, against ten-fifteenths or two-thirds in favor of throwing tail. The

chances are altered, it will thus be seen, by the reduction of the possible heads, while the possible tails are left undiminished, just as they would be altered if the ten heads and ten tails were represented by the same number of white and black balls respectively in an urn, from which five white balls had been drawn, and no black ones. Nothing meanwhile has happened to the coin, as my friend says, which still has only the same two sides, and may be thrown the same way as before; but, although it may be thrown the same way as before, the chances that it will be are reduced, as shown above, by the result of the previous throws. The chances against throwing head instead of tail the next time are two to one, because the number of possible tails remaining is twice the number of possible heads. In short, a solution of the point in question, as I conceive, hinges on the truth of Bernoulli's theorem. All of which is respectfully submitted.

The *Sun*, of New York, which fills with ability, not to say general acceptance, the chair of censor of mind and manners in our country, contained the other day the following paragraph:

"From totally unconnected sources comes this question and its answer: 'Can $5 be multiplied by $5?' writes J. T. F. O'C., and Col. John Hamilton on the same day, writes this:

"'Five dollars multiplied by $5 does not give $25 as a result; $5 multiplied by the abstract number 5 *does* give $25. To multiply $5 by $5 we would have to square the dollars as well as the abstract numbers, and we would have 5+5=25 multiplied again by the dollars (100+100), equal to 250,000, just as in multiplying 500 cents by 500. Wouldn't it give a funny looking coin to multiply a dollar by a dollar?'

"Thus Col. Hamilton answers J. T. F. O'C.'s question; and we answer Col. Hamilton's by remarking, 'Well rather.'"

So far from objecting to the answer, it would seem, the *Sun* accepts it as valid; but not so can I. The correct answer, I should say, is "No." Multiplying dollars by dollars is an inconceivable process. Multiplication is adding a number or quantity to itself a certain number of times. Can the sum of five dollars be added to itself five dollars times? The thing is blank nonsense. A multiplier is always and necessarily an abstract number. According to the extraordinary answer accepted by the *Sun*, five dollars multiplied by five dollars makes two hundred and fifty thousand cents, or twenty-five hundred dollars. This is the product not of five dollars by five dollars, but of five hundred cents by the abstract number five hundred, which is a totally different thing. The answer, I am constrained to say, is even more absurd than the question. The only rational operation suggested by the question, if it suggests anything rational, is the multiplication of five dollars by the abstract number five, with the rejection of its application to dollars in the multiplier as so much ridiculous surplusage. The error of using the sign of addition for the sign of multiplication is probably typographical; but, as it tallies exquisitely with the rest of the paragraph, I leave it as it stands in the *Sun*.

By the way, having referred to the critical function of that great journal, which certainly it discharges in general with unsurpassed ability, I may be permitted to call attention to the subjoined extracts from its columns:

"The original Thanksgiving Day was a day of worship, just as the original Fast Day was. One was the *converse* of the other."

* * * * * * * *

"Far from being a scholar, he had the kind of knowledge which is the *converse* of the exact learning synonymous with scholarship."

The last sentence is from the pen of the literary editor, whose initials are signed to the article in which it occurs. Under the circumstances, it is not too much to ask the *Sun*, in the interest of the purity of our mother tongue, to overhaul the dictionary for the meaning of the word *converse*, and, when found, make a note of it. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

MONISTIC RELIGION THE STRENGTH OF DANIEL WEBSTER.

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

HORACE GREELEY spoke the truth when he said: "Webster's intellect is the greatest emanation from the Almighty Mind now embodied." So says and quotes Mr. Oliver Dyer in his little book on Our Great Senators; a book exceedingly interesting and light-giving.*

The author was a reporter in the United States Senate and for many years was in constant and working contact with the great men to whom he introduces us in a way so life-like that he deserves the thanks and gratitude of every American. We seem to be for a time the associates of those who have done most to make our history; then, the light of far-reaching philosophy is thrown upon them, and we are made to see that they could not have been or acted otherwise than they did. The result is that we delight to raise the greatest, the worthiest of them aloft into the Pantheon of the Nation's heart.

It is very easy to see that according to our author's view three Americans lead all others in that Pantheon: *Washington*, *Webster*, and *Lincoln*. Time was when he, with thousands of others, would never have thought of Webster between those two sacred names. Time was, when he too joined in the howl about "the astounding apostacy" of the "rotten-hearted Daniel Webster." But time has whitened the head of the old "Reporter." He sees it differently now, and he could not leave this bank and shoal of time, until he had left his personal

* "Great Senators of the United States, Forty Years Ago. Being Personal Recollections, etc., of Calhoun, Benton, Houston, J. Davis, Clay, Webster, and Others." By *Oliver Dyer*. New York: Robert Bonner and Sons, 1889.

testimony as to the intellectual, moral, and patriotic grandeur of the greatest man he ever knew. He says: "Events have justified Webster. I say this with all the more freedom because I was of the fiercest of the howlers, and my howls were honest," (p. 298).

It is quite easy to see now, in the light of Sociology, that our Civil War was a great blunder, and a crime which the statesmanship of Webster would probably have averted. But the people were selfish and sectional, wild and mad, and the eloquence, wisdom, and patriotism of their greatest mind and heart were lost in battle-cries while their flag was "drenched in fraternal blood."

But Mr. Dyer points out with moral certainty that but for the wisdom, eloquence, great heartedness, and patriotism which gave Daniel Webster the victory—in the Senate and before the people—over Calhoun and Hayne, there could have been no successful war for the Union, nor would any victory have restored the Union. He puts it in a word, that Webster's services to the Republic were simply "incomputable." Very similar seems to be Mr. Blaine's estimate in his "Twenty Years in Congress"; and in his appendix to his second volume, he shows that Seward, Douglass, and other statesmen gladly took Webster's ground when too late. Webster had the heighth and breadth of vision to see futurity as if present, and the patriotism to forewarn, and do all in his power to avert dangers impending over those who could not or would not see for themselves. It is an interesting historical query to solve: Which was the greatest battle ever fought? and which the greatest speech ever made? In the end, it seems that Webster's Reply to Hayne is likely to appear as *that speech*. Not only as a speech, but as a poem and a prophecy, "The Man, the subject and the occasion," and also the *results* stand unparalleled by any other human utterance. The "Crown" oration of Demosthenes, the Phillipics of Cicero were wails of the lost cause of liberty, like the beautiful eloquence of modern Ireland; but the "American Union" sustained, defended, and made continuous by that one mighty effort, (made solid by the Reply to Calhoun in 1833,) has become the corner-stone of the progress of the whole human race. "Incomputable" is the word for such services. The Mighty Orator made successful the war for the Union by vindicating the supreme duty of the Union to exist. Thus he has lifted our whole country aloft and by it made the Republic the common inheritance of mankind. The weaknesses and failings of the man are lost in the immense public and human benefaction his life has been; pitiful is the soul that hunts them up and uselessly exposes them.

But it is time to ask what was the source of this orator's immense power. The answer must be his religion; and if it be asked, what religion was that? The answer must be substantially, the *Monistic Religion*. His own words about Religion are true and memorable: "*Religion*, therefore," he says, "is a necessary and indispensable element in any great human character. There is no living without it. Religion is the tie that connects man with his Creator, and holds him to his throne. If that tie be all sundered, all broken, he floats away, a worthless atom in the Universe; its proper attractions all gone, its destiny thwarted, and its whole future nothing but darkness, desolation, and death."*

We do not pretend that Webster ever broke with the religious elements that surrounded him. He used their phrases, but he swelled them into a meaning far beyond their traditional and usual contemplation. There was really very little Theology or Metaphysics about him. He was a *first* rather than a *second* hand soul, and as such *great*, because he was large enough to see, feel, and *embody* in himself the *order* of the world, physical, social, political, and moral. His power came because he was *at one* with the world,—was a *Monist!* The foundation upon which he stood sturdily with both feet, was the laws and order of the Universe,—sustaining the continuity and solidarity of the human race, and the UNITED STATES as their highest result. These ideas were his underlying power, and sometimes he brought them to actual revelation in "godlike action," which made his auditors stand spell-bound as before a superior being. The preparation for all this was his "religious" and poetic unity with Nature. His frequent hunting and fishing excursions were but pretexts for this "worship." He was never at home, except as a boy among his native-mountains, or as a man on his farm by the sea, whose tides, and winds, and waves became the music of his soul.

Nor less real was his union with human life as the great continuous consciousness of Nature. No Positivist has ever so beautifully illustrated the continuity of humanity by the succession of the generations. Their outcome in the great Republic made it sacred to him with a reverence too profound even for his utterance. Before these great realities Webster was the most reverent of men, because he saw and felt them the best, and stood in personal relation to them. If, as James Parton says, "the proper religion of a citizen of the United States is the United States of America,"—then Webster had that Religion bottomed solidly upon the Universe and History. Some *Monist* would do well to select from Webster's works, biographies, and correspondence, the abundant illustrations of his fundamental union with Nature, Humanity, and the

*Eulogy on Mason, p. 595 of Whipple's "Great Speeches and Orations of Webster." (Little, Brown & Co., Boston.) A book which should be in every library, and every household where pure, noble English, the grandest eloquence, and the purest wisdom and patriotism are desired.

Republic. To go no further than Whipple's book, look, for instance, at—

"The Settlement of New England," with its "Advance then, ye future generations," . . . . we welcome you to the *immeasurable blessings of conscious existence," etc., etc.*

The Revolution in Greece; with its Solidarity of Nations and Peoples.

The two inimitable Bunker Hill orations.

The oration on Adams and Jefferson, who "left the world filled with their radiant light," etc., p. 158.

The case of Joseph White with its revelation of human nature, like Shakespeare.

The Reply to Hayne, with such phrases as: "The bones of her sons, falling in the great struggle for independence," etc.; "Union and Liberty now and forever one and inseparable."

The Reply to Calhoun in 1833: "The people, Sir, in every state live under two governments," p. 290.

The two masterly New York dinner speeches.

The Character of Washington.

The Presidential Protest and Veto, with "The drum beat around the world."

The Rich and Poor; and the Log-Cabin of his Father.

The Landing at Plymouth.

The Girard will-case (exception, as it may seem,) appeals to a higher religion than that of his clients.

The Hulsemann Letter, with its Americanism.

The Seventh of March speech, with its patriotic sacrifice.

The Dedication of the Capitol at Washington, which practically closed his career.

The annals of eloquence and wisdom can show nothing equal to these wonderful productions. Lincoln's inspired consecration speech at Gettysburgh is but the continuation of the same line of thought and feeling, and unconsciously uses Webster's identical words.

The new universal faith has been for a long time growing under the ribs of the old, and has been compelled to use the old names and symbols. But God is no longer a spook or an unknowable abstraction, but the real world or universe. Christ is no longer an amphibious deity, nor one little Jew, but the ideal Humanity. The Holy Ghost is no longer a flitting personality, but the real living soul-activity of Man. In all these and other similar theological terms Webster, without criticizing or denying, struck through the names to the realities, and spoke for them. He, as none other, bottomed upon the Infinite Universe, and the continuity of the human race. Therefore he remains, and must long remain, a moving, educative power,—the greatest of monistic orators and statesmen.

FREEDOM OF WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY.

The question has often been asked: "Is a man responsible for his actions, or is he the slave of conditions?" The standpoint of science and that of ethics does not appear to agree. Science rests upon, it presupposes, and, indeed, it proves by its very existence the rigidity of law. All natural processes are pervaded by an irrefragable necessity, and psychical acts are no exception to the universal order of things. But the clergyman, the teacher, the ethical instructor step in, proclaiming the moral law: Thou shalt and thou shalt not. What is the use of moral behests, if the formation of future events is unalterably fixed, if we are unable to make or to mar? If this be the case, does not the *must* of science collide with the *ought* of morals?

It does not collide, unless the one or the other or both are misunderstood. The *must* and the *ought* do not contradict each other; on the contrary, they condition and they explain one another. The *ought* of morality has sense only on the supposition of the *must* of science.

Theologians made the mistake of defining freedom of will as something that breaks through all natural laws; and they were thus obliged to look upon it as a mystery beyond the grasp of the philosopher. On the other hand, the philosopher was obliged to deny the possibility of a freedom of will that infringes upon natural laws. Freedom of will was defined as a contradiction of scientific necessity, as an annihilation of physical laws, and as an exception to the natural order of things.

What is freedom of will? Freedom of will means that a man is free to do that which he wills. A prisoner is not free; his liberty is curtailed: he cannot do what he wills. A vanquished man who lies at the feet of his conqueror, is not free in his action; he depends upon the mercy of his adversary. Yet in a certain sense even the fettered man, the slave and bondsman remain, or at least can remain, free. Their actions do not, and need not, entirely depend upon circumstances outside of them.

Hagen in the Teutonic Saga stands locked in iron chains before Chriemhild; he is asked where he had hidden the treasure of the Nibelungs. Yet he answers proudly:

> Den schaz weiz nu nieman wan got unde min,
> Der sol dich valantinne immer gar verholn sîn.
>
> [The treasure is known to no one except to God and me.
> Forever, hendish woman, be it concealed from thee.]

Hagen proves to the Queen of the Huns his freedom of will; and his will is stronger than the fear of death, which thereupon he suffers at the hand of the revengeful woman.

If the decision of a man is determined by sur-

rounding conditions solely, he feels himself to be, and indeed he is, a slave of the situation. But if his decision is determined solely by his character, by the thoughts and principles that move his mind; if he remains unbiased by surrounding conditions; if on the one hand dangers, calamities, and the prospect of death cannot frighten, and on the other hand allurements and pleasures cannot decoy: then does his decision depend in all situations upon himself, then is he independent of the influences of surrounding conditions; he is a free man, even if he were laden with chains, even if he were a slave as was Epiktetus.

The motives that set the psychical mechanism of a human soul in motion have two phases—an objective and a subjective phase. They represent, (1) certain facts of the outside world, and, (2) certain principles or maxims in the mind indicating how to deal with the facts of one's surroundings. The objective fact is the one phase and the subjective attitude is the other phase. A man, in whom the objective fact constitutes the overwhelming part of a motive, cannot be said to be free; but if the subjective attitude remains the decisive element in a motive, he is free, and his actions will be the true expression of his character. He will preserve his freedom even under conditions where weaker souls would yield to a compulsion of circumstances.

The consciousness of man's moral freedom and of the dignity that rises from this freedom should never be lost by any one of us. For the idea that we can be free, if we dare to, that we are free if we do not allow ourselves to be enthralled, will afford us an incalculable power of self-possession. It will give us stability and quietude in the turmoil of exciting events which threaten to carry us away; whatever be our fate, we can be, and can remain, faithful to ourselves and to our principles.

Freedom of will is man's mark of dignity over brute creation, and Schiller, the poet of liberty, proudly sings:

Man is free, e'en were he born in chains!

In answer to this view, some theologians of a mystical cast of mind declare, that freedom of will does not denote the freedom of man's will to do a thing, but it means the freedom of a man's will to will another thing than he wills. It is plain that the freedom of a man to do what he wills as explained above, does not stand in contradiction to natural laws, it forms no exception to the universal and necessary course of nature. For whatever a man wills, he must will of necessity. The decision of a scoundrel if his freedom of will is not curtailed, if he can act as he pleases, will of necessity be that of a scoundrel; his actions cannot but show his character. That is his prerogative, flowing from the freedom of will that nature allotted to man. The decisions of an honest man will of necessity be honest and will prove the honesty of his character. If freedom of will means that the decision of the one or the other—granted their characters are as they are—might be different from what it is, this would indeed be a reversion of the order of nature, it would be an annihilation of the law of cause and effect, and it would make ethics impossible, —not only science in general, but among the sciences the science of the moral *ought* also.

We reject any conception of the freedom of will which implies the nonsensical statement that a man could will one thing and the contrary of that thing at the same time. Certainly a man can *wish* two things of which the one excludes the other; but he can *will* the one only. So long as he wishes to do at the same time two contradictory things, he will do neither the one nor the other, and unless the motive of the one is stronger than the other, he will be like Buridan's donkey, who starves between the two bundles of hay.

Will is the decision to let some of our wishes pass into act. The decision of a fully conscious and responsible man is the end and outcome of a deliberation. It is the plan of action sanctioned by the verdict of a consensus of the principles, the wishes, and the hopes—in one word, of all the ideas of a man. The decision is arrived at by a struggle of the conflicting wishes and it is natural that the strongest wish will of necessity gain the upper hand.

Let us for instance imagine, that a young man is led into temptation. An occasion offers itself to commit a defalcation. The hope of gain is the motive to commit a wrong; there is the chance of not being discovered; the stronger that chance is, the more will it strengthen the motive of the deed. On the other hand, there is the remembrance of the eighth commandment "Thou shalt not steal." There is the shame of becoming a thief, and then perhaps the exhortations of mother and father are remembered. Their shadows may be too dim and their voices may be too faint. Perhaps they grow clearer and stronger, the more the unhappy youth hesitates; they at last eclipse all other motives and he exclaims "Never! I shall never disgrace the name of my family; I shall keep holy the remembrance of father and mother, and remain as honest as were my parents."

The decision of a deliberation will always turn out as it does, with necessity. The decision, however, does not depend on the circumstances of the surrounding world alone, not solely on conditions outside of us, but also and chiefly on our character, on the conditions inside of us. If our moral principles, if the remembrances of dear parents and instructors are strong in a man, if he is clear minded and far-sighted enough to see the evil consequences that, perhaps not at once

but after a while, will be sure to fall upon him, he will not be in danger of falling an easy prey to every temptation. And it is for this reason that an ethical instruction of the young is necessary, that we build churches and have preachers to tell us again and again, how necessary is the moral ought. Noble ideals and virtuous principles must be implanted into the minds of men. They must become parts of their souls and truly the dominant parts, so that they will never be overruled in temptation by evil motives and low desires.

Could we preach morals, if after all an honest man might will the contrary of what he wills, if his decision did not result from his character with necessity, but might perchance be different from what it is? Or again, would it be worth while to trouble about preaching morals, if a bad character, into whose soul never entered any idea of obeying another command than the impulses of egotism, might after all act right as if he were a good and honest and well conducted man?

The *ought* of ethics would have no sense, if there were no *must* in the course of nature, such as science can prove. The *must* in natural events and in history is not such as is taught by Fatalism, that man is unable to change its course. The fates of individuals and of nations do not depend upon the circumstances of environment only. The most important factor of our personal development and of the future of a nation lies within—within the minds and the hearts of people. *Jeder ist seines Glückes Schmied*, ("Every one forges his own fate,") says a German proverb, almost too trite to be quoted. And yet it is so very true! The result of our development depends not only upon the circumstances under which we are born and live, but necessarily and naturally also, and chiefly, upon the manner in which we use these circumstances.

Therefore it is not true—although it is often contended—that science when recognizing the necessity with which decisions of the will take place, destroys the responsibility of man. What is responsibility but the consciousness that a man has to bear the consequences of his actions, be it for good or for evil? The experience of common sense teaches and science proves that every action always has definite consequences, which upon the whole can be calculated and ascertained before the execution of the action; and the person who does an action must accordingly be looked upon as the author not only of the action, but also of the consequences contingent upon that action.

A man in whose mind this idea is always present, i. e., a man who feels himself responsible for his actions, has a great advantage over persons in whom it is lacking. Those in whom it is lacking are, properly speaking, not men; they are children. They are liable to commit indeliberate actions which must in the end lead them into trouble; and if their own misfortunes do not educate them to become responsible men, they will ultimately go to the wall.

A man in whose soul the idea that he is responsible for his actions is a controlling power, is called a character. In whatever he does he will prove a consistency with himself and will never have occasion for regret. This idea so long as it is present in his mind, will exercise in difficulties a decisive, and in temptations a wholesome, influence upon all his decisions. P. C.

THE AUTO-PLASTIC SYNTHESIS OF THE UNIVERSE.

"We receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live;
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud."
—COLERIDGE.

ALTHOUGH the principles of Hylo-Idealism, or self-deification, which centre and end all in the Alpha and Omega of Self, are necessarily opposed to those of THE OPEN COURT, which aspire to harmonize Religion and Science, as making divine or any other worship but that of Self-worship, *impossible*; I trust the love of fair play, the interest of truth and progress and the vital importance, if only to ourselves, of hearing both sides of the grand problem, will induce the Editor to make room for a short synopsis of my arguments which introduces us to a new world entirely, in which Reason and Science receive their just award.

My great difficulty is to state clearly a thesis which is virtually self-evident—so simple, indeed, as to be intelligent to the least cultured mind. Indeed, as said of the Scriptures, I may say of this theory of mind and matter, that "*virginibus puerisque canto*." It is really a theme for "babes and sucklings," and has been, by vulgar realists, termed *Hylo-Idiocy*. Its gist, at bottom, is to reduce all objects to subjects, things to thoughts and to identify thought with cerebration, i. e., with cerebral function. So that Materialism is substantiated, while at the same time Matter is exalted to the level pure Idealists conceive of what they are pleased to designate as "Spirit," which on the data of relative (or Hylo-) Idealism, based as it is on exact Positive Science, is resolved into the corporeal function of the Encephalic Vesiculo-Neurine, or grey cells of the Cerebrum. All "things" thus disappear, including Space and Time, by resolution into individual states of self-consciousness. So that we are compelled to include "everything" in Heaven and Earth, within the ring-fence of the Ego, and to say of Egoism "*I am the Universe*," and its Creator as well. In other words, "*Quisque faber est sui mundi*."

In making these lofty claims of Mon-archy for each individual sentient being, beast or man,—their arrogance, which by scientists especially, has been stigmatized as grandiose and impious insanity,—I may mention that these recalcitrant gentry reckon without their host. For my position is founded inexorably, as humbly, on the relative, phenomenal and non-ætiological hypothesis—a hypothesis which, for ages past, has been the standpoint both of the Metaphysist and Physicist. To first causes, or indeed any true or ultimate causes whatsoever, man has no faculties to reach. Such are too high for him, he cannot attain to them. Higher than himself,—the creator of thought,—thought cannot soar. The kingdom of Earth, as of Heaven, is *within* him, or in other words self-consciousness—the product of Egoity—is his *summa scientiæ*.* He has been named the "Cause-seeking animal." But it is quite a misnomer, and until he learns to clip his wings, and confine himself within the relational sphere—proscribing the "Absolute" as quite *ultra vires*, he must ever remain the

* It will be seen that the "Spiritual" view is the arrogant one and the hylic the humble one.

mischievous Vermin Bacon labels him, or, as Goethe puts it in the Prologue in Heaven of Faust, "the beastliest of beasts," or as Mother Church has it, "a miserable sinner."

It will be seen that my principle is that of Bishop Berkeley, rationalized by the canons of all the positive sciences from Astronomy to General Anatomy (Histology), of which only the former, and that in the imperfect Newtonian form, existed in his day. And yet of him Byron says, "What a sublime discovery 'tis to make, The Universe universal Egoism." The concept is simple as it is sublime, only we must eliminate the rash and vicious *occultism* of an "Absolute," incomprehensible First Cause and stoop, or rise, to Selfism, pure and simple, beyond which, in the legitimate relative plane of ideas, all, if aught there be, is *naught*. Induction must supersede Deduction. I think the above is clear. It is nothing else than Kant's negation of "*Ding an S ch*"—a formula thoroughly worked out by Scotch Metaphysics (so odious to Dr. Johnson, George III, and the whole Philistine world) and especially by Dr. Thomas Brown in his work on "Cause and Effect," in 1804, the year of Kant's death. Let me, in this connection, refer to my treatise "Humanism *v.* Theism," which I recently forwarded to Chicago, and to the luminous exegetical essay, which precedes my portion of the tract, by the late brilliant, poetic, and scientific genius, Constance Naden,—too soon, alas! lost to the cause of Truth, in all her aspects,—entitled: "Hylo-Idealism, the Creed of the coming day."

It will be seen from the foregoing sketch that one of my aims, which lies close to my heart, is to dethrone all Godheads, hitherto adored by vain, perverse, and blind humanity, and to install Self on the cosmical throne. Of old such was a task for Prometheus and Titans, in which indeed they miserably failed. But we stand on a vantage ground and are able to bring to bear on our objectives, armaments undreamt of in earlier ages. Just as modern ordnance would crumble into dust, mediæval fortalices impregnable in their own day.

I have much more, social, political, and ethical *in petto*, of which, on this occasion, I shall be silent. But the head and front of my thesis is to root out the religious instinct, as a foe to human welfare and progress, quite in the spirit of Epicurus, Lucretius, Euhemerus, Seneca, Buddha, Confucius, Shelley, etc., on the ground, (which these august thinkers only adumbrated) of the *impossibility* of predicating any other Divinity than our own Egoity—a view ratified by all modern and evolutionary science, and by common sense, which is Science *in excelsis*, or *vice versa*.* Only Common Sense must be scientifically excogitated and held. It is impotent as our guide or pilot for a rational life, when only empirically and semi-consciously foreshadowed. Speculation must be, in our 19th century, superseded by assured Demonstration; Until man is Godless, he can never be master of himself.

LONDON, January, 1890. R. LEWINS, M. D.

[Hylo-idealism, it seems to me, is not "necessarily opposed" to the views of THE OPEN COURT. On the contrary, it appears to be in many respects a kindred philosophy—an attempt to construct a unitary conception of the world. That THE OPEN COURT has not as yet more fully considered the philosophy of Dr. Lewins—with the exception of occasional mention of it in notes—is due to the fact that my work has had to be, and is still, concentrated in other directions.

The point of difference between our views seems to be founded upon a difference of terminology. I do not as yet understand the usage of the terms "self" and "ego" in Hylo-Idealism; and thus I cannot form an opinion about the proposition "to root out the religious instinct" and to deify our own egoity. If I might be allowed to state the proposition in my own terms, it may mean, to root out superstition and to ennoble and elevate human personality. Publications of Dr. Lewins, and essays discussing his philosophy, are in our hands, and we hope to be able, later, to examine his theories more carefully. P. C.]

* Professor F. Max Müller assures one that these scientific formulæ are quite on the lines of pre-historic Vedantism. In his "Science of Thought" he insists that I have quite made out my point that "thing" is only "think." And on that postulate my *whole* position hinges.

CONSTANCE C. W. NADEN.

IN MEMORIAM.

IN the death of Miss Constance C. W. Naden, which took place at her residence, 114 Park Street, London, on December 23rd, the world of Society, Literature, and Philosophy has sustained a great loss. In the varied fields of Philosophy, Science, and Poetry she has made her mark. It is as the Authoress of 'Songs and Sonnets of Springtime,' and 'A Modern Apostle,' [London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co.] that Miss Naden is perhaps most widely known. Nor was her growing poetic fame undeserved. Mr. Gladstone in a discursive paper,—which appears in a late issue of "The Speaker,"*—on "The Poetry of the XIX. Century,' enumerates only eight English Poetesses as worthy of being ranked as real Poets, among whom Miss Naden figures as the latest. He ranks Mrs. B. Browning as the earliest and denies the title of "Poet" to George Eliot, to Mrs. Hemans, Joanna Baillie, and indeed to all prior to Mrs. Browning.

In the field of Science her mastery was no less assured, as her distinguished career at Mason Science College, Birmingham, sufficiently indicates; Dr. Lewins, who in many respects may be termed her philosophic Mentor, intends to perpetuate her memory by founding an Annual Gold Medal, and by placing her marble bust in the Library of the College.

It was, however, in the serene atmosphere of abstract thought, so little appreciated in contemporary Britain that her brightest triumphs were won, and her surpassing powers most fully revealed. Her brilliant historical and critical essay on 'Induction and Deduction,' which gained the Heslop Gold Medal at Mason College, is, we believe, to be published shortly, together with her memoir and collected literary remains. This expected volume, on its appearance, will only too sadly reveal what might have been forthcoming had the possessor of so many and varied talents remained with us. Any sample of her work is necessarily fragmentary; her young life was a rounded one, in itself a supremely beautiful epos. To those who were privileged to enjoy her personal acquaintance the loss is irreparable. To them it is that the full beauty of her brief life only now comes home,

> "Apparelled in more precious habit
> More moving-delicate and full of life
> Into the eye and prospect of the soul,
> Than when she lived indeed—."

A sheet of note-paper covered with her clear, statuesque handwriting lies before us. We had queried her presentation of some Hylo-Idealistic refinement. She explains that the difficulty in question arose in her mind at a time when—her acceptance of Dr. Lewins's Autoplastic Theory of Things being less complete than it subsequently became—she had been puzzled by the apparent contradiction involved in the persistence of individuality taken in connection with the perpetual material flux. But she adds, brightly,—referring to her more matured philosophic faith, which made everything 'clear from East to West,'—"Needless to say that that point does not trouble me now!" During the last few weeks, ever since we read the notice of her death in a Birmingham newspaper, these words have haunted us with a new meaning read into them—"That does not trouble her *now!*"

G. M. McC.

* Vol. I, No. 2, 11th Jan. 1890.

BOOK REVIEWS.

ASOLANDO. Fancies and Facts. By *Robert Browning*. Author's Edition. Boston and New York; Houghton, Mifflin, & Company.

This collection of verses, dedicated to Mrs. Arthur Bronson, was given to the world at Asolo, in October last. It derives its title from *Asolare*, 'to disport in the open air, to amuse one's self at random.' The typography and binding are simple and tasteful. The verses, of which there are many species and varieties, are true products of Mr. Browning's art—abounding in contrasts and unexpected effects. We quote entire "The Epilogue."

"At the midnight in the silence of the sleep-time,
When you set your fancies free,
Will they pass to where—by death, fools think, imprisoned—
Low he lies who once so loved you, whom you loved so,—pity me?

"Oh to love so, be so loved, yet so mistaken!
What had I on earth to do
With the slothful, with the mawkish, the unmanly?
Like the aimless, helpless, hopeless, did I drivel—being—who?

"One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better, sleep to wake.

"No, at noonday in the hustle of man's work-time
Greet the unseen with a cheer!
Bid him forward, breast and back as either should be,
'Strive and thrive!' cry 'Speed,—fight on, fare ever there as here!'"

M. C. Comte Goblet d' Alviella writes, in the December *Revue de Belgique*, an exhaustive, learned, and instructive article upon "Religion in Russia." (Brussels: C. Murquardt, *Librarie Européenne*.)

The February *Cosmopolitan* is an exemplary number of a magazine that is daily becoming more popular. "The Vienna Burg Theatre," "Horace Greeley," and "The Development of Trousers," are among the leading contributions of this month.

In *Himmel und Erde* (H. Paetel, Berlin), for January, Dr. L. de Ball writes upon Montigny's researches concerning the scintillation of stars. The same periodical contains an interestingly penned article by Dr. G. Hellmann upon the cut of the Elbe through the Saxon Switzerland.

The next volume of the series of '*Historic Towns*' edited by Mr. E. H. Freeman and Mr. Hunt, will be 'Winchester' by Mr. G. W. Kitchin, the Dean of Winchester, who declares that the place is the most historic of English cities. The book will be published immediately by the Longmans.

The Credibility of the Christian Religion is the title of a small pamphlet by Samuel Smith, M. P., (London, Cassell & Co.), "designed to meet in a popular form the Rationalistic objections to Christianity, now so common." It is our duty to affirm, from the evidence presented, that the pamphlet does not meet the objections of science and common sense to the supernatural phenomena upon which, as Mr. Smith contends, the credibility of Christianity is based.

We have received from the Scovill and Adams Company of New York, *The American Annual of Photography and Photographic Times Almanac for* 1890, edited by C. W. Canfield, a neat paper-bound volume of three hundred and thirty-seven pages. The book is an invaluable aid to workers in the photographic arts; the technical literature of the profession is represented in every phase; and the illustrations, among which we call especial attention to "Babyhood," "Minnehaha Falls in Winter," and "Southern Fruit," are truly superb productions.

The Transatlantic, a fortnightly review of European life and letters, published in Boston, has reached, with February 7, its eighth number. It is the aim of the magazine "to make easily accessible to the people of this Continent the best fruits of the thought and literature of the other and to inform them of the other's progress in art, society, and life." We find much attractive matter in the columns of *The Transatlantic*. It presents a pleasing variety of selections from the various departments of *belles lettres* and arts. Its musical pages, wherein are reprinted the words and music of noteworthy compositions, are a charming and distinctive feature. (Annual subscription, $2.00; Single copies, 10 cents. P. O. Box 210, Boston.)

Unquestionably the most excellent of the eclectic magazines that of late years have appeared, both in the vastness of its range of selection and the discrimination employed in the task it has undertaken, is *Current Literature*, a monthly publication of New York (30 W. 23d St.). It is obtainable for the extremely low price of $3.00 a year, and comprises some seventy-nine large quarto pages of material derived from the extensive field of contemporaneous English literature. A notable feature of *Current Literature*,—lacking in other similar periodicals,—is the instructive comment and literary chat of the editorial departments. We remark, too, the logical and systematical character of the method of selection practiced. The appended indices of notable books, magazine-articles, etc., much enhance its value. As a repertory of the best products of contemporary literary thought, we recommend it to our readers.

NOTES.

Mr. Victor E. Lennstrand, the Editor of the *Fritänkaren*, of Stockholm, a Swedish journal of Freethought, is in prison still, and we are informed that his incarceration is a punishment for publishing certain "heresies." The Christian authorities in Sweden seem to pursue a strange method of conversion,—one which should have long since disappeared among civilized nations. Mr. Lennstrand finds much support in England, Germany, and America; and the orthodox persecutors of liberal thought will soon find out that persecution is the best means to promote the cause of their adversaries.

Mr. Paul R. Shipman, referring in our present number to a problem presented by a correspondent of the New York *Sun*, calls attention to a lexical error committed by the literary editor of that journal. Mr. Shipman fully recognizes the ability with which the censorial functions of the *Sun* are discharged. But, in the cause of justice, it should be added, that, to the imperishable credit of that great newspaper, it rarely makes an error that it has not the frankness to confess and, for the benefit of its readers, publicly to discuss. Few newspapers care so much for "the purity of our mother tongue," and we wonder the rather that amid the difficulties under which it is daily compiled, its transgressions are so few.

The Inaugural Address of President Charles Kendall Adams, of Cornell University, delivered at the opening session of the American Historical Association, in Washington, and reprinted in the February *Magazine of American History*, is a noticeable review of the historical work accomplished in the present century in the United States, Germany, France, England, Italy, and the other countries of Europe. It is, we admit, a lamentable fact that historical instruction in our American Universities is so hampered. But, given the obstacles to special work that our present system of sciolistic University education present, and what does it avail that the methods of the German Seminary and the *Ecole des Chartres* are introduced? The American University is essentially an under-graduate University, and in its present form, with one or two notable exceptions, it is unfitted even collaterally for the so-called 'graduate' work. It is doubtful if the movement of reform can ever lead to good results if it is merely to be—in President Adams's own words—a new graft upon the old stock.

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THE MOTE AND THE BEAM.

The duty of the church and of all religious congregations is to preach morals. Religion should be man's guiding star through life. Religion, therefore, must give in great and plain outlines a conception of the world in which we live, and teach us how to regulate our conduct in agreement with the facts of life, for the benefit of ourselves and our family, our nation and humanity. If the church ceases to preach morals, or if it preaches wrong morals, its influence becomes injurious to the members of its congregation and dangerous to society.

As a matter of fact we must acknowledge that the churches have done much in preaching morals; they have accomplished great things in preserving communities and making our men and women strong in enduring the tribulations of life and resisting its many allurements. Let us take one example only which brings home to us the wholesome influence of religion. Let us read a description of the Puritans as they are characterized by an impartial historian:

"The Puritan was made up of two different men, the one all penitence, gratitude, passion; the other proud, calm, inflexible. He prostrated himself in the dust before his Maker. But he set his foot on the neck of his king. In his devotional retirement, he prayed with convulsions, and groans, and tears. He was half maddened by glorious or terrible illusions. When he took his seat in the council, or girt on his sword for war, these tempestuous workings of the soul had left no perceptible trace behind them. But those had little reason to laugh who encountered him in the hall of debate or in the field of battle. These fanatics brought to civil and military affairs a coolness of judgment and an immutability of purpose which some writers have thought inconsistent with their religious zeal, but which were in fact the necessary effects of it. The intensity of their feelings on one subject made them tranquil on every other. One overpowering sentiment had subjected to itself pity and hatred, ambition and fear. Death had lost its terrors and pleasure its charms. Enthusiasm had made them stoics, had cleared their mind from every passion and prejudice, and raised them above the influence of danger and corruption."

The virtues of the Puritans, it cannot be disputed, preserved them in the calamities that had been visited upon them in their old country; they pointed out to them the way to their new home, and when they arrived in the Mayflower on the shores of the new world, it was these virtues again that made their enterprise successful. Many of the pilgrims died of cold and hunger; yet the little colony of emigrants did not despair, and finally they triumphed in spite of every adversity. The virtues which preserved them, which were the cause of their final success, what were they but religious?

Compare the history of the pilgrims to the fate of those noblemen who landed in Virginia under Captain Newport in 1607. Why was their enterprise a failure? Because they lacked the energy and endurance, the patience and self-possession of the Puritans. They had no religion to teach them these virtues, and they came over in the hope of becoming rich without work. They expected pleasures and found innumerable hardships. They sought happiness and were soon confronted with dangers and disasters which they had neither the courage nor the strength to resist or to overcome.

Why is it that among all the colonies planted on our shores the most flourishing were those founded by religious exiles?

Religion is a great power, and the religious instinct will do great work, be it for good or for evil. We know that the churches made mistakes; we know that, through persecution, they induced people to commit most heinous crimes, that they opposed, and oppose still, the progress of science. And since they suffer our conception of the world and life to become distorted, their moral preaching is in danger of leading astray. We object to their oppression and protest against the fetters with which they shackle our minds and endeavor to tie us down to certain traditional errors which they regard with reverence.

The most violent assailants of the churches are certain freethinkers who declare that all religion is superstition and that religion must be killed like a wild beast, a turbulent hyena; we must rid ourselves of religion as if it were obnoxious vermin or a lingering disease. These freethinkers, as a rule, look upon clergymen as imposters and hypocrites and are in their turn by faithful believers regarded in a similar and not a

more favorable light. Most of these freethinkers are as honest as their adversaries, yet, like them, they are one-sided. They step forth and say to the people: "Why do you allow yourself to be imposed upon by religion? Religion is an invention of kings and priests to keep the masses of the people in subjection. Religion is a humbug and the rules prescribed by religion need not be followed. Live as you please and take out of life whatever pleasures you can get. That is the sum and extract of all philosophy."

The narrow orthodoxy of the churches is the mote in the eye of our clergy. How many of our ministers feel in duty bound to impress the dogmas of their sect upon their congregation and forget the main duty upon which all their work should abut, viz., to preach morals, to make of the souls that are entrusted to their care, characters strong enough to face the adversities of life, to endure troubles, and to resist the dangers of temptation. Clergymen generally forget that the most important moral rule is the love of truth, and truth must be judged by scientific evidence, not by its agreement with, or disagreement from, the tenets of their creed.

Such is the mote in the eye of the church. But the beam in the eye of destructive freethinkers is their unqualified contempt of religion. They have become blind to the importance of morality, and the preaching of morality. Not as if they were immoral themselves, or intended to spread immorality among our people, which as they well know would lead us into speedy ruin; but because the beam in their eye,—their contempt of all religion,—has made them blind to the fact that their own morality is a treasure inherited from their religious forefathers, a treasure that will soon be wasted in the coming generations of their irreligious descendants.

Churches have faults, and some of their faults are most grievous. Their dogmas are untenable unless a free interpretation be used. Yet their ethics, although wrong in some points, is upon the whole right. It is the ethics of the churches that kept them alive. It is the virtues of religious citizens that make colonies and nations thrive. Iconoclasts are right when protesting against the faults of the churches, against the false pretensions of religious authorities. But they are wrong when they attempt to destroy the institutions created for, and devoted to, the purpose of preaching morals.

The creed of the pilgrims was wrong in many respects; yet it was right in so far as it made of simple-minded men heroes, who could become the fathers of a great nation of liberty. The fathers were in their way freethinkers also; but they were constructive freethinkers, not destructive. They found some flaws in the religion that was taught them; yet they did not therefore throw away the whole ideal of religious life. They effaced the flaw as well as they understood to do, and preserved their ideals.

Life is a school. All of us are given a work to do. Among the scholars in the school of life, there are two: the orthodox believer and the agnostic nonbeliever. The one is plodding quietly along and tries to solve the problem given him; yet he makes mistakes. The other does not try to solve the problem, he thinks that the problem is insolvable, and seeing some blunders in the lesson of his schoolmate, attempts to erase the latter's work entirely. It is well that the agnostic should call attention to the errors of the orthodox, but the attempt to cast away that which is true and good in religion together with its errors cannot be recommended. There is a mote in the eye of the one, and the other, presuming to be the corrector and leader of his comrade, is not aware of the beam in his own eye.

Liberalism will never succeed in conquering the orthodoxy of the churches unless it offers something better than the ethics of ecclesiasticism. Liberalism must teach us morals, and its morals must be better than those of the church, its sermons must be based upon scientific truth, and must apply to the practical issues of life. Liberalism should be positive and constructive, not negative and destructive. It is true that it was necessary to destroy the old errors, but now we have done with tearing down and we intend to use the empty space to build upon it greater and nobler ideals.

Let liberalism be more than hostility toward antiquated traditions; let it cease to preach hatred of religion; and liberalism will rise in its grandeur to be the religion of mankind.

A DRAGON HUNT IN THE RIVIERA.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

II.

At Agra, in India, I paid in cowrie shells about a penny to see a much larger crocodile,—alive,—which two naked Hindoos had managed to drag out of the water and bind. They did not ask to be made patron-saints of England and Russia for their feat, like St. George, but were content to make their dragon earn them a few pennies. Soon after I met an orientalist of the same race who was utilizing the mythical monsters slain by mythical gods,—as Ahi by Indra,— in a higher way. He was converting them into solar myths. John Morley has announced that an era has arrived in which dogmas are no longer to be answered but explained. These fabulous and defunct dragons and dragon-slayers of Europe are now being rehabilitated by the Science of Comparative Mythology for purposes of explanation.

From Cimies I drove for some hours about the beautiful heights. On every side were olive trees,

myrtle, palms, and orange and lemon groves laden with golden fruit. I remembered that Goethe spoke of the Alps as, for the young Germans of his day, silver-fretted pillars of a portal between them and Paradise, which they longed to open. I recalled his Mignon's dream of the fair land from which she was stolen in childhood:

> "Know'st thou the land where the citron blooms,
> And the orange lights up the leafy glooms?
> A gentle wind from deep blue heaven blows
> The myrtle thick, and high the laurel grows."

All this I was enjoying, on a day balmy as summer, while beyond our sheltering Alps Europe was shivering under the icy breath of the winter dragon. I looked over a bay of the deep blue Mediterranean, and saw the jutting cliffs near Monte Carlo,—once called Pillars of Hercules. For there, according to classic tradition, Hercules slew the monster Geryon, and opened a passage through the Alps into this fair region of the Riviera. I felt a sure conviction that to the northern and eastern tribes this garden spot of Europe through which I was driving,—where the dragon of winter is subdued by sunbeam arrows,—was the wondrous garden of Hesperides. The long coil of the Alps was the dragon which guarded them. There were fables of how the dragon was slain, and how Geryon was slain; but the only spears which really went through his Alpine heart were those which tunnelled Mont Cenis, and cut the railway to Italy. The mountainous dragon was thereby not destroyed, it was changed into an agatho-demon. Its career as an obstructor ended, it remains as a protector; for did not its mighty back and coil shelter this Riviera from the north wind no more could its perpetual summer reign or the golden Hesperian apples flourish.

In fabled combats of gods, demigods, heroes, saints, with dragons, is dramatically recorded the religious development of our race. Indra was said to have slain the monster demons Ahi and Veitra; but the drought and famine represented by these monsters were not destroyed; they continued,—and faith in Indra faded. Then came the human god Rama, who was said to have slain ten-headed Ravanna, prince of demons. But many-headed and many-armed Evil continued its dire work in the world, and faith in Rama faded. Ravanna, clearly, was not dead at all. Then from the old Aryan dualism branched out the religion of Zoroaster, who believed that the combat was between equally powerful principles of Good and Evil,—which his followers gradually personified as Ormuzd and Ahriman. (I say, "his followers"; for Zoroaster never personified the Evil principle.) Orthodox Parsaism believes that the conflict is a drawn battle,—the Good Mind and the Evil Mind reigning alternately, 6,000 years each. (I say "orthodox Parsaism"; for under western influence the Parsîs tend to the doctrine of Universalism.) But there was another Aryan development,—Buddhism. Buddha was believed to have prevailed over the Nagas (serpents), and over the king of demons, Mara, by no other weapon than his sanctity. They were converted like the Cimies dragon, but did not expire; they lived to further Buddha's religion. The continuation of Evil, after the conversion of Mara and the Nagas, is explained by his doctrine of Pessimism. According to Buddha, Evil is the essential nature of things; wicked personalities are not authors of evil but its victims. The only way of escape from evil is escape from existence. That is Nirvana.

Mediæval Christianity combined Parsaism and Buddhism in its philosophy. As Ormuzd could not slay Ahriman, so Jehovah could not slay Satan. By a sort of contract Satan must be conceded his share of dominion in the universe. As evil was thus perpetual and eternal, Christianity agreed with Buddhism that the only way of escape from it was escape from existence. But it varied Buddhism by its doctrine of a happier future existence not liable to evil. Under this belief so many pious people committed suicide, in order to enjoy heaven, that the Church had to fix a ban against self-slaughter. The Buddhist was not tempted to suicide because that could not free him from existence. He might go to a worse situation.

The mantle of the Oriental and Greek dragon-slayers,—Indra, Rama, Hercules, Apollo,—fell on the shoulders of Christian saints. They were said to be able to exterminate serpents, subdue dragons, cast out devils; but they were not committed to the task of destroying the mother-principle of Evil altogether. That has been left to the heretical and secular religion of our own age. The new religion of our time does not admit that the combat with evil has no aim beyond the destruction of a particular dragon here and there, leaving the general evil to work on; nor does it admit that the only escape from it is by passing to a better world. There is no evidence, it holds, of any better world than this. The faith of our time has set itself to the task of exterminating evil from this world, and exterminating it altogether.

The method by which the new religion deals with the dragon,—that is the not-yet-humanized part of nature,—is the method of Buddha, and that of St. Victor. Indra's weapon against monsters was the hurled disk, Hercules used a club, Apollo his arrow. The sanctity of Buddha and of the saints of France, to which the fabulous dragons surrendered, prophesies the method by which civilization and science exterminate evil. It is not by revolution but by evolution that we can hope to prevail.

I am finishing this paper, begun in the Riviera, at Rome. I find the people here crowding a theatre to

witness a magnificent spectacle called "Excelsior." In a succession of tableaux the struggles of Light and Darkness are displayed. The genius of Darkness tries to impede the experiments of Volta, but the genius of Light defends him ; and his lonely chamber is succeeded by the telegraph office, and wondrous displays of electric light. The first small steamboat is destroyed by ignorant workmen, but the triumphs of steam are shown. We witness the opening of Mont Cenis, of the Suez Canal, and many other great achievements. It is sufficiently picturesque to witness this latter day celebration of civilization in Rome,—the last citadel of Obscurantism in Europe. When the scheme of a railway to Rome was first proposed, rumor said that it had to encounter papal opposition. The fear was well founded. The genius of Light entered by the first train, and the dragon Superstition has been shrinking ever since. Like the crocodile at Cimies Superstition's teeth are here falling out, its claws are lost, and it is creeping daily toward its dark closet. This is the gentle victory of Light. The railway has done far more than the sword of Garibaldi. Even the miasmas are largely exterminated ; the Roman fever becomes rare. The new religion,—that is, the addition to Science of the humanity of Jesus,—is not yet developed equally with material civilization, but it is at work in the heart of civilization. It will surely prevail over every dragon,—destroying its infra-human part, but converting its strength to the service of mankind. Here is already a new Rome, promising to become grander than that of the Cæsars. These temples built by Superstition, of which a fanatical Protestantism would not leave one stone on another, will not be destroyed ; they are already museums of the antiquarian, studies for the scholar, haunts of the artist ; they will become the rich inheritance of the age of pure reason and of the human religion.

Rome, December, 1889.

ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS.*

BY DR. FRANZ STAUDINGER.

If the greatest possible pleasure of the individual is made the ultimate aim of morality, there are two points that cannot be established. First, I do not understand from what source *one* pleasure derives the power and right to control rational reflection and so to induce the latter to aid in suppressing some *other* pleasure. And, secondly, it remains an equally obscure problem, which pleasure is to be held out as the only true moral aim. What authorizes the moral teacher to make just the most enduring or highest pleasure an aim ? He is unable to tell me what shall be my most enduring pleasure. Like the opium-smoker I might find the most enduring delight in the intoxication of opium, which is said to prolong minutes to years ; and I might also, like the Berserkers of old, kill and destroy everything within my reach, and afterwards want to die. Yet no one could call me immoral, or maintain that I 'ought' not to seek pleasure of this kind. However, the common moral sense—which, in most cases, indeed, unconsciously follows true moral laws—never calls that person moral who seeks his own happiness, but often immoral, and for that very reason.

Matters assume a different aspect when, not the weal of the individual, but the common welfare is made the aim. In words, at least, we now may say : "Thou shalt seek after those conditions that according to thy conviction are most subservient to the interests of the common weal, and thou shalt postpone thine own interests and those of thy kindred thereto." Here, apparently, a behest is implied, and it seems self-evident, that we should obey the same. In reality, however, this is not at all self evident, and it cannot even be explained from the presumptions made. The doctrine in question suffers from two grievous and incurable defects. It neither can explain wherein such common weal consists, nor demonstrate by virtue of what, as an individual, I am bounden unto the same. The 'common weal,' in fact, is a notion so unclear and hazy, that nothing remains but an empty word when one attempts to analyze and explain it.

* * *

In every explanation, it is necessary, in conformity with universally recognized methods of analysis, to disembarrass the idea from which our explanation proceeds, of all accessory notions that tacitly assume the thing to be proved and latently include the answer sought. When, therefore, it is maintained, that the common weal is the basis of obligation of our moral action, a conception of common weal must be fixed upon that does not throughout assume and take for granted, moral conduct.

If we satisfy this requisite, there remains of the notion 'common welfare' nothing but the truism, that common welfare is a state in which all are well. A common welfare that consists in the unimpeded operation of a general political organization, has of course no existence. The social order, itself, feels neither happy nor unhappy, but the individual men within it ; and if all, individually, are determined to be happy, it is thought by many, that the land of Utopia is their only goal.

The 'common weal,' therefore,—if we take it absolutely and do not, by begging the question, construct it in advance upon the basis of morality,—is a wholly empty and unclear notion, which disappears at every

*Translated from the *Gesetze der Freiheit*, Band I, *Das Sittengesetz*. Darmstadt: L. Brill.

hand. It is like a lustrous, radiant bubble, which, on being cut open, emits nothing but air..

* * *

That it is impossible to establish morality from mere presumptions of feelings, the advocates of the happiness-theory early felt,—felt but did not understand. They remarked, that morality has not yet arisen when one simply follows the feelings by which at the time one is impelled. And hence they demanded the subordination of the feelings to some one of the universally valid aims postulated.

But now the question arises, What brings about, what effects, this subordination of one feeling to another feeling? Epicurus had early stated the ground. And although this philosopher, as, substantially, all the ancients did, regards solely and exclusively individual morality, yet even for that purpose he was in need of some other instrument than pure feelings. 'Rational reflection' it is that tells him that many a momentary pleasure is followed by lasting discomfort and pain to the individual, and *vice versa*. Reflection, therefore, rationally endeavors to determine the highest degree of permanent pleasure. And in the same manner, when not individual interest but the common weal is the aim of conduct, reflection must tell us what inclinations must be promoted or suppressed in order to attain this aim.

Reflection, accordingly, contains the imperative element that enjoins the sacrifice of one pleasure to another, or to the common weal. Now, it is often said, that one passion can only be dislodged by another still stronger passion. Yet, in the present case, it appears that even the happiness-theory must demand and presuppose, that in reflection, as such, there is implied a power that is able to suppress our momentary inclinations. Whether reflection can accomplish this result, or whether it is a representation of a greater pleasure that has the power to overcome an actual present desire, or whether reflection can call in other feelings by the aid of which it may conquer any transient impulse,—it is not our duty here to inquire. However the matter may be regarded, it must eventually be granted that reflection, i. e., the representation of an aim, is able to control the will, and to direct the actions otherwise than they would have been regulated through the impulse of momentary feelings. Whatever, therefore, the true aim of morality be, I am, in any given instance moral, only in so far as my reason is able to determine my will to the aim accepted.

By this implication, the happiness-theory prepared the way for its own overthrow. For the true ground of obligation of my conduct at all times, is to be found in the fact that rational reflection commands my inclination to be surrendered for the sake of the aim.

THE WASTE OF TIME IN CONGRESS.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

It may be conceded that no people are so ingenious as the Americans in adapting physical means to ends. Since the days of Tubal Cain there have not been such cunning artificers in brass and iron; in wood and leather; in silk, wool, cotton, and all material substances. They excel all other people in contrivances for saving time, labor, and money; but in the mechanism of legislation their genius fails. In the field of statesmanship they work, figuratively speaking, with a yoke of lazy cattle and a wooden plough. The Circumlocution Office, at the height of its pompous imbecility, never practiced with so much diligence as the American Congress, the methods of "how not to do it."

The members of the House of Representatives now in session at Washington, were elected in the month of November, 1888. In February, 1890, they had not yet agreed upon a code of rules. They had not even decided whether they were all properly elected or not, for the right of several rival claimants to seats in the house, has not been settled. A foreigner examining the form of our legislative system might pronounce it admirable, if we concealed from him the mode of its operation. We might show him an American watch of such artistic design and elegant workmanship as to extort his praise, until he found out that the wheels were contrived so as to stop the springs, and that the springs were intended to hinder the wheels from turning; that, in fact, by a clumsy artifice the checks and balances were so arranged that the watch must go too fast at one time, and too slow at another. Then he would pronounce it ornamental, contrary, and inefficient. This handsome and inconsistent watch is the model of our legislative system.

The intention of the Republic is that the legislature shall be close to the people and quickly responsive to the popular will. The means provided to carry out this intention have been ingeniously perverted so as to thwart the original design. Congress is elected biennially in November, and this election, in theory at least, is a message from the people commanding that certain measures of public policy be enacted quickly into laws; but the elected members do not meet for business until thirteen months after the election, although their term of office begins on the following 4th of March. By this arrangement more than a year is permitted to escape before the message from the people can be acted on at all. No other legislature in the world has ever adopted such a successful method of "how not to do it."

This hindering policy is the more astonishing because the American people never conduct their ordinary affairs on any such business principle. They would

send a man to the lunatic asylum if he should hire 400 men to work for him thirteen months ahead, and give them nine months holiday on full pay out of the thirteen; yet this is the way they hire their own political servants to work at law making. Our congress is the most expensive legislature in the world, and the most unwieldy. It works like a giant in bonds.

Are the people cheated by their hired statesmen? A member of congress is paid ten thousand dollars for two years service, but the actual sessions occupy only ten months of the two years, so that he is really paid at the rate of about a thousand dollars a month. This is good wages and it ought to secure good work. To be sure, the people never intended to pay him $1000, a month, they hire him at the rate of $5000, a year, but by the operation of "how not to do it," he manages to double his pay.

A legislative body so important as the United States House of Representatives, ought not to be left unorganized for nine months after its election. Such a legislature is a solecism in government; and the custom which permits it is fraught with mischief, if not with danger. It is fruitful of corruption, and the result of it is always a great deal of hasty and inconsiderate legislation. The national legislature should be organized at the very beginning of its term, and all disputed election cases ought to be settled at the earliest moment possible, so that the House, and all interested parties may know who the legally elected members are.

Under the present practice, a member legally elected may be kept out of his seat for many months, and perhaps until near the expiration of his term. Six years ago, a member from Iowa was kept wandering about the lobby for two years, waiting for the seat which was wrongfully kept from him by a man who was not elected at all. Not until the very last day of the term, on the 4th of March, a few minutes before that congress went out of existence, did the committee report upon his case and give him the seat which had been unjustly withheld from him. This wrong could hardly happen if congress should begin to work when it begins to charge for it.

There is a humorous side to this matter as there is to many other serious things. The honorable members having taken a nine months' rest before beginning work, fall to quarrelling as soon as they get together, and cover one another with reproaches for "wasting time." More time is spent in hurling these reproaches than in the work of legislation, yet they never complain of the "nine moons wasted" from March to December, when they did nothing at all, and paid themselves four thousand dollars each for doing it. The doctrine of "how not to do it" does not apply to the drawing of unearned salary.

The important work of congress is done in the closing hours of the session and then it is badly done. There is excitement and inspiration in beholding the industry and activity of a dying congress. A few hours before its dissolution, bills are passed with frightful velocity, while the President of the United States sits in a room at the capitol signing them as fast as the clerks can bring them in. He may be signing his own death warrant for anything he knows about it, as there is no time to read the bills, for congress will expire at noon. This wasteful hurry gives a consistent finish to the whole proceedings, in dignified harmony with our legislative policy.

Just about one minute to twelve o'clock on the 4th of March, the supernatural power of congress is manifested in a sublime and impressive way. An awe-stricken multitude watches an old magician, said to be clerk of the Senate, as he solemnly approaches the great clock and sets it back nine minutes. On the success of this legislative miracle are supposed to depend vast appropriation bills and other measures of critical importance to the people of the United States; greater interests than have affected any nation, since the prophet Isaiah turned back the shadow ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz. There seems to be a little comic irony in this puerile miracle to gain nine minutes at the end of the session, after deliberately wasting nine full months at the beginning of it, without the assistance of any miracle at all.

RELIGION BASED UPON FACTS.

A WELL known clergyman, famous for his indefatigable energy, and the comprehensiveness of his practical activity, who believed in a supernatural world of purely spiritual existence, and a scientist with materialistic tendencies who looked upon all religious aspirations as mere illusions, once had a discussion about facts. The scientist declared that science alone dealt with facts, the clergy did not see the real world, but dealt with things that were unreal. The clergyman answered rather sharply in about this way: "You scientists imagine that you have a monopoly of facts. You should know that I have to deal with facts just as much as you do. I have stood at the bed-side of the sick and dying, and my experiences concerning that which comforts them in the hour of death and tribulation are based upon observations of facts. Practical theology is in no less a degree based upon facts than the science of physical or chemical phenomena."

The clergyman was right in so far as the duties of his calling arose from the facts of life. A pastor should be the adviser, the fatherly friend, and comforter of his congregation in all the situations of life. Individuals are not isolated beings. Many of their actions, and indeed their whole demeanor, are of great concern

to the community, and the community protects itself against vicious individuals by law. The duty of the clergy is to impress upon their congregations the moral spirit of goodwill towards all mankind, to teach them to regulate their conduct so that in the hour of death no remorse will flit over their minds,—to teach them that when they lie down to eternal rest, their deeds, their love, their sympathy, and their thoughts will live on and bear witness to their having fought a noble battle in life. The more thoroughly the clergyman does his duty in a spirit of religious truth and moral aspiration, the less will we want the work of the state's-attorney and the judge.

It is to be hoped that our churches will imbibe more and more the positive spirit of the age, and so found their duties upon the facts of life. Whether they believe in a supernatural world of purely spiritual existence is, or should be, of secondary importance. Our churches, however, have so much mixed up the real and objective facts of life with their antiquated interpretations of these facts, that they believe the fictitious world of supernaturalism as described in their dogmas, to be a reality.

It is a fact that people need solace in the hour of death, it is a fact that matrimony is a holy ordinance, in which not only the couple that is united for life until death do them part, but the whole community is greatly concerned. It is a fact that the birth of a child imposes duties upon the parents; the child is not their property; it is entrusted to their care, and they have to rear it for the best of humanity. Godfathers or godmothers promise to take the place of parents, if death should call the latter away too early to fulfill their duties upon the child. From the naming of a child upon its entrance into the world, unto the burial of the dead, when we pay the last honors to our beloved ones, man's life is permeated with duties that point higher than the fulfillment of egotistic desires. Egotism finds its end in death; man's duties teach him to think beyond his own death. And it is the performance of these duties that is the substance of all religious commands.

Some imagine that science is limited to the lower orts of natural facts only. Religious and moral facts have been too little heeded by our scientists. Thus people came to think that science and religion move in wo different spheres. That is not so. The facts of our soul-life must be investigated and stated with scientific accuracy, and our clergy should be taught to purify religion with the criticism of scientific methods. They need not fear for their religious ideals. So far as they are true, and their moral kernel is true, they will not suffer in the crucible of science. Religion will not lose one iota of its grandeur, if it is based upon a scientific foundation; all that it will lose is the errors that are connected with religion; and the sooner they are lost the better for us.

One of my orthodox friends maintains that Christianity, that is to say orthodox Christianity, is based upon facts, and these facts, he says, are historical facts: they are the life and teachings, the suffering and the death, and above all the resurrection, of Jesus Christ.

If Christianity is based solely upon historical facts, it stands and falls with their truth. If Christian morals depend upon the occurrence of a few events that are supposed to have happened once and will never happen again, their fate is very problematic indeed.

The question is well worth a closer consideration.

Natural processes around us show a certain regularity combined with a certain irregularity. Every phenomenon that takes place has its individual features, and no one thing is exactly like another. A visitor from the city may imagine that every sheep in a herd of one breeding looks like the other; yet the shepherd knows them all individually, and can distinguish them apart. Grains of corn may appear to us all alike, yet they are not; every one has its own idiosyncrasy. But in spite of all difference, there is a universality of law in all things and in all natural phenomena. A closer acquaintance with the nature of the differences teaches that they result, and can only result, from a difference of condition. Yet it is the same law that governs all. Thus we arrive at the conclusion, that isolated facts cannot exist which stand in contradiction to the laws of all other facts. And it is a rule that science derives its laws—the so-called natural laws—from such facts alone as repeat themselves again and again, from such as can be verified by experiment, from such as are accessible to the observation of every one who takes the trouble to investigate. It need scarcely be added that the same rule holds good for positive philosophy. Single and isolated observations cannot give a solid basis for a conception of the world. The facts upon which a view of the universe rests must be ascertainable by every one who cares to be positive about their being as they are represented to be and not otherwise.

The rule is unequivocally acknowledged in science. It is accepted—by some with a certain reserve—in philosophy. Yet it is recognized in religion only by few. Although if it be true in science it must be true in religion also.

What is religion but a conception of the world, in accordance with which we regulate our conduct? If religion is based upon verifiable facts, it stands upon a rock. If it is based upon an assertion of facts that happened once and will never happen again, it is built upon sand; and when 'the rain descends, and the floods come, and the wind blows, and beat upon it,' the structure will fall.

Christ's doctrine in so far as it is the religion of love, stands upon the moral facts of human soul-life. The ethical truth of Christianity rests on solid ground. Christian dogmatism, however, stands or falls with the history of Christ's life, his death, and resurrection. Had not orthodox Christianity been supported by the great truth of Christ's religion of love, it long ago would have disappeared; for Christianity as an historical religion is indeed extremely weak. What must a religious truth be that has to depend upon the verification of a few historical facts? And these historical facts are in themselves improbable, nay, impossible; they stand in contradiction to all the facts verified by science, and whether they are true or not, have not the least bearing upon the moral conduct of man. Whether Christ healed a few lepers or not, whether he abstained from all food for forty days or not, whether he has bodily risen from the dead or not, the 'ought' of Ethics remains the same. If Christianity means the dogmatism of the Church, it is an historical religion which will disappear in the course of time; if it means the doctrine of Christ, the fulfillment of the law through love, it will be the religion of mankind. P. C.

ROADSIDE REVERIES.

BY A RECLUSE.

II.

THERE is a pretty house across the way from mine, which is an inspiration to look at. It is both old and new; but the renovation has been so artistically put on that it makes no seam or jar. Nothing better blended can well be imagined; and the landscape, too, accepts it all as if it were a product of nature, very much as the pyramids are said to be in Emerson's poem. The amateur architect who designed it is a poet; and, he has put touches in this structure which are true poetry, too. There are certain windows in the house which would make striking extracts for an architectural anthology. Work like this ought to delight the art-artisan society lately established in New York. 'Tis of the sort that

> "Gives to barrows, trays and pans
> Grace, and glimmer of romance."

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It is said that the best telescopes now have brought the moon—measuring distance by the power of natural vision—to within three hundred or four hundred miles of the earth. The result, so far, adds a striking confirmation to the generally accepted theory that this minor planet is a spent ball. Nothing resembling life in any form is discovered there. The bald mountains and yawning chasms make a scene of utter desolation. Undoubtedly life once was there, but it has expired in dust and *débris*; but, whether any history is written n them, we are not near enough to that planet to know. I have no doubt that, if we could get there, and be permitted to exist somehow, we should find that our mental problems would be still the same, and that two and two would be four, notwithstanding John Stuart Mill's conjecture of a possibly different mathematics somewhere.

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This new proximity of the moon opens a wide avenue for thought and speculation. Suppose now for one thing, that Mr. Edison's new or conceived invention for Far-Sight-Making should prove the success he thinks it will be, and we should some day be able to add that to the large telescope. We might then be as near the moon, visually, as the intending steamboat passenger is to the boat, when he puts his first step on the gangway plank. We should by this help be able to know one of the heavenly bodies pretty thoroughly; and what new secrets might there not be extorted from Sirius, and even from Aldebaran and Alcyone? It is evident that science has not reached the forward end of her rope yet, by a distance some part of which when traversed may even amaze the present generation.

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I have often thought how much the literary criticism one has to give, is affected by the passage through life. If I had been asked what poet I cared most for, when I was in my early teens, I should have named Byron without hesitation. A little later on I should have superseded him with Shelley, or have coupled Shelley with him. Still later Shakespeare would have risen in my horizon in that full-orbed grandeur which no lapse of time makes him lose. And only after all this evolution had been accomplished, was I able to see much in either Wordsworth's verse or Emerson's. It is a pleasant study to follow this growing and changing admiration, not only for poets but for authors of all sorts. When I was fifteen I read Carlyle's "Latter Day Pamphlets" as far as I could; but I made little out of them. It seemed as if the language I thought I was familiar with, was running mad. Some years after when I read Richter, and had studied German, I saw where the Carlylean style got the most of its origin—and, at that time, even the "Sartor Resartus" had become measurably lucid. This book is really a philosophical prose-poem.

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In commenting on this mental change and growth, it seems plain that our progress in life does for us what the earth's passage through its orbit does for the astronomer. It furnishes a parallax for the assistance of observation. We see things, as we go on, from a different view-point. I wonder if it is not owing to this one fact that the poem which Tennyson offered as a

continuation to, or a counterpart of, his early "Locksley Hall," encountered so great a variety of criticism. There were two distinct receptions for it. One party said it was a great downfall from the earlier inspiration, even considered as a poem, without any reference to its philosophy or to the doctrines of either production. Another group said it was fully equal to the first flight; and some members of the group thought it was far superior to the "Locksley Hall" we knew of old. Now if the parallax has made the mischief, or division of sentiment, how are we ever to know?

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For my part I think the later poem is not equal to the first, from the fact that there is no such reception of it by young readers as that which "Locksley Hall" everywhere inspired sixty years, and later, ago. It is the young reader who has the achromatic lens which will clear this dispute, somewhat. And I think it must be confessed that not only is the young reader right in not being highly moved; but it must be acknowledged that Tennyson, the octogenarian, is not precisely the poet that he was a half dozen decades ago. And there is really nothing strange, or condemnatory, in that conclusion.

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Some one has said that "the miller, like the poet, is a lazy man, setting his wheel in the stream." The miller harnesses nature to a practical purpose; but, taking the judgment of the mass, the poet is an idler pure and simple, one who loafs and takes his ease. But, has he really no purpose? There were millers in Shakespeare's time, and they no doubt served their day and generation well. But not one of them, except he owned a mill near which Shakespeare loitered, is now heard of. Another of this worthy craft has a shadowy fame, because he had a daughter who helped shape that beautiful early lyric of Tennyson's. So the relativity of miller and poet is not altogether disadvantageous to the latter, for each serves an indispensable function. Each, in his way, supplies the bread of life.

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In Emerson's poem the poet is coupled with the farmer. He works upon the same fields, though his implements are finer and not so noisy or so much in sight. "Every aster" in his hand, "goes home loaded with a thought." It is an aftermath which he secures, without impoverishment of the land, or an actionable trespass upon its owner. And so he can easily and triumphantly say:

> "One harvest from thy field,
> Homeward brought the oxen strong,—
> A second crop thine acres yield
> Which I gather in a song."

DESTRUCTIVE OR CONSTRUCTIVE?

IN ANSWER TO THE CRITICISMS OF ILLIBERAL LIBERALS.*

A CORRESPONDENT of the *Boston Investigator*, Mr. H. L. Green, perhaps the editor of the *Freethinkers' Magazine*, takes offense at a remark made in the article "The Liberal's Folly," which appeared in No. 123 of THE OPEN COURT. The passage that excited his indignation is as follows:

> "How insignificant is the mote in Mr. Gladstone's eye in comparison to the beam in Mr. Ingersoll's, in spite of his great attainments and enthusiastic sincerity."

We are glad that Colonel Ingersoll has friends who spring so readily to his rescue; but Mr. Green's letter is so personal an assault on the Proprietor and Editor of THE OPEN COURT that, as a defense, it is worse than a failure; it injures the cause in which it is written. If Colonel Ingersoll can be defended only by the abuse of his critic, his cause is very weak indeed. Colonel Ingersoll might well say, when reading Mr. Green's letter: "God protect me against my friends; against my enemies I will protect myself."

Does not the *Boston Investigator* proclaim the motto: "Hear all sides, then decide?" Have we no right to criticise prominent freethinkers? I believe that Mr. Ingersoll would most decidedly object to being considered as infallible; he would protest against the honor of being looked upon as the Pope of freethought.

It is a matter of experience that if in a discussion one of the disputants is unable to defend his position with good and logical reasons, he becomes personal and abuses his antagonist. A man without reason turns rude. We may always conclude that if a disputant becomes insulting, it is evidence that he is wrong. And surely it is a certain sign that he is in possession of no arguments. However, bitter words and scurrilous attacks will convince neither his adversaries nor any impartial reader.

Why is it that the "illiberal liberal" has become proverbial, and that so many honest thinkers are prejudiced against the liberal movement? It is simply because there are but few freethinkers who refrain from the use of wild and rampant speech. A cause that has truth to back it, need not be defended by acrimony and virulence.

Mr. Green charges THE OPEN COURT with "sailing under false colors," and concludes his letter:

> "We believe in the utmost liberty of expression, and dislike anything that looks like intolerance, but we despise hypocrisy, deception, and fraud, and abhor *false pretensions;* therefore, we protest against such a journal as this sailing under the banner of *Liberalism*, and soliciting subscriptions on the claim that it is a Liberal paper. Col. Robert G. Ingersoll has done more to liberate the human mind from ignorance, intolerance, and superstition, than this defamer of him would be able to do in a thousand years That paper, evidently, belongs in the Catholic Church!

Mr. Green says that the editor of THE OPEN COURT "knows as much about true liberalism as does the Pope." The question, "What is true liberalism" is of great importance and I wish Mr. Green would lay aside all malice and ill-will, and discuss matters patiently, *sine ire ac studio*. There are many liberals who look upon liberalism as a mere subversive theory; they propose to attack everything that exists, to tear down our institutions and destroy society, church, and state. The more destructive a man is, the more liberal he is supposed to be.

This liberalism is wrong. True liberalism is not negative and destructive, but positive and constructive. True liberalism is critical. As a matter of course, in so far as it is critical, it will be destructive. But it is the error only that is to be destroyed; and

* Two letters by the editor of THE OPEN COURT, published in the *Boston Investigator* and *Freethought*.

One of the editors of the *Cumberland Presbyterian Review* protests against certain propositions presented in editorial articles of THE OPEN COURT, declaring that "such a teaching contradicts all the facts of revelation." We hope that we shall soon find an occasion to analyze the expression "facts of revelation."

the destruction of error is the beginning of a new construction. If the new construction of better ideals did not follow the critical work, liberalism would be vain and its goal would be the desert of nihilism

Negative liberalism is the liberalism of a Robespierre, a Danton, a Marat; its liberty means terrorism, and free speech the license of invective. Positive liberalism is the liberalism of a Luther, a Bruno, a Kant, a Lessing, a Franklin, a Darwin, a Parker and Emerson, and the other heroes of freethought. Their liberty means a fearless investigation of truth and obedience to the laws of thought. Their principle is never to rail at or cry down an adversary, but to listen to his arguments and refute him with good and sufficient reasons. Constructive liberalism is the cause of all progress in the history of civilization, while destructive liberalism is, at best, a harbinger to prepare the way and make straight the paths of true liberalism.

Colonel Ingersoll certainly has many great excellences and has done much by his brilliant oratory and caustic sarcasm to open the eyes of people to the fact that the old orthodox conception has become untenable. But we regret that Colonel Ingersoll instead of being positive and constructive is negative and destructive What a power for good might he be,—more so than he is at present,—if he understood the true needs of the time!

* * *

The present number of THE OPEN COURT contains an article that will more fully explain the meaning of the mote in the eye of the orthodox and of the beam in the eye of the iconoclast.

Col. Ingersoll in his latest publication contributed to the *Truth Seeker*, says:

"All religious systems enslave the mind. "Certain things are demanded—certain things must be believed—certain things must be done—and the man who becomes the subject or servant of this superstition must give up all idea of individuality or hope of intellectual growth and progress."

The religion of THE OPEN COURT is in that respect not at all different from any one of the other religions. We maintain that "Certain things are demanded—certain things must be believed—certain things must be done." We do not think that this is a "superstition." He who does not want to *believe*, may investigate; and if he investigate, he may *know*. The religion of THE OPEN COURT is a religion based upon facts, it is a religion that is verifiable by science. Come and refute us, if we are wrong; but do not sneer.

Col. Ingersoll says that, certain things being demanded, religion enslaves the mind. Here we most emphatically dissent. A religion based on facts will make us free, provided we are obedient to the truth. It appears like a contradiction, but it is not. Obedience to truth alone liberates us from the bondage of ignorance. Be disobedient to truth and you must inevitably give up "all idea of individuality or hope of intellectual growth and progress."

The venerable President of the American Secular Union is a man who I suppose knows what true Liberalism means, he says:

"To be in harmony with the laws of the universe is man's chief good. This is what may be called Natural Religion. Let not the Freethinking reader be startled at this word 'religion.' I know that it has been perverted to such vile uses that one almost detests it. But nevertheless it is something real.

"Prof. Tyndall says: 'The facts of religious feeling are to me as certain as the facts of physics.' 'The world will have religion of some kind.' 'You who have escaped from these religions into the high and dry light of intellect may deride them, but in doing so you deride accidents of form merely, and fail to touch the immovable basis of the religious sentiment in the nature of man. To yield this sentiment reasonable satisfaction is the problem of problems at this hour.' Renan, also, writes thus: 'All the symbols which serve to give shape to the religious sentiment are imperfect, and their fate is, to be one after another rejected. But nothing is more remote from the truth than the dream of those who seek to imagine a perfected humanity without religion.'"

Let me quote another passage from one of our most radical freethinkers:

"What is religion? Religion simply embraces the duty of man to man. Religion is simply the science of human duty and the duty of man to man—that is what it is. It is the highest science of all."

This passage apears in one of Col. Ingersoll's former writings. Where is Col. Ingersoll the true freethinker? in the former passage where he denounces duty, or "things demanded" as enslaving the mind, or in the latter where he recognizes "the duty of man to man" as "the highest science of all"? The former passage may be more applauded by the illiberal liberals, but the latter passage shows the man whom we respect and admire for his love of truth and ideal aspirations to liberate mankind.

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Another liberal journal, *Freethought*, also publishes an editorial article directed against THE OPEN COURT.

The criticism of *Freethought* is a broadside of irrelevant questions, such as whether I ever was "intimately acquainted with the sons of any great number of clergymen?" and, if so, whether I "find them better than other boys?" I suppose that I am not expected to answer any questions which might lead me away from the points at issue. But let me state in answer to the question quoted, that I know of many sons of clergymen who distinguished themselves in some way or another. Col. Ingersoll is one of them, and although I have not the pleasure of his personal acquaintance, yet I know that he must have inherited from his father some great qualities, of which I mention his love of truth, his brilliant oratory, his rhetorical style and the enthusiastic zeal for his cause which, if it were used in the reversed direction, would undoubtedly be called "religious."

It is perhaps natural that THE OPEN COURT should find opposition in both quarters: among the orthodox as well as among those liberals who are merely destructive. We are in sympathy with both and recognize in both the honesty of their intentions and the good-will to serve humanity. We observe that they antagonize and often vilify each other, and we wish to conciliate both parties. We see that in the evolution of mankind both are necessary factors to build up our future ideals and we invite them to leave aside personal abuse, insinuations, and invectives, and to join in the work of constructive liberalism, which will bring good-will among men and peace upon earth.

I am willing to listen to any argument, and, if it be strong enough to convince me, I shall freely acknowledge it. I trust that fairness in debate and the sincere wish of a mutual understanding will help us to arrive at practical results by which the debaters as well as their readers can profit. P. C.

RECENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.

CORRESPONDENCE OF LUCIEN ARREAT.

MY DEAR SIR:—I had scarcely mailed my last letter, when a new work by M. Fouillée appeared, entitled *L'Avenir de la Métaphysique fondée sur L'Expérience** ("The Future of Metaphysics Based Upon Experience"). The title of the book is so striking, and the name of its author held in such high esteem, that our special attention is at once demanded.

It is perhaps not altogether a paradox to assert, that the greatest dispute of the hour among philosophers mainly turns upon the point whether such a thing as a philosophy really exists. In the meantime, however nobody seems inclined, on that account to desist from philosophizing after the methods he himself has fixed. But the question remains, will philosophy, or can philosophy, ever actually be metaphysics, without losing all positive character in the eyes of scientists? . . . . There is the rub.

M Fouillée answers in the affirmative, as opposed to M. de Roberty. According to the latter the new philosophy will be neither science nor art, neither metaphysics nor religion; it will

* Publisher: Félix Alcan, Paris.

be—what always in principle it has striven to be—"a conception of the universe, reached by a general analysis of the laws and functions of science, followed by their general, and purely deductive, synthesis." *General synthesis, deductive synthesis*,—I am not particularly fond of expressions of this sort. At all events, just M. de Roberty's own discussion of the *Unknowable* (the title of the book I mentioned in a former letter) might suffice to show, that, at least, there exists what I have elsewhere called a "philosophical function" of the mind; and the idea even that we form of a philosophy reduced to experimental psychology, or of a philosophy passing into a kind of experimental metaphysics, seems to argue, for the present, the existence of "philosophy" in much abundance.

The first formula would be approximately that of M. Ribot. The second is exactly M. Fouillée's thesis—a thesis by which he appears to have been haunted ever since his earliest philosophical ventures, about twenty years ago.

M. Fouillée conveys at times the impression that he has remained a Platonist. As an accredited writer to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, he is an offshoot from the old school that once ruled supreme in the Sorbonne,—yet withal a vigorous offshoot, which has struck its roots into a new and virgin soil; and this, doubtless, will satisfactorily explain why his book contains two almost antagonistic views.

M. Fouillée declares, substantially, that the first thing to be done is to overthrow the old metaphysics, "which, given a physical world and individual consciousnesses, pretends to deduce the same from abstract ideas, or from general names, such as Being, Idea, the Infinite, the Absolute"; he desires to replace it by another kind of metaphysics, "which can at all times be put into terms of experience." He invokes in his favor, "the constitutive necessity of the human mind to solve certain problems," and he defines it as "the reaction of the human brain in the face of the universe." But, as soon as he attempts more precisely to define the object thereof, he at one time understands it as the investigation of the profound connections existing between facts,—"forestalling the conclusions of the science of the future, by the aid of a more general hypothesis,"—and at another he leaves us to draw the conclusion that this metaphysics will be "an interpretation of the universe by all that is most fundamental within consciousness, and of consciousness itself by what there is most general in the universe"—in short, "a representation of the all."

Now, if I am not mistaken, metaphysics, in the former case, would simply become the play-ground of hypotheses more hazardous and less positive than those of the particular sciences, while in the latter it still remains the old metaphysics—a premature attempt at a universal explanation, the explanatory fact only being changed. I am aware that here the explicative fact would be the *force-idea*—a notion that many seem to have accepted, while, as I believe, very diversely interpreting the same. But, it is not yet time to discuss this point; we must wait until the publication of another forthcoming volume that M Fouillée has announced.

Shall I confess my candid opinion, at the risk even of offending several writers for whom I otherwise entertain the highest regard? In truth, I greatly fear lest all expository metaphysics, for a long time to come, be doomed to remain the science of facts that do not exist, or at best, the science of the things that are not known; and I contend, that it is the beginning of wisdom, in philosophy, to ignore deliberately a very great number of questions. From the point of view of method, there exist but two kinds of research—the kind that can, and the kind that cannot, lead to some definite issue. From the point of view of common sense there are but two kinds of philosophies—those that are understood, and those that are not.

I now beg to call your attention to two special works, that, properly, are not philosophical treatises, yet for various reasons have a bearing upon philosophy. They are: *Hérédité et Alcoolisme, Etude Psychologique et Clinique sur les Dégénérés Buveurs et les Familles d'Ivrognes*, ("Heredity and Alcoholism, a Psychological and Clinical Study upon Degenerate Drinkers, and the Families of Inebriates,") by Dr. Legrain*; and *Nouvel Exposé d'Economie Politique et de Physiologie Sociale*, ("A New Exposition of Political Economy and of Social Physiology,") by M. Adolphe Coste.†

M. Legrain is one of our young alienists. He belongs to the school of Dr. Magnan, the learned head-physician of the St. Anne Asylum, known for his solid and accurate works, and who in the lecture room every autumn gathers about his desk a very select body of workers. In the work of which we are speaking, M Legrain very thoroughly studies the relations between insanity and alcoholism. What pre-existing failing or defect produces the alcoholic inebriate; what special reaction toward alcohol is presented by a person more or less affected with insanity; how is this defect aggravated; and is insanity transmitted by heredity—these are the principal questions discussed in this book. Dr. Magnan has written a short preface to the work, in which he very accurately defines its main subject. "At a time," he says, "in which the ravages caused by alcohol are claiming universal attention; in which the problems relating to heredity in mental diseases, give rise to such lively discussions, it is indeed profitable to ask oneself, how, when found together, these elements react upon each other, and what clinical product is the outcome of their morbid combination." M. Legrain's work, therefore, is that of a purely clinical practitioner, who does not investigate the processes of hereditary transmission, but simply establishes and verifies the same. He describes the apparent morbid phenomena, he draws up tables, furnishes statistics, and in this way exhibits the external aspects of a problem which the embryologist studies in its internal conditions.

M. Coste is one of our best economists. His enlightened and judicious mind seems to foster an innate taste for precision and clearness Reared in the doctrines of Comte, and familiar with problems of moral psychology, he proclaims his intention of "reconciling Economical Science with the Positive Philosophy," without dissembling the fact, that many of his fellow-workers may regard his excellent intention as simply "abominable."

To M. Coste political economy "should be a method of work and of observation, rather than a repertory of ready-made conclusions for the use of indolent minds." The author has sought a "philosophical direction,"—a philosophical method of procedure,—and he does not lay claim to a "definitive science."

In his book, it serves our purpose especially to observe, that he integrates the idea of evolution in the study of economical facts. This is the study, he maintains, of one of the functions of the social organism—functions that are interdependent and evolved together in the course of history; a fact, however, which does not prevent their being treated apart.

He accepts four great series of facts: *tutorial* functions with the family as the initial and mutuality as the final stage; *economical* functions, starting from domestic and leading to political economy; the *civic* functions, at first assuming the form of militarism, but finally that of law; and, lastly, *doctrinal* functions that lead from religion to science. The evolution of economics as displayed to our view in his book, consists, accordingly, in the progressive transmutation of domestic economy,—based upon work and saving,—into political economy, founded on exchange and credit. Still,—and this is another noticeable point,—according to M. Coste's view, neither mutuality nor political economy nor law nor science can absolutely replace the family, domestic economy, militarism, and religion. The advent of a new state of things does not abolish the previous state, but, rather, subordinates the one to the other.

* Publisher: Octave Doin.

† Publishers: Alcan et Guillemain.

There remains to mention the recent discontinuance of a small local review, *La Critique Philosophique*, founded some twenty years ago by M. Renouvier, to be the organ of a Neo Kantian doctrine, with which his name will remain associated. *La Critique Philosophique* disappears, just as, in 1883, the *Philosophie Positive* vanished—a journal shortly before founded by M. Littré. The fate of these *revues fermées*—exclusive reviews—seems to have wholly depended upon the fortunes of their respective founders. M. Renouvier, now old and ailing, is still a notable personality in our midst; as a philosopher, he has chiefly been a dialectician. The breaking up of a philosophical group, even so small as that which he had formed, is not an entirely insignificant fact; such events, indeed, have their significance in the intellectual history of an epoch, and of a country. Homage is due to sincere masters, even on the part of those who are not among their followers!

In conclusion I must apologize for the present lack of material, But several important works are said to be in course of publication, and the list of the next quarter promises, by way of compensation, to be much more crowded than is usual.

PARIS, January, 1890. LUCIEN ARREAT.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE RETURN OF THE NEGROES TO AFRICA.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

MR. FREDERICK MAY HOLLAND has replied to my article on the proposed removal of the African race, in the United States, to Africa, citing various objections to such a course. These objections are well known to the present writer. He is not a Democrat in politics, and was in the days of slavery, and still is, of anti-slavery opinions. He appreciates the amiable traits of the African, and on the ground of personal convenience prefers him as a servant to most representatives of the white race He does not forget his great services during the war to both the South and the North. He is aware that no citizen can be banished under the constitution on account of race or color, nor does he lay any stress on the matter of color. Many of the eastern representatives of the Indo-European race are black, and some of the African negroes are very light. It is a question of race, and not of color.

But all this is subordinate to two questions which are, as it seems to the present writer, of much greater importance, especially to a nation living under a republican form of government. These questions I have stated to be: 1st, that of negro rule; and 2d, that of negro mixture of race.

When a man has a service to perform to his kind, it is essential that he shall observe the physical conditions which are necessary to the performance of it. A teacher or preacher who should so live as to be in continual ill health, could not be said to be performing his duty. A judge, attorney, or member of congress who should eat or drink himself sick as a habit, would not long retain his position.

The people of the United States have to show mankind how order may be conserved consistently with the greatest amount of personal liberty. This we think is accomplished under our form of government. But all races are not equally capable of sustaining this relation between order and freedom. In fact, what we know as the inferior races, the Mongolian and African, have never made successful attempts to sustain republican forms of government. The negro has conspicuously failed in all but absolute governments, whatever they may be in name. It is not certain that all the white race are capable of self-government at present. The neighboring so-called republic of Mexico is really a military despotism, although I believe that the material for a republic is there, and that at some future day that country will be in fact what it is now only in name.

The United States have made laws excluding the Chinese from our country. We have assumed the right to do this for our own protection. On the whole, the present writer approves of these laws, although some of reasons assigned in support of them are not good, and the maltreatment of particular Chinese is a stain on the name of our country.

Many nations have at different periods of history removed parts of their populations outside of their borders for various reasons. It has seldom, if ever occurred, so far as I know, that an equivalent for loss of property was granted in such cases, and as is proposed in the case of the removal of the American negroes to Africa.

Whatever reasons may have existed, or do exist, for the removal of particular peoples, or the exclusion of particular races from any country, they exist with ten-fold force in the case of the negroes of the United States. In no country having a republican form of government, has the lowest race of mankind been found dwelling with the highest. The case is a new one, and demands some independence of thought for its treatment. So-called human rights appear to come into conflict with questions of physical fact or law. The pure idealist will sustain the former, in spite of the latter; but the wise man knows that he must bow to the latter, and acts accordingly. It seems hard to the idealist that inequalities between men exist, yet they do exist and appear to work injustice. But we cannot help it.

I will not discuss again the mental status of the black race. It is well known except to those who will not see. The ability to weave and raise crops does not make a man just or rational, or free him from degrading vices and maddening superstitions. As to race mixture, Mr. Holland is a trifle prejudiced in his remarks. The inferior race has never been known to resist the attractions of the superior, to any great extent, so far as I am aware; least of all, the negro. If Mr. Holland doubts the certainty of race-mixture, let him read history, or better, visit all countries where different races come in contact. The white race of the European coasts of the Mediterranean have not been benefited by their mixture with the African races, and these latter were and are superior to our negroes.

The reasons why the American negroes object to being returned to Africa are self-evident. As beneficiaries of a civilized nation, they have their rights better protected than they would have under a government of their own race. It must not be forgotten that much of their orderly and "peaceable" conduct is due to this fact. When left to themselves they are not distinguished for those qualities. They enjoy here the use of the numberless inventions made by the white race. They have the advantage of intellectual and ethical instructions controlled by them. These advantages are offset to a small degree by the outrageous treatment they too often receive from a degraded type of white men in the south, whom the southern authorities are not sufficiently active in bringing to justice.

I may be wrong, but I do not believe that our country ought to incur the risks incident to the existence of such a body of such a race in its midst. It is simply a question of self-preservation far more urgent than that presented by the Chinese question. The preferences of the negroes themselves must be in this case disregarded. In fact, the only natural right they have in the matter is to demand to be returned to Africa, from which their ancestors were carried against their own consent. The supposition that the South is not adapted for white labor will not bear examination. The negroes can be spared, and their place will be speedily filled with whites.

It is, however, difficult to convey to the general reader the seriousness of the difficulty as it appears to the student of species-characters in body and mind. The conclusion to be drawn from the facts is, that whatever of future progress the negro may have

before him, it will take so long before he has reached the capacity to stand alone as competent for self-government, that we cannot take the risk of his presence here. Let him work out his own salvation without risking the future of the Indo-European. If he is so capable as some persons believe, it will do him no harm. If he succeeds no better in the future than he has in the past, he will not surprise some who think they know him better.

E. D. COPE.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb., 1890.

THE NEGRO QUESTION.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

THE state of public opinion sixty years ago on the question of Negro Emigration is brought vividly to my mind by some remarks upon the subject in THE OPEN COURT, of February 6th.

The writer is mistaken when he says that the negro population of the country were largely opposed to emigration. The negro at the North had not at that time any distinctive influence, either in number or opinions, upon the ideas of the day, but ranged themselves in the lists of William Lloyd Garrison, at that time the Editor of the *Liberator*, published in the city of Boston.

Mr. Garrison, with whom I subsequently became well acquainted, was a mild-spoken gentleman in social life, a trait that formed a great contrast to his vehement, vituperative editorials as they appeared week by week in the *Liberator*.

At that time Liberia had for Governor John Russworm, a mulatto of superior intelligence, warmly upheld by the Colonization Society, of which Mr. Gusney was President, and B. B. Thatcher, poet and lecturer, was Secretary. The colored people, whatever they may have since become, were supinely indifferent to the movements made in relation to them, few attending meetings called together where their interests were at stake, and only one, Mr. Raymond (accent on last syllable), a half-breed, warmly supported by Wendell Phillips, ever pleading orally for his people.

It was not the negro who was opposed to emigration, but such men as Garrison and George Thomson, of England. B. B. Thatcher presented the views of the Colonization Society and the growing value of the Liberian Colony, in eloquent and fervid oratory. He voiced the cultured and far-seeing ideas of statesmen and philanthropists, while the Abolitionists were looked upon as fanatics, and the negro stood between the two like the animal between the two bundles of hay.

If we except a few members of their race, the negro has never wasted his abundant sensuality upon any questions of race improvement. Toussaint L'Overture was a great man, despite of race, and Count Timines, who was in this country just before the opening of the Civil War, was a man of elegant culture, educated in Paris, and holding brave hopes for the emancipation of Hayti, which was the limit of his world, and he wrote a history of it, describing the terrible war of races, which has deluged that lovely island with blood.

The negro has never made endeavors to attain dominion or power. The negro has never made a start for liberty. Liberty has been thrust upon him,—and he receives it without dignity, uttering complaints and making statements known to be false, with constant appeals to northern sympathy.

It may be Utopian to think of removing six millions of people to Africa, but once let emigration turn that way, and Africa will be remunerated for the wrong we have done her. We wrenched from her a sensual, ignorant, barbarous population, and we return thither a people with civilized instincts, and it is to be hoped with aspirations that may help the dark continent to wipe out her old pagan barbarism, cruelty, and sensuality, by creating in them the hope of culture and the intimations of Empire.

ELIZABETH OAKES SMITH.

HOLLYWOOD, N. C., Feb. 12, 1890.

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5 Boylston Place, BOSTON, MASS.

BOOK NOTICES.

"*The Daily News* (Chicago) Almanac and Political Register" for 1890, which we have just received, contains much valuable statistical information. (Price 25 cents.)

The Truth Seeker has put the following questions to leading liberals: (1) Is there an affirmative, positive, constructive side to Freethought? (2) If not, the reason why? (3) If there be, in what, in your opinion, does it consist and in what should it consist? Replies have been received from many prominent freethinkers; a great many, also, have promised to reply. The publication of the articles was begun in the number of Feb. 8th.

The *National Reformer* (London) of December 29, 1889, publishes a paper recently read by Mr. J. H Ellis at Soirée of the Liberal Social Union, entitled "Is Thinking Possible Without Words," a copy of which we have received. Mr. Ellis analyzes Prof. Max Müller's theory, and from a review of the philosophy of Lewes and others arrives at the conclusion that it is improper to restrict thought to the sense adopted by Prof. Müller. Reasoning, Mr. Ellis contends, is a *process*; the product or result of reasoning may be a thought expressed in words *or* an action; consequently words are not necessary to thinking proper, of which there are various degrees.

AMERICAN

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A WEEKLY PERIODICAL.

W. H. GARRISON, Editor.

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